Infinite dimensional mixed economies with asymmetric information
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Bhowmik, A
Cao, J
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Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA), Munich University
Abstract
In this paper, we study asymmetric information economies consisting of both non-negligible and negligible agents and having ordered Banach spaces as their commodity spaces. In answering a question of Hervés-Beloso and Moreno-García in [17], we establish a characterization of Walrasian expectations allocations by the veto power of the grand coalition. It is also shown that when an economy contains only negligible agents a Vind's type theorem on the private core with the exact feasibility can be restored. This solves a problem of Pesce in [20].
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Asymmetric information, Exactly feasible, Ex-post core, Mixed economy, NY-fine core, NY-private core, Robustly efficient allocation, NY-strong fine core, RW-fine core, Walrasian expectations allocation
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Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35618/MPRA Paper No. 35618, posted 28. December 2011 / 23:48
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