Understanding Shareholder Class Actions from an Agency Theory Perspective: A Comparative Analysis of Shareholder Class Actions and Class Action Regimes in Australia, the United Kingdom and Aotearoa New Zealand
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The class action is a procedural mechanism that enables multiple claimants to pursue a single defendant for the same wrong that arises out of substantively the same question or questions of law or fact. It has been long-identified as an important mechanism for improving access to justice. In common-law jurisdictions such as New Zealand, the class-action procedure emanates from England’s Court of Chancery in the late 17th and early 18th centuries. In modern times, class-action regimes now vary considerably in form from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For instance, in Australia class actions are governed by statute at both a Federal and State level. In New Zealand, class-action litigants currently pursue class actions under procedural rules that are becoming increasingly ill-fitting, particularly with the increasing prominence of the litigation-funding industry and high-profile shareholder class-action litigation such as “Feltex”, which only concluded in 2019, after 11 years in court. In December 2020, the New Zealand Law Commission initiated an investigation into the class-action and litigation funding regimes in New Zealand. In June 2022, the Commission released the outcome of that investigation, recommending that New Zealand adopt a statutory class-action regime akin to Australia’s. This paper examines and compares the class-action regimes in three jurisdictions, Australia, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand to determine what procedural settings will best ensure class actions are an accessible and cost-effective mechanism for shareholders to enforce their rights. It will explore the theoretical justification for shareholder class actions from an “Agency Theory” perspective. The class-action regimes presently in place in each jurisdiction will then be assessed and following this, shareholder class-action experiences in each jurisdiction will be analysed. Finally, the Law Commission’s recommendations regarding a statutory class-action regime will be assessed against the findings of this analysis. It concludes that the Law Commission’s recommendations will go a long way in improving access to justice for litigant in New Zealand’s, particularly shareholders; however, more could be done to break down barriers to justice through the class-action procedure. This paper recommends further changes to the Companies Act 1993 to enable shareholders to pursue class actions specifically for breaches of that Act. Further, enabling “bespoke” class-action proceedings which allow determination of preliminary legal or factual issues could result in savings in time and financial costs to the betterment of claimants. The conclusions in this paper emphasise the need for further discussion for continued and wider class-action reform in New Zealand.
