On the core and Walrasian expectations equilibrium in infinite dimensional commodity spaces
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Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA), Munich University
Abstract
In this paper, we establish two different characterizations of Walrasian expectations allocations by the veto power of the grand coalition in an asymmetric information economy having finitely many agents and states of nature and whose commodity space is a Banach lattice. The first one deals with Aubin non-dominated allocations, and the other claims that an allocation is a Walrasian expectations allocation if and only if it is not privately dominated by the grand coalition, by considering perturbations of the original initial endowments in precise directions.Description
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Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35060/MPRA Paper No. 35060, posted 28. November 2011 03:55 UTC
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