

The Price of Lasting Peace:

A Two-Pronged Analysis of the Development Causes of Political Violence in the Bangsamoro Conflict

A thesis submitted to the Auckland University of Technology in fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Social Sciences

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May 2017

Abstract

Like other developing nations, the Philippines has a long history of internal strife, especially in Mindanao where the Bangsamoro (Moro Nation) separatist struggle has extracted immense human and economic costs over the past five decades. Social science can offer a rich empirical understanding of the causes of these continued outbreaks of political violence in order to better inform policy responses and preventive measures.

This thesis examines the Bangsamoro conflict in terms of its relationship with economic development. Drawing on the grievance perspective derived from the cross-country civil war literature, it posits that political violence occurs disproportionately in areas with low levels of economic development. This overarching hypothesis is then tested using multidimensional indicators of development to include measures of social and material well-being and effective governance and service delivery.

It then conducts a two-pronged analysis of the causes of conflict. Factors associated with the incidence of political violence, operationally defined as armed clashes between government troops and rebel groups, are first examined using statistical analysis. Specifically, it applies regression analysis to the 2011-2015 Bangsamoro Conflict Monitoring System (BCMS) dataset to identify correlates of the incidence of political violence in municipalities of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), the epicentre of the Moro insurgency. Meanwhile, a process-tracing analysis adds a qualitative layer to the empirical findings by underlining the causal mechanisms that have appeared to either hinder or facilitate violence across two municipal-level case studies.

The quantitative findings show that political violence tends to be more frequent in municipalities where local governments are weak, access to particular social services are poor, and people are deprived of economic means such as education and land. Meanwhile, the qualitative findings explain the relationship found between underdevelopment and political violence in terms of the failure of the Philippine State and its local institutions to address these issues of underdevelopment, resulting in the erosion of legitimate authority on the ground and people's receptivity to rebel alternatives. Taken together, the findings lead to an overarching conclusion that strengthening local government and governance practices is essential to consolidating peace in the region.

This thesis underscores that threat of Moro separatism in the Philippines is not just simply an issue of religious/ethnic ideology, but perhaps more importantly of local governance and development.

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
List of Acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AIC	Akaike Information Criterion
ARMM	Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group
BCMS	Bangsamoro Conflict Monitoring System
BDA	Bangsamoro Development Authority
BDP	Bangsamoro Development Plan
BIC	Bayesian Information Criterion
BIFF	Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
BMLO	Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization
CAFGU	Civilian Auxiliary Forces Geographical Units
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CPH	Census of the Population and Housing
CVE	Community Visioning Exercise
CVO	Civilian Volunteer Officers
DILG	Department of Interior and Local Government
FAB	Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro
GPF	Galing Pook Foundation
HDN	Human Development Network
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
LCHR	Lawyers Committee for Human Rights
LGPMs	Local Government Performance Management System
LGU	Local Government Unit
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MIM	Muslim Independence Movement
MPC	Mindanao Peoples' Caucus
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
MSVG	Multi-stakeholder Validation Group
NAPC	National Anti-Poverty Commission
NBRM	Negative Binomial Regression Model
NCPAG	National College of Public Administration and Governance
NDCP	National Defense College of the Philippines

NEDA	National Economic Development Authority
NSC	National Security Council
OGRP	Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
PCID	Philippine Center for Islam and Democracy
PIA	Philippine Information Agency
PSA	Philippine Statistical Authority
RAF	Ramon Aboitiz Foundation
SIT	Social Identity Theory
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
ZIP	Zero-Inflated Poisson

Attestation of Authorship

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person (except where explicitly defined in the acknowledgements), nor material which to a substantial extent has been submitted for the award of any other degree or diploma of a university or other institution of higher learning.



Segfrey Dayao Gonzales

Acknowledgements

If there is anything I have learned in pursuing my research topic, it is that there is a lot left to learn and, more importantly, to do about the Moro people's plight for the Philippines to become a truly peaceful and unified state. It is my fervent hope that research on the Bangsamoro conflict would not cease and Filipino students would continue to be immersed in the topic. The very least that we can do is to keep the conversation going and the empirical information flowing.

This thesis would not have been possible without the wealth of institutions and individuals who generously shared their knowledge, time, and resources for the completion of this research project.

My foremost appreciation goes to my primary supervisor, Dr Kate Nicholls, who graciously devoted many hours in consultation meetings and reviewing multiple drafts of this thesis. Her advice has been extremely helpful and constructive. I could not have completed this thesis without her personal attention, thoughtful recommendations, and constant patience throughout the year. I could not simply wish for a better supervisor.

I would also like to extend my sincerest thanks to my secondary supervisor, Dr Erik Landhuis, who shared his insights on the technical aspect of this thesis.

I am personally indebted to the International Alert Philippines, the National Economic Development Authority, the Philippine Statistical Authority, and the Bureau of Local Government Supervision for providing the raw data used in this thesis.

My deepest gratitude goes to the New Zealand Government for generously supporting my education in awe-inspiring Aotearoa. Thank you very much for giving us scholars Philippa, Sacha, Marg, Ruth and the rest of the very dedicated scholarship team who took excellent care of us.

My two years at the Auckland University of Technology have truly been a worthwhile and very rewarding journey. During this time, I have gotten to know friends who have made my student experience more fun than usual. Special mention goes to Jennifer, Koleta, and Stanley. See you in two years!

Ad maiorem Dei gloriam

Chapter 1

The Ghosts of the Conflict Past, Present, and Yet to Come

I fear you [Ghost of Christmas Yet to Come] more than any spectre I have seen. But as I know your purpose is to do me good, I am prepared to bear you company.

Ebenezer Scrooge, *A Christmas Carol*

Introduction

Mindanao, the southernmost major island group of the Philippines, has been afflicted with a separatist conflict for almost half a century. The calculated consequences of political violence are staggering and disheartening at the same time. Based on the estimate by Schiavo-Campo and Judd (2005), the country has sustained a total economic cost amounting to USD 2-3 billion since the eruption of the conflict. This estimate could easily skyrocket if other social costs, such as increased displacement, poverty, and criminality; weakened agricultural productivity and investment climate; and disruption of social services were included in the equation. Notwithstanding these material losses, political violence emanating from the

conflict has claimed 100,000 to 150,000 lives—the rebels sustained half of which while the other half is further divided between government troops and civilians.

The armed discord, henceforth referred to as the ‘Bangsamoro conflict’, or put more simply, the conflict has been fought between the Moro people and the Philippine Government troops. Mindanaoan Muslims who choose to identify themselves as *Moro*, rather than Filipinos, contend that the *Bangsamoro* (Moro Nation) has never been part of the Philippines. Their fight for independence from the Philippine State is a continuation of their ancestors’ resistance to Spanish and American colonisation. On the other hand, the Philippine Government regards the conflict as an act of separatism from the sovereign state that duly commands international recognition and a territorial jurisdiction demarcated according to international laws.

Underlying the competing banners of self-determination and preservation of the state’s territorial integrity, however, are unaddressed demands for socioeconomic development and state failure in the area of local governance and egalitarian social service delivery, which characterise the political economy of the Bangsamoro conflict (Buendia, 2005; Edillon, 2005; Magdalena, 1977; Özerdem, Podder, & Quitoriano, 2010). A number of qualitative analysts suggest that the internecine violence emanates from these developmental and governance failures (e.g., Buendia, 2006; Concepcion, Digal, Guiam, De La Rosa, & Stankovitch, 2003; Magdalena, 1977; Santos, 2005). One explanation supporting such a supposed relationship is that the impact of these obstinate conditions on the conflict is sharpened by the Philippines’ colonial history, being reminiscent of the marginalisation and exploitation experienced by the Moro people during the Spanish and American domination (Magdalena, 1977). They evoke a perception of ‘internal colonialism’ that fuels resentment against the mainstream political system (Rupprecht, 2014). These contemporary analyses confirm that economic development, or rather, the lack of it, has become intimately associated with the protraction of violence.

Recalling the Philippines’ colonial past, Islam provided an avenue for the different ethnic groups to commune based on shared misfortunes and resentments against the colonial

governments and the Christianised Filipino majority. From this common ground, the concept of Moro identity sprouted, which has provided the ideological cornerstone to the separatist movement. Against this backdrop, economic-based accounts are presented as a departure from the supposed ethnoreligious basis of the conflict (e.g., Buendia, 2006; Lara & Champain, 2009; Podder, 2012; Rupprecht, 2014). Analysts tend to de-emphasise the role of ethnoreligious identity, albeit from different standpoints, to reinforce its economic-based counterparts.

Rupprecht (2014) considers socioeconomic grievances and inequitable development and modernisation as the material root causes of Moro separatism. On the other hand, the factor of identity had only been evident during the emergence of separatism, an observation also noted by Brown (2008) and Kerkvliet (2010). Buendia (2005, p. 131), meanwhile, perceives the malleability of the Moro identity to its politico-economic environment:

Although ethnic identities and affinities can serve as one's refuge when the primordial culture of Moros is threatened by the state's domineering power, the sense of Moros' separateness as a people can be altered or modified. Perceptions are neither fixed nor permanent. They change as material conditions change; identities and communal interests also change and are equally malleable and pliant as they interact with the power of the state. A dialectical relationship exists between one's perceptions and the actual situation or socioeconomic and political setting where one belongs. Perceptions and conditions do influence and transform each other.

Lara and Champain (2009) observe that ethnoreligious discourses are utilised to disguise governance failures, especially at times when local governments are poorly performing under the control of Moro elites or the rebels themselves. Such narratives from the Moro leadership, in turn, are the primary reason why many analysts are fixated on the ideological aspects of the conflict (Kerkvliet, 2010). The case study by Podder (2012) on the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) reveals that the legitimising and mobilising influence of the Moro ideology represents a decline in the Bangsamoro conflict. What is striking about the study is that the diminishing significance of ethnoreligious identity is attributed to the MILF's waning

capability to provide public services such as security and Madrassa schooling¹ and paid work from soldiering and community policing.

Nonetheless, many observers still reckon that the conflict is based on a Moro nationalist ideology (Kerkvliet, 2010; Lara & Champain, 2009). While acknowledging the hand of social and economic exclusion in the conflict, Vitug and Gloria (2000, p. 112) also report that “some Muslims join armed groups, like the MILF, in the name of jihad. It inspires them to sacrifice their lives for the cause of religion. Moreover, it gives them an identity, a status, social support and a purpose in life.” The accounts gathered by Özerdem et al. (2010) from interviews confirm that the same range of motivations applies to a portion of Muslim youth who joined the MILF.

What is crucial about these ideology-based narratives is that they are used to bolster positions that favour the creation of a Bangsamoro that is independent of the Philippine State (e.g., Wadi, 2008). On the other hand, Kerkvliet (2010) maintains that if the conflict is more about economic deprivation and exploitation than Moro nationalism, there is a reason to reconsider the ideological branding of the conflict. A change in labelling would have palpable impacts on how the Philippine Government handles the conflict and future frameworks for the peace process. Scholars, especially development-oriented analysts, make a contention between economic and ideological explanations of the conflict. Beyond the dialogue over the Bangsamoro conflict, however, its consequences are real.

The general purpose of this thesis is to gain a better understanding of the Bangsamoro conflict by investigating the relationship between the instances of political violence attendant on the conflict and various indicators of social and economic welfare and effective local governance and service delivery, collectively referred to as ‘economic development complex’, that are causally related to intrastate peace (Holtermann, 2013). In this regard, this thesis argues that political violence occurs disproportionately in areas with low levels of economic

¹ Madrassa is a term for a religious school or college for the study of the Islamic religion, culture, and practices.

development. While having such a focus, it also considers in the analysis the role of ethnoreligious identity, which serves as the cornerstone of the so-called Moro ideology.

This introductory chapter is organised into three major sections. The first section traces the historical antecedents of the Bangsamoro conflict. A review of the history of the conflict harking back to the country's colonial period is aimed at familiarising the readers with the basis of Moro ideology and struggle. The second section describes the beginning of the contemporary Bangsamoro conflict and the actual political and economic settings surrounding the conflict. The third section provides an overview of the thesis to follow.

Ghost of the Conflict Past: The Historical Context of the Bangsamoro Separatist Identity

The Moro people are the Muslim minority of the Mindanao Islands in the southern Philippines. Their lineage can be traced to the traditional inhabitants of Mindanao who converted to Islam as Arab traders/missionaries spread the faith across the region during the 14th century (Montiel, Rodil, & de Guzman, 2012). They coexist with other two major groupings of Mindanao peoples: the *Lumads* or the non-Islamised indigenous peoples, and the Christian migrant majority (Concepcion et al., 2003; Montiel et al., 2012).

Islam is the linchpin of the Moro identity's very existence. It is impossible to separate Islam from the Moro psyche and nationhood (Baddiri, 2005), an outcome of the Islamisation of Mindanao that had taken place over two centuries before the Spanish colonisers even reached the Philippine shores. Independent sultanates with common practices, laws, and systems of governance were established by Islamic tradition (Bangsamoro Development Authority/BDA, 2015). These Muslim communities weaved a unifying identity based on Islamic principles, which intensified amidst colonial Spain's atrocities and attempts to obliterate their way of life. By the time the American colonisers arrived, shared identity and common history had already forged these communities into a nation (Baddiri, 2005). The Moro identity would also prove to be distinct from the would-be mainstream Filipino identity that resulted from the 333-year process of Christianising the locals (Buendia, 2005; Montiel

et al., 2012). Note, however, that all the original inhabitants of the Philippines—Moro people, Christian Filipinos, and other indigenous groups—were of the same Malay race; before Islam and Christianity, they had a sense of common origins (Gowing, 1982).

The existence of an alternative community whose identity opposes that of the dominating state typically characterises separatism (Rupprecht, 2014). In the case of the Bangsamoro conflict, some analysts maintain that the ongoing tension has been between the Moro identity and the so-called mainstream Filipino identity and that religion separates these two identities (Baddiri, 2005; Özerdem et al., 2010; Rupprecht, 2014). There is a historical antecedent for such a narrative. The divide-and-rule strategy implemented by the Spanish colonisers resulted in sustained animosity between the Moro people and the Christianised Filipinos or *Indios* (Buendia, 2006; Montiel et al., 2012; Rodil, 2003). The Spaniards ascribed the collective Moro (Moor) to Muslim Filipinos, alluding to the Muslim inhabitants of the Iberian Peninsula.² They strategically contrived negative connotations around the term to incite hatred and mistrust among the Christianised Filipinos toward their Muslim brethren. They referred to the Muslims as *Moro piratas* (Moro pirates) and their offensives as *guerras piraticas* (war against the pirates); on the other hand, the Muslims engaged in these wars to protect their faith, territories, and constituencies (Baddiri, 2005; Montiel et al., 2012). Prejudice against Moro people among the Christianised Filipinos was also reinforced through regular performances of the *Moro-Moro*, a theatrical play that recaptured the triumph of the Christian ‘heroes’ over the Muslim ‘villains’ during the *Reconquista*³ (Buendia, 2006; Montiel et al., 2012). Nonetheless, the fact that the Spaniards drafted Christianised Filipino soldiers to fight their war with the Muslims created most of the animosities between the two groups in the Philippines. This outlook remains relevant to the conflict to this day, according to some analysts (e.g., Baddiri, 2005; Montiel et al., 2012; Özerdem et al., 2010). The memory of the *Indios* collaborating with the Spaniards was etched on the Moro people’s

² Iberian Peninsula is a territory principally divided between Spain and Portugal.

³ Reconquista was the series of campaigns by Christian states to recapture territory from the Muslims who had occupied most of the Iberian Peninsula in the early 8th century.

consciousness and was passed on to the generations that followed (Baddiri, 2005; Montiel et al., 2012).

In the end, the Spaniards were unsuccessful in subjugating the Moro people (Buendia, 2006; Montiel et al., 2012). The colonisation and conversion of the neighbouring islands of Luzon and Visayas, however, created a majority of Christian Filipinos that would later define the mainstream Filipino identity (Buendia, 2005; Montiel et al., 2012). The sporadic offensives by the Spaniards also rendered the Moro people economically and politically weakened (Montiel et al., 2012). The Americans, who became the country's second colonial invader in 1898, effectively took advantage of this vulnerability to conquer the Moro people and territories (Rodil, 2003). The Moro people's quest to establish their sovereign state had formally started (Buendia, 2005).

The Americans supposedly configured a political system for the Philippines that was based on democracy and liberalism (Buendia, 2006). However, what was portrayed as greater tolerance towards diversity, the Moro people viewed as an undermining of their Islamic identity (Abreu, 2008; Rupprecht, 2014). They saw the integration policies of the Americans as attempts to assimilate the Muslims into the mainstream Philippine society that to them had an incompatible set of culture, laws, and practices (Abreu, 2008; Montiel et al., 2012; Wadi, 2008). Some of these policies resulted in the multifaceted marginalisation of the Moro people (Montiel et al., 2012; Rodil, 2003). The establishment of tribal wards and compulsory public education, for instance, accelerated the process of social integration but side-lined the culture and political systems of the sultanates in the process (Montiel et al., 2012). Nonetheless, two of the most important features of American colonial rule that led to the Moro struggle consisted of the government's land ownership and migration policies, because of their pervasive and palpable consequences to the Moro people's way of life. The American colonial government did not recognise the Moro communal system of land use and distribution nor the land grants issued by the leaders of the non-Christian tribes. In lieu, it implemented the Torrens system of private land ownership that was unfamiliar to the Moro people and other indigenous groups in Mindanao. Christian Filipinos and private

corporations benefited from the new system, at the expense of the local inhabitants; it was coupled with discriminatory land allocation schemes as shown in Table 1-1.

Year	Number of hectares allowed for ownership		
	Christians homesteaders	Non-Christians (Moros and wild tribes)	Corporations
1903	16 ha	(no provision)	1,024 ha
1919	24 ha	10 ha	1,024 ha
1936	16 ha	4 ha	1,024 ha

Table 1-1. Land Allocation Laws during the American Regime

Source: Montiel et al. (2012, p. 76)

Meanwhile, the resettlement policies during the American regime opened vast territories of Mindanao to Christian migrants who were led to believe that they were to occupy public lands (Baddiri, 2005; BDA, 2015; Montiel et al., 2012). For the colonial government, this was a way of creating a support base and neutralising the rebellious peoples in Mindanao (Brown, 2008). In just a few decades after the resettlement law was enacted, the Christians already outnumbered non-Christians in several Mindanao regions, a condition that is observed to this day (Baddiri, 2005; BDA, 2015; Montiel et al., 2012).

Over the years, the imposition of discriminatory land laws contributed to the marginalisation of the Moro people in their homeland. The influx of Christian migrants from Luzon and Visayas, on the other hand, aggravated the situation through attendant social disruptions, competition for resources, and lack of job opportunities, problems which have hardly improved until the present day (Holden and Jacobson 2007). More inflammatory were the serious socioeconomic disparities between the Christian migrants and the Muslim locals ensuing from the marginalisation and minoritisation of the latter (Brown, 2008).

Admittedly, however, the progressive education policies of the Americans fostered a generation of educated elite who were conscious of their Muslim identity (Buendia, 2005). They led a peaceful struggle for independence that began in the 1920s, more than two decades before the American-sponsored Philippine independence. They asserted that Muslim

Mindanao should coexist independently of the would-be Philippine Republic dominated by Christian Filipinos. They proposed to be a sovereign state or a member of the federal government of the United States; being part of the Philippine State was not an option (Buendia, 2005). After the US Congress denied both proposals, however, the Muslim Leaders realigned the Moro identity to coincide with the forthcoming Filipino nation-state. During the 1934 Philippine Constitutional Convention, Muslim delegates urged their confreres to cease from referring to the Muslims of Mindanao as Moro. In lieu, they preferred ‘Mohammedan Filipinos’ (Muslim-Filipinos) as recognition of the Muslim’s membership of the Filipino nation (Abinales, 1998). While some analysts would consider this as “short-sightedness, revisionism and complicity” among the Muslim leadership (Wadi, 2008, p. 30), it also demonstrates the malleability of identity as a cornerstone of the separatist struggle (Buendia, 2006). After the Philippines officially gained independence, the recognition of the hyphenated identity, Muslim-Filipinos had intensified even among the masses until the late 1960s (Buendia, 2005). It was also clear that at that time the Muslim elite did not favour the collective term, Moro, a name given by a foreign aggressor and replete with pejorative connotations. No one could have foretold that the renewal of the separatist claim by their successors would be launched under the banner of Moro identity.

The Ghost of the Conflict Present: The Continued Marginalisation under the Sovereign Philippine State

On 18 March 1968, at least 28 Muslim recruits were summarily executed by their military superiors on the island of Corregidor, an island located at the entrance of Manila Bay in the southwestern part of the Luzon Island (Baddiri, 2005; Banlaoi, 2011; Concepcion et al., 2003). The then government of President Ferdinand Marcos was allegedly training them to conduct a clandestine mission to infiltrate Sabah as a prelude to an invasion (Banlaoi, 2011; Concepcion et al., 2003). Sabah is a territory in Malaysian North Borneo to which the Philippine Government has a claim. Notwithstanding a few congressional hearings, the perpetrators were never brought to justice (Buendia, 2006).

The tragedy that would be marked in Philippine history as the infamous Jabidah Massacre triggered the formation of the first Moro separatist group, the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM). The MIM was short-lived, but its influence on the long-run Moro armed struggle was far-reaching (Yegar, 2002). It was through the MIM that the ideology of ‘Bangsamoroism’ started to develop (Banlaoi, 2011). The manifesto of the MIM declared the independence of Mindanao, Palawan, and Sulu from the Philippine State and the distinctiveness of the Moro identity from the mainstream Filipino identity (Banlaoi, 2011; Yegar, 2002). The socially constructed ideas of Moro nationhood and identity would provide the ideological foundations of several separatist groups which succeeded the MIM (Banlaoi, 2011).

The Jabidah massacre is regarded as the watershed event that broke open the contemporary Moro separatist conflict against the Philippine State (Baddiri, 2005; Banlaoi, 2011; BDA, 2015; Buendia, 2006; Montiel et al., 2012; Rupprecht, 2014; Santos, 2005). The summary execution of the Muslim military trainees created a rallying point for Muslims in the Philippines to express their frustrations with the government’s negligence and contribution to their persisting predicament (Baddiri, 2005; Buendia, 2006; Muslim, 1990).

Succeeding administrations of the Philippine Republic pursued the task of nation-building by continuing America’s program of state-sponsored Christian resettlements to Mindanao (Baddiri, 2005; Concepcion et al., 2003; Montiel et al., 2012). Settlers and private corporations, in turn, took advantage of the prevailing Torrens system and land distribution laws to amass land from the local inhabitants. By the 1950s, it was estimated that 80% of Muslims had no property (Muslim, 1990). Land loss was thus a key issue leading to the outbreak of the conflict in the 1970s (Concepcion et al., 2003; Rupprecht, 2014). Aside from the injustice of land dispossession itself, unaddressed landlessness has been the cause of prevailing poverty and socioeconomic grievances among Muslims in Mindanao (Gutierrez, 2000). Being predominantly an agricultural population, loss of land resulted in considerable degeneration of the Muslims’ standard of living mainly through loss of income and food supply (Concepcion et al., 2003).

The large influx of settlers also drastically changed the Muslim/Christian population ratio in Mindanao. In the 1900s, there were about three Muslims for one Christian in Mindanao; however, this was easily reversed by the turn of the 20th century (Concepcion et al., 2003). Aside from displacement, the demographic shift tells the story of Muslim economic and political marginalisation. It meant steeper competition for resources (particularly land), sources of livelihood, and public services (Concepcion et al., 2003; Magdalena, 1977). When local elections were introduced in the 1950s, the numerical dominance of the settlers made winning hardly possible for traditional Muslim leaders in their hometowns (Montiel et al., 2012). The lack of genuine representation has fed Muslim's perceptions of exclusion from the Philippine political system (Concepcion et al., 2003; Montiel et al., 2012).

Political marginalisation at the local level was reinforced by the centralisation of the Philippine State (Buendia, 2005). National governments failed to convert the region's material wealth into socioeconomic and physical well-being for the locals (Buendia, 2006). On the contrary, their policies have pushed Muslim populations to the margins of socioeconomic and political development (Concepcion et al., 2003). Past national governments, except the 1992-1998 Ramos administration, had never considered the plight of Muslims in Mindanao a priority (Concepcion et al., 2003). Consequently, the discriminatory political order pushed some Muslim leaders to call for self-governance outside of the Philippine system of political administration.

Since the 1970s, there have always been peace negotiations between the Philippine Government and the Moro leaders. Political autonomy, as opposed to formal secession, has been the main item of negotiation right from the beginning (Rupprecht, 2014), but its implementation was challenged by problems emanating from both sides. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) clearly demonstrates this. The ARMM was established by the 1996 Final Peace Agreement between the Philippine Government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLFF), which was ushered in by the downfall of the Marcos dictatorship in 1986 and the recognition of autonomy in Muslim Mindanao in the 1987 Philippine Constitution. In principle, the creation of the ARMM should have accommodated the separatist demands (Rupprecht, 2014), but Former President Benigno

Aquino Jr. himself considered it as “a failed experiment” for “many of the people continue to feel alienated by the system, and those who feel that there is no way out will continue to articulate their grievances through the barrel of a gun” (Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines/OGRP, 2012 para. 3).

While its failure has been attributed to the lack of government commitment and funding (BDA, 2015; Concepcion et al., 2003; Rupprecht, 2014), there are also accounts of institutional inefficiency, poor economic governance, and corruption within the MNLF leadership (Buendia, 2005; Rupprecht, 2014). There are reports that up to 98 percent of the P20 billion ARMM annual budget had gone to personnel services with very little left for capital expenditures (Lopez, 2012). Consequently, the ARMM has been weak in providing the public services and the infrastructure its indigent provinces need (Mendoza, 2012). The factionalisation of the separatist movement during and after peace negotiations has also been a challenge to the autonomy’s viability (Rupprecht, 2014). The failure to empower and uplift the living conditions in the ARMM and other autonomous regions caused disillusionment among breakaway groups such as the MILF (Buendia, 2005).

The Ghost of the Conflict Yet to Come: An Overview of this Thesis

The general purpose of this thesis is to gain a better understanding of the causes of the Bangsamoro conflict by determining the effects of economic underdevelopment on the frequency of political violence in the region. In particular, it seeks to identify predictive variables and corresponding mechanisms that underpin the observed association between low levels of economic development and incidence of political violence in areas consumed by the conflict.

In this regard, the researcher sets the following objectives for this thesis:

- To identify conceptual and measurable definitions of political violence that tie with the Bangsamoro conflict and measures of economic development that theoretically relate to civil conflicts in general, from an in-depth literature review.
- To determine the strength and direction of the relationship between measures of political violence and economic development at the municipal level using regression analysis.
- To provide in-context explanations of the nature and extent of the statistical findings with the aid of the qualitative process-tracing analysis.

Civil conflicts predominantly occur in poverty-stricken countries, so that Sambanis (2002, p. 216) regards them as essentially a “problem of the poor.” While intrastate conflicts result in underdevelopment, which may explain such a global pattern, there is also consensus among scholars that the more important explanation is that conflicts are more likely to erupt in poorer countries (Holtermann, 2013). For example, the Bangsamoro has been one of the poorest regions in the country even before the violent conflict started, implying two important premises: that the continuing poverty in the area cannot be explained by the conflict alone and that economic development provides the best pathway to resolving the conflict (Concepcion et al., 2003).

The theoretical arguments behind this thesis derive mainly from cross-national studies on the determinants of civil war, the predominant approach in the literature. This thesis focuses on factors that may influence community participation in political violence, a period after non-state groups initiated a violent conflict with the government. In this process, the researcher’s engagement with different scholarly disciplines including economics, political science, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and history provides insights on violence in general, which add to understanding the causes of civil conflicts.

In focusing on the civil conflict literature, I consider economic development in a complex and multi-dimensional way, incorporating the material, political, and social well-being of the people. I draw inspiration from one of the most compelling definitions of development by the economic philosopher, Amartya Sen (2001). In relating development to ‘freedom’, Sen expands the notion of development beyond material welfare to encompass political and social well-being. In this light, there are several pathways as to how economic underdevelopment are causally related to violent conflict. This thesis explores three premises that have been influential in the literature. The first theory holds that low economic development creates opportunities for material gains only possible during violent times. The lack of peaceable economic activities makes people turn to illicit ones for income source, which tend to have violent outcomes. Given such a condition, seizing a portion of a region’s natural resources through violent means also becomes a profitable opportunity, and hence, an incentive for participation in collective violence. The second theory is logically plausible given that social and institutional changes go hand in hand with economic development (Holtermann, 2013). It posits that areas with economic underdevelopment tend to have weak government institutions and poorly developed infrastructure, which make rebellion more plausible. Aside from low military capacity, poor governance and failure to provide basic services to the people also demonstrate the weakness of government institutions. This underpins the third theory, which maintains that lack of economic development leads to deprived and frustrated populations—due to discriminatory governance, unequal income distribution, economic exclusion, and other conditions—that are more receptive to the notion of rebellion. The subsequent empirical testing focuses mainly on the second and third theories.

Motivations for the Researcher and Significance of this Thesis

The researcher’s professional experience at the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP) provides a motivation for pursuing this thesis topic. NDCP, one of the Philippine defence department’s educational and research arms, promotes a multifaceted view of national security, which includes an economic lens among others. I believe that my position in the security sector provides an opportunity to take part in a policy-oriented discourse on how economic development can help achieve lasting peace and security for the Philippines.

I have previously promoted the causal relationship between equitable economic development and intrastate peace, some of which are published in the NDCP Executive Policy Brief (e.g., Gonzales, 2013; Gonzales, 2014). One of my objectives in pursuing graduate studies is to conduct a more comprehensive and guided research on the subject matter, the realisation of which is this master's thesis.

Edillon (2005), one of the few Filipino scholars who statistically analysed the relationship underlying the causes of ideologically motivated conflicts in the Philippines, believes that such an approach explores the possibility of an early warning system for the incidence of violent conflict. This thesis also adopts a forward-looking approach by systematically identifying developmental risk factors of civil conflict. If the causes of political violence in the Bangsamoro conflict are grasped in such a manner, an understanding of how to anticipate and prevent it may follow.

The official recognition of economic development as an effective peacebuilding strategy in the Philippines also provides an impetus for this thesis. In the Philippine Development Plan and National Security Plan, the government formally recognises economic development as an effective solution to the country's internal security concerns including the Muslim separatist movements among others (National Security Council/NSC, 2011). The Philippine Government targets a permanent end to armed conflicts by implementing development-oriented peacebuilding programs (National Economic Development Authority/NEDA, 2011). With this new trend in the Philippine Government's approach to counterinsurgency, it is an opportune moment for the research community to make knowledge available for the development of policies that will cater to such expectations. Effective conduct of this study, therefore, will not only be a source of self-fulfilment for the researcher but may also prove to be beneficial to the Philippines, which has been confronted with the decades-old problem of rebellion.

Research Design

In conceiving the research design, a general guideline is to select the method that best enables the researcher to answer the research question, or, in the case of this thesis, to achieve the

research objectives (Flaten, 2012). The researcher aims to examine variations of economic development and political violence across the Bangsamoro municipalities to determine whether there is a causal pattern between the two variables. From the findings, general statements are drawn about how measures of economic development affect the measure of political violence. Such a feat implies the necessity of investigating a large number of cases. For such a purpose, statistical models provide the most efficient way of generating results from large-scale samples that allow for generalisation (Flaten, 2012).

The aspect of time also has an important role in this thesis. As mentioned earlier, it takes a forward-looking approach by developing an early warning system for the incidence of political violence. This relies on the researcher's choice of research method. Aside from its capability to indicate the direction of effects, regression analysis, the chosen statistical technique for this thesis, can also forecast values and trends based on causative factors (Field, 2009). For this thesis, the researcher uses regression analysis to determine whether a certain municipality would likely experience more incidence of political violence the poorer it is. The analysis is done retrospectively using collected data to examine how much change in measures of economic development is associated with the subsequent change in the measure of political violence.

Quantitative research designs are one of the two major approaches used to explain social phenomena. The civil conflict literature, in general, reflects such methodological diversity. Statistical studies as well as in-depth case studies and comparative studies have been continually uncovering the causes of civil conflicts. On the other hand, what is known about the actors' motivations in the Bangsamoro conflict is mostly thanks to the efforts of qualitative scholars who have drawn context-rich findings from case studies, multi-sectoral consultations, and interviews. Existing peace and security statistics in the Philippines, meanwhile, are "mere inventories of numbers that do not offer an explanatory sense of the overall threat environment in the country" (Banlaoi, 2013, p. 10). Furthermore, relevant statistical information falls short in terms of accounting for factors that approximate human welfare and equitable development in conflict-afflicted areas (Schiavo-Campo & Judd, 2005).

In fact, the researcher was able to retrieve only three recent quantitative studies (i.e., Crost, Felter, & Johnston, 2014; Crost, Felter, & Johnston, 2016; Edillon, 2005) as opposed to the numerous qualitative studies about the Bangsamoro conflict. All three, being countrywide studies, analyse the Bangsamoro conflict in conjunction with other civil conflicts in the Philippines, particularly the communist insurgency. Few studies of insurgency in the Philippines look at the armed conflicts in predominantly Muslim parts of the country (Kerkvliet, 2010). This thesis, on the other hand, is more focused on a particular civil conflict and geographic region in the Philippines.

The current government's position on peacebuilding in the Bangsamoro stands on unbalanced empirical groundwork characterised by an abundance of qualitative studies but a serious lack of quantitative work. Statistical evidence available offshore may not be helpful beyond identifying possible economic determinants to be tested in the Philippine setting. Context-specific inputs to policies/programs that shall achieve the Philippine Government's general peace aspirations must come from country-based research. Otherwise, there could be many missed opportunities for promoting peace.

The choice of method implies the nature of reality being considered in this thesis. Relying on statistical analysis, the researcher accepts that truths about the conflict can only be "imperfectly and probabilistically" grasped (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 165). Such a mindset resonates with 'critical realism', an ontological perspective associated with postpositivism and consequential to the intractable nature of the phenomena, especially in the social sciences (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Arguably, an internecine violent conflict is one of the most complex and unwieldy social phenomena in existence.

The epistemological stance of the researcher in this thesis, however, is that qualitative and quantitative research designs are complementary rather than rival approaches in the social sciences. As such, they should be used according to their individual strengths. Statistical methods, being able to detect correlations, are highly adapted for estimating causal effects, but not particularly useful in tracing causal mechanisms (Bennett & George, 1997). Given

that a range of explanations can be imposed on the same correlation, statistical methods cannot necessarily distinguish between competing accounts, especially those with closely related predictions (P. Collier, 2005). Considering that contexts are important aspects of civil conflicts, having an in-depth understanding of the mechanism of the relationship between political violence and low economic development is valuable. With this to consider, the researcher complements the findings of the statistical analysis by utilising process-tracing, a qualitative research technique. Process-tracing highlights from selected cases mechanisms that operate between cause and outcome. Such a research strategy perfectly fits with postpositivist thinking, which promotes the corroboration between qualitative and quantitative methods under the banner of ‘critical multiplism’ (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Critical multiplism offers a common ground between the two major research methods by extending the process of triangulation to multiple theories, analyses, and methodologies (Hinshaw, Feetham, & Shaver, 1999).

Structure of this Thesis

This thesis is divided into six chapters: Chapters Two and Three are theoretical and context-descriptive; Chapters Four and Five are empirical in content; Chapter Six concludes the study.

Chapters Two and Three draw on the civil war and conflict resolution literature to lay out the conceptual and theoretical foundations for studying the effects of economic development on civil conflict. Chapter Two formulates the conceptualisation and measurement of civil conflict suitable for a subnational-level study. Chapter Three explores the causes of civil conflicts with particular attention given to theories that deal specifically with its relationship with economic development. It moves from a broad to a narrow explanation of civil conflict, commencing with multidisciplinary perspectives on violence and then focusing on the ‘greed and grievance’ model, a prominent dialectic in civil conflict studies. It also justifies the use of the grievance narrative as the central theoretical perspective for this thesis. Both chapters culminate with a more contextualised account of the causes and outcome by exploring their manifestations in the Bangsamoro region.

In consideration of the research objectives, this thesis combines quantitative and qualitative techniques in studying the causality behind the Bangsamoro conflict, which are undertaken in Chapters Four and Five respectively. For the quantitative aspect of this thesis, municipalities are utilised as the unit of analysis for determining whether the lack of economic development has effects on the location of political violence in the Bangsamoro region. Chapter Four accordingly develops the analytical model for examining the causal relationship between spatial distributions of development and conflict. The analytical model serves as the basis for the formulation of hypotheses, which are derived as manifestations of municipal-level economic development and their supposed effect on the frequency of political violence in a municipality. The chapter then proceeds with presenting the data, indicators, and statistical techniques used in the subsequent empirical analysis. It undertakes diagnostic tests leading to the selection of the negative binomial model as the suitable regression analysis, given the characteristics of the data. The last part of the chapter consists of the results from the negative binomial estimation and the discussion of the larger implications of the findings for the study of the conflict.

Chapter Five offers a different dimension to the causality of the conflict with the use of process-tracing, a qualitative research technique used for inferring causal mechanisms from selected cases in a given population. A causal mechanism is a continuous pathway of processes and conditions in between a cause and an outcome. The chapter starts by devising the strategies for selecting and analysing the cases. It then presents the ‘empirical narratives’ of the two selected cases. Finally, it derives the causal mechanism that underpins the statistical correlations found in the previous chapter and evaluates whether it worked as theorised.

Chapter Six concludes the study by summarising and discussing the overall findings. It offers recommendations for possible peacebuilding policies, and future research agenda based on the delimitations and weaknesses of this thesis. Finally, it highlights the locus of economic development in the overall causality of the Bangsamoro conflict and the contribution of this thesis to the general understanding of economic development as a peacebuilding approach.

Delimitations of this Thesis and Potential Researcher Bias

George (1980, p. 11), who studied the revolt in Mindanao, writes, “The theories that run the gamut from religion to misgovernment were relevant only in so far as they were all pieces of an enormously complex jigsaw.” The Bangsamoro conflict is a multidimensional problem and to consider one of the dimensions as the outstanding cause of the upheaval hinders understanding of the total picture (Santos, 2005). While this thesis focuses on the economic dimension of the conflict, there is recognition that it cannot adequately explain the entirety of the conflict. Accordingly, it takes account of identity-based indicators as control variables in the subsequent statistical analysis.

The present ARMM constitutes the largest area of the Bangsamoro core territory at 87% of the total area of the region (BDA, 2015). Accordingly, this thesis considers the ARMM as the proxy for the Bangsamoro territory; therefore, data considered for analysis are obtained from ARMM municipalities. Due to limited data availability on political violence, in particular, this thesis can only examine a small period (2011-2015) of the Bangsamoro conflict, which has been ongoing for more than four decades now. Nevertheless, this thesis endeavours to come up with useful generalisations about the dynamics of the conflict, with the aid of an appropriate statistical model.

The researcher is a Filipino-Christian working for the Philippine Government. It is in my interest, therefore, to make knowledge available for the formation of specific policy measures that can be taken for the peaceful coexistence of Christians, Moro people, and other groups under a single nation and state. The researcher subscribes to the notion that peaceful coexistence in highly diverse societies can be facilitated by equitable development and an egalitarian and representative governance. Presently, the Philippine Government is still pursuing peace talks with the MILF. The researcher aims to determine the factors that give rise to violence, in the hope of shedding light on the developmental aspects of the peace negotiations, and identifying ways of averting future occurrences of conflicts.

Chapter 2

Conceptualising Violence in a Context of a Civil Conflict

[Violence] is a phenomenon in its own right.

Hannah Arendt, *On violence*

Civil war violence has always been described and understood as ‘political’.

Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*

Introduction

With the aim of understanding the dynamics of separatist conflict in the Bangsamoro region, this chapter presents a conceptual framework that will guide the subsequent statistical analysis of how economic development shapes the conflict. In particular, it addresses how to proceed with empirically testing the theories of civil conflict at a subnational scale given that civil conflict studies have predominantly consisted of cross-country analysis.

This chapter is organised into three major sections. With the perpetration of violence shifting from interstate to intrastate level since the end of the Second World War, the first section

highlights the importance of adapting to such a shift in the field of conflict analysis. The suitability and advantages of subnational level analysis are explored comparatively with country-comparative studies. The second section tells how to empirically approach civil conflicts in the level of analysis that this thesis is undertaking. In particular, it puts forward the micro-dynamics of violence at the centre of the analysis, which involves finding causal explanations for violent incidences' spatial variation. Given the political nature of civil conflicts in general, it argues that the Bangsamoro conflict must be examined primarily through incidents that operate as a form of political violence. Finally, the third section applies to the context of the Bangsamoro conflict lessons in concepts and definitions presented in the previous sections.

From Interstate to Intrastate Warfare: Implications for How to Study Civil Conflicts

Interstate warfare has become “historically distant and geographically remote” (Karp, Karp, & Terriff, 2010, p. 3). Optimists such as Fukuyama (1989) view the end of the Cold War as ‘the end of history’, which pertains to liberal democracy’s triumph over other ideologies and an era of unprecedented global peace and stability. Such optimism has been bolstered by democratic countries having more than doubled in numbers since the 1970s (Carnegie Commission, 1998). With the considerable abatement of hostilities between states, the international community has focused much of its attention in making progress in world politics, technology, and economy. Platforms for dialogue and cooperation were founded, major technological breakthroughs were reached, cures to vicious diseases were discovered, and incomes, particularly in the advanced capitalist countries, increased. There has also been substantial economic development in poorer parts of the world.

The persistence of violence tells, however, that the world is far from secure. While interstate wars have substantially subsided, violence per se remains interminable. Large-scale violence has just shifted down at the intrastate level, perpetrated by factions of a singular sovereign entity (Cramer, 2006b; Holsti, 1996). Intrastate conflicts have become the most common form of large-scale violent conflict since the end of World War II (Hoeffler, 2011; Holsti,

1996). Since 1945, 16.2 million lives have been lost to intrastate conflicts, almost five times the estimated deaths from interstate wars (3.3 million) during the same period (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Despite the progress of the twentieth century, it has been marked as one of the bloodiest periods in history primarily because of the predominance of intrastate conflicts (Carnegie Commission, 1998; Cramer, 2006b).

The shift from interstate to intrastate warfare has made a significant impact on how the future of societies is seen, which is somewhat underpinned by foreboding views on human nature. It implies the endurance of violence as a resort to resolving political difference, which encourages the assumptions of political thinkers with the likes of Clausewitz, Einstein, and Freud (see Einstein, Freud, & Gilbert, 1933; Von Clausewitz, 1873) who view primordial violence and enmity being inherent among people, just waiting to be justified at any opportunity. Keegan (2011, p. 4) warns that such an explanation of the persistence of violence not only challenges the civilised majority's notions of human nature, which he describes as "imperfect, no doubt, but certainly cooperative and frequently benevolent." More importantly, this casts serious doubts on general expectations of the future. The emergence of intrastate conflict as a global phenomenon indeed propelled pessimistic views about the post-Cold War period that dispels the end-of-history scenario to include the 'clash of civilisations' (Huntington, 1993), the 'coming anarchy' (Kaplan, 1994), and the 'age of deadly peace' (Carnegie Commission, 1998).

How to Study Civil Conflicts?

The shift also opened doors to new approaches to understanding the very nature of violent conflicts. Analysts and observers have taken notice of the ramifications of the shift to war's ontological and epistemological discourses (e.g., Cramer, 2006b; Hardt & Negri, 2005; Karp et al., 2010). Cramer (2006b) underscores the need to deviate from traditional war's analytical frame, which is almost exclusive to the academic sub-field of international relations. This cannot be reiterated enough given the predominance of cross-country over subnational analysis in civil war studies (Justino, 2009). While proven effective in identifying global patterns of conflict, cross-country analysis is less useful in revealing causal patterns

of subnational conflict. For instance, it can never satisfactorily explain why conflict happens in certain parts of a country but not in others, which is often the case for intrastate wars (Justino, Brück, & Verwimp, 2013). Macro-level indicators that are drawn from country-comparison also hardly say anything on how violence emerges (Lee, 2016). In this regard, Holsti (1996) argues that for conflicts waged at the domestic level, the source of explanation should be in the character of the state itself and not in the nature of relations between states. In a similar vein, Blattman and Miguel (2010) and Kanbur (2007) promote studies at the subnational scale as the most promising avenue for new empirical research.

Far from external violence, conditions that sow the seeds of internal violence depict an extreme form of redistributive struggle, as opposed to common interests across domestic groups (Besley & Persson, 2011). In this regard, the pursuit of predictive explanations of the different aspects of violent conflict has been set on a new path that appears to correspond to the shift from interstate to intrastate warfare. From the dynamics of international relations and politics, scholars turn their attention to people's propensity for participating in violence as dictated by human nature, social relations, and their political and economic environments. Civil conflict has been theorised as aggressive manifestations of a range of deep-seated social inequities in the community or symptoms of weak social and political institutions and predatory behaviour of a considerable portion of the citizenry. Attempts at empirically supporting these conjectures have been carried out by proving the concomitance of social, economic, and political factors with communal violence. An in-depth discussion of these factors is presented in Chapter Three.

Violence in Civil Conflicts Conceptually and Operationally Defined

The shift from interstate to intrastate warfare also opened what seems to be a Pandora's Box of concepts. Civil strife, ethnic war, insurgency, rebellion, and revolution (Kahl, 2006); local conflict (Barron, Kaiser, & Pradhan, 2004); civil conflict (P. Collier, 2000); armed conflict (Dube & Vargas, 2006); bottom-up and top-down economic violence (Keen, 2005); social violence (Chen, 2007); and ideologically motivated conflicts (Edillon, 2005) are a few of the

terms utilised by scholars to capture the idiosyncrasies of each conflict as it happened. More often than not, tangible distinctions have never been made to establish a particular term's conceptual autonomy from others. The profusion of such labels is arguably both a cause and an outcome of the semantic confusion confronting the study of intrastate conflicts in general. While 'civil war' has been one of the most popular concepts in the literature, the term itself is an object of semantic contestation (Kalyvas, 2006). It has often been used by analysts in contradictory ways, consequently compromising its conceptual autonomy (Ranzato 1994). Kalyvas (2006) notes that the very use of the term has been a key aspect of the conflict itself as it may confer or deny a status of legitimacy and equality among the belligerents to the conflict. Consequently, the ascription of the term tends to be highly politicised. This has somewhat confounded the research on the topic.

Amidst such conceptual confusion, scholars in the quantitative field have simplified the analysis of civil war by focusing the analysis on the scale of violence attendant on the conflict. In cross-country studies, a case of violent conflict is classed as a civil war and, accordingly, included in the analysis upon wreaking a certain magnitude of destruction on an area consumed by conflict. The magnitude of destruction is usually measured in terms of the number of deaths directly consequent on a violent conflict (Cramer, 2006b; Fearon, 2007; Stewart, Humphreys, & Lea, 1997). As regards to the exact number of the casualty threshold, however, no consensus has yet been reached in the literature. Different institutions and studies use different thresholds ranging from 25 to 1000 battle-related deaths in a year (Cramer, 2006a). The choice of where to set the casualty threshold has been arbitrary, which resulted in varied findings across the literature even when the same set of explanatory variables were used (Cramer, 2006b; Ross, 2004; Sambanis, 2004). Existing measurements have so far been designed for cross-country analysis but are less useful in subnational studies (Justino et al., 2013). The use of these thresholds has resulted in partial analysis of conflict in specific countries because several violent episodes do not cut through the benchmarks and are consequently dropped from various cross-country analyses (Cramer, 2006b).

Much of the internecine conflict that occurred after the Cold War had a variety of powerful agenda behind them (Berdal & Malone, 2000). In this regard, examining them simply as

disruptions of normal peacetime, episodically determined when a range of arbitrary thresholds is reached, conceals many of the purposes of collective violence. Cramer (2006a) maintains that the purpose of exploring the relationship between economic development and violent conflict cannot be effectively served by limiting the analysis to forms of violence that cross the prescribed threshold to be categorised as war: “Treating a wider range of phenomena may produce a different conclusion i.e., that violent conflict of very diverse types is an extremely common, basically a typical feature of development experiences” (p. 51). To acquire a comprehensive understanding of the nexus between policy, development issues, and violent conflict, the same author recommends other forms of violence to be analysed together with the operational definitions of civil war.

It is in such light that Kalyvas (2006) places the micro-dynamics of violence at the centre of analysis instead of the substance of civil war, to allow for a more local focus on the logics of violence. Given a single case of civil war, areas afflicted by the same conflict experience considerable variation in violence. Placing violence at the centre of analysis means embarking on the search for explanations for such variation. Doing so should not prevent analysts from using analytical frames developed within the ambit of civil war studies considering that the analysis of civil wars has been simplified in terms of the actual violence, albeit at an arbitrarily determined scale, that takes place within the conflict.

Violence in the Context of a Civil Conflict

Civil conflicts that are massive enough to be qualified as ‘war’ are aggregates of smaller violent episodes. If the empirical analysis were to focus on the micro-dynamics of violent incidences that are conceptually constitutive of a civil conflict, there is a need to distinguish them from other forms of aggression. Fundamentally, civil conflicts have been understood as a form of a violent struggle between groups of people within the same country (Cramer, 2006b; Fearon, 2007; Kahl, 2006; Stewart et al., 1997). The conflict may involve state agencies and non-state groups (Cramer, 2006b; Fearon, 2007; Kahl, 2006; Stewart et al., 1997), or state claimants within territorial boundaries (Cincotta, Engelman, & Anastasion, 2003; Cramer, 2006b). It is large-scale, sustained, and organised, which effectively excludes

less organised forms of internal violence such as crimes and riots (Kahl, 2006). These characteristics effectively weed out everyday forms of aggression, but not the entirety of large-scale and organised violence.

The rise to infamy of large-scale organised crime groups has created a grey zone between ordinary crimes and civil conflicts (Kalyvas, 2015). For instance, the scale of violence waged by drug cartels in Mexico and Central America has led analysts to label their operations as ‘criminal insurgency’ and the perpetrators themselves as ‘criminal soldiers’ (e.g., Grillo, 2012; Sullivan & Bunker, 2011; Sullivan & Elkus, 2008). Even before this, however, rational choice theorists have treated rebel movements no differently from organised crime in their models of civil conflicts (e.g., P. Collier, 2000; P. Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Grossman, 1999). Grossman’s (1999) economic theory of insurrection describes revolution as a rivalry between a ‘kleptocratic’ government and a revolutionary leader who is an alternative ‘kleptocrat’. In such a context, “insurgents are indistinguishable from bandits or pirates” (Grossman, 1999, p. 269). Others attempt to statistically demonstrate that rebel groups are formed not out of perceived social injustices, but when potential profits from the rebellion, mainly through looting and extortion, are high (e.g., P. Collier, 2000; P. Collier & Hoeffler, 2004).

Many scholars have strongly argued against placing civil conflicts and organised crimes in a similar category. Because of civil conflicts’ anti-system character, conflict-related violence should be distinguished and analysed as a form of political violence (Kalyvas, 2003). Civil conflicts occur as a threat to an established sovereignty, a notion that harks back to Plato’s *The Republic* in which a ‘domestic war’ is regarded as an event where “ruling becomes a thing fought over” (see Bloom, 1991, p. 199). Political groups, through the use of violence, seek to replace the government or change government policy, to seize control of a region, or to formally secede from a country (Cramer, 2006b; Fearon, 2007; Stewart et al., 1997). Scholars have widely adopted this distinguishing criterion in studying civil conflicts (e.g., Cramer, 2006b; Fearon, 2007; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Sambanis, 2004; Stewart et al., 1997).

The concept of monopoly on violence also helps in grasping the political nature of civil conflict violence. Physical force has always been a foundation of the state, which goes back as far as Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* and Max Weber's 1919 essay, *Politics as a Vocation*. Hobbes considers the indispensability of a sovereign authority in keeping internal wars at bay: "without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man" (Hobbes, Ch. 13, para. 8). Hobbes and Weber agree that legitimate force is a means specific to the state, hence the idea of the monopoly on violence. The modern state, according to Weber, emerged by expropriating the means of political organisation and domination, including violence, and by establishing the legitimacy of its rule. In fact, he defines a state as "a human community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory." (p. 78) ^[OBJ] to exist. to exist.

However, there is a fundamental distinction between the two in terms of the nature of such a monopoly. From a Hobbesian perspective, the ideal monopoly on violence requires that the state should have 'sole use' of physical force over people. The Weberian perspective, on the other hand, is concerned only with the state's 'sole control' of force, which implies that non-state actors may also wield violence without challenging the state. The point of departure between the two perspectives provides distinct insights on how civil conflict violence should be studied in relation to other forms of aggression. The Hobbesian monopoly on violence suggests that other than political violence, everyday forms of aggression jeopardise the state's monopoly of violence. The Weberian perspective's emphasis on the legitimate use of physical force implies that the state only has the authority over the use of force, as recognised by the people who accept its legitimacy. It may authorise other actors to use physical violence and criminal organisations may destabilise order using illegitimate violence, but neither can refute the state's monopoly of violence.

The Weberian monopoly on violence only becomes threatened when non-state groups use violence to establish themselves as parallel sources of rule, which is exactly how political violence is understood, particularly in terms of its outcome. Political groups' aggressive behaviour undermines the state's monopoly of violence, considering their aim to rule over a

targeted territory and its population, and establish an autonomous entity within the state. Indeed, rebel organisations are identified and set apart from organised crime groups in terms of their cohesiveness and resilience in the face of state repression (Staniland, 2012). They are characterised by having effective military control over a territory with an organised militia that can confront state agencies when needed (De La Calle & Sánchez-Cuenca, 2012; Grillo, 2012). Amidst competing groups fighting over control, individuals also have the option to shift their support and resources in between competing actors, which in fact has always been a central theme in explaining civil conflicts.

Going back to the drug cartels in Central America, Sullivan and Elkus (2008) explicitly reject the notion that criminal insurgency is a political movement. Criminal insurgents, unlike authentic political insurgents, do not seek “the removal of foreign forces, the satisfaction of discrete political demands, or regime change” (Sullivan & Elkus, 2008, p. 8). The same authors further explain that the use of the term ‘insurgency’ is meant only to highlight the resemblance of tactical operations between these drug cartels and classical insurgent groups. Indeed, the operations of criminal groups are not directed towards political change (Stewart et al., 1997); they simply seek to thrive amidst an existing political regime (Kalyvas, 2015). Explicit political motivation effectively separates insurgent groups from organised crime groups, which lack ideological motivations and clear political agenda.

Political Violence as the Explained Variable

The conceptual discussion above helps to illuminate the specificity of civil conflict violence as a form of political violence. Considering the various kinds of aggression that are nested within the Bangsamoro conflict, which will be discussed in the next section, this thesis analyses those that operate as a form of political violence, bearing the concepts and definitions presented above.

To be considered political, a violent episode must be in opposition to the existing political authority. It must also pose a threat or grave inconvenience to the regular operations of the political elite mainly by being a collective activity. These preconditions resemble that of Gurr

(1970) and Hibbs (1973) who describe an instance of collective political violence as destructive attacks by groups within a political community against its regime, authorities, or policies. Adopting the Weberian perspective, only a few non-state actors such as political insurgents or terrorists can pose a threat to the state's sovereignty by challenging its monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force. This expands the horizon of the analysis to grasp smaller forms of political violence, but not the extent of including everyday forms of aggression and organised crime. In addition, violence is considered a 'social situation' because there will always be at least two sides involved in its creation (Schmidt & Schröder, 2001). In relation to political violence's anti-system character, violent conflicts in consideration must involve direct attacks against the state and its agents, which can be interpreted as the government's armed forces being the embodiment of the state's physical force on the ground.

Measuring Political Violence

Currently, there is no universally accepted empirical measure of civil conflict for research at the subnational scale. As shown in Table 2-1, different subnational studies use varying measures to examine civil conflicts in a country of interest. From these research works, however, it is highly evident that existing subnational studies of civil conflict have typically focused on the local-level dynamics of violence. They empirically approach violence in terms of frequency, and, if not, its magnitude as implied by the number deaths directly attributable to the conflict. Both measures do not subscribe to any form of a threshold. With regard to frequency, violent incidences involving state and non-state actors (e.g., armed forces and insurgents) have also been a tried and tested measure (e.g., Berman, Callen, Felter, & Shapiro, 2011; Crost et al., 2014; Edillon, 2005; Hegre, Østby, & Raleigh, 2009). Given these precedents and the conceptualisation presented above, this thesis examines the causality of the Bangsamoro conflict through instances of political violence, which is categorised as the reported encounters between the rebel groups and the government's armed forces.

Table 2-1. Subnational Studies of Civil Conflict

Author(s)	Country	Measurement(s) of Civil Conflict
Barron et al. (2004)	Indonesia	Frequency of conflicts per locality that have resulted in loss of life, serious injury, or property damage
Murshed and Gates (2005)	Nepal	Number of people killed in each district that was attributed to the Maoist insurgents
Edillon (2005)	Philippines	Frequency of reported armed incidents or encounters between government forces and rebel groups at the provincial level
Hegre et al. (2009)	Liberia	Frequency of conflict incidences involving the government, civilians, and militias
Berman, Callen, et al. (2011)	Afghanistan, Iraq, Philippines	Frequency of rebels' attacks against the government, its allies, and civilians at a district/provincial level
Counihan (2011)	Afghanistan	Soldiers killed per province each year
Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov (2013)	Afghanistan	Frequency of security incidents committed by the Taliban group per village
Crost et al. (2014)	Philippines	Frequency of insurgent-initiated incidents and civil conflict casualties suffered by government forces and civilians
Crost et al. (2016)	Philippines	Frequencies of both conflict and non-conflict related incidents per municipality

Sifting through the Violence in the Bangsamoro Conflict

The Bangsamoro Conflict Monitoring System (BCMS) is this thesis' main source of conflict data. It is a subnational database created by the International Alert Philippines and the World Bank. It draws panel data on violent conflicts from police and media reports in the five provinces comprising the bulk of the Bangsamoro core territory. Multi-stakeholder validation groups (MSVG) maintain the credibility and accuracy of the data. Given that data are collected by an independent, third-party institution, the chances of misreporting are less likely. With regard to data gathering, the BCMS casts a wide net given its definition of violent conflict: "incidents where two or more parties use violence to settle misunderstanding and grievances, and/or defend and expand their individual or collective interests" (International Alert, 2014a, p. 16). In this regard, the conceptual framework proves to be invaluable in sifting through the dataset.

The BCMS classifies violent conflicts into two general categories: vertical and horizontal (International Alert, 2014b). Vertical conflicts pertain to insurgency-related, separatist, and non-separatist armed struggles against the state, such as terrorist actions. Meanwhile, horizontal conflicts refer to skirmishes among private armed groups, insurgent factions, political parties, clans, and ethnic groups. As shown in Figure 2-1, there were as many vertical conflicts as horizontal conflicts in the past four years, although in 2014 vertical conflict incidents dramatically increased. Given the conceptual and operational definitions of political violence, the subsequent empirical analysis focuses on vertical conflicts.




Figure 2-1. Vertical vs. Horizontal Conflict, 2011-2014

Source: International Alert (2014a)

The conflict involves the Philippine Government and four non-state groups that essentially constitute the one hand of the conflict: the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF). These groups succeeded the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) and the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization (BMLO), which were created in the immediate aftermath of the Jabidah Massacre but eventually became inactive. Younger groups are usually offshoots of older ones (see Figure 2-2), consequent to opposing demands between independence and autonomy, and dissatisfaction from peace agreements

between the Philippine Government and a predecessor. For example, when the MNLF abandoned their call for independence in favour of autonomy in the 1970s, its radical members splintered off and created the MILF (Özerdem et al., 2010). In 2010, when the MILF brokered a peace agreement with the government, Commander Ameril Umbra Kato founded the BIFF as a breakaway group to continue the separatist struggle (Banlaoi, 2011). Nonetheless, there is also evidence of relationships among these groups. There are news reports of units or members from different groups cooperating in attacks (e.g., BBC, 2012; Thomson Reuters, 2014).




Figure 2-2. The Genealogy of Conflict

Source: Mapping Militant Organizations, Stanford University

As shown in Figure 2-3, various forms of violence are attributed to these separatist groups although clashes/encounters with the Philippine State remain dominant (areas shaded in light green). These other forms of violence are excluded from the analysis for several reasons. They do not constitute a direct physical attack against the government and, hence, do not sit well with the conceptual framework devised for this thesis. In addition, there are accounts of

non-conformist rebel commanders who engage in illicit activities out of personal motivations (Podder, 2012). While these violent incidences implicate a separatist group as a whole, there is no way of telling from data whether they were politically or personally motivated. Finally, their inclusion may confound the spatial analysis of political violence considering that they may not conform to a geographical pattern the same way as clashes between the military and rebels do, which serves as a critical component of the empirical design discussed in Chapter Four.




Figure 2-3. Violent Incidences Attributed to Separatists Groups, 2011-2015
Data Source: BCMS

Alternate Governance: A Non-violent Threat to the Philippine State's Sovereignty

Aside from perpetration of political violence, rebel groups challenge the Philippine Government's legitimacy by establishing an alternative source of governance. Although far from being violent, it helps in mobilising support on the ground for the continued armed struggle. This particular strategy is mostly attributed to the MILF (e.g., Espressor, 2016; Özerdem & Podder, 2012; Podder, 2012; Taya, 2007; Vitug & Gloria, 2000). As a result, the MILF is the Philippines' largest separatist group, considered the strongest and the most capable of governing the region (Quitoriano, 2010; Stratfor, 2014).

From its beginnings, the MILF has permeated Moro society by setting up a parallel government where Islam plays a central role (Vitug & Gloria, 2000; Wilson, 2009). It has built functioning communities with religious, social, economic, and military structures. Its camps encompass mosques, sharia courts, madrassah schools, factories, and multi-purpose cooperatives. It provides basic services in areas where the local institutions of the Philippine Government fail to deliver.

The MILF's governance system is felt more by the people compared to the Philippine State's local government units (Espressor, 2016). Replicating the Philippine Government's structure, the MILF created political committees that extend to the municipal and village levels to govern its claimed territories (Taya, 2007). At the top, the central and provincial committees ratify MILF policies in consultation with the local communities. In turn, the Moro people follow the policy directives of the MILF, which are disseminated through the local commanders designated in each community (Espressor, 2016).

Community engagement and government service delivery have earned the MILF broad popular support (Bale, 2003; Podder, 2012; Taya, 2007). In some areas, the MILF is considered the official government with the authority to implement law and order (Espressor, 2016). The government armed forces have experienced difficulties in gaining the trust and cooperation of the public in MILF-controlled areas (Taya, 2007). The Bangsamoro General Assembly is also a demonstration of the strong local backing enjoyed by the MILF. This recurring general consultation gathers hundreds of thousands MILF members and supporters to bring out unified political positions and to bolster the group's claim of being the legitimate representative of Moro interests (Taya, 2007). One of the most prominent general assemblies occurred in 2005 where approximately 900,000 supporters and some foreign dignitaries attended.

Moving Forward: From Outcome to Potential Causes

This chapter has formulated the conceptual and operational definitions of political violence suitable for a within-country analysis of the Bangsamoro conflict. The physical

manifestations of the conflict were also explored descriptively by presenting the conflict data from the BCMS. The following chapter lays out the theoretical framework for studying the effects of economic development on the intensity of a civil conflict. In particular, it extracts potential development causes of political violence from the civil war and conflict resolution literature.

Chapter 3

The Logic of Political Violence in a Civil Conflict: A Literature Review

A civil war is not a stupid thing, like a war between nations, the Italians fighting the English, or the Germans against the Russians, where I, a Sicilian sulphur miner, kill an English miner, and the Russian peasant shoots at the German peasant; a civil war is something more logical, a man starts shooting at the people and the things he loves, for the things he wants and against the people he hates; and no one makes a mistake about choosing which side to be on.

The Sicilian soldier in ‘Antimony’, *Sicilian Uncles*

Introduction

People’s participation and support dictate the success of an armed group’s strategic objectives (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008). Indeed, the community is the main source of recruits, wherewithal, and intelligence for the rebels (Podder, 2012). Rebel groups, on the other hand, cannot operate in an area where people are hostile to its claims (Beath et al., 2013). With regard to the social phenomenon that this thesis is aiming to understand better, empirical studies recognise that the strength of an organised armed group and the attending

intensity of violent conflict depend on the level of popular support (Beath et al., 2013; Hoeffler, 2011; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008).

In the Philippines, the government troops reported difficulties in gaining cooperation from the public in certain regions of the Bangsamoro because the MILF, having engaged the local Moros in their governance, has been able to win popular support (Taya, 2007). On the other hand, the local population refuses to cooperate with a military that has relied mostly on coercive and military intensive counterinsurgency operations (Podder, 2012). Mass support has gained MILF certain advantages in its fight for greater autonomy (Taya, 2007). The people carry out voluntary intelligence gathering activities for the group while refusing to give information to the military. More importantly, it has justified the MILF's claim that it is truly a mass-based organisation, which is an apparent reason why the Philippine Government has chosen to negotiate peace with the MILF but not with the other separatist groups.

A range of motivations influences people's behaviour amidst conflict, that is, whether to support political violence or not and which party to favour. These motivating factors behind people's participation in group violence, in turn, give reputation to civil conflicts as having a more riveting sense when compared to interstate wars.

Conflicts leading to violence begin at the micro-level and then potentially develop into civil conflicts at the macro-level (Lee, 2016). The micro framework is more relevant for the analysis of counterinsurgency, as it directly concerns factors that affect the willingness of the population to support either the insurgents or the government (Beath et al., 2013). Given these guiding assumptions, this chapter reviews the corpus of theory that has accumulated concerning the logic of people's support and participation in civil conflicts. It establishes what theories already exist, which in turn provide the logical basis to the hypotheses to be developed and tested vis-à-vis the Bangsamoro setting. It is organised into three major sections. The first section presents several theories about violence as promoted by the different disciplines in the social sciences. The researcher, being an interdisciplinary social science student, subscribes to the importance of developing a theoretical framework that is grounded in different scholarly perspectives on violence. The different truths in the study of

violence, meanwhile, converge in the greed and grievance model, a prominent theoretical discourse in the civil war literature. The second section provides an overview of this paradigm and uses it as a frame for specifying which key variables influence the phenomenon of interest. It culminates with the researcher's position in the greed and grievance dialectic, based on the substance of both statements, how they resonate with the historical narratives of the Bangsamoro conflict, and how they fit with the objectives of this thesis. The third section offers its readers a more contextualised account of the determinant variables specified in the previous section by exploring how they manifest in the Bangsamoro region. Figure 3-1 depicts the structure of this chapter.




Figure 3-1. Organisation of Chapter 3

The Blind Men and the Elephant: The Different Truths in the Studied Consciousness of Violence

And so these men of Indostan
 Disputed loud and long,
 Each in his own opinion
 Exceeding stiff and strong,
 Though each was partly in the right,
 And all were in the wrong.

John Godfrey Saxe, *The Blind Men and the Elephant*

Tracing back the origins of violence means going back to the origins of humanity itself, for much of human history is marked by stories of violence. Schmidt and Schröder (2001) uphold the same view by portraying violence as a key feature of social relations. Violence is a social

action that serves specific purposes at intergroup as well as intragroup levels. Inasmuch as it may appear to be a senseless act of bloodshed, violence can never be meaningless for the perpetrator, the victim, or even the observer. It can never be detached from instrumental rationality (Schmidt & Schröder, 2001), which makes it an ever continuing topic of scholarly enquiry.

Considering how violence has been accepted as a permanent feature of people's way of life, societies have developed differing forms of awareness of violence, which have somewhat shaped how they cope with the problem. Lee (2015a) encapsulates these into three levels of consciousness—alarm consciousness, lack of consciousness, and the studied consciousness of violence. Alarm consciousness of violence, an immediate response that occurs in the aftermath of major violent episodes, can be considered 'reactive' by nature. It is only as good as the lifespan of the memory of war: "as the memory of the alarm fades, so does the awareness" (Lee, 2015a, p. 200). Lack of consciousness, meanwhile, is the denial, complacency, or adherence to the belief that violence is declining, which allows for its further perpetration. It is best exemplified by the optimism that has become prevalent in the post-cold war era amidst the observed shift from interstate to intrastate warfare (Cramer, 2006b). On the other hand, the studied consciousness of violence is characterised by a mindful and serious study of violence as a phenomenon, which is born out of the full cognizance of its threat to society and fuelled by the need for its prevention. The rest of the discussion is devoted to the studied consciousness of violence and its different truths as have been established by various disciplines in the social sciences.

The poem *The Blind Men and the Elephant* by Saxe (1884) creatively parallels how the studied consciousness of violence has progressed over time. The poem, which is inspired by a popular Hindi parable, begins with six blind men who inquisitively approached an elephant, with the aim of depicting the creature. The poem proceeds with each blind man using his sense of touch to observe the elephant. Each correspondingly likened it to a wall, snake, spear, tree, fan or rope, depending on which part they touched. In a similar fashion, different disciplines across the social sciences have provided a distinct understanding of the pathological causes of violence. Hence, they have illuminated certain facets of violence, with

none being able to claim the monopoly of truth on the ontology of violence. “All specialities, independent of each other, have identified a pathogen that seems to be a necessary but not sufficient cause of violent behaviour,” as Gilligan (2000, p. 1802) puts it.

Nonetheless, this has not prevented scholars from certain disciplines to do as such. Essentialist ideas such as ‘primordialism’ and ‘economism’ oversimplified the complexities of violent conflict into reduced-form and often misleading relationships, wherein aggressive social behaviour is a function of primordial animosity based on ethnicity and cultural identity or rational choices made to maximise utility (Cramer, 2006a). Perhaps the starkest of such a reductionist way of thinking come from the presidential address delivered by Jack Hirshleifer (1994, p. 3) at the annual meeting of the Western Economic Association International. He talked about the relatively recent venture of economists on the study of the ‘dark side of force’, to wit, crimes, war, and politics:

As we come to explore this continent, economist will encounter a number of native tribes—historians, psychologists, philosophers, etc.—who, in various intellectually primitive ways, have preceded us in reconnoitring the dark side of human activity. Once we economists get involved, quite properly we will, of course, be brushing aside these a-theoretical aborigines.

The following subsections discuss the different truths of the studied consciousness of violence subscribed to by different social science disciplines. The discussions are not in any way exhaustive, but are rather aimed at demonstrating the multidisciplinary foundation of the greed and grievance model, which serves as the main theoretical framework for this thesis. They are organised in terms of what knowledge each discipline offers concerning the processes and elements involving the production of violence—from the intrapersonal to the interpersonal and then within-society, and in terms of the contingent political and economic contexts and milieus that surround groups and individuals.

Psychology

Human behaviour is relentlessly shaped by cognitive and psychodynamic systems, which respectively process information and stir affective reactions amidst a confluence of external stimuli (Lee, 2015b). The production of psychological forces, particularly thoughts and

emotions, has therefore been a rewarding area in terms of grasping the mechanisms behind violence at individual and group levels.

Cognitivism (or cognitive psychology) supposes that the way people think impacts their behaviour. For cognitivists, the human mind is an information processing system where external input is encoded, processed, evaluated, and generalised (Chater, Clark, Goldsmith, & Perfors, 2015). Put simply, thinking is a form of computing. Cognitivism emerged in the 1950s, but the idea can be traced back to the works of Hobbes. In *De Corpore*, Hobbes elaborates on the view that reasoning is computing. “By reasoning”, he writes, “I understand computation. To compute is to collect the sum of many things added together at the same time, or to know the remainder when one thing has been taken from another. To reason, therefore, is the same as to add or to subtract” (as cited in Chater et al., 2015, p. 12). In relation to violence, thoughts that fuel aggressive behaviour are characterised as “low-arousal, pre-meditated, and predatory” (Lee, 2015b, p. 12).

Meanwhile, there are also emotive explanations of aggressive behaviour. The frustration-aggression nexus is likely the most prominent theory that links emotions and violence. Gurr (1970), the proponent of the ‘relative deprivation theory’ of conflict, asserts that the universal capacity of emotions arising from hindrances to the realisation of an individual or a group’s material expectations (i.e., frustration) to transform as aggression against the perceived source of their frustration. On the other hand, Lee (2015b) argues that violence can be understood better by taking into consideration the ‘paradoxes of the mind’. She explains that people’s destitute and desperate situation triggers the urge for destruction. She writes, “Human beings choose the former [enhance life] when they are healthy, resourceful, and capable of making choices, whereas they gravitate toward the latter [induce death] when they are ill, under stress, and perceive few options, or incapable of changing behaviour due to external constraints” (Lee, 2015b, p. 213). This explains why people have the penchant for violence when they feel powerless, cornered, and deprived. Violence is not a physical manifestation of possession of power, but rather of desperation and powerlessness.

Sociology, Anthropology, and History

Violence is a social fact in the sense that there will always be perpetrators and victims in the creation of violence (Blume, 1996). Furthermore, deciding these roles is never a random act. Schmidt and Schröder (2001) maintain that no matter how remote it may seem, violent acts are outcomes of a competitive relationship, which dates back in history. A victim or a group of victims are likely representatives of a larger category in relation to a specific historical process.

Indeed, violent conflicts have been explained in terms of primordial incompatibilities between tribes, ethnicities, and religions, collective identities that have endured a long, unbroken history (Cramer, 2006b). Studying the historical features of these collective identities, therefore, provide edification on how violence becomes a collective movement. By calling on the common experiences, loyalties, and values that these collective identities imply, they provide an important mobilising role in the production of violent conflicts. It is through these shared notions that a group adversary becomes a personal enemy on the basis of collective and impersonal enmity (Lee, 2016). They present themselves as ancient and inescapable facts that extend to every individual, and, to some extent, even transcending the concept of individuality. Collective identities exude a homogenising force that gets people to act as a group even to the point of forgoing their individual interests (Reicher, Spears, & Haslam, 2010). When acting out of these group rivalries, petty as it may seem, it is collective identities that enable individuals to see themselves as heroic (Cramer, 2006b).

Economics

Resource scarcity and abundance are the two central concepts in the material-based explanation of what triggers political violence and conflict (Cramer, 2006b). This belief harks back to classic economic writings that portray scarcity and maldistribution of material sources as harbingers of catastrophe in societies and institutions. Malthus (1798/1959, p. 49) predicts that human population growth will eventually outstrip the production of food (i.e., theory of diminishing returns). In the face of famine, people's proclivity for violence awakens to reduce the population to a level matching the earth's productive capacity:

The power of population is so superior to the power of the earth to produce subsistence for man that premature death must in some shape or another visit the human race. The vices of mankind are active and able ministers of depopulation. They are the precursors in the great army of destruction and often finish the dreadful work themselves.

David Ricardo (1891), on the other hand, focuses on resource distribution instead of the concept of scarcity. He argues that unequal distribution of material wealth may result in induced scarcity (as opposed to actual) for certain groups in society. He posits that both population and capital growth will overstrain the fixed amount of labour supply. Given this circumstance, the only way to ensure the continued existence of production is to hold down wages. By proposing that labourers should only be waged at a subsistence level (i.e., iron law of wages) to ensure the availability of private capital for future investment, he justifies the exploitation of the working class for the sake of the capitalist system (Tyner, 2016). Karl Ma (1867/2012) explicitly accounts for the relationship between the exploitative distribution of wealth and violence. He asserts that capitalism's wealth distribution system polarised people into two major social classes, namely the bourgeoisie and proletariat, which will always be in conflict with each other, given their contradictory economic circumstances.

Rational choice theory is the model through which most contemporary economists make sense of social behaviours (Hoeffler, 2011). It underpins the recent economic conjectures concerning the relationship between resource and violence. Lee (2016, p. 3) concisely provides the general assumptions of the model: "economic actors or agents act rationally, having multiple desirable ends, limited resources, a set of preferences, a guiding objective, and the ability to make choices." Central to the model is the process of 'utility maximisation' or choosing the option that best serves one's objectives (Green, Shapiro, & Shapiro, 1994).

Within the ambit of rational choice, scarcity influences all individual calculations of self-interest. Improvement of individual material conditions dominates social behaviour and outcomes. In relation to violence, rational choice implies that aggression is simply one of the many options in a continuum of possible actions that maximises utility. People are equally capable of peace and violence, the choice being an outcome of rational selection of optimum

action based on cost and benefits. They will choose violence if the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. Such an extremely logical calculation discounts abstract concepts such as values, beliefs, moralities, and loyalties, which explains why they remain a puzzle to rational choice thinkers (Lee, 2016). Given this backdrop, economics mainly accounts for the supply-side of the story of violence given its focus on the opportunities for violence, both in terms of its feasibility and lucrateness, which people readily take if it is seen as profitable.

Political Science

Political science as a discipline deals with states, systems and institutions of government, and the analysis of political life, activity, and behaviour. Political thinkers have been engrossed with ideal features of the state from within. Hobbes (1651/1969) to the “miseries, and horrible calamities, that accompany a civil war” (Hobbes, Ch. 18, para. 18). In the absence of a government, he argues, the situation becomes a condition of mere nature wherein private judgment prevails, and no recognised authority exists to arbitrate disputes and enforce decisions. Violence, therefore, is characterised as the breakdown of authority and subsequent anarchy in the Hobbesian tradition. Hobbesian tradition.

Since Hobbes, the idea of what states owe people, or what constitutes the ‘social contract’, has been greatly expanded. The social contract represents a set of principles that governs the peaceful relationship between the state and its citizens in terms of the distribution of wealth, rights and responsibilities in a civilised society (Rousseau, 1895). Given this context, state capacity is determined not only in terms of ensuring its continued rule, but also in terms of protecting the rights, security, and well-being of all its people. This brings in a new range of characteristic determinants of state weakness that creates favourable conditions for violent conflict. For instance, the inability of state institutions to equitably manage differing group rights, interests, and demands for political participation fractures societies, while failure to provide basic services to all its citizens compromises the state’s legitimacy. Corruption, on the other hand, undermines public trust in government, worsens wealth inequalities, and intensifies socioeconomic grievances. Ultimately, these institutional weaknesses undermine the state’s social contract with the people. These situations of discrimination and injustice

become a mobilising factor for communal violence, especially when a particular group is victimised. It is in such light that political science provides the demand-side of the story of violence, which is understood as consequent to the unaddressed grievances ensuing from institutional failures such as these (Lee, 2016).

Towards an Integrated Research Agenda: The Greed and Grievance Model

Psychology offers perhaps the closest scholarly encounter with violence, given its focus on intrapersonal explanations of aggressive behaviour. Meanwhile, social and cultural identities matter in the generation of violent conflict at the intergroup level. However, thoughts and emotions that lead to violent behaviour are only as relevant as the external stimuli that create them while competition over scarce resources usually precedes intergroup conflict. Put simply, there is nothing automatic about these explanations. They depend on environmental factors that trip the switch to turn on the option of violence.

The greed and grievance model is an attempt at capturing the theoretical explanations through which political and economic factors influence people's attitude towards internecine conflicts (Beath et al., 2013; Blattman & Miguel, 2010; Cramer, 2006b; Keen, 2012). The model originates from contrasting accounts of civil conflicts offered by economics and political science literature (P. Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Nonetheless, it also makes use of individual- and group-level processes to substantiate its assumptions on how environmental causes result in a violent outcome. While derived mainly from cross-country civil war studies, factor determinants emanating from the greed and grievance narrative remain relevant in explaining the dynamics of political violence because civil war has also been examined in terms of violent conflicts albeit at specified magnitudes.

The greed and grievance model is a dichotomous paradigm of conflict determinants. Table 3-1 classifies the interdisciplinary theories discussed in the previous section according to the two sides of this dichotomy. Grievance stresses desperation and inequity, while greed

emphasises calculation and opportunity. The following paragraphs elaborate on greed and grievance discourses separately.

Greed	Grievance
Cognitivism, Rational	Psychodynamic, Emotive
Economic	Political
Supply Side	Demand Side

Table 3-1. The Greed and Grievance Dialectic

Greed is shorthand for the argument that explains conflict in terms of ‘opportunity’ or the circumstances in which people ‘are able’ to rebel. The desire for self-enrichment and self-preservation serves as motivation for combatants in armed conflicts. These urges are regulated by an informal calculation of the costs and benefits of participating in the conflict or otherwise. Violent conflict, therefore, is likely to occur if there is a wide perception of material gains from participating in violent conflict and when waging a rebellion is feasible. The presence of profitable opportunities to seize a portion of a country’s resources provides an effective incentive for participation (P. Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Meanwhile, feasibility typically translates to the presence of favourable circumstances to rebellion such as a weak state security apparatus, which indicates a weak constraint on rebellion.

Within the greed assumption, poor people are driven into conflict because abject economic conditions indicate that they may gain more from taking arms than from peacetime activities (Justino, 2009). When the cost of non-participation is too high, people cannot afford to stay out of conflict, which is usually the case when they need to protect their economic assets in conflict areas (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007). Poor economic conditions are considered indications of a weak state (Fearon, 2008) or the low opportunity cost of rebelling (P. Collier & Hoeffler, 1998). Coupled with abundant natural resources, these are tell-tale signs of an imminent civil conflict, according to greed theorists.

Grievance is shorthand for the argument that explains conflict in terms of ‘motive’ or the circumstances in which people ‘want’ to rebel. Poverty, deprivation, and inequality are said to provoke discontent (Cramer, 2006b), especially when directed against certain identity-

based groups (Beath et al., 2013; Stewart et al., 1997). In segmented societies, economic advancement that appears exclusive to a particular ethnicity, language, religion, or regional group will always be seen by other groups as an unfair exploitative advantage over them (Hirschman & Rothschild, 1973). This may be the reason why the grievance argument has been better known as identity-based issues that motivate people to rebel (P. Collier & Hoeffler, 1998). Nonetheless, the issues that revolve around these social identities have been socioeconomic in nature. Ultimately, conflict is the consequence of failing to peacefully resolve these grievances (Beath et al., 2013). Whether or not people violently act on their grievances partly depends on their perception of how prevalent economic injustice is in the society (Homer-Dixon, 1994).

What Makes People Rebel: Factors Associated with Violent Conflicts

This subsection systematically embarks on the task of introducing determinants of civil war and distinguishing them in terms of their purported relationship with violent conflicts, as prescribed by the greed and grievance narratives. These factors are discussed in turn to provide context and justification for the subsequent empirical testing to be conducted in Chapter Four.

Collective Identity

Samuel Huntington (1993, p. 22) predicts that “the conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating civilisations.” Indeed, many of the wars during the post-Cold War erupted along ethnic and religious lines (Cramer, 2006b; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Nevertheless, more explanatory work is required to determine how ethnicity is associated with outbreaks of conflict (Justino et al., 2013).

Ethnicity is commonly understood as the state of belonging to a particular ethnic group. An ethnic group is a form of social group larger than the family, where membership is typically determined by the descent rule (Fearon, 2006; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). This explains why religion is considered ethnicity in some contexts, for instance in Northern Ireland, where descent rather than profession of faith decides religious affiliation (Fearon, 2006).

Rebellion always faces the ‘collective action’ problem because it is essentially a public good (P. Collier & Hoeffler, 1998). That is, if a rebellion succeeded in achieving social justice, practically everyone benefits. People, therefore, have the incentive to free-ride on the efforts of others, especially with the physical dangers of rebelling. With the expectation of everyone free-riding, in the end no one participates. Against this backdrop, ethnicity offers a solution because ethnic groups tend to be homogenous within and distinct from other groups (Reicher et al., 2010). Collective identities such as religion and ethnicity enhance ingroup members’ trust and customary alliance against the outgroup (Cramer, 2006b).

Greed theorists, notably P. Collier and Hoeffler (1998), argue that civil war is more feasible when there is an adequately large group of people sharing the same ethnicity, a condition recognised as ethnic polarisation. With values of trust, loyalty, and secrecy appreciating in times of rebellion, the transaction costs of waging a civil conflict tend to be higher in ethnically diverse societies; the opposite is observed where there is ethnic polarisation (P. Collier & Hoeffler, 1998, 2004). Religion, meanwhile, reinforces the notion of life after death that becomes a component of an individual’s calculation of costs and benefits (Cramer, 2006b). Indicative of this point, religion is reported to take a vital role in recruiting and motivating potential suicide bombers (Hassan, 2009).

While there may be empirical studies that suggest a correlation between a certain level of ethnic polarisation and organised mass violence (Justino et al., 2013), relatively few scholars take an essentialist perspective (e.g., Horowitz, 1985) on the relationship between ethnicity and incidence of violent conflict (Fearon, 2006). For instance, Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that ethnic divisions must be politicised beforehand to influence the likelihood of war incidence. This happens when there is differential access to political and economic benefits based on ethnicity. The awareness of being trapped in one’s social class prompts class conflicts, thus taking on ethnic overtones (Varshney, 2001). In this regard, it is equally enlightening to observe how measures of violent conflict respond to collective identity when shared misfortunes are part of the mix. Indeed, many scholars favour well-defined collective

grievances to explain identity-based conflicts (e.g., Murshed & Gates, 2005; Østby, 2008a; Stewart, Brown, & Langer, 2008).

Resource/Environmental Factors

Quantitative studies on the resource-conflict nexus have yielded mixed findings on the role of natural resources in civil war onset, duration, and intensity (Ross, 2004). With statistical analysis providing less robust linkages, an array of theoretical explanations has surfaced in the literature, each lacking empirical support.

One of the most publicised interpretations of the resource-conflict nexus is a tributary of the greed model, which has been propagated by Collier and Hoeffler in a series of joint and separate research works (e.g., P. Collier, 2000, 2005; P. Collier & Hoeffler, 1998, 2004). The authors portray rebellion as an organised criminal activity with participants motivated by profits from illicitly appropriating resources for themselves. The abundance of natural resources indicates profitable opportunities, which makes rebellion “feasible and perhaps even attractive” (P. Collier & Hoeffler, 2004, p. 588). They statistically validated this hypothesis by measuring the influence of dependence on primary commodities (e.g., oil, minerals, and agricultural goods) on the likelihood of civil war, which they found to increase conflict risk substantially, among other factors. In a similar vein, other environmental factors, such as rough terrain, poorly served by roads (Fearon & Laitin, 2003) and mountainous and forested topography (Do & Iyer, 2010) should also increase the feasibility of rebellion.

However, the appropriation of revenues from primary commodities through illicit activities does not necessarily translate to criminal intent; many civil conflicts that featured predatory behaviour, also revealed characteristics that suggest grievance-based motivations (Kalyvas, 2001). The causal relationship between primary commodities and conflict may be driven more by agricultural dependence (Humphreys, 2005). Aside from profitable opportunities, the dependence on primary commodities has also been portrayed as an indicator of a weak state apparatus (Fearon, 2005; Ross, 2004). Stewart et al. (2008) suggest that severe group inequality is often a mediating factor that activates a natural resources’ conflict-inducing effect, a mechanism that applies to both separatist struggles and local-level conflicts.

Resource scarcity has been a central topic in the grievance framework (Cramer, 2006b). Kaplan (1994, p. 54) predicts that war and ethnic politics in the next fifty years will follow a form of causal chain in which a preceding factor leads over to the next: “environmental scarcity, cultural and racial clash, geographic destiny and the transformation of war”. Indeed, many countries in the developing world experienced violent conflicts partly because of environmental scarcities (Homer-Dixon, 1994).

Population growth and density may lead to scarcity of natural resources (Homer-Dixon, 1994; Østby, Urdal, Tadjoeeddin, Murshed, & Strand, 2011). Population-induced shortage of natural resources, in turn, triggers intergroup competition, which may take the form of violent conflict given the enabling political and economic conditions (Østby et al., 2011). Nonetheless, resource scarcity in itself increases economic deprivation and weakens the government, mainly through income loss and greater political demands, which in turn causes deprivation conflicts, such as insurgency and civil war (Homer-Dixon, 1994).

Scarcity, however, need not always be the result of an inherent shortage of a resource. At times, it could also be a consequence of existing social relations or economic distribution (Cramer, 2006b). Differential access to resources has been central to major studies on scarcity and political violence (Kahl, 2006). When combined with rapid population growth, environmental scarcity leads to ‘resource capture’ wherein dominant groups in the society shift the resource distribution to their favour, and to the dissatisfaction of the weaker group. Consequently, scarcity may also harden existing divisions among religious, ethnic, or linguistic groups in a process dubbed by Homer-Dixon and Blitt (1998) as ‘social segmentation’. The authors write, “competition among these increasingly distinct groups worsens, which reduces their interactions with each other and with the state” (p. 10).

Socioeconomic and Demographic Factors

According to social revolution scholars, the depth of a person’s discontent with their current economic position in the society substantially influences their motivation to participate in a rebellion (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008). The level of discontentment is determined in

absolute terms or relatively where personal capabilities and aspirations, or the economic status of a pertinent reference group, serve as a benchmark to a person's material welfare. Rationalist theorists, on the other hand, claim that the abject economic condition of the poor in peacetime becomes a comparative advantage in a war scenario (Cramer, 2002). There is less to lose and more to gain from violence in terms of opportunities for the disadvantaged to improve their material well-being, mainly through illicit means.

Absolute and Relative Deprivation

The anonymous state minister who was interviewed by Kaplan (1994 para. 1) describes the war in Sierra Leone and the rest of West Africa as “revenge of the poor, of the social failures, of the people least able to bring up children in a modern society.” Keegan (2011, p. 56) who reflected on the evolution of warfare notes that war's instrumentality expanded from only a way of resolving interstate disputes to “a vehicle through which the embittered, the dispossessed, the naked of the earth, and the hungry masses yearning to breathe free, express their anger, jealousies, and pent-up urge for violence.”

Absolute deprivation occurs when there is a discrepancy between what people get and what they need (Kahl, 2006). The hypothesis that poverty leads to social upheavals has been tested quite frequently (Blattman & Miguel, 2010), which has yielded some affirming results. For instance, countries in the lower half of the United Nations Development Program's (UNDP) human development index (HDI), are proven to be three times more likely to experience internecine conflict compared with the upper half (Van der Lijn, 2006). The HDI, meanwhile, focuses on two measures of deprivation that form a routine part of national surveys: income and education (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008).

Meanwhile, Gurr (1970) defines relative deprivation as the difference between people's ‘value expectations’ and their ‘value capabilities’. Value expectations are the goods and quality of life that people believe they are reasonably entitled to. Value capabilities, meanwhile, are the goods and quality of life that people are capable of achieving or maintaining. Gurr argues that value capabilities in the present are what people have attained,

that is, their achievements. Therefore, relative deprivation occurs when there is a tension between achievements and expectations.

The intensity of relative deprivation strongly determines the possibility of collective violence. Gurr (1970) explains that the frustration-aggression mechanism is the most relevant psychological theory that underpins the link between the two, regardless of any cultural identities. Frustration is a hindrance to the maximisation of one's value capabilities; meanwhile, aggression is the violent behaviour that is directed against the source of frustration.

Deprivation has a strong parentage with the grievance discourse. Both absolute and relative deprivation have a resentment-inducing effect among the inflicted members of the population.

Income

The direct relationship between gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and domestic peace is one of the most robust findings in cross-country statistical studies on civil war (see P. Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Nonetheless, scholars are yet to arrive at a consensus on the explanations underpinning this empirical relationship (Hegre et al., 2009). Fearon and Laitin (2003) used GDP per capita as a measure of the state's capacity to monitor the population and effectively implement counterinsurgency programs. On the other hand, P. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) suppose that the lower the foregone benefit of choosing rebellion over legal economic activities, as indicated by lower GDP per capita, the more likely that people will join rebel groups. Coming from the greed argument, both works look at the level of per capita income that is favourable for rebellion while failing to account for its relationship with poverty (Hegre et al., 2009). Grievance proponents such as Nathan (2008) question the ability of the supposed greed variable in the Collier-Hoeffler model to isolate greed from grievance effects. In particular, she maintains that a low average income per person may also spawn grudges. To this challenge, Collier and Hoeffler admit that the greed variables they used "could also proxy some grievances but are perhaps more obviously related to the viability of rebellion" (p. 536).

Demographics

Previous discussions established that population puts pressure on the environment, and economic and state resources, which aggravate social tensions in the community. With this line of argument, however, demographics are indirect rather than a root cause of political violence. In this regard, scholars argue that a distinctive range of population structures makes civil conflict more likely. For instance, Cincotta et al. (2003) consider ‘youth bulges’ or a high proportion of young people as demographic stress factors of civil conflict.

Cincotta et al. (2003) expect that a high proportion of young people (15-29 years) results in an uneducated, unemployed, and, thus, a frustrated crowd who feel both absolutely and relatively deprived. Furthermore, youth bulges are more volatile if largely represented by young men who are research-proven to be more susceptible to the perpetration of violence than women. Meanwhile, P. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) used male secondary enrolment rate to appraise the opportunity cost of participating in a rebellion. Regardless of the underpinning causal mechanisms provided, both works empirically confirm the existence of a significant link between this demographic feature and the likelihood of social unrest.

Inequality

Cramer (1997, p. 2) describes civil conflict as a “moment of truth”, for it exposes the tension that is otherwise dormant but deeply entrenched within the community. It is suggestive of the civil conflict being the climactic point when existing social cleavages completely fall apart, escalating to large-scale violent aggression. One of the salient systems of stratification across societies focuses on the economic differences among people. As such, the differential distribution of wealth and income has been at the centre of civil conflict discourse.

Quantitative studies have usually looked at vertical inequality or the level of economic disparities among individuals (Østby et al., 2011). The findings, however, are inconclusive at best (Cramer, 2006b; Justino et al., 2013; Østby et al., 2011). Greed proponents (e.g., P. Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003) empirically refute the existence of a significant relationship between the risk of conflict and vertical inequality, the latter being consistently portrayed as a grievance factor in the literature. However, other scholars have

forwarded explanations that are a reminder to regard with prudence the salience of vertical inequality in generating political violence. Cramer (2006b) is one of those who questions the reliability of country-level statistical studies on inequality and civil war. He observes that with regard to economic inequality, “different countries are often measuring different things, when they are trying to measure the same thing” (p. 108). Moreover, Justino et al. (2013) argue that although vertical inequality proves to be an insufficient determinant of violent conflict, it may still be instrumental to collective violence through other, more generative causes. For instance, Tadjoeeddin and Murshed (2007) theorise that vertical inequality may intensify the feeling of grievance through relative deprivation, particularly the frustrations arising due to low monetary returns of education while Welsh (2008) points out that vertical inequality could be a representation of weak law and order.

Haider (2014), on the other hand, encourages analysts to pursue an understanding of violent conflict not in terms of the extent but of the nature of inequality. Indeed, grievances felt at the individual level are not automatically reflected at the group level (Homer-Dixon, 1994). Given that civil war is essentially a form of collective violence (Hegre et al., 2009), inequality must align with a collective identity to effect an outbreak of violence (Haider, 2014; Homer-Dixon, 1994). Social psychology provides solid theoretical foundations for this conjecture. Social identity theory (SIT) postulates that individuals strive to achieve self-worth from their social group and what they get depends on how well their group is doing relative to others (Tajfel & Turner, 2004). When their group has a relatively low social status, it is hardly possible to obtain positive self-worth from their membership. SIT predicts that such a condition coupled with impermeable intergroup boundaries (typical of religious and ethnic divisions) will lead to intergroup intolerance and hostilities.

Quantitative contributions to civil conflict, however, have mostly neglected the collective aspect of economic inequality (Østby et al., 2011). Some analysts have started addressing this gap by looking at the relationship between civil conflict and ‘horizontal inequalities’, which is defined as the inequality among well-defined identity groups in a population (Stewart et al., 2008; Stewart, Brown, & Mancini, 2010; Stewart et al., 1997). The relevance of horizontal inequalities for conflict is underpinned by the interaction between shared

identity and inequality. Shared identity provides a mobilising point for individuals which tends to overcome the collective action problem (Gleditsch, Hegre, & Strand, 2009; Østby, 2008b). Inequality, meanwhile, provides a powerful sense of injustice that can be harnessed by calling on how the relative impoverishment and exploitation individuals experience are attendant on their group identity (Stewart et al., 2010).

Greed or Grievance? The Position of this Thesis in the Dialectic

Using the greed and grievance dichotomy in explaining motivations for support and participation in a civil conflict, this section renders a stocktake of the theoretical determinants of political violence, as acknowledged in the literature. In so doing, it pieced together a comprehensive research agenda towards understanding the dynamics of political violence in the Bangsamoro.

Indeed, the debate over recent years on the causes of war has been channelled towards a focus on the greed and grievance dialectic defining the whole of war (Cramer, 2006b). The stark distinction made between the two, however, has resulted in a lack of consensus as to how these factors trigger armed conflicts. It is, therefore, essential at this point to establish this thesis' position in the dialectic that would frame the subsequent analyses, particularly in the following two chapters. In this regard, the researcher considers the grievance argument as the default analytical perspective of this thesis for a number of reasons.

Greed proponents stress the criminal agenda of rebels and downplay grievance as a motive force behind rebellion and civil conflict (Keen, 2012). For instance, P. Collier and Hoeffler (2000, p. 96) assert that their findings “overwhelmingly point to the importance of economic agenda as opposed to grievance” and that grievance-based explanations of civil war are “seriously wrong.” Such a standpoint effectively delegitimizes political violence (Keen, 2012) and renders inconceivable the view on rebellion as justice-seeking (Kalyvas, 2015). As a frame of analysis, therefore, a greed-based perspective does not conceive of the historical and academic narratives of the Bangsamoro conflict, as presented in the introductory chapter. The historical antecedents and the contemporary political, social, and

economic setting of the Bangsamoro conflict suggest that it resonates more with grievance than greed. The social and economic exclusion reminiscent of the colonial past has either remained to this day or has resulted in other sorts of deprivation, an observation that will further be substantiated in the succeeding section. Either way, there have been no significant developments in the material, social, or political condition of the Moro people since the inception of the separatist movement. A strong discontent with the status quo leads individuals to take extraordinary risks by choosing to participate in armed conflicts (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008).

Greed empiricists are yet to develop measures that are exclusively their own. Going back to the studies conducted by Collier and Hoeffler (see P. Collier, 2000; P. Collier & Hoeffler, 1998, 2004), low male secondary school enrolment rate, low per capita income and low economic growth were taken as proxies for greed, based on the logic that they lower the foregone benefit of choosing rebellion over legal, economic activities. Meanwhile, dependence on primary commodities indicates an abundance of natural resources, and thus more opportunities for looting and extortion. However, previous discussions demonstrate that these supposed greed variables might equally or better be seen as proxies for grievance, which is a downfall of statistical findings supporting the greed logic. Low per capita income, slow economic growth, and lack of access to education lead to material deprivation. High dependence on primary commodities may mean limited economic opportunities while natural resources, if unfairly distributed, may also spawn grudges.

Admittedly, not all cases of large-scale grievance escalate into armed conflict, which brings about the assertion made by Collier (2000) that grievances exist virtually in every society, but only in certain cases is rebellion feasible. In his recent writings, Collier shifts from economic opportunities as the key driving force of rebellion, to an emphasis on its feasibility (see P. Collier, Hoeffler, & Rohner, 2009). However, the presence (or absence) of material conditions favourable to a rebellion works for its survival and success regardless of whether it was greed- or grievance-motivated. Indeed, Collier and his associates maintain that feasibility is independent of a rebel group's motivations. One of the major components of feasibility revolves around state weakness; however, greed proponents simplify feasibility

into a comparison of strength between the state and potential rebels (Keen, 2012). For instance, slow economic growth and lack of reliable roads proxy state weakness, because they undermine the ability of government forces to control an area, thus increasing the feasibility of insurgency.

Stressing the role of good governance

As mentioned earlier, the development-oriented peacebuilding stance of the Philippine Government serves as an impetus to this thesis. As such, the researcher endeavours to put emphasis on the importance of government and governance through the findings of this thesis. It should rather be instinctive in any examination of civil conflicts, considering that the government is one of the two major forces in any threats of insurgency, the other one being the rebel groups.

This thesis, however, diverges from the aspect of state weakness considered by greed proponents in explaining civil conflicts. In focusing on state weakness in terms of its coercive capacity, Bensted (2011, p. 84) writes that Collier and his associates have “unwittingly omitted” other important factors including governance, proper management of natural resources, and the influence of charismatic leadership on rebel groups and considers this a major flaw in Collier’s work. Poor governance strongly influences the opportunity for and feasibility of rebellion because it diminishes the relative strength of the government (Ballentine & Nitzschke, 2003). Like other basic services, keeping peace and security through physical force depends on the habitual actions, processes, and practices involved in governing. Furthermore, weaker political legitimacy has also been associated with lower recruitment and opportunity costs borne by potential challengers (see Ballentine & Nitzschke, 2003).

In rebellions, grievances are usually directed against the state when it is perceived to be an active participant in deprivation or even when it is seen as lethargic in the face of these grievances (Edillon, 2005; Kahl, 2006). The state has been a central figure of grievance-themed theories of conflict. For instance, the ‘hearts and minds’ theory by Berman, Shapiro, and Felter (2011) posits that development programs and services provided by the state reduce

insurgent violence because these initiatives improve the people's attitude toward their government.

Keen (2012) observes that grievance empiricists adopt a more sophisticated approach with regard to the political aspect of civil conflicts. Grievance proponents examine political variables that may thwart or stimulate a rebellion in conjunction with various grievances in different societies. For instance, Caumartin, Molina, and Thorp (2008) observe that despite the high socioeconomic horizontal inequalities, the participation of ethnic groups in Ecuador and Bolivia's mainstream politics discouraged outright rebellion—a sharp contrast with Guatemala and Peru where indigenous groups were marginalised from formal politics. The statistical analysis conducted by Brown (2008) reveals that the relationship between political and socioeconomic horizontal inequalities is highly inclusive. Brown (2008) maintains that conflict is more likely where “political and socioeconomic HIs [horizontal inequalities] are high and run in the same direction.”

Clamour from the Ground: The Current Situation in Moro Land

It is not difficult to confirm that the Moro people remain a victim of political and economic underdevelopment. Based on official statistics, the Bangsamoro region is found at the bottom of the national rankings in practically all indicators of physical and socioeconomic well-being.

The Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) is a development organisation created by the 2001 Tripoli Agreement between the Philippine Government and the MILF. In 2014, the BDA conducted a series of community visioning exercises (CVEs) with the MILF, MNLF, other Moro groups, settlers, and community representatives, the outcome of which forms a chapter in the Bangsamoro Development Plan. The results of the CVEs show that the sources of dissatisfaction are common to all study areas. Furthermore, the findings tie in with parallel research works conducted earlier, namely the survey commissioned by the World Bank in 2003 (see Edillon, 2005), and the multi-sectoral consultation conducted by Palm-Dalupan

(2000). These studies consistently identify inadequate institutions, high poverty, and deprivation of livelihoods and social services as the causes of discontent among the communities in the Bangsamoro. Two of them explicitly link these frustrations to the increased unrest in the region (see BDA, 2015; Palm-Dalupan, 2000).

Table 3-2 compares the ARMM, the rest of Mindanao, and the Philippines across measures of social, political, and material well-being, which clearly show large development gaps between the Bangsamoro region and the rest of the country. The BDA (2015) estimates that at least three decades of sustained public and private investment is needed for the region to reach the 2013 country averages, given its low starting point.

Indicators	ARMM	Mindanao	Philippines
GDP per capita, PHP (2013)			
- in current prices	29,608	79,902	117,603
- in constant prices	14,565	46,050	68,897
Source: PSA-Regional Income Accounts			
Poverty Incidence (% , 2012)	55.8	39.1	25.2
Source: PSA			
Net Enrollment (% , SY 2012–13)			
- primary	72.5	-	95.2
- secondary	26.1	-	64.6
Source: ARMM RDP			
Access to electricity (% HH, 2012)	58.1	81.2	88.8
Source: PSA-FIES			
Access to safe water source (% HH, 2012)	36.6	73.3	79.9
Source: PSA-FIES			
Access to sanitary toilets (% HH, 2012)	22.5	83.6	87.2
Source: PSA-FIES			
Seal of Good Housekeeping (% municipalities, 2013)	6.6	59.7	76.6
Source: DILG			

Note: HH refers to household

Table 3-2. Bangsamoro Development Gaps at a Glance

Source: BDA (2015, p. 23)

Material Condition

After a few decades of the Philippine Government's continued claims of developing Mindanao (Buendia, 2005), official statistics show an unfortunate paradox. In relation to the rest of country, the poverty incidence in the ARMM has been more than twice the country

average (see Figure 3-2). Poverty is multidimensional in that it presses on the various forms of inequality (e.g., income, assets, and access to services), which gravely influences the level of social cohesion in society. It is also concomitant with the government's inadequacy to provide basic services to the people.





Figure 3-2. Poverty Incidence Among Families: ARMM vs. Country Average
 Data Sources: Buendia (2005); Philippine Statistical Authority/PSA (2012a);
 National Anti-Poverty Commission/NAPC (2016a)

ARMM remains the poorest region in the Philippines. It had the highest poverty incidence among families in 2012 and 2015, 46.9% and 53.4%, respectively (NAPC, 2016a). This translates to 1 out of 2 families in the ARMM not having enough income to meet the basic food and non-food necessities.



Note: ARMM outlined in blue

Figure 3-3. Philippine Poverty Incidence Among Families (2015)
Source: NAPC (2016b)

Three out of five of the ARMM provinces are among the 20 poorest in the country (NAPC, 2016a). Lanao del Sur registered the highest poverty incidence at 73.8% in 2012. Poor provinces such as Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur are less populated than better-off provinces; nevertheless, they have the highest household poverty incidence because they have a larger average family size of five to seven members (See Figure 3-3). A larger family size means a greater strain on household resources compared with a smaller non-poor family.

Meanwhile, 83 out of the 116 municipalities in the ARMM have poverty incidences greater than 50% (see Figure 3-4). In relation to the rest of the Philippines, ARMM figures the most number of municipalities (108 of 116) falling under the 25% poorest municipalities in the country (see Figure 3-5).




Figure 3-4. Poverty Incidence by ARMM Municipality
Data Source: PSA (2012b)




Figure 3-5. Count of Municipalities in the Bottom 25% Poorest in the Philippines by Region
Data Source: PSA (2012b)

What are the causes of poverty?

The indigence experienced by the Moro people has been a consequence of limited employment opportunities, an underperforming agricultural sector, and low investment (BDA, 2015). Almost 70 percent of gainful workers in the ARMM depend on the agricultural

sector (see Figure 3-6). On the other hand, the agricultural sector has been highly unstable, showing a declining trend in recent years (see Figure 3-7). Not surprisingly, jobs from the agricultural sector in the ARMM pay one of the lowest wages relative to the rest of the country. Notwithstanding, the ARMM also has the second lowest non-agricultural minimum wage, just a few pesos higher than Region V (see Figure 3-8).

ARMM Share of Agriculture in Total Employment (2013)




Figure 3-6. Share of Agriculture in Total Employment
Data Source: PSA (2013)

Agriculture, Fishery and Forestry Sector Growth (1996–2012)




Figure 3-7. Agriculture, Fishery, and Forestry Sector Growth (1996-2012)
Source: BDA (2015, p. 41)

Agricultural (2013) and Non-Agricultural (2012) Daily Minimum Wage by Region




Figure 3-8. Agricultural and Non-Agricultural Minimum Daily Minimum Wage by Region
Data Sources: PSA (2013); International Labour Organisation/ILO (2012)

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) adds unfinished land reform agenda as a major cause of poverty in the Philippines (cited in NAPC, 2016c). As previously discussed, landlessness remains a major issue among the Moro people because of mass migration and unjust land distribution policies in the past. Half of the municipalities, in fact, have portions of landless households between 56 to 98% while the rest cluster within 25 to 50% (see Figure 3-9). Consequently, the Moro people feel dispossessed of their ancestral lands (Banlaoi, 2011; Tan, 2003). With no lands at their disposal, they are stuck at being landless agricultural workers and collectively form one of the economically marginalised groups in Philippine society.




Figure 3-9. Fraction of Households without Land by Municipality
Data Source: PSA (2010)

Furthermore, the ADB cites governance issues, including corruption and a weak state as antecedents to poverty. In a similar vein, the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC) associates the higher poverty incidence rates in certain regions of the country with ineffective governance and poorly designed anti-poverty interventions (NAPC, 2005).

Social Condition

Better access to services, resources, and opportunities is an effective way for the government to make its presence felt in a marginalised area and to win back the trust of its people (Beath et al., 2016). In terms of measures of living conditions and provision of social infrastructure, however, the Bangsamoro region needs the most attention. It has some of the country's worst

social indicators, particularly in the areas of education, health, water, and sanitation. It has the lowest access to safe drinking water, electricity, sanitation, and health services. Deprivation of these social services, in turn, is one of the sources of injustices that have fuelled the conflict in the region (World Bank, 2005).

Figures 3-10 to 3-13. Different Facets of Social Well-being in the Bangsamoro vs. the Rest of the Philippines

Source: BDA (2015, pp. 73, 75, 77)




Figure 3-10. Educational Attainment, 18 Years Old and Above, 2011




Figure 3-11. Government Health Workers per 100,000 Population, 2011




Figure 3-12. Percent of Households with Access to Improved Safe Water Supply, 2011





Figure 3-13. Percent of Households with Access to Sanitary Toilet Facilities, 2011

Good Governance

Former President Aquino believed that structural reforms must be implemented to deliver the gains of lasting peace and sustainable development in the Bangsamoro. During the Framework Agreement with the MILF, he said, "many of the people continue to feel alienated by the system, and those who feel that there is no way out will continue to articulate their grievances through the barrel of a gun" (OGRP, 2012 para. 3). The Bangsamoro Development Plan also emphasises the need for governance reforms to achieve the normalisation and development goals for the region (BDA, 2015).

Clearly, a credible and legitimate public sector is key to addressing systemic problems in the Bangsamoro region. However, the ARMM government has constantly been associated with weak governance (BDA, 2015; Rasul, 2014). Corruption and mismanagement of resources have hounded governance in the ARMM for decades. These factors, in turn, have resulted in the region remaining the least-served and poorest region in the country (Rasul, 2014).

As of 2016, only four out of the 115 ARMM municipalities have received the Seal of Good Local Governance (Philippine Information Agency/PIA, 2016). To be conferred with this recognition, a local government unit (LGU) must have demonstrated a sustained practice of transparency, accountability, and participation. LGUs are also evaluated in terms of their performance in various areas including social protection, peace and order, disaster preparedness, and environmental management. Those awarded with the Seal are entitled to a package of incentives such as the Performance Challenge Fund and access to other national performance-based programs. In 2011, meanwhile, less than 40 percent of its municipalities (44 of 115) passed the seal of good financial housekeeping, making ARMM the second worst performing region in the country (see Figure 3-14). As of 2016, only two ARMM municipalities were added to the list (PIA, 2016).



**Figure 3-14. Fraction of Municipal Governments with
'Seal of Good Housekeeping' by Region (2011)**

Data Source: Bureau of Local Government Supervision/BLGS (2011)

Meanwhile, the State of Local Democracy (SoLD) assessment conducted in the ARMM by the Philippine Center for Islam and Democracy (PCID) and the University of the Philippines National College of Public Administration and Governance (UP-NCPAG), reveals that LGUs generally need to improve in the area of participatory governance (see Rasul, 2014). Their findings suggest the prevalence of 'protective politics' in local government, wherein officials encourage participation from their supporters but not from the general population. Respondents from the municipalities and villages registered a general perception of minimal engagement from their local governments. Participation happens only during the election period when people are asked about their opinions on issues. After the election, the process of participation is over.

Involving all stakeholders in the formulation of development programs promotes a sense of ownership of the prospects of the peacebuilding. As the MILF Chairman Murad Ebrahim said, "further development can only be effective when it is people-centered. One that is determined and undertaken by its ultimate beneficiaries. One that empowers people and its processes empowering" (BDA, 2015, p. 112).

Moving Forward: Causal Validation

In this chapter, theories explaining people's engagement in violent conflicts were explored. Narratives telling how the Moro people have lived in a vicious cycle of injustice, poverty, and conflict for generations has also been further substantiated. At this juncture, the outcomes of this chapter need to be empirically validated with the data on the Bangsamoro conflict as explored in Chapter 2. The next chapter proceeds with the empirical investigation on the precursors to the conflict from the insights and propositions that these discussions have generated.

Chapter 4

Development Correlates of the Bangsamoro Conflict: Evidence from a Quantitative Subnational Analysis

Essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful.

George Box, *Empirical Model-Building and Response Surfaces*

Introduction

This thesis conducts a within-country empirical analysis of the Bangsamoro conflict in the Philippines. Such an approach allows for the construction of finer measures of conflict intensity, rather than just using a dummy variable as to whether an area experiences conflict or not (Do & Iyer, 2010). In particular, this thesis analyses the frequency of political violence reported within a Bangsamoro municipality from 2011 to 2015. Recalling the conceptualisation made earlier, political violence is mainly characterised as encounters between the rebel groups and the government's armed forces.

This thesis tests whether the theories commonly invoked in the cross-country literature are also at work when looking 'within' a country. These theories were presented in the previous chapter as the motivating factors to people's participation in a civil conflict. These factors'

influence on participation is explained in terms of greed or grievance. In the same chapter, the grievance model was justified as the appropriate analytical perspective for this thesis' purpose. The material, social, and political conditions that are believed to be sources of frustration among the Moro people were also explored. These conditions constitute the concept of economic development endorsed in this thesis. Accordingly, they provide focus to the empirical analysis that follows.

With this recap provided, this chapter proceeds by further comprehending the conflict in terms of its statistical relationships with different aspects of economic development. It renders a thorough account of the processes undertaken by the researcher to bring the reader closer to an understanding of the relationship between economic development and the Bangsamoro conflict. Most importantly, it reports the outcome of the quantitative analysis.

This chapter is organised into three major sections. The first section provides an analytical framework for studying the relationship between geographical distributions of development and conflict, which provides practical logic to the empirical analysis that follows. It also provides an account of the formulation of hypotheses to be tested. The second section describes the operationalisation of the hypotheses, presents the overall empirical model, and justifies the chosen statistical technique for the empirical analysis. The third section presents and discusses the empirical findings.

Analytical Model: Geography, Poverty, and Political Violence

Most theoretical accounts of civil conflict tend to be geographic in the sense that they explain why violent conflicts erupt in certain areas but not in others. They make sense of the spatial aspect of the conflict by taking local issues and core-periphery relations into account (Hegre et al., 2009). Murshed and Gates (2005), for example, predict that conflict will be more intense in disadvantaged areas in terms of human development indicators and land ownership. Similarly, Iyer and Do (2007) expect conflict intensity to be considerably higher in places with greater poverty and lower levels of economic development. Relative

deprivation arguments imply the same on locations that are relatively poor and are marginalised by the central government (Hegre et al., 2009). Meanwhile, the mechanism by which these factors might affect the likelihood of conflict is explained in terms of support provided by segments of the population who are discontented with the status quo in those areas. Support may be in the form of intelligence gathering, economic contributions, places to hide or set up bases, or as recruits for the rebel army.

Using a similar approach, this thesis determines whether economic underdevelopment has effects on the location of political violence in the Bangsamoro region. For this purpose, there is a need to identify a geographic unit of analysis that allows for the systematic evaluation of the geographical variance of violent incidences in relation to different measures of economic development. For this thesis, the investigation is conducted at the level of municipalities. A municipality is an administrative division in the Philippines that is authorised by law to enact local policies, enforce them, and govern their jurisdictions. Most of the measures of economic well-being available from official sources in the Philippines can be aggregated at the municipality level. More importantly, municipalities have their own local government units, which allows for large-scale comparison of the quality of local governance. The ARMM comprises 115 municipalities divided among five provinces.

Concern about the spatial analysis of civil conflicts, however, is that it is possible for rebel groups to receive support from one location but target another. It is also not impossible for violence to spill over, particularly in contiguous zones. However, there must be local characteristics that set apart municipalities where the conflict is observed to be intense from other municipalities where conflict is absent. Pertinent research works do assume that areas where violent incidences are most frequent reflect local conditions and the degree of support. Such an assumption lies in the fact that civil conflicts generally display an asymmetrical relationship between the government and a rebel group, wherein the latter tend to be a weaker opponent at least in military terms (Hultman, 2007). Hegre et al. (2009) logically demonstrate that in asymmetric conflicts, it is reasonable to expect the government armed forces to bring and contain the fighting in rebel areas while the rebels are inclined to protect their bulwarks.

In order to generate testable implications regarding the location of violent conflicts within Liberia, Hegre et al. (2009) develop the concepts ‘support level’ and ‘target value’. These concepts are not observable per se but used by the authors to formulate conjectures that can be tested with available data. Support level refers to the degree to which a population is likely to support either the rebel group or the government in a civil conflict scenario depending on the general welfare in the locality. Target value, meanwhile, translates to the degree to which a location is a valuable target for either group. The degree to which a local population supports a party to the conflict increases its target value to the other.

With limited resources, opponents will attack or defend locations that are valuable militarily or economically. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that actors seek to protect areas where the local population is supportive and to attack areas that support the opponent. Given similar strategies of actors to a civil conflict, Hegre et al. (2009) posit that the parties’ relative strengths determine where the clash occurs. They based their logic on Kenneth Boulding’s ‘loss-of-strength gradient’ (see Figure 4-1).




Figure 4-1. Boulding's Loss-of-Strength Gradient

Source: Hegre et al. (2009, p. 602)

Given parties to the conflict A and B, the vertical axis indicates A and B's military strength while the horizontal axis represents the physical distance between their home bases, points L_A and L_B , which partly coincide with differences in support levels for A and B. Obviously, both parties will opt to target locations that support the opposition. However, the closer a party launches an attack on the opponent's home base, the higher the likelihood of defeat and

the number of casualties. Boulding's model suggests that both parties are willing and able to engage each other at location L_C where their military strengths intersect. Skirmishes, therefore, tend to occur in such areas. If A is considerably weaker than B, clashes will erupt in locations closer to L_A . Generally, these are also locations that support A.

“The implication is that clashes are more frequent in locations with high support levels for the weaker party to the conflict” (Hegre et al., 2009, p. 601). In the context of this thesis, the model implies that fights between the government armed forces and rebels will occur where the rebel groups get support, the rebels being the weaker challenger than the government. The authors, meanwhile, used this framework to examine where clashes between the Liberian armed forces and rebels occur in geographical cells as small as 76 square kilometres. The average municipality in the ARMM extends to approximately 300 square kilometres, which means that the abovementioned assumptions may hold better in the geographical specification selected for this thesis.

Furthermore, the analytical model for this thesis cannot be easily dismissed on abstract, logical grounds alone. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that the inferences presented above resonate with the dynamics of the conflict on the ground. Through proximity, the MILF creates general conditions that favour a functional relationship between the rebel group and nearby communities, which often are current and former MILF members, their kith and kin, and their extended families (Özerdem et al., 2010; Taya, 2007). In Chapter Two, it was mentioned that one of the strategies of the MILF is to create alternate political and military structures under its spheres of influence. These structures operate within the municipality, even down to the barangay (village), according to Moro traditions and practices, to compete with the Philippine Government in terms of social, economic, political, and military control over these areas. In return, the communities near MILF camps offer support to the group. Meanwhile, the municipality of Datu Piang in the province of Maguindanao registers one of the highest incidences of political violence in the data. It is partly home to Camp Omar, the fort of the 105th Brigade of the MILF. Commander Umbra Kato, the charismatic Islamist who leads the 105th base command, has deep roots in the area being a native of Kitango, one of the villages of Datu Piang (Pinol, 2011).

Arriving at Hypotheses: Possible Developmental Issues Affecting the Frequency of Political Violence in the Bangsamoro

There is no single cause of conflict. The review previously conducted on the explanative theories of conflict emphasises that it is rather context-dependent, multidimensional, and consequent to a range of factors. Generally, these factors could be: socioeconomic (e.g., inequality, marginalisation, poverty, weakened social cohesion); institutional (e.g., weak government institutions, political exclusion, breaches of social contract); resource and environmental (e.g., resource scarcity, unjust resource allocation, greed and feasibility); and identity-based. Given this thesis' focus on composites of economic development, it takes a particular interest in potential socioeconomic, institutional, and, to some extent, resource and environmental factors related to the Bangsamoro conflict. Nonetheless, observing how they interact with other factors is essential to ensure that the empirical model has a much closer fit to reality as possible.

Two parameters were utilised in formulating the hypotheses to be verified in this thesis, capitalising on what was learned from the previous chapter. First, the central analytical perspective that informs the formulation of the following hypotheses is the grievance paradigm. Second, a crucial role is given to institutional factors in explaining the occurrence of conflict. Given that political violence has been conceptualised primarily as conflicts between rebels and the government, the latter is assumed to hold authorship of most causes of collective frustration, which means that the sources of grievances are outcomes of the political system. Government weakness, therefore, creates conditions for violent conflict. Having presented these parameters, the following paragraphs discuss these factors and suggest mechanisms by which these could be associated with the frequency of political violence in the Bangsamoro region.

Recall from the previous chapter two channels through which resource scarcity leads to conflict. First, the depletion of natural resources, through loss of income and greater political demands, leads to material deprivation and weak government. Second, shortage of natural resources can be transformed to collective frustration, through the process of intergroup

competition over these scarce resources. Given such a scenario, dominant groups in the society may shift the resource distribution to their favour and to the dissatisfaction of the weaker group.

Hypothesis 1: Resource scarcity increases the risk of frequent political violence in a region.

The likelihood of frequent political violence may also be influenced by socioeconomic factors through their generative role in social cohesion and connectedness. The previous chapter explained how poverty and marginalisation might contribute to conflict in terms of their association with perceived injustices and forms of exclusion among groups. These perceptions, in turn, increase the disadvantaged group's feeling of alienation from and animosity toward the wider society. Over time, such collective frustration can foster group mobilisation and fuel violent conflict.

Meanwhile, several causes and manifestations of poverty and marginalisation particular to the Moro experience were covered in the previous chapter. These include poor education, lack of economic opportunities, and landlessness. Among these factors, landlessness is expected to have the largest aggravating influence on political violence because it has been a major issue in the Bangsamoro conflict with origins harking back to the Philippines' colonial past.

Hypothesis 2: Poverty is associated with increased incidences of political violence.

Hypothesis 3: Lack of economic opportunity and insecure income sources are associated with increased incidences of political violence.

Hypothesis 4: Landlessness is associated with increased incidences of political violence.

People care about their relative well-being, and the relative status of their in-group can be a source of contentment or frustration. Recently, more analysts contend that it is relative deprivation and inequality, not absolute poverty per se, that make conflicts more likely (Haider, 2014). Meanwhile, statistical findings that refute the aggravating role of inequality

in civil conflicts have done so by analysing such a condition at the individual level. However, there is growing empirical evidence suggesting that disparity among well-defined identity groups in a population explains occurrences of conflict better and, hence, should be the focus of subsequent studies.

Hypothesis 5: Relative deprivation is a contributing factor to the increased incidences of political violence in an area.

Hypothesis 6: Group inequality is a contributing factor to the increased incidences of political violence in an area.

Government responses are crucial in whether societal level dissatisfaction turns violent. If it reacts severely to non-violent protests, as opposed to finding redress to alienation, chances of people resorting to violence are more likely. Meanwhile, socioeconomic and political causes of conflict are underpinned by their association with the breakdown of the government's social contract with the people. The previous chapter characterised the social contract as a set of standards that guides the peaceable relationship between the government and the governed. The degeneration of systems of redistribution, inability to provide basic services, and failure to peacefully manage intergroup tensions and accommodate demands for political participation may be considered breaches of the social contract on the part of the government. Moreover, these institutional failures hinder people's ability to be and to do (Edillon, 2005).

Hypothesis 7: Frequent political violence is less likely to occur in administrative areas with better public or communal provision of basic services.

Hypothesis 8: Frequent political violence is less likely to occur in administrative areas where institutional support for economic development is high.

Hypothesis 9: Frequent political violence is less likely to occur in administrative areas with good governance practices.




Figure 4-2. Bangsamoro Conflict Choropleth Map, 2011-2015
Data Source: BCMS

Empirical Model: Statistical Analysis

As shown in Figure 4-2, incidences of political violence per municipality range between 0 and 60, with most municipalities registering as low as 1 and as high as 30. The subsequent analysis capitalises on the differences in the incidence of political violence experienced by the municipalities in testing the hypotheses. The aim is to determine whether the frequency of violent incidences among municipalities varies correspondingly with the quantifiable indicators of economic development. The results are used to derive generalizable characteristics that may predict which municipalities will witness more violent conflicts and which will have less. In order to do all of these, proxy variables for the explained, explanatory, and control variables must be identified.

Proxy Variables

A proxy variable is a measurable indicator that is used in place of a variable that, otherwise, is hardly possible to measure. A proxy is selected based on its high correlation with the variable of interest. This section presents selected proxies of the explained and the explanatory variables. To have as close a simulation of the real conflict environment as possible, it is important to observe how the hypothetical factors influence the frequency of political violence in the presence of other factors. Accordingly, this section also presents some control variables that are included in the empirical analysis.

Explained Variable

Because there is no universally accepted conceptual definition of civil conflict to date, a clear consensus on the optimal way to measure it in a quantitative analysis is yet to be achieved. In this thesis, the empirical analysis considers the incidences of political violence, operationalised in terms of encounters between the government's armed forces and the rebel groups, for reasons extensively covered in Chapter Two. Several studies also serve as precedents in choosing this proxy (e.g., Barron et al., 2004; Beath et al., 2013; Berman, Callen, et al., 2011; Edillon, 2005; Hegre et al., 2009).

Explanatory Variables

Given that this thesis examines a spatially referenced event, it also requires a corresponding explanatory data structure. Municipalities are administrative territories constituting the Bangsamoro region, which provide the basic data structure for the empirical model. The municipality is chosen as the unit of analysis for this thesis because the explained variable is reported at the same level of geographical specification. Moreover, it also captures the variability in terms of local government performance. Accordingly, the explanatory variables comprise municipal-level data on population, household, and institutional characteristics.

Population Pressure as a Measure of Resource Scarcity

Population pushes natural resources to its limits (Homer-Dixon, 1994; Kahl, 2006). Several observers find demographic events, such as high population useful for studying how resource scarcity may trigger violent action (e.g., Barron et al., 2004; De Soysa, 2002; Homer-Dixon, 1994; Østby et al., 2011; Raleigh & Urdal, 2007; Urdal, 2005). Given these precedents, the empirical model includes population to capture resource scarcity (based on Barron et al., 2004).

Measures of Absolute Poverty and Well-being

Unemployment is taken as an indicator of poverty and monitored as the municipality-level share of the working age population (15-65 years) who are deprived of gainful work (based on Barron et al., 2004). Meanwhile, it is equally instructive to observe how alternate scenarios (i.e., material well-being) influence the intensity of the conflict. Having said this, measures of material welfare and conflict intensity are expected to move in opposite directions, based on a grievance perspective. There are two proxies for material welfare that form part of the empirical model: 1) educational attainment (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008) observed as the proportion of the working-age population who are high school graduates or better; 2) household-level welfare examined as the proportion of households with access to electricity (based on Crost et al., 2014).

Agricultural Employment as a Measure of Limited Economic Opportunity

The causal relationship between primary commodities and conflict may be driven more by agricultural dependence. Considering that the lowest paying jobs in the region are generally found in the agricultural sector, the percentage of the working-age population

engaged in agricultural work is considered as an indication of the absence of other better economic opportunities in a municipality (based on Barron et al., 2004).

Measure of Landlessness

Land dispossession of farming communities may lead to rebellion, especially when the dispossessed belong to separate and distinct ethnic or religious groups. This is pertinent to the process of land dispossession of the Moro people, which also has deep roots in the country's colonial past. To analyse the issue of landlessness in the region, the proportion of households in a municipality that holds no land is considered a proxy variable (based on Murshed & Gates, 2005).

Measures of Relative Well-being

Gurr (1970/2015) suggests that the relative deprivation of a particular group can be observed by measuring the gap between its collective achievements and aspirations. Achievement and aspiration are calculated respectively based on the indicators used by Magdalena (1977). Achievement is taken as a composite index of households with radios, flush toilets, and electric lights. Meanwhile, aspiration is taken as the share of the population completing high school or better, having the assumption of a close correlation between educational attainment and people's material expectations. To be able to calculate the ratio between achievement and aspiration, each indicator is transformed into a standard score (or z-score) producing two comparable scales. Note that a high ratio means low relative deprivation, and hence an inverse relationship with the frequency of political violence. Although the relationship between group inequality and political violence was hypothesised (H6), as prescribed by the review of literature, the available data at a municipal scale does not allow for comparison of different groups' well-being. Consequently, this particular hypothesis cannot be empirically tested.

Institutional factors: Measures of Government Response/Non-response

Empirical evidence of government response (or non-response) to community-level grievances is examined in terms of the provision of basic social services, government support to the economic development of their respective jurisdiction, and markers of good governance. Government performance in providing basic social services is taken as the share of barangays (villages) with access to community waterworks, hospitals, and secondary schools (based on Edillon, 2005). It is assumed that if such communal facilities are present in the villages, then households are able to access them. Additionally, 'social

governance index', a composite of each local government units' performance ratings in the areas of health and education; housing and basic utilities; and peace and security, is also considered in the empirical model as a proxy for the government's capacity in social service provision. Meanwhile, government support in economic development is examined in terms of the level of public investment in existing industries and business enterprise. This is captured by calculating the 'economic governance index', a composite of each local government's performance ratings in support of the agriculture and fisheries sector and promoting business and industry. Lastly, good governance practice is scrutinised in terms of each local government's performance ratings in the areas of transparency, participation, and financial accountability. These performance markers, in turn, constitute the composite for 'fundamentals of governance index'.

Control Variables

Control variables are included in the empirical model. They are also potentially associated with the location of clashes, as informed by the literature on civil conflict. In particular, the greed perspective focuses on the presence or absence of these factors as indications of opportunities and overall feasibility of material self-gain by igniting a rebellion. The grievance perspective, on the other hand, generally maintains that the relationship between these factors and conflict is not automatic, but dependent on other factors. These variables are introduced into the empirical analysis the same way as the explanatory variables. This way, the analysis will have a closer resemblance to reality wherein development factors, in shaping the conflict, have dynamics with other variables. While not a primary interest to this thesis, their effects on instances of political violence are reported in the findings.

Measures of Collective identity

From the previous chapter, collective identities such as religion and ethnicity figure prominently in civil conflict literature as a point of mobilisation into politicised, radical movement. Given this assumption, the larger the share of Muslim population in a municipality implies the ease of garnering support against the government (based on Magdalena, 1977). On the other hand, it is reasonable to expect that a high level of ethnic diversity would have a counteracting effect on the frequency of political violence in a locality. As discussed in Chapter Three, the transaction costs of running a rebellion, as implied by the stricter need for trust, loyalty, and secrecy, tend to be higher in ethnically

diverse societies. Diversity is empirically captured by computing ‘ethnic fractionalisation’, a measure of the probability that two randomly drawn individuals in a municipality are from different ethnicities (based on Fearon & Laitin, 2003).

Measures of Feasibility

Fearon (2008) considered roads as an indication of the feasibility of rebellion. In particular, he posits that the existence of roads and other communication networks lessen the possibility of conflict by making it harder for an emerging rebel group to hide. On the other hand, bad roads could also be a source of frustration among the people, as the survey conducted by the World Bank revealed for some of the poorest communities in the Philippines (see Edillon, 2005). Either way, quality roads can be expected to thwart the possibility of violent incidences in an area. In turn, this can be empirically captured by measuring ‘road density’ or the concentration of paved roads in a region (based on Murshed & Gates, 2005).

Meanwhile, the large proportion of young men implies a great availability of potential recruits as rebel soldiers, which makes it easier and even cheaper to start a rebellion. On the other hand, the relationship between conflict and youth bulges can be explained by the latter’s close correlation with the number of uneducated, unemployed, and, hence, frustrated members of society. In this regard, it may be more elucidating to focus on the direct sources of frustration at the societal level. This distinctive demographic feature can be empirically observed by taking the proportion of the male population who are 15-29 years old (based on Cincotta et al., 2003).

Empirical Model at a Glance

Table 4-1 presents the empirical model. With the aid of statistical analysis, generalizable insights about the determinants of political violence are drawn from this model. The findings serve as inputs to policy recommendations on peacebuilding in the Bangsamoro region, which is discussed in a different chapter.

Table 4-1. Empirical Model at a Glance

Factors	Basis in the Civil Conflict Literature	Hypothesised relationship w/ political violence	Proxy Variable(s)
Resource Scarcity	Resource	Positive	Population (log form)
Poverty	Absolute Deprivation	Positive	Unemployed (%)
Material Well-being	Absolute Deprivation	Negative	High school grad or better (%) Households with electricity (%)
Lack of Economic Opportunity	Absolute Deprivation	Positive	Agriculturally employed (%)
Landlessness	Absolute Deprivation	Positive	Households without land (%)
Relative Deprivation	Relative Deprivation	Positive	Relative deprivation (z-score)
Group Inequality	Inequality	Positive	No data available
Social Services	Institutional Weakness	Negative	Social governance index Villages with hospitals (%) Villages with waterworks (%) Villages with high schools (%)
Support to Economic Development	Institutional Weakness	Negative	Economic governance index
Good Governance	Institutional Weakness	Negative	Fundamentals of governance index
Collective Identity	Collective Identity	Control Variable	Ethnic fractionalisation Muslim population (%)
Road Density	Environmental Feasibility	Control Variable	Road density (km/km ²)
Youth Bulge	Demographic Feasibility	Control Variable	Young male (%)

Data Sources

As discussed in Chapter two, municipal level data on incidences of political violence are culled from the Bangsamoro Conflict Monitoring System (BCMS). Meanwhile, there are two main sources for the explanatory variables. The population- and household- based variables are derived from the 2010 Census of the Population and Housing (CPH) conducted by the Philippine Statistical Authority (PSA). From the 2010 CPH, explanatory variables are extracted at the municipal level. In general, a national census has high reliability because of standardised questionnaires, random sampling, and large sample sizes. The PSA also spends resources on training enumerators and data processing staff

and developing standard procedures and manuals to guide the survey process. These measures, in turn, address potential sources of measurement errors.

The institution-based data are collected from the Local Government Performance Management System (LGPMS). The LGPMS is a national information system on local governments managed by the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). It is an online database that keeps a record of information on the state of local governance performance in terms of governance and development indicators. Through the LGPMS, local government units (LGUs) are informed of their strong and weak points in the delivery of essential public services. Independent studies attest to the efficacy of the LGPMS as a performance measurement and management tool for LGUs (e.g., Adriano & Estimada, 2014).

Deciding on a Statistical Model

One purpose of this thesis is to better understand the frequency of violent episodes in Bangsamoro municipalities from 2011 to 2015. In terms of measurement, the explained variable takes the form of count data, which have discrete values (i.e., 0, 1, 2, and so on) indicating the number of occurrences of an event in a fixed period. Cox, West, and Aiken (2009) caution against analysing count data with the most commonly used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model. A standard OLS model assumes a linear relationship between the explained and explanatory variables wherein a unit increase in the explanatory variables increases or decreases the probability of some event with a fixed number (i.e., homoscedasticity). This is not the usual case for count data, such as the instances of political violence. At some levels of an explanatory variable the likelihood of violent occurrences may increase, but not at a fixed rate (i.e., heteroscedasticity).

A simple histogram also shows that statistically analysing the data with an OLS regression model is less appropriate. The distribution of political violence across the municipalities appears to be positively skewed having low-count observations, which is typical of count variables (see Figure 4-4). The explained data being strongly skewed to the right violates the conditional normality assumption (see Figure 4-3) of the OLS regression.




Figure 4-4. Frequency Distribution of Political Violence across Bangsamoro Municipalities




Figure 4-3. Normal Distribution




Figure 4-5. Poisson Distribution

Proceeding with OLS regression for the analysis, given issues with heteroscedasticity and non-normal distribution, may result in biased standard errors and inefficient statistical significance tests (Coxe et al., 2009). Ultimately, the empirical model's statistical power to detect true effects may be affected. Meanwhile, Figure 4-4 more closely resembles a Poisson distribution (see Figure 4-5), which is indeed typical of count data. Accordingly, a type of Poisson analysis should be a more appropriate choice.

There are several available choices in the Poisson family of regression models. Stata 12 supports standard Poisson, negative binomial, and zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) regression models, among others. In this regard, several diagnostics resulted in the negative binomial regression analysis as the most appropriate model, given the features of the data collected. A detailed discussion of these tests forms part of Appendix A.

Methodological Challenges and Weaknesses

In the process of formulating the hypotheses, popular support has been emphatically positioned in between the occurrence of political violence and development issues in a municipality. While not directly observed, popular support is considered to be an inbuilt variable to the analysis, given the assumption that rebels cannot operate in a location without a certain level of community support. This assumption is reinforced by logical and empirical grounds on how local issues influence people's attitude towards the government and rebel groups, which were retrieved from previous studies pertinent to the topic and the Bangsamoro case itself. Recalling the discussions, it was learned that social

issues easily sway people into alternate ideologies, and that rebel groups, in fact, create strongholds amid supportive communities.

The analysis is carried out by applying cross-country statistical analysis to a within-country context. Consequently, the researcher has encountered some issues with regard to operationalising the explanatory variables. For instance, some of the data are aggregated to larger geographical specifications (e.g., national, regional, provincial). There were serious efforts to disaggregate the information at the municipal level, but due to data unavailability, the hypothesis on group inequality cannot be tested empirically. Information on some municipalities is also missing.

It is understood that frustration needs to brew and transform into actual aggression. An incidence of conflict, therefore, takes time to occur. An additional issue is that of endogeneity. In cross-sectional regression analysis, the direction of causal relationship tends to be ambiguous (Flaten, 2012). This is especially true for conflicts which may also cause destruction and poverty. These concerns are addressed by lagging the explanatory variables or observing them at an earlier period relative to the explained variable. Given that the conflict data were collected from 2011 to 2015, the explanatory data mostly come from 2010 reports. The situation observed in 2010 can be considered to be a carryover of situations of the more distant past, particularly the historical narrative of the Moro conflict explored in Chapter One. The practice of lagging the explanatory variables also reduces the threat of reverse causation (Flaten, 2012; Hegre & Sambanis, 2006).

Finally, there is also the need to alleviate the risk of multicollinearity. In a regression equation, multicollinearity happens when an explanatory variable is highly correlated with one or more of the other explanatory variables. Multicollinearity is a reason for concern because it undermines the statistical significance of the explanatory variables (Allen, 1997). It is suspected to be true for government performance indicators. Accordingly, a bivariate analysis is conducted before proceeding with the regression analysis to check for multicollinearity. Highly correlated explanatory variables must then be tested separately in different permutations of the empirical model.

Empirical Findings

Descriptive Statistics

The summary statistics of the explained and explanatory variables are presented in Table 4-2. Political violence is a cumulative count of reported clashes/encounters between the military and rebels from 2011 to 2015. The explanatory variables were collated from official government reports in 2010.

Table 4-2. Summary Statistics of the Explained and Explanatory Variables

Proxy variables	Mean	Standard Deviation
Political violence (count)	4.00	9.00
Population (log form)	10.00	0.55
Unemployed (%)	0.52	0.07
High school grad or better (%)	0.29	0.15
Households w/ electricity (%)	0.54	0.30
Agriculturally employed (%)	0.65	0.17
Households w/ land (%)	0.54	0.20
Relative deprivation (z-score)	0.63	5.36
Social governance index	3.77	0.89
Economic governance index	3.06	1.03
Fundamentals of governance index	4.04	0.69
Villages w/ hospitals (%)	0.02	0.05
Villages w/ waterworks (%)	0.23	0.25
Villages w/ high school (%)	0.19	0.13
Ethnic fractionalisation	0.17	0.21
Muslim population (%)	0.94	0.15
Road density (km/km ²)	0.02	0.02
Young male (%)	0.13	0.01

Bivariate Analysis: Kendall tau-b Correlation Coefficient

The analysis commences with a bivariate correlation analysis between all of the variables (see Table 4-3). For this purpose, the Kendall tau-b correlation coefficient is used. The Kendall tau-b is a nonparametric measure of strength and direction of the correlation, as opposed to causality, that exists between two variables. Non-parametric statistics do not require the data to fit any model distribution (e.g., normal, Poisson). The Kendall tau-b is considered an alternative to the Spearman rank-order correlation for data with a small

sample size and with many tied ranks. Many municipalities have reported zero incidences of political violence, which would transform them into tied ranks given an ordinal scale analysis. Like Spearman, the Kendall tau-b transforms two continuous variables into ordinal-scale data. It then proceeds with measuring the concordance between the resulting two columns of rank data. Noether (1981) provides a detailed discussion of the step-by-step process involved in the Kendall tau.

Table 4-3. Kendall Tau-b Correlation Coefficient

Proxy Variables		A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
A.	Political violence	1								
B.	Population	.19	1							
C.	Unemployed	-.14	.01	1						
D.	High school grad or better	-.15	.22	.21	1					
E.	Households electricity	-.04	-.04	.26	0.43	1				
F.	Agriculturally employed	-.08	-.13	.15	-.32	-.27	1			
G.	Households w/o land	.15	.22	-.05	.02	-.18	-.03	1		
H.	Relative deprivation	.01	.14	-.06	-.03	-.11	-.04	.15	1	
I.	Social governance	-.14	-.02	.07	.25	.32	-.19	-.10	-.06	1
J.	Economic governance	-.09	.05	.12	.23	.28	-.13	.02	.02	.52
K.	Fundamentals of governance	-.06	.06	.09	.25	.29	-.14	.03	-.02	.45
L.	Villages w/ hospitals	.06	.39	.08	.29	.03	-.05	.18	.01	.02
M.	Villages w/ waterworks	.02	.12	.21	.02	.12	.15	.05	.06	.12
N.	Villages w/ high school	-.04	.17	.02	.04	-.14	.01	.24	.06	.02
O.	Ethnic fractionalisation	.14	.20	-.14	-.08	-.18	.12	.33	.03	-.16
P.	Muslim population	-.11	-.19	.14	-.01	.10	.02	-.19	.01	.03
Q.	Road density	-.02	.13	-.06	.19	.09	-.16	-.03	-.07	.04
R.	Young male	.09	.27	-.13	.02	-.13	-.08	.19	-.03	-.03
		J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R
J.	Economic governance	1								
K.	Fundamentals of governance	.39	1							
L.	Villages w/ hospitals	-.03	.04	1						
M.	Villages w/ waterworks	.13	.12	.15	1					
N.	Villages w/ high school	.04	.05	.08	.04	1				
O.	Ethnic fractionalisation	-.05	-.05	.07	.13	.11	1			
P.	Muslim population	-.04	-.01	-.10	-.15	-.16	-.57	1		
Q.	Road density	.06	.06	.14	-.11	-.02	0	-.04	1	
R.	Young male	-.01	-.05	.19	-.04	.29	.30	-.28	.05	1

The Kendall tau-b validates the hypothesised relationship between the occurrence of political violence and measures for scarcity, material well-being, landlessness, access to basic services, and local government performance, tantamount to 8 out of 13 proxy variables. Based on the customary interpretation of the size of a correlation coefficient (see Hinkle, Wiersma, & Jurs, 2003, p. 109), however, the resulting correlations can be

regarded as very weak. This is not surprising considering how complex a phenomenon the formation of political violence is; there is no expectation of a single factor explaining a substantial portion of the variability of political violence's occurrences across municipalities. A variable has to be statistically observed while controlling for other factors pertinent to the conflict.

It is also important to point out that there is some substantial inter-correlation among the explanatory variables. As expected, governance performance indicators are either moderately or highly inter-associated. The same goes for measures of material well-being. Although this confirms the consistency within groups of indicators, which after all measure the same explanatory variable, this type of inter-correlation can cause problems in the subsequent regression analysis.

Negative Binomial Regression Estimation

Table 4-4 presents the empirical findings drawn from the negative binomial regression analysis on the incidences of political violence across municipalities in the Bangsamoro. Model 1 serves as the base model wherein all the proxies for the explanatory variables are entered into the statistical analysis. Unexpected effects on political violence are observed with unemployment and access to electricity. As mentioned earlier, the bivariate analysis indicates that access to electricity showed the right direction of correlation with political violence. Accordingly, both are tested for non-linear relationships with political violence in Model 2. The different signs of the regression coefficients of two explanatory variables and their respective second power transformations do confirm curvilinear effects. This will be explained further in the discussion of the statistical findings. Meanwhile, Models 3 to 5 address the issue of multicollinearity across the proxies for government performance by testing them one at a time for each model. The bivariate analysis reveals that they are a few of the most inter-correlated indicators in the data set. On the other hand, the effects of multicollinearity are not detectable among indicators of material welfare, which remain statistically significant across the different permutations of the empirical model.

Notice that the number of observations used in the regression model is less than the number of cases in the dataset. By default, Stata does a listwise deletion of cases if there

are missing values for some variables in the equation. Meanwhile, obtaining a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test statistic that is equal or higher than the LR chi-square (χ^2) values indicate that all of the regression coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. In other words, the empirical model as a whole does not say anything about the occurrences of political violence in a given municipality. The $P > \chi^2$ value measures the probability of the model getting an LR test statistic equal to or higher than its LR χ^2 value. The small p-values across the five variations of the empirical model lead to a conclusion that at least one of the measurements has an effect on the frequency of political violence in a municipality.

Table 4-4. Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Political Violence

Proxy Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Population	2.00**	1.56**	1.49**	1.63**	1.48**
Unemployed	-6.87*	-13.46	-7.73	-13.97	-8.01
(Unemployed) ²	---	9.15	1.98	11.14	3.47
Households w/ electricity	4.23**	15.17**	14.35**	15.37**	15.68**
(Households w/ electricity) ²	---	-12.23**	-11.30**	-12.69**	-12.82**
High school grad or better	-9.57**	-5.71**	-6.19**	-5.44**	-6.10**
Agriculturally employed	-0.19	-0.87	-0.80	-0.82	-0.29
Households w/o land	2.77*	4.47**	3.74**	4.90**	4.97**
Relative deprivation	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02
Social governance	-0.61	-0.29	-0.60**	---	---
Economic governance	-0.17	-0.32	---	-0.58**	---
Fundamentals of governance	0.23	-0.09	---	---	-0.56**
Villages w/ hospitals	4.19	1.22	4.17	-0.81	4.09
Villages w/ waterworks	-0.58	1.39	0.97	1.50	1.32
Villages w/ high school	-4.30**	-4.58**	-4.10**	-5.16**	-4.33**
Ethnic fractionalisation	-1.05	-2.27	-2.21	-2.15	-2.50*
Muslim population	0.74	-0.45	-0.30	-0.52	-0.53
Road density	-9.94	-7.69	-10.22	-5.53	-6.67
Young male	18.02	3.23	5.19	2.96	-3.34
Observations	91	91	91	91	91
LR χ^2	45.83	56.38	55.41	55.50	53.32
$P > \chi^2$	0.0002	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
** $p < 0.05$. * $p < 0.10$					

Figure 4-6 is a graph for plotting the probability of political violence occurring at an increasing frequency (0-15). The blue line plots the ‘observed’ probability based on the actual frequency distribution of political violence in the data. The red line plots the ‘expected’ probability predicted after running the empirical model through the regression analysis. Considering that the two lines almost perfectly overlap, the empirical model does a fair job of forecasting incidences of political violence when fitted in a negative binomial regression model. Nevertheless, the consistency of the resulting regression coefficients is tested in a different regression model. For this purpose, ordered logit regression analysis is used. Ordered logit is a regression model for an ordered (from low to high) explanatory variable. Overall, it yields the same findings, especially in terms of the expected relationship of the variables with the frequency of political violence. A detailed result of the ordered logit analysis forms part of Appendix D.




Figure 4-6. Observed vs. NBRM Expected Distribution (Model 1)

Interpreting the Findings

One of the disadvantages of the NBRM analysis lies in the interpretation of its regression coefficients, which is not as straightforward as the conventional OLS regression. Like the OLS, the numerical value of a negative binomial regression coefficient measures the rate of change in the explained variable as the explanatory variable changes; meanwhile, the sign (+/-) indicates the direction of change. However, in the NBRM, the rate of change applies to the logs of expected counts of the explained variable as opposed to its actual count. Thus, the measurement for educational attainment with a regression coefficient of -6.19 should be interpreted as follows: a percent increase in the population with high school diploma or better would result in a decrease in the logs of expected counts of

political violence by 6.19 units while holding the other variables constant. Given that the primary task of this thesis is to identify factors that alleviate or aggravate conflict intensity in the Bangsamoro, the direction of change has more bearing than its magnitude. Among other things, this result shows that providing access to higher education is better for peacebuilding in the Bangsamoro.

Nonetheless, using ‘adjusted predictions’ can make these results more tangible (Williams, 2012). This involves computing the predicted frequencies of political violence along with the incremental changes in a selected explanatory variable, say educational attainment, while holding the other explanatory variables fixed at their average values. In other words, it is forecasting how much less political violence an ‘average’ municipality will witness as the percentage of its population with higher education increases. Note however that adjusted predictions are a statistical approximation and are only indicative of how a pair of explained and explanatory variables interacts in reality. Having provided this clarification, the following subsections go through each hypothesis and discuss the results.

H1: Resource scarcity increases the risk of frequent political violence in a region. In all model permutations, population is strongly and significantly correlated with the incidence of political violence in the direction that was expected. As Figure 4-7 shows, the adjusted prediction for the occurrence of political violence more than doubles with the log unit increases in population.





Figure 4-7. Adjusted Predictions for Population (Model 1)

H2: Poverty is associated with increased incidences of political violence. Across five models, an increase in the percentage of the educated population is associated with a drop in the expected incidences of political violence in an average municipality. Figure 4-8 shows that as the percentage of the working-age population with higher education reaches half, the adjusted prediction for the incidence of political violence is virtually reduced to zero. Factors that can improve the material well-being of the citizenry can, therefore, lead to a marked reduction in the predicted intensity of conflict in a municipality.



Education (%)	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
Adj. Predict.	8.4	4.5	2.4	1.3	.70	.38	.20	.11	.06	.03	.02


Figure 4-8. Adjusted Predictions for Education (Model 3)

Contrary to expectations, the share of households with access to electricity, an indicator of material well-being, has a statistically significant, positive relationship with the frequency of political violence. This outcome is further investigated by adding a second power transformation for access to electricity in the statistical model. The intuition behind adding a squared term is to generate a quadratic curve and check for a curvilinear relationship between access to electricity and occurrence of political violence. The statistically significant, negative regression coefficient of access to electricity's squared term (see Models 2-4, Table 4-4) confirms a curvilinear relationship between the two variables. Furthermore, a concave curve models the relationship between access to electricity and occurrence of political violence. This means that the positive effect of electrification on the frequency of political violence gets weaker as more households get access to electricity and eventually becomes negative. What can be inferred from this discovery? In terms of the relationship between the two, the findings suggest that a certain level of electrification must be achieved first before its alleviating effect on conflict

intensity can be observed. Meanwhile, the exact opposite case applies to the proxy for unemployment. The negative sign of unemployment and the positive sign of its squared term suggest that a convex curve models the relationship between unemployment and political violence. Put simply, a certain level of unemployment could be acceptable, but only up to a degree. Regardless, its effects are not statistically significant.

H3: Lack of economic opportunity and insecure income sources are associated with increased incidences of political violence. The share of agriculturally employed members of the working age cohort exhibits an unanticipated effect on political violence. Contrary to the hypothesis, the higher percentage of agricultural workers results in lower occurrences of political violence across models, although such a relationship is not statistically significant (see Models 1-5, Table 4-4).

H4: Landlessness is associated with increased incidences of political violence. Landlessness among households is found to be considerably associated with heightened intensity of the conflict. The positive effect of landlessness on political violence remains statistically significant across model specifications. Meanwhile, Figure 4-9 illustrates how the predicted number of violent incidences rises with the percentage of landless households. When half the households are deprived of land assets, a municipality may start witnessing incidences of violent conflict. It could expect as much as 14 incidences in a sweeping case of land deprivation. The result underscores that land deprivation indeed could fuel violence, thus highlighting the centrality of the land/indigeneity issue to the conflict.



No land (%)	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
Adj. Predict.	.10	.17	.28	.45	.73	1.2	2	3.2	5.2	8.5	14

Figure 4-9. Adjusted Predictions for Landlessness (Model 4)

H5: Relative deprivation is a contributing factor to the increased incidences of political violence in an area. From previous discussion on measurements, a high ratio between composite measures of achievements and expectations means low relative deprivation. The inverse relationship between the measurements for relative deprivation and political violence depicted in Figure 4-10 is, therefore, entirely consistent with the given hypothesis. However, there is no adequate statistical evidence to support the observed relationship between the two variables.




Figure 4-10. Adjusted Predictions for Relative Deprivation (Model 1)

H6: Group inequality is a contributing factor to the increased incidences of political violence in an area. Group inequality is one of the most recent, promisingly illuminating discoveries in civil conflict studies. Unfortunately, data are not available to test its potential contribution in the Bangsamoro conflict. This is a common stumbling block to researchers, given that national surveys and censuses often drop or do not publish questions concerning ethnic and religious affiliations (Østby, 2008a).

H7: Frequent political violence is less likely to occur in administrative areas with better public or communal provision of basic services. There is sufficiently strong evidence to say that wealth redistribution via basic service provision reduces the likelihood of conflict. Social governance index, a composite measure of a municipal government's performance in service delivery exhibits a statistically significant, negative effect on political violence after accounting for multicollinearity (see Model 3, Table 4-4). At the lowest rating for social governance, a municipality could experience at least

eight incidences of political violence. At its peak, there could be as little as one (see Figure 4-11). Access to school also has the same statistically significant effect, which is notably consistent with the earlier findings on educational attainment. Figure 4-12 illustrates that the more villages that have access to secondary schools, the more peaceable a municipality is predicted to be. Unexpectedly, access to hospitals and community waterworks appear to increase the frequency of political violence although these effects are not statistically significant.




Figure 4-11. Adjusted Predictions for Social Governance (Model 3)





Figure 4-12. Adjusted Predictions for Access to School (Model 4)

H8: Frequent political violence is less likely to occur in administrative areas where institutional support for economic development is high. As mentioned previously, the economic governance index is another dimension of institutional strength. It is a quantifiable representation of a local government's performance in supporting profitable sectors and fostering business enterprise in its jurisdiction. After accounting for multicollinearity, economic governance exhibits a statistically significant easing effect on political violence (see Model 4, Table 4-4). At the lowest possible rating for economic governance, the average municipality is predicted to experience around five incidences of political violence; on the other hand, the likelihood of clashes is practically reduced to zero at its peak (see Figure 4-13). Active institutional support for economic development is, therefore, beneficial to peacebuilding, but perhaps more so in relatively stabilised areas.



Econ. Gov.	1	1.5	2	2.5	3	3.5	4	4.5	5
Adj. Predict.	4.9	3.6	2.7	2	1.5	1.1	.9	.6	.5

Figure 4-13. Adjusted Predictions for Economic Governance (Model 4)

H9: Frequent political violence is less likely to occur in administrative areas with good governance practices. Fundamentals of governance index, a composite measure of participative, accountable, and transparent administrative practices also displays a statistically strong evidence of assuaging influence on community-level tensions that often lead to conflict (see Model 5, Table 4-4). Figure 4-14 shows that at the lowest rating of fundamentals of governance, the average municipality is expected to experience eight incidences of political violence. At its highest, there could be as little as one. Political violence is, therefore, less likely to occur in the presence of democratic, rule-based local institutions.




Figure 4-14. Adjusted Predictions for Fundamentals of Governance (Model 5)

Discussion of Findings

Poverty is a multifaceted phenomenon encapsulating deprivations in income, assets, and access to basic services. It sharpens perceptions of inequality, which gravely impact the level of social cohesion in society. In the empirical analysis, land deprivation stands out as a major exacerbating factor for the frequency of political violence in a municipality. This finding confirms that the issue of land loss runs in accord with the historical narratives of the Moro struggle and still plays a central role in the conflict. Unemployment, meanwhile, does not display the same substantial effect. Another phenomenon with an intrinsic link to deprivation and inequality is resource scarcity. Using population to approximate how much palpable lack of resources there is in a municipality, the test shows that skirmishes between the military and rebel groups tend to occur more often in municipalities that are relatively populous.

As poverty reaps violence, it is reasonable to expect that indicators of general welfare have the opposite effect. This is observed to be correct with educational attainment. As the percentage share of the population with higher education increases, the likelihood of clashes in a municipality diminishes. Aside from better economic opportunities that come along with better education, researchers who studied insurgent movements in the Philippines also suggest social integration and access to information as two other

mechanisms underpinning this observed relationship (see Edillon, 2005; Magdalena, 1977). Access to information, in particular, mitigates the susceptibility of the people to the hate-creating stories of rebel groups (Edillon, 2005).

Surprisingly, access to electricity is found to be positively correlated with occurrences of political violence. The relationship, however, is not linear. When power services cover a sizeable portion of households, the relationship reverses. If this were to be graphed, an inverted-U emerges. What can be inferred from this finding? One likely explanation is that only at a certain municipal coverage basic utilities like electricity become a significant indication of welfare and anything below this threshold could be grievance-inducing.

Social services perhaps are the most powerful redistributive instrument available to a government. They are the most tangible indication of a government's effective presence in the community. They can reduce community-level frustrations by offsetting the effects of poverty and inequality in society, and by easing the vulnerability of the marginalised. Accordingly, the local government's competence in public service delivery was supposed to foster local peace. Tests on the social governance index and access to school provide strong evidence for this hypothesis. On the other hand, access to hospitals and waterworks do not exhibit the same robust effects. Nonetheless, it is accurate to say from the findings that certain types of social services have a pacifying effect on civil conflict and that a local government's welfare efforts, in turn, are vital for the preservation of peace. At the same time, the findings also suggest that the insufficiency of these public goods can intensify the conflict in a municipality.

In addition, a municipal government's commitment to upholding basic principles of good governance, as proxied by fundamentals of good governance index, appears to decrease motivations for operating a rebellion. Tests on the economic governance index, an approximation of how invested a municipal government is in local economic growth, also offer similarly encouraging findings. Taken together, these findings provide substantial affirmation that the government's institutional capacity does have a strong relationship with local peace, as hypothesised.

On the other hand, statistical tests on the relationship between observed frequencies of political violence and proxies for relative well-being and lack of economic opportunities generated inconclusive findings. The same can be said about the set of control variables included in the empirical model. Conflict intensity does not have a significant relationship with indicators of rebellion feasibility, namely road density and youth bulge. The relationship of conflict intensity with ethnic fractionalization and percentage share of Muslim population are also not statistically robust. When considered alongside other statistically significant factors, these findings offer some affirmation that underlying issues of economic development are at work in the most recent circumstances surrounding the conflict. A lot is lost in the understanding of the conflict if it were to be simplified as an ongoing struggle for autonomy ensuing from irreconcilable cultural and religious identities.

Overall, the empirical analysis confirms that a range of material, social, and political factors do influence the observed frequencies of conflict events transpiring in Bangsamoro municipalities. Findings do show that clashes tend to be more frequent in locations where political institutions are characteristically weak, access to particular social services are poor, and people are deprived of economic means such as education and land. There is, therefore, empirical support for the importance of local development in explaining the intensity of the Bangsamoro conflict, which goes to show that it is also a major avenue for peace and security. These findings serve as inputs to designing peacebuilding policies and plans for the region.

Moving Forward

This chapter has identified through statistical analysis some of the development factors for the frequency of political violence in the municipalities constituting the Bangsamoro region. The next chapter digs deeper into the causality of the conflict by accentuating from two case studies the intermediary processes that substantiate the causal relationship between political violence and its determinants.

Chapter 5

How Underdevelopment Intensifies the Bangsamoro Conflict: Searching for Mediating Processes in Case Studies

Merely knowing that 'C' has generally been followed by 'E' is not enough; we want to understand the continuous process by which 'C' produced 'E,' if it did.

Andrew Sayer *Method in Social Science: Revised 2nd Edition*

Introduction

The previous chapter identified systemic characteristics that differentiate restive from peaceful municipalities in the Bangsamoro. The findings indicate that clashes tend to be more frequent in locations where political institutions are characteristically weak, access to particular social services are poor, and people are deprived of economic means such as education and land. This was achieved by demonstrating the statistical relationship between these explanatory variables and the frequency of political violence in a municipality. By approximating how the frequency of political violence changes with the value of an explanatory variable, the previous chapter demonstrated the 'causal effect' between the two (see Bennett & George, 1997).

The study of causality, however, involves not only causal effects but also 'causal mechanisms' (Bennett & George, 1997). Causal mechanisms are the processes and

intervening factors that explain how and why a hypothesised cause lead to a particular outcome. Intermediary processes matter if different policy interventions can be designed to reduce the conflict (Bennett & George, 1997; P. Collier, 2005). A fuller study of the causalities pertinent to the Bangsamoro conflict, therefore, requires a qualitative research method that is adapted for examining causal mechanisms that underpin the causal effects found in the numerical data. In this regard, ‘process tracing’ helps in gaining better insight into the pathways of explanation mediating between institutional, social, and economic factors and political violence (Beach & Pedersen, 2013; Bennett & George, 1997; D. Collier, 2011).

Process tracing is a method that identifies and evaluates causal mechanisms (Beach & Pedersen, 2013; Bennett & George, 1997; D. Collier, 2011). It generates and examines data on “processes, events, actions, expectations, and other intervening variables that link putative causes to observed effects” (Bennett & George, 1997, p. 5). In addition, it can identify different causal paths to an outcome, point out variables that otherwise might be left out, and check for spuriousness, reciprocal causation, and selection bias. Given these functionalities, Beach and Pedersen (2013) claim that its essence is to complement other research methods in social science, such as statistical tests in achieving a better understanding of causal relationships.

Process tracing uses detailed within-case empirical analysis of how a causal process plays out in an actual case. In the context of this thesis, its conduct, therefore, entails a close examination of preselected municipalities to flesh out stories from what the quantitative data shows. Process tracing allows causal inferences on the basis of a few cases or even a single case (Beach & Pedersen, 2013; Bennett & George, 1997). This chapter probes two municipalities. How they are selected and examined are discussed in the following subsection.

Case Selection and Analytical Approach

Beach and Pedersen (2013) identify three ways process tracing is practised within the social sciences: theory-building, explaining-outcome, and theory-testing, the last of which is considered the most appropriate for this thesis. In theory-testing, “correlation has been found between X and Y” (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 21). Chapter Four has

statistically demonstrated the correlation between economic development and conflict. Having done so, the goal now is to find empirical evidence of causal mechanisms linking the frequency of political violence with its statistical determinants. Central in theory-testing is determining whether observable manifestations of causal mechanisms linking causes and outcomes exist in a given case (Beach, 2017; Beach & Pedersen, 2013). These intervening factors and processes are then assessed for consistency with the causal theories from which these confirmed correlations are conceived during the hypothesis formulation. Such a procedure resembles ‘process verification’ described by Bennett and George (1997, p. 5) as an approach to process tracing that involves “testing whether the observed processes and factors among variables in a case match those predicted by previously designated theories.”

In the context of this thesis, the method of theory-testing can be broken down into two phases. The first involves an exploration of causal mechanisms linking economic development and conflict. Essentially, this shifts the focus of the inquiry from the causes and outcome to the processes linking them. The output is ‘empirical narratives’ providing a thick description of the mechanisms through which an explanatory variable influence the explained variable (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). This practice helps in developing better judgment in discriminating among possible explanations, which essentially is the objective of the next phase of theory-testing. The second phase entails an assessment of whether the causal mechanism observed agrees with the central theory of this thesis, which may be recalled from Chapter Three as the grievance (as opposed to the greed) narrative.

In theory-testing, no claims can be made that a single mechanism is the only pathway to the outcome (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Admittedly, there is no way to know all the mechanisms that link the explanatory variables to the explained variable in the empirical model, but some central ones should surface from examining a few cases. If the cases reveal a few potentially significant variables that the empirical model might have missed, they may contribute to the development of new theories and hypothesis to be empirically tested. Future studies can improve the causal inferences drawn from the model by incorporating these variables, which will ultimately lead to a better understanding of the Bangsamoro conflict.

With regard to case selection, there are a few legitimate ways to select samples from a pool of cases. Sampling can be done on the explained variable (Forgues, 2012) or the explanatory variable (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994). Meanwhile, Beach and Pedersen (2013) assert that positive cases are the only cases that should be selected for theory-testing. Positive cases are chosen on the basis of “observability of effect” or those which feature the relationship of interest between cause and outcome most prominently (Barnes & Weller, 2012, p. 14). Testing for a causal mechanism makes little sense when we know it cannot be present in a case because either X or Y is not present (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

In choosing the cases, therefore, low and high frequencies of political violence should also be associated with the right values of the explanatory variables, as prescribed by the empirical model. These criteria lead to two suitable municipalities to closely examine: 1) Datu Piang, a municipality that has abject political and economic conditions, as indicated by the explanatory variables, and one of the most frequent reports of armed conflict, and 2) North Upi, a municipality that performs relatively better and has fewer reports of political violence. Both are located in the Maguindanao province, which is considered a major hotspot of insurgency conflict in the southern Philippines (Espressor, 2016).

Having selected the cases, the next step is to gather empirical materials and look for evidence of causal mechanism in the cases and assess whether it works as theorised (Beach, 2017). In this chapter, the numerical findings are integrated with examples from secondary sources. The evaluation of secondary sources is an initial step to obtaining an understanding of how underdevelopment-conflict nexus operate in the Bangsamoro context. Materials mainly include news articles and relevant documents/reports from stakeholders (e.g., government agencies and non-governmental organisations).

The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The following two sections present factual narratives on local conditions in Datu Piang and North Upi pertinent to the Bangsamoro conflict. The fourth section presents the components of the causal mechanism that emerged from the cases reviewed. The fifth section reflects on the findings and finally

takes on the task of assessing whether the causal mechanism found is a good fit with the grievance narrative.

Datu Piang: A Fertile Ground for Revolt?

Overview

Datu Piang was one of the oldest towns in the empire province of Cotabato that was eventually dissolved into six smaller provinces, one of which is Maguindanao. The mighty Rio Grande de Mindanao flows along the town, which used to be the seat of the Rajah Buayan Sultanate (Layson, 2007). Then called *Dulawan* or ‘unsurpassed’ in the Maguindanaon dialect, the municipality was founded in the late 1600s by Rajah Buayan, a Muslim devotee who fiercely resisted the entry of the Spanish conquerors in his dominion (DILG, 2015).

The municipality received its official name in honour of Datu Piang, one of Rajah Buayan’s successors who reigned during the first three decades of the 1900s. McKenna (1998) accounts for some of the feats attributed to Datu Piang as a ruler, which deserve recognition. Under Datu Piang’s rule, the town witnessed economic progress, partly due to his lucrative connections with Chinese traders and amicable relationship with the Spanish and American colonisers. In 1908, the town being part of greater Cotabato province was also the most peaceful district of Muslim Philippines, due in large part to Datu Piang’s influence. He also supported the settlement of Christian immigrants that began in 1913. For a few decades after Datu Piang’s death in 1933, the situation remained peaceable. During the Second World War, the municipality was one of the safest places to live (DILG, 2015). When the Moro struggle started to get bloody in the 1970s, it seemed to have served as a safe harbour for Christian migrants. The elderly townspeople have inspiring recollections of Muslims protecting the small minority of Christians who chose to stay (see Layson, 2007).

Unfortunately, as the conflict has dragged on, the peace situation in Datu Piang has also plummeted. The town is presently considered a Moro insurgency hotspot (Unson, 2003). It seats the 105th Base Command of the MILF, which has been the unit most involved in armed clashes in the province of Maguindanao (Maulana, 2015). Concurrently, the town

is one of the most severely affected by the armed conflict (International Committee of the Red Cross/ICRC, 2008). The data confirms this with the town registering 38 incidences of political violence within a five-year period, one of the highest in the whole of Morolandia.

Conditions are present in the municipality that make the idea of rebellion at the very least possible. Datu Piang's unique topography has facilitated the MILF's operation in the area. There are reports of dysfunctional and repressive local government agencies and officials, which serve as a push factor for rebel support and even recruitment. Anecdotal evidence shows that a portion of the community trust the rebel group more than the agencies of the Philippine Government, particularly the military, because of reported abuse and harassment against civilians.

The Rebels' Highway

Datu Piang is built on marshland. It constitutes 16 villages, 14 of which lie along Rio Grande de Mindanao and Dansalan River. The wide network of tributaries flowing across these villages used to serve as passageways to merchant vessels that converged on the town to buy and sell goods (DILG, 2015). Datu Piang had been a trading mecca for Maguindano, probably even for the neighbouring provinces. Today, the marshland serves as the rebels' highway, a trackless labyrinth used for escaping the military in the direction of the MILF 105th Base Command. Amidst the marshlands and hills, according to a senior military officer, the rebels' stronghold stands (see Cruz, 2011). The marshlands also sit on natural gas reserves that could transform life in the whole province, now one of the poorest in the Philippines.

A Missing Government?

From previous discussions in this thesis, the Moro people have legitimate grievances about poverty and historical injustices, which serve as a social justification for insurgency (Espressor, 2016). MILF Chair Al Haj Murad Ebrahim identified injustice as central to why people in the Bangsamoro bear arms (see Arguillas, 2012). According to the MILF leader, the Moro people muster firearms because they want their families to be treated as any other families in the Philippines whose necessities are provided. It was also observed how the MILF has obtained substantial support in its current spheres of influence. At the

onset, it permeates the society by setting up a parallel government offering public services, which the institutional representatives of the Philippine Government at the local level often do not provide.

More than half of the families in Datu Piang (55%) are considered poor (DILG, 2015). The data corroborates this statistic, with nearly half of the families (30% to 45%) deprived of assets such as land, education, and employment. The local government's failure to create employment opportunities and connect with the market aggravates the socioeconomic conditions in the area (DILG, 2015).

Basic services are almost entirely inaccessible. From the data, 98% of the households do not have ready access to potable water. The townspeople depend on ground wells for water sources (DILG, 2015). The lack of water systems has been somewhat of a boon to a few residents who make a living from water peddling, which is common in Datu Piang (Cabrera, 2015). Greeted by the imposing Rio Grande daily, the locals experience the frustrating absurdity of being surrounded by water but not having enough to drink in ways only imaginable to outsiders. A third (31%) of the population literally live in the dark. The long dirt roads of Datu Piang are unlit except for occasional flickers from mortar explosions (Cruz, 2011). There have also been reports, implicating public health centres, of widespread extortion in exchange for medicines and health services, which are supposed to be free (see Amnesty International, 2009).

The social condition in Datu Piang signals absentee government and the dysfunctional service delivery institutions. These serve as favourable conditions for rebel organisations to earn the support and loyalty of the people from the grassroots (Espressor, 2016), especially given the rebels' mobilisation strategy of creating a de facto government and the longstanding frustration and feeling of neglect among the Moro people. Empirical evidence also confirms that failure in governance delivery determines the level of support for the Bangsamoro struggle (see Özerdem & Podder, 2012).

Local Authoritarians in the Democratic Philippines

Datu Piang is within the political radius of the infamous the Ampatuans, a clan of warlords/politicians in Maguindanao (Mercado, 2013). The late Saudi Ampatuan, son of

the deceased patriarch Andal Ampatuan Sr. had been an undisputed mayor of the municipality for almost a decade. His reign ended with a fatal bomb blast in his residence (Unson, 2002). The military implicated the MILF in the bombing, although the latter denied the allegation. The Ampatuan clan has a hostile relationship with the MILF (Espressor, 2016). They are allies to the military in its war against rebels and for their hardline policy in dealing with MILF forces operating in their bailiwick (HRW, 2010; Unson, 2002). On the other hand, the MILF does not recognise the legitimacy of local politicians, and MILF sympathisers do not participate in any democratic exercise, especially elections.

The Ampatuans are not a family to be crossed. After the murder of Saudi, they reportedly went on a “killing binge” in retaliation against their political opponents (Cruz, 2011, para. 7). They have been notorious for reports of intimidation, electoral manipulation, and violence. In fact, a village official said in a Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, “The Ampatuans are viewed as almost God, very powerful. A single word is enough to frighten the people, whatever they ask is done. Their arms make them powerful. They kill people” (see HRW, 2010, p. 25).

The clan is also known for operating its private army. Aside from a clutch of armed civilian outfits, state-sponsored paramilitary units such as the Civilian Volunteer Officers (CVOs) and the Civilian Auxiliary Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU) had been at the disposal of the Ampatuans as part of their armed group (McIndoe, 2009). These auxiliary units were created in 1987 for counterinsurgency operations against Moro rebels. However, they are somehow used for political gains and elimination of political enemies (Espressor, 2016). The people see them as wearing uniforms of the security forces of the Philippine State.

The Ampatuans personify local authoritarianism considered prevalent in the southern corner of the Philippines (Espressor, 2016; McIndoe, 2009). The atrocities and total misuse of law enforcement by these local authoritarians have contributed to the dwindling legitimacy of the Philippine State’s local agencies in southern communities, which have given rise to the overwhelming number of sympathisers to militant rebel organisations such as the MILF (Espressor, 2016). Even worse, the abuses instigated by local officials

backed by paramilitary units have drawn people into insurgency (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights/LCHR, 1990). One of the reasons why people muster firearms, according to MILF Chair Ebrahim, is because they feel insecure, they do not get justice, and they feel oppressed (see Arguillas, 2012). The HRW (2010) exemplifies these reports with actual accounts from the townspeople who sought the MILF for protection from the abuses of the Ampatuans' private militia. One of them was 'Fayyad', a resident of Datu Piang who fled the town and joined a MILF community after three of his relatives were slain allegedly by the Ampatuans' private army.

IDPs as "enemy reserve force"

In an interview, the late MILF Founding Chairman Hashim Salamat expressed no trepidations about the government projects then ongoing in Camp Abubakar, which used to be the iconic bastion of the MILF (see Vitug & Gloria, 2000). He maintained with certainty that as long as military harassment persisted, any form of government flirtations would not calm the people. He was quoted as saying, "The right counterinsurgency is for the AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] to leave the area" (see Vitug & Gloria, 2000, p. 108).

Anecdotal evidence suggests that a portion of the community do trust the MILF more than the military. In the heat of the intensive military operations in Datu Piang, many townspeople have fled their homes (Sundang, 2009). Meanwhile, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that the many evacuees refuse to return to their villages while the AFP is present and without the MILF (see UNHCR, 2009). Reports justify civilians' wariness toward the Philippine armed forces. They hold stories of arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, torture, and other forms of ill-treatment that have implicated the government security forces or government-supported paramilitaries.

There have been civilian casualties in Datu Piang as a result of the military's counterinsurgency operation. In 2008, seven people, including five children, were killed after a military aircraft blasted a small civilian boat (Jacinto, 2008). The incident coincided with *Ramadan*, the holiest month for Muslims. The military insisted that those killed were rebels (see Jacinto, 2008). The following year, soldiers and CVOs were

implicated in burning civilian houses in Balanakan village, Datu Piang (Amnesty International, 2009).

An Amnesty International report alleged that the Philippine military authorities treat many Moro civilians with suspicion of being MILF-supporters or fighters (see Amnesty International, 2009). In particular, internally displaced persons (IDPs) are suspected of supporting the rebels or being actually rebels posing as IDPs. The report referred to a video documentation and PowerPoint presentation of an AFP press briefing, which presented evidence of IDPs diverting relief assistance to the MILF. In this briefing, the IDPs were reportedly labelled “enemy reserve force” (Amnesty International, 2009, p. 45).

IDPs subsist on food rations from government relief agencies and international organisations (Mogato, 2009). However, there have been media accounts of the military refusing entry to aid organisations to Poblacion, Datu Piang where thousands of residents and evacuees from other towns flee for refuge (see Sarmiento, 2009). The Mindanao Peoples’ Caucus (MPC) formed by humanitarian agencies and IDP leaders have directly criticised the military for undermining the relief operations by dictating when and how relief should come in (see MPC, 2009). Meanwhile, the military maintained that it was a temporary block for security purposes (Sarmiento, 2009).

There are also reports of IDPs being arbitrarily arrested. On 7 May 2009, in Datu Piang, a group of displaced persons were waiting for food rations when five of them were forcibly taken by “unidentified armed men in military uniform” (Sundang, 2009, para. 10). A witness told Amnesty International that the abductors covered their nameplates with masking tape, making identification difficult (Amnesty International, 2009). Two of the arrested were found dead the following day (Sundang, 2009).

Fighting for Land and Livelihood

In the advent of the signing of the 2012 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB), a regional news provider visited the MILF community in Datu Piang to gauge the fighters’ attitude toward the ongoing peace agreement between the Philippine Government and the MILF (see Arguillas, 2012). The fighters seem to be enthusiastic

about the prospect of long-term peace. They look forward to letting go of their heavy firearms, leaving the skirmishes behind, and going back to their families. They expect the peace agreement to allow them to go back to a normal and productive life. The older fighters hope to return to farming while the younger ones are eager to attend school or to start up a small business.

There was no mention about self-determination or preservation of Islam. The rank and file did not speak of these banner issues of the Moro struggle, but of political, military, and paramilitary abuses and their need for land, livelihood, and basic services. Apparently, the people's long-term concern is their uncertain future: when they will go back to their villages, how they will rebuild their homes, how they will regain their farms and other livelihood, and how long until the next surge of the violence.

In the FAB, there is an arrangement for autonomy. The FAB primarily is a commitment by the Philippine Government and the MILF to establish a new autonomous political entity in Muslim Mindanao, which is envisioned to be more empowered and equitable than its predecessor, the ARMM. This perception is anchored on favourable prospects for the economic and political provisions on the FAB. The FAB also contains provisions on normalisation including the gradual decommissioning of MILF forces.

North Upi: An Inspirational Story of Leadership and Community

Overview

A few municipalities across Datu Piang lies the hinterland town of North Upi, still in Maguindanao province. Sixty-two years ago, a Republic Act carved the town from the older Dinaig municipality, now named Datu Odin Sinsuat. North Upi has 23 villages laid out on rugged, mountainous terrain.

As recently as 2000, North Upi had been a destitute town, with more than half (65%) of the population living below the poverty threshold (Galing Pook Foundation/GPF, 2004). It had witnessed numerous cross-tribe disputes and clan wars, which often ended in bloodshed (GPF, 2004). These feuds involved not only different clans but also MNLF

and MILF commanders. Commanders mobilised their troops in support of one clan versus another to maintain their loyalty and allegiance (Podder, 2012) or out of regard for blood relations (Unson, 2015). These skirmishes also provoked military intervention (Fernandez, 2011).

Within a span of a decade, however, the town of North Upi has undergone an impressive transformation in terms of both peace and development. In 2010, its income grew to that of a first-class municipality. There are still reports of MILF operations in North Upi and residents joining the rebel group (GMA News, 2009). Nonetheless, conflict still seems relatively distant from North Upi. From 2011 to 2015, North Upi only recorded one incidence of political violence.

North Upi has taken a comprehensive pathway to peace. At the onset, the local government had to know what the people needed and made sure that its presence was felt in those areas. In this regard, it helped that the local chief executive was recognised for his participatory and consultative style of governance. The resulting executive agenda of the local government in the past decade or so fits well with this thesis' empirical model. Since 2001, the local government has laboured to improve service delivery and provide the people with opportunities for self-help and other possible economic activities. From within, it underwent substantive reforms to strengthen its institutional mechanisms and to empower the people thru participation, representation, and access to information. In addition, it also promoted a culture of peace and understanding in the community to achieve harmony amidst diversity.

Elected leaders alongside traditional elders exercise legitimate rule in North Upi. In contrast, it is known from the previous case that rebel groups such as the MILF capitalise on a combination of governance voids, other institutional weaknesses, and people's negative attitude toward their local government to take root in an area. It took, however, at least a decade of steady reforms, community engagement, innovative programs, and development projects for the local government to establish legitimate rule in the area. In turn, it reaped opportunities for further social progress and transformed North Upi into a peaceful zone in the Bangsamoro.

Celebrating Differences

North Upi is home to the majority *Tedurays*, one of the indigenous peoples in southern Philippines, Maguindanao Muslims, and Christian settlers (GPF, 2004). A major challenge that had confronted North Upi in the past were the local conflicts ensuing from the cultural and religious differences among its three major ethnic groups. Conflicts across these groups were difficult to settle and frequently escalated into violence.

In 2001, Mayor Ramon Piang sought an end to cross-tribe conflicts by creating the tri-people Mayor's Council whose function is to amicably settle disputes among Upi residents and, at times, between Upi residents and outside parties (GPF, 2004). Özerdem and Podder (2012) found evidence that feuding and revenge figure as one of the main reasons for participation in the MILF. To ensure equal representation, the council is composed of six representatives, two from each ethnic group. The groups choose their representatives who are usually respected elders in their communities. It guarantees the recognition and respect of the decision the council makes. The elders take turns in presiding over the Council in a way that the Muslim council members take over when a case involves Muslims and so on. If the dispute involves parties from different tribes, all the council members sit in court to decide on the case. Applicable customs and rituals are observed to ratify a resolution. The Teduray, for instance, finalise agreements with the cutting of rattan and scraping of fingernails.

Within a few years, the council was able to reduce the number of cases filed to the police by more than a third (GPF, 2014). It helped residents to reach settlements without the cost and rigours of court proceedings while ensuring that the traditional ways of conflict resolution were preserved and recognised. The ensuing peace has also made residents feel safer in North Upi compared to other areas in Maguindanao (GPF, 2004).

The local government impresses upon the residents to take pride that North Upi is a municipality of three peoples (Aquino, 2014). Every December, the town celebrates *Meguyaya*, a thanksgiving festival for a bountiful harvest. The festivities exhibit the cultures of the town's three main inhabitant groups.

A Paragon of Political Leadership and Local Governance

North Upi Mayor Ramon Piang is not a traditional Philippine politician. Before entering politics, he was a seminarian, a teacher, and a school principal. His personal reach to the people likely contributed to his landslide success in 1992 when he first ran for public office as vice mayor. He served as the town's second highest local executive for three consecutive terms, before going up against the Sinsuat political clan and winning the mayoral race. He has been undefeated ever since. While some local politicians use electoral manipulation and coercion to stay in power, genuine public service guarantees his recurring political success (GPF, 2014).

Under Mayor Piang's leadership, North Upi grew its income from PhP50 million to more than PhP136 million to become the first-class municipality that it is today (GPF, 2014). His achievements are not only recognised by the townspeople but also formally by local and international organisations. He is a two-time recipient of the *Galing Pook* Leadership Award, one of the country's most coveted prizes for excellence in local governance (Aquino, 2014). He has also had international leadership accolades from the Canadian International Development Agency (Ramon Aboitiz Foundation/RAF, 2006). The RAF, which also cited Mayor Piang for individual excellence in 2006, attributes the town's local development through his leadership values and practice of transparency and accountability.

Local programs under Mayor Piang's administration also received domestic and international distinctions. The tri-people Mayor's Council, for instance, received the *Galing Pook* Award three years after its creation (GPF, 2004). In the same year, North Upi became the site of the first Community e-Center (CeC) in the country (Aquino, 2014), which won the 2005 Best e-Practice Award by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Digital Opportunity Center in Taiwan. Project Rendaw, a literacy program by the local government also garnered the *Galing Pook* Award in 2010.

Mayor Piang's achievements in peacebuilding and community engagement were recognised in 2010 when the national government appointed him as a member of its panel negotiating peace with the MILF (GPF, 2014). Being a Teduray chieftain, he represents the indigenous people in the peace negotiations.

Elders Have Control

Mayor Piang attributes his winning streak as mayor to the support by the elders to his leadership (Unson, 2012). He recognises a strong tradition among local people of respecting the elders and observing their decisions on community issues (see Unson, 2013a). On the part of the government, he adds, the profound influence that the town elders have over the residents makes them invaluable in addressing domestic peace and security issues.

The way the local government has efficiently harnessed the pre-existing regard the people have for their traditional leaders deserves distinction. The elders have served their purpose well as the local government's conduit to the wider community. Ensuring their support for the public official's leadership, in turn, has ensured the community's support to their local government. The senior residents also constitute an active segment of North Upi's civil society whose main advocacy is peace.

Elderly constituents are regularly consulted by Mayor Piang on how he can best perform his task as a peace negotiator and representative of the indigenous people (Unson, 2013a). Meanwhile, the tri-people council members are left alone by the mayor to independently hear cases. In an interview, he explained that he wants the members to develop their sense of ownership in their decisions (see GPF, 2016). The arrangement seems to work quite well. Out of the 212 cases the council heard from 2001 to 2013, 136 reached a resolution while 76 were endorsed to the police (GPF, 2016). Mayor Piang said he is able to focus on local governance instead of resolving local conflicts with the help of the Council (GPF, 2014).

Senior members of the community are active stakeholders in peacebuilding and governance. They organised themselves into a group to oversee the local peace and development program in North Upi (Unson, 2012). Through their initiative, the very first peace centre in the Bangsamoro region was erected in North Upi. The elders have become strong advocates of peace partly because both the national and local governments have been consultative and transparent about the peace process (Unson, 2013b). Elected leaders also openly appeal to the elders not to engage in partisan politics and conflict when indulging in programs that complement the wider peace process (Unson, 2012).

No Use/abuse of Paramilitaries in North Upi

Unlike what reports say about the Ampatuan clan, Mayor Piang does not seem keen on using paramilitaries for personal and political interest. In 2010, he successfully negotiated with armed civilian volunteers in North Upi to support the ongoing local government's effort to disband armed groups in the area (Unson, 2010). Through his mediation, they willingly turned over their arms and let the military secure the areas under their watch from armed rebel groups.

The decommissioning of the community militias in North Upi coincides with the revamp of the leadership structure of the Philippine Army's 6th Infantry Division (6ID) as a consequence of the Maguindanao massacre in 2010. Following the revamp, 6ID transformed from an isolated garrison to a standout peace advocacy unit among military outfits in Mindanao (Unson, 2015). Camp Siongco, the 6ID command centre, was opened to all people with security concerns. Military personnel were also restrained from siding with local officials locked in clan wars. This is a substantial shift from the 6ID's image before the Maguindanao massacre. 6ID commanders were labelled 'puppets' of the Ampatuan clan for allegedly condoning the latter in using private militias against its political enemies, particularly the MILF (Unson, 2015). The reinvention of the 6ID, according to Mayor Piang, restored the public confidence in 6ID and improved the security climate in North Upi and the province of Maguindanao as a whole (see Unson, 2015).

Government Visibility

The social situation in North Upi was bleak before Mayor Piang served as the local chief executive (Cureg, 2008; RAF, 2006). People can only so far recall the present administration as the one that provided authentic public service to the people. A village leader of 36 years claims that Mayor Piang's achievements exceeded that of all his predecessors combined (see RAF, 2006).

Before the current administration, people were fed up with government incompetence and inaction and with the daily fears for their lives (Cureg, 2008). Mayor Piang recognises

that people will build their trust in the local government if town officials make them see and feel that the government works for them (see Aquino, 2014)

The mayor also sees the value of government visibility in bridging cultural divides and promoting peace and development in North Upi (Cureg, 2008). This especially applies to the local government's soft projects like the tri-people Mayor's Council, the Meguyaya Festival, and the government-run radio station DXUP FM, all of which are directly meant to foster peace in the area. The DXUP FM, in particular, serves as a broadcasting platform for educating the residents of their neighbours' culture and a venue for interfaith dialogue (Unson, 2013c).

The local government has laboured on appreciable programs to win back the confidence of the people (Cureg, 2008). Indeed, one of the first projects of the Piang administration was the improvement of transportation to and from the town (Aquino, 2014). Today, a concrete highway passes 20 out of the 23 villages in North Upi leading to Cotabato City, where the townspeople sell their produce. Other infrastructure and amenities, such as telecommunication facilities, satellite cable TV, and banks followed (RAF, 2006).

The state-run Upi Agricultural School educates hundreds of residents for free under the government scholarship program. However, the current administration's most celebrated accomplishment in education is the Project *Rendaw*, a multisectoral initiative to develop the reading proficiency among children in North Upi. Through Rendaw, which in Teduray language means 'light', the literacy rate among children increased from 20 to 80 percent (Aquino, 2014).

The current administration also instituted meaningful reforms within government institutions. The Community e-Center (CeC) promotes transparency and accountability by making the local government's revenues, budget, development plans, and tax records open to the public through the internet (Aquino, 2014). The processes for project bidding and purchases were also made accessible online. The computerisation of the local government systems significantly improved the delivery of government services. It deserves distinction also because of giving the community an opportunity to interact with their families and friends through the internet. The CeC also provides internet access to

schools. Meanwhile, DXUP provides a consultative and participative venue where the people and the local government interact. The mayor hosts regular programming in DXUP where he updates the people with the government's ongoing programs and addresses queries and complaints by the people, usually sent via text messaging (Cureg, 2008). Anecdotal evidence shows that the local government acts on the grievances aired on the radio. For instance, a resident complained about the biased selection of the recipients for the local government's livelihood program. After a thorough investigation had found the allegation to be true, the program implementation was suspended, and the program officers' contracts were not renewed (see Cureg, 2008).

As a way around the scarcity of public resources, the local government seeks out resources and partnerships for the improvement of the municipality (RAF, 2006). The Mayor lobbies with people in business and potential funding partners for the establishment of public amenities. The good reputation of the local government of North Upi in governance, leadership, and community engagement serves as surety to these organisations. Furthermore, Maguindanao Governor Mangudadatu sees no problem implementing big projects in Upi because the community believes in its elected leaders and traditional elders (see Unson, 2013c).

Empirical Findings: Causal Mechanism

Adopting the framework designed by Beach (2017), the overall causal mechanism is depicted in Figure 5-1. Each of its parts in-between the set of the explanatory variables and political violence is presented in detail. Each logically leads to the next, with no large logical gaps in the causal narrative starting with the causes and ending with the outcome.




Figure 5-1. Causal Mechanism

Political violence has been operationalised as the reported clashes between the government military and the rebel groups. The increased interaction between these two actors, therefore, translates to an increase in the value of the explained variable (Y). Meanwhile, Part 3 of the causal mechanism is based on the assumptions presented in Chapter Four about the strength relationship between the rebel groups and the government military, which lead to an expectation of more frequent clashes in areas where there is relatively high rebel activity. On the ground, evidence exists suggesting that a high rebel presence is concomitant with the susceptibility of political violence in a municipality. It is known that Datu Piang is home to the 105th MILF base command and has witnessed the highest share of skirmishes between the military and the rebels. On the other hand, the control residing in North Upi's local government and community leaders has been invaluable in maintaining peace in the municipality.

A comparison between the two cases highlights some enabling circumstances for rebel activity to flourish in a municipality. The operation of rebel groups in a municipality appears to depend partly on the residents' positive attitude toward the rebel group, which is intensified by the dwindling political legitimacy of the local state agencies (i.e., Part 2). In Datu Piang, there is evidence to suggest that at least a portion of the community

trust the MILF more than the local state agencies. Despite reported rebel visibility in North Upi, on the other hand, the local government exercises legitimate rule over its constituents, partly thanks to its good governance practices, innovative peacebuilding approaches, and development programs.

The following subsections present evidence-based accounts of how residents become more receptive to the idea of rebellion and how government legitimacy crumbles at the municipal level, which seem to be the main channels through which rebel groups can grow its force in a locality. The processes involved are discussed in terms of local conditions that accompany the determinants of political violence upon crossing their causal thresholds and the implications these concomitants have to political legitimacy and people's receptivity to the idea of revolution (i.e., Part 1), thus completing the causal chain.

Governance Void/Frustrations with the Local Government

Perceptions of longstanding neglect by the Philippine Government have been prevalent in Morolandia. Lethargic government response to excessive deprivation and poverty bolsters people's predisposition to accept the conflict and rebel alternatives in known areas of rebel influence such as Datu Piang. The UN Human Development Network (HDN) presents the same findings in the 2005 Philippine Human Development Report, which claims that communities living in circumstances of material deprivation and injustice become more "receptive to competing-state ideologies" (HDN, 2005, p. 28). The lack of administration and non-delivery of basic services intensify the already existing governance void, which the MILF should be eager to fill with a parallel source of rule and legitimacy. It is known that Moro rebel groups such as the MILF endeavour to project an image of being the people's government in their spheres of influence, as a way of securing support from the people. The lack of governance, therefore, makes it easier for them to demonstrate among the people that their way is better than the current regime.

The case of Datu Piang demonstrates how governance void at the local level worsens the general susceptibility of the people to engage in violent action. At the same time, it accentuates the local government of North Upi's reliance on government visibility as a peacebuilding approach. In North Upi, government schemes were implemented for the

creation of economic opportunities, provision of basic services, and good governance practices as soon as the current leadership stepped in, which helped to reduce disgruntled residents and potential civilian combatants.

Safety Concerns

Safety concerns lead people to muster firearms for protection or seek refuge with the rebel groups. In fact, the need for protection in the face of atrocious local government officials, when viewed as a causal mechanism, presents the most explicit evidence linking institutional weaknesses and participation in a rebellious movement. The case of Datu Piang demonstrates the Philippine State's counterinsurgency program, particularly the creation of paramilitary units, has become susceptible to exploitation by local politicians/warlords who use them as a means of political oppression. The government military also has a share of reported incidences of civilian harassment. These atrocities tend to contribute to the people's fear and hatred of the Philippine State and its agencies at the community level. In stark contrast, use of force does not seem to have a place in North Upi's present regime. In fact, the local executive has worked toward the decommissioning of paramilitaries, which has become the main tool for repression and pursuit of political interest for some of the traditional politicians in the Bangsamoro.

Distrust with Local State Agencies

In times of conflict, the immediate concern is survival. Ordinary Moro people have little choice about where to put their allegiance: the political warlords, the government troops, or the rebel fighters. In Datu Piang, a portion of the community trust and support the rebel fighters while being apprehensive of Philippine State agencies in the area, particularly the local government, the military, and paramilitary units.

North Upi residents had the same perceptions toward their government as a consequence of the decades of reported incompetence and inaction by past administrations. The then-incoming leadership needed to take confidence-building measures to gain the people's trust and support for their local government. In this regard, government-initiated development has been particularly invaluable. The local government has also efficiently harnessed the pre-existing esteem the people have for their traditional leaders. Ensuring

their support to the local official's leadership, in turn, has ensured the community's support for their local government.

Another Possible Mechanism

In the course of closely examining the cases, one potential causal pathway has emerged. It is clear that the rebel fighters in Datu Piang have taken advantage of the topography of the area to build a stronghold. Unlike the other factors, physical environment demonstrates a more direct path to increased rebel activity.

Discussion of Findings

Aside from discovering an evidence-based causal mechanism bridging economic underdevelopment and conflict, close examination of the cases has led to some validation of the direction of causality that this thesis aimed to explore. It is a known fact that conflict was already existent before North Upi underwent institutional reforms and moved onto more successful paths of economic development. It is also clear that some of the changes have a direct influence on peace in the area. While conflict is notorious for debilitating government presence in a locality, the Mayor's Council demonstrates that institutional mechanisms can also forge peace. The ensuing peace from this pioneering conflict resolution mechanism has allowed the government to focus on local development; however, it must also be recognised that the Council is a product of government innovation and built with the foundations of participation and equal representation.

In the introductory chapter, different pathways in studying the causal relationship between economic underdevelopment and violent conflict were introduced, which served as precepts in considering conflict theories to adopt, and particular numerical data to collect. One of these pathways emphasises the synchronicity between institutional change and economic development. Areas with low levels of economic development were supposed to have weak government institutions and poor governance practices. In this thesis, institutional variables have therefore been essential elements in characterising whether a municipality is economically progressive or backwards, and whether this affects the frequency of conflict in an area. Statistical analysis conducted in the previous

chapter did reveal that they, alongside other variables, show the expected influence on political violence.

However, the case studies demonstrate the precedence of institutional capacity over other factors within the context of the conflict. The interactive process involving the quality of local institutions, its effect on people's behaviour amidst conflict, and the production of political violence is also the most observable phenomenon that can be drawn from the cases. Regression analysis has so far confirmed that conflict has institutional causes, but not this much detail in-between the causal relationship. At the same time, however, the quality of institutional performance tends to depend on the personalities of those who are taking the helm. Datu Piang's local government has yet to witness positive changes, possibly because it has remained under the influence of the same political clan. Before the leadership change that occurred in 2001, North Upi had a comparable quality of local governance with Datu Piang.

Other variables of economic development, meanwhile, manifest as a function of institutional capacity. Such an observation is underpinned by the fact that these localities are extremely poor and battered with conflict, and the main (or possibly the only) agent of economic development is the local government. Nevertheless, it must also be acknowledged that the cases also demonstrate how essential and effective development becomes a peacebuilding approach. The local government's early emphasis on quick-impact development has been critical in sustaining peace in North Upi. Indeed, the local government's capacity to improve the living conditions of the people forms an inherent part of leadership quality and institutional performance.

At this point, institutional strength presents itself as having the greatest potential in terms of peacebuilding at a municipal level. The creation of the Mayor's Council and implementation of development programs in North Upi demonstrate the direct and indirect means through which a competent government institution shapes the conflict and peace situation within its jurisdiction. Such an outcome does not run contradictory to the causal effect of material deprivation on political violence, as revealed by the statistical analysis. On the contrary, the results of the case study enrich the numerical findings by

identifying certain prerequisites for the existence of more conventional indicators of economic development in the context of an interneccine conflict.

While the cases did not show empirical evidence of links between other development indicators and conflict (or at least those independent of institutional capacity), research studies that suggest otherwise abound. In particular, research works that focus on how rebel groups operate in the Bangsamoro region have made bold conclusions, pointing out large ideological gaps between the rebel leadership and the rank and file (e.g., Concepcion et al., 2003; Lara & Schoofs, 2013; Özerdem et al., 2010; Podder, 2012; Vitug & Gloria, 2000). Alternative ways of earning a livelihood, these studies claim, figure as a more prominent reason for joining the rebellion than cultural or religious identity. Admittedly, case analysis conducted at the organisational level seem to demonstrate such causal linkages more elaborately than geographically-based analysis, which from experience has been constrained by what information is available in a particular municipality under scrutiny. Regardless, findings from these studies buttress the expectation that examining more cases will yield the empirical evidence needed to map out the causal link between other indicators of economic development and conflict.

Having presented the casual mechanism found in the cases, the next objective is to examine its compatibility with the grievance narrative. Recall from the introductory chapter that empirically demonstrating the state agencies' bearing on local peace provides motivation to this thesis. The central role state agencies play in grievance-based explanations of conflict has therefore been a reason for choosing grievance as this thesis' default theoretical lens. More importantly, grievance-based theories accommodate qualities of institutional strength that the researcher takes an interest in (e.g., good governance and service delivery) better than greed-based theories, which generally focus on military strength. On the ground, institutional capacity has performed its expected part in the causal chain leading to political violence. The cases consistently demonstrate that a local government's ability to uphold good governance and socioeconomic justice determines its political legitimacy, and, in turn, its political legitimacy partly determines the feasibility of rebel operation in a locality. Meanwhile, people's attitude toward rebel groups has more to do with self-preservation, in terms of meeting basic needs and seeking protection, rather than self-enrichment, which greed proponents consider the motive force

behind a rebellion. All of these arguments support the conclusion that the causal relationships found operated on the ground as theorised.

The two cases have shown a certain degree of consistency in terms of where the causal pathway leads to, conflict-wise, in the presence and absence of signs of economic progress in a municipality. Beach (2017, p. 5) asserts that if the causal mechanism worked consistently between two positive cases, a “cautious inference” could be made that they exist in the rest of positive cases in a given population. Nonetheless, generalisation does not form part of this chapter’s ambitions. It must also be recognised that the causal mechanism found is just one of possibly more mechanisms that additional cases may reveal.

Moving Forward

This chapter has led to a more in-depth grasp of the causal links between underdevelopment and political violence in the Bangsamoro, by presenting mechanisms governing these statistical relationships. The next chapter concludes this thesis by synthesising the empirical findings, articulating recommendations, and reflecting on the locus of development issues in understanding the Bangsamoro conflict and civil conflicts in general.

Chapter 6

Prospects for Lasting Peace: Highlighting the Role of Local Governance and Development

Many of the people continue to feel alienated by the system, and those who feel that there is no way out will continue to articulate their grievances through the barrel of a gun.

Former President Benigno Aquino Jr.

Introduction

Finding evidence-based solutions to the ongoing conflict in the Bangsamoro served as an impetus for this thesis. Accordingly, it undertook a within-country quantitative analysis of the correlates of conflict intensity, with a focus on the decades-old Muslim insurgency. It capitalised on the important contributions that prevailing cross-country studies have made to understanding the causes of civil conflicts by adopting their empirical approach on a subnational scale.

The search for the causal explanations of civil conflicts mainly focused on economic underdevelopment. This thesis subscribed to a multidimensional definition of economic development in order to distinguish its presence and absence on the ground. The grievance paradigm, the one side of the prominent dialectic in civil conflict studies, served as the central theoretical explanation for this thesis. Grievance-based explanations

informed the hypothesised direction of causality between every indicator of economic development and reported incidences of political violence in a municipality. Finally, the assumption that the strength of an insurgency and the attendant levels of violence depend primarily on the level of popular support completed the hypothesised link between underdevelopment and political violence.

Given the above theoretical framework, the ensuing hypotheses linked the frequency of political violence to factors known to be detrimental to the material, political, and social well-being of the people. Using the municipality as the unit of analysis, these conjectures were empirically tested using a negative binomial regression technique. Meanwhile, the theoretical explanations' validity on the ground was verified by accentuating in two municipalities indicative evidence of causal mechanisms in-between the causes and the outcome, with the aid of a qualitative process-tracing technique.

This concluding chapter is organised into three sections. The first section summarises the findings from the two previous chapters and discusses their broader implications for the Bangsamoro conflict. The second section offers recommendations for possible peacebuilding policies and future research. The third section concludes with the researcher's stance with respect to the locus of economic development in the overall causality of the Bangsamoro conflict and reflections on the contribution of this thesis to the study of civil conflicts.

Summary of Findings and their implications

Through regression analysis, this thesis confirmed that locally-specific development factors influence the frequency of political violence at a municipal level. The incidence of political violence was observed to be higher in municipalities with worse cases of material deprivation, particularly land, and scarcity of resources as implied by a larger population. In contrast, violent incidences appeared to be lower in municipalities with a more educated population, better access to basic services, and stronger governing institutions, particularly in the areas of service delivery, support to local development, and good governance. Meanwhile, results were inconclusive for measures of relative deprivation, unemployment, and low economic opportunity. Conflict intensity also

showed no robust association with identity-based indicators, particularly ethnic diversity and religious polarisation. The same applied with environmental and demographic variables suggesting the ease of conducting a rebellion.

The process tracing analysis identified intermediary mechanisms which explained how the causalities operated on the ground, at least for factors statistically correlated with conflict intensity. Based on the findings, the aggravating effect of underdevelopment could be mostly explained through failures of the local government as the main agent of local development. In the case of Datu Piang, attendant conditions with underdevelopment were identified that negatively influenced the local government's legitimacy and people's receptiveness to the idea of rebellion. Poverty, failure in service delivery, and poor governance sharpened perceptions of a negligent government. In addition, reports of atrocity and abuse implicating local state agencies incited distrust and fear among the community, which lead people to seek rebel groups for protection. In contrast, the case of North Upi exemplified how a local government can reverse these processes through institutional reforms and local development initiatives. Vice versa, access to basic services, the creation of economic opportunities, and implementation of development programs proved to be an important means of quickly legitimising and strengthening local government institutions as part of the peacebuilding effort. Taken together, these findings culminated with a verdict that causalities found operated on the ground as theorised.

Institutional factors demonstrate consistently affirming results in regression estimation. The role of institutions in explaining the overall relationship between development and conflict reduction has been a central finding of process tracing. However, the interrelationships between local government capacity, development, and conflict reduction do not appear straightforward and one-way. Within a context of a sensitive peacebuilding process, a strong local government has been seen as fundamental to increasing the quality and coverage of services to citizens, alleviating poverty, and strengthening participatory governance at the local level. Concurrently, local development has provided legitimacy to the local government.

Accordingly, the overall findings have brought to the fore issues of local governance and development in the threat of separatist conflicts in the Philippines. While the central Philippine Government and the Moro rebels negotiate broad areas of a peace agreement such as political autonomy, wealth sharing, and normalisation, these governance and development issues on the ground, if left unaddressed, will continue to fuel the conflict and derail any peacebuilding initiative. On the part of the state, a critical balance must, therefore, be made between the task of responding to the broader aspirations of the Moro people and the need to speedily reconstruct figures of government at both the local and national levels. In this regard, the solution may lie in the problem. As most public services are delivered at the local level, local governments have been observed at the centre of many developmental problems found to be part of the root causes of the conflict. At the same time, however, this goes to show that state-society relationships are more pronounced at the local level. From this vantage point, harnessing the local government's potential to foster local economic development presents an opportunity of extending the Philippine State's legitimacy in these contested areas in the south.

Taking advantage of this opportunity is not without challenges, however. This thesis touched on the existing power structures and traditional political elites, which shaped the state of their local governance. Empowering local government without regard to such local realities may replicate or even exacerbate social patterns of exclusion, inequity, and marginalisation. If this happens, local governance initiatives would rather foster continued or renewed conflict and ultimately fail as a peacebuilding tool. In contrast, the findings offer possible alternative scenarios if strategies for local governance reforms were based on a thorough assessment of these highly localised conditions. North Upi implementing a consociational form of democracy at the local level, provided an excellent example of using the existing power structure to foster participatory governance and quick service delivery, particularly equitable justice. It is dangerous, however, to expect every local government authority to behave as such. In this regard, the task of harnessing local governance reforms for the consolidation of peace requires a strong oversight from the central government with a clear, institutionalised accountability framework.

Recommendations

This thesis articulates policy implications of the findings. It offers recommendations mostly in broad strokes, as specific policies require further studies and are therefore beyond the scope of this thesis. Recommendations are more focused on conflict prevention as opposed to management and recovery. Prevention of violent conflict refers to approaches used to avoid, minimise, or contain continued or renewed conflicts. With regard to agenda for future research, suggestions are given with consideration to subject areas and approaches to address or improve on the weaknesses and limitations of this thesis.

Policy

Monitoring and Data Collection

Conflict prevention requires cautious and timely monitoring of indicators of increasing tensions and taking measures to assuage them, which make early warning systems a critical element of effective conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Early warning consists of gathering data, analysing risks, and relaying information and recommendations for response to the intended recipients. This thesis aimed at developing an early warning system for the incidence of violent conflict in the Bangsamoro by identifying some of its risk factors through statistical analysis. In terms of monitoring conditions that will likely give rise to more political violence at a municipal level, the following parameters are identified: landlessness, educational attainment, village-level access to basic services, and quality of local governance.

A key constraint facing conflict monitoring and analysis is the lack of quality data. In the course of collating statistical data for the study of causality behind the Bangsamoro conflict, this thesis had also hinted at some weaknesses as respects their availability. Government data is presently insufficient to test the effects of group inequality in the instances of political violence at a municipal scale. In this regard, incorporating questions designed to gauge ethnic/religious affiliations and well-being in national surveys and censuses will profoundly benefit future quantitative research.

In 2003, the Indonesian government included in its periodic Village Potential Statistics (PODES) a section on Politics, Conflict, and Crime to map conflict across all of the country's 69,000 villages (Barron et al., 2004). The Philippine Government may replicate this good practice by incorporating local conflict modules in existing national and regional surveys or through centralised data gathering from different police/military posts scattered all over the country. Gathering conflict data, however, entails refined and standardised definitions and thresholds, carefully designed questionnaires, and training of enumerators.

Structural Conflict Prevention

This thesis diagnosed socioeconomic and political maladies that if left unaddressed may lead to prolonged and more intense conflict in the long run. Particular areas for structural intervention may be identified from these findings. Programs that improve the education of the labour force appear to be worthwhile investments to achieve peace in the future. Agrarian reform policies that promote equitable land redistribution also show potential as a deterrent to the incidence of political violence in the region. It is worthy to reiterate that such prospects about land reform are attributed to the fact that land disputes have been a critical element of the history of the Bangsamoro conflict's history. Ensuring that existing land conflicts are resolved may prove to be a propitious point of departure for building the foundations of reconciliation and trust. Increasing access to basic services, promoting livelihoods, and creating economic opportunities, which are necessary for social justice and cohesion, show potential to build favourable conditions for lasting peace.

Strengthening Local Governance

There is a need to bring the Philippine Government closer to the Moro people. Most of the underlying issues relevant to the conflict can actually be overcome through political leadership and good governance. Local governments are found to be an effective avenue through which development interventions can be utilised to ease the social tensions in the region. This thesis' overarching recommendation for conflict prevention and long-term peacebuilding is to strengthen the local public institutions' initiative and capacity to improve the general welfare of the people; to promote greater transparency, accountability, and participation; and to foster prospects of local growth and development

in areas under their leadership. In addition, integrating processes of local governance reform and peacebuilding should be a nationally driven endeavour.

Future Research

Determinants of Individual Participation in the Bangsamoro Conflict

This thesis rationalised hypothesised links between local development issues and occurrence of political violence through people's motivation in supporting or participating in the rebellion. While several studies have accepted the interdependence among popular support, rebel strength, and conflict intensity to be universally true, it is still deemed beneficial to confirm the determinants of individual participation in the Bangsamoro conflict. Data on individual participation in the conflict will help to completely tread the causal path between underdevelopment and political violence, in terms of finding empirical evidence. More importantly, the findings will serve as inputs to strategies of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Such a micro-level analysis, however, cannot be assessed using the data on hand. Accordingly, this topic is put forward as part of the future research agenda. Given the risks and difficulties of collecting data in conflict-torn areas, research topics of this kind are plausible in a post-conflict environment. Survey research can be used to retrospectively examine political behaviours in situations of conflict (see Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008 for example).

The Role of Local Governance in Sustainable Peacebuilding

Research on local governance interventions in conflict settings is lacking (Dabo, Salmon, Venancio, & Keuleers, 2010). Considering that strengthening local governments involves power shifts, this thesis has done just adequate empirical work to demonstrate that there are risks and benefits associated with utilising local governance approaches in circumstances of violent conflict. Furthermore, extreme cases were selected for the investigation to bring out these findings. Examining more cases will shed light on different aspects of governance approaches to peacebuilding, areas which should be prioritised, overarching themes of potential risks and benefits, and good practices on how to effectively manage them.

Methodological Improvements

Future research in line with this thesis may improve on its methodological aspects including proxy variables at the municipal level to measure factors potentially associated with the conflict and the research design to better address issues of reverse causality. How measures of underdevelopment influence conflict intensity over time is also an area left for future research as quantitative information on the Bangsamoro conflict accrues.

The current state of official data is not sufficient to examine the horizontal/group inequality's effect on instances of political violence at a municipal level. Considering that a rebellion essentially is a collective activity, group inequality could have provided one of the most substantial contributions in terms of making sense of the separatist conflict in Mindanao. In addition, a particular concern for this thesis has been the rudimentary approach used in addressing the possibility of reverse causality, although the supplementing case study provided some validation in the direction of the causality between underdevelopment and political violence. Nevertheless, the possibility of reverse causality can be addressed more effectively with sophisticated and more complex procedures (see Miguel, Satyanath, & Sergenti, 2004 for example).

Conclusion

The overarching aim of this thesis is to further the current understanding of the Bangsamoro conflict by determining whether violent episodes occur disproportionately in areas with low levels of economic development. In this regard, the most valuable contribution of this thesis relates to this main research objective. By presenting the results of a unique large-sample analysis of the intensity of internecine conflict in the Bangsamoro region, it has provided empirical evidence supporting underdevelopment-civil conflict association. To my knowledge, this thesis represents one of the first attempts at testing the link between economic underdevelopment and the location of violence, with a particular focus on the Bangsamoro conflict.

This thesis has established grounds for cautious optimism regarding the operative value of economic development in peacebuilding. The findings suffice to shape belief and action in respect to the role of economic development in peacebuilding in the

Bangsamoro. While the conflict cannot be reduced to purely economic issues, they are clearly at the heart of the problem. Meanwhile, the inconclusive findings on identity-based variables suggest, at the very least, that it is not all about religion or ideology—this is an oversimplification of the underlying causes of the Bangsamoro conflict. Accordingly, future peacebuilding endeavours should be fashioned in accordance with this grounded belief. On the other hand, there are important tasks for future research in terms of empirically identifying causal variables, addressing methodological concerns, and bringing out causal mechanisms producing such patterns. The ontological stance of this thesis also commands to regard the findings as probabilistic, subjecting them to further validation (or falsification).

Separatism is commonly defined as an ongoing tension between the dominant and marginalised ethnic, cultural, or religious groups within society. This definition has preceded studies that explain separatist conflicts occurring in developing nations, such as the Philippines, in terms of these collective identities. This thesis, on the other hand, digressed from this view by highlighting the underlying socioeconomic and institutional factors behind the Muslim separatist struggle in the Bangsamoro. The analysis has led to some encouraging findings. At the onset, this thesis illuminated situations of socioeconomic and political exclusion that have accompanied the so-called Moro identity all throughout the history of the Bangsamoro conflict. Meanwhile, the empirical analysis confirmed that nothing has substantially changed in the interrelationship between the Moro identity, experiences of socioeconomic and political marginalisation, and political violence in the most recent circumstances surrounding the conflict.

All of the above observations support the argument that ethnic, religious, or cultural differences do not automatically foster violence. If the prevailing political system upholds socioeconomic and political equality, the salience of group identity as a mobilising factor for political violence may become less significant. In fact, identity can be a peaceful means of inclusion and empowerment, which was clearly demonstrated by the case of North Upi's governance. Identity-based differences, therefore, do not condemn societies to a perpetual threat of separatist conflicts. Attempts at preventing separatism and other identity-based conflicts should focus on its underlying socioeconomic and political causes, which tend to aggravate the tension among different groups in the first place.

The process-tracing analysis leads to a grounded understanding of the patterns governing the relationship between economic underdevelopment and instances of political violence shown in the regression analysis. Its main finding points to the Philippine State's reach throughout the Bangsamoro region as an important variable underlying the underdevelopment-civil conflict association. In this regard, state reach is mainly embodied by the local government. The two cases show, in both positive and negative light, the fundamental role local governments play in shaping the coverage of services to citizens, the adequacy of development, and the quality of participatory governance at the local level. Combining the findings from the two research approaches, great potential is found among local governments in terms of directly tackling the systemic causes of the conflict. It leads to an overarching conclusion that strengthening local government and governance practices is essential to consolidating peace. While most studies have pointed out the need for development in the Bangsamoro peace process, few offer concrete recommendations as to how its dividends, whose distribution has long been a subject of violent contestation, should be delivered efficiently. The local government may serve as an effective channel, but not without prior arrangements for accountable, transparent, and participatory governance.

Demonstrating the centrality of local governance and development issues in the context of a civil conflict is the unique contribution of this thesis to the conflict literature. Empowering local governments through some degree of decentralisation has been pursued by many countries in various political settings, but rarely in the context of internecine conflicts and peacebuilding. As indicated in Chapter Two, the current body of knowledge, shaped predominantly by findings from cross-country studies, is yet to fully grasp the changing nature of armed conflicts consequent to the rise in violence and state failure at the subnational level. In the light of the subnational dynamics of the Bangsamoro conflict demonstrated in this thesis, an emphasis is given to localised explanations and solutions as the basis for sustainable peace and post-conflict state-building. While civil conflicts are generally recognised as a national threat, the vantage point from which they should be examined must be closest to the affected communities and at the lowest possible level of government, especially if the ambition is to find sustainable solutions for peace. The government's counterinsurgency strategies premised

on the disproportionate use of military force and violence can weaken local recognition and support for the state while solidifying people's penchant for accepting conflict and rebel alternatives.

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Appendices

- A. Deciding on a Statistical Model
- B. Negative Binomial Estimation
- C. Adjusted Predictions
- D. Ordered Logit Estimation
- E. Descriptive Statistics
- F. Kendall Tau Correlation
- G. List of ARMM Municipalities

A. Deciding on a Statistical Model

Test of Goodness of Fit: Standard Poisson, Zero-inflated Poisson or Negative Binomial Regression Model?

There are several available choices in the Poisson family of regression models. Stata 12 supports standard Poisson, negative binomial, and zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) regression models, among others. Starting with the basic Poisson regression model, statistical theory dictates that in a Poisson distribution the mean and variance of the explained variable should be the same (Coxe et al., 2009). Otherwise, its variance might be greater than what is expected in a standard Poisson distribution (i.e., overdispersion). Summarising the explained variable, political violence using the ‘detail’ option in Stata shows that its variance is markedly larger than its mean (see Table A-1). As such, the distribution of political violence is displaying signs of overdispersion.

Mean	5.443478
Std. Dev.	11.9738
Variance	143.3718
Skewness	3.643655
Kurtosis	17.55843

Table A-1. Summary of the Explained Variable, Political Violence

The Poisson goodness-of-fit (GOF) test confirms that the Poisson regression model is a less appropriate choice, given the characteristics of the data. Running the empirical model in a standard Poisson regression analysis followed by a GOF test yields a markedly large Pearson chi-square value ($\chi^2=652.56$) with a significant test statistic ($p=0.0000$). This brings the options down to the ZIP and negative binomial regression models.

Given that many municipalities have reported zero incidences of political violence, the overdispersion may be caused by the preponderance of zeroes in the explained data (Drukker, 2009). ZIP regression could be the appropriate model if the excess zeros are ‘structural’. It means having municipalities that will never take a value greater than zero due to their distinct characteristics (Coxe et al., 2009). In the quintessential alcohol consumption example, never-drinkers produce structural zeros because they will always

respond that they consumed zero drinks. The best option, according to Coxe et al. (2009), is to identify and eliminate the observations that produce structural zeros from the data set. If the information to identify observations that are structural zeros is not available, running a ZIP regression model is another option.

Another common method for accounting for overdispersion is the negative binomial regression model (NBRM). Furthermore, Drukker (2009) demonstrates that it can also account for excess zeros. Both the ZIP and NBRM seem viable choice given the characteristics of the data. Accordingly, a battery of assessments is conducted to determine the more adequate model between ZIP and NBRM.

A graphical method for assessing model adequacy is to plot and compare the residuals from the tested Poisson-type regression models (Cameron & Trivedi, 2013). Residuals are the difference between the observed value of political violence and its predicted value. The empirical model supplies the predicted value, given the explained and explanatory data. Small residuals, therefore, are indicative of good-fitting models.




Figure A-1. Residual Plots of ZIP and NBR Models

In Figure A-1, the model with the line closer to zero should be considered for the data. Apparently, the ZIP and the NBRM perform very similarly for middle counts, three to six. They both differ substantially from the actual values and each other at counts one and

two. NBRM performs better than ZIP at the larger counts, seven to nine. Although NBRM appears to perform better than ZIP in more count values, it is difficult to decide based solely on this graph.

Model	Maximum Difference	At Value	Mean Diff
NBRM	-0.021	2	0.008
ZIP	0.085	1	0.016

**Table A-2. Maximum and Mean Absolute Difference
between the Observed and Predicted Count, NBRM vs. ZIP**

Table A-2 compares NBRM and ZIP in terms of maximum and mean absolute differences in observed and predicted counts. It confirms what was observed in the residual plot: ZIP performed worst at predicting a count of one while NBRM performed worst at a count of two. At their worst predictions, however, NBRM did better and also has a lower mean absolute difference between predicted and observed values. At this point, NBRM appears to be a better choice than ZIP.

Another way to assess model adequacy is to compare the observed probabilities of political violence with its predicted probabilities (Coxe et al., 2009). Observed probabilities are based on political violence's actual distribution while the predicted probabilities are drawn by each tested regression model from the data. Tables A-3 and A-4 present the count-by-count information table for NBRM and ZIP. For counts 0-9, the actual proportion of the data with the given count and the predicted proportion from each regression model are presented in the tables respectively.

Count	Actual	Predicted	Diff	Pearson
0	0.484	0.481	0.002	0.001
1	0.154	0.145	0.009	0.050
2	0.055	0.076	0.021	0.542
3	0.044	0.049	0.005	0.046
4	0.033	0.035	0.002	0.009
5	0.044	0.026	0.018	1.055
6	0.033	0.021	0.012	0.631
7	0.011	0.017	0.006	0.196
8	0.011	0.014	0.003	0.066
9	0.011	0.012	0.001	0.008
Sum	0.879	0.877	0.079	2.604

Table A-3. Predicted and Actual Probabilities, NBRM

Count	Actual	Predicted	Diff	Pearson
0	0.484	0.479	0.004	0.004
1	0.154	0.069	0.085	9.595
2	0.055	0.063	0.008	0.085
3	0.044	0.053	0.009	0.140
4	0.033	0.044	0.011	0.234
5	0.044	0.036	0.008	0.146
6	0.033	0.031	0.002	0.010
7	0.011	0.027	0.016	0.864
8	0.011	0.023	0.012	0.600
9	0.011	0.020	0.009	0.379
Sum	0.879	0.845	0.164	12.057

Table A-4. Predicted and Actual Probabilities, ZIP

The Pearson Chi-Square statistic compares the actual distribution of the data and the distributions proposed by each model. The lower the score, the closer the predicted proportions are to the actual proportions. Comparing the sums of the Pearson columns for each model confirms that NBRM has a better fit than the ZIP.

Finally, the Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria (A/BIC) provide an objective basis for model selection given the sample size, the number of parameters (or explanatory variables), and goodness of fit. AIC and BIC ensure model simplicity as both penalises adding parameters to improve a model's goodness of fit. The preferred model is the one with the minimum AIC and BIC values. Comparing the two models in terms of their AIC and BIC values, the NBRM is preferred over ZIP (See Table A-5).

NBRM	BIC=	439.178	AIC=	391.472	Prefer	Over	Evidence
vs ZIP	BIC=	681.056	dif=	-241.878	NBRM	ZIP	Very strong
	AIC=	590.665	dif=	-199.193	NBRM	ZIP	
ZIP	BIC=	681.056	AIC=	590.665	Prefer	Over	Evidence

Table A-5. Tests and Fit Statistics, NBRM vs. ZIP

B. Negative Binomial Estimation

Model 1: nbreg polvio pop unempl elec educ agriemp nolnd rldep socgov ecogov fungov vlhsptl vlwtr vlsch efrac muslim rdden yngmle

Negative binomial regression		Number of obs	=	91
		LR chi2(17)	=	45.83
Dispersion = mean		Prob > chi2	=	0.0002
Log likelihood = -176.73587		Pseudo R2	=	0.1148

	polvio	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
pop		2.003422	.5444657	3.68	0.000	.9362887	3.070555
unempl		-6.868006	4.189707	-1.64	0.101	-15.07968	1.343669
elec		4.233344	1.436792	2.95	0.003	1.417283	7.049406
educ		-9.571518	2.64299	-3.62	0.000	-14.75168	-4.391354
agriemp		-.1941702	1.844815	-0.11	0.916	-3.809942	3.421602
nolnd		2.766824	1.717451	1.61	0.107	-.5993179	6.132966
rldep		-.01912	.0399457	-0.48	0.632	-.0974121	.0591721
socgov		-.6053961	.4192384	-1.44	0.149	-1.427088	.2162961
ecogov		-.1715484	.3548129	-0.48	0.629	-.866969	.5238721
fungov		.234184	.4039757	0.58	0.562	-.5575938	1.025962
vlhsptl		4.187419	5.933453	0.71	0.480	-7.441935	15.81677
vlwtr		-.5764454	1.071766	-0.54	0.591	-2.677069	1.524178
vlsch		-4.302667	2.084376	-2.06	0.039	-8.387969	-.217364
efrac		-1.047847	1.543533	-0.68	0.497	-4.073117	1.977423
muslim		.7442738	1.598496	0.47	0.641	-2.38872	3.877268
rdden		-9.939457	10.87577	-0.91	0.361	-31.25558	11.37666
yngmle		18.02012	18.74351	0.96	0.336	-18.71648	54.75672
_cons		-16.64194	6.336485	-2.63	0.009	-29.06123	-4.222662
/lnalpha		.6471691	.2254612			.2052732	1.089065
alpha		1.910126	.4306592			1.227861	2.971494

Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0: chibar2(01) = 353.07 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000

Model 2: nbreg polvio pop unempl unemplsq elec elecsq educ agriemp nolnd rldep socgov ecogov fungov vlhsptl vlwtr vlsch efrac muslim rdden yngmle

Negative binomial regression		Number of obs	=	91
		LR chi2(19)	=	56.38
Dispersion = mean		Prob > chi2	=	0.0000
Log likelihood = -171.45986		Pseudo R2	=	0.1412

	polvio	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
pop		1.561331	.5415447	2.88	0.004	.4999233	2.62274
unempl		-13.46293	46.15971	-0.29	0.771	-103.9343	77.00845
unemplsq		9.153831	46.57213	0.20	0.844	-82.12586	100.4335
elec		15.16533	3.683279	4.12	0.000	7.946231	22.38442
elecsq		-12.23286	3.808563	-3.21	0.001	-19.6975	-4.768211
educ		-5.712971	2.770325	-2.06	0.039	-11.14271	-.2832342
agriemp		-.8713499	1.78298	-0.49	0.625	-4.365926	2.623227
nolnd		4.470849	1.829856	2.44	0.015	.8843962	8.057301
rldep		-.020723	.0360517	-0.57	0.565	-.091383	.049937
socgov		-.2878644	.416249	-0.69	0.489	-1.103697	.5279686
ecogov		-.3242582	.3545422	-0.91	0.360	-1.019148	.3706317
fungov		-.0855978	.3927992	-0.22	0.827	-.8554701	.6842744
vlhsptl		1.218526	5.962262	0.20	0.838	-10.46729	12.90434
vlwtr		1.389905	1.200971	1.16	0.247	-.9639546	3.743765
vlsch		-4.580384	2.003566	-2.29	0.022	-8.507302	-.6534666
efrac		-2.274804	1.499635	-1.52	0.129	-5.214035	.6644266

muslim	-.4528593	1.545962	-0.29	0.770	-3.482889	2.57717
rd den	-7.6895	10.68603	-0.72	0.472	-28.63374	13.25474
yngmle	3.230284	18.80922	0.17	0.864	-33.63511	40.09568
_cons	-10.96429	11.32386	-0.97	0.333	-33.15866	11.23007
-----+						
/lnalpha	.4619635	.2331958			.0049082	.9190189
-----+						
alpha	1.587187	.3701254			1.00492	2.50683

Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0: chibar2(01) = 321.57 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000						

**Model 3: nbreg polvio pop unempl unemplsq elec elecsq educ agriemp nolnd rldep
socgov vlhsptl vlwtr vlsch efrac muslim rd den yngmle**

Negative binomial regression	Number of obs	=	91
	LR chi2(17)	=	55.41
Dispersion = mean	Prob > chi2	=	0.0000
Log likelihood = -171.94317	Pseudo R2	=	0.1388

polvio	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
-----+						
pop	1.485257	.5345721	2.78	0.005	.4375149	2.532999
unempl	-7.731956	45.68724	-0.17	0.866	-97.2773	81.81339
unemplsq	1.983726	45.82857	0.04	0.965	-87.83861	91.80606
elec	14.34708	3.448977	4.16	0.000	7.587206	21.10695
elecsq	-11.29974	3.560293	-3.17	0.002	-18.27779	-4.321697
educ	-6.192156	2.722325	-2.27	0.023	-11.52782	-.8564962
agriemp	-.8033845	1.799589	-0.45	0.655	-4.330514	2.723745
nolnd	3.740113	1.547085	2.42	0.016	.707881	6.772344
rldep	-.0241959	.0364222	-0.66	0.506	-.095582	.0471903
socgov	-.5960851	.2351358	-2.54	0.011	-1.056943	-.1352273
vlhsptl	4.173553	5.061457	0.82	0.410	-5.74672	14.09383
vlwtr	.966328	1.074815	0.90	0.369	-1.140271	3.072927
vl sch	-4.103375	1.910953	-2.15	0.032	-7.848773	-.3579764
efrac	-2.214337	1.480782	-1.50	0.135	-5.116617	.6879428
muslim	-.3007406	1.548842	-0.19	0.846	-3.336416	2.734934
rd den	-10.21693	10.20776	-1.00	0.317	-30.22378	9.78992
yngmle	5.188115	17.69623	0.29	0.769	-29.49585	39.87208
_cons	-11.21914	11.36329	-0.99	0.323	-33.49079	11.0525
-----+						
/lnalpha	.4732982	.2320566			.0184756	.9281209
-----+						
alpha	1.60528	.3725159			1.018647	2.529751

Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0: chibar2(01) = 351.56 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000						

**Model 4: nbreg polvio pop unempl unemplsq elec elecsq educ agriemp nolnd rldep
ecogov vlhsptl vlwtr vlsch efrac muslim rd den yngmle**

Negative binomial regression	Number of obs	=	91
	LR chi2(17)	=	55.50
Dispersion = mean	Prob > chi2	=	0.0000
Log likelihood = -171.90106	Pseudo R2	=	0.1390

polvio	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
-----+						
pop	1.6279	.5554217	2.93	0.003	.5392939	2.716507
unempl	-13.96917	46.80942	-0.30	0.765	-105.714	77.77561
unemplsq	11.13782	47.17894	0.24	0.813	-81.33121	103.6069
elec	15.3653	3.581441	4.29	0.000	8.345809	22.3848
elecsq	-12.68544	3.717713	-3.41	0.001	-19.97203	-5.398857
educ	-5.443815	2.810988	-1.94	0.053	-10.95325	.0656195
agriemp	-.8203322	1.77633	-0.46	0.644	-4.301874	2.66121
nolnd	4.897879	1.652611	2.96	0.003	1.65882	8.136937

rldep		- .011011	.0349269	-0.32	0.753	- .0794665	.0574444
ecogov		-.5842703	.2305625	-2.53	0.011	-1.036164	-.1323761
vlhsptl		-.8117521	5.733858	-0.14	0.887	-12.04991	10.4264
vlwtr		1.495456	1.163751	1.29	0.199	-.7854549	3.776366
vlsch		-5.157042	1.947978	-2.65	0.008	-8.975008	-1.339076
efrac		-2.15164	1.497414	-1.44	0.151	-5.086518	.7832383
muslim		-.5177422	1.559316	-0.33	0.740	-3.573945	2.538461
rd den		-5.532417	10.71939	-0.52	0.606	-26.54204	15.47721
yngmle		2.960824	18.85512	0.16	0.875	-33.99454	39.91619
_cons		-12.65096	11.4091	-1.11	0.267	-35.01238	9.710463

/lnalpha		.4900882	.2308648			.0376015	.9425749

alpha		1.63246	.3768776			1.038317	2.566582

Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0: $\text{chibar2}(01) = 327.37$ Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000

Model 5: nbreg polvio pop unempl unemplsq elec elecsq educ agriemp nolnd rldep
fungov vlhsptl vlwtr vlsc efrac muslim rdden yngmle

Negative binomial regression	Number of obs	=	91
	LR chi2(17)	=	53.32
Dispersion = mean	Prob > chi2	=	0.0000
Log likelihood = -172.98775	Pseudo R2	=	0.1335

polvio	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
pop	1.482745	.5589918	2.65	0.008	.3871416	2.578349
unempl	3.474802	46.77752	0.07	0.941	-88.20745	95.15706
unemplsq	-8.006137	47.12929	-0.17	0.865	-100.3778	84.36557
elec	15.68177	3.679786	4.26	0.000	8.469519	22.89401
elecsq	-12.82383	3.736591	-3.43	0.001	-20.14742	-5.500248
educ	-6.100496	2.846338	-2.14	0.032	-11.67922	-5.5217755
agriemp	-.2937548	1.829955	-0.16	0.872	-3.8804	3.292891
noInd	4.967349	1.651953	3.01	0.003	1.72958	8.205118
rldep	-.0195688	.037022	-0.53	0.597	-.0921305	.0529929
fungov	-.5550021	.2804842	-1.98	0.048	-1.104741	-.0052632
vlhspt1	4.085731	5.547547	0.74	0.461	-6.787263	14.95872
vlwtr	1.322677	1.1792	1.12	0.262	-.9885124	3.633866
vlsch	-4.327221	1.992716	-2.17	0.030	-8.232872	-.4215689
efrac	-2.500823	1.517293	-1.65	0.099	-5.474662	.4730161
muslim	-.5274248	1.590804	-0.33	0.740	-3.645344	2.590494
rdDen	-6.665225	10.49777	-0.63	0.525	-27.24048	13.91003
yngmle	-3.337158	19.39928	-0.17	0.863	-41.35904	34.68473
_cons	-14.20587	11.46196	-1.24	0.215	-36.67089	8.259157
/lnalpha	.5284574	.2284475			.0807085	.9762063
alpha	1.696314	.3875186			1.084055	2.654367

Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0: $\chi^2(01) = 377.88$ Prob>= $\chi^2 = 0.000$

C. Adjusted Predictions

```
margins, at(pop=(8(.5)11.5)) atmeans noatlegend
```

Adjusted predictions	Number of obs	=	91
Model VCE : OIM			

Expression : Predicted number of events, `predict()`

		Delta-method					
		Margin	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
at							
1		.0764127	.0894231	0.85	0.393	-.0988534	.2516787
2		.1603761	.1437397	1.12	0.265	-.1213485	.4421007
3		.3365997	.2110946	1.59	0.111	-.0771382	.7503376
4		.7064603	.2639063	2.68	0.007	.1892134	1.223707
5		1.482729	.3039754	4.88	0.000	.8869484	2.07851
6		3.111974	.987759	3.15	0.002	1.176002	5.047946
7		6.531456	3.669839	1.78	0.075	-.6612966	13.72421
8		13.70831	11.36128	1.21	0.228	-8.559383	35.97601

```
margins, at( educ=(0(.10)1)) atmeans noatlegend
```

Adjusted predictions	Number of obs	=	91
Model VCE : OIM			

Expression : Predicted number of events, `predict()`

		Delta-method				
		Margin	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Intervall
at						
1		8.379814	6.379434	1.31	0.189	-4.123646 20.88327
2		4.511412	2.269739	1.99	0.047	.0628047 8.960019
3		2.428793	.6647335	3.65	0.000	1.125939 3.731647
4		1.307581	.2771083	4.72	0.000	.7644588 1.850703
5		.703958	.2843323	2.48	0.013	.1466769 1.261239
6		.3789875	.2483996	1.53	0.127	-.1078668 .8658417
7		.2040342	.1874737	1.09	0.276	-.1634076 .5714759
8		.1098452	.130302	0.84	0.399	-.145542 .3652324
9		.059137	.0860694	0.69	0.492	-.1095559 .2278299
10		.0318374	.0549376	0.58	0.562	-.0758384 .1395132
11		.0171402	.0342167	0.50	0.616	-.0499232 .0842036

```
margins, at( nolnd=(0(.10)1)) atmeans noatlegend
```

Adjusted predictions	Number of obs	=	91
Model VCE : OIM			

Expression : Predicted number of events, `predict()`

		Delta-method				
		Margin	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Intervall
_at						
1		.1036146	.0998371	1.04	0.299	-.0920625 .2992916
2		.1690959	.1356847	1.25	0.213	-.0968411 .4350329
3		.2759595	.1775472	1.55	0.120	-.0720266 .6239455
4		.4503576	.2200014	2.05	0.041	.0191627 .8815524
5		.73497	.2524223	2.91	0.004	.2402313 1.229709
6		1.199449	.2732438	4.39	0.000	.663901 1.734997
7		1.957465	.3937387	4.97	0.000	1.185751 2.729179
8		3.194523	.9239108	3.46	0.001	1.383691 5.005355
9		5.213367	2.220768	2.35	0.019	.8607417 9.565992
10		8.508057	4.916203	1.73	0.084	-1.127525 18.14364
11		13.8849	10.21215	1.36	0.174	-6.130555 33.90035

D. Ordered Logit Estimation

Model 1: ologit gpolvio pop unempl elec educ agriemp nolnd rldep socgov ecogov fungov vlhsptl vlwtr vlsch efrac muslim rdden yngmle

Ordered logistic regression	Number of obs	=	91
	LR chi2(17)	=	29.06
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0339
Log likelihood = -86.106741	Pseudo R2	=	0.1444

	gpolvio	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
pop		1.558086	.5936809	2.62	0.009	.3944929 2.721679
unempl		-3.031631	4.707882	-0.64	0.520	-12.25891 6.195648
elec		2.7172	1.529059	1.78	0.076	-.2797014 5.714101
educ		-8.320015	2.908001	-2.86	0.004	-14.01959 -2.620438
agriemp		-.9805623	2.031849	-0.48	0.629	-4.962913 3.001789
nolnd		2.618942	1.68701	1.55	0.121	-.6875366 5.925422
rldep		.0183958	.0406501	0.45	0.651	-.0612768 .0980684
socgov		-.3519233	.4556165	-0.77	0.440	-1.244915 .5410687
ecogov		-.2428377	.3634012	-0.67	0.504	-.9550909 .4694155
fungov		.3358052	.4400264	0.76	0.445	-.5266307 1.198241
vlhsptl		1.361072	5.220841	0.26	0.794	-8.871588 11.59373
vlwtr		.249551	1.092864	0.23	0.819	-1.892423 2.391525
vlsch		-2.981348	2.147299	-1.39	0.165	-7.189977 1.22728
efrac		-1.873009	1.757196	-1.07	0.286	-5.31705 1.571033
muslim		-1.612169	1.658088	-0.97	0.331	-4.861961 1.637623
rdden		2.794532	11.33924	0.25	0.805	-19.42996 25.01903
yngmle		5.353418	20.21601	0.26	0.791	-34.26924 44.97608
/cut1		11.29709	6.779698			-1.990875 24.58505
/cut2		14.00829	6.850973			.580634 27.43595
/cut3		14.78498	6.866623			1.32665 28.24332
/cut4		15.56389	6.879385			2.080539 29.04723

Model 2: ologit gpolvio pop unempl unemplsq elec elecsq educ agriemp nolnd rldep socgov ecogov fungov vlhsptl vlwtr vlsch efrac muslim rdden yngmle

Ordered logistic regression	Number of obs	=	91
	LR chi2(19)	=	41.80
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0019
Log likelihood = -79.741354	Pseudo R2	=	0.2076

	gpolvio	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
pop		1.573157	.65989	2.38	0.017	.2797959 2.866517
unempl		-98.26093	48.2702	-2.04	0.042	-192.8688 -3.653067
unemplsq		99.93943	48.99125	2.04	0.041	3.918352 195.9605
elec		14.41437	4.201341	3.43	0.001	6.179896 22.64885
elecsq		-12.84017	4.231098	-3.03	0.002	-21.13297 -4.547368
educ		-4.62117	3.216202	-1.44	0.151	-10.92481 1.682471
agriemp		-1.164631	2.053515	-0.57	0.571	-5.189448 2.860185
nolnd		3.92766	1.894225	2.07	0.038	.2150471 7.640274
rldep		.0181459	.0431634	0.42	0.674	-.0664528 .1027445
socgov		-.2354384	.474749	-0.50	0.620	-1.165929 .6950525
ecogov		-.459925	.3844421	-1.20	0.232	-1.213418 .2935676
fungov		.3288714	.4657579	0.71	0.480	-.5839974 1.24174
vlhsptl		-2.079529	5.488592	-0.38	0.705	-12.83697 8.677914
vlwtr		2.031665	1.299196	1.56	0.118	-.5147131 4.578042

vlsch	-4.650054	2.24819	-2.07	0.039	-9.056426	-.243682
efrac	-2.837549	1.768234	-1.60	0.109	-6.303225	.6281264
muslim	-2.87886	1.756858	-1.64	0.101	-6.322238	.5645191
rdden	-2.206398	11.45039	-0.19	0.847	-24.64875	20.23595
yngmle	-11.84855	21.80106	-0.54	0.587	-54.57785	30.88075

/cut1	-11.31227	12.12304			-35.07299	12.44845
/cut2	-8.293258	12.09295			-31.995	15.40849
/cut3	-7.491373	12.09167			-31.19061	16.20786
/cut4	-6.694264	12.09503			-30.40008	17.01155

**Model 3: ologit gpolvio pop unempl unemplsq elec elecsq educ agriemp nolnd
rldep socgov vlhsp1 vlwtr vlsch efrac muslim rdden yngmle**

Ordered logistic regression	Number of obs	=	91
	LR chi2(17)	=	39.95
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0013
Log likelihood = -80.662026	Pseudo R2	=	0.1985

gpolvio	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
pop	1.390759	.6398137	2.17	0.030	.1367468	2.644771
unempl	-82.50942	46.69537	-1.77	0.077	-174.0307	9.011827
unemplsq	83.2392	47.28226	1.76	0.078	-9.432323	175.9107
elec	13.97772	4.064576	3.44	0.001	6.011295	21.94414
elecsq	-12.51438	4.147658	-3.02	0.003	-20.64364	-4.385122
educ	-4.578468	3.202748	-1.43	0.153	-10.85574	1.698803
agriemp	-1.399824	2.023671	-0.69	0.489	-5.366146	2.566497
nolnd	3.402722	1.725054	1.97	0.049	.0216779	6.783766
rldep	.0094622	.0403499	0.23	0.815	-.0696221	.0885465
socgov	-.4508516	.3292266	-1.37	0.171	-1.096124	.1944207
vlhspt1	.1933852	5.05069	0.04	0.969	-9.705785	10.09256
vlwtr	2.001831	1.29514	1.55	0.122	-.5365964	4.540259
vlsch	-4.25611	2.219263	-1.92	0.055	-8.605786	.0935662
efrac	-2.768702	1.758612	-1.57	0.115	-6.215518	.6781138
muslim	-2.728867	1.736553	-1.57	0.116	-6.132448	.6747141
rdden	-1.292191	11.29257	-0.11	0.909	-23.42522	20.84084
yngmle	-12.9277	21.34443	-0.61	0.545	-54.76201	28.9066
/cut1	-10.65138	12.15216			-34.46918	13.16642
/cut2	-7.70689	12.12493			-31.47132	16.05754
/cut3	-6.919993	12.12341			-30.68143	16.84144
/cut4	-6.122239	12.12643			-29.88961	17.64514

**Model 4: ologit gpolvio pop unempl unemplsq elec elecsq educ agriemp nolnd
rldep ecogov vlhsp1 vlwtr vlsch efrac muslim rdden yngmle**

Ordered logistic regression	Number of obs	=	91
	LR chi2(17)	=	41.23
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0009
Log likelihood = -80.024332	Pseudo R2	=	0.2048

gpolvio	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
pop	1.574674	.6617448	2.38	0.017	.2776786	2.87167
unempl	-95.71225	47.95499	-2.00	0.046	-189.7023	-1.722187
unemplsq	97.28101	48.59952	2.00	0.045	2.027701	192.5343
elec	14.7444	4.176156	3.53	0.000	6.559284	22.92951
elecsq	-13.06211	4.210051	-3.10	0.002	-21.31366	-4.810563
educ	-4.368721	3.206061	-1.36	0.173	-10.65248	1.915043
agriemp	-.9701286	2.030044	-0.48	0.633	-4.948941	3.008684

nolnd		4.337974	1.758604	2.47	0.014	.8911733	7.784775
rldep		.017049	.0417925	0.41	0.683	-.0648628	.0989607
ecogov		-.5092243	.290116	-1.76	0.079	-1.077841	.0593927
vlhsptl		-2.731439	5.284302	-0.52	0.605	-13.08848	7.625604
vlwtr		2.028717	1.290888	1.57	0.116	-.5013782	4.558812
vlsch		-4.611609	2.258665	-2.04	0.041	-9.038512	-.184706
efrac		-2.739405	1.762155	-1.55	0.120	-6.193165	.7143547
muslim		-2.853422	1.751032	-1.63	0.103	-6.285383	.5785377
rd den		-1.333135	11.40885	-0.12	0.907	-23.69406	21.02779
yngmle		-15.21076	21.23049	-0.72	0.474	-56.82176	26.40023

/cut1		-11.15502	12.07419			-34.81999	12.50996
/cut2		-8.168801	12.04396			-31.77452	15.43692
/cut3		-7.374827	12.04205			-30.97682	16.22716
/cut4		-6.575972	12.0468			-30.18727	17.03533

```
Model 5: ologit gpolvio pop unempl unemplsq elec elecsq educ agriemp nolnd
rldep fungov vlhsptl vlwtr vlsc efrac muslim rdden yngmle
```

Ordered logistic regression	Number of obs	=	91
	LR chi2(17)	=	38.09
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0024
Log likelihood = -81.592705	Pseudo R2	=	0.1893

gpolvio	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
pop	1.289054	.626474	2.06	0.040	.0611879	2.516921
unempl	-73.71137	45.8493	-1.61	0.108	-163.5743	16.1516
unemplsq	75.54807	46.62218	1.62	0.105	-15.82972	166.9259
elec	13.62288	4.072029	3.35	0.001	5.641851	21.60391
elecsq	-12.47179	4.112081	-3.03	0.002	-20.53132	-4.412255
educ	-5.042345	3.234388	-1.56	0.119	-11.38163	1.296939
agriemp	-1.179619	2.002483	-0.59	0.556	-5.104413	2.745175
nolnd	3.868409	1.704211	2.27	0.023	.5282175	7.208601
rldep	.0185965	.0427778	0.43	0.664	-.0652465	.1024395
fungov	-.0548996	.4028741	-0.14	0.892	-.8445183	.7347191
vlhspt1	.0708075	5.030538	0.01	0.989	-9.788866	9.930481
vlwtr	1.655934	1.257461	1.32	0.188	-.808645	4.120513
vlsch	-4.255878	2.209759	-1.93	0.054	-8.586925	.075169
efrac	-2.568707	1.738533	-1.48	0.140	-5.97617	.8387554
muslim	-2.660587	1.724502	-1.54	0.123	-6.04055	.7193752
rddden	-.4984581	11.53471	-0.04	0.966	-23.10608	22.10916
yngmle	-14.23208	21.5217	-0.66	0.508	-56.41384	27.94967
/cut1	-7.743208	11.90045			-31.06767	15.58125
/cut2	-4.852135	11.8919			-28.15984	18.45557
/cut3	-4.079379	11.89368			-27.39057	19.23181
/cut4	-3.29522	11.8984			-26.61566	20.02522

E. Kendall Tau Correlation

ktau polvio pop unempl elec educ agriemp nolnd rldep socgov ecogov fungov vlhsptl vlwtr vlsch efrac muslim rdden yngmle, stats(taub)

	polvio	pop	unempl	elec	educ	agriemp	nolnd	rldep	socgov	ecogov	fungov
polvio	1.0000										
pop	0.1862	1.0000									
unempl	-0.1425	0.0071	1.0000								
elec	-0.0380	-0.0422	0.2562	1.0000							
educ	-0.1454	0.2230	0.2068	0.4300	1.0000						
agriemp	-0.0761	-0.1316	0.1473	-0.2684	-0.3187	1.0000					
nolnd	0.1482	0.2225	-0.0486	-0.1780	0.0188	-0.0261	1.0000				
rldep	0.0102	0.1404	-0.0632	-0.1116	-0.0261	-0.0447	0.1463	1.0000			
socgov	-0.1431	-0.0169	0.0711	0.3207	0.2509	-0.1913	-0.1048	-0.0613	1.0000		
ecogov	-0.0943	0.0476	0.1234	0.2782	0.2274	-0.1297	0.0164	0.0203	0.5158	1.0000	
fungov	-0.0566	0.0570	0.0883	0.2912	0.2511	-0.1391	0.0257	-0.0208	0.4483	0.3866	1.0000
vlhsptl	0.0560	0.3868	0.0815	0.0305	0.2940	-0.0503	0.1814	0.0106	0.0244	-0.0315	0.0433
vlwtr	0.0244	0.1197	0.2056	0.1177	0.0194	0.1539	0.0478	0.0634	0.1203	0.1337	0.1189
vlsch	-0.0360	0.1686	0.0167	-0.1361	0.0378	0.0118	0.2443	0.0609	0.0187	0.0423	0.0512
efrac	0.1465	0.1995	-0.1429	-0.1785	-0.0755	0.1179	0.3294	0.0335	-0.1566	-0.0452	-0.0452
muslim	-0.1067	-0.1922	0.1394	0.1038	-0.0081	0.0154	-0.1932	0.0090	0.0300	-0.0359	-0.0144
rdden	-0.0199	0.1337	-0.0644	0.0875	0.1865	-0.1614	-0.0256	-0.0724	0.0427	0.0553	0.0574
yngmle	0.0880	0.2664	-0.1287	-0.1292	0.0247	-0.0789	0.1932	-0.0295	-0.0349	-0.0081	-0.0452
	vlhsptl	vlwtr	vlsch	efrac	muslim	rdden	yngmle				
vlhsptl	1.0000										
vlwtr	0.1486	1.0000									
vlsch	0.0831	0.0351	1.0000								
efrac	0.0708	0.1285	0.1130	1.0000							
muslim	-0.0956	-0.1539	-0.1578	-0.5697	1.0000						
rdden	0.1430	-0.1078	-0.0200	-0.0040	-0.0372	1.0000					
yngmle	0.1927	-0.0396	0.2924	0.3001	-0.2811	0.0473	1.0000				

F. Descriptive Statistics

fsum polvio pop unempl elec educ agriemp nolnd rldep socgov ecogov fungov vlhsptl vlwtr vlsc efrac
muslim rdden yngmle, label

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max	
polvio	115	4.00	9.00	0.00	58.00	political violence (count)
pop	115	10.00	0.55	8.24	11.68	population (log form)
unempl	115	0.52	0.07	0.34	0.62	unemployed (%)
elec	115	0.54	0.30	0.00	1.00	HH w/electricity (%)
educ	115	0.29	0.15	0.06	0.69	highschool grad or better (%)
agriemp	115	0.65	0.17	0.09	0.95	agriculturally employed (%)
nolnd	115	0.54	0.20	0.01	0.98	HH w/o land (%)
rldep	115	0.63	5.36	-32.66	34.71	relative deprivation (z-score)
socgov	101	3.77	0.89	1.67	4.98	social governance
ecogov	101	3.06	1.03	1.00	4.84	economic governance
fungov	101	4.04	0.69	1.70	4.97	fundamentals of governance
vlhsptl	115	0.02	0.05	0.00	0.35	villages w/ hospitals (%)
vlwtr	115	0.23	0.25	0.00	1.00	villages w/ waterworks (%)
vlsc	115	0.19	0.13	0.00	0.67	villages w/ highschools (%)
efrac	115	0.17	0.21	0.00	0.69	ethnic fractionalisation
muslim	115	0.94	0.15	0.10	1.00	Muslim population (%)
rdden	102	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.11	road density
yngmle	115	0.13	0.01	0.08	0.17	young male (%)

G. List of ARMM Municipalities

Basilan (11)	Saguwaran
Akbar	Sultan Domalondong
Al-Barka	Tamparan
Hadji Mohammad Ajul	Taraka
Hadji Muhtamad	Tubaran
Lantawan	Tugaya
Maluso	Wao
Sumisip	Maguindanao (36)
Tabuan-Lasa	Ampatuan
Tipo-Tipo	Barira
Tuburan	Buldon
Ungkaya Pukan	Buluhan
Lanao Del Sur (38)	Datu Abdullah Sangki
Bacolod Grande	Datu Anggal Midtimbang
Balabagan	Datu Blah Sinsuat
Balindong (Watu)	Datu Hoffer Ampatuan
Bayang	Datu Odin Sinsuat (Dinaig)
Binidayan	Datu Paglas
Buadiposo-Buntong	Datu Piang
Bubong	Datu Salibo
Bumbaran	Datu Saudi Ampatuan
Butig	Datu Unsay
Calanogas	General S.K. Pendatun
Ditsaan-Ramain	Guindulungan
Ganassi	Kabuntalan (Tumbao)
Kapai	Mamasapano
Kapatagan	Mangudadatu
Lumba-Bayabao (Maguing)	Matanog
Lumbaca-Unayan	Northern Kabuntalan
Lumbatan	Pagagawan
Lumbayanague	Pagalungan
Madalum	Paglat
Madamba	Pandag
Maguing	Parang
Malabang	Rajah Buayan
Marantao	Shariff Aguak
Marogong	Shariff Saydona Mustapha
Masiu	South Upi
Mulondo	Sultan Kudarat (Nuling)
Pagayawan (Tatarikan)	Sultan Mastura
Piagapo	Sultan sa Barongis (Lambayong)
Picong (Sultan Gumander)	Talayan
Poona-Bayabao (Gata)	Talitay
Pualas	Upi

Sulu (19)	Tawi-Tawi (11)
Hadji Panglima Tahl (Marunggas)	Bongao
Indanan	Languyan
Jolo	Mapun (Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi)
Kalingalan Caluang	Panglima Sugala (Balimbing)
Lugus	Sapa-Sapa
Luuk	Sibutu
Maimbung	Simunul
Old Panamao	Sitangkai (Sibatu)
Omar	South Ubian
Pandami	Tandubas
Panglima Estino (New Panamao)	Turtle Islands
Pangutaran	
Parang	
Pata	
Patikul	
Siasi	
Talipao	
Tapul	
Tongkil	