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dc.contributor.authorSirota, Len_NZ
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-26T00:09:28Z
dc.date.available2019-09-26T00:09:28Z
dc.date.copyright2017en_NZ
dc.identifier.citationDPCE Online, [S.l.], v. 31, n. 3, oct. 2017. ISSN 2037-6677. Available at: <http://www.dpceonline.it/index.php/dpceonline/article/view/436>.
dc.identifier.issn2037-6677en_NZ
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10292/12856
dc.description.abstractConstitutions can be seen either as defensive mechanisms for protecting liberty, as suggested by the metaphor of entrenchment, or as weapons to eliminate injustice, as suggested by the metaphor of striking down unconstitutional legislation. In his statement on originalism in support of then-Judge Gorsuch’s appointment to the Supreme Court of the United States, Lawrence Solum eloquently defends the former, defensive view, and argues that originalist interpretation is more consonant with it than living constitutionalism. This comment supports Professor Solum’s position by reference to some Canadian cases in which living constitutionalism could have been, has arguably been, or may well become a source of danger to the rights and liberties of citizens.
dc.publisherDPCE
dc.relation.urihttp://www.dpceonline.it/index.php/dpceonline/article/view/436en_NZ
dc.rightsThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
dc.subjectCanada; Constitutional interpretation; Living constitutionalism; Originalism
dc.titleMore v Roper: A Comment on Lawrence Solum’s Defence of Originalismen_NZ
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.rights.accessrightsOpenAccessen_NZ
aut.relation.endpage645
aut.relation.issue3en_NZ
aut.relation.startpage635
aut.relation.volume31en_NZ
pubs.elements-id315598
aut.relation.journalDiritto pubblico comparato ed europeo Onlineen_NZ


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