Bhowmik, ACao, J2012-01-112012-01-112011-12-282011-12-28Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35618/MPRA Paper No. 35618, posted 28. December 2011 / 23:48https://hdl.handle.net/10292/3259In this paper, we study asymmetric information economies consisting of both non-negligible and negligible agents and having ordered Banach spaces as their commodity spaces. In answering a question of Hervés-Beloso and Moreno-García in [17], we establish a characterization of Walrasian expectations allocations by the veto power of the grand coalition. It is also shown that when an economy contains only negligible agents a Vind's type theorem on the private core with the exact feasibility can be restored. This solves a problem of Pesce in [20].All papers reproduced by permission. Reproduction and distribution subject to the approval of the copyright owners.Asymmetric informationExactly feasibleEx-post coreMixed economyNY-fine coreNY-private coreRobustly efficient allocationNY-strong fine coreRW-fine coreWalrasian expectations allocationCommissioned ReportOpenAccess