An Exploratory Study aimed at Understanding the Perceptions of Corruption in Political Leadership with specific reference to Sub-Saharan Africa.

Kanday Sewraj Hurburun

A thesis submitted to the Auckland University of Technology
in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Philosophy.

2011

Department of Social Sciences
Primary supervisor: Professor Charles Crothers

Table of Contents

An Exploratory Study aimed at Understanding the, Perceptions of Corruption in Political Leadership with specific reference to Sub-Saharan Africa

List of figures used in the study

List of tables used in the study

ATTESTATION OF AUTHORSHIP

"I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person (except where explicitly defined in the acknowledgements), nor material which to a substantial extent has been submitted for the award of any other degree or diploma of the university or other institution of higher learning"

_____

Kanday Sewraj Hurburun

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This study is especially dedicated to my wife, Anita Hurburun, who has been the driving force in helping me complete this thesis. I further dedicate this study to my three children and to my late father, Mr. Sewraj Hurburun who was not only a scholar and a gentleman but also a pioneer in education amongst the Indian Indentured Labourers in KwaZulu Natal.

I would like to extend a special thanks to Professor Anand Singh (University of KwaZulu- Natal) for the hours of advice given on his very sober assessment of the many realistic challenges that face South Africa and the African Sub-Continent as a whole.

Last of all, I extend my appreciation to Associate Professor, Stephen Hoadley (University of Auckland) for his friendship and advice over the years throughout my academic endeavours.

ABSTRACT

_____

The objective of this thesis is to investigate perceptions of political corruption in Africa, particularly the Sub-Saharan region. The various types of corruption are described and how these interlink is shown. This study also includes a review and utilization of various indices and measurements of corruption in an attempt to answer two fundamental questions namely:

1. Is the Sub-Saharan region of Africa more corrupt than other regions?
2. Are leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa as corrupt as perceived?

The literature was reviewed with particular reference to definitions, types, causes and consequences of corruption. The review also identified some specific hypothesized causes and consequences of alleged corruption and perceptions of corrupt leadership in Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, various published indices were identified through the literature review which can be accessed for the purposes of comparing the different levels of perceived political corruption relative to specific criteria such as; bribery, cronyism or "rent-seeking". From the many indices available, five generally well known and documented indices and their respective datasets were selected for further analysis through this study. The sources of the selected indices for this study were from those provided by: Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index; World Bank's Country Rankings; ICRG (International Country Risk Guide's) Failed State Index; Ibrahim Index's Ranking and Good Governance; Afrobarometer's Round 3 and Round 4 survey questions for 18 to 20 Sub-Saharan African countries respectively. In addition to some comprehensive datasets used in this study, other sources such as Freedom House's Country Status ratings and the overview of other peripheral indices were also briefly referred to. The researcher collated the results of the major datasets and surveys contained in these indices and subsequently used two "data analysis tools" namely:

SPSS[1] and MS Excel to conduct the analyses mainly using simple correlations and other related statistical procedures.

In terms of the combined quantitative and qualitative data, this study has shown that political corruption is prevalent in the Sub-Saharan region and that the allegations or perceptions for this appear to be credible. The extent and magnitude of political corruption is however, a critical question and will therefore require more investigation through further research. Despite the plausibility of corruption being prevalent for many countries within the Sub-Saharan region, this study has revealed that there are also a few other countries in the region which appear to be far more progressive than expected and may thus emerge as being less corrupt when compared to countries in other regions of the world. Selected corruption indicators such as "cronyism" and "nepotism" for example, when compared to non-OECD/non rich countries, indicated that some countries in the Sub–Saharan region were no more corrupt than other non-OECD/non-rich countries specifically in relation to these two selected indicators.

With reference specifically to the Afrobarometer dataset used in this study, the analysis in this instance however, indicated that a few political leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa appeared to be as corrupt as perceived even though this dataset does not have full coverage of all of the Sub-Saharan African countries. It could thus be inferred from the literature and the various tests used in this study that in some instances, political leadership appears to be synonymous with perceived corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, "Political Leadership" as relevant to the Sub-Saharan region, is also often perceived as exploiting the spoils that come with this position which in turn alleges political corruption. Given that actual corruption is difficult to establish, the wide practice of patriarchal and tribal based traditional authority in the Sub-Saharan region further adds to the complexity of the perceptions of corruption. It is possible therefore that some arcane distinctions of what are a corrupt acts or what is entitlement may be conveniently blurred in contemporary political societies.

---

[1] SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) is a computer application that provides statistical analysis of data. It allows for in-depth data access and preparation, analytical reporting, graphics and modeling.

Other facets of perceived corruption such as "bribery", whilst considered by the writer to be one of the significant "indicators" of corruption for the region, appeared not to reveal any strong correlations across all tiers of government. These correlations for "bribery" however, were done using only the Afrobarometer survey data. Thus, the link in terms of the correlations between bribery and corruption for government in general within the context of the Afrobarometer survey data, has not been established. In a further analysis, one of the predictors for political corruption such as the levels of "GDP per capita" which was also expected to yield strong correlations between wealth in terms of GDP per capita and political corruption surprisingly did not reveal any significant relationships. GDP per capita was also negatively correlated with most of the other indices used in this study. Notwithstanding any significant correlations between low GDP and acts of bribery, the region still shows many areas of poor political leadership based on some of the causal symptoms of corruption. These symptoms may align themselves with alleged political corruption in varying degrees and are often manifested by many Sub-Saharan political leaders who display blatant arrogance and a total disregard for statesmanship through a lack of transparency and accountability. There are other manifestations that indicate a gross failure of political leadership and the subversion of good governance in this region of Africa. Indeed, there are the many political leaders including some of the ruling elite within the Sub-Saharan region who wilfully create political tension. To this end, thugs and loyal followers are actively recruited in further inciting others to commit savage acts of violence against innocent people including those who oppose the ruling party or leader. Such tensions eventually explode, giving rise to prolonged and on-going internal conflict. Under these conditions, malevolent leaders or incumbent leaders amongst the political elite who become complicit either directly or indirectly in wide scale political violence; who continue to persecute opposing factions to the point where there is a mass refugee efflux and; who deliberately encourage cross border wars thus creating wider tensions in the greater region. In a climate of heightened fear and where state resources are plundered to the point where innocent masses are left destitute and vulnerable, unscrupulous and indulgent political leaders become even more determined to stay in power. The Sub-Saharan region is replete both past and present with such types of political leadership who have boastfully and arrogantly extended their tenure within government. The trajectory of political corruption is seen not only through allegations of greed, financial

mismanagement, embezzlement or other government malpractices but it is also visible when it takes hold of the entire state bureaucracy. To this end a complete subversion of all the principles of good governance becomes the status quo and thus "statecraft" itself is in essence, "corrupted". This wilful dereliction of good governance by many political leaders in the Sub-Saharan region has already culminated in the total anarchy of Somalia, hence now regarded as a failed state. Aside from Somalia being a failed state, the Sub-Saharan region has also produced a number of other countries that have come very close to the precipice of total state failure, largely by the conduct of deluded and despotic leadership.

In the writer's assessment, the overall literature study undertaken, combined with the collective data analyses, suggests that political corruption amongst the rank and file of leadership including heads of states within many countries in this region is very likely. Given this scenario, some serious challenges lie ahead for some countries within the region.

Chapter 1:

An Introduction to this study

_____

"Political leaders and statesmen are serious men even when they appear to be fools, and it is rare to find them acting without some deeper reason they can offer to themselves." Norman Mailer

---

Chapter Outline

This chapter attempts to explain what corruption is in the context of leadership. It outlines the need and relevance for this study as well as a brief discussion on the researcher's particular interest in the study area. The chapter concludes by providing an outline of the chapters included in this paper.

1.1 Introduction

Leadership is a process by which a person influences others to accomplish an objective and directs the population in a way that makes it more cohesive and coherent. Leaders, by definition, set examples for others to follow, however before that happens; they will have to prove their worth. Leaders are constantly being observed by those who are expected to follow and whose respect they must earn. For this reason, integrity and courage define leadership better than any pompous statement (Shahni, 2008). Leadership is a combination of credible authority, persuasion and empowerment of others (Conger, 1989). Boafo-Arthur (2007) further adds that when difficulties arise, a call for leadership is necessary.

This view of a good leader espouses someone with a vision, a plan of action and perhaps with the ability to summon people to extraordinary effort. It is also believed that leadership goes to the heart of politics where it summons people to act together on their shared concerns. In the ideal sense, political leadership therefore imposes the duty

of maintaining the highest levels of integrity, transparency and accountability when holding public office. This unfortunately, is often not the case even amongst the most developed and democratic states. The manifestation of malfeasance in public office points to varying tiers of corruption from the highest levels in government and seemingly cascading down to bureaucrats in various branches of the government.

There are a multitude of definitions of Political Corruption and amongst these is a succinct view which loosely defines political corruption as a violation of trust by public officials and where the public interest is harmed. To this end, such an official gains privately through personal benefits by engaging in practices that is contrary to holding public office (Johnston & Heidenheimer, 2001). An inherent problem with this definition is the concept of "public interest". "Public interest" encompasses many things and may thus vary culturally and ideologically which in itself makes it very difficult to assess particularly within the context of corruption. This view on political corruption however, does underscore a very central motive which is, the desire for "private gain" and this is true for many of those who have had allegations of engaging in corrupt practices whilst holding public office. Beyond this, other definitions imply that political corruption also extends from private gain to group enrichment which in turn can especially be a 'reward of sustained tenure in office'. Often these two forms of political corruption are connected. In a similar context, Nye (1967) in a much earlier article defined political corruption as deviant behaviour where formal duties within public office are neglected on account of greed through personal gain. He further adds that this deviant behaviour goes beyond private or personal gain extending to a larger circle of family, friends and other associates who are thus drawn into this clique. In his view, bribery, nepotism and misappropriation are common practice. Political corruption or corruption *per se* becomes a pervasive phenomenon reaching all tiers of society augmented by deviant leadership.

Notwithstanding, it still remains a complex phenomenon to define. Mills (2001) supports this view and acknowledges the complexities of defining as well as detecting corruption. This appears to be a common thread in studies of corruption. Within their anti-corruption guidelines the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) for example also mentioned that it was clearly difficult to define corruption and moreover, what appeared

to be illegitimate government practices in one camp may be acceptable in another, both legally and culturally speaking (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2006).

Taking a global perspective of political corruption, Blagojevich (2002), the former Governor of Illinois mentioned that corruption has replaced leadership; perhaps suggesting that leadership itself has lost its moral compass. It is ironic that he had mentioned this during his campaign for office given that he has since been indicted, prosecuted and is now awaiting a sentence for political corruption.

Much earlier and in a very different geopolitical setting, the issues of political corruption also had some challenges for Africa as suggested by the Prime Minister of Uganda. To this end he said:

> "Africa, being a continent never in shortage of problems, has also the problem of corruption, particularly bribery and misuse of office to serve personal interests" (Museveni, 1985).

In their assessment, Stapenhurst and Sedigh (1999) argue that corruption is the abuse of power, mostly for personal gain or for the benefit of a group to which one owes allegiance. Corruption can be motivated by greed and by the desire to retain or increase one's power. Stapenhurst and Sedigh, (1999, p.1) further contend that "corruption is a pervasive phenomenon that can be found in countries of widely varying ideologies, economic conditions, and social development". Supporting this view, Harsch (1997) suggests that no country in the world today is immune from corruption's corrosive influence.

Historically speaking, political corruption has been a fact of life for a couple of thousands of years, commencing initially as far as the written record goes with the first attempts at a democratic form of government in ancient Greece and Rome (Pollick, 2003). Furthermore, according to Pollick (2003), a considerable number of political office bearers and their political representatives in ancient Greece and Rome were from the wealthier class. These elites formed the ruling class which inevitably led to a division between the influential *haves* and the virtually powerless *have-nots*. It is perhaps amongst the ruling elites that the seeds of corruption are sown where entitlement is substituted for by corruption. Over time, the unholy marriage of political

corruption when intertwined with leadership, underscored the concept that power in politics could be wielded far more effectively when political leaders realized that power and wealth could be equals. The basis then, for political corruption, often begins with favouritism towards those with wealth and influence.

In a more contemporary sense, the term *political corruption* implies that there is a consistent eroding, almost cancer-like momentum impacting on the integrity of more vulnerable States. In their assessments of alleged political corruption within certain regions, many writers look at Africa in its entirety. Olowu (1993) for example, reports that one of the reasons why governmental corruption has grown to be pervasive in Africa today is mainly because much effort has been utilized to remedy the problem rather than to understand it. Africa's leaders consolidated power and reinforced the systems that enabled the exploitation of the continent's people. For these leaders, the economy is defined by a network of inefficiently run government enterprises thus alluding to corruption within government (Shagaya, 2002). Furthermore, Shagaya (2002) suggested that if leaders are corrupt and untrustworthy, then the domino effect is started where eventually the entire system will be corrupted.

Mohammed Ibrahim, also known as Mo Ibrahim, a Sudanese billionaire, launched a $5 million prize for exemplary leadership across all of Africa (Nsehe, 2008). Mo Ibrahim, according to Nsehe (2008), imagined that the money would motivate Africa's leaders to shun corruption, greed and self-interest and work towards developing their countries. He envisaged that the money would go a long way in improving the continent's weak leadership problem. But whether any financial incentives would motivate leaders in Africa and leaders in general is a moot point. While Ibrahim's intention in giving the prize was well motivated, it would be interesting to see, perhaps in the long term, if the money will do much in solving the problems in Africa with regards to the perceptions of poor leadership associated with perceived corruption. As of June 2010, the Ibrahim foundation duly announced that no prize will be awarded as none of the leaders had measured up to the key performance indicators. (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2010).

As mentioned, Africa in general but more specifically Sub-Saharan Africa, has leadership challenges entwined with allegations of perceived government corruption and perhaps the only way the Sub-Saharan region is going to overcome its perceived

leadership problem is for the leaders themselves to have a paradigm shift in thinking. In order to emulate stable democracies or other ideologies with a record of good governance the world over, including one or two countries in Africa, political sensibility through political maturity is certainly required. In Namibia for example, a concerted effort was made to transform the diverse factional and cultural differences within the public sector on account of the country's newly found independence from South Africa. Failure to deal with this issue effectively would have possibly sown the seeds for a new round of conflict. To this end, political commentators have applauded this effort by the government and said that the political leadership showed a sense of political maturity and sensibility. When this mature way of thinking takes hold in the mind-sets of those who endeavour to make a difference through progressive leadership, it will cultivate amongst other virtues of good governance, the resolve and discipline to guard against avaricious tendencies and to be forever vigilant as a leader holding public office in meeting the obligation to be transparent and accountable. Some countries within the Sub-Saharan region, according to Mafeje (1998), have already embarked on this journey towards accountability and transparency thus further indicating the growing maturity within civil society. Whilst there are some leaders within the Sub-Saharan region who are to some extent, demonstrating a move towards liberal politics and capable of dealing with diversity, many other leaders for this region have failed and are unwilling to share power. This unwillingness to change is perhaps on account of greed and the determination to stay in power so that the plundering of state resources for self-enrichment is seen as having little or no consequence. In this regard, unlimited power, wealth through self-enrichment and being complicit in conflict and violence against innocent masses have left many Africans impoverished, particularly those in the Sub-Saharan region. These innocent masses have gone through decades of untold pain, suffering, poverty and misery not only because many in the continent are poor, but because the leaders have committed to serving themselves before anyone else (Nsehe, 2008).

Much has been written about political corruption and indeed there is no shortage of literature on the various forms of corruption within any society. There is also a need for empirical studies to examine the relationship of the perceptions of corruption that are often associated with flawed political leadership. In regions where there are heightened

allegations of government impropriety and mismanagement, closer scrutiny through empirical research is required to assess the credibility of such allegations. Some of the existing literature on political corruption suggests that accounts of corruption for the Sub-Saharan region are higher than many other regions. By using quantitative and qualitative methods, this study will endeavour to assess whether the political leadership within Sub-Saharan Africa is as corrupt as perceived.

1.2 Background and Relevance for the study

Reportedly, much of the Sub-Saharan African leadership and the regimes in which they are located in, are often characterized by creating and maintaining an environment for political conflict through the mismanagement of government. Moreover, many of these leaders have been also accused of some of the following amongst other alleged deviant acts:

- being complicit in wide scale violence
- displaying arrogance and claiming impunity for human rights and other violations
- by not being politically accountable and;
- being often negligent in not applying due diligence for government spending, conducting social and environmental impact studies for issues such as de-forestation, mining and oil exploration to name but a few.

In referring to Africa as a whole, Allen (1999) mentions that politics in this region has a notoriety for voilent breakdown of order ultimately leading to the demise of any form of central government. Perhaps a more serious issue that underpins such serious issues like violence, conflict and mismanagement are the many accounts of alleged political corruption for the entire region with particular reference to Sub-Saharan Africa.

Indeed, Africans themselves are all too aware of the many failings of their respective governments. In his assessment of alleged political corruption within the government of Cameroon for example, Kah (2010) argues that the culture of corruption and violence is spread across Africa. He refers to this culture by uniquely coining and using words such

as: "*gluttonocracy*" and "*connectocracy*" coupled with arrogance, arbitrariness and a sense of ruthlessness in maintaining political domination.

Subversive conduct by governments however, does not go unnoticed particularly when the high levels of political instability create an environment that to some extent discourages many foreign investors. This does not take into account the indifference and apathy shown by some other foreign governments or multi-national corporations who continue to engage with allegedly corrupt leaders within these unstable governments. (Bennett, 2002), cites the case of British Petroleum (BP) operations in Nigeria through which the company was accused of being complicit to some extent in mass killings, human rights violations and in the direct involvement of wide scale environmental degradation.

Notwithstanding the lack of ethical business standards by some foreign investors, others such as governments and multi-national corporations would, for conscientious reasons or sound business practices, be more circumspect in their foreign business dealings when rogue states are involved. In many areas of the Sub-Saharan region therefore, the potential for a lack of foreign investment which could lead to economic decline amongst, other key performance indicators are high. Some writers argue that there appears to be an economic divide when comparing the Sub-Saharan region to some other regions. In this regard, Lawrence & Thirtle (2001) suggests that there is a "lag" of the economies of some Sub-Saharan African countries compared to the economic growth of Asian economies. Given the many allegations of government mismanagement for the region, there appears to be an undercurrent of some sort of a malaise through which a central destructive force often retards any socio-economic and political development for the region. By many accounts, this sinister presence within the malaise is very likely to be or at least partly due to the effects of actual levels of corruption which, are unfortunately difficult to establish. Amundsen (1999) maintains that due to its illicit or immoral nature, political corruption is even more inaccessible to scientific investigation than most other human behaviour.

As mentioned, the aim of this thesis is to therefore examine political leadership characteristics and perceptions of government corruption (with specific reference to various forms of corruption) within the context of some key indicators of national

performance across Sub-Saharan Africa. To some extent, these indicators will also reflect the literature on perceived corruption globally which hence, forms some basis for comparison.

Although there has been no shortage of literature on Africa, and particularly the Sub-Saharan region with regards to its politics and its problems, no one to date has come up with an adequate explanation of variation in levels of actual or perceived corruption let alone suggesting viable alternatives which would deliver effective, sustainable, stable and good governance for this region. The literature also shows that there are some good Sub-Saharan political leaders with outstanding credentials amongst who are statesmen, philosophers and intellectuals. This however is where the romance ends, for most of them remain essentially as "idealists" or if they come into power, usually fail to deliver on their ideals. Therefore, concepts such as: "Ubuntu" (*I am human therefore I belong)* (Murithi, 2006) "Ujaama" (*freedom, equality and unity*) and "African Renaissance*"* (*the renewed confidence and optimism towards development and security for Africa*) (Dibua & Ibhawoh, 2003) whilst promising, remain idealistic rhetoric and appear thus far to have failed to deliver. A few visionary leaders, however, such as Julius Nyerere, Kwame Nkrumah and Nelson Mandela have shown substance and promise during the post- independence period, the most noticeable of which was the democratic elections that transformed South Africa.

It is very easy to become emotionally drawn into socio/political issues particularly involving matters that impact with the rights, liberties and promises of prosperity. This is particularly true of Sub-Saharan Africa given that the respective governments within a few countries of this region persist in having the notoriety for poor human rights and are indifferent to the abject suffering and large scale poverty amongst its citizens. Whilst freedom and the entitlement to vote may be a constitutional right in many nations across the globe even when these rights are taken for granted, it is arguably a pressing issue for many Sub-Saharan Africans when compared to the rest of the African continent. Many within the Sub-Saharan region still continue to face adversity that impoverishes much of the region and where leadership and direction are often left wanting. Notwithstanding, in any scientific study one has to steer clear from the emotive content and thus endeavour to present a logical and rational argument whilst also making allowances for further scrutiny. This study, whilst not diminishing the

enormity of the perceived problems of corruption in the Sub-Saharan region, will attempt to analyse several viewpoints in order to form a realistic appraisal of the socio-political conditions for this region in view of the current perceptions of political corruption associated with political leadership.

1.3 Researcher's personal interest in this study

The researcher was born in the Southern part of Africa and has spent much of his adult life in and around Sub-Saharan Africa. Both he and his family endured the politically constrained era of apartheid South Africa during the White minority rule up until the early nineties. There were some opportunities afforded to persons of colour, however, given the racial issues that predominately favoured the White minority, these opportunities were disproportionately very little.

The paradox of this era was that whilst the region was comparatively more prosperous than most, if not all, of other African nations, it still had at the helm, leadership which was fundamentally flawed and issues of embezzlement, corruption, bribery and coercion were commonplace (Nevin, 2006). Within this brutality of the apartheid era, laid hidden the most obnoxious forms of political corruption within the leadership. The extent of this form of corruption was so pernicious that it robbed an entire nation of self-determination, freedom and the ability to prosper on equal terms. The unilateral direction of political leadership in that era was in itself a corrupt system of governance. Van Vuuren (2006) contends that for more than 300 years, all South Africans were under the yoke of colonial and apartheid rule, a system that benefited the few at the expense of the many. It was a system that ensured that white settlers and later, white South Africans were at the helm of a racial oligarchy that was built on the subjugation of black South Africans. The dominant force behind the political leadership during apartheid was undoubtedly the military regime that was in no small measure supported by the arms industry.

The secrecy under which this industry operated (and which is still not open to public disclosure) underscores the nexus of government deception at all levels of the apartheid regime particularly reminiscent of that time. On account of the blanket of secrecy under which the apartheid government operated, it is certain that corrupt activity was commonplace. The extent of this corruption however will perhaps never be known.

An example of this was the disclosure of oil-for-weapons deals with countries such as Saudi Arabia. In terms of this, it was and is still prohibited under other legislation but was also further prohibited in terms of article 23 (1) of the then newly-introduced and subsequently withdrawn Conventional Arms Control Bill of 2000. This provision is particularly ominous given the history of corruption that characterises the armaments industry and the South African armaments industry in particular. It is reminiscent of the obsessive secrecy of the apartheid era, and primarily intended to protect the state-owned Armscor and Denel (Crawford-Browne, 2008). Second in notoriety to the armed forces and perhaps sometimes more notorious was the South African police whose main role was the overseeing of the law and order policies of the country. These mandates were very rarely honoured and were masquerades concealing the real intent which was the clandestine surveillance and subsequent apprehension of political dissidents.

Corruption may have received little attention under apartheid, but it was certainly there. Police officers testifying recently about past atrocities have offered a frightening picture of how widespread it was (Daley, 1997). Petty corruption was endemic, for instance, officers spent days collecting receipts off supermarket floors so they could cheat on expenses. But some of the corruption was far more ambitious. One former officer, Dirk Coetzee, testified that his men murdered someone when their diamond smuggling deal went bad (Daley, 1997).

The legitimacy and integrity of political leadership has since become a significant issue for the researcher who had also undertaken academic study in Political Science and Public Administration at Undergraduate and Postgraduate levels. After the first democratic elections were held in South Africa during 1994, many opportunities were accessible for persons who were previously deprived of these. The researcher was subsequently fortunate enough to procure a senior government position overseeing migrants, displaced persons, refugees and 'economic migrants" who were by this time arriving in droves to South Africa and to other relatively stable countries within the region. His time within this government agency was spent preparing submissions for the White Paper on the Refugees Act (1998) and the Immigration Amendment Bill (2010). To this end, the researcher had further opportunity to interact significantly with well-known Non- Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in this field as well as International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) such as the United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees (UNHCR), the latter being one of the principal organizations overseeing the refugee problem within conflict zones of Africa and the rest of the world.

It was within this context and under the auspices of the South African government working under the directive of the UNHCR that the researcher's portfolio as Chief Immigration Officer (Inspectorate and Enforcement) extended to a secondment within the Refugee Section undertaking the role of Refugee Status Determination Officer. This role is also referred to as "Protection Officer" under the UNHCR mandate. The position required that he undertake personal interviews with refugees and displaced persons, most of who arrived from all of the conflict zones of the continent. As part of his extended delegated duties within this role; the writer was required to undertake the removal of persons from South Africa who were not considered to be refugees in terms of the relevant sections of the South African Immigration Act (2002) and under the UNHCR's mandate for the voluntary return of former refugees under the UNHCR's *cessation agreement-durable solutions criteria* (UNHCR, 2011). In this regard, the writer had travelled to a few Sub-Saharan countries, some which had just emerged out of protracted civil wars such as Mozambique. In addition to this role, the researcher, together with a few of his colleagues, had also interviewed approximately two and half to three thousand refugees and displaced persons in refugee holding facilities or other locations over a period of five years. There were many gruesome accounts given of torture and oppression administered by the power elites within the respective countries from where these persons were forced to escape.

Common threads however, appeared within the narratives given and some of these accounts clearly indicated that there was total anarchy (as in the case of Somalia); a failure of political leadership; an unequivocal intent in having unlimited tenure as the head of the state; a penchant for ruthlessness that is notoriously associated with dictatorships and war-lords and; the strong and persistent allegations of government and bureaucratic corruption coupled with greed. In assessing the credibility and veracity of the various accounts of persecution that were given, strong and robust empirical evidence had to be gathered supported by international and domestic refugee law. Decisions towards affording person's protection were therefore based on the similarities of the subjective accounts given by those who were interviewed and the reasonably objective reports which were published by the UNHCR, Amnesty International, Human

Rights Watch and The US Department of State Country Reports. Such decisions had to undergo further scrutiny not dissimilar to the standards as required in other academic disciplines. To this end, the decisions reached after undertaking thorough research, had to be overseen by the UNHCR including the cases that were required to be reviewed by the Refugee Appeals Authority. In as much as it is incumbent upon government or other officials to be meticulous in making sound administrative and legally based decisions when dealing with complex issues such as Refugee Status Determination, it is also indeed very difficult to apply legal standards towards making decisions on subjective accounts of human rights abuses. In this regard, the accounts of the "levels of persecution" experienced by refugees are subjective with the very emotive content describing graphic details of torture, oppression and exploitation. One has to be mindful however that even though these were often emotionally charged accounts, they still had to meet a standard of very stringent legal criteria set by international and domestic human rights and refugee laws. Notwithstanding some credibility issues surrounding the accounts given by those who had been interviewed for refugee status, the fact that a significantly large number of Africans from the Sub-Saharan region were compelled to leave their respective countries posed serious concerns of governance and leadership within these countries. In view of the writer and his colleague's first-hand experience with such larger volumes of African refugees amongst smaller numbers of refugees from other continents, the writer's interest therefore expanded towards examining political leadership and its nexus with alleged government corruption. Sub-Saharan Africa appeared to be a good starting point given that the respective political leaders with the exception of a few from the many troubled countries of region had consistently produced large masses of displaced persons, economic migrants and refugees. When large masses of people are compelled to leave their respective countries such as the case in the Sub-Saharan region, it is one of the many symptoms of poor governance through sub-standard political leadership. Many Africans and others as well from different parts of the world also attribute the mass efflux of people to alleged political corruption that further leads to the failing of governments for this region.

Given that South Africa had just emerged out of apartheid, many of those refugees felt that the country was a safe haven. Most of the refugees came from war torn and failed

states such as: Rwanda; the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); Burundi; Sierra Leone; Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast); Mozambique and; most prominently, Somalia.

The irony of this unfolding drama however, was that many of the refugees from the various regions who gravitated towards South Africa were not particularly welcome in the country. Accounts of xenophobia started to surface from 1994 and were directed at most of the Africans arriving in the country (Neocosmos, 2010). This held true for all of the Border entry zones of the country. Indeed xenophobic reaction from some sectors of the South African public was strong and sometimes brutal. On some occasions acts of violence on refugees were committed and some fatalities also involving these refugees were reported.

To varying degrees, many government agencies within the respective regions of the country also dealt with these refugees. Accounts of bribery and corruption levelled against low level government officials emerged as the writer engaged in lengthy interviews with some of these refugees. It was also alleged that some of these officials demanded payment for the issue of false identity documents, birth-certificates, passports and marriage certificates. The writer himself, in his official position, was often required to give expert evidence in court regarding refugees and asylum seekers being in possession of false documents or genuine documents obtained fraudulently. Cases that involved the alleged involvement of government officials were also investigated by the South African Police. Records of these indictments remain in official court transcripts. Despite South Africa being viewed as the last bastion of tolerance post the apartheid era, some measure of notoriety still linger.

Thus it can be seen that accounts of political corruption for most of Sub-Saharan region would appear to be plausible and, amongst the genuine victims, there would be little reason to doubt the veracity of their accounts of corruption and brutality experienced at the hands of the various officials from the respective regions of the continent. During his tenure within government as a public official, the writer was also well aware that some public officials within different tiers of the South African government were embroiled in allegations of various levels of corruption. Very senior officials for example, within The Department of Home Affairs were implicated in incidents involving significant levels of corruption with migrants. One of these officials was the

Director General of the Department of Home Affairs (wa Afrika, 2005). Notwithstanding allegations of corruption, throngs of refugees and many asylum seekers from the other troubled regions of Africa and other parts of the globe still gravitated towards South Africa. The fact that refugees and asylum seekers still chose to come to South Africa indicated to the writer that Africa in general was in serious trouble and that conflict, violence and war were merely symptoms of a much deeper malaise, namely corrupt leaders and government. The accounts given by refugees and asylum seekers had a profound effect on the writer and affected him personally to some extent. The writer felt the need to explore through a research study, whether African leaders and their respective governments were indeed the cause of the problems in Sub-Saharan Africa. This formed the basis for this thesis.

1.4 Structure of the Thesis

The thesis comprises four chapters:

Chapter One: An Introduction to this study

Includes the relevance for the proposed study and the researchers' particular interest in the area.

Chapter Two: A Review of the Literature with respect to this study

Includes a table of some of the different studies of corruption. Includes the definition of corruption, types of corruption, corruption-related concepts and consequences of corruption and how this relates to Africa. Details the corruption in leadership in Africa. Discussed failed states in relation to African Leadership and its relationship with corruption. An outline of cultural views of corruption and Leadership

Chapter Three: Analysis and Discussion of Corruption in Africa

Details comparatively the findings of the corruption perception indices and measures as they relate to Africa and globally. Outlines indices and measures of corruption relevant to this study. A discussion of advantages and limitations of statistical measurements of corruption. A discussion of variations in statistical measures of corruption.

Chapter Four: Conclusion

Final comments on the hypothesis include whether the Sub-Saharan political leadership is as corrupt as made out to be in comparison to the rest of Africa and other regions. Correlates and causes of corruption are also summarised in this section.

Chapter 2 : A Review of the Literature With Respect To This Study

---

> **Chapter Outline**
>
> This chapter firstly attempts to define corruption using several sources. It considers the types of corruption, causes of corruption and corruption-related concepts. The chapter also reviews consequences of corruption. The corruption concept is identified and discussed with particular reference to Sub-Saharan Africa. The second part of the chapter highlights corrupt leadership in the region, failed states in relation to Sub-Saharan African Leadership and its relationship to corruption. It also considers an outline of cultural views of corruption and leadership. The third part of this chapter details the literature on the indices and measures of corruption relevant to this study. This chapter documents the relevance that corruption and political leadership have in the Sub-Saharan region, as indicated by various corruption perception indices and measures. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the advantages and limitations of statistical measurements of corruption as well as a review of variations in statistical measures of corruption.

2.1 Introduction

The literature study commences with a review of various sources of information gathered from books, journals, online articles and other published research studies within the same domain as the current study. Initially the concept of corruption is explored in terms of what the literature could provide. This is then streamlined to focus on political corruption and its relationship with leadership particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. Some prominent sources are accessed namely working papers from Afrobarometer, various books both hard copy and online books, online and hard copy journals, published indices from World Bank, Mo Ibrahim Index (IB Index), Afrobarometer, Transparency International's Corruption Perception Indicators,

examining country profiles through ICRG (International Country Risk Guide) and published works and articles of the World Bank.

Political corruption is the use of governmental powers by government officials (politicians and civil servants) for illegitimate private gain. Corruption not only brings benefits to those in control of power, but also allows the latter to manipulate the institutions to their advantages; the result is that corruption has a tendency to be self-perpetuating. Thus, once a system is corrupt, it is likely to remain corrupt and become even more corrupt unless drastic reforms are undertaken to eradicate the phenomenon. Corruption therefore appears to become endemic and as Amundsen (1999, p.1) contends,

> "corruption is a disease, a cancer that eats into the cultural, political and economic fabric of, society and destroys the functioning of vital organs".

Corruption becomes more insidious when it takes hold at the very heart of power such as the head of government. The very fact that there is centralised power and decision-making means that the power elite may have the incentive to act unilaterally and disregard established norms and rules. This is not necessarily true in all instances. However, if this is the case then decisions made or the lack of decision making will more than likely, affect discretionary public spending, determining how the tax system should be structured, exploitation of wages in the government sector, rent seeking, bribery, extortion, cronyism, nepotism and patronage.

Sub-Saharan Africa is but one of many regions which are plagued by allegations of corruption. As alluded to above, one has to understand that corruption is not a recent phenomenon. Accounts of corruption are documented in some form or the other for hundreds of years but contemporary accounts appear to be given more prominence. Even advanced societies such as those within North America according to Meagher (1997) are rife with patronage, bribery and embezzlement. Transparency International 2006's Global Corruption Perceptions Index shows that the most honest countries are Finland, New Zealand, Iceland, Denmark and Singapore, whilst the most corrupt countries are Haiti, Guinea, Myanmar, Iraq, Bangladesh, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan. China, Brazil, Ghana, Senegal, Peru, Mexico, Saudi

Arabia and Egypt rank in the middle of the 163 countries ranked (Uslaner, undated). As of 2009, much of these rankings still remain unchanged (Transparency International, 2009).

Other indices show rankings that are similar, for example The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) that produces a perceived-corruption index reports that 79 per cent of the around 140 nations in the world (2005- 2006) are run by corrupt bureaucrats. Although the article does not further specify any details about who these corrupt bureaucrats are, one can only assume that this points to elected officials in various tiers of government.

The aggregated corruption index from the World Bank (WB) indicated that 59 per cent of 207 countries and territories are corrupt. Transparency International in their 2005 discussion paper suggests that Finland is generally regarded as the least corrupt country (Thompson & Shah, 2005). Meanwhile, Somalia is the most corrupt country according to the WB index, and Zimbabwe according to the ICRG data (Gunardi, 2008). Corruption is found almost everywhere (Bales, 2007; Werve, 2006) and according to Amundsen (1999) it is stubbornly entrenched in the poor countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. Corruption as a phenomenon is found in all tiers of society and its influence spread in many facets.

Table (1) below gives examples of some randomly selected studies. Bearing in mind that the literature on corruption is vast, a snapshot of some of the various studies has been compiled by the researcher which identifies the source, summarises the findings, the methodology used in identifying corruption and the variables that either predict or indicate whether corruption is prevalent. It is evident from this table, that corruption within politics is almost always associated with levels of power within government regardless of the political ideology. The power struggle associated with corruption sometimes manifests itself in conflict and violence particularly relevant at almost any given time in many countries within Sub-Saharan Africa. Corruption becomes pervasive but may not necessarily be uniform in terms of how it is perceived. Thus there are regional and national variations of the concept with attitudes also spread over time. Studies of corruption also underscore government accountability whether from Democratic, Authoritarian or Dictatorial regimes. Other salient features on the study of

corruption look at the collective term "favouritism." In a generic sense, favouritism incorporates concepts such as nepotism and cronyism thus indicating the "fairness" or lack of this within government.

Table 1: showing different studies of corruption

Study	Summary	Methodology	Variables/ measures
Corruption and Democracy (Moreno, 2002).	Identifies significant cross-national and cross-regional variations in corruption permissiveness, and shows that attitudes toward corruption affect political ideologies such as democracy.	Uses surveys and develops *index of corruption permissiveness*, that is, the extent to which individuals tend to justify certain practices that can be considered corrupt	claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled", "avoiding a fare on public transport", "cheating on taxes if you have a chance", and people "accepting a bribe in the course of their duties"
Corruption and Conflict (le Billon, 2003)	Looks at greed and self-interest amongst the power elite and thus corruption as an interface of social and political conflict.	Correlates the relationship between corruption and the outbreak, duration and termination of conflict	Shock/crisis, nepotism, cronyism, market corruption, client-patronage
Corruption and Governance (Gunardi, 2008)	Explores the determinants of cross-country variations in corruption. and whether corruption is really persistent across time	Correlations between the current and past levels of corruption as well as the relationship between economic growth and government governance.	Uses Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) understand relationship among governance indicators such as democratic accountability, government stability, bureaucracy quality, corruption, and law and order.
Corruption and Economic Development. (Douglas, Judge, & Kutan, 2009)	Attempts to provide empirical evidence of whether corruption affects economic development in the Middle Eastern-North America (MENA) and Latin American countries	Using economic data from two regions, the correlations between the measure of corruption and GDP per Capita in both random and fixed effects	GDP *per capita* in US dollars as a dependent variable and Gross Capital Formation as an independent variable in addition to corruption being the key independent variable .

Table 1: continued showing different studies of corruption

Corruption in Authoritarian Regimes (Chang & Golden, 2009)	Examines the determinants of corruption particularly from non-democratic politics and specifically autocratic and authoritarian regimes	Multiple correlations that investigate corruption in autocratic polities using secondary sources such as those provided by World Bank. Examples such as the quality of governance, as determined by surveys of citizens, experts and large corporations.	Variables include the identity of the ruling group, the availability of both natural resources and foreign aid, regime time horizons characterized by the experience of civil war, regime duration, or the number of previous regime interruptions), and average annual per capita income.

As mentioned, the table above is but a brief overview of the various studies of corruption. A more detailed discussion on the types, causes and consequences of corruption is covered below.

2.2 Types of Corruption

The concept of corruption, when used in the generic sense, appears to be something morally unacceptable for the majority of people and this suggests that there is a behavioural element to this. It is within this context that the various types of corruption need to be understood. Robinson (1988) categorises corruption into three main types: "incidental", "institutional" and "systematic". In terms of incidental it could be suggested that this is tantamount to being selective particularly in securing jobs for friends and family hence nepotism becomes an issue in government agencies but is not necessarily limited to the government for this can extend to the private sector as well. The second, institutional, would more than likely be conjoined to the first. However, it becomes more pervasive to the extent that officials, regardless of their stature, become less conscientious in engaging in sound administrative practices. This then runs the risk of becoming endemic and hence institutionalised. The third, which is systemic, is more than likely at the upper end of the scales of corruption in that a culture of corruption now exists within a given society.

Kaufmann (2002) recognises corruption on different levels namely: "grand corruption" at government level, "middling corruption" at enterprise level, and "petty corruption" such as small scale transactions between citizens and public officials. Begovic (2005) also suggests that there are three types of corruption which include entitlement, administrative corruption and state capture. Although it is not too clear what he means in terms of the first, it could suggest "entitlement" in that any person with the means could potentially bribe a public official towards securing a gain whether it is material or other. The second type of corruption is a corruption that violates the legal rules, or a very biased enforcement of the rules. This type of corruption corresponds to the principal-agent model of corruption, as the total supply of corruption (demand for the bribe for violating the rules) is provided by the civil servants. The most significant direct consequence of this type of corruption is that legislation and public policies are not justly enforced. The third type is "State capture", corruption that is aimed at

22

changing the rules and regulations into rules and regulations that favour the interests of the corruptor. The concept of state capture was developed by the World Bank primarily for explaining the reality of political life in transitional economies (Hellman & Kaufmann, 2000). The underlying assumption is that legislation and public policies are decisively influenced in the bribing of legislators by a few very powerful business people. It may also be the case that the power dynamic is so pervasive within this relationship that bribing becomes unnecessary. The very notion of corruption and wrong-doing becomes indifferent amongst the power elite. Ultimately, public policies are inevitably formulated to favour these very powerful business people and, not the public (Begovic, 2005).

Amundsen (1999) distinguishes between: political and bureaucratic corruption; private and collective corruption and redistributive and extractive corruption.

Political and Bureaucratic Corruption:

Political corruption has to be juxtaposed with the highest levels of leadership within government and this is what Amundsen suggests in that the highest levels of decision-making appear to be the monopoly of the political elite. To this end, the power that comes with this position is manipulated such that status, wealth and entitlement become synonymous with this power. He also thinks that bureaucratic corruption varies from political corruption in that bureaucrats are engaged in activities of corruption in the various tiers of government. Whilst there might be some demarcation of these concepts it is still difficult to separate political power and bureaucratic power, especially when bureaucrats are more than likely from the same political affiliation of the leadership that is governing. This holds particularly true for Sub-Saharan Africa as well as for other regions that have notoriety for alleged corruption. Political corruption therefore has a symbiotic relationship with bureaucratic corruption and this collusion perpetuates mismanagement of government. Political corruption is also more than a deviation from formal and written legal norms, from professional codes of ethics and court rulings. Carbonell-Catilo (1985) shares this same view that political corruption is when laws and regulations are more or less systematically abused by the rulers, side-stepped, ignored, or even tailored to fit their interests.

Private and Collective Corruption:

Private and Collective corruption is in essence wealth-seeking for personal gain which is generally associated with politically corrupt leaders who feel that holding political office and having wealth equates to entitlement.

The illegality and immorality of corruption necessitates a fair degree of collusion, conspiracy and complicity between individuals, or at least a perverted sense of closeness and mutual confidentiality. Corruption is regarded as "private" or individual because private benefits are sought and collected. Acts of corruption which no doubt benefit the corruptor have also wider implications for his/her family. It also extends to others within a wider circle that he or she trusts. It is when the scale and magnitude of corruption goes beyond individual greed that one sees the emergence of collective corruption in so far as the family and friends referred to, become the benefactors. The sphere of influence then goes far beyond because this notion of entitlement starts to permeate all within this sphere of influence. The wider group including the leader takes advantage of the economic benefits that are made available and any other resource to further their aims.

Other definitions of private and collective corruption underscore the fact that the leadership, including those within this elite circle, make undue demands to the extent that this impacts on limited resources that would benefit the leadership and the elite (Amundsen, 1999). In another sense, this also translates to the extent "collective" goods are illegitimately converted to "private" goods in terms of receiving pay-offs (Heidenheimer, Johnston, & LeVine, 1999).

Redistributive and Extractive corruption:

The various definitions of corruption maintain that the state (or some state agent) is always involved, and that corruption is basically a particular state-society relationship. It is furthermore maintained that this relationship is based on a mutual exchange of benefits, that it is an exchange from which both the state (the state agent) and the society (the individual citizen, client or businessman) will draw some immediate and

private benefit. Extractive corruption implies a level of complicity between the political leadership and an elite ruling class. This relationship further suggests that a dynamic of "collective corruption" takes hold starting with the head of state and then spreading to cabinet members, military officials and senior bureaucrats. This may extend even further down the line of government influence.

Amundsen (1999) looks further at this symbiosis in terms of redistributive corruption. The fact that this symbiosis exists, whether it is extractive or redistributive, suggests that corrupt practices within this sphere of government become even more difficult to pinpoint.

Notwithstanding, it should be noted again that whoever is engaged in corruption within the sphere of government aims to maximise on personal benefit and to capitalise on limited resources. If one has to look for collusion within government Ministries then, the DRC in Africa, amongst other similar States, would be a typical example. Successive failure in leadership saw violence with state resources being looted by the Congolese and foreign soldiers, civilians, militia and other foreign nationals. These resources can be money, wealth and fiscal privileges for one party, and constructs such as "influence", "identity" and "security" to the other. This implies, for instance, that the state as a group or elite may extract substantial resources in the form of wealth and power from the nation or the society at large, while the society, in return, will have resources like protection and national identity. In many cases, corrupt practices have established extremely well-to-do political and state-based elites (ruling classes) amidst poverty and recession. On the other hand, businesses and other groups may be very successful in getting tax exemptions and other privileges from corrupt officials in weak states, to the extent that the unity and coherence of the state and its policies are ruined, the policy implementation capacity ravaged, and the resources of the nation depleted.

Friedrich (as cited in Heidenheimer, Johnston & LeVine, 1999, p. 3) maintains that corruption exists in all societies and is also certain that the extent of corruption may vary depending on the type of government or ideology. With this characterisation, it certainly appears that there are countries in Sub-Saharan Africa where there is alleged corruption that rides tandem with the type of government such as dictatorships and military regimes. This characterisation also holds true for other regions of the world

such as corruption issues and the military dictatorship in Bangladesh. (International Crisis Group, 2008).

2.3 Some Corruption-related concepts

It has been mentioned in the foregoing that corruption would appear to be different in different political contexts and thus the perceptions might vary as to the magnitude and scale of corruption or whether corruption exists at all. In the discussion on corruption, common themes are shared and the following concepts provide an overview.

Garner (2004) defines *"Bribery"* as the offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of any item of value to influence the actions of an official or other person in discharge of a public or legal duty.

Amundsen (2000) suggests that bribery is the payment of a fixed sum, a certain percentage of a contract, or any other favours in money or kind paid to the state official in charge of making contracts on behalf of the state or otherwise distributing benefits to companies or individuals, businessmen and clients. To pay or receive a bribe is corruption per se, and should be understood as the essence of both extractive and redistributive corruption. The bribe is the payment (in money or kind) given to or taken by the state official in a corrupt relationship. Bayart, Ellis, & Hibou (1997) suggest that there are also many equivalent terms to bribery such as kickbacks, *baksheesh*, sweeteners, grease money and pay-offs, which are all notions of corruption seen from below, as "redistributive" corruption.

Embezzlement is commonly referred to as the act of dishonestly appropriating or secreting assets, usually financial in nature, by one or more individuals to whom such assets have been entrusted. It is a kind of financial fraud. Embezzlement may range from the very minor in nature, involving only small amounts, to the immense, involving large sums and sophisticated schemes. The legal definition of embezzlement is "the fraudulent appropriation of money or property by someone entrusted with its care on behalf of others, but who uses it for his/her own purposes" (US Legal, Inc.). Similarly, McCracken (2007) defines embezzlement as the fraudulent appropriation of money or property held in trust and a deficiency caused by a breach of trust.

Fraud: In the broadest sense, fraud is an intentional deception made for personal gain or to damage another individual (Wikipedia, undated). Bayart et al, (1997:11) referred to fraud within government as "dirty tricks politics". He describes how money is extorted by many within government. Dirty tricks politics include cases of governments "importing" toxic and atomic waste from one region that have strong legislation against this but nonetheless still attempt to dump this in other regions of the world which have no environmental considerations. Other forms of "dirty tricks" engagement are when state leaders have printed large amounts of national bank notes to pay civil servants. What is widespread and even more alarming, according to Bayart, is the role of some of these leaders who actively participate as mediators, facilitators and partners in fraudulent and criminal business activities, in organized crime nationally and internationally (Bayart et.al. 1997).

Extortion: The Harvard Law Review Association (1894) defined extortion as the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of force or fear or under colour of official right. Another source, (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2009) further supports this by suggesting that extortion is the unlawful extraction of money or property through intimidation.

Favouritism: is the unfair treatment of a person or group on the basis of a prejudice or an inclination to favour some person or group (Wordweb Online, 2005-2008). In a political context it has strong ties with elitism such that special privileges are afforded to those within the political affiliation.

2.4 Causes and Consequences of Corruption

In examining corruption in any society a "chicken and the egg" situation often prevails, in other words, is corruption a cause or a consequence? The literature supporting this dilemma is scant but interesting. Lambsdorff (1999) indicates that the interactions between corruption and other indicators are difficult to establish and as such corruption can also simultaneously be a cause and consequence to other variables. What may also become clear is that the regime type and their involvement in government, weak institutions, social inequality and the absence of competition correlates strongly with perceived levels of corruption.

Although unclear, it may be that one of the more glaring indicators or consequences of a corrupt government is the economic output of that society. One of the benchmarks for economic output can be indicated by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). La Palombara (1994) has suggested that economic growth in a country is a good indicator of corruption and can be measured by comparing the relationship between GDP, inequality and the size of government. Corruption and GDP was thus positively correlated by using a sample of randomly selected countries. Some Scandinavian countries however, proved to be the exception in that the size of government spending and GDP gave no indications for levels of corruption if any. Elliott (1997 182-3), also, after using a sample of 83 countries, reports that in general, GDP decreases with increased levels of corruption and Mauro (1995) suggested also that corruption has a negative impact on investment. Ackerman (1991), however, mentions that these simple correlations may be misleading in that GDP alone is hardly an indicator of levels of corruption. In a similar vein, La Porta *et al* (1999: 242) suggest that there is insufficient evidence on the size of government expenses and GDP as a cause of corruption. It follows then that the extent to which any government involvement impacts the economy is somewhat murky and would probably be difficult to measure with any measure of reliability. However, the manner in which market indicators, and hence the economy, are performing may point to government effectiveness and hence, allegations of mismanagement and corruption against the government may follow. The need to be efficient, effective and fair within government has a direct link with accountability, transparency, maturity and sound leadership. When governments consistently fail to provide optimum service delivery, allegations of endemic mismanagement associated with political corruption are made. Such allegations however, are difficult to prove and in his assessment, Lambsdorff (1999) concludes that governments' involvements in corruption are hard to establish with any degree of certainty.

Notwithstanding, two of the major indices, such as those published by the World Bank and IMF, on corruption indicate that the level of corruption varies negatively with the level of economic prosperity (Podobnik et al., 2008). In other words, as a country grows richer, the level of corruption decreases. Whether the income increases, because the level of corruption goes down or whether, corruption goes down because the income increases remains unclear. In the literature, there are indications of both. Research by

Littvay & Donica (2006) however, concluded that there were no uniform levels of GDP as a cause of corruption or vice versa. In other words, the direct link between GDP and corruption has not been established.

It is likely that economic growth in less developed economies such as those within the Sub-Saharan African region are affected by the extent of actual levels of corruption. Harrison & Huntington (2000) suggest that corruption is negatively related to economic development and to the existence of democratic institutions. Keefer & Knack (1997:p590-p602) also agree that corruption has a negative effect on economic growth. On the other hand, however, increased income may quite simply foster more corruption because of more opportunities and temptations. At the same time, increased income is also believed to reduce the level of corruption because economic development usually goes hand in hand with political development, democratization and accountability. Another aspect to this argument is that increased levels of corruption are believed to be inhibitive to economic growth, in particular certain kinds of corruption and at certain stages of growth. Paradoxically, increased levels of corruption have been seen as a positive indicator of economic development because it creates competition and market structures for private sector actors. Amundsen (1999) suggests that there are more than just economic indicators pointing to corruption. Similarly, Johnston (1997) mentions that entrenched corruption also features in societies with characteristics such as uneven economic growth; low political competition; a weak civil society; and the absence of institutional mechanisms to deal with corruption.

Other characteristics include culture which now becomes a very salient point in terms of how governments come in to being and are allowed to operate. The cultural relativity in respect of corruption also becomes a pertinent issue. De Sardan (1999:25) maintains that the crux of corruption is the carry-over into present-day political behaviour of cultural values inherited from a patrimonial past, like negotiations, gift-giving and unconditional solidarity with extended families, clans and other communal groups. A government ministry from Zimbabwe (Ministry of State enterprises, undated) however, suggests that apart from political, economic and social issues, cultural causes of perceived corruption may also be pertinent. Cultural identity and sectarianism may create inequality of wealth distribution compounded by situations where salaries and wages are generally very low. Given these conditions, activities essential to the survival

of society are performed by social classes who do not become rich by the efforts they make. However, affluent classes do not hide their loathing and despising of such activities and will use their power to capture the efforts of less favoured classes. Hence, wealth is concentrated in the hands of the few, a minority, leading to the emergence of a factional social system and where rent/booty becomes the source of wealth (Khaldun, 2005).

Perceptions of corruption levels or the admission of this may thus vary with the leadership and regime type. If corruption is then juxtaposed with democracy and democracy is the ideal then one widely-held assumption is that the level of corruption corresponds negatively with democratisation, i.e. that the level of corruption is decreasing with increasing levels of democracy (Bhattacharayya and Hodler, 2008). The more the power is legitimate, the less are the levels of corruption. Furthermore, the most extreme levels of corruption have been observed in a number of countries that are experiencing the double processes of political and economic liberalisation which implies some cultural uncertainty or transition. This may then be exacerbated by ineffective political institutions and increased opportunities at the same time. That is, high levels of corruption have been found in countries in rapid economic and political transformation when there is a transition of a political ideology.

Cultural identity can sometimes manifest itself within an unofficial hierarchy of (or an official hierarchy was the case in the former apartheid government of South Africa) a class society which attempts to attribute identity mainly on racial and ethnic demographics. Inevitably, an elite group emerges who, for historical or political reasons believe that they are entitled to more of the States' resources and privileges. Over time and depending on the prevailing political conditions, the uneven distribution of wealth in favour of the elite becomes more noticeable. It is the levels of disparity that emerge coupled with other socioeconomic conditions that provide a snapshot of the economic state of a country. Sometimes, the elite are also part of the ruling class having dominant links in this stratification and thus entitlement is substituted for "corruption". Good democratic ideologies, on the other hand, are more likely to have transparency and accountability even if there is a perceived level of corruption. In a similar vein, Goel & Nelson (2005: 127 and 130) find that levels of corruption may decline with established democracies. Countries with poor development according to Myint (2000) are as a

result of the consequences or causes of corruption associated with strong central government controls and regulations. He further attributes the ascendance of corruption to institutional failings allowing for political and economic decline to the point where corruption becomes entrenched. The levels of corruption go unchallenged on account of the lack of judicial and legislative due diligence and thus the vicious cycle continues

Opposing these views, Ades and Di Tella (1999: 987) and Fisman and Gatti (2002: 336-338) suggest that the link between political and/or civil rights associated with democracy and corruption are not significant and may be non-existent. Case (2002) also mentions that corruption appeared to increase in some countries following democratization mainly because centralised government control gave way to decentralized control thus the incentive to engage in corrupt activity fell less under scrutiny.

Treisman (2000) tracks two notions which point to likely root causes of corruption namely: the level of development in a region, or lack of it further questions whether democratic principles are maintained. The levels of development and democracy are also dependent on the length of time the respective region or country has allowed these principles to mature. It thus follows from this argument that countries with a long tenure of sound development and adherence with democratic ideals tend to show low levels of perceived political corruption.

The second cause, according to Triesman (2000), is the notion in which perceptions of corruption are shaped through the impact of culture and tradition that has dominated a given society or political region. Religion as a subset of culture and tradition is also a strong and dominant force in shaping socio/political behaviour. It is maintained that strong Protestant values and work ethics shape values and thus contribute to robust civil societies allowing for democratic values to progress. Furthermore, Triesman (2000) suggests that countries with ties to former British occupation appeared to show much lower levels of corruption. The reason, he argues, for lower perceived corruption in countries with former British occupation was because the British system of justice had instilled a greater system of procedural fairness over substantive fairness. This system ensured that when corrupt practices were encountered, they were dealt with in a fair and transparent manner. Notwithstanding, Treisman (2000) does maintain that there are

limitations to these findings in his research insofar as the choice of policies or ideology may very well have little impact on corruption and would also not have discernible effects until it has festered for a considerable length of time.

Disagreeing with the above view by Triesman, Osaba 1996 (as cited in (Mulinge & Leseteti, 1998) emphatically maintains that corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa is largely as a result of the influence of the former colonisers including Britain, France and other countries.

Huther & Shah (2000) examine further sources on the causes of corruption as suggested by The World Bank in its promotion of educational awareness on corruption. Four basic causes for corruption are identified which firstly points to "opportunity". This for example, identifies government-owned assets such as mining companies with no competitors or government controlled licensing agencies where there is a considerable injection of cash. This then leads to the second likely cause creating the opportunity for theft going unchecked and with little chance of being caught. It is not only that there are no mechanisms to deal with this or that existing ones are too weak to circumvent such behaviour but that accountability and transparency are lacking. Coupled with this lack of accountability and the need for transparency, is the blatant arrogance of some state officials in refusing to disclose their questionable sources in relation to the accumulation of wealth.

Thirdly, beyond the opportunities that are created for corrupt practices to take hold, there are other circumstances under which government officials find themselves that might cause him or her to indulge in questionable and dubious practices. It may be that he or she is poorly remunerated and also has fewer incentives than other persons in employment. He or she thus finds it more amenable to accept bribes to supplement their income. These transactions become lucrative and thus continue unabated.

Fourthly according to The World Bank, corruption is a behavioural output shaped by attitudes of individuals largely created by errant and oppressive regimes such as the former apartheid government in South Africa. There is a deliberate attempt not to abide by laws created by an unjust government and thus such persons, if not communities,

continue operating on the fringes which are nonetheless corrupt practices yet under oppressive conditions would be deemed acceptable.

The last paragraph perhaps epitomises the complexity of the causes of corruption in that corruption goes beyond what is considered ethical and is therefore shaped by many factors including culture, tradition, work ethic and government involvement or the lack of it.

As mentioned it is difficult to determine whether corruption is a consequence or a cause. Whenever the issue of corruption comes to the fore, riding alongside one will for example, typically see elements of rent seeking, self-serving policy interpretations, employment inequality and perhaps a cultural interpretation threading through all of these. Some prominent research discussed above focussing on the subject of corruption has suggested causal relationships between corruption and consequences. The literature on corruption appears to have some common threads identifying the symptoms of causes and consequences. Although the list in terms of the literature is exhaustive, table 2 below collates some examples of these which were selected as pertinent by the researcher.

Table 2: (summary of some of the causes of corruption and the key findings)

Key Findings/Studies pertaining to these causes	Causes of Corruption
Johnston (1997), entrenched corruption is common in societies that present with these features	Low political competition; low and uneven economic growth. a weak civil society; and the absence of institutional mechanisms to deal with corruption
Huntington (1968) postulated a variety of propositions about the conditions favouring corruption in government.	Rapid growth and modernisation, due to changing values, new sources of wealth and power. Expansion of the government. A country's ratio of political to economic opportunities affects the nature of corruption. Foreign business Poorly developed political parties.
(Pellegrini & Gerlagh, 2008) based their findings in support of cultural theories on the causes of corruption	Political instability as a nexus to corruption.
(Goel & Nelson, 2008)conducted a study on Causes of corruption: History, geography and government	Size and scope of government Archaic practices resulting in institutional inertia in established countries. Rent seeking in developing nations. Geographical factors may influence the extent of corruption.

World Bank (undated).	Personal motives
	Patronage
	Mismanagement of government
	Opportunity
	Poor legal system
	Impunity
	Lack of incentives
	Indifference to the Law.
(Leys, 1989)	Pervasive and chronic poverty
	extremely high levels of material deprivation
	Severe inequalities in the distribution of resources.
Mbaku(1994): Bureaucratic Corruption in Africa	Poverty across the region.
	Poor distribution and mismanagement of resources.
	Increased militarization post-independence.
	Disproportionate share of appropriated funds with particular reference to the military.
Amundsen (1999).	Political and economic liberalisation.
	Uncertainty.
	Increased opportunity.
	Ineffective political institutions.
Ningthoujam Sandhyarani (March 2009) in http://www.buzzle.com/articles/causes-of-graft-and-corruption.html	Bribery
	Patronage
	Graft/rent seeking
	Rent seeking
	Nepotism and favouritism
Ministry of State	Tyranny and abuse of power.

Enterprises, Anti-corruption & Anti-Monopolies, in Zimbabwe (undated) in http://www.fightcorruption.gov.zw/contacts/contact.htm	Favouritism Inequality of wealth distribution Inflation Culture/religion

Much of the focus thus far has been on corruption in general and the literature has also covered this to some extent. The focus of this paper however is on corruption particularly in Sub - Saharan Africa linked to its political leadership on which I now will now focus at some length.

2.5 Leadership in Africa: Contributing Factors to Corruption and Incapacity

"Ladies and Gentlemen, Now we have a winner. In the world corruption league, the grand prize goes to. . . Mr. Suharto, the former president of Indonesia! Let's have a loud cheer for the most corrupt president in the globe" (Gunardi, 2008).

Although the above was not an African leader, this is arguably an example of what could be considered as gross mismanagement in government. Accusations of this nature can be levelled at any leader depending on what the motivation is and the context in which this is placed in. In his view, Mauro (1998) suggests a few causes such as trade restrictions, favourable industrial policies, price controls, and government controlled provisions of credit, multiple exchange rate practices, and foreign exchange allocation schemes. Others argue that corruption emanates from different causes: for example, Leite and Weidmann (1999) believe that corruption in Africa is perhaps much deeper and that it is dependent on the availability and abundance of natural resources, government policies and the concentration of bureaucratic power amongst power elites. On closer examination of the latter view however, they do not appear to explain much as to the cause of political corruption or about leadership that has fallen foul of good government but merely suggest that these conditions would be opportunistic at best.

Africa has very complex patriarchal and tribal-based societies which operated well for centuries. African society appears to be steeped in a patriarchal system where the split across genders is pronounced. This according to Ferreira (2004a) is most pronounced in rural areas where they are buttressed by tribal structures and traditional authority. However, with the advent of colonialism, this type of leadership had profound changes more to its detriment where, for example, forced taxation was imposed on the indigenous people via the tribal elders and chiefs. Moreover, where tribal leaders or chiefs did not exist or were un-cooperative, new ones were created by the colonial powers. This in itself was the catalyst for corrupt practices amongst chiefs and tribal leaders (Mulinge & Lesetedi, 1998).

The notion of perceived corruption in the African leadership context is often labelled as a consequence of Western style leadership where the benchmark for leadership was established. It is a controversial view and one which appears no closer to being resolved. There is the expectation that African leaders must be seen to be adopting the Western notion of governance. Regardless of the type of leadership, political corruption also includes for example, the manner in which this leadership influences judicial, legislative and administrative decisions and moreover the extent to which these decisions are expedited or thwarted by political influence and its leadership.

Often overlooked within many studies of corruption, is power and political advantage resulting in certain gains by granting favour to powerful corporations or nepotism within key positions within government. This power lies in the hands of the ruling elite and perhaps more specifically within the leader. To this end, he/she is able to grant a wide range of favours, access to commodities, money and utilities to individuals, family members, institutions, ethnic groups and his/ her own political party (Porta & Vannucci, 1999). One of the more salient features of this political advantage is the extent to which family and friends are awarded positions of power or influence. Nepotism and other allied indicators are but one facet of perceived corruption by the elite in the African context.

Hamber (2005), reports that the Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index asserts that eighteen of the fifty world's most corrupt nations are in Africa. This view however, does not appear to be the case in that on assessment of the 2009 TI's

index, only six of Africa's countries appear to be perceived as the most corrupt in terms of the global rankings. These global rankings are based on broad categories such as police corruption, political corruption and business corruption (See appendix 2 & 3 for TI rankings of corruption).

Notwithstanding, perceptions still indicate a nexus between corruption and leadership. Research conducted by Uslaner (undated), looking at public attitudes towards corruption in transition countries in other regions such as Latin American and some Asian countries and including Africa, found that people see a clear link between corruption and inequality both economic and legal. It was ascertained that what bothered people was not petty corruption but grand corruption associated with the leadership. Furthermore, he also found that in countries with lower levels of corruption, such as the Nordic nations and the United States, people do not see a connection between corruption and inequality.

If equality is juxtaposed with a political ideology like that in established democracies then the link is further entrenched that corruption is less likely to occur. Similarly, Brown *et al.* (2005) found no evidence that greater income inequality increases corruption. Triesman (2000) suggests that democracies tend to be less corrupt, however, this in his assessment, only occurs after a period of about 40 years. From this reasoning and by inference it suggests that most of African countries may have higher levels of perceived corruption given that the region has very few democratic regimes and those that are democratic are at the fledgling stage. Uslaner (2007) maintains that the roots of corruption lie in the unequal distribution of resources in a society and that Africa in general has high levels of income inequality. He also maintains that with the exception of Botswana, other African countries stand at the poles when compared with Nordic countries but the United States on the other hand varies significantly across states and it is states with higher inequality and lower trust that are the most corrupt.

Mbaku (2007) states that despite efforts made by many African leaders to try and address inequality and to combat corruption, corruption still appears to be one of the country's most important development constraints. He further acknowledges that Africa is the poorest region of the world and the only one with very poor prospects for the future. Moreover, he also believes that the leadership/corruption nexus is one of the

major contributions to this state of affairs in Africa. As corruption is an important constraint to foreign investment, many foreign entrepreneurs who could provide the resources and technology that African economies need to improve domestic macroeconomic performance and significantly increase their participation in the global economy are unwilling to invest in Africa due to the high levels of corruption (Mbaku, 2007).

Some political leaders in Africa also undertook opportunistic reforms, which improved their ability to monopolise political power and use state structures for their private capital accumulation activities. Mbaku (2007) further contends that whilst the government in Africa has spent generously on military and other institutions of coercion very little resource had been allocated to critical development areas such as education, health care, economic infrastructures, and environmental protection. Uganda for example between 1971 to 1979 suffered from economic mismanagement as the political and despotic leader Idi Amin, spent excessive amounts of money on the military, neglecting such areas as health, industry, and education. Instead, Amin increased the military's share of the Ugandan budget from 20 per cent to 60 per cent in his first year of rule alone.

In this declining economy, Uganda could not repay its debts or finance new purchases. With most national funds devoted to the armed forces and to Amin's personal security, education, health, transport, food and cash-crop production, industrial and manufacturing sectors and foreign investments were neglected. Corruption and mismanagement was endemic in this era yet this even crossed over into the post-Amin regimes in Uganda which were still characterised by corruption, factionalism and an inability to restore order and acquire popular legitimacy.

Many decades later one of the continent's most developed nations, namely the Republic of South Africa, saw the emergence of what appeared to be bold and stalwart leadership. However, after democratic elections post-apartheid some of the leadership who were heralded as heroes sadly climbed onto the "gravy train" and thus joined the train of others African leaders embroiled in corruption. One such leader at the time of writing is Jacob Zuma, now the current serving President, was investigated after an allegation of abuse of power levelled against him. In 2004, Mr Zuma became involved in the

"Schabir Shaik" trial. Schabir Shaik, a Durban businessman and his financial advisor, was questioned over the purchase by South Africa of some Valour class patrol corvettes, a proposed waterfront development in Durban, and lavish spending on Mr Zuma's residence in Nkandla. On 2 June 2005, Mr Shaik was found guilty and sentenced to 15 years in prison, with Judge Hilary Squires was widely reported to have described the relationship between Zuma and Shaik as "generally corrupt" although this description does not appear in the court transcripts. International observers interpreted Mr Zuma's dismissal from his position as the then deputy president as a clear sign that the South African government was dedicated to rooting out corruption within its own ranks. The "Zuma" saga has continued to dominate South African politics ever since these allegations were levelled against him. These were serious allegations against a top ranking African National Congress (ANC) official and regarded as a hero by many within its following. But then, as recently as April 2009 corruption charges against Mr Zuma were dropped altogether and this was subsequently announced by the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) (Jacobson, 2009). Given that these charges were dropped, the pathway was once again clear for Mr Zuma to then stand for elections and subsequently become the president of the Republic of South Africa whilst still embroiled in the corruption scandal with the inference that it had much to do with political interference. This understandably has incensed many people in South Africa who despite their misgivings about the government in general hoped that justice at the very least would have ensured that Mr Zuma stood trial for these allegations of corruption.

Another African leader within the Sub-Saharan region, who was embroiled with allegations of high levels of corruption in an earlier period, was the late Mobuto Sese Seko. According to the Star Newspaper (2004), the late Mobutu Sese Seko was regarded as the third most corrupt leader in the world. He is said to have acquired approximately 3.7 billion US dollars when he ruled Zaire - now the Democratic Republic of Congo. Blue (2008), reports that Kenya, which is regarded as one of the more prosperous countries of the region, ranks eighth from the bottom on the list of the world's most corrupt countries. Kibaki's government and that of his predecessor Daniel Arap Moi have been marked by allegations of dirty deals running into hundreds of millions of dollars. At the time of writing, Kenya had been in involved in election

violence and allegations of electoral fraud by both leading contenders. This also resulted in factional violence leaving a significant number of civilians dead. As of 2009, the political turmoil in Kenya has returned to normal from an African standpoint but, it does underscore the frequent "stalemate" situations and the impasse that is reached post elections in much of the African region.

In Nigeria the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission says the country's rulers stole $US400 billion from 1960 to 1999. The President of Kenya, Daniel Arap Moi (Phillips, 1999) reportedly said that corrupt officials will now "be hunted down like rats". He further said that corruption has become so bad in Kenya that the IMF and the World Bank are constantly threatening to cut off donor funds until things improve.

In 2005 the head of the World Bank Wolfowitz (2005) commented as follows:

> "corruption is a disease ...it's a threat to development everywhere in the world and I think in the past it has done enormous damage to Africa's prospects, but to see African leaders saying it's a problem and not just saying it's problem but doing something about it is one of the major reasons for feeling that we are in a new era and at a turning point".

On the other hand, Swaniker (2008) reports that, whilst not perfect, leaders such as Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf in Liberia, John Kuffour in Ghana, Abdoulaye Wade in Senegal, Paul Kagame in Rwanda, the former Nigerian president Umaru Yar'Adua and Jakaya Kikwete in Tanzania are in an entirely new class of leaders than those of the past. Some countries within regions of Africa also have notoriety for conflict and violence such as the DRC and Liberia to name but a few. The phrase that has been commonly used in respect of these countries with the legacy of violence is "blood-diamonds[2]" which aptly highlights the corruption and conflict nexus.

In Liberia, the post-violence era saw the emergence of a charismatic and insightful leader in Johnson-Sirleaf who endeavoured to transform the country into one of the

---

[2] See for example the report, published by the United Nations Department of Public Information 2001 'Conflict Diamonds: Sanctions and War"

most peaceful from day one in office. Her efforts to root out corruption at all levels have been commendable where she branded "corruption" as "public enemy #1" and urged all within her cabinet to have "zero tolerance" for corruption. In so doing, she also asked the US for help in fighting corruption in Liberia (The Analyst, 2009). Another very proactive fight against corruption was spearheaded by the President of Tanzania, Jakaya Kikwete. During most of 2008, many Tanzanians waited to see how he would deal with corruption scandals that dogged his government. Subsequently, arrests were made which heralded much praise for the President even though some were sceptical, demanding that more officials be arrested for numerous high profile corruption allegations (Tungaraza, 2008).

Once again it would be prudent to look at leadership within the South African context given that it is a hegemonic region within Africa. If one had to consider charismatic and sensible leadership then a good starting point would be former president, Nelson Mandela who no doubt ushered a wave of change that the region so desperately needed. Given the years of political and social oppression that much of the disenfranchised masses suffered under apartheid, his emancipation and subsequent appointment as the country's first democratically elected Black leader literally transformed the nation overnight. Unfortunately this euphoria died down considerably after his term was over as the first Black president in the previously White dominated South Africa. It is commendable however that unlike many of his Black counterparts in the region, his tenure of leadership was for a single term and despite popular calls by the masses both Black and White, he stood down making way for the next democratically elected leader.

His successor, Thabo Mbeki, who was also his protégé, attempted to lead the country in what was now a true but fledgling democracy. His legacy however, is still to be recorded in the annals of South African history. The Wall Street Journal (Tupy, 2008), for example, intimated that Mr Mbeki had been very partial to leaders from some Communist countries such as China and Cuba. Moreover, this partiality also extended to leaders from countries such as Zimbabwe, Iran and Libya who could be characterised as being autocratic and even despotic in some instances. Other accounts suggest that Mr Mbeki's leadership post the Mandela era, had raised some serious concerns about his suitability and performance as a leader and that rifts amongst the ANC's rank and file had taken hold (Singh, 2006).

It does appear from some of the preceding reports that after the Mandela era, the direction that Mr Mbeki showed as the leader of South Africa was lacklustre at best. The glaring accounts of arrogance and the very poor handling of the AIDS/HIV nexus certainly showed in some respects, his ineptness in dealing with significant and contemporary socio-political issues which thus questioned his ability to lead and to deliver and good governance. Whilst the latter does not have a direct association with political corruption, the subversion of good governance, allowed maligned policies to take hold. On the whole however, Mr Mbeki still garnered far more respect in terms of his leadership than most of his contemporaries within the Sub-Saharan region.

In examining perhaps whether there is trend of progressive leadership for the region, Swaniker (2008), believes that there are a new breed of leaders who genuinely seem to have the best interests of their people at heart as opposed to simply amassing personal fortune or pursuing their own agendas. Shaw (2009) for example, mentions that Morgan Tsvangirai, the former opposition leader in Zimbabwe had faced incredible adversity against the still serving president, Robert Mugabe. As of 2009, Mr Tsvangirai is now jointly sharing leadership as the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, much to the country's benefit when it came very close to the brink of collapse. For the time being however, Zimbabwe still remains one of the pariah states within the central African region and the political uncertainty for the country is tentative.

With reference again to South Africa, the country also saw its first democratic election and freedom from apartheid through the collective efforts of people such as: Nelson Mandela, FW De Klerk and Desmond Tutu. At present, even though former president Nelson Mandela retired from mainstream politics, he is nonetheless still an influential leader in his own right. His legacy is well documented and one of his greatest achievements is his perseverance and dogged determination for the total abolition of the apartheid regime. Whatever the controversy surrounding previous problems he had with the former apartheid government that led to his subsequent incarceration, there is nothing to suggest that he was ever involved in corrupt practices.

Notwithstanding some accounts of good political leadership in the region, there are still some who are of the view that the Sub-Saharan region is reputed to be one of the most violent and politically corrupt regions of the world on account of the lack of leadership.

le Billon (2003) maintains that those with political ambitions and the proclivity to indulge may through this naked self-interest, intensify social inequalities and encourages social fragmentation. Moreover, internecine conflict becomes the "perfect storm" for the ruling elite to engage in absolute corrupt practices which paralyses an entire society ultimately leading to an unremitting cycle of institutional anarchy and violence. This nexus of violence and "corrupt" practices within leadership becomes more palpable and also appears to be legitimised, especially when this power is exercised towards control of all the country's resources whatever the cost. In Nigeria for example, violence against those who oppose persons holding political power is the "preferred" method by which tenure in office is extended and state resources are plundered for personal gain (Ogundiya, 2010). Nigeria wields significant influence in the Sub-Saharan region in terms of its size and population density. Leadership in this country has been plagued with corruption for decades. Ribadu[3], as cited in Wolfowitz (2006), commented that he was aware of what corruption has cost the country namely; it has denied the country of the value of its resources, both human and natural. It breeds injustice and causes killings. He further contended that this is not what the country wants, and this is not what was going to be allowed to continue. In fact, this key government figure is literally on the frontlines putting powerful officials from Nigeria in jail.

Frome the above, one can see this unholy yet comfortable alliance of violence and the alleged corrupt practices augers well with those in leadership. This relationship is spawned not only by greed, but by informal codes of conduct in terms of reciprocity. It is also possible, in the writer's view that there is the emergence of dual forms of "governance" which complement each other in a perverse sense. This alliance thus manifests in two trajectories where; one stream suggests some semblance of a state governed by an inherited ideology such as democracy or socialism. The other trajectory is state run/state sponsored violence coupled with on-going intimidation against those who do not succumb or remain defiant to those who hold political power. The reciprocity as mentioned above is the "pay-off" for the ruling elite that ensure almost unending tenure in political office. Within their tenure, such leaders often become

---

[3] Nuhu Ribadu is the head of the Nigerian Economic and Crimes Commission

delusional, believing that state resources and wealth is one and the same thing as personal entitlement. O'Donnell (as cited in Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002), also shows the link between corruption, subversion and violence. He mentions that formal rules about how political institutions are supposed to work do not appear to be the case. In reality, he suggests, *clientelism* and *patrimonialism* appear to be significant contributors to stifling popular participation, subverting the rule of law, fostering corruption, distorting the delivery of public services, discouraging investment and undermining economic progress.

It is evident that there are states who still continue to rule with subversive forms of governance coupled with on-going corruption and sporadic violence in the Sub-Saharan region. Other states such as Somalia, the DRC and some parts of Sudan however, have become crippled by anarchy and total or partial state failure which has been as a result of the on-going violence and corruption.

The preceding examples cited above where some infamous leaders have been mentioned may suggest a pattern pointing to the emerging of failed leadership. Whilst this is not unique to Africa as a whole, it does indicate that some countries and the leadership within the Sub-Saharan region more than likely have some extraordinary challenges ahead. The issue also of corruption facing its leadership however, is by no means limited only to the Sub-Saharan region. It does however, gives the impression to a few that much of the Sub-Saharan African leadership rightly or wrongly substitutes corruption for entitlement which in the extreme, contribute to states becoming ungovernable resulting in state failure.

2.6 Failed States, Conflict, African Leadership and Nexus with Corruption

Amongst other definitions, in its article *Foreign Policy Magazine* (2006) provided this loose definition of a failed state.

> [...] a failing state is one in which the government does not have effective control of its territory, is not perceived as legitimate by a significant part of its population, does not provide domestic security or basic public services to its citizens [...]

Moreover

> [...] a failing state may experience active violence or simply be vulnerable to violence [...]

The concept of a failed state is not new for conflict and violence spiralling out of control has plagued many nations. Schachter (1998) maintains that there have always been strong and weak states and that no state is wholly autonomous, free of constraints and influences from outside its borders.

Nation-states fail, according to Rotberg (2002) because they are convulsed by internal violence and can no longer deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants. From an African perspective, Reno (1997) argues that when states undergo upheaval leading to 'failed states', the client patronage alliance breaks up as state resources are depleted. This then means that those "associates" who were rewarded in the past by monetary or other means from the corrupt leaders are no longer forthcoming. Depending on who usurps power at the dissipation of the client patronage alliance, violence once again becomes the hallmark of "political authority". This violence then becomes endemic and is thus the only alternative perpetrated largely by the usurper and his loyal following. A new alliance is established with a dictatorial, violent and charismatic leadership at its helm. Over time, coupled with their notoriety, such "leaders" are then elevated to the stature of "warlords". Whatever form of central authority that still remains in this period of mayhem is then targeted by these "warlords". Areas that fall under the brutal reign of such "warlords" become ungovernable in the normal sense. To this end, large swathes of the land, taken by force are ruled by these despotic individuals as is the case in all of Somalia which is now regarded as having total state failure. Notwithstanding extreme cases such as the current situation in Somalia, Szeftel (2000) generalises that corruption in Africa at the extreme end, is the struggle for the spoils and that these "rewards" have thus encouraged civil war. Ogbunwezeh (2005) makes a similar generalisation where he argues that Sub-Saharan Africa is: "the poorest, most turbulent and most war-torn and crisis ridden location on the earth's surface." He further adds that not only is this region perceived to be the most conflict ridden but it also has the notoriety of having leaders who set the stage for states failing. In continuing with this characterisation, Lawal (2007) suggests that the entire continent of Africa alone has produced the largest

number of unstable or failed states whilst Mullins & Rothe (2008) argue that Africa has produced a disproportionate number of failed states associated with large scale atrocities in which the military-style totalitarian regimes have largely been complicit.

Despite these generalisations, a dilemma might exist in that corrupt practices or corruption itself becomes irrelevant, on account of the manifestation of the lawlessness such as that which still prevails in all of Somalia or which was the case in Liberia, Sierra Leone and the DRC.

Whilst there is current turmoil, issues of perceived political corruption and some state failure within some parts of the Sub-Saharan region as a result of multiple factors, this state of affairs however, is not typical for the entire region. Indeed from Hitler's Nazi regime to Nixon's Watergate, the legacy of failed leadership coupled with corruption is also evident in other types of governments. This would include established democracies and other political ideologies in various regions of the world. Despite the latter argument, the extent to which all of Sub-Saharan Africa can be characterised in superlative terms of poor governance is a moot point. It is a fact however, that there are a few leaders within this region, who obsessed with power; wilfully and deliberately neglect the responsibilities of public office. This cadre of subversive leaders thus become the catalysts who no doubt, plunge their respective countries into such chaos that any return to normal, robust governance becomes impossible so long as they remain in power. This deliberate attrition of state resources plunges the nation toward state failure when this kind of ruler-led oppression provokes reaction on the part of resentful groups or newly emerged rebels (Rotberg, 2002). Conflict, violence and corruption therefore appear to be inextricably linked with failed and failed leadership. One also has to be mindful of other contributing factors such as the often malevolent behaviour tyrants and dictators. This behaviour may be typical of individuals and power elites who through insatiable greed and self- indulgence, tax an entire nation often amounting to a total failure of the state. Deviant behaviour amongst political leaders is not uncommon. It becomes problematic however when this deviance manifests itself within regions that have a history of political and social problems and thus credibility, accountability and the capacity to function properly is severely compromised. This scenario appears to be the commonly held perception in some parts if not all of Sub-Saharan Africa. Whether the latter holds true or not depends on how the evidence unfolds within the on-going

research not only for the Sub-Saharan region but other countries in all of Africa and its political affairs. It is therefore under some of these conditions that the few countries mentioned earlier within the Sub-Saharan region have ultimately resulted in becoming failed or partially failed states. The nexus therefore, between total or partial state failure, leadership, violence and more than likely unbridled corruption, is thus highly plausible in these above mentioned countries.

The "failed state syndrome" as discussed above therefore displays a few characteristics including political corruption that coalesce until such time the country reaches a state of total anarchy. However, even if these elements contribute to state failure, the cause/effect bifurcation of perceived corruption amongst political leadership is still a dilemma. Mindful of this dilemma, "corrupt practices" amongst "political" leadership within existing failed states becomes more complex when these leaders spiral out of control and thus they emerge as absolute dictators. Nyong'o (as cited in Prah, 2004) suggests that pathological traits amongst ruling elites are perhaps more prevalent than corruption itself for the lack of development in Africa.

Whilst Nyong'o singles out African leaders as having perhaps some pathological condition, this behavioural manifestation may also hold true for other dictatorial leaders across the globe. Notwithstanding the above arguments, it is still not clear to what extent behavioural aspects motivate deviant leadership to the extent that it is a cause of initiating conflict, further corruption and ultimately, state failure. The possibility that cantankerous behaviour amongst tyrannical leaders contributing to unrelenting corruption or the indifference to corrupt practices and destructive elements therein is perhaps another facet to consider in terms of wider research. If these facets of leadership ride tandem with other insidious elements then it is also possible as in the case of Somalia and the DRC that they exacerbate conditions of continued instability on account of the savagery of violence and on-going conflict. The very issue of corruption then becomes a "side-show" because the oppressiveness and brutality of this leadership relative to the community in question becomes the pivotal issue. Such a leader or leaders as in the case of Somalia's warlords, become the catalysts for further underdevelopment or no development at all within the region. The lack of development in the region brought about by deviant leadership thus spawns a further cycle of continued violence and conflict.

Other forms of deviant behaviour in leadership concomitant with perceived corrupt practices may also be as a result of conditioning. To this end, Maathai (2009) mentions that:

> "Africa is held back and continues to do so because its origins had a lack of principled and ethical leadership. The link also between corrupt elements within leadership and state failure particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa is demonstrated by patrimonial rule largely depending on a patronage-based system of extraction from ordinary citizens".

The conditioning aspect in this regard is the accepted violence, accepted "corruption" where state failure itself may become the anti-climactic event when it does occur. This may occur on account of the strong link between the patrimonial authority and the unflinching loyalty of the followers. The relationship between accepted levels of perceived corruption, whether it is through a sense of entitlement or other factors, coupled with leadership based on tyrannical behavioural and traditions such as the patrimonial conditioning thus becomes more intriguing in trying to account for actual corruption occurring in the Sub-Saharan region.

Violence alone, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa however, is perhaps not only a product of social inequality and therefore actual corruption has to be but a thread as one cause which perpetuates this strife. Another very pertinent and potential cause has to involve the military regimes and paramilitary forces that align themselves with corrupt leaders. Once again one sees that actual corruption becomes acceptable and the norm to the extent that corruption itself becomes a legitimate practice. The respective military establishments and those associated with the military then justify this by the use of force and intimidation. Moreover, others within the regime or state apparatus are all competing at the same time for the same resources. Violence becomes one of the key elements as a capricious medium for ensuring total control of all state resources. Thus the total indifference to corruption by despotic leaders and loyal military contingents establishes a symbiotic relationship towards securing their often overlapping places within total state control. Howe (2001) suggests that due to personal rule, Sub-Saharan Africa's predominant governing method since independence has often weakened military professionalism. Professionalism within the military becomes weak to the extent that there is significant interference by deviant and corrupt

leaders. This interference then allows such leaders to severely undermine military professionalism. An example of this is the wide use of child soldiers by the former dictator of Sierra Leone, Charles Taylor (Singer, 2006). Leaders such as Charles Taylor only hold on to power because of the allegiance of the military and paramilitary forces and where such allegiance, is rewarded through unbridled corruption. At some point, equally ambitious if not more corrupt military personnel choose to usurp political power by means of a political *coup d'état*. Decalo argues (as cited in Baynham, 1986) that soldiers in dictatorial regimes have similar ambitions to their political masters and when the opportunity arises, they exploit power for their own narrow ends. Having a political agenda, such military officers pursue these political ambitions until they have total control of the state. (Howe (2001) argues that even though some military *coups* may be effected for the "right" reasons such as the removal of dictatorships and alleged corrupt leaders, the military itself soon falls into the same trap once in power.

From the foregoing, a plausible argument can be made that in order to achieve any semblance of stability, military dictatorships often become the order of the day. Whether good governance is achieved in the long term is questionable. Ebo (2005) suggests that the military in Africa becomes the master of its own destiny instead of remaining under civilian control. By taking control of the entire state, the consequences for the nation are dire in terms of political stability and national development. It is perhaps that the actual levels of corruption appear to be a dominant feature in conflict and violence ridden states for this region. This is unfortunately a very sobering assessment and also a dismal scenario that haunts much of the Sub-Saharan African leadership. The vicious circle then within Sub-Saharan Africa and its governance, is re-enacted even if there appears to be hope in the initial stages when corrupt and dictatorial leaders are overthrown. New elected officials, by whatever means, upon assuming office soon emulate the military despots they denounced and replaced (Joseph, 2008).

Many of the problems associated with the crisis of sub-standard political leadership reportedly in Sub-Saharan Africa are based ostensibly with perceptions of mediocrity, ineptitude, indulgence, extravagance and impunity. Accounts of this indulgence and extravagance give more credibility to heightened perceptions of corruption levelled at many of the Sub-Saharan African leaders. Notwithstanding any indulgence in alleged corruption, political legitimacy also has to be questioned in terms of its juxtaposition to

the means of this ascendance to power. This then begs the question of whether such power was obtained through the ballot box, through the barrel of a gun or perhaps both in some cases. Legitimacy in terms of the right to rule however becomes even more complex particularly in the Sub-Saharan region when the governance of ethnically dominated areas is bound by traditional leadership.

Leadership shapes a political society to some extent and this is also true for Sub-Saharan Africa. Logan (2008) indicates that traditional leaders, chiefs and elders clearly still play an important role in the lives of many Africans. In this study, most traditional leaders generally received positive ratings overall in terms of their leadership. (For a more detailed study of these findings see also full dataset in www.afrobarometer.org/papers.) Moreover, many countries according to Logan (2008, p. 1), still consider traditional authorities playing major roles as mediators of violent conflict. There is, however, considerable cross-country variation in these indicators of the status and importance of African chiefs and elders. These attitudes in terms of their importance have varied amongst different countries thus for example; Guinea, Tanzania and Uganda ventured to abolish traditional leadership whilst Ghana had significantly curtailed the powers of the traditional chiefs. Other findings in Afrobarometer (Bratton, 2002) also show variance in how traditional leaders are viewed for example; people in Mali were equally split whether government by a council of elders would be an acceptable form of alternative government compared to 88 per cent of Tanzanians who rejected the notion of being governed by chiefs or headmen. In its findings, published by the Economic Commission for Africa, traditional African leaders were also found to be lacking in terms of expediting decisions mainly due to consensus building which was deemed to be a time-consuming exercise (Economic Commission for Africa, 2007). Notwithstanding, Ubink (2008) mentions that in general traditional leaders often act as intermediaries between the government and the local population and have a significant influence over their communities.

On balance, popular perceptions of traditional leaders are slightly more positive than those for elected leaders. Of concern despite the latter, is the notion that leadership is often still rightly or wrongly associated with perceptions of corruption amongst elected African officials particularly in the Sub-Saharan region. As mentioned earlier, actual corruption may thus be one of the significant factors as to why some states are poised to

fail whilst others such as Somalia have already failed in the midst of protracted conflict. On returning to the issue of legitimacy, the context of legitimate power must also be relative to those belonging to an entire ethnic group or a community with common values who ultimately elect their political office bearers. To this end the electorate may also be complicit to some extent in discord and division because they share the same ideology as those in leadership. In his book, Bill Berkeley likens Africa's tribal and warring factions to the Sicilian Mafia further equating them to being vigilantes and racketeering entrepreneurs (Berkeley, 2001). To the extent that elections are rigged by corrupt politicians, Nigerian politics as one example in the African context has been given this notoriety in many of the elections that were held. Albin-Lackey (2007) reporting on political corruption in Nigeria for Human Rights Watch also supports this view, linking loyal groups and corrupt leaders who openly hired cult gangs to intimidate and unleash violence on local communities.

Political conflict and corruption in Sub Saharan Africa however, whether it is substituted for entitlement or not, may be beyond just a failure of leadership or on-going violence. Other possible causes such as colonialism for example, have been also been alleged.

The legacy of colonialism is often cited as one of the causes of Africa's conflict ridden, failed states and the alleged corrupt leadership that followed in different post-colonial countries. With reference to all of Africa however, Obiechina (1992) implies that even though much of the continent had transcended colonial rule from the French, British, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Portugal, there still appears to be vestiges of this mind-set. He further mentions that the colonial past handicaps African leadership and thus gives African leaders a reason to engage in unbridled corruption, political repression and violence. Ahluwalia (2001:60) suggests that the reasons for this are that when one carefully analyses the African state, one can discern two principal factors: *absolutism* and *arbitrariness*. Such power was inherited from the colonial state as well as the desire to maintain a patrimonial social order in line with African traditions.

This might explain the drive towards one-party state regimes. In addition, this power was handed over to the African nations at independence when they were least prepared to handle such immense powers. Moreover, military dictatorship and totalitarian one-

party regimes seized political power in most African countries and swept away the nascent, multi-party democratic experiments in the new states (Obiechina, 1992). Many African countries have seen this transition of ideologies from the pre-colonial era to the post-colonial period and thus these were defining moments for some countries who did not placing much blame on a colonial heritage but who continue to shape their own destiny. Others however, sadly continue to be enmeshed in the "blame game" whilst steadily heading towards the brink of state failure through corrupt and deviant leadership. All societies in any geopolitical setting endeavour to shape their political destiny. The pace and conditions under which this takes place is determined by many factors that will define political outcomes. Common values that are shared regionally may be as a result of ethnicity which in turn establishes cultural identity. The way of doing things such as choosing a leader is thus, culturally defined. The *Akan* tribe for example from West Africa according to (Wired, 1995) embark on the political right of passage based on kinship and succession essentially from the same ancestry. There is therefore no question of the usurping of power or waiting for a cleavage to change the political order. The transition of leadership is succession, based on entitlement to such authority and all the trappings that come with this office. In essence, it is culturally defined.

2.7 Cultural Perceptions of Corruption and Leadership

Culture and tradition are inextricably linked to all societies. Thus the moral dimensions of how political power is used and whether there is any sense of entitlement to personal enrichment, is clearly open to wide interpretation and criticism. In attempting to further understand whether leadership and political corruption has any bearing on high levels of ethnic violence until a country arrives at total anarchy, issues such as warlordism[4], behavioural traits, violence, gift-giving and receiving have been examined above.

Corruption is thus far proving to be an elusive concept to define if it is to be examined contextually such as culture and tradition. It is indeed not only a significant global phenomenon but the failings of government in actual corrupt practices appear to manifest itself far more conspicuously within the Sub-Saharan region of Africa.

---

[4] The phrase "Warlordism" was first coined around circa 2001/2003 by journalists and policy-makers during the Afghan war.

The challenge as with many studies of corruption in other parts of the globe however, is to show the extent of actual corruption that matches anecdotal accounts or perceived accounts of corruption for all of the countries in the Sub-Saharan region. Moreover, given all of Africa's diverse cultural identity, are there variances in these perceptions from country to country? It may be that there is a precarious generalisation of leadership and alleged corrupt practices without consideration of many subtle variables such as culture and tradition assuming that cultural and traditional values have remained essentially impervious to external impurities. The notion that corruption in a defined community is a non-issue where activities such as gift giving and the granting of favours by political leaders is accepted as a cultural norm would, in the contemporary sense, be an idealistic stretch of transcendental logic. Not to undermine the significance of culture and tradition in society, the writer is of the view however, that when culture and tradition are brandished in order to obtain for example, land resource entitlements to the exclusion of others then entrenched and historical legacies of constitutional corruption still exist. The right over indigenous ownership and certain entitlements by indigenous groups in New Zealand for example, is very controversial. Is it an issue of dominance and racial superiority? (Charters, 2009) suggests that Maori seats in Parliament could mean discriminatory privileges which in essence corrupts the "one person one vote" system of elections. Moreover, Maori are seen to have other disproportionately more privilege than other people in terms of land rights and education to name but a few.

In the African political arena also, it could very well be that tradition, culture, clan, ethnicity, language and religion are complex and underlying factors that determines the political landscape and tips the balance in favour of ruling elites. However, an alternative argument suggests that there is a tendency to generalise on political leadership across the board where a Eurocentric benchmark is commonplace. This perception, in its entire ramification, is a grand historical distortion. Mlambo (2006) is of the view that Africa in its entirety is viewed through Eurocentric eyes and operated on the premise that Western norms were universal. All other systems, societies, practices and cultures were, therefore, to be measured against them. Thus, the Western world grew increasingly to deny 'the existence of any "self" but its own'.

In a slightly different view incorporating African and Caribbean political leadership, Burns (1978) generalises that leadership, is largely premised on a psychological basis in that he uses typologies such as transactional, transformational, heroic and demonic leadership and the effect this has on the followers. Typical of many other writers on the subject, there do appear to be sizeable gaps in his view of leadership such as the role of religion, tradition and culture. Whether political leadership finds itself in the midst of tradition, culture and religion or vice versa, the fundamental issue is the direction of leadership, ever vigilant against government malpractice and being proactive to foster good governance for all regardless of race and ethnicity.

Religion as a Subset of Culture

Leadership and its association with traditions and culture is an intriguing and interesting dynamic. From this standpoint, tradition and culture are also often strongly grounded in religious practices and beliefs. When this facet is thrown into the mix of tradition and culture, the role of the leader as a political figure is often controversial. Moreover, religion coupled with secular, charismatic or fundamentalist leadership as conceived and propagated by the major religious movements such as Islam, Christianity, Buddhism and Hinduism has to some extent, shaped and continues to shape the political destiny of all regions. In this context, Sub-Saharan Africa is no different. Liebenow (1986) suggests that many traditional societies in Africa relied extensively on rituals so that political authority could be maintained in a central figure. In addition to this, the political authority was sanctioned by gods, spirits and other types of spiritual influences. The latter may not be far removed from some theocracies in other parts of the world where religion and politics are synonymous and thus wields a significant influence in many undertakings of governance.

There is a significant presence of Islam, Christianity and other religious denominations spread across much of Africa whose influence can be mainly attributed to some form of colonialism. Equal recognition however, must also be given to other tribal religious practices which have been in existence from time immemorial across many African states. Whatever the accepted religious practices amongst different communities and tribal groups, one of the underlying principles is the reverence shown in various forms to beings, entities, and persons either living or dead. The act of giving and receiving of

gifts in various forms, as a token of this reverence purely on religious grounds is however commonplace the world over. It would therefore be difficult in some instances to demarcate the reverential aspect of gift giving and receiving within the religious context as this has been the tradition and practice in many societies. In much of Africa, the giving and receiving of gifts is also steeped in long established traditions. The cultural and moral differences however, need to be assessed in the context of perceived corruption. The transcendental logic or way of thinking to justify such a practice does create a dilemma towards objective reasoning for somebody from the outside trying to understand this practice. In this regard, Cantor (2004) suggests that one man's corruption is another man's only way of doing business. To this end he says that corruption is a historical concept and this tends to clash with contemporary explanations of corruption. Similarly, Achebe (1968) suggests that what appears to be bribery in the modern sense is hard to distinguish from the act of gift-giving and-receiving. He adds that in the case of Nigeria, it is this act of giving and receiving that perpetuated a cultural acceptance and justification. On the other hand, Gyekye (1997) says that whilst the act of giving and receiving is perhaps an African tradition, he nonetheless still considers this to be some form of malpractice.

One has also to accept that Africa has been a predominantly traditional society and as mentioned, deference has been shown to leaders whether they be tribal chiefs, elders or elected officials. As mentioned earlier, it is not uncommon for traditional societies to demonstrate reverence to higher beings and thus such esteem is often given to their leaders who are elevated to a status of having some form divine leadership. Deng, (1995), shows that the Dinka in the Sudan have a deep reverence for their leaders in that the traditional leader mediated between god, the ancestors and the living. He further adds that the belief that leadership is sanctioned by God is not far removed from the psyche in many quarters in Africa. However, earlier on, Deng (1986) also suggests that traditional leadership is often confronted with material demands and thus allegations of corruption and abuse were levelled at these leaders from the people. The moral undertones of when does the act of giving and receiving become onerous rather than reverential might depend on who benefits the most in this setting. It is within this perception that the notion of divine, spiritual and traditional leadership becomes opaque.

Again one must be mindful that the link between God and leadership is not unique to Africa. Countries like India and Japan hold similar reverence for their leadership. In the case of India for example which is reportedly the largest democracy in the world Hindu Nationalism is a very dominant force across many parts if not the entire region. To date, the country has not seen a Christian or Muslim as the head of government post-British rule. Highlighting the significant force that "culturally defined Hindus" pose across India, (Omvedt, 1993 as cited in Allen, 1992) says militant Hindu's across India appear to have an overwhelming presence during Indian elections and thus the message this sends across to other religious minorities is that the Indian should be identified as a Hindu. No doubt, corruption amongst the rank and file of Indian and Asian politicians and their followers is well documented. This facet however, could be explored for example, in future research of global comparative political corruption.

There appears to be a cult association which in turn encourages the elite to steal and plunder rendering a nation impotent. Token and gratuitous payments to loyal followers are made from goods, services and funds procured through corrupt means. The vicious cycle is in place in that charismatic leadership spawns unbridled power and demands unquestioning loyalty. Total and unquestioning obedience disguises perhaps an oppressive norm to the extent that the followers will go to any length to ensure their chosen "demi-god" remains in power.

The complexities of perceived corruption have thus been further expanded with the inclusion of traditional and cultural trajectories thrown in this mix. In trying to understanding the pervasive dynamics of corruption one therefore uncovers a labyrinth that is far more complex when other facets such as wide scale conflict, violence and poverty are included. Corruption however, cannot exist without human interaction hence the central theme is political leadership, its complicity, its indulgence and the intolerance of others who appear to be different. Notwithstanding cultural nuances in trying to justify violence, personal enrichment and the entitlement to all the resources of the state, certain standards for good governance are universal such as: accountability; transparency; a functioning civil society and above all, the respect for human rights. Political leaders who choose to remain stubbornly entrenched in power and having inexorable tenure are also complicit in propagating fundamentalist and sectarian ideologies whilst at the same time they are supported by ethnic elites who have a cult-

like fascination for such leaders. Schatzberg (1997) mentions that the reverence for leadership has been illustrated in the former Congo (now DRC) and its failed leadership where the former dictator Mobutu Sese Seko and now deceased, was elevated to the status and revered as a demi-god. However, Schatzberg (1997) further mentions that conflict in any region using this as leverage towards scoring political gains from a leadership perspective has not been significant. Of significance however, is that most conflicts, including those that occur in Sub-Saharan Africa, are complex rather than to simply attribute singular causes for conflict such as: war, civil war and large scale insurrections by elite factions in the region. If the traditions of giving and receiving as a traditional Sub-Saharan or greater African phenomenon are accepted without the stigma of leaders being labelled as being corrupt then there is the possibility that conflict or violence in this region may be avoided. There appears to be an ominous view however, that conflict and violence are the hallmarks for many African countries. Given this view, it is worth considering to what extent this holds true particularly if the perceived malaise with leadership has very little to do with culture and tradition.

Alternative views therefore suggest that endemic violence and corruption are not necessarily a Sub-Saharan African phenomena and some mischief-making may be at play in stereotyping the region into this mould. Somerville (2008) for example, mentions that this not only leads to the further reinforcing of misleading stereotypes but it colours the world's view of Africa and its development problems including political divisions. He further questions: Why the region is so often described as a basket case or beyond hope? The reason for this he explains, is because deep down, there is the assumption created and nurtured by the belief that Africa is tribal and therefore unable to get out of the cycle of violence, dictatorship, corruption and further violence. It is possible however, that a few countries particularly within Sub-Saharan Africa may be no more corrupt than countries of other regions of the world. Notwithstanding, the impact of actual corruption appears to be perceived as worst particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa.

In terms of further exploring this cultural dimension to corruption associated with leadership, the levels of how perceived corruption manifests itself and its effects is also significant for comparison insofar as perceptions vary from country to country. The African Development Bank Group (2006) has coined the phrase "*corruption relativism*"

suggesting that some practices deemed as corrupt in one country may not be considered as such in another. To paint Africa as being uniformly corrupt may be somewhat of a stretch and misleading. To this end, the influential African businessman, Mo Ibrahim (Ibrahim, 2010) said in a recent article that:

> "the usual images of Africa are of a continent mired in conflict and squalor, but this picture, based on Africa's most corrupt regimes is unfair and misleading. It is like claiming that all Europeans are guilty of "ethnic cleansing" because of what happened in the former Yugoslavia. Yes, Africa has some failed states, but the majority of its 53 countries are mostly peaceful, agreeable places."

Notwithstanding these comments, Ibrahim, although a strong advocate for African development and its image is still one of the leading contributors in providing a quantitative framework of perceptions of corruption through his well-documented Mo Ibrahim Index which is used in this study.

Countries within the Sub-Saharan region and other countries to the North of the continent including some countries within other parts of the globe have their fair share of leaders who are at any given time, embroiled in allegations of various types of corruption. Some of these leaders are still in power and others have either been overthrown, killed, died of natural causes or incarcerated in rare instances. The relative moral dilemma that is posed is how leaders govern and whether they are entitled to engorge themselves in wealth through the receiving of substantial "gifts" amongst other entitlements for example. The issues to be explored are; is this really a common practice and is it still ensconced in tradition particularly with respect to Africa's traditional leadership? The traditional and cultural dimension of leadership becomes more compounded in the context of perceived corruption when certain religious practices that tribal and state leaders be elevated to the platform of the divine.

Corruption, whether at the anecdotal level or developed as a theoretical construct in academic research is a good starting point towards gaining a deeper understanding of the magnitude of this phenomenon. In order to explain this problem in a more robust manner and to see how corruption manifests itself, one has to also consider the quantitative data that may augment this view. To this end vast amounts of quantitative data have been published and a significant number of these come from credible sources

such as World Bank or Transparency International and a few other renowned sources. Some of these indices and their quantitative output are discussed below.

2.8 Indices and Measures of Corruption

Despite the fact that there are attempts to explain corruption from a qualitative and quantitative perspective, actual corruption is still difficult to prove and at best, only perceptions of corruption will emerge. Sampford (2006) contends that it is still necessary to measure corruption in order to achieve progress towards greater integrity, transparency and accountability in governance. However, even though it makes sense to "measure" corruption, Janvier-Urra (2007) mentions that corruption is still an inherently difficult reality to measure. He also suggests that although there has been much research in this area, the information is inconclusive and objective data is limited. Any assessment of corruption should include both subjective and objective measurements. Subjective accounts of corruption are sometimes anecdotal yet also compelling. The data component of this phenomenon comes from various sources which may often have wide variations in completeness and accuracy. Moreover, the more reliable sources of corruption provided by the major indices are limited in scope in terms of how corruption should be measured.

The corruption index such as that provided by Afrobarometer is based on "experience" questions, which are posed to individuals participating in surveys. These are questions that seek to determine the individual's reported personal experience with corruption. In the survey the individual is asked to describe a few government agencies to which he or she has paid a bribe or asked to participate in a corrupt act. This approach might prove to be unreliable as some people may be unwilling to report their involvement in corrupt activities. In their assessment, Kurtz and Schrank (2007) argue that surveys on corruption may only include the narrow interests of respondents such as those from business communities. Furthermore, a potential bias in sample selection may occur due to the exclusion of respondents who perhaps did not succeed in the marketplace, or who were deterred from entering local markets by corrupt elements within government itself and so therefore were not included in the study. In this regard it is possible that the sample may be skewed by the views of unrepresentative respondents who are therefore unlikely to provide accurate reports. On the other hand, Sampford (2006) suggests that

expert knowledge is required to gather appropriate information and to also interpret the information gathered correctly. Corruption in essence is generally a clandestine affair, and this holds true for Africa as well, which makes detection and measurement difficult (Mbaku, 2007).

It has been suggested that the extent and impact of corruption in an economy can be determined by examining public financial records. The allegation pointed at Africa unfortunately is that the region is not known for good record keeping (Mbaku, 2007). Hence one cannot ascertain which public property has been illegally appropriated (stolen) or how much money has been embezzled from public accounts. Hence it is impossible to determine the extent and impact of corruption based on examining public records. Mbaku (2007) does suggest, however, that some elements of corruption can be measured by undertaking forensic audits on government spending. Any discrepancy pointing to mismanagement of funds would be reported to the police if there is transparency and accountability. The vexing problem however may lie with the police itself in that they may be equally corrupt and may not conduct any investigation. The view that Sub-Saharan Africa lacks accountability in access to information and hence reporting on corruption may be a little stretched to some extent in that access to public records or the lack of this is a universal phenomenon. However, it does appear to be more pronounced in developing countries including those in Africa and the Middle East as well as from those emerging from British and European colonial rule (Transparency International, 2007).

Studies of corruption, according to Mbaku (2007) however, are quite important for effective policy formulation and thus have to rely on available data to test hypotheses that seek to determine the causes and impact of corruption. Sometimes the poor quality of data makes the results of these studies unreliable. Even though the data could at times be unreliable, there are researchers who will continue to conduct empirical analysis from partial indices such as those published by CPI in order to make a case for corruption (Mbaku, 2007). The implications for this means that unless complete and more robust measures are used to empirically study corruption, interpreting the results based on unreliable or partial data poses validity issues on whether corruption is likely to be present or not.

On further views of measuring corruption, Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi (2006) mention that corruption can also be measured in three broad ways such as:

By gathering the informed views of relevant stakeholders: The information from sources such as business organizations, serving public officials and citizens is collated through surveys and the views of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO's). Multilateral donors are also solicited. There is no shortage of this data some of which spans many years for the reporting period with demographics including women, colleagues, students and retired public officials, all of whom are typical within such surveys.

By tracking country's institutional features. All executive institutions of government, government agencies and government contractors would at any given time, engage in spending in terms of what was approved in the state or municipal budgets. Government spending is generally tabled in an Appropriations Bill, voted and approved or rejected in terms of any restrictions to spending in Parliament. Good governance therefore endeavours to implement checks and balances to hopefully ensure accountability and transparency. With the best of intentions and with a commitment to ensure that the government remains accountable, acts of corruption within all tiers of government will unfortunately still occur. Given that alleged corruption and misappropriation is likely to occur in any government, good governance ensures that any form of government malfeasance is thoroughly investigated and justice is served. Governments the world over are replete with various forms of corruption. The case to be made, however, is the extent to which governments from developing countries, with a track record of instability are able to monitor lavish and unauthorised spending or to uncover alleged corruption amongst its rank and file and across all departments.

By careful audits of specific projects. By conducting detailed audits which may include government finances. Thus any disparity between spending and the physical output of projects must be accounted for. It is unlikely that these types of audits would point to wide ranging corruption but it will give an indication of possible mismanagement of authorised projects such as transport infrastructure development for example. Many facets in such a project can be audited such spending relative plant, equipment and wages/salaries; the process of hiring government contractors and the fairness of the Government Tender process for this particular project.

Governments, regardless of their geopolitical setting, almost always operate within a milieu of detractors whether it is one of the many opposition parties or a demographic within the electorate who do not support the government. It is therefore not uncommon that discontent on a wide range of issues are levelled at the government but perhaps the issue that becomes most vocal are allegations of corruption within the government. For corruption to exist, it has to be compared to the norms of good governance and it is thus against these norms or the accepted practices that warrant the study and measurement of alleged corruption. There are a number of highly reputed organisations who endeavour to gather reliable information on the performance of governments the world over and in so doing, issues pointing to alleged government corruption are also collated. Some of these organisations and their respective data collection methodologies are explained in the following sections below.

2.8.1 Transparency International (TI)

Transparency International (TI) seeks to provide reliable quantitative diagnostic tools regarding levels of transparency and corruption, both at global and local levels. The annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), first released in 1995, is the best known of TI's tools. It has been widely credited with putting TI and the issue of corruption on the international policy agenda. The CPI ranks 180 countries by their perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys of risk agencies, country analysts and some senior business professionals. In recent years, TI has sought to develop other corruption measurement tools to complement the CPI. The Bribe Payers' Index (BPI) assesses the supply side of corruption and ranks corruption by source country and within each industry sector. In terms of industry it looks at corporations and companies who are likely to bribe within their respective countries and abroad. The BPI in 2008 ranked 22 leading international and regional exporting countries by the tendency of their firms to bribe abroad. The Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) is a public opinion survey that assesses the general public's perception and experience of corruption in more than sixty countries which include Sub-Saharan African countries. It canvases the viewpoints of corruption from citizens and aims to uncover the extent and types of corruption as well. Moreover, the BPI also

explores experience of petty bribery in greater depth, presenting information on the institutions and public services most affected by bribery, the frequency of bribery, and how much people pay.

Transparency International also examines the issue of corruption in the context of development aid to the poorest countries. TI generally uses three ways of measuring corruption. The first method for example looks at direct estimates in monetary terms suggesting dipping into coffers by corrupt politicians. From 2004 to date, estimates and reporting years beyond, give an indication of stolen or embezzled funds by political leaders. The latter is at a macro level however, at the micro level; the data indicates bribe payments to public officials may also be used to calculate this phenomenon. The second method of measuring corruption is by way of indirect payments at a micro level and focuses on missing expenditure, ghost corporations/ front companies. The third form of measurement is by secondary based methods and uses "polls of polls" where approximately seventeen different well conducted polls from different sources are assessed by TI which is claimed to be valid for a period of up to three years.

2.8.2 International Country Risk Guide (ICGR)

Since 1980, International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) has provided expert financial, political and economic risk analysis for investors and international business professionals. The ICRG evaluates both the obvious developments and the subtle factors that cursory annual reviews all too frequently miss. The ICRG was produced by Political Risk Services which is a branch of the Web based forum, *countryrisk.com.* This organisation comprises political risk analysts and is headed by two academics that have extensive experience in government and the corporate world (Countryrisk.com, undated). The ICRG further analyses the financial, economic and political environments in developed and emerging countries, providing insight into investment risks and business opportunities, as well as the impact of current and future worldwide events.

The ICRG incorporates several economic risk factors to determine a country's investment potential, including loan default, delayed payment of suppliers' credits, political leadership, inflation and international liquidity ratios. Each country is given a risk rating. Data from the ICRG rating comprises 22 variables in three subcategories of

risk: political, financial, and economic. A separate index is created for each of the subcategories. The Political Risk index is based on 100 points, Financial Risk on 50 points, and Economic Risk on 50 points. The total points from the three indices are divided by two to produce the weights for inclusion in the composite country risk score. The composite scores, ranging from zero to 100, are then broken into categories from Very Low Risk (80 to 100 points) to Very High Risk (zero to 49.5 points).

Corruption is one of the 12 political risk components, with scores rating less or higher corruption. Moreover, corruption is measured against actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, favour-for-favours', secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business. Political Risk Services is the data provider and they obtain their data from ICRG, which has been published monthly since 1984. The data is also sourced from The World Bank, World Bank Government Indicators and the IRIS-3 Dataset from the University of Maryland Libraries (undated).

2.8.3 World Bank

Another of the extensive sources of secondary based data comes from the corruption data of the World Bank which forms one of the six components of its governance index. This gives an indication of corruption since the mid-nineties, with the data spread over 200 countries using a significant number of other primary sources such as questionnaires and surveys. Respondents are asked to rate their preference to a particular question on corruption. For example, these questions are on corruption relating to the education sector with a ranking of corruption on a scale with a score of 10 being most corrupt and a score of 0 being no corruption (Hasan, undated). Preferences and attitudes towards corruption are constructs which are latent variables meaning that the preferences and attitudes of people are inferred from other observed indicators such as nepotism, rent-seeking and bribery. The World Bank uses linear regression and correlation to show a link between corruption indicators and thus results may show relationships amongst variables such as perceived corrupt practices and a country's economic performance.

2.8.4 The Ibrahim Index (IB Index)

The IB Index of African Governance was a new, comprehensive ranking of Sub-Saharan African nations according to governance quality. It was created in recognition of the need for a more comprehensive, objective and quantifiable method of measuring governance quality in Sub-Saharan Africa. Indicated below, the IB Index assesses national progress in five key areas, which together constitute a holistic definition of good governance. These are:

- Safety and Security
- Rule of Law, Transparency and Corruption
- Participation and Human Rights
- Sustainable Economic Development
- Human Development.

The IB Index assesses national governance against 57 criteria. The criteria capture the quality of services provided to citizens by governments. The focus is on the results that the people of a country experience. The IB Index is a progressive and responsive tool that will evolve to accommodate feedback and critiques from stakeholders, as well as changes in the governance context in Sub-Saharan Africa. It was created in recognition of the need for a comprehensive and quantifiable method of measuring governance quality in Sub-Saharan Africa, and has been designed to:

- Provide a tool for civil society and citizens to hold governments to account.
- Stimulate debate on governance, in particular by providing information about leadership performance.
- Provide a diagnostic framework to assess governance in Sub-Saharan Africa.

In selecting measures of governance, the Index strives for transparency and simplicity. Unlike other such indexes, it is not based exclusively on perceptions or the judgments of experts. Such data are often difficult to verify against any standard metric, and reasonable people may differ markedly in their perceptions and judgments. Instead, insofar as possible, the Index reflects objective data, the hard numbers available on each

country. (See tables 4a and 4b for categories and scores for respective rank of African countries).

In the absence of such numbers, it seeks to use "objectively measured" data systematically derived scores that could be replicated by other researchers following the same approach. The IB Index appears to be an effective method in that it canvases the views and critique from various stakeholders such as citizens, civil society, business, governmental and nongovernmental organisations, as well as taking into account economic and social transformation that may affect the governance context in Sub-Saharan Africa. The governance context is examined in terms of the region's security, levels of perceived corruption and the respect for human rights. First published in September 2007 and recently superseded by the Index for African Governance, the Index aims to assess the quality of governance in Sub-Saharan Africa every year, making it a valuable reference tool to gauge the effectiveness of national leadership over a period of time. There is a lag period in reporting data for example; the 2008 IB Index is based on data from 2006, the last year with reasonably complete available data for nearly all Sub-Saharan Africa countries. The Index and category scores are reproduced with the full data available online. The 2009 and earlier indices uses available sources from such organisations as the World Bank's World Development Indicators, UNESCO, WHO, IMF, TI and so on.

Earlier indices covered only forty-eight countries. This limitation was because of the lag in the availability of data from other sources and thus missing values were used to compensate for this, terms of the sampling, the Index measures attempts to measure outcomes rather than inputs. In this regard, the following questions are asked relative to the five broad categories given earlier:

- What has a government achieved?
- How well has it performed?
- What has come of government expenditure and appropriation?
- Have citizens benefited?
- Have their health outcomes improved, as measured by maternal mortality rates or by access to clean water?

The composite score attempts to normalize the raw data by putting it on a common scale so that the many different measures included in the Index could be compared and combined to calculate a single overall score. The Index is comparable to most other renowned methods which produce similar results in terms of the best and worst performers. The manner in which the data are also normalized and re-scaled does affect year-to-year comparisons and the ease of determining whether a nation-state in Sub-Saharan Africa is improving its performance or regressing. The Index also uses three primary methods to assess good governance across the region. The first is attempts to show whether a country is being governed more effectively the current year compared to a previous year. The second method attempts to determine whether a country's rank has increased or decreased compared to the other forty-seven African nation-states, but is based on specific single year measurements and has limitations to uncovering important year-to-year variations. The third method benchmarks each country's results for the year 2000 or some later period and also shows whether there are any increases or decreases relative to good governance as measured on the benchmark figures (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2007).

These indices have certainly found favour amongst some prominent leaders both within and outside the continent. Leaders like the former President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, mentions that the Ibrahim foundation will allow for the recognition of good governance by African leaders who have left office after a successful period in power. (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, undated). In the same vein Kofi Annan, former secretary general of United Nations, acknowledges that good governance and democracy are central to Africa's development and he believes that the foundation can contribute to the growing movement to build honest and enlightened African leadership (Africa Reporters Newspaper Online, 2011).

Tony Blair, former prime minister of The United Kingdom, reports that African leaders need to drive policies and plans for reducing poverty, combating corruption, and to put an end to bad governance. He believes that the new foundation will help to achieve these goals. (Africa Reporters Newspaper Online, 2011). Given that some of these leaders, past and present, have singled out Africa as in need of attention particularly in the leadership domain, clearly indicates the need for robust and reliable research which could point towards (or away from) progress in African governance. They have

identified the Mo Foundation as one of the more reliable social and political research institutions that will provide the tools to identify and hopefully address corruption. Whilst the Index has received a fair amount of praise for its work there are some detractors most notably from the African Leadership and Progress Network (African Leadership and Progress Network, 2008). They suggested that the Mo Foundation has overstated the importance of civil society as change agents or champions which they contend is not the case as civil society in Africa is powerless against the ruling elites.

2.8.5 Afrobarometer

The Afrobarometer is an independent, nonpartisan research project that measures the social, political and economic atmosphere particularly within Sub-Saharan Africa. Afrobarometer surveys are conducted in more than a dozen African countries and are repeated in a regular cycle. The instrument asks a standard set of questions, hence countries can be systematically compared. It is carried out through a partnership of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), and the Department of Political Science at Michigan State University. Afrobarometer results are based on face-to-face and house-to-house interviews of individuals and are considered reliable and generalisable (Bratton & Mattes, 2004). As of January 2008, the project had conducted 4 main rounds of surveys, covering a total of 19 African countries, as well as a number of other surveys.

Round 1 surveys were conducted from July 1999 through June 2001 in 12 countries: Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Round 2 surveys were carried out from May 2002 through October 2003 in 15 countries: the Round 1 countries (except Zimbabwe, which was surveyed in 2004) and Cape Verde Kenya, Mozambique, and Senegal.

Round 3 surveys were conducted from March 2005 through February 2006 in 18 countries: the Round 1 and Round 2 countries and Benin and Madagascar.

Round 4 surveys were conducted from March 2008 to December 2008 in 19 countries.

The objectives of the Afrobarometer include:

- Produce scientifically reliable data and analysis on Sub-Saharan Africa.
- Build institutional capacity for survey in Africa
- Broadly disseminate and apply results

The methodology used by Afrobarometer is by sampling and the surveys are conducted through a national probability sample method. The sample also represents a cross-section of all citizens of voting age in a given country. All persons within this demographic relative to the sample size are given the opportunity to express their views on corruption and related issues. Furthermore this methodology has four stages in the sampling design and these are according to (Afrobarometer, undated):

- To randomly select primary sampling.
- To randomly select sampling start points
- To randomly choose households
- Random selection of individual respondents

In doing so, Afrobarometer helps to give voice to the citizens, including minority groups, and challenge elite claims to speak on behalf of the people. Users of Afrobarometer research findings include: decision-makers in government, non-governmental advocacy groups, international donor agencies, journalists and academic researchers and the average Africans who wish to become informed and active citizens. In general, Afrobarometer can provide insight into how people feel their governments are progressing in the areas of democracy and economic reform but can be used more specifically to gauge perceptions of corruption using the survey method. Within the survey, key questions are asked of respondents aimed at assessing their perceptions of corruption levelled at government officials including the office of the president and government agencies in their respective countries. The responses however, are only in respect of the selected countries and cannot be used for all of Africa.Advantages and Limitations of Measurement and Data Sources of Corruption/Incapacity

2.9 Advantages and Limitations of Measurement and Data Sources of Corruption/Incapacity

Corruption must be defined contextually and some of these indices do not account for this such as the C.P.I. which, for example, makes little distinction between political and bureaucratic corruption. In the same vein, the complex nature of bureaucracy sometimes makes it difficult to assess corruption in terms of phenomena such as nepotism, cronyism, and bribery within government. It thus does not give a true indication of how effective government is when bureaucracy and the politics of the day are intertwined. Assessment of corruption at the outset is thus deeply reliant on how it is defined.

Amongst the plethora of studies relating to corruption within the literature the more prominent and possibly more reliable sources appear to come from World Bank, Transparency International, Freedom House, and Afrobarometer. Notwithstanding all the studies of these major sources, most appear to arrive at similar conclusions in terms of the consequences and causes of corruption. All of these sources, however, endeavour to canvass the subject of corruption either directly or indirectly through indices and surveys however, none of them actually "measure" corruption. Inferences however, may be drawn from the published indices and reports of perceived corruption. Despite this, there is a wide body of research where attempts are made at "measuring" corruption using the published data sets and, indices by the sources mentioned.

Given that these variables emanate from various sources, Seldadyo (2006) suggests that even though the observations may appear to be a little inconsistent, the sum of all these major indices point to a notion that corruption compared to such variables as regulatory capacity, inequality, trade, and political liberty appear to be significant. On the other hand, Janvier-Urra, (2007) mentions that corruption assessment is a difficult and challenging task given that there appears to be a lack of objective data. Moreover, the assessment of both endogenous and exogenous variables coupled with the error measurement to corruption further adds to the complexity to build effective bridges from measurement. Surveys such as those used by Afrobarometer therefore appear to be more reliable and appear to capture more plausible perceptions of corruption. The ability to understand the questions within the survey i.e. cognitive ability of the respondent may also be an issue. Notwithstanding, some weight must be afforded to respondents regardless of any level of cognitive ability such that perceived corruption or

71

belief that the latter is occurring and actual levels of corruption may show levels of correlation. Konold (2007), in his Afrobarometer working paper no.85, suggests that questions about corruption even though they are perceptions of those surveyed are still perceptions of an objective reality even if the facts/objective measures are unknown. He further suggests that the experience with respondents within the Afrobarometer survey suggest that reporting or not reporting levels of corruption will vary depending on such variables as: media reports of corruption, direct or indirect experiences with corrupt practices and taking and giving of bribes, support for a ruling party and also their understanding of the concept of corruption depending on geographical, cultural and social factors. Several data sources and measurement methods have been discussed above which point to some of the limitations of any one individual approach.

It is most appropriate to rely on a wide variety of different indicators, subjective and objective, individual as well as aggregate, cross-country as well as country-specific, in order to monitor results on the ground, assess the concrete reality of corruption, and develop anti-corruption programs (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2006).

2.10 The Extent to which Variations in Corruption/Incapacity can be explained Statistically by the Measures of the Factors likely to be Causing it.

Corruption may be deemed both a cause and effect in many societies however; this thesis attempts to examine the extent of political corruption within leadership particularly within Africa as a dependent variable using various indicators. Notwithstanding the complexity of this task given the many definitions of corruption, there are still very compelling reasons to pursue the subject and the patterns therein.

Lambsdorf (2005) supports the view that corruption is correlated over time. He mentions further that the best defenders of this come typically from Transparency International where the measures of corruption from previous years correlate strongly with measures of latter years for example; the 1996 index has a strong correlation with the 2005 scores. TI is perhaps one of the more significant data sets indicating the facets of corruptions such as corruption over time and the cross-national variations in corruption levels. (de Swardt, 2005).

Kraay (2007) also suggests that the World Bank measures of corruption over time despite "measurement error" also show aggregate measures as unchanging. Thompson & Shah (2005), however, say that aggregate corruption indices are problematic in that they lack precision and thus question the feasibility of determining meaningful rankings across countries or trends across time.

Summary:

This literature review has endeavoured to map the various definitions of corruption but more particularly direct or indirect reference to political corruption within leadership in Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore types of corruption were examined as well as a review of the more prominent indices with respect to political corruption in Africa.

Chapter 3: Analysis and Discussion of Corruption in Africa

<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 10px;">

Chapter Outline

This chapter includes the collation of secondary corruption data based on major indices. It also progresses onto the analysis of this acquired data using SPSS, EXCEL and online interactive statistical analysis programs to produce scatter-plots, basic correlations and regression analysis and histograms. A discussion of the findings is integrated in the analysis.

</div>

3.1 Introduction

Various organisations have collected vast amounts of data on corruption, for example table 3 below shows some of the key indicators, the data source and the methodology used to assess perceptions of corruption. These were predominantly drawn as primary sources namely surveys and secondary sources namely poll-of-polls based data. Regardless of how the data has been acquired it is nonetheless the collation of a wide variance of perceptions of corruption and not actual corruption given that the latter is very difficult to measure (Janvier-Urra, 2007). Despite this difficulty an attempt has been made to analyse the information using secondary data regarding perceptions of political corruption within Sub-Saharan Africa.

Table 3: (some indicators and methodologies used of in the study of corruption)

Indicator	Data set	Methodology
Nepotism/favouritism	World Bank (*Impact of Nepotism Sitesources.Worldbank.org 1.29 pdf*) (featured in this study) **Afrobarometer***(Implications for Democratic Development- Jobs to Unqualified relatives) Briefing Paper no.81(2007)*	Country ranking surveys Expert assessments Face to Face interviews(primary data) National probability samples (random selection Surveys various sources
Corruption Law and Order	WGI (2009) The World Bank (Global Competitive Index) (2008-2009) The World Bank (Worldwide Government Indicators) (1996-2007)	Surveys various sources including Expert assessments Country Rankings only Country Ranking only
Rent seeking	ICRG Index (2008) (featured in this study)	Uses *hundred country* reports utilising the independent "Coplin-O'Leary system" scaling data from A+ to D- Face to Face interviews(primary data) National probability samples (random selection
Cronyism	World Bank Governance Indicators (*Global Insight Business Risk and Conditions-Control of Corruption: Cronyism)* (featured in this study)	Global surveys, expert assessments From 1996 to 2008 (10 risk factors assessed on a 10-point scale.)

Bribery	World Bank *Global Insight Business Risk and Conditions*	Global surveys, expert assessments
	Transparency International (Bribery Payers Index-selected countries for Gallup polls) (2006 & 2009)	Polls
		From 1996 to 2006 Face to Face interviews(primary data) National probability samples
		Random selection
Client patronage/State Capture	World Bank (*World Development Report-Investment Climate Survey*) (2005) client patronage refers to % of bribes paid to officials/politicians for getting contracts or starting a business)	Country ranking surveys
		Expert assessments
		Face interviews(primary data) National probability samples
	Transparency International (State Capture Survey featured in Global Corruption Barometer) (2009)	Random selection

Table 4 (some predictors of corruption)

Predictor	Data set	Methodology
Sustainable Economic Activity	IB Index (2008) (featured in this study)	Secondary data source and cluster method (multivariate variations in data with similar characteristics)
GDP per capita	World Bank *World Development Indicators 1996-2008* (featured in this study) IB Index (2008) (featured in this study)	Secondary data Secondary data source and cluster method Face to Face interviews(primary data) National probability samples (random selection)
Failed States	Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace + International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 2008 interactive data set. (featured in this study)	Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST), which is a four step trend line analysis.
Conflict/violence	Ibrahim Index (IB Index) (2008) (featured in this study) Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR) 1946 to 2008 The World Bank (Worldwide Government Indicators) (1996-2007)	Country ranking surveys Expert assessments Rescaling of secondary data source and cluster method Open source/secondary data Country Ranking only
Democratic accountability	**Afrobarometer** *(democracy, markets and civil society in Africa) working paper no.69 (2007).***Afrobarometer** *(Africa: Implications for democratic development) working paper no .81(2007)* IB Index (2000-2008) (featured in this study) The World Bank (Worldwide Government Indicators) (1996-2007	Face to Face interviews(primary data) National probability samples (random selection) Rescaling of secondary data source and cluster method Country Rankings only

Table: 4 continued

Government stability/Government effectiveness	Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Governance Matters (2009)	Surveys various sources including Expert assessments
	The World Bank (Global Competitive Index) (2008-2009) (both featured in this study)	Country Ranking only
Culture/Religion	Project SMILE (Synergies in Multi-Scale Inter Linkages of Eco-Social Systems)	Cluster analysis, Distance Matrix (Europe Only))
		Country ranking survey
	(no surveys or data for Africa)	Expert assessments/aggregate multiple indicators
Safety and Security	IB Index (2000-2008)	Ranking method using expert assessments.
	(featured in this study)	Rescaling of raw data source
		cluster method
Participation and Human Rights	IB index (2000-2008)	Rescaling of secondary data source and cluster method
	(featured in this study)	

3.2 The Data

It should be noted once again that the data produced in this study is only at the secondary level and hence the analysis of this is based on the reliability of the primary source. Notwithstanding, whilst some caution was exercised in using secondary sources for the analysis, there was little reason to doubt the reliability of this methodology. In general, the quality of statistics available for countries as ranked in the various indices and surveys was of a reasonable standard. Where "measures" of information were not forthcoming, "missing values" were factored in by the writer for the specific countries or the reporting years. Hence where possible, estimates for missing values were included to calculate the Index as described. The overall analysis, despite some limitations, has produced relatively reliable results for interpretation where reasonable inferences of corruption can be made. The real values for these missing data points are similar to those for other indicators in the same category relative to other countries.

3.3 IB Index

The data collected and used start with the tables that follow and commence with those derived from the Mo Ibrahim 2008 dataset which indicate the 2006 scores for the five categories (see Table 5). The extent to which each of these indicates any perceived failure in leadership is provided by sampling forty-eight Sub-Saharan countries using the Index as a secondary source. This IB Index (see Tables 5a & b) which has been reproduced for this study is divided into the years 2008 to 2005 and years 2002 to 2000. All sections give the overall 2006 country rankings and scores only for forty-eight out of Africa's fifty-three nation-states. At the commencement of this study, the total number of nation states in Africa totalled fifty-three. However; as of 9th of July 2011 this number has increased to fifty-four on account of South Sudan becoming officially recognised as an independent nation state (Goldberg, 2011).

Governance in terms of the index comprises the average sum of the five categories by which governance is measured, on a 0–100 scale. In order to rank these categories, the score relative to the country is thus ranked first and has the highest score, and the country ranked last has the lowest score. Rankings between countries are provided for ease of comparison, but should always be read along with the country scores, which provide important information about the magnitude of differences in performance between countries, some of which may be virtually indistinguishable. Figure 1 which follows the discussion after tables 5a & 5b below, shows a scatter-plot for these rankings and good governance.

Table 5a: IB Index for the years 2008- 2005

Country	Safety & Security 08	Rule of law transparency & corruption 08	Participation & human rights 08	Sustainable economic	Human development 08	IB Index of African Govt 08	Rank 08	Safety & Security 05	Rule of law transparency 05	Participation & human rights 05	Sustainable economic	Human development 05	IB Index of African Govt 05	Rank 05
Angola	82.0	38.4	29.0	32.9	34.4	43.3	44	81.60	38.40	27.90	32.50	34.40	43.00	42.00
Benin	86.1	52.3	81.1	36.9	56.2	62.5	13	86.10	52.30	76.40	36.40	55.90	61.40	12.00
Botswana	75.0	81.6	87.4	58.2	68.0	74.0	4	75.00	82.00	86.70	57.30	67.70	73.70	4.00
Burkina Faso	86.1	56.5	70.1	30.3	48.4	58.3	20	86.10	58.50	57.20	29.70	47.70	55.90	23.00
Burundi	62.0	48.3	60.4	35.9	43.3	50.0	35	59.80	47.90	27.20	33.80	43.00	42.30	43.00
Cameroon	77.7	43.3	54.7	44.7	56.5	55.4	25	77.70	42.70	53.70	43.50	56.10	54.70	26.00
Cape Verde	100.0	86.1	77.7	47.2	62.6	74.7	3	100.00	80.40	84.70	48.80	61.20	75.00	3.00
Central African Republic	46.7	42.7	60.2	34.9	33.2	43.6	43	51.60	45.40	59.50	33.10	33.20	44.50	41.00
Chad	51.5	40.1	29.8	25.6	22.5	33.9	46	56.50	42.20	43.00	27.20	22.50	38.30	45.00
Comoros	94.4	52.8	73.1	37.5	51.5	61.9	14	94.30	51.40	58.80	39.20	52.30	59.20	16.00
Congo	68.5	43.5	48.6	48.7	57.1	53.3	28	67.70	47.80	48.60	48.20	53.40	53.20	28.00
Congo Democratic Republic	52.8	24.3	14.7	26.3	30.7	29.8	47	52.10	25.00	13.40	26.30	30.40	29.40	47.00
Cd'Ivoire	75.2	36.0	22.6	42.9	51.6	45.6	42	75.50	35.10	20.00	42.50	49.80	44.60	40.00
Djibouti	86.0	43.6	55.6	36.8	54.0	55.2	26	86.00	40.20	49.60	36.50	53.20	53.10	29.00
Equatorial Guinea	86.0	43.3	32.2	48.5	36.0	49.2	36	86.00	44.60	29.40	52.80	35.90	49.70	33.00
Eritrea	81.0	56.6	10.6	35.4	48.8	46.5	41	82.00	58.50	10.30	35.50	49.10	47.10	39.00
Ethiopia	72.8	47.9	40.4	40.5	52.7	50.9	31	75.20	49.10	44.30	40.40	51.00	52.00	30.00
Gabon	100.0	56.4	61.2	61.6	67.8	69.4	8	100.00	55.20	62.20	61.60	67.80	69.40	9.00
Gambia	86.0	54.7	42.5	40.5	52.2	55.2	27	86.00	56.80	48.60	39.80	51.00	56.40	20.00
Ghana	86.1	72.7	80.2	47.3	64.3	70.1	7	86.00	70.50	79.80	46.60	64.10	69.40	8.00
Guinea	80.3	51.0	25.4	32.3	50.0	47.8	40	80.30	51.00	30.20	32.60	48.70	48.60	34.00
Guinea-Bissau	80.5	34.6	75.2	23.3	45.8	51.9	30	80.50	34.60	54.90	22.40	46.30	47.70	37.00
Kenya	63.3	56.0	63.3	48.6	64.5	59.1	17	63.00	56.70	66.20	47.70	63.90	59.50	15.00
Lesotho	75.0	69.3	75.5	42.9	53.7	63.3	12	75.00	66.80	72.50	40.00	51.70	61.20	13.00
Liberia	58.8	26.8	87.9	36.9	33.2	48.7	38	56.20	27.40	39.00	36.00	32.80	38.30	44.00
Madagascar	86.1	57.3	74.9	39.4	44.3	60.4	16	86.10	54.70	67.90	35.30	43.90	57.60	18.00
Malawi	86.1	64.0	69.1	40.7	59.7	63.9	11	86.10	63.20	71.00	39.20	59.10	63.70	11.00
Mali	77.8	50.0	74.7	31.4	45.8	55.9	23	77.80	51.40	76.40	28.60	45.10	55.90	24.00
Mauritania	71.0	58.8	30.8	36.8	56.5	50.8	32	71.00	62.20	60.40	30.90	56.50	56.20	21.00
Mauritius	91.7	80.5	92.2	71.4	89.9	85.1	1	91.70	82.70	95.30	70.90	89.90	86.10	1.00
Mozambique	86.1	50.4	70.4	36.7	41.7	57.1	22	86.10	46.60	70.50	35.40	41.50	56.00	22.00

Namibia	83.3	76.7	75.3	57.4	61.6	70.9	6	83.30	74.10	76.90	55.50	62.40	70.40	6.00
Niger	86.1	51.7	79.4	27.6	32.5	55.5	24	86.10	50.50	82.80	24.90	31.70	55.20	25.00
Nigeria	63.7	48.2	44.1	40.7	45.9	48.5	39	62.80	44.50	42.90	40.40	45.70	47.30	38.00
Rwanda	98.4	46.0	69.5	37.7	43.6	59.0	18	97.70	44.00	66.50	38.00	43.10	57.90	17.00
Somnd Prcipe	100.0	55.6	83.4	41.5	61.1	68.3	9	100.0	51.80	93.80	43.60	61.00	70.10	7.00
Senegal	85.4	66.2	81.7	42.3	54.9	66.1	10	85.90	65.00	82.20	43.10	54.40	66.10	10.00
Seychelles	83.2	80.4	76.9	70.0	88.4	79.8	2	83.30	74.40	76.90	67.70	88.40	78.10	2.00
Sierra Leone	79.6	37.3	69.8	27.1	31.8	49.1	37	79.70	38.30	66.00	26.70	31.70	48.40	35.00
Somalia	38.8	8.2	6.4	26.0	15.2	18.9	48	46.00	20.00	5.40	26.00	15.10	22.50	48.00
South Africa	61.1	78.1	86.3	63.5	68.7	71.5	5	61.10	75.40	86.90	62.80	68.30	70.90	5.00
Sudan	29.0	29.8	12.0	42.2	58.0	34.2	45	31.20	31.10	15.40	40.60	58.10	35.30	46.00
Swaziland	69.4	56.9	28.8	46.5	49.2	50.2	34	69.40	51.60	22.80	45.90	49.50	47.90	36.00
Tanzania	83.3	59.6	65.4	43.4	56.4	61.6	15	83.30	57.60	62.60	43.60	53.90	60.20	14.00
Togo	77.2	47.1	44.2	42.0	54.4	53.0	29	76.70	46.10	38.70	41.60	53.70	51.40	31.00
Uganda	75.1	55.8	61.0	42.2	57.4	58.3	19	70.40	55.00	46.20	42.00	57.00	54.10	27.00
Zambia	77.8	60.5	66.6	43.0	43.5	58.3	21	77.80	60.50	65.50	40.50	42.50	57.40	19.00
Zimbabwe	75.1	44.6	41.9	38.8	51.7	50.4	33	75.00	45.80	40.00	44.30	51.20	51.20	32.00

Source: IB Index http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/section/the-ibrahim-index

Table 5b: IB Index data for the years 2002- 2000

Country	Safety & Security 02	Rule of law transparency	Participation & human rights 02	Sustainable economic	Human development 02	IB Index of African Govt 02	Rank 02	Safety & Security 00	Rule of law transparency & corruption 00	Participation & human rights 00	Sustainable economic 00	Human development 00	IB Index of African Govt 00	Rank 00
Angola	56.80	24.60	22.60	27.50	35.10	33.30	46.00	57.70	24.00	22.10	22.40	33.20	31.90	46.00
Benin	86.10	59.60	83.60	36.40	50.60	63.30	12.00	86.10	61.50	93.00	35.80	50.70	65.40	9.00
Botswana	75.00	82.60	90.00	56.50	67.30	74.30	3.00	75.00	80.90	90.00	56.80	67.10	74.00	3.00
Burkina Faso	86.10	50.50	55.50	29.10	44.20	53.10	25.00	86.10	58.90	46.50	27.10	42.60	52.20	23.00
Burundi	49.10	46.30	21.30	35.10	40.60	38.50	43.00	47.80	46.30	20.00	33.30	40.10	37.50	44.00
Cameroon	77.70	39.40	35.60	42.60	53.40	49.70	34.00	77.80	40.70	35.10	42.60	52.00	49.60	30.00
Cape Verde	100.00	73.70	83.70	44.40	63.60	73.10	4.00	100.00	77.40	71.20	43.40	63.30	71.00	5.00
Central African Republic	50.40	48.40	68.60	32.10	31.90	46.30	39.00	55.60	48.40	66.00	32.40	32.00	46.90	36.00
Chad	55.40	38.20	53.00	26.60	22.00	39.00	42.00	56.60	38.20	52.50	23.10	20.50	38.20	43.00
Comoros	94.40	50.70	40.30	38.40	50.80	54.90	22.00	94.40	50.70	38.50	37.50	49.30	54.10	18.00
Congo	61.90	46.00	49.60	45.10	52.20	51.00	31.00	67.80	46.00	29.30	47.00	51.40	48.30	32.00
Congo Republic Democratic	32.50	35.40	15.60	23.70	28.30	27.10	47.00	39.30	35.40	7.80	16.90	29.70	25.80	47.00
Cd'Ivoire	64.00	46.20	28.50	39.60	49.50	45.50	40.00	76.10	48.20	25.40	39.30	50.60	47.90	33.00
Djibouti	86.00	40.40	63.70	35.20	50.00	55.10	20.00	85.80	40.40	63.70	34.00	49.20	54.60	17.00
Equatorial Guinea	86.00	34.50	30.10	51.00	34.40	47.20	37.00	86.00	34.50	30.10	43.80	35.80	46.00	37.00
Eritrea	75.70	59.80	17.10	34.40	46.50	46.70	38.00	62.80	34.80	22.80	29.30	46.50	39.20	41.00
Ethiopia	75.60	49.80	47.70	36.90	48.00	51.60	29.00	74.40	43.30	23.70	38.10	46.70	45.20	38.00
Gabon	100.00	59.20	70.30	58.20	67.30	71.00	6.00	100.00	50.70	70.80	57.60	67.20	69.20	7.00
Gambia	86.00	60.50	56.50	36.50	48.10	57.50	17.00	86.00	60.50	31.20	39.00	48.00	53.00	20.00
Ghana	85.90	70.50	77.10	44.70	61.80	68.00	9.00	86.00	63.80	69.90	43.80	61.40	65.00	10.00
Guinea	79.90	50.30	46.80	32.50	42.90	50.50	32.00	75.80	48.50	61.70	31.30	41.80	51.80	24.00
Guinea-Bissau	80.50	48.60	66.90	18.40	43.50	51.60	30.00	78.30	48.60	73.10	24.30	44.60	53.80	19.00
Kenya	63.40	54.70	64.00	44.70	63.40	58.00	15.00	63.70	53.50	61.10	44.70	64.00	57.40	13.00
Lesotho	75.00	69.50	74.30	38.50	51.10	61.70	13.00	75.00	67.70	33.20	37.70	51.10	52.90	21.00
Liberia	46.60	18.40	59.60	35.50	27.10	37.50	44.00	50.10	18.40	59.10	42.00	27.00	39.30	40.00
Madagascar	85.80	51.30	67.80	28.60	41.10	54.90	21.00	86.10	45.30	79.80	34.30	40.80	57.30	14.00
Malawi	86.10	63.80	73.00	36.30	57.80	63.40	11.00	86.10	66.50	73.50	37.80	56.90	64.20	11.00
Mali	77.80	57.30	61.40	27.70	41.80	53.20	24.00	77.80	57.30	46.80	27.70	38.20	49.60	31.00

Mauritania	70.90	71.90	54.50	28.60	56.40	56.50	19.00	70.90	70.10	28.40	27.80	53.30	50.10	29.00
Mauritius	91.70	78.10	89.20	66.20	88.40	82.70	1.00	91.70	78.70	91.00	63.80	88.20	82.70	1.00
Mozambique	86.10	43.40	83.90	34.60	38.40	57.30	18.00	86.10	40.10	79.80	32.00	36.60	54.90	16.00
Namibia	81.40	85.80	79.90	54.00	62.60	72.70	5.00	79.50	90.50	79.70	51.90	63.20	73.00	4.00
Niger	86.10	48.50	72.20	24.60	28.40	52.00	27.00	86.10	48.50	71.60	23.00	26.90	51.20	27.00
Nigeria	61.70	39.20	47.60	36.00	42.80	45.50	41.00	63.80	34.70	47.30	37.80	42.50	45.20	39.00
Rwanda	95.00	49.80	24.30	38.70	40.50	49.60	35.00	91.40	46.10	24.80	35.90	40.00	47.60	35.00
Somnd Prcipe	100.00	55.00	93.80	40.60	57.80	69.40	8.00	100.00	55.00	85.20	34.90	55.40	66.10	8.00
Senegal	85.60	64.90	86.70	41.10	49.60	65.60	10.00	82.10	62.90	78.90	41.50	47.70	62.60	12.00
Seychelles	83.20	78.00	78.20	62.10	88.60	78.00	2.00	83.30	78.00	78.20	61.70	88.40	77.90	2.00
Sierra Leone	77.10	38.30	77.50	31.70	25.80	50.10	33.00	56.80	40.10	49.60	24.40	24.50	39.10	42.00
Somalia	40.40	20.00	7.30	25.00	15.70	21.70	48.00	45.60	20.00	7.30	24.90	14.70	22.50	48.00
South Africa	61.10	74.10	92.20	59.30	67.80	70.90	7.00	61.10	76.10	90.70	58.00	67.00	70.60	6.00
Sudan	34.20	44.20	12.00	36.90	55.80	36.60	45.00	35.50	40.90	10.20	36.70	55.40	35.80	45.00
Swaziland	69.40	47.50	27.80	44.20	50.00	47.80	36.00	69.40	51.20	24.60	43.30	50.70	47.90	34.00
Tanzania	83.30	54.90	72.20	43.10	52.10	61.10	14.00	83.30	56.60	42.00	41.80	51.80	55.10	15.00
Togo	77.50	47.50	40.70	41.50	51.60	51.80	28.00	77.70	47.50	42.50	37.90	51.00	51.30	26.00
Uganda	63.30	55.40	52.00	41.20	55.20	53.40	23.00	75.10	53.40	30.60	40.60	53.00	50.50	28.00
Zambia	77.80	59.90	71.50	39.00	40.40	57.70	16.00	77.80	60.50	44.40	39.40	40.10	52.50	22.00
Zimbabwe	77.00	45.10	46.30	44.80	48.20	52.30	26.00	75.90	52.80	36.90	41.60	50.10	51.50	25.00

Source: IB Index http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/section/the-ibrahim-index

3.4 Discussion

From the index above and comparing Figure 1 below, one can see that Mauritius, although not geographically situated on the continent, shows a significant trend towards good governance and is thus ranked "one" indicating the "most improved" in terms of governance. This is predominantly for the period 2005 and 2008. Gauging from the previous year's 2000 up to 2002, there appears to be at least a 5 point shift towards improvement in its score. The latter could possibly be due to its relatively small size and quasi-African status allied with a comparatively stable record in leadership and transitions of leadership. Furthermore, it also suggests that some measure of respect for Human Rights as well as improvements in Security is given consideration. Other countries that fair relatively well in terms of this index are Seychelles, Botswana, Cape Verde, Gabon, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Ghana and even Malawi which has one of the poorest economies on the continent.

The most predictable country with an obvious poor showing is Somalia ranked 48 and unchanged since the year 2000. Other countries that fare badly in terms of their ranking are the DRC, Sudan, Chad, Angola, Cote' d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) and Eritrea. (For comparison see also Figures 36 & 37 ICRG rankings and Appendix 6-Political Stability Scores) Protracted wars within and beyond their respective borders, failed leadership or non-existent leadership contributing towards failed states are more than likely the causes for their low ratings in terms of this index. Other countries not mentioned so far are Burundi, Uganda, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, The Comoros, Burkina Faso, Swaziland, and Djibouti. The latter countries have shown trends towards opportunities for economic development, human development as well as a respect for human rights. See also Figure 1 & 2 below. At the time of writing, Zimbabwe had spiralled out of control with regards to the political upheaval and the hyper-inflation caused by the questionable leadership of Robert Mugabe and his Zanu PF party. It has thus moved back in terms of the ranking in 2008 compared to the year 2002. As of 2009 and progressing through to 2010, some stability crept into the country as a result of the MDF and Zanu PF forging some semblance of an alliance in order to usher change hopefully for the better.

Figure 1: Bar-graphs with ranking and IB Index of Good Governance ending 2008

Figure 2: Bar-graphs with ranking and IB Index of Good Governance ending 2008

Using SPSS, repeated measures showing the analysis of variance (ANOVA)[5] were also performed and these are illustrated below which thus show the overall change in the IB Index of governance for Sub-Saharan African countries with year (2000, 2002, 2005,2008) as the within-subjects factors. The analysis revealed that there is an effect of time/year on the index scores (F (3, 141) v =15.127, p<.001). Post-hoc tests with Bonferroni[6] correction showed that the 2008, 2005, and 2002 index scores were significantly higher compared to the index scores for 2000. No other significant differences were evident. The higher the IB Index score, the more likely those issues of heightened perceptions of political corruption were identified within leadership and dealt with in a more transparent manner over the reported period. Figure 3 further below shows a graphical representation of the index scores across the four reporting years.

Figure 3: IB Index scores as a function of year for Sub-Saharan African countries

In a further analysis using this Index, the writer has created a dichotomy of the region into "failed" and "progressive" states based on their performance during the reporting period and the political history for the respective countries. The total number of failed states equals five whilst progressive states total to forty three.

---

[5] See Field (2005), for a detailed discussion regarding the use of ANOVA. It is however in general, a statistical procedure used in experimental research to test the overall fit of any linear model and the extent to which group means vary.

[6] Field also refers to Bonferroni corrections which are done as a control procedure for errors such as assuming that there is genuine effect in a population sample when in fact there is no effect.

Failed states in the writer's assessment[7] would include Somalia, DRC, Liberia, Ivory Coast and Sudan.

Table 6 Means for Failed and Progressive States

	Country Type	N	Mean Rank	Sum of Ranks
Ibrahim Index of African Governance	Progressive	43	26.49	1139.00
	Failed states	5	7.40	37.00
	Total	48		

Source: IB Index http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/section/the-ibrahim-index

An independent samples t-test was performed to compare "failed states" with "progressive states" on the IB Index for 2008. As expected, the t-test revealed that progressive states (M=57.84, SD=10.97) have significantly higher IB Index scores compared to conflict ridden states (M=38.68, SD=13.75, t (46) =3.606, p=.001).

The above analysis for the IB Index including combined tables 5a and 5b illustrate the overall measure of good governance as provided by the leadership in the region. Thus in terms of the measure for good governance by which inferences can be made with regards to corruption within leadership, the following variables were scrutinised: Transparency and Human Rights; Sustainable Economic Opportunity; and Human Development. On their own very little can be deduced from these variables to indicate any failure in leadership except for the downward or upward movements of respective countries. This movement reflects some measure of progress or regress within a specific time frame relative to criteria such as, transparency or lack of it thus suggesting possible government corruption**.**

3.5 Afrobarometer Data

This is by far the largest dataset used as a measure of perceived corruption particularly for the Sub-Saharan region. The data collected, reflects the trends since 2004 and the measurement tools that were included cover both *corruption* and *governance*. As this dataset was far too comprehensive for inclusion into this study given the limitations,

---

[7] See earlier discussion of "failed state" in the literature review section of this study.

calculations were done using SPSS for the questions 56a to 56j[8] of the Round3 survey pertaining to corruption in leadership within a cross-section of government. (For the micro data set in relation to the scores as well all questions and answers, see appendix 7 in appendices section) The responses to these questions provide a snapshot of the perceptions of corruption within all tiers of government. As a pertinent starting point which epitomises leadership in government, perceptions of corruption within the office of the President across all 18 countries (Round 3 only) has been tabled and the total number of responses relative to each country has been plotted. Figure 4 below with a bar-graph summarises these findings.

Figure 4: Proportion of responses to questions regarding perceptions of corruption relating to the Office of the President in eighteen Sub-Saharan African countries

[8] The questions asked in the Afrobarometer Round 3 survey from sections 56a to 56j were: "How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?"

These values reflect the proportions of the respondent's answers for each category in all the electoral districts within each of the eighteen countries listed above. For the complete scores per each respondent per district within the selected countries see: "Round 3 Afrobarometer Surveys in 18 African Countries":http://www.afrobarometer.org/Summary .

The most significant statistic in terms of the overarching issue perceived corruption within the pinnacle of political leadership would be question q56a which focuses on perception of corruption within Office of the President of the survey across all 18 countries. From the foregoing analysis of all 18 countries which underscores the highest levels of political leadership within Africa, the issue of corruption thus within the Office of the President as a dependent variable appears to fall generally within response categories of 1 to 3. (1=some of them; 2=all of them; 3=most of them However, even though most respondents indicate that only **some** of their most senior leaders are perceived to be corrupt, there are also a significant number of respondents who think that perhaps most if not all of their Presidents or Prime Ministers are perceived to be corrupt.

A more detailed analysis of the Afrobarometer dataset encompassing all government agencies including the office of the President is included as an indicator of political corruption from Figure 8 to Figure 13 below. Perceptions of corruption in the various other government agencies within 18 countries was assessed in questions about (q56 a, to 56 j in the survey). These questions and the responses relate to perceptions of corruption within government and its executive and administrative organs of state as well as the officials employed within these organizations. The responses are compared across a variety of variables such as "Corruption in relation to health workers", "Corruption in relation to local government officials" and so on. The final analysis on the Afrobarometer data in this study shows the correlations of "corruption" as well as "bribery" as an indicator of corruption for the selected 18 Sub-Saharan African countries. Bar graphs and correlations of the micro data set relating to the various government agencies are illustrated below:

Figure 5: Proportion of responses to questions regarding perceptions of corruption amongst Members of Parliament in eighteen Sub-Saharan African countries

Figure 6: Proportion of responses to questions regarding perceptions of corruption amongst Local Government Councillors in eighteen Sub-Saharan African countries

Figure 7: Proportion of responses to questions of perceived corruption amongst National Government Officials in eighteen Sub-Saharan African countries

Figure 8: Proportion of responses to questions of perceived corruption amongst Local Government Officials in eighteen Sub-Saharan African countries

Figure 9: Proportion of responses to questions of perceived corruption amongst Police Officials in eighteen Sub-Saharan African countries

Figure 10: Proportion of responses to questions of perceived corruption amongst Tax Officials in eighteen Sub-Saharan African countries

Figure 11: Proportion of responses to questions of perceived corruption amongst Judges and Magistrates in eighteen Sub-Saharan African countries

Figure 12: Proportion of responses to questions of perceived corruption amongst Health Officials in eighteen Sub-Saharan African countries

Figure 13: Proportion of responses to questions of perceived corruption amongst Teachers & School Administrators in eighteen Sub-Saharan African countries

The bar charts illustrated above measure the range of responses from a sample of the population who were questioned with regards to their perceptions of corruption across the various government departments from the 18 selected Sub-Saharan African countries. The central issue in this thesis is to assess the phenomenon "perceived levels of corruption within political leadership particularly within Sub-Saharan Africa". In table 7 below, the relationship between perceived political corruption in leadership and perceived corruption amongst officials in other government departments is correlated. In this regard, a statistical procedure called "correlations" has been used to understand this relationship. Fidell & Tabachnick (2000) describe e correlations as the assessment of one continuous variable and its relationship with other continuous variables. The variables however, have to be categorised as either "independent" or "dependent variables". For the purposes of the quantitative aspect of this research, the phenomenon: "perceived levels of corruption within political leadership within Sub-Saharan Africa", is therefore considered to be the "dependent variable" In order to further assess the

degree of the relationship between this dependent variable with other phenomena, "independent variables" were selected which may influence the 'dependent variable". The perceived levels of corruption within the many other government departments such as those illustrated in the above bar charts are therefore regarded as "independent variables".

Table: 7 Afrobarometer Round 3 Correlations Surveys Q56a to 56h

Correlations between different perceptions of corruptions across all tiers of government.		Q56a. Corruption: Office of the President	Q56b. Corruption: Members of Parliament	Q56c. Corruption: Local Government Councillors	Q56d Corruption: National Government Officials	Q56e. Corruption: Police Officials	Q56f. Corruption: Tax Officials	Q56g. Corruption: Judges and Magistrates	Q56h. Corruption: Traditional Leaders
Q56a. Corruption: Office of the President	Pearson Correlation	1	.667**	.559**	.558**	.436**	.491**	.488**	.161**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	18741	18046	18006	18125	18304	17336	17548	16909
Q56b. Corruption: Members of Parliament	Pearson Correlation	.667**	1	.668**	.619**	.497**	.522**	.521**	.175**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	18046	19261	18693	18716	18910	17838	18116	17331

Source: Afrobarometer Round 3 dataset: http://www.afrobarometer.org/

Table: 7 continued

Q56c.Corruption Local Government Councillors	Pearson Correlation	.559**	.668**	1	.647**	.513**	.520**	.502**	.192**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	18006	18693	19754	19089	19341	18183	18416	17734
Q56d.Corruption:National Government Officials	Pearson Correlation	.558**	.619**	.647**	1	.581**	.566**	.507**	.156**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	18125	18716	19089	19886	19558	18283	18526	17814
Q56e. Corruption: Police Officials	Pearson Correlation	.436**	.497**	.513**	.581**	1	.625**	.555**	.130**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000
	N	18304	18910	19341	19558	20755	18806	19129	18292

Source: Afrobarometer Round 3 dataset: http://www.afrobarometer.org/

Table: 7 continued

Q56f. Corruption: Tax officials	Pearson Correlation	.491[**]	.522[**]	.520[**]	.566[**]	.625[**]	1	.643[**]	.132[**]
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000
	N	17336	17838	18183	18283	18806	19088	18217	17215
Q56g.Corruption: Judges and Magistrates	Pearson Correlation	.488**	.521**	.502**	.507**	.555**	.643**	1	.224**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000
	N	17548	18116	18416	18526	19129	18217	19440	17555

Source: Afrobarometer Round 3 dataset: http://www.afrobarometer.org/

3.6 Discussion

From the trends of the above analysis, it does appear that a significant number of respondents in Round 3 discussions across all 18 countries point to a lack of trust in their government and not necessarily the ruling elite or the leader. In this regard, the percentages of respondents indicate that there is moderate to high levels of perceived corruption across all tiers of government. Starting from the Office of the President once more, and then moving on to other tiers of government, the public perception of corruption appears to be strong. The data shows that at least 25 to 40 % of those covered in the survey believe that "most" of the political leaders are not fit to hold public office.

The data analysed in this study also supports the original findings of the Round 3 Survey and to this end it appears that the very institutions that are meant to uphold law and order namely the police are perceived to be the most corrupt. Almost 40% of the respondents indicate corruption amongst police officers across all 18 countries. Given that policemen amongst government officials are perceived to be more likely to take bribes, it is not surprising that the latter are perceived to be at least twice as corrupt as the President. Following these is the Tax department with about (35%), followed by national and local government officials (30% and 29%, respectively). Elected MPs and local councillors, along with judges and magistrates, are perceived as corrupt by about one-quarter of respondents (25%, 27% and 28%, respectively).

In table 8 below, a more specific relationship such as "Bribery" as an indicator of political corruption is correlated with perceived corruption amongst officials from all tiers of different government departments. Different facets of bribery as an indicator were selected because it appears in some instances, to be more commonly associated with perceived government corruption. In support of this view, Johnstone (2005) also mentions that bribery is the most predominant form of corruption in many countries.

Table 8: Afrobarometer Round 4 Correlations of some forms of "Bribery" with indicators of Perceived Corruption for 20 Sub-Saharan African countries

		Q51a.Pay bribe for: document or permit	Q51b. Pay bribe for: water or sanitation services	Q51c. Pay bribe to avoid problem with police
Q56a.Corruption Office of the President	Pearson Correlation	-.009	-.017[*]	-.017[*]
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.220	.023	.021
	N	18664	18658	18651
Q56b.Corruption Member of Parliament	Pearson Correlation	-.006	-.013	-.013
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.434	.063	.064
	N	19181	19178	19166
Q56c.Corruption Local Government Councillors	Pearson Correlation	-.001	-.009	-.013
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.850	.193	.072
	N	19671	19662	19650
Q56d.Corruption: National Government Officials	Pearson Correlation	.008	.000	-.002
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.289	.921	.730
	N	19805	19794	19788

Table: 8 Continued Afrobarometer Round 4

Q56e. Corruption: Police	Officials Pearson Correlation	-.020[**]	-.031[**]	-.028[**]
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.003	.000	.000
	N	20670	20666	20651
Q56f. Corruption Tax Officials	Pearson Correlation	.012	.009	.008
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.101	.219	.273
	N	19006	19011	18996
Q56g. Corruption Judges and Magistrates	Pearson Correlation	.014[*]	.012	.012
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.047	.100	.096
	N	19371	19366	19358
Q56h. Corruption Traditional Leaders	Pearson Correlation	-.124[**]	-.128[**]	-.135[**]
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
	N	19250	19244	19227

Source: Afrobarometer Round 4 dataset: http://www.afrobarometer.org/

Table 8 above shows three categories of the reported experience of "Bribery" compared with perceived corrupt political leaders and other government officials. Corruption as a dependent variable was correlated with reported experiences of "bribery" as the independent variable using bivariate correlations. By using Pearson's r[9] as a measure of correlation, moderate to weak correlations between perceptions of corruption and

---

[9] Pearson's r or Pearson's correlation coefficient is a standardised measure of the strength of relationship between two variables See Fields (2005) for a more detailed discussion on Pearson's r.

bribery are surprisingly seen across all tiers of government. In some examples, the results for "bribery" are so weak as to be almost negatively correlated with perceived corruption amongst: local councillors; local government officials; members of parliament; the president's office; traditional leaders and the police. These correlations were also very weak with tax officials, judges and magistrates. The weakest of these correlations were between perceived corruption of "Traditional Leaders" and "bribery" when compared to officials from all other government levels. Whilst "bribery" as a facet does not give a clear indication of perceptions of corruption in the above analysis, in further examining table 8, the strong relationship between "Corruption Office of the President" (r=.667, p<.001) correlated with Corruption of the "Police" (r=.436, p<.001). It is therefore possible that within this relationship, "bribery" has an indirect association and is thus an indicator of perceived corruption of leadership by default. Notwithstanding, the net results suggest that bribery has an undercurrent of perceived corruption within all the government agencies although it is not significant enough to show a direct link within this study. A credible argument can therefore be made that many elected officials including those who came to public office by other means are perceived to have engaged in possible corrupt practices. The magnitude however, and actual accounts of government corruption linked to "bribery" is yet to be determined. In the context of Tribal leaders, the relationship between "bribery" and perceived corruption appeared to be less likely where a plausible inference can be made that these traditional leaders as a demographic have wide appeal, across much of the Sub-Saharan region if not all of Africa as a whole. Tradition and culture may therefore act as powerful buffers to any scrutiny of the conduct of political leadership in this context. In so doing, this culture wherever it is strong enough, enamours such tribal leaders from being besmirched with the machinations of alleged corruption largely on account of the reverence and esteem held by loyal followers.

Based on these results, the relationship between "bribery" and "government corruption" does not appear to be conclusive. It does not mean however, that acts of bribery are not engaged in because "bribery", when even mildly alleged to be associated with government officials, would generally provide a fairly good reason to create perceptions of government corruption. One has also to be mindful that these results are only significant if one views them in the context of the 20 countries covered in the Round 4

survey. The literature review in this study however, provides many sombre accounts of alleged government impropriety for many countries in the Sub-Saharan region. Given this grim portrayal within the literature review and when compared with results such as those contained in Round 3 and Round 4 surveys, it can be argued that many if not most of the other countries in the Sub-Saharan region are likely to produce similar findings if and when they are robustly and quantitatively analysed in future research. Notwithstanding projections of poor governance through alleged corruption, there are a few countries in this region that have demonstrated progressive reforms on many fronts coupled with stable leadership over a relatively consistent period. It is also hopeful that this trend will continue and influence the entire region so that perceptions for governance can be more positive. In this regard, one therefore has to be a little more circumspect in painting all of Africa as bereft of good leadership.

3.7 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) scores Africa only

This index is used widely in many studies of corruption and is based mainly on polls culminating as secondary data. As with any other survey, the results vary and are likely to be subjective. Figure 14 below starts off with scatterplot with a regression line for the global ranking of all countries in Africa. For the full table covering all countries see: **http://www.transparency.org/news**

Following the scatterplot in figure 14, tables 9a and 9b have also been included below and have been rescaled for 52 African countries. This was done to reflect the CPI regional corruption rankings for Africa only. (See appendix 2 for CPI global scores).

Figure 14: Corruption Perception Index 2008 scores ranked scores Sub-Saharan Africa

Table 9a: Case Summaries CPI Index2008 Africa only

CPI 2008 rank world	Country	CPI 2008 score
36.00	Botswana	5,8
41.00	Mauritius	5,5
47.00	Cape Verde	5,1
54.00	South Africa	4,9
61.00	Namibia	4,5
62.00	Tunisia	4,4
67.00	Ghana	3,9
72.00	Swaziland	3,6
80.00	Morocco	3,5
85.00	Madagascar	3,4
85.00	Senegal	3,4
92.00	Algeria	3,2
92.00	Lesotho	3,2
96.00	Benin	3,1
96.00	Gabon	3,1
96.00	Mali	3,1
102.00	Djibouti	3,0
102.00	Rwanda	3,0
102.00	Tanzania	3,0
109.00	Belize	2,9
115.00	Egypt	2,8
115.00	Malawi	2,8
115.00	Mauritania	2,8
115.00	Niger	2,8
115.00	Zambia	2,8
121.00	Nigeria	2,7

CPI 2008 rank	Country	CPI 2008 score
121.00	Sao Tome and Principe	2,7
121.00	Togo	2,7

Continued/Table 9b: Case Summaries CPI Index2008 Africa only

CPI 2008 rank	Country	CPI 2008 score
126.00	Eritrea	2,6
126.00	Ethiopia	2,6
126.00	Libya	2,6
126.00	Mozambique	2,6
126.00	Uganda	2,6
134.00	Comoros	2,5
138.00	Liberia	2,4
141.00	Cameroon	2,3
147.00	Kenya	2,1
151.00	Central African Republic	2,0
151.00	Côte d´Ivoire	2,0
158.00	Angola	1,9
158.00	Burundi	1,9
158.00	Congo, Republic	1,9
158.00	Gambia	1,9
158.00	Guinea-Bissau	1,9
158.00	Sierra Leone	1,9
166.00	Zimbabwe	1,8
171.00	Congo, Democratic Republic	1,7
171.00	Equatorial Guinea	1,7
173.00	Chad	1,6
173.00	Guinea	1,6
173.00	Sudan	1,6

180	Somalia	180.00

From the foregoing, a trend over time since 2008 appears to be predictable in terms of the overall performance relative to the political situation as reported within the respective countries. Somalia for example, epitomises the total failure of government and thus leadership. It is therefore ranked 180 in terms of the CPI index. Other examples, such as Sudan or the DRC, also rank poorly due to the protracted civil and cross-border wars but at the same time fall short of being regarded as totally failed states as there are still functional governments in power. These figures and the scatter plot however do not give any indication of the extent of perceived corruption except for the failure of leadership in the region; however the inference can still be made from the relative positions within the scale. In terms of these relative positions, one can see that with the exception of the countries showing no or extremely poor leadership such as Somalia, Sudan and the DRC, other countries in the region such as Botswana, Mauritius, Cape Verde, South Africa and Namibia achieved significantly high scores in the reporting year of 2008.

In the context of comparing the overall global scores of about 180 countries (see Appendix 2), 7 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa alone rank poorly and once again the inference can be drawn as to heightened perceptions of corruption within the leadership. In considering the scale of this problem regarding perceived corruption, one has to look at the levels of these fragile and even "failed" states in relation to the reported levels of perceived corruption in this region. (See figures 17 and 18 of Failed States as compiled by International Country Risk Guide) ICRG. Thus, for example, on a scale of 7 to 0.1, Somalia scores 1.0 relative to the CPI Index 2008, while each of the other seven sub-performing countries score in the ranges of 1.7 or below.

These low scores again indicate that the Sub-Saharan region is falling behind on issues like education, health, justice and law & order. Perceived corruption coupled with the increased negativity from potential domestic and foreign investors is more than likely to create greater public distrust and consequently the lack of investment coupled with the demise of social and economic growth becomes a precursor to the *failed state syndrome*

112

as perceived by the writer. The extent to which political leadership for the region is prepared to accept these findings and undertake bold and robust measures to address issues of alleged and actual corruption is a moot point. However, the summary, for example, also indicates that Nigeria which was often considered to be amongst the most corrupt country in Africa, scored within the range of 2.8 in this last assessment of 2008. This score shows an improvement since 2007 which then was in the range of 2.2. Whether the progression of the scores suggests a shift towards the leadership being more circumspect in affairs of the government remains to be seen.

For the region as a whole, issues like transparency and accountability need to be addressed until the perceptions themselves change for the better. There is a chance for this to happen provided that a resolve of political leaders across the spectrum is strong and there is a real commitment to back anti-corruption pledges

The bias within the CPI index may become apparent because it automatically assumes that corruption is present within the listed countries and this fact alone may detract from objective social science data. The CPI index however, still promotes awareness that the global phenomenon of corruption exists and prompts one to examine issues of corruption more closely as they are reported. An important fact to consider when examining the CPI index is that it is a stand-alone indicator which assumes that corruption is rampant in many parts of Africa. On this account, the CPI cannot be used in isolation for the purposes analysing political corruption. For the purposes of obtaining a more balanced view of wider perceptions of corruption for the Sub-Saharan region, other published datasets for perceived political corruption also have to be compared.

3.8 Combined Analysis of all five Indices used in this study

In this final analysis, an attempt is made to examine all the major data used in this study with a view to determine the perceptions of corruption within Sub-Saharan Africa. This is attempted again by using multiple correlations and scatter-plots. The combined scatter plots for the indices used in this study are shown below in figure 15. These scores are based on the actual ranks as given by the respective Index such as IB Index or Afrobarometer. Table 10 further below, gives the ranks or scores relative to the Index

and country. This is followed by the correlations of all indices in all the permutations for comparison.

Figure 15: Scatter Plot Combined scores of all indices for18 selected Sub-Saharan Countries

Table 10: Combined data scores for all indices ranking corruption

Country	Corruption Office of the President Afrobarometer	2008 CPI Rank Corruption	Control of corruption World Bank 2008 Rank	IB Index Rule of Law Transparency & Corruption 2008	Failed State Index 2009
Benin	30	96	42	52	75.5
Botswana	4	36	80.2	82	68.8
Cape Verde	5	47	75.4	87	78.5
Ghana	5	67	56.5	73	66.2
Kenya	6	147	13.5	56	101.4
Lesotho	1	92	59.9	70	81.8
Madagascar	3	85	55.1	58	81.6
Malawi	7	115	33.8	64	93.8
Mali	11	96	37.7	50	78.7
Mozambique	5	126	34.3	50	80.7
Namibia	8	61	73.4	77	75.6
Nigeria	30	121	17.9	49	99.8
Senegal	5	85	38.6	67	74.2
South Africa	6	54	65.2	78	67.4
Tanzania	2	102	36.2	60	81.1
Uganda	9	126	23.2	56	96.9
Zambia	7	115	36.7	60	84.2
Zimbabwe	11	166	3.9	45	114

Sources: Afrobarometer Round 3 dataset: http://www.afrobarometer.org/,

The preceding table illustrates 18 selected countries only because the Afrobarometer dataset was limited to 18 countries in their Round 3 survey. Other indices within the above table therefore were rescaled to 18 countries respectively for comparison to the Afrobarometer dataset. Table 11 below however, excludes the Afrobarometer data but includes all the other indices on account of them covering most of the African countries with regards to perceived corruption. GDP per capita was also included in table 11 as a

"controlling variable" the assumption being that GDP would be affected as an economic indicator of perceived corruption.

Table 11: Correlations of all major indices including GDP with the exception of Afrobarometer data

		CPI 2008 rank	Ib Index 2008 rank	Failed State 2008 rank	World Bank 2008 Rank	Human Development Index 2007 (GDP)
CPI 2008 rank	Pearson Correlation	1	.812[**]	.799[**]	.615[**]	-.171
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.000	.262
	N	47	46	47	46	45
Ibrahim Index 2008 rank	Pearson Correlation	.812[**]	1	.771[**]	.602[**]	-.163
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000	.000	.284
	N	46	47	47	46	45
Failed State 2008 rank	Pearson Correlation	.799[**]	.771[**]	1	.561[**]	-.325[*]
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000		.000	.028
	N	47	47	48	47	46
World Bank 2008 Rank	Pearson Correlation	.615[**]	.602[**]	.561[**]	1	-.156
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000		.300
	N	46	46	47	47	46
Human Development Index 2007 (GDP)	Pearson Correlation	-.171	-.163	-.325[*]	-.156	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.262	.284	.028	.300	
	N	45	45	46	46	46

Sources: Transparency International**: http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2008/cpi2008/cpi_2008_table ;**

IB Index http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/section/the-ibrahim-index;http://info.worldbank.org/governance

The above table shows Pearson's *r* correlation tests which revealed that relationships across all the major indices with the exception of Afrobarometer indicated strong and positive correlations. In this regard, the IB Index 2008 rank for example, (r=.812, p<.001) correlated with CPI 2008 rank scores (r=1.000). That is, a higher CPI rank was associated with a higher IB Index rank. In general however, the Human Development Index (GDP per capita) for the year 2007 has flat-lined and was negatively correlated with all of the indices above. Thus for example, the Human Development Index (GDP) (r=-156, p<.001) negatively correlated with the World Bank 2008 rank (r=.615, p<.001). This relationship suggests that even if the percentage earnings were moderate to, low for the respective 18 selected countries, negative GDP scores gave little or no indication of perceived corruption relative to all the other indices in the above table. This is also illustrated below in Figure 16 which indicates the combined scatter plot.

Figure16: Combined Scatter Plot

3.9 Discussion

The relative positions of each Sub-Saharan African state has been shown in the above combined scatter-plot in terms of some of the major indices used in this study. One of the more obvious indicators that would give some idea of how poorly a country is performing relative to others is the extent to which the leadership in a particular country has lost the ability to govern. To this end, the country's entire infrastructure is in chaos; the state resources are squandered and the economic output is almost non-existent. The global "Failed State" index has been included below in this study for comparison and all of the political risk assessments are made on the basis of subjective analysis of the available information. Africa as a whole is covered in Figure 17 which is then contrasted with some other countries across the globe in Figure 18. Some of these countries have some notoriety for poor governance yet not necessarily considered to be a "Failed State".

The aim of the political risk rating is to provide a means of assessing the political stability of the countries covered by *ICRG* on a comparable basis. This is done by assigning risk points to a pre-set group of factors, termed political risk components which include political risks, financial risks and economic risks.

Figure 17: Regional Index of Failed States ICRG (Africa)

Figure 18: (Failed state Index as of 2005) ICRG (excluding Africa)

3.10 Combined correlations for some predictors of corruption

In order to determine whether some of the predictors of corruption are significant or not for the selected 18 African countries, an overall analysis was done using Pearson's *r* again. These combined correlations as illustrated in table 12 below were included as they contain specific variables regarded to be key predictors of corruption. The Ibrahim Index data set for 2008, World Bank Governance Indicators for 2008, and the International Country Risk Guide for the years 2000 to 2007 (2008 data not available) were thus included in table 12 for analysis.

Table 12: Correlations for some predictors of corruption selected 18 countries

		Rule of law, transparency and corruption (ICRG)	Ibrahim Index of African Governance	World Bank indicator for corruption
Rule of law, transparency and corruption(ICRG)	Pearson Correlation	1	.944[**]	.879[**]
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000
	N	53	53	48
Ibrahim Index of African Governance	Pearson Correlation	.944[**]	1	.830[**]
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000
	N	53	53	48
Law, Transparency & Corruption (World Bank)	Pearson Correlation	1.000[**]	.889[**]	.879[**]
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
	N	48	48	48
Free and Fair Executive Elections (ICRG)	Pearson Correlation	.486[**]	.677[**]	.559[**]
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
	N	48	48	48

Source: *Ibrahim Index data set for 2008, World Bank Governance Indicators for 2008 and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) for the years 2000 to 2007*.

Table 12: Correlations continued

		Rule of law, transparency and corruption (ICRG)	Ibrahim Index of African Governance	World Bank indicator for corruption
Opposition Participation in Executive Elections (ICRG)	Pearson Correlation	.456**	.629**	.397**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.000	.005
	N	48	48	48
Free and Fair Legislative Elections (ICRG)	Pearson Correlation	.456**	.602**	.554**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.000	.000
	N	48	48	48
Opposition Participation in Legislative Elections (ICRG)	Pearson Correlation	.367*	.553**	.338*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.010	.000	.019
	N	48	48	48
Respect for civil rights (ICRG)	Pearson Correlation	.456**	.629**	.397**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.000	.005
	N	48	48	48

Source: *Ibrahim Index data set for 2008, World Bank Governance Indicators for 2008 and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) for the years 2000 to 2007*

Table 12: Correlations continued

		Rule of law, transparency and corruption (ICRG)	Ibrahim Index of African Governance	World Bank indicator for corruption
Press Freedom (ICRG)	Pearson Correlation	.618**	.795**	.638**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
	N	48	48	48
Civil/Political Rights	Pearson Correlation	.592**	.801**	.609**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
	N	48	48	48
Participation & Human Rights	Pearson Correlation	.315*	.345*	.376**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.029	.016	.008
	N	48	48	48
GDP per capita growth	Pearson Correlation	.058	.059	.070
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.696	.691	.639
	N	48	48	48

Source: *Ibrahim Index data set for 2008, World Bank Governance Indicators for 2008 and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) for the years 2000 to 2007*

Table 12: Correlations continued

		Rule of law, transparency and corruption (ICRG)	Ibrahim Index of African Governance	World Bank indicator for corruption
GDP per capita (normal)	Pearson Correlation	.315[*]	.345[*]	.376[**]
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.029	.016	.008
	N	48	48	48
Inflation	Pearson Correlation	-.077	-.071	-.120
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.603	.632	.415
	N	48	48	48
Reliability of financial institutions	Pearson Correlation	.388[**]	.320[*]	.476[**]
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.006	.027	.001
	N	48	48	48
Business environment	Pearson Correlation	-.193	-.147	-.067
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.194	.323	.654
	N	47	47	47

Source: *Ibrahim Index data set for 2008, World Bank Governance Indicators for 2008 and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) for the years 2000 to 2007*

Table 12: Correlations continued

		Rule of law, transparency and corruption (ICRG)	Ibrahim Index of African Governance	World Bank indicator for corruption
Number of wars	Pearson Correlation	.073	.108	.006
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.603	.442	.970
	N	53	53	48
Government involvement in armed conflicts	Pearson Correlation	.286[*]	.383[**]	.266
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.048	.007	.068
	N	48	48	48
Number of battle-deaths	Pearson Correlation	.401[**]	.528[**]	.321[*]
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.005	.000	.026
	N	48	48	48
Number of civilian deaths due to one-sided violence	Pearson Correlation	.252	.300[*]	.193
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.084	.038	.188
	N	48	48	48

Source: *Ibrahim Index data set for 2008, World Bank Governance Indicators for 2008 and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) for the years 2000 to 2007*

Table 12: Correlations continued

		Rule of law, transparency and corruption (ICRG)	Ibrahim Index of African Governance	World Bank indicator for corruption
Refugees and asylum seekers originating from the country	Pearson Correlation	.490**	.525**	.328*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.023
	N	48	48	48
Internally displaced people	Pearson Correlation	.396**	.461**	.317*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.005	.001	.028
	N	48	48	48
Ratification of core international human rights conventions	Pearson Correlation	.343*	.215	.217
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.017	.143	.138
	N	48	48	48
International sanctions	Pearson Correlation	.600**	.500**	.350*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.015
	N	48	48	48

Table 12: Correlations continued

		Rule of law, transparency and corruption (ICRG)	Ibrahim Index of African Governance	World Bank indicator for corruption
Property rights index	Pearson Correlation	.794**	.722**	.742**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
	N	44	44	44
Judicial independence ICRG	Pearson Correlation	.784**	.844**	.762**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
	N	47	47	47
Efficiency of the courts	Pearson Correlation	.488**	.340*	.411**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.028	.007
	N	42	42	42
Number of days to settle a contract dispute	Pearson Correlation	.265	.080	-.038
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.071	.595	.802
	N	47	47	47

Source: *Ibrahim Index data set for 2008, World Bank Governance Indicators for 2008 and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) for the years 2000 to 2007*

Table 12: Correlations continued

		Rule of law, transparency and corruption (ICRG)	Ibrahim Index of African Governance	World Bank indicator for corruption
Public Sector corruption	Pearson Correlation	.879**	.830**	1.000**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
	N	48	48	48
Legal Norms	Pearson Correlation	.837**	.696**	.621**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
	N	48	48	48
Judicial Independence World Bank	Pearson Correlation	.819**	.731**	.613**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
	N	48	48	48

Source: *Ibrahim Index data set for 2008, World Bank Governance Indicators for 2008 and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) for the years 2000 to 2007*

3.11 Discussion

In examining the correlations done above, the break down in the Rule of law, Transparency and Corruption predictor is significant and positively related to the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (r=.944, p<.001) as well as the World Bank Corruption Indicator (r=.879, p<.001). That is, a high score for the Rule of Law, Transparency, and Corruption score is associated with a high overall Ibrahim index score and Corruption score. This means for example, if the Corruption Perception Index alludes to perceived corruption then the IB Index would point possibly to poor governance and by the same token, incidences of the breakdown of law and order being compromised for the country in question.

Other indicators within this correlation such as Free and Fair Executive Elections are also significant and positively related to the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (r=.677, p<.001) as well as the Corruption Indicator (r=.559, p<.001). That is, a high Free and Fair Executive Election score is associated with a high overall Ibrahim Index score and low Corruption score. This again suggests that flawed elections within a country have a significant bearing on the level of governance and perceived corruption amongst the leadership of the country. Similarly, for a number of other predictors such as:

- Free and Fair Legislative Elections

- Respect for civil rights

- Opposition Participation & HR Participation in Legislative Elections

- Press Freedom

- Civil and Political Rights

A significant and positive relationship was observed with the Ibrahim Index of African Governance and the Corruption Indicator. In contrast, Ratification of Core International Human Rights Conventions, Business Environment, Number of Wars, Inflation and GDP per capita growth were not associated with the Ibrahim Index of African Governance or the World Bank Corruption Indicator. Low scores for GDP per capita however appeared to be negatively correlated across all of the combined indicators used. The negative correlations of GDP mean that for all the indicators that it was correlated with in this study; GDP per capita was not affected. This in essence means that when all other indices tracked positively for perceived government corruption, GDP per capita as an indicator moved in the opposite direction. It follows from this that if there are heightened perceptions of corruption it does do not automatically mean that the nation is impoverished that civil liberties would be curtailed or that wars would naturally follow.

Finally, Public Safety was positively and significantly correlated with the Ibrahim Index (r=.488, p<.001) but not the Corruption Indicator (r=.174, p=.237). This again assumes that as a result of poor governance, due diligence to overall public safety has

not been a priority and further assumes that the military and other law enforcement agencies are not effective entities for an infinite number of reasons. This apparent ineffectiveness however, does not necessarily mean that the police or the military within the selected eighteen countries are corrupt. The results however, may be very different for other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa which not included in this dataset.

The above analysis using simple correlations examined some of the predictors of corruption across 18 selected countries using various data sources. Combining the various sources, the sample size in the writer's view, is reliable for generalizations about trends of perceived corruption within Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, based on the sources used above, one can deduce that the Sub-Saharan region in particular has some serious leadership issues and thus continue to be the catalysts towards feeding to notions of perceived government corruption across certain countries. In addition to this, lack of safety, security, law and order also appear to be strongly correlated with poor governance thus giving a reasonable indication that these are some credible symptoms of corruption within government. The following section uses "compared means" for "indicators" of corruption but also places Africa in a global setting through which a greater comparison can be made in terms of these indicators.

3.12 Africa in Comparison to other Non-Rich Countries of the World

Africa as an overall region was compared to other countries globally using two corruption indicators namely, "nepotism" and "cronyism." Compared means using the data set from "Corruption World Bank Government Indicators for 100 Countries-year 2008" were used. (For the full index see appendix 1.) For comparison, Africa was compared against Non-rich countries.

Table 13:Indicating Compared Means of Nepotism and Cronyism across Non-Rich and African countries

Region		Nepotism	Cronyism
Africa	Mean	3.9148	.5915
	N	27	27
	Std. Deviation	.64671	.21124
Non Rich Countries	Mean	4.1726	.6037
	N	62	62
	Std. Deviation	.65666	.14239
Total	Mean	4.0944	.6000
	N	89	89
	Std. Deviation	.66081	.16514

Source: http://info.worldbank.org/governance

ANOVA Table

		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
cor1 * region	Between Groups	1.250	1	1.250	2.925	.091
	Within Groups	37.177	87	.427		
	Total	38.427	88			
cor2 * region	Between Groups	.003	1	.003	.102	.750
	Within Groups	2.397	87	.028		
	Total	2.400	88			

Source: http://info.worldbank.org/governance

For "nepotism", there was no statistically significant difference between Africa and non-rich countries, $F_{(1, 87)} = 2.925$, p= .091. Similarly, for "cronyism", there was also no difference between Africa and non-rich countries, $F_{(1, 87)} = .102$, p=.750. In comparing the means using these corruption indicators such as "cronyism" and "nepotism" the difference between Africa as an entire region and the rest of the non-rich countries of the world is that there is no significance at all. In terms of this comparison, for the facets "nepotism" and "cronyism", Africa appears to be no more corrupt than the non-rich countries.

3.13 Overall discussion on data used

Some of the limitations of all the data used in this study may become obvious to the reader and this is also illustrated in the final analysis. Data sources relating to corruption are proxies for the real thing and hence the first inherent measurement error is incorporated unwittingly. The second type of error is the manner in which the data is collated which in turn affects the aggregate indicator. Sampling error is associated with survey questions in terms of how they are framed and posed to the sample population.

The Afrobarometer questions used in this study is one example that has been illustrated separately given that it does not utilise the full count of Sub-Saharan African countries (see previous discussion on this). It is nonetheless an excellent data set which if expanded for all of Africa, would yield much more accuracy.

In this study however, the combined data was used notwithstanding any measurement errors and the writer correlated each index such as the relationships between the World Bank and IB Index; IB Index and CPI and so on, contrasting them with a quasi-economic measure such as GDP per capita based on the US GDP as a benchmark. These correlations were by no means perfect but the intent was to measure a common theme which was a plausible assumption of corruption associated with the failure of good leadership across Sub-Saharan Africa. When the correlations above are studied and even if one acknowledges that some degree of measurement error is apparent, corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa still appears to be very likely and one can conclude that it is a serious issue for the region. Many countries within the region have shown dismal leadership based on some of the causal predictors of corruption such as the lack of transparency, accountability, trust, internal conflict, violence, refugee efflux, cross border wars, extended tenure within government, state failure and flawed elections to name but a few. Whilst actual corruption has not been established for Sub-Saharan Africa, the writer maintains the view that the perceptions of corruption are highly credible. Whether a few countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are less or no more corrupt than countries in other regions of the world are of little consequence. The literature study, combined with the overall data analysis, suggest that corruption has taken hold across the Sub-Saharan region and that there is no evidence to date of this waning.

Chapter 4: Conclusion

_____

This thesis has attempted to investigate perceptions of political corruption in Africa, particularly the Sub-Saharan region, relevant to its political leadership. To this end, the following questions were asked:

1. Is the Sub-Saharan region of Africa more corrupt than other regions?

2. Are African leaders as corrupt as perceived?

In attempting to understand why Africa is so often maligned as being the most corrupt region of the world, the phenomenon of corruption itself within African political leadership and some key concepts of corruption were examined. To this end, a literature study was undertaken where various arguments were studied. Corruption, and political corruption to be specific is real however, actual corruption has proven to be a difficult concept to define and measure therefore only perceptions of corruption can be measured. The literature study indicated that in most instances, persons in public office including those in political leadership roles engage in varying levels of malfeasance or corrupt practices. Over time, political corruption, and other types of corruption, becomes a pervasive phenomenon nurtured by the environment in which it operated. . Through time again, all tiers of a society are ultimately affected and moreover, political leaders are deluded or perhaps not deluded into believing that it is culturally acceptable to engage in corrupt practices. Given that corruption is often associated with persons holding political office, it has also become synonymous with political leadership in many societies (Blagovich, 2002).

In further discussing different forms of corruption within the literature review, some associated concepts were also looked at and a common theme appeared to run through all of them. Bribery for instance, entailed the act of soliciting any item of value in order to influence an official or other person in discharge of a public or legal duty. To bribe somebody also meant that some form of payment occurs in varying degrees. Apart from monetary transactions of bribery, that which is given and received in kind

or any other favour is offered to a state official in charge thereby influencing decisions on behalf of the state. Bribery has thus been seen as one of the principal acts of being corrupt to the extent that it is sometimes used synonymously as "corruption". Some common terms associated with "bribery" whether in money or kind were found to be kickbacks or *baksheesh* as notions of corruption. Other concepts such as embezzlement, fraud, extortion and favouritism are some of the elements of political corruption. Self- enrichment by secretly appropriating assets are often typified as financial fraud ranging from small to large amounts which is sometimes compounded by the sophisticated methods in which this is undertaken. Amongst the many types of fraud, political fraud (which is often used synonymously with political corruption) can also been characterized as "dirty tricks" politics. State leaders and bureaucrats intent on deception would participate as mediators, facilitators and partners in fraudulent and criminal business activities, in organized crime nationally and internationally (Bayart et.al. 1997). Given that there is no clear demarcation of these concepts, other types of corrupt practices by state officials become intertwined. Whilst many ordinary people would be tempted at times to engage in some form of fraud or corruption, the same scenario could be potentially dire for political candidates if for whatever agenda, allegations of corruption are levelled against them. In this regard, further questions could be asked in terms of whether there was the intent to deceive so as to get into power by any means. It is not uncommon for political candidates to engage in such subversive acts as the literature review has shown. More so, once they hold political office, political corruption becomes more entrenched and difficult to prove. Amongst the many dirty tricks they are likely to engage in, extortion by subtle or overt manipulation, sometimes with the use of force or fear is induced as a means to extort or extract money and/or property through intimidation. Whether it is extortion, bribery or favouritism, the causes and consequences of corrupt practices are serious socio-political issues.

Corruption lies somewhere in the middle between a cause and a consequence and may thus still be an elusive concept. However, whether corruption is seen as a cause or consequence is semantically irrelevant because the real issue is that when corruption is engaged in amongst political elites and leadership, it then becomes the insidious catalyst for continued and prolonged mismanagement in government. In some cases,

the regime type such as dictatorships and authoritarian may be a pivotal cause and in other cases legitimate governments become corrupt along the process of governing. Thus varying levels of corruption may be because of government interference in decision-making, restricting individual choice, taking hold of private institutions and nationalising the weak institutions, social inequality and where the government controls the economy to the point that a competitive market based economy is either non-existent or severely constrained. Again, although unclear, some of the literature points to economic activity of varying degrees within a country or region as a possible indication of corrupt practices. Low "GDP" (Gross Domestic Product) for example, as suggested by La Palombara, (1994) has a strong and negative correlation with respect to corrupt practices within government in his sampling of selected countries. This correlation however, had no significance at all with Scandinavian countries such as Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway as these countries in his view have good market economies and by inference their respective governments are unlikely to be corrupt (La Palombara, 1994). Contrasting with the latter view, Ackerman (1991) argues that these simple correlations may be misleading in that GDP alone is hardly an indicator of levels of corruption. In general, some suggest that GDP or economic activity may give indications that corrupt practices are evident to a certain extent. Others however, (see chapter two - causes and consequences) maintain that there is insufficient evidence to draw conclusions one way or the other.

GDP or economic activity by itself may not give an indication of corrupt activity but when coupled with other facets such as low political competition; a weak civil society; and the absence of institutional mechanisms to deal with corruption, gives a fair indication that corrupt practices in government are being undertaken. Notwithstanding, the World Bank and the IMF contend that perceptions of corruption can be based on economic indicators and thus corruption itself is negatively correlated with the level of economic prosperity (Podobnik et al., 2008). Littvay & Donica (2006) however, concluded in their research that levels of GDP were hardly uniform and thus could not be established with any degree of certainty that this facet alone was a cause of corruption or vice versa. Opposing this view, Atkinson (1997) contends that corruption increases income inequality and poverty through lower economic growth; biased tax system favouring the rich and well connected. Gauging from some of the

literature, it does appear however, that economic activity features strongly in attempting to establish some baseline as to whether corruption is present or not. In assessing whether GDP had any bearing on perceived corruption within Sub-Saharan Africa or whether wealth was measured by GDP, this study has indicated that GDP was negatively correlated with other non-economic indicators of perceived corruption. In this regard therefore, GDP could not provide any bearing on levels of perceived levels of government corruption. Some accounts provided by others of GDP having no relevance to perceptions of political corruption are also reflected in the literature review section of this study.

More than just economic indicators suggesting corruption, Johnston (1997), suggest that entrenched corruption also features in societies with other characteristics including uneven economic growth: low political competition; a weak civil society; and the absence of institutional mechanisms to deal with corruption. Political ideologies often dominate social and political behaviour and thus perceptions of corruption levels or the admission of this may thus vary with the regime type and more importantly, the leadership within which it occurs. It is also widely assumed that long established democracies are generally perceived to be less politically corrupt. (Battacharayya & Hodler, 2008). It has been argued that the more power is legitimate, the less corruption. Furthermore, the most extreme levels of corruption have been observed in a number of countries that are experiencing the double processes of political and economic liberalisation. The reasons for this are possibly due to the transition phase of a culture through which a mismatch with new ideologies is initially encountered coupled with the failure to grasp the notion that some measure of political discipline, compromise and concessions are required to function within liberal, free-market societies. Through this transition, many political institutions are ill-equipped and become inefficient to deal with a new type of government bureaucracy which in essence, is meant to be largely accountable and responsive to the society in which it functions. Given this scenario, high levels of government and other forms of corruption have been found in countries with rapid economic and political transformation when there is a transition of a political ideology. Ideologies are entrenched in cultural influences where cultural bonds manifest themselves.

Cultural identity within some country's is often fiercely guarded and thus a class society emerges where divisions between others in the country are sometimes defined for example by; ethnic, tribal or religious affiliations. Dominant groups in terms of this cultural identity can and often influence political leadership. A 'ruling elite" associated with the political leadership is established either by design or default. The accumulation of wealth within these societies is often skewed in favour of the dominant social class which in turn, reveals the economic disparity between the dominant class and other societies. Wealth in terms of how it is distributed coupled with political power and influence offers some perspective on the economic state of a country. The ruling elite often have a misguided sense of entitlement and thus any notions of a sense "corruption" are dismissed. Good democratic ideologies are therefore seen to have more transparency and accountability even if there is a perceived level of corruption. In support of this, Goel and Nelson (2005: 127 and 130) found that levels of corruption reduced with established democracies. However, in opposing this, Ades and Di Tella (1999: 987) and Fisman and Gatti (2002: 336-338) suggested that the link between political and/or civil rights associated with democracy and corruption are not significant and may be non-existent. Case (2002) also mentions that corruption appeared to increase in some countries following democratization mainly because centralised government control gave way to decentralized control thus the incentive to engage in corrupt activity fell less under scrutiny. In his view, Myint (2000) suggests that the causes and consequences of corruption to some extent may stem from countries that have poor development coupled with strong regulation and central government control. He further attributes the ascendance of corruption to institutional failings allowing for political and economic decline to the point where corruption becomes entrenched. The levels of corruption go unchallenged on account of the judicial and legislative indifference and thus the vicious cycle continues (Myint, 2000).

The causes and consequences of corruption were further looked at in terms of the African context, particularly the Sub-Saharan region. Given that there are many accounts of corruption in all tiers of society, causes and consequences were examined with the nexus of leadership and political corruption. Good leadership within government is about integrity, providing sound governance, giving direction and

encouraging prosperity for the nation. Boafo-Arthur (2007) argues that good leadership is about having the entire backing of a nation through which people feel a sense of pride and a sense of empowerment. Leadership is fundamental to political stability in which it summons people to act together on their shared concerns. It is when allegations of greed, entitlement and the proclivity to indulge surface that political leadership is often juxtaposed with allegations of political corruption. Sub-Saharan Africa, if not all of Africa, has had a fair share of leaders accused of having these characteristics.

Without a robust and true global comparison for corruption and mismanagement it appears to be difficult to single out the Sub-Saharan region as the only pariah. It is nonetheless a fact that large masses within the region are impoverished and that accounts of flawed and perceived corruption within political leadership are plausible. The magnitude of this problem is yet to be established. Corruption is certainly a topical issue for much of Africa particularly the Sub-Saharan region. At the time of writing, some of the indicators that certainly pointed to this phenomenon for example, were the number of states in the region that were heading in the direction of total anarchy such as Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) and the DRC including Somalia which was already relegated to the status of a "failed state". A pivotal part for the dismal performance within government of some states in Sub-Saharan Africa has largely to be on account of bad leadership acting alone or colluding with rich, powerful and allegedly corrupt outside business interests. Notwithstanding indulgent leadership, there are for every misguided and deluded political leader, many loyal followers who are equally complicit if not directly then by association in terms of the reverence and loyalty to such leadership.

There are further compounding and contributing factors for the perceived failure of leadership and corruption within the Sub-Saharan region such as some accounts of the traditions of gift giving and receiving. The extent to how wide spread this is deemed to be part of African tribal and cultural identity is questionable including its relevance in contemporary politics. If this turns out to be a wide scale and common practice without the moral connotations, then actual corruption and "tradition" becomes even more blurred when defended in the context of the traditions of gift giving and receiving. Apart from alleged traditional notions of possibly disguising actual

corruption, other very real and compounding problems for the Sub-Saharan region that are symptomatic of perceived political corruption include the many protracted cross border wars concomitant with unrelenting and brutal civil wars. The sobering reality of such wide scale and resurgent unrest are the droves of internally displaced persons (IDPs), mass refugee efflux/influx, disillusioned diaspora, and the very well documented episodes of ethnic cleansing and genocide.

In terms of the quantitative analysis conducted in this study all the data used, attempted to give some indication as to the state of the region in terms of the possible causes and consequences of perceived corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Starting with the Ibrahim Index for the region, the most prominent example of a progressive state on perhaps on all fronts was Mauritius which although not geographically situated on the continent, is usually counted as part of the African region and that there was hardly any corruption prevalent in this country. Other countries in the region which suggested that there were lesser levels of corruption included Seychelles, Botswana, Cape Verde, Gabon, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Ghana and even Malawi which has one of the poorest economies on the continent.

The country that appears to fare worst in terms of being corrupt and mismanaged is Somalia which was ranked 48 as the worst and is unchanged since 2000. Other countries that follow are; the DRC, Sudan, Chad, Angola, Cote' d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) and Eritrea. Notwithstanding even with persisting accounts of perceived political corruption, many countries in this region have shown trends towards economic development, human development as well as a respect for human rights. Zimbabwe, even though it had almost gone to the brink of a "failed-state" moved back in terms of the ranking in 2008 and 2009 compared to the year 2002. In further analysis of the IB Index using SPSS, it was established that there was an effect of time/year on the various IB scores index scores. Further tests using SPSS also indicated that the 2008, 2005, and 2002 corruption index scores were significantly higher compared to the index scores for 2000. No other significant differences were evident. It is possible that issues of heightened perceptions of political corruption were identified because this was dealt with in a more transparent manner over the reported period. Using this index, the region was divided into "failed" and "progressive" states based on their

performance during the reporting period coupled with reports on the political history for the respective countries.

In using a wider selection of variables but limited to a smaller number of countries, Afrobarometer datasets were analysed also using a combination of "SPSS", online analysis and "MS Excel." Afrobarometer 2006 Round 3 dataset was used initially followed by 2009 Round 4 dataset which was used for some comparisons. Perceived corruption in various tiers of government leadership was examined. This included 18 selected countries in Round 3 and 20 countries in Round 4. The results of the Round 3 for the 18 countries were surveyed indicated that most respondents believed that in general, only "some" of their leaders were perceived to be corrupt. However the results also indicated that a significant number of respondents in each country thought that perhaps "most" if not "all" of their respective Presidents or Prime Ministers were perceived to be corrupt. This mistrust in government and leaders in general suggests that there is a moderate to high level of perceived corruption across all tiers of government, but at the same time this does little to answer with any measure of accuracy who exactly is corrupt in government. Ironically given their job to uphold the law, policemen across all 18 selected countries were perceived to have higher levels of corruption than other officials within the analysis. Policemen, who typically do not hold positions of political leadership, are nonetheless supposed to be symbols of authority and trust. Moreover, there does appear to be a trend, although not entirely consistent of the overall negative perception of government and/or all its agencies related to impropriety.

As a follow up, Round 4 data was analysed for issues of corruption and specifically bribery across all government agencies covering 20 out of 52 countries in Africa. In this analysis "Traditional Leaders" were included since they play a significant role in tribal and local politics. By using Pearson's r as a measure of correlation, it was revealed that with the exception "Traditional Leaders", a strong to moderate and positive correlation was seen for perceived corruption with varying degrees. One again "policeman" across all 20 countries fared poorly, followed with "Members of Parliament". The glaring exception was that of "Corruption: Traditional leaders" which are significantly lower than the other government agencies measured. These results however, are significant in the writer's view even if one views them in the

context of the 20 countries surveyed. "Bribery" as an indicator of corruption was also analysed. These correlations for "bribery" however, showed mixed results across all categories. Although these results for the extent bribery could not be clearly linked with perceived corruption amongst officials in various government roles, it does show that acts of bribery are more than likely taking place and that it is a contributing factor to the very serious issue of alleged political corruption. It also does not indicate the extent of corruption taking place even when bribery as an indicator is present. In general, Afrobarometer although one of the more robust primary data sets, cannot be relied on by itself especially when only selected countries for this vast continent are surveyed.

In using Transparency International's CPI (Corruption Perception Index) for 2008, the overall trend still appears to be predictable. In comparison with the IB Index, relative to the political situation, as reported within the respective countries, Somalia again still reflected total failure of government and thus leadership. Similarly, Sudan and The DRC also ranked poorly due to the protracted civil and cross-border wars but at the same time fall short of being regarded as totally failed states as there are still functional governments in power. The analysis for CPI also however, does not give any clear indication of the extent of corruption or how corruption is associated with a failure of leadership in the region. In terms of these relative positions, and again compared with the IB Index, countries such as Botswana, Mauritius, Cape Verde, South Africa and Namibia achieved significantly high scores in the reporting year. In terms of comparing the overall global scores of about 180 countries using the global CPI data set for 2008, only 7 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa ranked poorly suggesting that corruption is present but at the same time equates more or less with countries in other regions such as; the Middle East (Afghanistan and Iraq), Asia (Myanmar), and the Caribbean (Haiti).

In further considering the scale of the problem regarding perceived corruption, proxies for corruption such as "fragile" and even "failed" states have to be scrutinized. To this end, 19 countries across the globe were examined using the online analysis of the ICRG. Once again, Somalia, Sudan and the DRC featured at the lower end of countries poorly managed and this was similar to both the IB Index and the CPI scores for 2008. These low scores again indicate that the region is faring poorly on issues like

a robust economic and investment climate, education, health, justice and law & order. Perceived corruption coupled with the increased negativity is more than likely to create greater public distrust and consequently might be a precursor to the *failed state syndrome*.

As an overall assessment for the Sub-Saharan region, a combined analysis with the exception of the Afrobarometer data set was undertaken using five measures in this study. Simple correlations and scatter plots as a framework were also used for analysis. It must be pointed out that all measures of corruption involve some degree of subjectivity which by definition includes this study.

With the exception of The World Bank's data , GDP per capita for the year 2007 which was for the most part, negatively correlated with all of the indices, Pearson's *r* correlation tests showed relationships across all the other major indices indicating strong and positive correlations for example; a higher CPI rank was associated with a higher IB Index rank. In other examples; The Rule of law, Transparency and Corruption predictor was significantly and positively related to the Ibrahim Index of African Governance. The relative positions of each Sub-Saharan African state has also revealed how poorly a country is performing relative to others and this again shows the extent to which the leadership is responsible for mismanagement and corruption. Other proxies or possible links with alleged government corruption such as the non-Ratification of Core International Human Rights Conventions, Business Environment, Number of Wars, Inflation and GDP per capital growth were however, not positively correlated with the Ibrahim Index of African Governance or the World Bank Corruption Indicator. It follows from this that even though there are plausible accounts of corruption; it does not automatically mean that the nation is impoverished, that civil liberties would be curtailed or that wars would naturally follow.

In terms of a global assessment for corruption, Africa as a region was then compared with other non-rich countries of the world. In this final analysis, Africa was measured using two available corruption indicators namely, "nepotism" and "cronyism." Compared means using the data set from "Corruption World Bank Government Indicators for 100 Countries-year 2008" were used. It was thus revealed that for "nepotism", there was no difference between Africa and non-rich countries and

similarly, for "cronyism", there was little or no difference between Africa and the non-rich countries. Africa as an entire region was hardly significantly different from the rest of the non-rich countries of the world in terms of this comparison.

The limitations of all the data used in this study may become obvious to the reader and this is also illustrated in the final analysis. Corruption per se no doubt exists in the region and in general, the perceptions for same are high. Actual levels of corruption however, are difficult to measure on account of the huge gaps in data sources coupled with measurement error.

Corruption is difficult to quantify which has also been the case in this study mainly because it is an output of habit, conditioning, attitudes and behaviour, all of which are shaped by perceptions of reality. Olken (2009) illustrates the limitations of perceptions in terms of the reliability and accuracy stemming from possible biases of respondents. Notwithstanding the inherent limitations of quantifying corruption, one has still to be mindful that the operative word in this discussion in essence is "perception". Perceptions in all the social sciences are essentially what social scientists have to rely on and then make plausible inferences from this. It is still problematic because perception based measures have validity, reliability and precision problems which are often difficult to interpret.

The limitations of this study on corruption, points to the lack of data and perhaps the reliability of some of the data may be of some concern. In examining the two sources of corruption data namely the primary and secondary data, there do appear to be some shortcomings in terms of the assessments conducted by the experts. It does not suggest that these were erroneous assumptions made of corruption particularly in Africa but that there was a zealousness to perhaps overestimate the notion of corruption at times. Ranking of countries relative to mere perceptions of corruption does not necessarily meet with the reality of actual corruption The tendency for measurement bias or error based on the international benchmarks appear to suggest that the least developed countries have a greater propensity for political corruption or corruption per se. With the exception of the Afrobarometer dataset, the other major indices have more "econo-centric" analyses which may also point to ideological biases of Western style governance. Lambsdorff (2008) specifically refers to the CPI index as soliciting the

views of business people and country analysts. Moreover, the data tends to rank countries based on political preferences such as democracies, with a sparse acknowledgement that culture, tradition and ethnicity that are also factors that may be pivotal but not necessarily in all cases in determining the perception of political corruption in Africa.

Galtung & Sampford (2005) cite the former Prime Minister of Malaysia as saying "Who are they to determine how our people should live? This is our country, so we are the ones to decide". There also appears to be a subtle inference perhaps in the pejorative sense, that there is a lack of political maturity and sophistication in the Sub-Saharan region compared to other Western style ideologies. One must be mindful however, that the vagaries of political behaviour even amongst the most stable of governments may be all that is needed to tarnish otherwise good statesman and the reputation of a country.

The measures of corruption in this study concluded with the combined use of the primary and secondary data of the major indices using simple correlations and scatter plots in order to answer the two research questions posted at the onset of this paper. In examining all the literature and the data thus far contained in this study, the researcher is more convinced that there are credible accounts of corruption and corrupt leaders across many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the exceptions are few. This study therefore also shows that, allegations of corruption for the region are *prima facia* more credible than other regions; that the consequences of corruption for the region are dire and most of all that corruption remains a phenomenon defined by perception regardless of where it is occurring and that the perception is also premised on multiple factors.

To optimise any study of political corruption and as an endeavour for further research on corruption within the region, it would be more circumspect not to rely so much on the use of global governance indicators. There is thus a need to then engage multiple sources of primary and secondary data but more particularly to collate the combined data from experts and respondents from a more regional setting if one has to accept that culture and other unknown variables are relevant. In order to establish with a greater degree of reliability how corrupt the region is, greater emphasis must be placed

on primary data and the interview/survey methodology as that used by Afrobarometer. Beyond this, all demographics with sizeable samples from respective countries within the region must be surveyed and not just the selected few for the reporting years. Apart from these methodologies, measuring corruption in the region has to be based on those indicted for corruption coupled with those confirmed criminal convictions of corrupt officials from the respective courts where these exist and are made available. If and when this information is forthcoming, it has to be then compared with other regions so as to benchmark this phenomenon. No doubt this endeavour will be easier said than done given the logistics involved and the unwillingness of some African governments to release information.

In conducting surveys to assess corruption, other comparable data on crime and victimization across countries must also be collated. This again might prove to be logistically difficult for many Sub-Saharan African countries however; the telecom networks are well established for much of the region and growing. Where this is still to be achieved, more refined and committed interviewing techniques in both developed and lesser developed countries using face-to-face surveys has to be undertaken. More than likely, even if fifty percent of the total number of surveys is completed regardless of the geographical setting, this will be sufficient for reliable analysis provided that the surveys are tailored for the demographic being canvassed. Experiences of urban households can be recorded in relation to incidents of offering bribes to government officials or whether there was an expectation to pay same for services rendered during the reporting period. As an economic indicator for corruption, the results obtained from these actual incidents of bribe paying across all households surveyed and GDP per capita will assist more robust predictions of corruption. Other indicators such as the wage/salary disparity between bureaucrats and other sectors can also be compared. In addition to this, the wealth accumulation of politicians and bureaucrats can be established provided there is accountability of same.

References

Achebe, C. (1983). *The Trouble with Nigeria* London: Heinemann.

Ades, A., & Di Tella, R. (1999). Rents, Competition and Corruption. *The American Economic Review, 89* (4), 982-993.

African Development Bank Group. (2006). *Combating Corruption in Africa.* Ouagadougou: African Development Bank Group.

African Leadership and Progress Network. (2008, March). *www.africanprogress.net.* Retrieved July 30, 2009, from www.africanprogress.net: www.africanprogress.net.

Africa Reporters Newspaper Online. (2011, April 13). *Africa Reporters Newspaper Online.* Retrieved September 30, 2011, from Africa Reporters Newspaper Online Web site: http://www.africareporters.com.

Afrobarometer. (undated*). www.afrobarometer.org/sampling.* Retrieved July 30, 2009, from www.afrobarometer.org/sampling: www.afrobarometer.org/sampling.

Ahluwalia, P. (2001). *Politics and Post-Colonial Theory: African Inflections.* London: Routledge.

Albin-Lackey, C. (2007). *Criminal Politics: Violence, "Godfathers" and Corruption in Nigeria.* New York: Human Rights Watch.

Allen, C. (1999). Warfare, Endemic Violence & State Collapse in Africa. *Review of African Political Economy, 26* (81*),* 367-384.

Allen, D. (1992). *Religion and Political Conflict in South Asia: India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.* Westport: Greenwood Press.

Amundsen, I. (1999). *Political Corruption: An Introduction to the Issues.* Bergen: Chr. Michelson Institute.

Anti- Corruption Resource Centre. (undated). *U4 Anti- Corruption Resource Centre.* Retrieved May 18, 2008, from U4 Anti- Corruption Resource Centre: http://www.u4.no.

Armed Deals Riddled with Corruption (2000, October 11). *Woza www.woza.co.za.* Retrieved 17 April 2009.

August 29, 2010, from World Bank Website: http//infor.worldbank.org.

Atkinson, A. (1997). "Bringing Income Distribution in From the Cold", *The Journal of the Royal Economic Society*, *107* (441), 297-321.

Bales, K. (2007). *Ending Slavery: How We Free Today's Slaves*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Balogun, M. (2001) "*Diversity Issues Facing the Public Service in Sub-Saharan Africa" Paper Presented at the United Nations Expert Group Meeting on Managing Diversity in the Civil Service*, New York, 3-4 May 2001.

Baofo-Arthur, K. (2007). *Ghana: One Decade of the Liberal State*. South Africa: Unisa Press.

Bayart, J., Ellis, S. & Hibou B. (1997). *Criminalisation of the State in Africa (African Issues)*. USA: Indiana University Press.

Baynham, S. (1986). *Military Power and Politics in Black Africa.* New York: St Martin's Press.

Begovic, B. (2005). *Corruption: concepts, types, causes and consequences. Argentina*: Centre for the Opening and Development of Latin America (CADAL).

Bennett, J. (2002). Multinational Corporations, Social Responsibility and Conflict. *Journal of International Affairs, 55* (2)*,* 394-410.

Berkeley, B. (2001). *The Graves Are Not Yet Full: Race, Tribe and Power in the Heart of Africa.* New York: Basic Books.

Bhattacharyya, S. & Holder, R. (2008). *Natural Resources Democracy and Corruption*. http://www.isid.ac.in/~pu/conference/dec_08_conf/Papers/SambitBhattacharyya.pdf. Retrieved 2 January 2009.

Blagojevich, R. (2002). *http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com.* Retrieved 29 December 2008.

Blue, L. (2008). *The Demons That Still Haunt Africa.* http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1702349-2,00.html. Retrieved 4 January 2009.

Bratton, M. (2002, August). Wide But Shallow: Popular Support for Democracy in Africa. *Afrobarometer: Working Paper No.19*.

Bratton, M., & Mattes, R. G.-B. (2004). *Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform in Africa.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brinkerhoff, D. W., & Goldsmith, A. A. (2002). *Clientelism, Patrimonialism and Democratic Governance: An Overview and Framework for Assessment and Programming.* Bethesda: U.S. Agency for International Development.

Brown, David S., Michael, T., and Andrew B. Whitford. (2005).*Political Polarizations a Constraint on Government*: *Evidence from corruption"* on SSRN http://ssrn.com/abstract.

Burns, J. (1978). *Leadership*. New York: Harper and Row.

Cantor, P. (2004). *Private and Public Corruption*. Lanham: Roman and Littlefield Publishers Inc.

Carbonell-Catilo, A. (1985). *The Dynamics of Manipulation and Violence in Philippine Elections: A case of Political Corruption*. Paris: International Political Science Association.

Case, W. (2002). *Politics in Southeast Asia: Democracy or less*. New York: Routledge Curzon: 147-200.

Chang, E., & Golden, M. (2009). *Social Science Research Network*. Retrieved May 18, 2009, from Social Science Research Network: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1339972.

Charters, C. (2009). *Victoria University of Wellington Law Review* Abstract retrieved October 9, 2011, from Victoria University of Wellington http://www.lexisnexis.com/.

Conger, J.A. (1989). *Charismatic Leader: Behind the Mystique of Exceptional Leadership.* USA: Jossey-Bass Inc. Pub.

Corruption Perceptions Index Regional Highlights (2008): *Sub-Saharan Africa.*

Crawford-Browne, T. (2008, September 28). *The Betrayal of Struggle against Apartheid*. Republic of South Africa.

Daley, S. (1999, March 5). *Apartheids Feared Police Prove Inept and Corrupt. The New York Times*. Retrieved 17 April 2009 from www.nytimes.com.

de Sardan, O. (1999). A Moral Economy of Corruption in Africa. *Journal of Modern African Studies, 37*(1), *25-52.*

de Swardt, C. (2005). Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific. *Transparency International.* Beijing: Transparency International.

Deng, F. (1986). *The Man called Deng Majok: A Biography of Power, Polygyny and Change*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Deng, F. (1995). *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan*. Washington: Brookings Institution.

Dibua, J., & Ibhawoh, B. (2003). Deconstructing Ujaama: The Legacy of Julius Nyrere in the Quest for Social and Economic Development in Africa. *African Journal of Political Science, 8*(1), 60-83.

Douglas, T., Judge, W., & Kutan, A. (2009). Does Corruption Hurt Economic Development? Evidence from Middle Eastern, North African and Latin American countries. In S. Sayan, *Economic Performance in the Middle East and North Africa: Institution, Corruption and Reform.* New York: Routledge.

Ebo, A. (2005). *Towards a Code of Conduct for Armed and Security Forces in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges.* Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).

Economic Commission for Africa. (2007). *Relevance of African Traditional Institutions of Governance.* Addis Ababa: ECA Publications.

Elliott, K.A. (1997), "Corruption as an International Policy Problem: Overview and Recommendations." *Corruption and the Global Economy,* ed. by K.A. Elliott (Washington D.C: Institute for International Economics).

Encyclopaedia Britannica. (2009). *http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/199029/extortion*. Retrieved July 26, 2009, from http://www.britannica.com.

Exploratory Research. (n.d.). *Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopaedia.* Retrieved October 04, 2007, from http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/Exploratory_research.

Fidell, L., & Tabachnick, B. (2000). *Using Multivariate Statistics.* Boston: Harper Collins.

Field, A. (2005). *Discovering Statistics Using SPSS*. London: Sage Publications.

Foreign Policy Magazine. (2006, April 25). *Foreign Policy & Fund for Peace.* Retrieved September 14, 2009, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006.

Ferreira, M. 2004a. Elder abuse in Africa: What policy and legal provisions are there to address the violence? *Journal of Elder Abuse & Neglect, 16*(2), 17–32.

Garner, B. (2004). *Black's Law Dictionary*. Minnesota: West Group.

Galtung, F., & Sampford, C. (2005). *Measuring the Immeasurable: Boundaries and Functions of (Macro) Corruption Indices*. Ashgate, UK.

Goel, R, K., and Nelson, M. A. (2005). Economic Freedom versus Political Freedom: Cross Country Influences on Corruption. *Australian Economic Papers. 44* (2), 121-133.

Goel, R. K., and Nelson, M. A. (2008, October). Causes of Corruption: History, Geography and Government. *BOFIT Discussion Papers Finland: Institute for Economies in Transition.*

Goldberg, L. M. (2011, September 16). *The United Nations.* Retrieved September 30, 2011, from The United Nations Web Site: http://www.undispatch.com/map.

Gunardi, H. S. (2008). *Corruption and Governance around the World: An Empirical Study.* Enchede: PPI Publishers.

Gupta, S., Davoodi, H., & Alonso-Terne, R. (1998). *"Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty?"* IMF Working Paper 98/76. Washington D.C.

Gyekye, K. (1997). *Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on an African Experience.* USA: Oxford University Press.

Halkos, G., & Tzeremes, N. (2007, January 3). MPRA: *Munich Personal REPC Archive.* Retrieved August 23, 2009, from MPRA: Munich Personal REPC Archive: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2874.

Hamber, B. (2005). *Let's stop moralising about Corruption in Africa.* Look South Column published on Polity July 2005. http://www.brandonhamber.com/index.htm. Retrieved January 2007.

Harrison, L. &. Huntington (2000). *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress.* New York: Basic Books.

Harsch, E. (1997). African States in Social and Historical Context. *Journal of Sociological Forum, 12*(4)*, 671-679.*

Hasan, A. (undated). *Preference for Corrupt Professions: Is Poverty Induced Or Social Norm?* Retrieved June 15, 2009, from http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/WG .

Heidenheimer, A. J., Johnston, M., & LeVine, V. T. (1999*). Political Corruption: A Handbook.* New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.

Hellman, J., & Kaufmann, D. (2000, July). *World Bank.* Retrieved February 2009.

Hellman, J. S., Jones, G and Kaufmann, D. (2002). *Far from Home: Do Foreign Investors Import Higher Standards of Governance in Transition Economies?* World Bank Institute, August 2002.

Hopkins, W.G, (1998). Quantitative Research Design. *Sportscience 4(1).*

Howe, H. M. (2001). *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States. London:* Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Huntington, S. (1989). Modernisation and Corruption. In A. J. Heidenheimer, M. Johnston, & V. T. Levine, *Political Corruption: A Handbook* (p. 377). New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Huntington, S. (1968). *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Huther, J., & Shah, A. (2000). Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs: A Framework for Evaluation (Working Paper No. 2501). Retrieved from The World Bank website: http://worldbank.org/research/workingpapers.

Ibrahim, M. (2010, March 1). *The Stereotype Of a Corrupt Africa Does the Continent a Great Disservice.* Retrieved April 20, 2010, from News.scotsman.com: http://news.scotsman.com/world.

Immigration Act, No 13. (2002). Retrieved from http://www.acts.co.za/immigration/index.

Immigration Amendment Bill, B32. (2010). Retrieved from http://www.acts.co.za/immigration/index.

International Crisis Group. (2008, April 28). Restoring Democracy in Bangladesh. *Asia Report No.51* .

Jacobson, C. (2009). South Africa: *Dropped Zuma Charges Raise Questions.* www.examiner.com. Retrieved 19 April 2009.

Janvier-Urra, F. (2007, May). *Assessing Corruption. An Analytical Review of Corruption Measurement and its Problems: Perception, Error, and Utility.* George Town University.

Johnstone, M. (2005). *Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power and Democracy.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Johnston, M. (1997). *What can be done about Entrenched Corruption?* 9th Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Johnston, M., & Heidenheimer, J. A. (2001). *Political Corruption: Concepts and Contexts.* New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.

Joseph, R. (2008). Progress and Retreat in Africa: Challenges of a Frontier Region. *Journal of Democracy, 19*(2), 94-108.

Kah, H. (2010).The Culture of Appointments, Arrogance, and Chop Broke Pottism in Cameroon's Contemporary Governance. *Cameroon Journal of Democracy and Human Rights, 4*(2)19-25.

Kapoor, M., & Ravi, S. (2009, August 4). *Social Science Research Network*. Retrieved September 2, 2009, from Social Science Research Network: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1443617.

Kaufman, D. (2003). *Rethinking Governance, Empirical Lessons Challenging Orthodoxy*. The World Bank, Discussion Draft March 2003.

Kaufman, D. (2002). *Transparency, Incentives and Prevention (TIP) for Corruption Control and Good Governance.* Retrieved from http://info.worldbank.org. Accessed on May 2009.

Kaufmann, D, Kraay, A., and Mastruzzi, M. (2007). *Governance Matters VI: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators for 1996-2006'*, World Bank Working Paper Series 4280.

Keefer, P., & Knack, S. (1997). Why Don't Poor Countries Catch Up? A Cross National Test of an Institutional Explanation. *Economic Inquiry, 35* (3), 590-602.

Khaldun, I. (2005). *Al-Muqaddimah* [The Prolegomena]. Beirut.

Klein, J. (1998). *A Strategic Approach for Donor Assisted Counter Corruption Programs* Governance Innovations in the Asia Pacific Regions, 143.

Konold, C. (2007, December*). http://www.afrobarometer.org/papers*. Retrieved August 01, 2009, from http://www.afrobarometer.org.

Kraay, A. &. (2007). *Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996- 2006.* Social Science Research Network.

Kurtz, M. J., & Schrank, A. (2007). `Growth and Governance: Models, Measures, and Mechanisms', *The Journal of Politics,* 69(2):538-554.

Lambsdorff, J. G. (1998). *Corruption in Comparative Perception*: in Jain, A. (ed.), The Economics of Corruption (81-110). Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Lambsdorff, J. G. (1999, November). *Corruption in Empirical Research-A Review*. Transparecy International Working Paper Transparency International.

Lambsdorff, J. G. (2005). *Consequences and Causes of Corruption: What do we know from a cross section of Countries?* Passau: University of Passau.

Lambsdorff, J. G. (2008). *The Methodology of the Corruption Perception Index.* Transparency International (TI) and University of Passau.

La Porta et al. (1998). "The Quality of Government." *Journal of Law Economics & Organization, 15* (1), 222-279.

Lawal, G. (2007). Corruption and Development in Africa: Challenges for Political and Economic Change. *Humanity and Social Sciences Journal, 2*(1), 1-7.

Lawrence, P., & Thirtle, C. (2001). *Africa and Asia in Comparative Economic Perspective.* Basingstoke: Palgrave.

le Billon, P. (2003). Conflict and Corruption: Buying Peace or Fuelling War: The Role of Corruption in Armed Conflict. *Journal of International Development, 15*(4), 413-426.

Leite, C. & Weidmann, J. (1999). *Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, Corruption and Economic Growth*. International Monetary Fund Working Paper: WP/99/85.

Leys, C. (1989). What is the problem about corruption? *Journal of Modern African Studies, 3*(2), 215-230.

Liebenow, G. J. (1986). *African Politics: Crisis and Challenges.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Libraries, E. U. (undated). *http://einstein.library.emory.edu*. Retrieved June 28, 2009, from http://einstein.library.emory.edu.

Littvay, L., & Donica, A. (2006). Corruption: A Cause or an Effect? *Canadian Political Science Association Conference*, (p. 22). Toronto.

Liu, Z. (2006, January). *www.allacademic.com*. Retrieved August 05, 2009, from www.allacademic.com: www.allacademic.com.

Logan, C. (2008). *Traditional Leaders in Modern Africa: Can Democracy and the Chief Co-exist?* Afrobarometer Working Paper No.93.

Maathai, W. (2009). *The Challenge for Africa*. New York: Pantheon Publishers.

Mafeje, A. (1998). "*Democracy, Civil Society and Governance in Africa", Proceedings of the Second DPMF Annual Conference on Democracy, Civil Society and Governance in Africa II*, 7-10 December 1998, Addis Ababa.

Mauro, P. (1995). "Corruption and Growth." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110*(3), 681–712.

Mauro, P. (1998). Corruption and the Composition of Government Expenditure. *Journal of Public Economics*, *69* (2), 263-279.

Mbaku, J. (2007). Corruption in Africa Causes. *Journal of Asian and African Studies, 43*(4), 579-584.

McCracken, M. (2007). *http://www.teachmefinance.com/Financial Terms/Embezzlement.html* Retrieved 29 December 2008.

Meager, P. (1997). *Combating Corruption in Africa: Institutional Challenges and responses*. University of Maryland at College Park. WP: no.203.

Mills, K. (2001). *Identifying the Causes of Corruption within the Public Sector and how it Affects Service Delivery and the Poor and Assess the Role of the Press Media as an Anti-Corruption Watchdog: A case study*: Bangladesh. The University of Birmingham.

Ministry of State Enterprises. (undated). *Anti-Corruption & Anti-Monopolies in Zimbabwe.* Retrieved January 15, 2010, from Ministry of State Enterprises: http://www.fightcorruption.gov.zw/contacts/contact.htm.

Mlambo, A. (2006). Western Social Sciences and Africa: The Domination and Marginalisation of a Continent. *African Sociological Review*, 10, (1), 161-167.

Mo Ibrahim Foundation. (undated) *Mo Ibrahim Foundation.* Retrieved August 01, 2009, from Mo Ibrahim Web site: http://.moibrahimfoundation.org/the-index.asp.

Mo Ibrahim Foundation. (undated). *Mo Ibrahim Foundation.* Retrieved December 15, 2010, from Mo Ibrahim Web site: http://moibrahimfoundation.org.

Mo Ibrahim Foundation. (2010, June 13). *Mo Ibrahim Foundation.* Retrieved December 25, 2010, from Mo Ibrahim Web site: http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org.

Moreno, A. (2002). Corruption and Democracy: A Cultural Assessment. *The Social Science Journal, 45*(2), 495-507.

Mullins, C., & Rothe, D. (2008). *Blood, Power and Bedlam: Violations of International Criminal Law in Post-Colonial Africa.* New York: Lang Publishing Inc.

Mulinge, M. M., & Lesetedi, G. N. (1998) Interrogating Our Past: Colonialism and Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa. *African Journal of Political Science*, *3*(2), 15-28.

Museveni, Y. K. (1985). *Selected Articles on the Uganda Resistance War.* Kampala: NRM Publications.

Myint, U. (2000). Corruption: Causes, Consequences and Cures. *Asia-Pacific Development Journal*, *7*(2), 1-26.

Myrdal, G. (1968). *Asian Drama*. Vol. II: Pantheon, New York.

Nevin, T. (2006). *Apartheid Era Crooks exposed a report*. African Business Report. Retrieved from http://findarticles.com/p/articles. Accessed on February 2008.

Neocosmos, M. (2010). *From "Foreign" Natives to "Native" Foreigners: Explaining Xenophobia in post-Apartheid South Africa.* Dakar: CODESRIA.

Norwegian Refugee Council (2006). Retrieved 28 August 2010 from *www.u4.kno/pdf/documents anti-corruption guideline.*

Norway: Chr. Michelson Institute WP: 99:7 *Answers.com Idi Amin Political Leader*. http://www.answers.com/topic/idi-amin. Retrieved November 2008.

Nsehe, M. (2008). *Africa's Leaders Need a Paradigm Shift in Their Thinking.* Free online articles directory. http://www.articlesbase.com. Retrieved November 2008.

Nyang, J., & Shaw, T. (2000). African Renaissance in the New Millennium? From Anarchy to Emerging Markets? *African Journal of Political Science, 5*(1), 14-28.

Nye, J. (1967, June 2). Corruption and Development: A Cost Benefit Analysis. *American Political Science Review 61*, p. 419.

Obiechina, E. (1992). *Parables of Power and Powerlessness: Exploration in Anglophone African Fiction Today*. African Studies Association.

Ogundiya, I. S. (2010). The Bane of Democratic Stability in Nigeria. *Journal of Social Sciences, 2* (3), 233-241.

Ogbunwezeh, F. (2005). *Scandal of African Poverty*. Global Politician. http://globalpolitician.com. Retrieved December 2008.

Olken, B. (2009). Corruption Perceptions vs. Corruption Reality. *Journal of Public Economics*, *93*(7), 950-964.

Olowu, D. (1993). *Governmental Corruption and Africa's Democratization Efforts*. Corruption and Reform. 7(3). P277-236.

Palombara, L. (1994). Structural and Institutional Aspects of Corruption. *Social Research*, *61*(2), 325-350.

Pellegrini, L., & Gerlagh, R. (2008). Causes of Corruption: A Survey of Cross-Country Analyses and Extended Results. *Economics of Governance, 9*(3), 245-263.

Phillips, B. (1999, November 11*). BBC News*. Retrieved March 03, 2009, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/515788.stm: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/515788.stm.

Podobnik, B. et al. (2008). Influence of Corruption on Economic Growth rate and Foreign Investment. *The European Physical Journal, 63*(4), 547–550.

Pollick, M. (2003). *What is Corruption?* www.wisegeek.com. Retrieved July 2008.

Porta, D. D., & Vannucci, A. (1999). *Corrupt Exchanges: Actors, Resources and Mechanisms of Political Corruption*. New York: Walter de Gruyter.

Prah, K. K. (2004). *African Wars and Ethnic Conflicts-Rebuilding Failed States.* Cape Town: The Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society.

Qizilbash, M. (2001). Corruption and Human Development. *Oxford Development Studies*, *29*(3), 265-278.

Razafindrakoto, M. (2006, December). *www.dial.prd.fr/dial_publications*. Retrieved August 02, 2009, from www.dial.prd.fr/dial_publications: www.dial.prd.fr/dial_publications .

Refugees Act, No.130. (1998). Retrieved from http://www.dha.gov.za.

Reno, W. (1997). *African Weak States and Commercial Alliances*. *African Affairs, 96* (383), 165-187.

Risk.com, C. (n.d.). *Country Risk.com.* Retrieved May 30, 2009, from Country Risk.com: www.countryrsik.com.

Robinson, M. (1988). *Corruption and Development*. UK: Routledge Publishers.

Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999), *Corruption and Government. Causes, Consequences and Reform* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Rotberg, R. (2002). The New Nature of a Nation-State Failure. *Washington Quarterly*, *25*(3), 85-96.

Sandhyarani, N. (2009*). Causes of Graft and Corruption*. Retrieved January, 10, 2010 from http://www.buzzle.com/articles/causes-of-graft-and-corruption.html

Schachter, O. (1998*). Hein Online's Law Journal Library.* Retrieved December 19, 2009, from Hein Online's Law Journal Library: www.heinonline.org.

Schatzberg, M. (1997). *Alternative Causalities and Theories of Politics: Explaining Political Life in the Congo (Zaire*). Texas: Rice University.

Seldadyo, H. &. (2006). *The Determinants of Corruption: A Literature Survey and New Evidence*. EPCS Conference. Turku.

Shahni, A. (2008). *How Do We Define Leadership?* http://ezinearticles.com/How-Can-We-Define-Leadership?&id=1327242. Retrieved December 2007.

Shaw, A. (2009, February 11). *Huffington Post.* Retrieved December 17, 2010, from Huffington Post Web site: http://huffingtonpost.com

Singer, P. W. (2006). *Children at War.* Berkley: University of California Press.

Singh, A. (2006). Media Perceptions and Academic Responses to South African President Thabo Mbeki. *Journal of Social Science, 13* (3), 163-176.

Stapenhurst, R. & Sedigh, K.J. (1999). *Curbing Corruption Toward a Model for Building National Integrity*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Shagaya, S. (2002). *Africa's Lack of Leadership*. USA: The Harvard Business School.

Somerville, K. (2008). *Africa is Tribal, Europe is Ethnic, The Power of Words in the Media*. Washington DC: Committee of Concerned Journalists.

Stebbins, R.A. (2001). *Exploratory Research in the Social Sciences*. USA: Sage.

Swaniker, F. (2008). *Leadership matters: Africa's New Leaders Herald a New Dawn.* http://www.sagoodnews.co.za/newsletter_archive/leadership_matters_africas_new_leaders_herald_a_new_dawn.html. Retrieved 3 January 2008.

Szeftel, M. (2000). *Clientelism, Corruption & Catastrophe.* Review of African Political Economy, 27(85), 427-441.

Tavits, M. (2005). C*auses of Corruption: Testing Competing Hypotheses.* Nuffield College. University of Oxford.

Theobald, R. (1990). *Corruption, Development and Underdevelopment. Basingstoke*: MacMillan.

The Analyst. (2009, June 8). *Block or Extradite Them.* Retrieved August 2010, from allAfrica.com: http://www.allAfrica.com:Liberia.

The Economist (2008). *Growing more Corrupt*. http://www.economist.com/. Retrieved August 2008.

Thomas, M.R. (2003). *Blending Qualitative and Quantitative Research Methods in Theses and Dissertations*. California: Corwin Press.

Thompson, T., & Shah, A. (2005, March). *World Bank.* Retrieved August 29, 2010, from World Bank Website: http//siteresources.worldbank.org.

Transparency International. (2007). *Transparency International*. Retrieved May 3rd, 2009, from Transparency International Website: http://www.transparency.org.

Transparency International. (2009). *Transparency International*. Retrieved February 3rd, 2010, from Transparency International Web Site:www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys.

Treisman, D. (2000). The Causes of Corruption: A Cross National Study. *Journal of Public Economics*, *76*(3), 399-457.

Tungaraza, N. (2008, December 23). *Tanzania: Fight against Corruption Increases.* Retrieved August 2010, from Global Voices Web site: http://globalvoicesonline.org.

Tupy, M. (2008, September 22). *Mbeki's Legacy.* Retrieved August 25, 2011, from The Wall Street Journal: http://online.wsj.com/article

Ubink, J. (2008). *Traditional Authorities in Africa: Resurgence in an Era of Democratisation.* Amsterdam: Leiden University Press.

UNHCR. (2011, October 21). Refworld: The Leader in Refugee Decision Support. Geneva, Switzerland. Retrieved from UNHCR Website.

United Nations Department of Public Information. (2002). *Conflict Diamonds: Sanctions and War.* New York: United Nations.

Uslaner, E. (2007, April). Corruption and the Inequality Trap in Africa. *Afrobarometer Working Paper No.69.*

Uslaner, E. (n.d). *The Roots of Corruption.* Retrieved from http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/uslaner. Accessed on June 2008.

US Legal, Inc. (n.d.). *Embezzlement Law & Legal Definition.* Retrieved December 15, 2009, from US legal Web site: http://definitions.uslegal.com/e/embezzlement.

Van Vuuren, H. (2006). *Apartheid Grand Corruption assessing the scale of Crimes of Profit from 1976 to 1994.* Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

wa Afrika, M. (2005). Investigative Journalism. In A. Hadland, *Changing the Fourth Estate: Essays on South African Journalism* (pp. 36-41). Cape Town: HSRC Press.

Wiredu, K. (1995). *Conceptual Decolonization in African Philosophy: Four Essays Selected and Introduced by Oladipo Olusegu.* Ibadan: Hope of Publications.

Werve, J. (2007). *The Corruption Notebooks 2006: Stories from the Worldwide Struggle against Abuses of Power.* Lulu.com.

Wolfwitz, P. (2006). *Why Africa Matters to Americans*, Eizenstat Memorial Lecture, Atlanta, GA. http://web.worldbank.org. Retrieved 4 January 2009.

Wolfwitz, P. (2005). *World Bank President Paul Wolfwitz remarks at Corporate Council on Africa Dinner* www.Africanprogress.net/worldbank_corruption_africa. Retrieved 19 April 2009.

Wordinfo. (n.d.), from www.wordinfo: *www.wordwebonline.com/en.* (2005-2008). Retrieved July 27, 2009, from www.wordwebonline.com/en.

Zollner, C., & Teichmann, I. (2007). *Mapping of Corruption and Governance Measurement Tools in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Transparency International.

Zoellick, R. (2008, September 12). *http://www.iiss.org/conference/global-strategic-review*. Retrieved January 26, 2009, from global-strategic-review: http://www.iiss.org/conference/global-strategic-review.

Zuma, J. (n.d.). *Contemporary Black Biography.* Retrieved November 15, 2008, from Answers.com Web site: http://www.answers.com/topic/jacob-zuma.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Combined corruption indicators Africa and other regions Rescaled source: "*World Bank Government Indicators 2008 as referred to in Table 3 and further discussed in chapter 2.8.4. Also see analysis in Figure 19*

Country	Nepotism	Cronyism	Mean	Region
Algeria	4.70	.25	-.44	Africa
Angola	3.30	.48	-1.22	Africa
Benin	3.50	.73	-.42	Africa
Botswana	4.50	.83	1.00	Africa
Burkina Faso	4.10	.45	-.36	Africa
Burundi	3.40	.80	-.97	Africa
Chad	3.10	.28	-1.45	Africa
Egypt	4.70	.30	-.67	Africa
Ethiopia	4.00	.40	-.66	Africa
Gambia	4.50	.53	-.78	Africa
Kenya	3.50	.65	-1.01	Africa
Madagascar	3.10	.55	-.10	Africa
Malawi	4.10	.73	-.59	Africa
Mali	3.70	.85	-.47	Africa
Mauritania	3.50	.15	-.80	Africa
Mauritius	4.80	.85	.53	Africa
Moldova	3.70	.68	-.64	Africa
Morocco	4.00	.68	-.26	Africa
Mozambique	3.80	.73	-.55	Africa
Namibia	4.20	.78	.59	Africa
Nigeria	3.60	.48	-.92	Africa
South Africa	4.50	.83	.30	Africa
Tanzania	4.50	.75	-.51	Africa
Tunisia	5.50	.35	-.04	Africa
Uganda	3.30	.58	-.79	Africa
Zambia	2.70	.85	-.48	Africa
Zimbabwe	3.40	.43	-1.37	Africa
Albania	3.70	.80	-.45	Non Rich
Argentina	3.60	.70	-.44	Non Rich
Armenia	4.20	.65	-.54	Non Rich
Australia	5.30	.90	2.03	Europe/rich
Austria	5.00	.93	1.82	Europe/rich
Azerbaijan	4.00	.43	-1.00	Non Rich

Appendix 1 continued

Lithuania	4.50	.75	.18	Non Rich
Luxembourg	5.20	.88	2.02	Non Rich
Malaysia	5.20	.50	.14	Non Rich
Malaysia	5.20	.50	.14	Non Rich
Mexico	4.00	.65	-.26	Non Rich
Mongolia	4.00	.63	-.62	Non Rich
Nepal	3.40	.55	-.68	Non Rich
New Zealand	5.90	.93	2.32	Europe/rich
Nicaragua	3.30	.60	-.81	Non Rich
Norway	5.90	.85	1.88	Europe/rich
Pakistan	3.70	.35	-.77	Non Rich
Panama	3.90	.80	-.15	Non Rich
Peru	4.00	.50	-.26	Non Rich
Philippines	3.60	.50	-.75	Non Rich
Poland	4.40	.75	.38	Non Rich
Portugal	5.30	.78	1.08	Non Rich
Qatar	4.90	.38	1.24	Non Rich
Romania	3.40	.70	-.06	Non Rich
Russia	3.90	.32	-.98	Non Rich
Serbia	3.90	.55	-.16	Non Rich
Singapore	5.90	.58	2.34	Non Rich
Spain	4.20	.83	1.18	Europe/rich
Sri Lanka	4.40	.55	-.15	Non Rich
Suriname	4.00	.78	-.09	Non Rich
Sweden	5.70	1.00	2.24	Europe/rich
Switzerland	5.80	.73	2.15	Europe/rich
Tajikistan	3.80	.45	-.99	Non Rich
Thailand	4.50	.48	-.38	Non Rich

Appendix 1 continued

Bahrain	4.70	.63	.44	Non Rich
Bangladesh	3.30	.30	-1.10	Non Rich
Belgium	4.90	.88	1.35	Europe/rich
Bolivia	3.40	.70	-.47	Non Rich
Bosnia-Herzegovina	3.60	.63	-.32	Non Rich
Brazil	3.70	.73	-.03	Non Rich
Bulgaria	3.10	.73	-.17	Non Rich
Cambodia	3.00	.50	-1.14	Non Rich
Costa Rica	4.60	.80	.48	Non Rich
Croatia	4.30	.63	.12	Non Rich
Cyprus	4.70	.68	1.04	Non Rich
Czech Republic	4.20	.85	.37	Non Rich
Denmark	5.70	.83	2.32	Europe/rich
Dominican Republic	3.70	.53	-.62	Non Rich
Ecuador	3.40	.58	-.79	Non Rich
El Salvador	3.90	.50	-.22	Non Rich
Estonia	4.80	.70	.94	Non Rich
Finland	6.40	.88	2.34	Europe/rich
France	5.20	.80	1.43	Europe/rich
Gambia	4.50	.53	-.78	Europe/rich
Georgia	3.60	.63	-.23	Non Rich
Germany	5.80	.83	1.77	Europe/rich
Greece	4.70	.70	.10	Non Rich
Guatemala	4.40	.50	-.72	Non Rich
Guyana	4.00	.68	-.47	Non Rich
Honduras	3.50	.55	-.82	Non Rich
Hungary	4.30	.78	.55	Non Rich
Iceland	6.10	.90	2.32	Europe/rich
India	5.10	.75	-.37	Europe/rich
Indonesia	5.20	.53	-.64	Non Rich
Ireland	5.10	.93	1.76	Europe/rich
Israel	5.50	.58	.87	Non Rich
Italy	3.80	.68	.13	Europe/rich
Japan	5.80	.75	1.25	Europe/rich
Jordan	4.30	.58	.41	Non Rich
Kazakhstan	4.40	.58	-.95	Non Rich
Korea, south	4.30	.65	.45	Europe/rich
Kuwait	4.30	.48	.50	Non Rich
Latvia	4.80	.83	.29	Non Rich

Lithuania	4.50	.75	.18	Non Rich
Luxembourg	5.20	.88	2.02	Non Rich
Malaysia	5.20	.50	.14	Non Rich
Malaysia	5.20	.50	.14	Non Rich
Mexico	4.00	.65	-.26	Non Rich
Mongolia	4.00	.63	-.62	Non Rich
Nepal	3.40	.55	-.68	Non Rich
New Zealand	5.90	.93	2.32	Europe/rich
Nicaragua	3.30	.60	-.81	Non Rich
Norway	5.90	.85	1.88	Europe/rich
Pakistan	3.70	.35	-.77	Non Rich
Panama	3.90	.80	-.15	Non Rich
Peru	4.00	.50	-.26	Non Rich
Philippines	3.60	.50	-.75	Non Rich
Poland	4.40	.75	.38	Non Rich
Portugal	5.30	.78	1.08	Non Rich
Qatar	4.90	.38	1.24	Non Rich
Romania	3.40	.70	-.06	Non Rich
Russia	3.90	.32	-.98	Non Rich
Serbia	3.90	.55	-.16	Non Rich
Singapore	5.90	.58	2.34	Non Rich
Spain	4.20	.83	1.18	Europe/rich
Sri Lanka	4.40	.55	-.15	Non Rich
Suriname	4.00	.78	-.09	Non Rich
Sweden	5.70	1.00	2.24	Europe/rich
Switzerland	5.80	.73	2.15	Europe/rich
Tajikistan	3.80	.45	-.99	Non Rich
Thailand	4.50	.48	-.38	Non Rich

Appendix 2: Transparency International (TI): Rescaled Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2008 scores for Sub-Saharan Africa as discussed in Chapter 3.3 and analysis in Figure 14-16

Case Summaries		
Country	**Case Number**	**CPI scores on corruption 2008**
Botswana	1	5.80
Cape Verde	2	5.10
South Africa	3	4.90
Namibia	4	4.50
Ghana	5	3.90
Swaziland	6	3.60
Burkina Faso	7	3.50
Senegal	8	3.40
Lesotho	9	3.20
Mali	10	3.10
Gabon	11	3.10
Benin	12	3.10
Tanzania	13	3.00
Rwanda	14	3.00
Zambia	15	2.80
Malawi	16	2.80
Niger	17	2.80
Mauritania	18	2.80
Nigeria	19	2.70
Togo	20	2.70
Eritrea	21	2.60
Ethiopia	22	2.60
Mozambique	23	2.60
Uganda	24	2.60
Comoros	25	2.50
Liberia	26	2.40
Cameroon	27	2.30
Kenya	28	2.10
Cote d' Ivoire	29	2.00
Central African Republic	30	2.00
Gambia	31	1.90
Guinea Bissau	32	1.90
Congo Republic	33	1.90
Angola	34	1.90
Burundi	35	1.90
Sierra Leone	36	1.90
Zimbabwe	37	1.90
Congo Democratic Republic	38	1.80
Equatorial Guinea	39	1.70

Appendix 2 continued

Chad	40	1.70
Sudan	41	1.70
Guinea	42	1.60
Somalia	43	1.00

Appendix 3: Transparency International (TI): Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2009 global scores. For comparison of scores, also refer to 2008 CPI index in chapter 3.3 and Appendix 2 above.

Rank	Country/Territory	CPI 2009 Score
1	New Zealand	9.4
2	Denmark	9.3
3	Singapore	9.2
3	Sweden	9.2
5	Switzerland	9
6	Finland	8.9
6	Netherlands	8.9
8	Australia	8.7
8	Canada	8.7
8	Iceland	8.7
11	Norway	8.6
12	Hong Kong	8.2
12	Luxembourg	8.2
14	Germany	8
14	Ireland	8
16	Austria	7.9
17	Japan	7.7
17	United Kingdom	7.7
19	United States	7.5
20	Barbados	7.4
21	Belgium	7.1
22	Qatar	7
22	Saint Lucia	7
24	France	6.9
25	Chile	6.7
25	Uruguay	6.7
27	Cyprus	6.6
27	Estonia	6.6
27	Slovenia	6.6
30	United Arab Emirates	6.5

Appendix 3 continued

31	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	6.4
32	Israel	6.1
32	Spain	6.1
34	Dominica	5.9
35	Portugal	5.8
35	Puerto Rico	5.8
37	Botswana	5.6
37	Taiwan	5.6
39	Brunei Darussalam	5.5
39	Oman	5.5
39	Korea (South)	5.5
42	Mauritius	5.4
43	Costa Rica	5.3
43	Macau	5.3
45	Malta	5.2
46	Bahrain	5.1
46	Cape Verde	5.1
46	Hungary	5.1
49	Bhutan	5
49	Jordan	5
49	Poland	5
52	Czech Republic	4.9
52	Lithuania	4.9
54	Seychelles	4.8
55	South Africa	4.7
56	Latvia	4.5
56	Malaysia	4.5
56	Namibia	4.5
56	Samoa	4.5
56	Slovakia	4.5
61	Cuba	4.4
61	Turkey	4.4
63	Italy	4.3
63	Saudi Arabia	4.3
65	Tunisia	4.2
66	Croatia	4.1
66	Georgia	4.1
66	Kuwait	4.1

Appendix 3 continued

69	Ghana	3.9
69	Montenegro	3.9
71	Bulgaria	3.8
71	FYR Macedonia	3.8
71	Greece	3.8
71	Romania	3.8
75	Brazil	3.7
75	Colombia	3.7
75	Peru	3.7
75	Suriname	3.7
79	Burkina Faso	3.6
79	China	3.6
79	Swaziland	3.6
79	Trinidad and Tobago	3.6
83	Serbia	3.5
84	El Salvador	3.4
84	Guatemala	3.4
84	India	3.4
84	Panama	3.4
84	Thailand	3.4
89	Lesotho	3.3
89	Malawi	3.3
89	Mexico	3.3
89	Moldova	3.3
89	Morocco	3.3
89	Rwanda	3.3
95	Albania	3.2
95	Vanuatu	3.2
97	Liberia	3.1
97	Sri Lanka	3.1
99	Bosnia and Herzegovina	3
99	Dominican Republic	3
99	Jamaica	3
99	Madagascar	3
99	Senegal	3
99	Tonga	3
99	Zambia	3
106	Argentina	2.9
106	Benin	2.9

Appendix 3 continued

106	Gabon	2.9
106	Gambia	2.9
106	Niger	2.9
111	Algeria	2.8
111	Djibouti	2.8
111	Egypt	2.8
111	Indonesia	2.8
111	Kiribati	2.8
111	Mali	2.8
111	Togo	2.8
120	Armenia	2.7
120	Bolivia	2.7
120	Ethiopia	2.7
120	Kazakhstan	2.7
120	Mongolia	2.7
120	Vietnam	2.7
126	Eritrea	2.6
126	Guyana	2.6
126	Syria	2.6
126	Tanzania	2.6
130	Honduras	2.5
130	Lebanon	2.5
130	Libya	2.5
130	Maldives	2.5
130	Mauritania	2.5
130	Mozambique	2.5
130	Nicaragua	2.5
130	Nigeria	2.5
130	Uganda	2.5
139	Bangladesh	2.4
139	Belarus	2.4
139	Pakistan	2.4
139	Philippines	2.4
143	Azerbaijan	2.3
143	Comoros	2.3
143	Nepal	2.3
146	Cameroon	2.2
146	Ecuador	2.2
146	Kenya	2.2
146	Russia	2.2

Appendix3 continued

146	Sierra Leone	2.2
146	Timor-Leste	2.2
146	Ukraine	2.2
146	Zimbabwe	2.2
154	Côte d´Ivoire	2.1
154	Papua New Guinea	2.1
154	Paraguay	2.1
154	Yemen	2.1
158	Cambodia	2
158	Central African Republic	2
158	Laos	2
158	Tajikistan	2
162	Angola	1.9
162	Congo Brazzaville	1.9
162	Democratic Republic of Congo	1.9
162	Guinea-Bissau	1.9
162	Kyrgyzstan	1.9
162	Venezuela	1.9
168	Burundi	1.8
168	Equatorial Guinea	1.8
168	Guinea	1.8
168	Haiti	1.8
168	Iran	1.8
168	Turkmenistan	1.8
174	Uzbekistan	1.7
175	Chad	1.6
176	Iraq	1.5
176	Sudan	1.5
178	Myanmar	1.4
179	Afghanistan	1.3
180	Somalia	1.1

Appendix 4: The Impact of Nepotism-Global comparison

The Impact of Nepotism (1 = enormous influence, 7 = no influence) Mean 4.3 Source: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEXPCOMNET/Resources/1.29_Impact_of_Ne potism.pdf.

Refer also to Table 3 and Figure 19 covering indicators of corruption

RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	SD	RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	SD
1	Finland	6.4	0.8	28	Canada	5.0	1.8
2	Iceland	6.1	1.2	29	Slovak Republic	4.9	1.6
3	Singapore	5.9	1.4	30	Malta	4.9	1.7
4	New Zealand	5.9	1.4	31	Taiwan, China	4.9	1.3
5	Austria	5.9	1.2	32	Qatar	4.9	1.6
6	Norway	5.9	1.2	33	Belgium	4.9	1.5
7	Germany	5.8	1.2	34	Algeria	4.9	1.8
8	Switzerland	5.8	1.4	35	Estonia	4.8	1.7
9	Japan	5.8	1.4	36	Latvia	4.8	1.9
10	Denmark	5.7	1.2	37	Mauritius	4.8	1.8
11	Sweden	5.7	1.4	38	Turkey	4.8	1.7
12	Netherlands	5.6	1.2	39	Slovenia	4.7	1.6
13	Hong Kong SAR	5.6	1.5	40	Greece	4.7	1.7
14	Israel	5.5	1.2	41	Cyprus	4.7	1.5
15	Barbados	5.5	1.4	42	Egypt	4.7	1.9
16	Tunisia	5.5	1.5	43	Bahrain	4.7	1.9

Appendix 4 continued

17	United Kingdom	5.4	1.5	44	Uruguay	4.7	1.8
18	Australia	5.3	1.5	45	Costa Rica	4.6	1.8
19	Portugal	5.3	1.3	46	Gambia	4.5	1.8
20	Indonesia	5.2	1.3	47	Tanzania	4.5	1.4
21	Malaysia	5.2	1.5	48	South Africa	4.5	1.7
22	Chile	5.2	1.4	49	Botswana	4.5	1.7
23	Luxembourg	5.2	1.5	50	Jamaica	4.5	1.6
24	France	5.2	1.8	51	Thailand	4.5	1.6
25	United Arab Emirates	5.1	1.7	52	Lithuania	4.5	1.7
26	Ireland	5.0	1.9	53	Kazakhstan	4.4	1.6
27	India	5.0	1.6	54	Poland	4.4	1.2
55	Lesotho	4.4	1.8	90	Vietnam	3.7	1.5
56	Guatemala	4.4	1.6	92	Albania	3.7	2.0
57	Sri Lanka	4.4	1.8	93	Mali	3.7	1.2
58	Kuwait	4.3	1.8	94	Ukraine	3.7	1.7
59	Korea, Rep	4.3	1.6	95	Pakistan	3.7	1.5
60	Jordan	4.3	1.8	96	Philippines	3.6	1.5
61	Hungary	4.3	1.8	97	Nigeria	3.6	1.9
62	Croatia	4.3	1.7	98	Georgia	3.6	1.7

Appendix 4 continued

63	United States	4.2	1.8	99	Bosnia		
64	Spain	4.2	2.0		Herzegovina	3.6	1.9
65	Armenia	4.2	2.0	100	Argentina	3.6	1.7
66	Czech Republic	4.2	1.6	101	Benin	3.5	1.4
67	Colombia	4.2	1.9	102	Macedonia,		
68	Namibia	4.2	1.7		FYR	3.5	1.8
69	Malawi	4.1	1.8	103	Kenya	3.5	1.7
70	China	4.1	1.5	104	Mauritania	3.5	1.9
71	Burkina Faso	4.1	1.6	105	Cameroon	3.5	1.6
72	Suriname	4.0	1.8	106	Honduras	3.5	1.9
73	Azerbaijan	4.0	1.9	107	Ecuador	3.4	1.7
74	Ethiopia	4.0	1.9	108	Romania	3.4	1.9
75	Guyana	4.0	1.8	109	Nepal	3.4	1.6
76	Mexico	4.0	1.8	110	Kyrgyz Republic	3.4	1.7
77	Peru	4.0	1.8	111	Zimbabwe	3.4	1.3
78	Mongolia	4.0	2.0	112	Burundi	3.4	1.7
79	Morocco	4.0	1.6	113	Bolivia	3.4	1.8
80	Russian Federation	3.9	1.8	114	Angola	3.3	1.9
81	El Salvador	3.9	1.9	114	Nicaragua	3.3	1.5
82	Panama	3.9	1.7	116	Bangladesh	3.3	1.6
83	Serbia and Montenegro	3.9	1.8	116	Uganda	3.3	1.6
84	Mozambique	3.8	1.7	118	Paraguay	3.2	1.9
85	Italy	3.8	1.9	119	Madagascar	3.1	1.5
86	Tajikistan	3.8	1.9	120	Chad	3.1	1.7
87	Brazil	3.7	1.8	121	Bulgaria	3.1	1.6

Appendix 4 continued

88	Trinidad and Tobago	3.7	1.9	122	Cambodia	3.0	1.6
89	Moldova	3.7	1.9	123	Venezuela	3.0	1.8
90	Dominican Republic	3.7	1.8	124	Timor-Leste	2.9	1.7
				125	Zambia	2.7	*1.2*

Appendix 5: Transparency International (TI) 2005 Corruption Perception Index (Rescaled) included in appendix for comparison only with TI 2008 and 2009 see appendix 2 & 3 above.

Country rank	Country	2005 CPI score*	Confidence range**	Surveys used***
32	Botswana	5.9	5.1 - 6.7	8
47	Namibia	4.3	3.8 - 4.9	8
46	South Africa	4.5	4.2 - 4.8	11
62	Belize	3.7	3.4 - 4.1	3
65	Ghana	3.5	3.2 - 4.0	8
70	Burkina Faso	3.4	2.7 - 3.9	3
	Egypt	3.4	3.0 - 3.9	9
	Lesotho	3.4	2.6 - 3.9	3
78	Morocco	3.2	2.8 - 3.6	8
	Senegal	3.2	2.8 - 3.6	6
83	Rwanda	3.1	2.1 - 4.1	3
88	Benin	2.9	2.1 - 4.0	5
	Gabon	2.9	2.1 - 3.6	4
	Mali	2.9	2.3 - 3.6	8
	Tanzania	2.9	2.6 - 3.1	8
97	Algeria	2.8	2.5 - 3.3	7
	Madagascar	2.8	1.9 - 3.7	5
	Malawi	2.8	2.3 - 3.4	7
	Mozambique	2.8	2.4 - 3.1	8
103	Gambia	2.7	2.3 - 3.1	7
	Swaziland	2.7	2.0 - 3.1	3
107	Eritrea	2.6	1.7 - 3.5	3
	Zambia	2.6	2.3 - 2.9	7
	Zimbabwe	2.6	2.1 - 3.0	7
117	Libya	2.5	2.0 - 3.0	4
	Uganda	2.5	2.2 - 2.8	8
126	Sierra Leone	2.4	2.1 - 2.7	3
130	Burundi	2.3	2.1 - 2.5	3
	Congo Republic	2.3	2.1- 2.6	4
137	Cameroon	2.2	2.0 - 2.5	6
	Ethiopia	2.2	2.0 - 2.5	8
	Liberia	2.2	2.1 - 2.3	3

Appendix 5 continued

144	Congo DRC	2.1	1.8 - 2.3	4
	Kenya	2.1	1.8 - 2.4	8
	Somalia	2.1	1.6 - 2.2	3
	Sudan	2.1	1.9 - 2.2	5
151	Angola	2.0	1.8 - 2.1	5
152	Cote d'Ivoire	1.9	1.7 - 2.1	4
	Equatorial Guinea	1.9	1.6 - 2.1	3
	Nigeria	1.9	1.7 - 2.0	9
158	Chad	1.7	1.3-2.1	6

Appendix 6: Political Stability, Comparison across selected countries (compare with failed states of the ICRG in body of this study)

Source : http://info.worldbank.org/governance

Country	Sources	Year	Percentile Rank (0-100)	Governance Score (-2.5 to +2.5)	Standard Error
ANGOLA	8	2007	28.4	-0.46	0.23
	7	2003	16.8	-1.09	0.25
	5	1998	3.4	-2.23	0.25
BURKINA FASO	10	2007	46.2	+0.09	0.21
	5	2003	48.1	+0.04	0.30
	4	1998	41.3	-0.10	0.31
CAMEROON	10	2007	31.3	-0.39	0.21
	8	2003	28.4	-0.60	0.23
	6	1998	23.1	-0.77	0.25
CONGO, DEM. REP.	7	2007	2.4	-2.26	0.25
	5	2003	1.9	-2.19	0.28
	4	1998	0.0	-3.06	0.28
COTE D'IVOIRE	9	2007	3.4	-2.12	0.21
	7	2003	4.3	-1.89	0.24
	6	1998	33.2	-0.28	0.25
ETHIOPIA	9	2007	7.2	-1.72	0.22
	7	2003	11.5	-1.35	0.26
	5	1998	21.2	-0.82	0.27
GHANA	9	2007	53.4	+0.22	0.21
	8	2003	46.6	0.00	0.23
	6	1998	43.8	-0.05	0.25
KENYA	10	2007	15.9	-1.10	0.21
	8	2003	12.5	-1.27	0.23
	6	1998	15.4	-1.02	0.25
MADAGASCAR	10	2007	40.4	-0.06	0.21
	5	2003	60.6	+0.44	0.31
	3	1998	46.6	+0.03	0.31
MALAWI	8	2007	41.8	-0.01	0.23
	6	2003	40.4	-0.20	0.27
	4	1998	40.4	-0.13	0.28
MALI	9	2007	38.9	-0.13	0.22
	6	2003	53.4	+0.23	0.29
	4	1998	47.6	+0.08	0.31
MOZAMBIQUE	10	2007	57.2	+0.37	0.21
	8	2003	49.5	+0.10	0.23
	5	1998	45.7	0.00	0.27
NIGER	8	2007	26.4	-0.55	0.23
	4	2003	43.3	-0.14	0.32
	3	1998	26.9	-0.48	0.31

Appendix 6 continued

NIGERIA	10	2007	4.3	-2.07	0.21
	8	2003	6.7	-1.65	0.23
	6	1998	20.2	-0.84	0.25
SOUTH AFRICA	12	2007	51.0	+0.18	0.20
	10	2003	34.1	-0.35	0.22
	7	1998	20.7	-0.83	0.23
SUDAN	7	2007	1.9	-2.30	0.23
	6	2003	2.4	-2.13	0.25
	4	1998	4.8	-2.06	0.28
TANZANIA	9	2007	39.9	-0.07	0.22
	8	2003	29.8	-0.48	0.23
	6	1998	42.3	-0.09	0.25
UGANDA	10	2007	13.9	-1.15	0.21
	8	2003	8.2	-1.53	0.23
	6	1998	12.5	-1.27	0.25
ZAMBIA	9	2007	54.3	+0.24	0.22
	8	2003	44.2	-0.11	0.23
	6	1998	42.8	-0.09	0.25
ZIMBABWE	10	2007	11.5	-1.30	0.21
	8	2003	7.7	-1.61	0.23
	6	1998	18.3	-0.86	0.25

Appendix 7: Afrobarometer Round 3 Survey questions for comparison only with Figures 4 to 13 and Table 6. (*Source:* Afrobarometer Round 3 dataset: http://www.afrobarometer.org)

Question Number: Q56A

Question: How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The President/Prime Minister and Officials in his Office?

Variable Label: Corruption: Office of the Presidency

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=None, 1=Some of them, 2=Most of them, 3=All of them, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Source: SAB

Note: "Prime Minister" in Lesotho; "President" in all other countries.

Question Number: Q56B

Question: How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Members of Parliament/National Assembly Representatives?

Variable Label: Corruption: Members of Parliament

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=None, 1=Some of them, 2=Most of them, 3=All of them, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Source: SAB

Note: "National Assembly Representatives" in Benin, Madagascar, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa; "Members of Parliament" in Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Question Number: Q56C

Question: How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: elected local government councillors?

Variable Label: Corruption: local government councillors

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=None, 1=Some of them, 2=Most of them, 3=All of them, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer,

-1=Missing Data

Source: SAB

Note: "Elected Local Government Councillors" in Benin, Botswana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; "Assembly Man/Woman in Ghana"; "Elected Village Development Councillors" in Lesotho; "Vereadores" in Cape Verde.

Question Number: Q56D

Question: How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: National government officials?

Variable Label: Corruption: National government officials

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=None, 1=Some of them, 2=Most of them, 3=All of them, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Source: SAB

Question Number: Q56E

Question: How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Local government officials?

Variable Label: Corruption: Local government officials

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=None, 1=Some of them, 2=Most of them, 3=All of them, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Source: SAB

Copyright Afrobarometer 29

Question Number: Q56F

Question: How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Police?

Variable Label: Corruption: Police

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=None, 1=Some of them, 2=Most of them, 3=All of them, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer,

-1=Missing Data

Source: SAB

Question Number: Q56G

Question: How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Tax Officials (e.g. VATS/IRS officials)

Variable Label: Corruption: Tax Officials

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=None, 1=Some of them, 2=Most of them, 3=All of them, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Source: SAB

Note: Specific examples of tax agencies were inserted in each country.

Question Number: Q56H

Question: How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Judges and Magistrates?

Variable Label: Corruption: Judges and Magistrates

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=None, 1=Some of them, 2=Most of them, 3=All of them, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Source: SAB

Question Number: Q56I

Question: How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Health workers?

Variable Label: Corruption: Health Workers

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=None, 1=Some of them, 2=Most of them, 3=All of them, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Source: SAB

Question Number: Q56J

Question: How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough

about them to say: Teachers and school administrators?

Variable Label: Corruption: Teachers and school administrators

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=None, 1=Some of them, 2=Most of them, 3=All of them, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer,

-1=Missing Data

Source: Adapted from SAB