An Analysis of Penalty Kick Behaviour
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This thesis examines the penalty kick game within a behavioural game theory context to better understand the decision making rationale behind players’ actions. There is currently debate to the existence of goalkeeper ‘Action Bias’ where goalkeepers are shown to dive to the sides rather than staying in the centre, even when staying in the centre more often may be strategically optimal. This research examines the dataset collected by (Bar-Eli et al., 2007) where the researchers find evidence for action bias. This thesis formally parametrises and models action bias, which has not been done before in previous research. This thesis also explores logit best responding through the use of the Quantal Response Equilibrium framework to test if bounded rationality better corresponds to real world play as opposed to perfect rationality assumed under the commonly used Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium framework. This research finds evidence of action bias within the primary dataset and that the inclusion of action bias within specified payoffs along with bounded rationality provide the most explanatory power out of all the models tested. Supplementary testing finds no evidence for behavioural heterogeneity. The penalty kick game cannot be treated as a singular homogeneous game across all observations, and all results must be treated as dataset dependent. This research finds there is evidence of goalkeeper action bias within the primary dataset as well as evidence that players are shown to not be acting as perfectly rational utility maximisers.
