What Is Strength?
| aut.relation.endpage | 34 | |
| aut.relation.issue | 1 | |
| aut.relation.journal | Metaphysics | |
| aut.relation.startpage | 22 | |
| aut.relation.volume | 9 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Kind, Adrian | |
| dc.contributor.author | Veit, Walter | |
| dc.contributor.author | Heffernan, Conor | |
| dc.contributor.author | Helms, Eric | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-08-11T00:24:20Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2026-08-06 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We argue that physical strength is best understood, in philosophical terms, as the general agentive ability to exercise difficult physical effort. We develop this claim by examining the historically developed and paradigmatic test of overall strength: the sport of Strongman/woman. We identify the understanding of strength embedded in this sport and show how contemporary philosophical accounts of agentive ability capture its main features. Finally, we argue that Strongman/woman competitions are already well designed for assessing strength. By balancing the trade-offs involved in quantitative measurement, they provide a robust interdisciplinary tool for strength assessment. | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Metaphysics, ISSN: 2515-8279 (Print), Ubiquity Press, Ltd., 9(1), 22-34. doi: 10.5334/met.267 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.5334/met.267 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 2515-8279 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10292/21741 | |
| dc.language | en | |
| dc.publisher | Ubiquity Press, Ltd. | |
| dc.relation.uri | https://metaphysicsjournal.com/articles/10.5334/met.267 | |
| dc.rights | CC Attribution 4.0 | |
| dc.rights | © 2026 The Author(s). This is an Open Access article. | |
| dc.rights.accessrights | OpenAccess | |
| dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | |
| dc.subject | 5003 Philosophy | |
| dc.subject | Strength | |
| dc.subject | Ability | |
| dc.subject | Effort | |
| dc.subject | Strength sport | |
| dc.subject | Strongman | |
| dc.title | What Is Strength? | |
| dc.type | Journal Article | |
| pubs.elements-id | 770924 |
