CEO Marital Status and Insider Trading
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Journal Article
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Elsevier
Abstract
We investigate the association between the chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) marital status and their tendency to profit from insider trading. We argue that marriage can constrain CEOs’ opportunistic behaviour, which could increase litigation risk and show that married CEOs earn lower future abnormal profits compared to unmarried CEOs. We also find that married CEOs are less likely to engage in opportunistic trades and earn lower insider trading profits among firms with weaker corporate governance and those with higher information asymmetry. Our empirical results remain robust after accounting for several endogeneity tests.Description
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S&P Global Market Intelligence Research Paper Series. British Journal of Management. https://www.ssrn.com/ http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3991991
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