How do Immigrants to New Zealand from "Confucian" Societies Conceptualize Social Justice?

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Attestation of Authorship

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person (except where explicitly defined in the acknowledgements), nor material which to a substantial extent has been submitted for the award of any other degree or diploma of a university or other institution of higher learning.

Acknowledgments

Abstract

A large group among recent immigrants to New Zealand are from the so called 'Confucian' societies and values based on Confucian philosophy may affect their views on social and political issues. The current study examined their perceptions about social justice.

Confucianism is the philosophy that has influenced the shaping of East Asian societies with a distinct value system from Western philosophy. In New Zealand, Western philosophy has influenced the shaping of the society as well as how people think about social justice (Duncan, 2004). Dominant modern Western conceptions of social justice revolve around the issue of how to promote the autonomy and freedom of the individual (Duncan, 2004). The ethical value system of Confucianism, on the other hand, does not promote individualism or values such as equality (Chan, 2001). Hence, a Confucian based perspective of social justice may be different to a Western perspective. But, it has been argued that modernity has weakened Confucian based value system in East Asian region (Shin, 2012).

This thesis endeavoured to establish if Confucian values influence how immigrants to New Zealand view issues related to social justice by using interviews. In the end, the research found that a Confucian based perceptive of social justice was not present among the participants. The participants in the research believed in certain concepts that cannot be put in line with a Confucian based perspective of social justice. An example of that is the concepts of equality, which is not on line with Confucian based view of social justice.

Chapter 1: Introduction

The aim of this thesis is to explore the perceptions of immigrants to New Zealand from so-called 'Confucian' societies on the topic of social justice. It is estimated that the population in New Zealand drawn from Confucian societies will continue to grow from around 250,000 in 2006 to around 550,000 in 2026 (Bedford & Ho, 2008). Therefore, their cultural concepts, which could possibly impact their political behaviour, may become more relevant in the future within New Zealand and even change the political landscape of the country. Of course, political attitudes can be examined in different areas. One can, for example, explore attitudes of people towards democracy. In this thesis, however, I will focus on social justice. The reason for this is that social justice is an imperative constituent for the stability and legitimacy of any political system (Schraad-Tischle, 2011). Also, debates around social policy making are often about achieving social justice (Duncan, 2004). The issue is, however, that there is not a single definition for the concept of social justice. The conceptual boundaries of social justice are continuously being changed because its conception at any given moment is dependent on the particular historical and cultural value system in which it operates (Schraad-Tischle, 2011). The term was used for the first time by the Italian philosopher Luigi Taparelli in the mid-19th century (Behr, 2005). By discussing social justice, Taparelli was referring to the distribution of benefits and values that society expanded to its members. Since then, many discussions over how to define social justice have emerged, and by the 20th century the topic of social justice had gained prominence in the discourse of Western political philosophy (Behr, 2005). As a result, many new theories and concepts have emerged that seek to frame the idea of a just society. It is assumed that each of these theories appeals to a different ultimate value (Kymlicka, 2002). In other words, these theories appeal to the considered convictions of individuals, to our beliefs about what is right and what is wrong (Kymlicka, 2002). These convictions, however, can also be culturally loaded. Anthony Parel (2003) asserts, "The emergence of political philosophy is conditioned by cultural and linguistic tradition within which it occurs" (p. 12). For example, a Western idea of a just society may be framed around the issue of promoting autonomy and freedom for the individual while a 'Confucian' concept of a just society may appeal to the welfare of family and the community. Therefore,

this thesis begins by comparing how a just society has been framed in Western philosophy and in Confucian philosophy.

It is important to note that New Zealand legal and political systems are based on the values of the early immigrants that came from Britain and these values in turn are reflective of Western political philosophy (Duncan, 2004). The most influential concepts of a just society drawn from Western political thought that have shaped the political system of New Zealand are, contrastingly, social democracy and different forms of liberalism (Boston, 1999). However, in the late 20th century recognition of indigenous cultures also began to emerge. Due to the dynamics of New Zealand society, which finds its roots in the Treaty of Waitangi, combined with a vocal indigenous population, the country has moved towards acknowledgement of a 'biultural' values system (Johnson, 2008). Changes in immigration policy since the 1980s, however, have made New Zealand increasingly diverse. In the population census of 2006, it was estimated that 879,543 people were born overseas (Department of Labour, 2008). That means that approximately one in five New Zealanders were immigrants. The 2013 census is likely to show an increase in the number of immigrants – a large proportion coming from the so-called 'Confucian' societies of East Asia, constituting people from China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore and North and South Korea. In fact, it is estimated that the population in New Zealand drawn from these countries will continue to grow from around 250,000 in 2006 to around 550,000 in 2026 (Beford & Ho, 2008). Despite going through processes of modernization, it has been argued that Confucian values still shape the value systems of these societies. It can be argued, then, that Confucian values and concepts still shape these societies' attitudes toward social justice. Thus, it also can be speculated that immigrants from these societies still have their own cultural concepts of certain political and social notions. How these notions conflict with or are complementary to dominant ideas about social justice held in New Zealand society is the major theme of this thesis.

Drawing upon Iris Marion Young's theory that a just society is one in which cultural diversity is acknowledged, I believe that it is important to know how people from Confucian societies in New Zealand conceptualize social justice. Young (1990) argues that ignoring cultural expressions creates a form of cultural domination, which reinforces injustice. As she points out, "cultural imperialism involves the paradox of experiencing oneself as invisible at the same time that one

is marked out differently" (Young, 1990, p. 60). She further argues that this invisibility becomes stronger when there is a failure to recognize different cultural expressions as a perspective (Young, 1990). Another prominent political theorist, Nancy Fraser, argues that a just society requires not only redistribution but also the recognition of various groups in society. Non-recognition, according to her, may become an obstacle for participation in society. "A theory of justice must reach beyond the distribution of rights and goods to examine institutionalized patterns of cultural value; it must ask whether such patterns impede parity of social life" (Fraser, 2003, p. 34).

Further, some studies have outlined that in order to achieve social justice, societies should work toward empowerment of individuals and groups. These studies see social justice as groups and individuals having equal access to resources. This belief in equal access encompasses the idea that structural and institutional barriers must be reduced so that the participation in societies as well as access to resources by different individuals and groups is enhanced (Torres-Harding, Siers & Olsen, 2011). On the other hand, recognition may undermine certain values relating to how people in New Zealanders have regarded social justice in the past. For example, as we shall see further in this thesis, a Confucian based theory of social justice is not concerned with the value of equality (Chan, 2001), which is a value that is upheld in New Zealand (Halligan, 2003).

At the same time, raising awareness about social justice promotes favourable attitudes toward social action, including political and social activism or activities related to promotion of social justice. Social action can be defined, for example, as engaging in work that promotes empowerment of individuals or groups. One can choose to engage in such work as a volunteer or through career. A study that was conducted by Torres-Harding, Siers and Olsen (2011) found that people, who were more aware of social justice related issues, were more likely to be interested to work in a public service. Thus, raising awareness about social justice enhances the chances of social action. Raising awareness about how immigrants from Confucian societies regard social justice may entail that people who choose to work in public sector, take into consideration such attitudes, which in turn could strengthen social cohesion. In line with these points, this study will endeavour to find out how immigrants from Confucian societies conceptualize social justice.

The second chapter of this thesis, then, offers accounts of Western theories of social justice and their influence on the New Zealand political system. In the first part of this chapter, the focus will be on the schools of thought that are the products of modernity in the West. As Parel (2003) argues, modern Western political philosophy has subverted classical and medieval philosophy and the notions and ideas that have emerged in the modern era dominate the Western political system of New Zealand. The second part of this chapter looks at the history of the pursuit of social justice in New Zealand. Arguments from various Western theorists will be explained and evaluated. The reason for comparing 'Western' theories of social justice with the Confucian ones is that, as pointed out earlier, 'Western' theories and concepts are the source of political and legal institutional arrangements in New Zealand. On the other hand, 'Confucianism' can be considered as the dominant tradition of East Asian societies (Parel, 2003).

The third chapter will assess if there is a Confucian-based concept of social justice. Confucianism is considered as the dominant tradition of East Asian societies (Parel, 2003). Therefore, Confucianism can also provide the basis through which people in East Asian societies conceptualize social justice. However, as Joseph Chan (2001) points out, the East Asian notion of social justice has not been given explicit treatment. For this reason, a Confucian concept of social justice is relatively interpretive. Therefore, in this chapter I will look at how social justice can be interpreted in Confucianism. On the other hand, it has been argued that modernity has also subverted non-Western philosophies, including Confucianism (Parel, 2003). In the last few decades, there has been considerable argument in the scholarly field about the impact of modernization on so-called Confucian values. As it shall be seen in this chapter, some scholars have argued that a Confucian value system is incompatible with modernization and therefore, it has largely faded away (Martin, 1990). Other scholars argue that Confucianism is still a dominant force in East Asian societies, albeit in different form; in fact, they attribute certain positive aspects of their societies in the modern era to Confucianism. An example of this is the economic "miracle" of the four Asian 'Tigers' of Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea and Hong Kong between the 1960s and the 1990s (Holliday & Wilding, 2003). Therefore, in the second part of this chapter, there will be a discussion on whether a Confucian-based value system is still present in East Asian societies today. I will look at secondary data from past surveys as well as existing literature on the presence of Confucianism in East Asian societies in order to identify a Confucian theory of social justice in contemporary East Asian societies.

In this research, I utilized primary data to find out how immigrants to New Zealand conceptualize social justice. I conducted interviews with eight members of immigrant communities in New Zealand who had backgrounds in Confucian societies, the results of which will be discussed in chapter four of this thesis. In this chapter, I will also discuss the impact of the presence of Confucian concepts of social justice on the New Zealand society. I will do this by drawing upon Elizabeth Rata's work, who argues that communitarianism is against individualism and equality (2005). She asserts that traditional cultures are hierarchal and therefore inequality is justified within them. According to Rata (2011), this is compatible with market-liberalism, because inequality is more advantageous to production. The methodology and data collection technique used for these interviews will be discussed below. In chapter four, I will also discuss the impact on New Zealand society of the presence of Confucian concepts of social justice. Finally, based on the results and theories, I will suggest that participants from Confucian societies are not strongly influenced by Confucianism in their perceptions of social justice. Although the participants in the research illustrated some level of inclination towards the family and community, which could be in line with a Confucian-based notion of social justice, most of them also believed in certain concepts that cannot be aligned with a Confucian concept of social justice. A good example was the strong belief in equality, a concept which is conflict with a Confucian-based value system and a Confucian perspective of social justice.

Methodology

There are two methods through which research in social sciences can be conducted: the quantitative method and the qualitative method. The aim of this study is to explore the extent to which immigrants to New Zealand from Confucian societies reflect principles of Confucian philosophy in terms of social justice. The research is thus about interpreting their world view based on concepts that can be culturally experienced and socially constructed. Such research can be done using the qualitative method. According to Berg (2009), "qualitative research refers to the meanings, concepts, definitions, characterization, metaphors, symbols, and description of things. In contrast, quantitative research refers to counts and measures of things" (p. 3). This is especially the case for the critical paradigms within the study of social sciences. An example of these could be feminist research, which intends to "radically change fundamental social structures and processes and to reconceptualise the entire research enterprise" (Marshall & Rossman,

1999, p. 1). Thus, certain paradigms involve different assumptions of what a proper research inquiry is and therefore they use qualitative and interpretive approaches.

Thus, the qualitative method is best used to explore how different people perceive the world around them and how they explain it. There are several ways to collect qualitative interview data including qualitative interviewing (Berg, 2009). Through qualitative interviewing, one can interpret meanings of concepts that are socially constructed (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). Since the aim of the study is to understand the ways in which people from Confucian societies conceptualize social justice – assuming that social justice is a subjective concept itself – the qualitative method was used and collection of the data was done through the use of 'elite' interviews.

As Rossman and Marshall point out, "an elite interview is a specialized case of interviewing that focuses on a particular type of interviewee" (1999, p. 113). 'Elites' are usually people that are influential, prominent and well informed (Rossmann & Marshall, 1999). For this study I chose elite research participants who were known in their communities and were part of organizations that represented their communities. They were also prominent and well informed. Among them were business leaders, journalists, people who held positions in community-recognized organizations, politicians, and leaders of cultural organizations in New Zealand. Since I was adopting an elite interview methodology, I selected participants deliberately and thoughtfully rather than through random selection. Since the participants held positions in different organizations, their details were found online and were contacted through email. Participants were individuals that were identified as immigrants to New Zealand from Korea, China and Taiwan. Immigrants from these countries constitute the largest populations of immigrants from East Asia in New Zealand and therefore it was more likely that there were many organizations linked to their communities. This enabled me to search more quickly for participants, being aware of the time limit for the research. Because immigrants from such backgrounds have a longer history of being in New Zealand it was assumed they would be more able to engage using the English language. I also assumed that they would have a better understanding of New Zealand culture, which in my judgement meant having been a resident in New Zealand for at least five years.

The advantage of selecting elites for research participation is that they are likely to have some level of understanding of the research subject. According to Marshall and

Rossmann (1999), since elites hold positions in social, political and administrative realms, they can provide information valuable to the research. However, there are also disadvantages in selecting elites to participate in research. One of the disadvantages is their schedules may be full since being an elite means that their lives are eventful (Zuckerman, 1972).

Initially, a target of approximately 15 participants was adopted for the research. Finally, however, I managed to conduct interviews with 8 participants. The table in the next page contains information about the participants. Due to the circumstances of one of the participants, and reluctance another two to be named, I decided to not mention their names.

It has been argued that this number of participants is within an acceptable range for a qualitative research. The aim of the study is to interpret concepts from a different cultural point of view. This requires a more intensive study and according to John Gerring (2007), practical reasons mean that such research is usually limited to a dozen or fewer participants. Furthermore, Gerring (2007) argues that many influential researches have used fewer subjects. Examples include Freud's work in human psychology and Piaget's theory of cognitive development (Gerring, 2007).

Table 2: Information about the research participants

Participant	Occupation
A	Committee member in Auckland Chinese Community Centre, a known person in the Chinese media of New Zealand.
B	I prefer to keep this participant as anonymous.
C	A business person, a politician and a member of a liberal party.
D	A well known lawyer who works with the Asian community and is also involved in politics.
E	The participant preferred that no information will be provided on her/him.
F	A communicator at the Business Council involving China and New Zealand. The participant was described as an expert in issues relating to this thesis by the chairperson of the Council.
G	Businessman, designer and politician. The participant is a member of leftist party.
H	A manager in a well known organization that assists immigrants from Asia to settle in New Zealand.

Data Collection

The data was gathered through semi-structured elite interviews. Semi-structured interviewing was used because it allowed the discussion of important themes whereby participants clarified their answers by taking control and talking. I also chose to conduct conversation-style interviews with the participants as this approach allowed them flexibility and enabled them to feel more confident in talking about topics. As the conversations developed, certain topics were discussed that were meant for subsequent discussion. Semi-structured interviewing allowed me to have control over these issues.

In research that involves interpreting socially constructed concepts within the context of a different culture, it is important for a qualitative interviewer to learn and understand cultural concepts and definitions (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). Based on an interpretation of what Confucian theory of social justice may be like, a list of questions was made. While some of the questions were not directly linked to a Confucian concept of social justice, through some of the answers I could interpret concepts that will be mentioned in the theory chapter. Furthermore, I looked at pre-existing data (in chapter two) as well as some of the findings of the Maxim Institute (2006) study about perceptions of social

justice in New Zealand. I triangulated them with findings from my interviews through interpretation, given the small size of my participant base. The interviews were used to add emphasis and texture to the findings based on existing research.

The data was recorded and saved on the sound-recorder of my laptop. This enabled me to create accurate and complete transcripts. After the interviews were conducted, the data was transcribed. Since a Confucian concept of social justice is interpretive, the questions were based on Joseph Chan's (2001) idea of Confucian social justice. He has argued that according to Confucianism a just society means that the government is responsible for making sure that the citizens lead a good life. The good life, according to Confucianism, entails the extent to which individuals develop their moral virtues, engage in community life and have valuable human relationships (Chan, 2001). A Confucian perspective on social justice as such has the following features:

> (1) Sufficiency for all – there is state provision to ensure that each citizen enjoys a level of material goods sufficient to live a good life. First priority would be given to the poor and needy. (2) Universal education – there is publicly sponsored education for all. (3) Meritocracy – social positions and offices are distributed, and hence differential rewards justified, on the basis of individual merit. Confucian justice differs from egalitarian justice in that the former does not seek to equalize life chances as such. It does not see natural inequalities (such as unequal natural talents) or social inequalities (such as unequal family background) as inherently unjust. When it comes to matters about people's well-being, material welfare, and life chances, Confucian justice seeks to promote sufficiency for all and not equality between individuals (Chan, 2001).

Accordingly, I made up a list of questions, which were as follows:

1. What do you think about the role of government in general in people's lives? What do you think just rulers/governments should do for their citizens?
   a) What do you think about the distribution of resources?
   b) What do you think about equality in society?
   c) What do you think about the government's role in making sure that everyone gets equal opportunities? For example, how should people have access to political institutions? (meritocracy)
   d) To what extent do you think the government should provide healthcare?

e) To what extent should the government provide education and to what level? Or is this mainly a personal responsibility?

f) What do you think about the government providing security for the least advantaged members

 of New Zealand society?

g) What do you think about policies that target state resources based on ethnicity?

I assumed that the answers to these questions would provide a rough idea of perceptions held by the participants with regard to the theme of social justice. I looked at their responses in terms of patterns, ideas and themes and based on this I drew conclusions regarding participants' views on the concepts in question.

I should clarify that in questions e and f I tried to determine if the participants believed more strongly in a communitarian society or an individualistic one. In question f, I tried to find this out by asking if participants believed there should be a family based care system for the elderly – referred to as the needy in Confucianism. Question e attempted to find out if participants believed in the strengthening of community rather than individuals.

In a second series of questions, I tried to find out more directly to what extent participants felt their backgrounds influenced their conceptions of social justice. The questions were:

1. The first question asked: what do you think a socially just society looks like?

2. After participants were asked: What hinders social justice in New Zealand? This was subsequently guided towards:

3. What can New Zealand learn from your culture about social justice?

Chapter 2: Western Concepts of Social Justice

This chapter compares discusses Western concepts of social justice. The first part discusses different theories of social justice in Western political philosophy. Social justice has been the subject of discussion over many ages but gained a strong boost during the European Enlightenment in the 18th and the 19th centuries as a consequence of the social and economic transformation which was taking place in Europe and America at the time (Sen, 2009). Although rulers' lack of ethics and benevolence was of primary concern before that time, a quest for social justice can in fact be traced in the writings of thinkers, in uprisings and in social movements long before the Industrial Revolution happened (Macpherson, 1985). Plato, for example, envisaged an ideal society with a 'natural' division of labour amongst its members. In his view, the well-being of a society is assured if the members perform the tasks that they are naturally suited to do in the best manner (Plato, 2004). Aristotle's concerns, however, can be regarded as more closely aligned to contemporary debates. His concerns were over the distribution of material wealth and he emphasized the fact that a moderate income is all that is needed to lead a good life. Aristotle also pointed to the destructiveness of the market economy, which is based on the exchange of money and the quest for profit (Aristotle, 2007). He regarded this as unjust because he believed that making profit this way is at the expense of others. References to distributive justice have also been made in the texts of Christian writers. St. Aquinas, for example, referred to the distribution of wealth in the community and community justice (St. Aquinas, 2010). One should note that references to justice in antiquity were always made within this context of the community and individuals were defined through their roles and status in this community (Perrett, 1992). This differs from the modern concepts of social justice, which often assume that individuals are autonomous beings with different goals. Dominant modern Western conceptions of social justice revolve around the issue of how to promote the autonomy and freedom of the individual, while liberalism promotes individualism. Since liberal political systems have been dominant in the West (Buchanan, 1989), so too, liberalism has been dominant in Western political philosophy. This is also the case in New Zealand, in which the legal-political system is based upon modern concepts of Western philosophy (Duncan, 2004) .

The first part of this chapter will begin with a discussion on various strands of social justice within liberal political thought such as classical liberalism and utilitarianism. Following this, socialist notions of social justice will be discussed. Socialism has often

vigorously challenged liberalism from *within* Western political thought. It opposes liberalism because it does not believe that the values liberalism strives for are achievable through liberalism itself (Gamble, 1981). Subsequently, I will discuss Rawls' theory of justice (1971), which also falls within liberal political thinking and as we shall see can be regarded as a 'contractual' theory of a just society. Next, communitarianism and feminism will be discussed. These two theories have often challenged Rawls' theory of justice as well as liberalism. Communitarianism, especially, has challenged liberalism in various ways, including through one of its variants, namely, socialism. The socialist argument can be seen as relevant in many Asian and African countries that have sought to preserve their values through socialist means (Heywood, 2003). In the West, however, communitarianism has provided the earliest attacks on liberalism after the apparent defeat of socialism (Heywood, 2003).

The second part of this chapter will look at the discourse of social justice within the New Zealand context. It has been explained above that the legal-political system of New Zealand is based on Western political thought. Accordingly, the most influential concepts of the just society that have shaped the political system of New Zealand have been social democracy and various strands of liberalism (Boston, 1999). For the most part, this section will discuss the underpinning reasons why these philosophies have been influential in shaping the discourse of social justice in New Zealand. Also in this section, I will discuss feminism within New Zealand, as well as the Maori quest for the recognition of their cultural values, which can be seen within a communitarian context.

Western Theories of Social Justice

Liberalism

Liberalism has triumphed as a systematic political creed since the 19th century (Heywood, 2003). However, the ideology is based on theories and ideas that were developed during the three centuries prior to the 19th century (Heywood, 2003). Liberal ideas emerged as a result of the break-down of the feudal systems in Europe, and their replacement with market and capitalist societies (Heywood, 2003). Consequently, demand rose for freeing the mobility of labour and capital. This required the abolishment of slavery and a cutback in the unlimited property-owning privileges of the aristocracy. At the same time, demand rose for individuals to have the right to own assets and be able to freely trade their assets. Simultaneously, demand rose for political rights, equal access to courts of justice and protection of property and broader political

participation. Many of these ideas about rights and liberties found early expression in the writings of classical liberals such as Locke and Adam Smith (Duncan, 2004).

In general terms, "the key to liberal ideology is contained in the term 'liberty' or 'freedom', especially as it refers to the liberty of the individual" (Duncan, 2004, p. 59). While committed to individualism, different strands of liberalism are concerned with the question of how to promote the autonomy of the individual. To do that, many theorists of liberalism have drawn moral justification for their theories from traditions such as natural rights (Heywood, 2003).

For classical liberal thinkers such as Locke and Kant (Sen, 2009), 'social contract' is the foundation of society, through which a harmonious coexistence is ensured by consensual association of 'free' and 'equal' individuals. Amartya Sen (2009) calls this group of thinkers 'contractarian'. Individuals enter the social contract, and as a result give up part of their freedom to the government, so that their rights are protected by the government (Locke, 1988). This way chaos can be prevented, which would characterize societies in the absence of institutions (Sen, 2009). For Locke, social contract ensures that individuals can live in a united political society where their natural rights are recognized by an organized power. He declared that these natural rights are the right to live once created; the right to live in freedom; and the right to private property (Locke, 1988).

The overall aim of classical liberal thinkers, who believed in social contract theory, was to develop theories of justice, which mainly focused on ideal institutions (Sen, 2009). For them the ideal would be a society in which the individual can be autonomous, self-reliant, and responsible. The individual should be able to make free choices when it comes to economic and moral issues. For Locke, for example, the state's interference beyond upholding natural rights should be avoided. The only time the state can use force is when it is trying to uphold these rights. Furthermore, the state and its institutions should not play a role in enhancing economic prosperity or in the provision of social security. As Adam Smith suggested, the material needs of individuals should be provided by the market. This will broaden the choice for citizens, which means more freedom of choice (Duncan, 2004).

Therefore, it can said that classical liberals traditionally resisted the idea of 'social justice', when it was associated with the redistribution of wealth. Yet, it could be claimed that social justice was part of their concerns as its ingredients can be seen in

their writings. Adam Smith, for example, was supported the laissez-faire economy because of his concern for the working poor. His measurement for the wealth of a nation was not based on aggregate products, but in terms of opportunities for all individuals in a nation (Smith, 1982). Locke also had similar concerns which could explain his views on private property. He saw private property not only in the context of rights, but also as a means to promote wealth among individuals in a society. Locke's reason for that was based on what was subsequently called 'the tragedy of the commons': If a piece of land is owned by the commons, there is little to no incentive to work on it, since it is possible that that individuals could benefit from each other's labour (Locke, 11988). In such a situation people could wonder why they should invest their labour in growing products when other people on the commons have the right to come along and use them for their own use. At the same time there is the possibility that the land could be exploited when the population exceeds the capacity of the land used by the commons. Therefore, if the land is enclosed, everyone would be better off. Those people that are left without land could at best have access to a small number of resources in the commons which are on their way to ruin, whereas they could be offered jobs now by the new landowner. Thus not only is private property among the natural rights and essential for freedom, but it also results in a society where individuals are overall better off (Locke, 1988).

It can be argued that classical liberalism has a limited definition of liberalism, putting emphasis on laissez-faire capitalism. However, for classical liberal thinkers justice is achieved when individuals are free from coercion and interference and the foundations for such a society can be laid through social contract. It should be said that most of these ideas have also found expression in the writings of neoliberal philosophers/economists such as Fredrick Hayek and Milton Friedman, whose theories have shaped the economic arrangements of the late 20th century in many parts of the world. For example, Friedrich Hayek, who was inspired by classical liberalism, stated in his book *The Road to Serfdom* (1944) that welfare policies could lead to totalitarianism. He argued that economic freedom is the pre-requisite of political freedom. Friedman, in his book *Capitalism and Freedom*, points to the relationship between political and economic freedom. He states:

> Viewed as a means to the end of political freedom, economic arrangements are important because of their effect on concentration or dispersion of power. The kind of organization that provides economic freedom, namely, competitive capitalism, also provides political power because it separates

economic power from political power and this enables the one to
offset the other (Friedman, 2009, p. 9).

Utilitarianism

Jeremy Bentham is generally considered as the founder of utilitarianism, the moral philosophy which believes that 'good' is grounded in happiness, while 'bad' is equated with pain and unhappiness (Heywood, 2003). Bentham's work was based on the writings of other philosophers who had the 'utility' ingredient (sum of pleasure) in their theories. David Hume, Adam Smith and Cesar Beccaria were among those philosophers (Johnston, 2011). Some of these thinkers were in agreement that institutions affect people's lives and therefore they should promote the well-being of people who are affected by them. The "well being of *all* those people, from the least and lowliest to the most eminent, should be taken into account in any evaluation of how well those institutions serve their prescribed purpose" (Johnston, 2011, p. 116). This is in sharp contrast with natural law-based theories that are against institutions' interference with the economy and welfare of people.

Still, it was Bentham who for the first time suggested that utility should be the single principle to which legislators should appeal when they are enacting laws. He rejected the idea of natural laws because he believed that they do not promise freedom and equality for all members of a society, calling them "rhetorical nonsense" and "nonsense upon stilts" (Bentham, 1839, p. 501). He argued natural laws encourage revolution against governments, civil unrest and resistance to laws. Bentham was also against natural laws because at the time he felt these ideas were an obstacle to reform of the English laws. In his view, natural rights served the interests of the privileged elite. Furthermore, he believed that liberty which was proclaimed by the American and French Revolutions had not led to the establishment of a truly free society. Despite these revolutions there was still an omnipresence of slavery and tyranny (Hudelson, 1999).

Bentham believed that natural laws do not provide extrinsic grounds for moral judgement, and therefore, they are subjective. Thus, he appealed to a theory that finds its justification in consequences (Clark & Elliott, 2001) . In terms of the principle of utility, he maintained that "nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure" (Bentham, 1839, p. 1). It is futile to follow any moral conviction that does not find these two as primary points of concern. At that time

Bentham found that the job of government was to maximize utility or the happiness of a society. This happiness was seen in terms of seeking the greatest pleasure and happiness for the greatest number of people (Bowie & Bowie). This laid the foundation of a utilitarian theory of justice.

Utilitarianism was further developed by John Stuart Mill whose father was a friend of Bentham. Mill founded his theory of utility based on Bentham's principles. However, he differed from Bentham in the sense that he did not see pleasure as a uniform phenomenon undifferentiated by its quantity. According to Mill (2010), human beings are capable of 'lower' and 'higher' pleasures. For example, reading poetry or having philosophical knowledge is among the higher pleasures and physical pleasures are among the lower pleasures. By distinguishing between higher and lower pleasures, Mill argued that the former leads to happiness while the latter brings contentment. He famously stated:

> It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied;
> better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the
> fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only
> know their own side of the question (2010, p.14).

What this means is that for Mill utility is the ultimate measurement for justice; however, "in a sense, justice acts as a guardian, preventing short-term subjective interests from undermining the long-term advantages of social institutions" (Clark & Elliott, 2001, p. 475). At the same time, Mill argued that institutional changes should not interfere with legitimate subjective interests of individuals. He considered the following three as the most important subjective interests of individuals: liberty, security and equality.

Mill recognized that these three subjective interests might override economic development which in turn will impede maximization of utility. For example, promotion of equality by institutions may result in equal access to resources but it may at the same time suppress individual effort. Therefore, he conceptualized subjective interests in a way that prevents them being in conflict with the long-term goal of justice which is the maximization of happiness in a society. For example, Mill was in favour of equality of opportunity rather than equality of outcome, since he believed that utility could be best promoted when individuality has been realized. When it comes to the working class, Mill argued against equality of outcome since he believed giving the same wages to all the labourers would lower labour productivity which would in the long term harm the

interests of labourers. He also assumed that equality of outcome would not promote self-help and self-development (Clark & Elliott, 2001).

Nevertheless, it seems that the aim of early utilitarian theorists was to reform the institutions that administered their societies based on maximizing happiness. This meant that certain minimal rights should be bestowed to all members of the society. These rights were needed for personal development. For example, hitherto, only the small privileged elite had the right to vote. Utilitarian theorists, therefore, thought that suffrage should be extended. Mill argued that the right to vote should be extended to include women and the working class people. Furthermore, utilitarian theorists advocated limited government intervention in economy. Bentham, for example, played a significant role in the reforms of the Factory Act and the Poor laws. The Factory Act of 1833 was an Act that was meant to improve the condition of working children (The National Archives of UK Government). The Poor Law Act of 1834 was meant to provide relief for the poor to the point that they could support themselves as well (The National Archive of UK Government). Mill on the other hand, advocated state intervention in helping the lower-classes to achieve self-sufficiency. He was in favour of maximizing equality of opportunity for the individuals in a society (Kaufman, 2012). It has been argued that these ideas set England on the path of becoming a centralised welfare state (Steintrager, 2004). As Amartya Sen (2009) states, welfare economics in its modern form was initiated by Bentham and championed further by economists such as Mill. These utilitarian ideas thus laid the ground for progressive-liberalism/egalitarian-liberalism.

Once its principles had been accepted, utilitarian theory proved to be unstoppable. This was partly due to its reliance on public opinion, which is conceived as the sum of private interests of individuals living in a society (Gamble, 1981, p. 84). That is one of the reasons why utilitarianism became one of the most influential theories of justice. The theory dominated the discourse of social justice in the 20th century, until John Rawls' justice of fairness became an alternative to it in 1971 (Kymlicka, 2002).

However, Will Kimlycka (2002) points out that utilitarianism is no longer coherent as a movement. It is also more conformist than reformist. One reason he points out is that the early utilitarian philosophers where formulating their theories because they wanted to overhaul the society of England, in which the privileged were a small elite group. Many disputes at the time centred on the issue of the extension of rights to the majority

of the population. In the liberal democracies of today, where many rights have been extended to the majority, it has become problematic for utilitarianism to give clear and progressive answers to certain issues in the area of policy making. Moreover, utilitarianism has also faced critique because of its calculation of utility. For example, there are limits on how far the liberty of some people can be sacrificed for the pursuit of greater happiness of the greater number of people. Therefore, many political philosophers began shifting away from utilitarianism in the second half of the 20th century, even though some continued to defend it. One example is Peter Singer, who not only champions utilitarianism for human societies but also for animals (Singer, 1993). Still, none of the theories could provide an alternative to utilitarianism until John Rawls formulated his theory of justice in 1971.

Before moving to the next important theory of liberal justice, which is that of John Rawls' justice as fairness, I will discuss socialism and one of its main schools of thought, namely Marxism, which emerged in approximately the same era as utilitarianism. Socialism itself has often laid vigorous challenges to liberalism, forcing its theorists to look more critically at concepts within the ideology during an era in which thinkers began scrutinizing political institutions and calling for reform (Miller, 1999, p. 3). Indeed, socialists look at certain concepts such as liberty from a different perspective than liberal thinkers. At the same time, while it is important to discuss socialism, it is more important to discuss Marxism because the ideology "is the most important critique of liberalism in Western thought and whereas most other socialist theories were eventually absorbed within liberalism, Marxism stands outside" (Gamble, 1981, p. 111). I will begin the next section by briefly discussing the emergence of socialism. Then I will discuss Marxism, followed by social democracy which is a mix of socialism and liberalism.

Socialism

Similar to the rise of liberalism, socialism emerged in Europe in the late 18th and 19th centuries. Both ideologies appeared as an effect of the bourgeois revolution which resulted in the modern state, abolishment of the feudal system, the movement of capital and demand for labour. In England, the Industrial Revolution in the late 18th century led to the creation of factories, new means of communication and a new industrial proletariat. This was among the starting points of socialism. However, what was also important in the rise of the ideology was the French Revolution. The revolution led to

the initiation of debates over issues and problems of the modern state that had not been settled before. It also led to thinking about concepts whose definitions was far "beyond the limited programmes of the liberal constitutions whose main concern was to protect the private property and maintain order" (Gamble, 1981, p. 91).

The values that early socialists strived for were not much different from the values of the liberals. They also believed in values like equality and liberty. However, they doubted the achievement of these values was possible in liberal societies. The way these concepts were defined by liberals was denounced as worthless by socialists. For example, liberals believed in equality but it was formal equality they endorsed. That means that they believed in equality before the law, equal civil and political rights and equal opportunity (Gamble, 1981). However, they did not believe in equality in terms of access to resources. For them the emergence and perpetuation of inequalities in terms of wealth were justified based on the argument that this would guarantee individual freedom. Socialists, on the other hand, believed that formal political equality destroyed harmony in society. For them, true 'equality' and true 'freedom' could only be achieved if there was the destruction of the means that were responsible for the deterioration of social harmony and justice. For socialists, the most important means to be destroyed was therefore the institution of private property. They believed that private property was the evil cause of division of classes and rift in social harmony. "Only when this rift was abolished and classes abolished, a true just society could be achieved" (Gamble, 1981, p. 102).

How to achieve a socialist society, however, historically divided the advocates of the ideology into two groups: the reformists and the revolutionaries. The first group believed that a socialist state could be achieved by gradual and democratic means while the revolutionaries maintained that private property and the capitalist system could only be eliminated with the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie class (Duncan, 2004).

Prominent members of the reformist group included people like Charles Fourier, Robert Owen and Henri Saint Simon who lived between the late 18th century and the mid-19th century. What this 'group' of people had in common was that they had a radical critique on individualism and preferred a society with social harmony. They did not believe in political activity. Instead they looked for strategies to improve social cooperation, and to achieve more efficient production and fair distribution. They emphasized means such as education to weaken the individualistic and competitive attitudes of society.

Furthermore, they proposed several measures through which socialism could be achieved. Among these were public ownership of the land, abolishment of class distinctions, rationalization of the industry, and redesigning of the cities (Paden, 2002).

On the other hand, a half century later, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels developed a belief that true freedom and equality could be achieved by the revolution and the overthrow of the state and its political institutions, and the systems that strengthen inequality. Marx argued that human beings cannot be free unless production takes place freely. He claimed that this is achieved when activities of human beings are for the purpose of fulfilling human needs through cooperation, which reflects their social nature. Marx's claim was related to his belief about private property and the oppressive nature of it. Marx argued that production is one of the most fundamental human activities. Therefore, the person who owns property and controls the process of production and labour takes away one of the most fundamental attributes of humans, what he called the loss of free will and the 'self'. Therefore, he argued that there is no true freedom unless there is an end of oppression from the property owning class. Moreover, as pointed out above, he also saw freedom in the social nature of human beings. He argued the imbalance that results from the inequality in a society makes freedom impossible (Morrow, 2005).

Marx and Engels believed the modern state and its institutions are by themselves the products of private property, and their interests are the protection of the property owning classes, thus dismissing the idea that the origin of the modern state was justified by social contract. As they put it in *The Communist Manifesto*, "the executive role of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeois" (Marx & Engels, 2002, p. 221).They believed inequalities should be banished in order for people to have a sense of community and feel genuinely free. However, they realized that this was impossible in the modern state, since it is a reflection of the interests of the dominant class. Thus, they believed it is the state itself that upholds inequality. They came to the conclusion that freedom and equality can only be achieved by the overthrow of the political institutions of the modern state and the economic systems that strengthen them. True freedom is realized when the means of production are collectively controlled (Morrow, 2005).

Social Democracy

In the second half of the 19th century another group of socialists appeared within the socialist tradition, whose ideology is still present in modern day politics. This group, namely, the social democrats, found their roots in the socialist tradition. They were influenced by liberalism's emphasis on individual freedom and did not share the pessimism of Marx regarding the state. One of their influential thinkers, Eduard Bernstein, believed the state was an important instrument for moving towards socialism, which could be achieved through reform of constitutional democracies within capitalist systems (Bernstein, 1993).

In general it can be said that social democrats are against the concentration of wealth by the ruling classes. At the same time, they oppose the idea that markets can provide welfare for the masses, even though many of them have shown acceptance of mixed economies. Therefore, they are in favour of collective responses such as state provision of welfare for its citizens (Cheyne, O'Brien & Belgrave, 2008). Moreover, social democrats are committed to state provision of welfare because they believe that through this more people in a society can truly be free. While committed to equality, Bernstein, for example, states:

> The aim of all socialist measures, even of those which appear outwardly as coercive measures, is the development and the securing of a free personality. Their more exact examination always shows that the coercion included will raise the sum total of liberty in society, and will give more freedom over a more extended area than it takes away (1909, pp. 149-150).

Because of this, some have argued in the past that 'social democracy' and 'liberal equality', pursue the same aims and that the difference is only in the name. However, scholars disagree on this. Some argue that social democracy follows a social conception of justice, while liberal democracy an individualistic conception of justice. As Kymlicka (2002) puts it:

> The former [liberal equality] is concerned with the claims of individuals to their share of resources; the latter [social democracy] is concerned with constructing the right sort of egalitarian social relationships. The former is concerned with ensuring greater equality in people's private share of resources, the latter with ensuring people's equal standing in public life (pp. 195-196).

As Tony Fitzpatrick (2011) points out, social democrats believe that socialism is more oriented towards social justice and welfare. They believe that equality of opportunity is insufficient as there will always be inequalities and underserved disadvantages in society, which are reinforced by capitalism. Inequalities in a capitalist system have also a habit of being ossified into cross-generational structures. Moreover, socialism is against class-based exploration. Thus, the goal of social democracy is to create a classless egalitarian society (Fitzpatrick, 2011). These are some of the points that distinguish social democrats from liberal democrats such as John Rawls. So far, therefore, it has been pointed out that socialism emphasizes social relations as an important premise for social justice. The ideology looks differently on notions such as private property, equality, liberty and even social contract. In the next section I will discuss Rawls' theory of social justice, which falls within the paradigm of liberal equality.

Liberalism and Rawls' Theory of Justice

John Rawls, who was a major critic of utilitarianism, believed a just society is not based on the principle of utility. He believed it is unlikely that individuals who believe in equality would agree on a principle which limits life prospects for some in order to achieve a greater sum of advantages (Rawls, 1971, p. 140). At the same time, he believed that current theories disputing utilitarianism provided unsatisfactory alternatives. He called these theories 'intuitionist' since they spoke to people's primary intuitions regarding justice. Rawls believed a theory was needed to speak to intuitions but which also made sense of those intuitions. Hence, he formulated his own theory of justice, called *justice as fairness* (Kymlicka, 2002).

The foundation of a just society for Rawls is based on principles that agreed upon from an equal and fair position. Thus for Rawls, principles of justice are the result of a social contract. What makes Rawls' version of social contract different from others who use this conceptual device is that he believed that the social contract must be settled from a fair position. For him this is an imaginary 'original position'. In the original position, individuals have a 'veil of ignorance', meaning that they are unaware of their personal attributes and talents.

> This ensures that no one is advantaged and or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances. Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to design principles to favour his

particular condition, the principles of justice are the result of a
fair agreement or bargain (Rawls, 1971, p. 12).

Therefore, the principles of justice in Rawls' theory were chosen in an equal and a fair position. He believed in the original position: individuals choose the goods that are necessary for them to lead a good life. However, because they are unaware of their talents, abilities and disabilities, they do not know what goods are beneficial for them. This assures that gains and losses based on an arbitrary place in a society are eliminated.

Rational individuals choose to maximize what they get in case they end up in the worst position in society. Consequently, they prefer the following two principles of justice: First (1), all the contractors in the original position will agree on full access to equal basic liberties. This gets priority over all other principles. The second principle has two parts. The first (2a) is that all agree on equal distribution of social primary goods. The second (2b) is called the difference principle, on which the contractors agree that inequalities should be arranged in a way so that they are to the advantage of the least advantaged member of society (Rawls, 1971).

Rawls argued that instead of focusing on the promotion of utility, there should be emphasis on providing primary social goods. These are the goods that every individual needs in order to achieve self-realization. Among them are income and wealth, basic liberties and self-respect. According to Rawls' principles, some social goods are more important than others, and so, they cannot be relinquished to promote other social goods (Rawls, 1971). For example, equal liberties are the most important social goods and therefore they get priority over others. One of Rawls' aims was to put together a theory in which institutions of a society are arranged in an order that allows distribution to be fair. His idea could be called 'egalitarian' because he believed that all social primary goods should be distributed equally unless unequal distribution is to the advantage of the least advantaged people in a society.

Rawls' theory of *justice as fairness* has attracted wide attention within academic circles. It has been described as one of the most influential writings in political philosophy in the last century (Raphael, 2001). Scholars argue that Rawls' theory of justice has set the framework of debate on social justice in the 20th century and that many theories in the last few decades have been formulated as a response to Rawls' work (Daniels, 1989). This is the case for both theories that are against Rawls' theory, as well the ones that are influenced by it. As Solomon and Murphy put it: "*A theory of justice* has been

accredited with almost singlehandedly reviving moribund political philosophy and virtually nothing written today about justice manages to escape a direct confrontation with that work" (2000, p. 279). With that in mind, the next section discusses some of the responses to Rawls' work. Since there are many responses, the discussion will be about the most prominent ones, two of which will be criticisms from theorists of the communitarian and feminist schools of thought. These critics will be discussed along with a general account of their theories.

Critiques of Rawls

Communitarianism as a political philosophy not only targets Rawls as a subject of critique but also the school of thought within which Rawls' work belongs: liberalism. Just like Marxists that reject the foundation of liberalism, communitarians target some of the principles upon which liberal political philosophy has been built. In fact, it can be argued that the emphasis on the 'community', which is the defining feature of communitarians, can also be found in Marxism. However, the communitarianism that has gained prominence in the last few decades is in contrast with Marxism because to some extent it believes in the social values of communities, which can be seen as exploitative by Marxists (Kymlicka, 2002, p. 209). Amy Guttman (1985) points out that old communitarians used to look up to Marx and his ideals of reshaping the world while the new communitarians find inspiration in Hegel's ideals of wanting to reconcile people with their world.

In general, communitarians put emphasis on the importance of the community and see it as the basis for the development of the individual, while at the same time stressing the role of shared values of the community as the foundation of what is just. They reject the claim that natural rights are the foundation of a just society. "Instead the fundamental value is one of 'belonging' or 'participating' within a social group, and this means accepting the 'individual' duty to that group within the role she or he occupies" (Duncan, 2004, p. 191).

Contemporary communitarians' critique of liberal justice includes social conceptions that are found in Hegel's work. Similar to communitarians, Hegel did not believe individuals are separated from their societies and that freedom does not merely exist in terms of individuals pursing their preferences. On the contrary, people are free when they are engaging and interacting with their external world. He believed that the human ethical life and individual identity is embedded in the practices of the societies those

individuals belong to as well as their sphere of social duties. Freedom is more complete this way (Hegel, 1991). Contemporary communitarians give similar consideration to ideas and ethical values of a given society. Charles Taylor (1999) for example, argues that men cannot simply be regarded as 'individuals' because individuals identify themselves by their community, culture and language. Moreover, he rejects the claim of the universality of one absolute value for morality, believing that individuals conceive themselves and what they find to be moral through their commitments to their surroundings. These commitments are not only strong feelings about what are good values, but they are also evaluative frameworks of identification without which they would be lost.

This means that communitarians do not believe in a universal theory of justice. Michael Walzer (1983), for example, rejects the idea of universal justice, believing the quest for it is misguided. For him the quest for justice must be culture-specific. In his book, *Spheres of Justice* (1983)*,* Walzer's argument is that it is impossible to step outside the community and history to evaluate the requirements for justice. He claims that in order to understand justice from the perspective of a particular community, one must evaluate the way that community distributes social goods, which is not detached from history and culture: "different social goods ought to be distributed for different reasons, in accordance with different procedures, by different agents; and all these differences derive from different social goods themselves-the inevitable product of historical and cultural particularism" (Walzer, 1983). Thus, identifying the principles of justice is not a matter of philosophical argument; rather, it is embodied in shared characteristics and practices of institutions of a particular society and its culture.

Another communitarian thinker, Alasdair Macintyre (1988), argued that liberalism is flawed because liberal morality is subject to arbitrary commitments and personal wills. He believes that this is notable in the language used for those arbitrary commitments. For example, someone might tell another: you have to be doing this because it is your duty. Macintyre points out that by doing this we are displaying our arbitrary feelings and attitudes, which have a historical meaning to them since they are not justifiable. This means that individuals could claim that a certain moral view is right but in effect there is not one single perspective on morality. Macintyre (1988) believes moral judgments are therefore bound to their surroundings and that overlapping communal traditions and customs are the sources of how human goods are distributed.

The above forms the basis for Macintyre's critique of Rawls. Macintyre (1988) argues that according to Rawls, the original position is composed of individuals who come together to form common rules for a society to live by. By placing emphasis on individuals and excluding the community, Rawls neglects the possibility that the contractors in the original positions could be communities who have different understandings of what is a good life for human beings (Macintyre, 1988). Therefore, from a communitarian point of view, the argument of justice principles based on the imaginative original position becomes redundant. Also, Michael Sandel (1982) argues that Rawls depicts a person in the original position that is autonomous but seeks cooperation because of circumstances. According to Sandel, this concept of the person is separate from its history and community, commitments and capacities and therefore thin and denuded.

Feminism

Like communitarians, feminists also criticize liberal theories of justice in general terms. Although, it be should said that 'first wave' feminists sought to promote gender equality within the context of liberalism (Fitzpatrick, 2011). They believed that liberal institutions possessed enough flexibility to allow women to achieve equality with men. However, from the 1960s onwards, after the emergence of 'second wave' feminism, many feminist thinkers of justice argued that most liberal theories seek to promote the autonomy of a free individual. This individual is implicitly male in most theories of justice. For example, the social contract is an accord between male heads of households and excludes woman by and large. The equal 'rights' that are established in the liberal social contract only reinforce the subordination of women in patriarchal households and, in comparison to males, places them in a vulnerable and disadvantaged position in society. Therefore, feminist theories of justice have sought to illustrate the issues present in liberal theories of justice and to promote women's case for liberty and equality (Duncan, 2004, p. 157).

The main rallying cry of the 'second wave' feminist theorists was the separation of private and public spheres. Most liberal theories of justice consider families as private units. According to feminists, this makes women vulnerable and dependent and it puts them in a disadvantaged position in comparison to males. An example of this is, when it comes to marriage and family life, it is mostly the men that are the providers. A woman as a care-giver faces either the choice to be at home and do the domestic work or take a

part-time job. Either of these two cases makes the women care-giver economically dependent and puts them in a disadvantaged position. As a result, some feminists have argued in their theories that the traditional distinction between public and private life should be overcome. Following that, certain measures can be taken to put women in a more equal position in comparison to men. One of the measures is to get paid for domestic work. Also, suggestions have been made by some feminists for the equal splitting of wages between the parents, even if there is only one wage-working partner in the family (Okin, 1991).

When it comes to Rawls, feminists argue that Rawls' principles of justice, like other contract-based theories, give women an unfair disadvantage. They argue that Rawls believes his principles of justice apply to the basic structure of society. For Rawls this basic structure is the way that social institutions distribute rights and duties and it includes the family. Feminists such as Susan Okin (1991) have argued that if the family is considered as the basic structure of society, women are denied equal opportunity. Okin (1991) suggested that Rawls' theory of justice should include the concerns of women: to achieve justice, genderless families should be promoted and the roles and responsibilities in the families should be shared equally. It should be mentioned that Rawls addressed this issue in his book *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement* (2001). He argued that his principles of justice apply to basic structures of the society. However, they do not apply directly to the internal life of the basic structures. That means that certain rights and liberties are protected by constraints outside of internal life structure, which will limit inequalities and injustice (Rawls, 2001).

Nevertheless, other feminist theorists of social justice address the issue of social justice from a very different angle. They believe that many concepts within the discourse of social justice have been generated by white middle-class men, something that Kymlicka (2002, p. 327) calls the 'normal citizen'. This is due to the fact that men have been the creators and administrators of the institutions. Hence, in some societies there is often emphasis on concepts such as individualism, competition and productivity. This is especially the case in Western societies. It is argued that if women had been the creators and administrators of those institutions, there may have been more emphasis on concepts such as community, nurturing and connectedness between individuals as these concepts are more characteristic of female lives (Callahan & Roberts, 1996).

So far, this chapter has examined theories of social justice put forward by writers in the West. I have also examined concepts that upon which Western theories of justice have been founded. Among these concepts were social contract, utility, equality and individualism, community and gender equality. Many of these theories and concepts have also influenced the legal-political system of New Zealand. In the next section of this chapter, there will be discussion on the theories and concepts of social justice that have been dominant in New Zealand.

Social Justice in New Zealand

Background

The early decades of the 19th century in Britain influenced the formation of Chartist, Liberal and Radical cultures. These cultures were looking to reform the laws and the system of Britain. Chartism was a mass-movement addressing the struggles of the working class, while the Radicals were people who wanted parliamentary reforms. Among Radicals were people such as Bentham and Mill. Many of these individuals began considering different approaches and solutions to issues such as poverty, rising inequalities, class warfare as well as lack of political representation. Radicals sought parliamentary reforms in the 1820s. Later, the reform movement became more centrist. Different groups such as the followers of Robert Owen, trade unions and Whig Aristocrats were brought together. A decade later, when unemployment was high and wages were low, the Chartist movement became more threatening to the ruling classes. This was followed by repression and imprisonment took place. As a result, Chartists turned towards settlement on land as well as emigration. Many Chartists and Radicals, who had a strong tradition based on redistribution of the land, saw landed monopoly as the cause of inequalities. Many wage-earners blamed lack of access to land as the reason for the decline in security and devaluation of their skills (Martin, 2010).

Against this background, Edward Gibbon Wakefield developed his theory of political economy and systematic colonization. He argued that emigration should be devoted to the development of new societies. In these new societies, labour, capital and land would be fruitfully combined. He believed that the unemployment problems of Britain's labouring class could be solved by the expansion of unoccupied land in the Antipodes. Among his intentions was to create a society that could provide high wages for the labourers as well social mobility. He further believed he could recreate British society without its class relations. Wakefield believed that because there was enough available

'free' land in New Zealand, property ownership would not be restricted to the wealthy people. Although there are doubts regarding his real motives, The New Zealand Company, which was set up for the systematic colonization of New Zealand, followed Wakefield's ideas and plans. According to his plans, the state in New Zealand would take a stronger role than it did in Britain while at the same time act in the interests of wage-earners. In line with that, the purpose of 'sufficient price' was to facilitate the mobility of wage-earners and help them to settle on land (Martin, 2010). Wakefield believed that New Zealand could provide opportunity for all people, including wage-earners, to acquire property (Duncan, 2004).

Wakefield's ideas attracted widespread support among a group of radicals called Colonial Reformers. They were among the colonizers of New Zealand, and typically originated from the English middle class. This middle class was characterized by having individual ambition among its members, while at the same time its members were unhappy about their low status in a class-based society (Thomson, 2012). Therefore, the waves of immigrants who arrived in the country brought with them their strong values and political affiliations. They expected to create an egalitarian society in which people with different backgrounds were less constrained than in Britain and would have equal opportunities (Martin, 2010). According to Duncan (2004), the 'spirit' of classical liberalism was present among these immigrants that came to New Zealand. They strived for a liberal society based on self-reliance and individualism, and free from the ills of Britain and its poverty and unemployment (Duncan, 2004).

As a result, in the first few decades after settlement, there was little support for the idea that the government or the public should promote the welfare of the community and demand for the public provision of welfare did not begin to develop until around the 1870s. According to Tennant (2004), in the first few decades after the settlement, provision of welfare was largely averted. This was mainly because the settlers that came to the country were younger, healthier and richer. As Thomson (1998) points out, "the poorest, sickest, or most handicapped undoubtedly were left behind, and so were under-represented in the new colony" (p. 19).

However, by the 1870s, the ageing process began to catch up with many settlers. At the same time, the discovery of gold attracted new waves of settlers to the country. But, as Hutchinson (1916) points out, it was soon to be discovered that the 'gold boom' was an exaggeration, "and when the bubble burst a horde of men were left in in the mines and

the cities without work" (p. 4). Also, the export of dairy products had shrunk and the national debt of the country had begun to rise. The economy reached stagnation (Hutchinson, 1916). As a result, New Zealand began reproducing the negative features of the old world and issues such as unemployment, poverty, alcoholism and prostitution were on the rise (Duncan, 2004). Many of the immigrants, who had left Britain in search of a better life, felt that they had not achieved their aim. During a sermon in 1888, Reverend Rutherford Waddell criticized the fact that the conditions in Britain from which many emigrants had escaped were being reproduced in New Zealand. He began questioning if New Zealand was the moral and just society that it had promised to be. Others began developing the same doubts and many from different political backgrounds began calling for reform. Furthermore, discontent with working conditions led to union actions such as the seamen's and the wharf strikes in 1890 (Sinclair, 1967). The Government of Premier Atkinson remained neutral during the strikes, while some of the Liberals who were among the people that had called for reforms were supportive of the strikes. Among these Liberals were people such as William Pember Reeves. During the election, the Liberals ran on a reform platform, which received the support of many groups including labour unions. As a result, they won the elections of 1890 and formed the Liberal Labour government (Condliffe, 1959). Many members of the Labour Liberal Government were in favour of a society which enhanced individual opportunity for all members and not only for one privileged section of society (Bassett, 1998).

Many members of the Liberal Labour Government were influenced by the views of John Stuart Mill (Sinclair, 1967; Condliffe, 1959), believing that the state must take positive steps in improving the lives of all the people in New Zealand (Sinclair, 1967). Several Acts that were enacted by Parliament during the Liberal Labour Government served as evidence for that. Among these Acts were the Factories Act of 1891, the Industrial Arbitration Act of 1894 and the Old Pension Act of 1898 (Lee, 1938). Condliffe (1959) points out that the main source of most of these legislations was Mill. He asserts that "the great master of political economy was widely read and had many correspondents in the colony" (1959, p. 182). However, it has also been claimed that some members of the Liberal Labour Government believed in socialism. One example is William Pember Reeves, who it is said believed in state socialism (Moloney, 2002). As Moloney states, "Reeves is an inseparable person from the idea of socialism in New Zealand" (2002, p. 42). Nevertheless, Mill was an inspiration for many people in New

Zealand at the time and the policies of the Liberal Labour Government were more concurrent with progressive liberalism/egalitarian liberalism.

From Social Democracy to Neoliberalism

Later, many unions and workers that were unhappy about their limited wages and their living standards came together to form the Labour Party in 1916 (Gustafson 1980; Bassett, 1998). The party was formed as a result of the unification of several groups on the left. However, it was not until 1935 that the Labour Party led by Michael Joseph Savage won the elections. Richard Peet (2012) points out that Labour's policies were at first too radical and therefore did not appeal to middle-class and rural voters. Later, the Labour Party moved towards the right to adjust to political realities and to win broader support. After the 1925 elections, the Party moved "towards liberal mainstream, with the addition of more socialistic conceptions of a welfare state and with membership and leadership coming from the unions" (Peet, 2012, p. 160). Gustafson (1980) asserts that the worldwide economic depression in the 1920s and 1930s led to the victory of the Labour Party.

The Labour Government of Savage that won the elections in 1935 introduced policies that have bestowed on him the reputation of the man who designed the welfare state in New Zealand. Savage's welfare state policies also became an inspiration for many other leaders in the post-war era (Castles, Leibfried, Lewis, Obinger & Pierson, 2010). In 1938 after a being re-elected, the Labour Government enacted policies that can be regarded as a landmark in the development of the New Zealand welfare state. A few weeks before the re-election, the Social Security Act was passed. The Act came into force in 1939. It consisted of universal health care, benefits to old people, and benefits to the sick and unemployed among others (Bassett, 1998).

New Zealand thus became a welfare state. The welfare state policies were based on the philosophy of social democracy. From a social democracy perspective, a just society requires equal opportunity, social and economic equality as well as equal outcomes. Social democracy believes that in a just and a progressive society, individuals and families need more than a minimum to subsist. A just society requires that individuals and families live in dignity and participate in the social life and culture of that society (Boston, 1999). A just society also requires a strong commitment towards egalitarianism and equality. "This is not to suggest that all inequalities are unjustified; but those that

are unjust should, wherever possible, be reduced, if not eliminated" (Boston, 1999, p. 38). Social democracy believes these goals can be achieved through welfare policies.

Over the next two decades it was felt there was no need to further reform the state. At the same time, during the 1960s and the 1970s the growth in consumer choice, air travel and television, which drew New Zealand more into the international community, made the objectives of a socialist state harder to achieve. "Need became increasingly the ability of individuals to exercise their own spiritual, cultural, sexual, ethnic and consumer choices" (Belgrave, 2004, p. 34). Whereas previously the family had been idealized as the basic unit of society, it now became the consumer. The emphasis was increasingly on the individual rather than the gender-based family unit. Therefore, the idealized worker, driven by consumerism and more individual choice, lost relevance in social policy (Belgrave, 2004). Peet (2012) points out that low economic growth, inflation and hardship combined with the expansion of individualism, resulted in the loss of support for welfare policies. Cowen (1997) also points out that inflation and economic hardship were the result of Britain joining the European Community in 1973, which had disastrous effects on the New Zealand economy. On the other hand, Boston (1992) asserts that in the 1960s and 1970s new philosophical debates emerged concerning the role and policies of the state that involved theorists such as Hayek, Nozick, Friedman and Rawls, shedding a light on the ethical basis of the welfare state. It can be argued that the emergence of all of these issues influenced New Zealand's shift towards the liberalization of the economy and neoliberalism (Belgrave, 2004).

Neoliberalism, as pointed out in the first chapter, is influenced by the ideals of people such as Hayek. Neoliberal philosophers like Hayek advocate the decrease in power of the state and its involvement in the economy. Similar to classical liberals, they encourage the free market and believe individuals know best what serves their interests. They argue that if the welfare state is diminished, competition will create an efficient economy, which will benefit the whole society (Boston, 1999). This is based on the belief that markets are more responsive to the needs of people if they are left to themselves. Therefore, in association with neoliberalism, there is often reference to 'economic deregulation', 'decrease in public spending' and 'privatization'. Moreover, one of the aims of neoliberalism is to give individuals more freedom and autonomy, and at the same time, the theory emphasizes personal responsibility (Duncan, 2004). Furthermore, neoliberals or market liberals are sceptical that social justice can be achieved through welfare policies. They believe welfare policies are morally unjust

while at the same time self-defeating. They argue that welfare policies require high tax rates, which in return make people reluctant to invest in the economy. As a consequence, the economy slows down and therefore, unemployment rises. The overall result is a decrease in living-standards and less employment opportunity (Boston, 1999). Instead, neoliberals argue that there is a need for redirecting assistance towards the needy while making the range of choices for the public wider (Boston, 1992).

In New Zealand, 1984 marked the start of a shift towards neoliberalism. Ironically, it was the Labour Party, which had historically adopted social democracy as its doctrine that implemented this shift. Labour argued that neoliberal policies were necessary as a response to a socially diverse society (Cheyne, O'Brien & Belgrave, 2000). A prominent figure in the Labour Government at that time was Roger Douglas. He was the Minister of Finance and the leading figure in adopting neoliberal changes. Douglas argued that the classic objectives of the Labour Party could be better achieved through a free market. Therefore, many state-owned enterprises became privatized, and subsidies and trade barriers were reduced. At the same time, New Zealand opted for a floating exchange rate as well as liberalized capital flows. These policies were continued under the National Government that came to office in 1990. According to National Prime Minister Jim Bolger, the philosophy of the Government was based on four key principles. These principles were: fairness, self-reliance, efficiency and greater personal choice. "Fairness was defined by Bolger as ensuring that the people in 'genuine need' have adequate access to government assistance and those who can make greater provision for their needs should be encouraged to do so" (St. John, 1999, p. 13).This form of neoliberal economic policy can also be interpreted within the scope of utilitarianism. The emphasis on greater public choice can be traced to public choice theory, whose proponents argue that market mechanisms work more efficiently than the government in providing services for the public. When the government interferes less with the market, there is less monopoly and therefore more competitors are able to enter the market. As a result, the choice becomes wider for consumers. As Duncan points out, "there is an assumption that such systems will result in the greatest overall fulfilment of the human needs within the limits of the resources available (Duncan, 2004, p. 194).

Feminism and Social Justice in New Zealand

In New Zealand, feminism began as a political ideology with the suffrage movement, fighting for the right of women to vote (Duncan, 2004). Women won the right to vote in

1893 and became the envy of many feminists in Western countries (Levesque, 1986). However, that was not the sole concern of feminists during 1890s. Many women and organizations were concerned about gender equality. For example, the National Council of Women of New Zealand (NCWNZ) which emerged as a branch of the International Council of Women in 1896 was concerned with equal pay, equal divorce laws, and economic independence for women. These feminists can be called liberal feminists since they were inspired by liberal concepts of equality and freedom. However, there were also other ideologies that influenced the women's movement. Some of the women were inspired by socialist ideas of English Radicalism and Marxism (Sutch, 1974).

Nevertheless, New Zealand women gradually gained equality in terms of political rights in the 19th and early 20th centuries. After they had won the right to vote, one of their next objectives for NCWNZ was to win the right for women to stand in parliamentary elections. This was achieved in 1919 (Sutch, 1974). Later, they became more focused on gaining their social rights, which were previously overshadowed by the campaign for equal political rights. Women demanded more equal rights in terms of the unemployment benefit, equal opportunities and equal pay. After the Second World War, equal pay became the major issue. In 1957, the Council for Equal Pay and Opportunity was formed by the New Zealand Federation of Business and Professional Women's Club (NZFBPW) and the New Zealand Federation of University Women (NZFUW). The Equal Pay Act was finally passed in 1972 (Nolan, 2000).

As Belgrave (2004) states, in the 1930s and 1940s, the government regarded the needs of women and families as the main the concern of the state, which broke with the government's traditional reluctance to interfere in private lives. Still, the first Labour Government idealized a family in which the man was the breadwinner and the woman the carer of the family and the manager of the house. As Dalley (2004) states, the common perception of the 1950s is the working father and the stay-home mother who took care of the children. Nolan (2000) argues that for most of the 20th century New Zealand women were 'domesticated'. However, by the 1950s the male breadwinner ethos was already being undermined and since then the number of women in the workforce has gradually increased. By 2009, the number of women in the workforce had increased to 61.9 percent (Glazebrook, 2009). Overall, the position of women has changed dramatically over a century and the choices for women have increased (Nolan, 2000). Women are more present in the legal and political system as well as education and have achieved equal status in other areas (Glazebrook, 2009). However, many

feminists have argued that policies to promote equality have not achieved their goals as there is still a wide range of areas in which women are disadvantaged, including equality in terms of pay and an unequal presence in many areas such as education, judiciary and management (Glazebrook, 2009). There is still considerable evidence that women have an inferior political and economic status to men. Many feminists blame the social and economic structure of the society for this. Moreover, they are critical that neoliberalism in New Zealand gives men an unfair advantage in comparison to women (Cheyne, O'Brien & Belgrave, 2000).

Recognition of Maori Concepts of Justice

Paradoxically, and concurrent with the adoption and implementation of neoliberal policies, which put emphasis on individuality, demand grew for the recognition of the collectiveness of Maori society (Belgrave, 2004). In the 19th century the Maori way of life and social structure was looked at with suspicions of 'tribalism' and 'communism' by the settler population. Yet, one of the reasons why New Zealand is labelled as a 'social laboratory' has been the existence of a vocal and strong indigenous population over the last few decades (Tennant, 2004). It is notable that for Maori, notions of justice are linked with the collective responsibly of a group and are compatible with communitarianism. These notions do not start from the perspective of the individual. Conversely, liberals who believe in equality and those who believe in the market economy uphold the notion of individuality. Both of these groups of liberals assume that systems should enhance the interests of individuals. Maori have traditionally emphasized the value of the collective group rather than the individual. Traditional Maori society did not strive to enhance the interest of the individual. "The collective good is the primary value, and individuals solely exist to meet individual's interest" (Perrett, 1992, p. 28). This is not to say that Maori collectivism is still intact; rather, it has been argued that traditional Maori collectivism has been eroded. Still, there are certain characteristics of the Maori culture which define it as more of a collective culture (Perrett, 1992).

When signing the Treaty of Waitangi, the Maori may have thought that their cultural traditions and concepts would remain intact. However, only 18 years after signing the Treaty in 1840 Maori became a minority in their own land as by then their numbers had been outstripped by the Europeans (Sutch, 1966). Not only were they alienated from their lands through various means, but the dominant legal-political system of the

country was Western and according to Jackson (1992), the Maori way of life has been ignored ever since. In fact, the underdevelopment of the Maori population in terms of education, housing, health and employment among others has been attributed to a legal-political system that is based on values different from Maori cultural traditions. As Henare (1999) points out, the under- development of Maori is not just economic; it can also be seen in the context of a crisis in human values. "In this context, sustainable social policy that promotes the common good requires diverse social, cultural, economic, political structures and institutions, which address people's essential needs in a holistic programme of change" (Henare, 1999, p. 59).

The push for recognition of the difference between the cultures of Maori and European New Zealanders began in the 1960s. At first it was Eric Shimmer who in 1968 attempted to redefine the relationship between the Maori and Pakeha within new conceptual framework based on the Canadian model that acknowledges both the Anglophone and Francophone culture. He argued that "to a significant extent, there are in New Zealand two distinct social groups and two distinct cultures in frequent intensive contact with one another" (Schwimmer, 1968). This was followed by a decade of Maori protests looking for increased rights. As Johnson points out, these protests resembled the American civil-rights protests. This led gradually to the recognition and acceptance of 'biculturalism' in New Zealand. For example, publicly funded institutions and government departments have accepted biculturalism as their official policy. In line with that, the 1988 Royal Commission on Social Policy emphasized that in order for New Zealand to be a fair and just society, the cultural traditions of the indigenous people must be recognized. "The increasing awareness of the constitutional importance of the Treaty of Waitangi by Pakeha policy-makers meant that there is growing acknowledgement in public policy of the values of the indigenous people of New Zealand" (Cheyne, O'Brien & Belgrave, 2000, p. 50).

New Waves of Immigrants and Cultural Diversity

According to Spoonley and Bedford (2012), the immigration policy of New Zealand has occurred in three distinct phases. The first phase spanned from 1840 to 1960, starting with the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, which made New Zealand a British colony. The majority of immigrants to New Zealand during this period were from Britain and Ireland. Immigration from these countries was preferred for a long time in order to maintain the British character of the country. The second phase spanned from

the 1960s to the 1980s. During this phase the notion that a nation should be seen as a single community was challenged in many ways, with the strongest voice coming from the Maori community. Maori demanded that the sovereignty of the state should be divided between them and the Pakeha. Many of their demands were recognized by the 1980s. At the same time, in the 1960s the first wave of immigrants from the Pacific countries arrived in the country. This was significant because it was the first immigrant flow from countries that were not British or Irish. The third phase began when the immigration policy changed in 1986. The policy that was put in place for the first time did not privilege European people. Since then a significant number of arrivals in New Zealand have been from Asian countries, especially from Hong Kong, Korea, China, Taiwan and India. This flow of immigration brought about by changes in immigration policy has made New Zealand a multicultural society.

 In 2006, the total population of New Zealanders who were born in Asian countries was 255,111. The largest groups among them were immigrants from China and Hong Kong with their numbers reaching 85,000 in 2006. The second largest group were from Indian backgrounds. Their number stood at 43,000 in 2006. The number of Koreans, Japanese and Taiwanese stood at 28,806, 9573 and 10764 respectively. The number of people identifying as Asian was 354,552 in 2006. Of those people 147,000 came from a Chinese background and 104,000 from an Indian background (Bedford & Ho, 2008). The *National Ethnic Population Projections*: *2006* (base)-*2026*, which was released in 2008, estimates that the number of Asians will increase to between 603,000 and 990,000 by 2026. With assumptions on many dependent variables such as mortality and fertility, it is estimated that the Asian population will in fact be around 778,000. The same projection puts the number of Maori at 820,000 and the number of Pacific Islanders at 480,000. The number of European and other ethnicities was estimated to be around 3,439,000 by (2008). Based on these numbers, Bedford and Ho (2008) argue that at some point the Asian population will inevitably become the second largest group in New Zealand. By taking into account factors such as the economic growth of China and East Asia, and the further orientation of the New Zealand economy toward Asia, it can be estimated that the numbers of people from Confucian societies will grow to a larger number.

Thus, New Zealand will be reshaped further and this may influence the values of New Zealanders, which may be echoed in the political landscape of the country. Manying Ip (2002) has reflected upon this point. She has pointed out that the interest in the Chinese

vote and that of other immigrants may have begun with the arrival of the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) voting system. In MMP, a person that has been chosen as the representative of an electorate is given a seat in parliament. Looking at some electorates in New Zealand it is understandable why the vote of certain immigrant groups is important. For example, in Mt. Roskill, 40.3 percent are Asians. In Botany, that proportion is equal to 33.5 percent. In Pakuranga 27.2 percent are Asians and in Mt. Albert Asians make up 24.1 percent of the population of the electorate (*New Zealand Herald*, 2011). According to the *New Zealand Herald* (2011), the key issues for Indians in the elections of 2011 were the economy, law and order, and health. For Chinese and Koreans the key issues were the economy, education, and health. Furthermore, like other New Zealanders, the participation of immigrants in the political process could influence social cohesion and alienate social exclusion, which in turn will be beneficial the country. Therefore, it is important to know which issues serve as impetuses for Asian participation in the political process. A method to realize that is to measure how they feel about social justice and how they conceptualize it. The reason for this is that social justice, as pointed out before, is often at the centre of the debate on social policy making. Thus, how a group of people think about social policy is influenced by their views on social justice, among other issues. The next chapter attempts to explore how social justice is conceptualized in Confucianism.

Chapter 3: Confucian Concepts of Social Justice and the Influence of Confucianism in Contemporary East Asian Societies

This chapter explores 'Confucian' concepts of social justice. It will begin by explaining why Confucianism has been chosen for the focal point of this study before comparing it with other schools of thought or philosophy, including those of the West, that have influenced Confucian societies since modernization hit the East Asian region. This is important to the discussion since Confucianism as a tradition stems back around 2500 years. Therefore, the following concern might rise: Why compare Confucianism, which goes back 2500 years, with modern theories of Western thinkers? One reason that will be discussed further in the chapter is the claim that Confucianism has survived the process of modernization. In fact, it is argued that certain triumphs within Asian countries during the process of modernization can be attributed to Confucianism. More about this will be discussed in the second part of this chapter. The first part of the chapter explains important concepts within the moral convictions of the Confucian ethical system. Then, social justice will be explained within a Confucian context. Finally, a comparison will be made between Western and Confucian theories of social justice.

In the second part of this chapter, I will look how great the presence of Confucianism is in contemporary East Asian societies. There has been considerable discussion as to what extent Confucianism has survived modernization. Some scholars believe that Confucianism has survived it well, albeit through adjustment. Some even believe that Confucianism has been responsible for certain positive aspects of East Asian modernization such as the economic 'miracle' of the four Asian Tigers. Therefore, I will explain the impact of modernization on Confucianism and the attitudes that grew with it. First, I will briefly discuss the history of Confucianism during modernization. Following that, I will look at surveys of social attitudes and values in order to explore if Confucian values still exist despite modernization. I will consider the pre-existing evidence as to whether core values of the Confucian tradition such as 'filial piety' are still held by people living in so-called Confucian societies. Then, I will endeavour to find out if there are surveys that indicate if Confucian concepts are present in the values of the people in Confucian societies when thinking about social justice. Finally, I will try to trace Confucian attitudes in political and social institutions in East Asian regions. As a part of that, reference will be made to welfare systems. The reason for this is that I will assume that any welfare systems that are present in East Asian societies may find

their legitimacy from a Confucian-based ethical system similar to welfare policies in the West, which have found inspiration in utilitarianism and social democracy.

Confucian Concept of Social Justice

Why Confucianism?

As pointed out above, Confucianism was chosen partly because of the large number of immigrants to New Zealand from so called Confucian societies. It remains to explain, however, why Confucianism was chosen over other religions and philosophies in East Asia such as Buddhism, Taosim or Daoism. The reason why Confucianism was chosen is because of the extent of its influence on East Asian cultures. It is said that regardless of their religious beliefs, people of East Asia "seldom fail to be Confucian" (Weiming 1993, p. 149). East Asia as a whole is a region that consists of around 16 countries that find themselves geographically in South East Asia and North East Asia. The term East Asia is popular and often used in business and diplomatic communities. The countries in the region are culturally diverse. However, in this context, a culturally defined as opposed to geographically defined East Asia refers to the region where the writings of figures such as Confucius, Mencius and their disciples have served in formulating the cultural and institutional basis for regulating public and private life (Shin, 2012, p. 23). 'Cultural' East Asia is thus the region that consists of countries that have a Confucian culture. These countries are China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Vietnam (Shin, 2012, p. 23).

Confucianism has had a profound influence on the cultures of the above mentioned countries. It is a way of life which consists of moral, social, political and religious teachings It is however, not considered as a religion by some people, even if it is mentioned alongside other religions. Nonetheless, its influence is so huge, that it can be said that Confucian ethical values have been, for well over 2000 years, "the source of inspiration as well as the court of appeal for human interaction at all levels— between individuals, communities and nations within the Sinic World" (De Vos & Slote, 1998, p. 3).

When it comes to education and governance, Confucianism has been influential in establishing educational and civic institutions, conforming to Confucian values of universal education and Confucian meritocracy. In educational institutions the most prominent Confucian texts "have served as the core curriculum of moral education"

(Shin, 2012, p. 23). The Confucian concept of meritocracy has affected the process of choosing people for governmental positions. In everyday life, it can be said that Confucian ethical values shape the way people of East Asia interpret the world they live in as well as how they regulate their interpersonal relationships. As Lee and Tamai (2000) put it:

> Confucianism is a philosophy that considers proper behaviour and human relationships as the basis of the society. In pursuit of ideal moral goals, Confucianism sets forth principles that define "appropriate" manners or attitudes toward other people as well as toward oneself (p. 33)

At the same time, Confucian values such as respect for family, order in the society and harmony are upheld by the people of the region. Furthermore, throughout the region, people appeal to moral concepts of Confucianism to engage in political discussions (Shin, 2012, p. 23). However, there is also disagreement between scholars over whether to consider some of these societies as Confucian. In Japan, for example, some have pointed out that Japanese people have completely different lifestyles than the Chinese based on customs, familial system and political forms. Hence, they say that the cultural imagination that considers Chinese, Japanese and Korean culture collectively is not real. They believe that there are historical issues that motivate individuals to have different views: Japan became more advanced in the late 19th century than Korea and China, which caused some Japanese to think they should enter Europe to make more progress. Other scholars, however, point out that there has been some continuity in accepting Confucianism as a way of life (Jiang, 2007). Studies all confirm that the people of East Asia have attitudes that can be considered as Confucian, even though they each have their own distinct characteristics. A study conducted by Tamai and Lee (2000) found differences and similarities between Confucianism and its influence on Japanese and Korean societies. Yet, these studies can still be interpreted as highlighting the influence of Confucianism on the cultures of these East Asia countries.

Another argument that is presented by people who consider East Asia as a cultural whole is the comparison of East Asia with other regions. If countries like Japan, China, Korea and Taiwan, for example, are grouped together and compared to the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, it can be seen that that both of these groups have distinct characteristics through which they are interrelated. The cultures of East Asians emphasize values such as loyalty and piety (both of which are Confucian values), while the cultures of the United States, Britain and Australia value ideas found

in liberalism such as freedom, equality and the rule of law. Based on this, Jiang (2007) concludes that "although we cannot point out how much percentage of commonality East Asian countries share, East Asia, after all, can be seen as a cultural whole" (p. 8).

The Roots of Confucianism

Confucianism began in China around 2500 years ago and spread to other countries in East Asia. In essence, the word Confucianism has no corresponding term in Chinese. It is more of a Western term that is used to point out a tradition of thought and a way of life, transmitted and passed on by Confucius. The origins of the term 'Confucianism' can be traced back to 16th century Europe, when European missionaries, namely the Jesuits, tried to understand the Chinese intellectual system. They added "ism" to the school of thought of the Chinese scholars "Ju" to create the term (Yao, 2000). The name 'Confucius' was also given by the same missionaries to one of the eminent scholar who began the tradition (Littlejohn, 2011). His name in Chinese was Kong Qiu or Kon Zhongni, or in translation, Master Kong. The group of scholars and teachers of which he was a member were known as *Ru* in Chinese. These people were experts in the values and customs of an exemplary Chinese individual (Littlejohn, 2011).

Confucius was born circa 551 BC to an aristocratic family in East China (Yao, 2000), in a politically chaotic era known as the Spring and the Autumn period. He had great respect for the Zou dynasty (half a millennium before), its customs and literature (Littlejohn, 2011, p. X). 'Confucian' concepts were present before Confucius; however, the philosopher clearly articulated and organized these concepts systematically. He developed a coherent system of ethics from an array of historical values, customs and practices. What motivated him to do so was the chaos and strife of China during that time. He observed this chaos and thus began promoting harmony, duty, propriety benevolence and family. These are among the key organizing principles of his thought (Shin, 2012).

Following his death, Confucius' followers organized some of his works into what is known as a loosely structured system of values and beliefs. Hence, his beliefs became a dominant school of thought within the Chinese scholarly community. After his philosophy gained prominence within the intellectual circle and gained dominance among scholars, it was also passed on to the ruling class and became the official ideology of the state. From there onwards, it was passed to all segments of society and thus became a cultural movement (Shin, 2012).

Confucius' philosophy also spread to other countries in the region. However, it never had a missionary tradition to it. It reached other countries in the region because of Chinese literate, culture and its writing system. Other factors such as foreign occupation, human migration and cross-cultural communication played a part in spreading Confucianism into Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Taiwan and Singapore. These countries are the most profoundly Confucian societies of East Asia today (Shin, 2012 p. 28). Confucianism has affected different realms of East Asian society, among them the political realm. Political institutions and governance in East Asia has been considerably influenced by Confucian values. Based on this and considering the extent of influence of Confucianism, it can be argued then that political philosophy in East Asia is largely influenced by Confucian values. Therefore, it can also be assumed that Confucianism influences how people in the region view social justice.

As discussed earlier, political philosophy appeals to the moral convictions of the people. In this next section, it will be explained what these moral convictions are for the people of East Asia within a Confucian context. Before doing so, it should be pointed out that there have been other schools of thoughts, religions and ideologies that have had a profound influence on the values of East Asian countries. These include Buddhism, Taoism, Shinto, Marxism and Christianity (De Vos and Slote, 1998). Moreover, it should also be explained that since the advent of modernity in East Asia in the late 19th century, Confucianism has not fared well. Back then, scholars who looked at the relationship between modernity and Confucianism noted that the tradition did not correspond well to capitalistic development. Therefore, many East Asians began condemning their own tradition. In the eyes of nationalists and militarists, Confucianism was the reason behind their countries' weakness in withstanding the onslaught of Western imperialism, while the communists saw Confucianism as a feudal and reactionary world view that was standing in the way of progress. Thus, "for the vast majority of East Asians, modernity had come to mean overcoming Confucianism" (Bell & Chaibong, 2003, p. 2). Nonetheless, certain developments in the last century have all contributed to the discussion that Confucianism is alive in East Asia. For example, the flourishing economies of East Asian countries in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s meant a reason was needed to explain such success, with many scholars attributing it to Confucianism (Little & Reed, 1989). Other scholars have disputed this argument however, and have pointed out that Confucianism is an old tradition, which is not useful for the age of modernization (Bell & Chaibong, 2003). Recognizing the impact of

modernity as well as different religions and ideologies, the next sections will gauge the moral convictions and concepts of East Asians based on the premise that they are influenced by Confucianism.

Confucian Moral Convictions and Key Concepts

The core of Confucius' thought is found in the Analects (Shin, 2012), which contains the conversations, discussions and questions between him and his students. There are also other books that were written by Mencius who was the interpreter and the promoter of his work.   All these books have had different interpretations and different applications in the past 2000 years. Therefore, over time, concepts have gained different meanings and interpretations in the same way as debates within liberalist ideology. It has reached a point where some scholars have categorized Confucianism into different subtypes. Two of them are classical-Confucianism and neo-Confucianism (Shin, 2012). In this section, Confucianism is defined as the moral system that Confucius, Mencius and his followers promoted and which may still define the moral convictions of East Asians. This section will look at the most prevalent concepts in Confucian philosophy.

Confucius' aim was to convince the government to promote harmony and peace in society. As pointed out earlier, he was living in an era of chaos. Confucius, Mencius and other Confucians blamed the moral degeneration of human beings on the chaos of that time. Hence, Confucius advocated a harmonious social and political order that could in turn cultivate virtue in individuals. He supported strong social bonds and he prescribed norms and virtues which individuals should use to regulate their relationships. Additionally, he also emphasized the importance of government and believed that the state was a central human institution that could promote harmony and peace, while at the same time good governance could pave the path for economic prosperity and thus moral and intellectual progress for the populace. This way humanity could be realized (Shin, 2012).

So what was Confucius and his followers' idea of humanity? For them humanity meant that each human being was a good person if ego and served others selflessly. That is how they defined a good and a virtuous person. For Confucians, both the rulers and the common people needed to become virtuous and illustrate that in character and deeds through interacting with other individuals. In line with this, Confucians offered a system of ethics which was very different from that of the Western philosophers of the Enlightenment. The ethical system of Confucians was founded upon four premises

concerning the mind of human beings and nature: firstly, they believed humans are good by nature. Secondly, humans are not autonomous as in the liberalist view and are seen in the context of relationship with others. Third, by fulfilling mutual and complementary roles and by being in constant interaction with others, individuals can cultivate themselves and become full humans (Shin, 2012). Finally, cultivation of oneself is the foundation of a good social order which in turn is the foundation of a politically stable society, peace and harmony.

Confucian philosophers believed that human-beings achieve moral rightness through the dynamics of their conduct in relationship with others, thus promoting the "realization of social and political order which enables people to integrate themselves into the cosmic order and to participate in an especially moral universe" (Ames, 1994, p.2). This process is what the Confucians called the 'way' and it starts at the top of society with the ruler.

For Confucians, goodness is a natural capacity of the human being. They believed, however, that moral growth is a matter of instruction and discipline. Some people might vary in their actions because of being in different situations and environments and not instructed well (Ames 1994) and thereby not achieving moral growth. In the Analects Confucius states: "by nature men are similar; by practice men are apart" (p. 329). Hence, he and his followers emphasized learning and formal education. They believed that education must be spread to all segments of society, from common people to rulers, in order to allow self-cultivation. They believed that going through a process of self-cultivation is essential for individuals as it promotes harmonious relation with others and strengthens the sense of community. This self-cultivation is a process through which an individual disciplines his or her body and at the same time enlightens the soul. It can be achieved through interaction with others such as family, community, neighbourhood and the state. It is a process through which an individual curbs his or her ego, dogmatism, opinionativeness and obstinacy (Lee, 1995). It could be thus interpreted as a process through which a human being curbs his or her own individualistic desires and becomes selfless in order to serve others, while at the same time realizing his or her own spiritual nature. Through self-cultivation, as a result of education, individuals can become good members of society. As Shin puts it, education has two important functions: the first purpose is to learn to cultivate virtues and become an upright, moral, and complete person, or a gentleman or exemplary person (junzi).

"The second purpose is to serve other people and the larger community by practising and extending what has been learned" (Shin, 2012, p. 78).

As pointed out above, Confucians called the moral and complete person *junzi* or the gentleman. In the Confucian ethical convictions, the most important virtue that a gentleman should possess is benevolence. For Confucius himself, benevolence could be defined as the love for fellow human beings. He believed that love begins gradually at the family level and then extends to society. As he put it himself: "a young man should be a good son at home and an obedient young man aboard ... and should love the multitude at large" (Ho, 2003, p. 290). This is the virtue that provides ground for the growth of other virtues. The most important of these virtues are filial piety (*xiao),* fraternity (*di*), kindness (*ci*) and reverence (*jing*) (Ho, 2003).

The Confucian concept of filial piety emphasizes the devotion and dedication that children should show to their parents. Not only should children show loyalty to their parents and take care of their needs, but they must also show reverence to them. This idea was constructed based on the Confucian idea that family should be seen as a whole organ. Since the family is seen as a whole organ, it follows that one should not hurt any of its members. Further, there is belief that our body, with hair and skin, is derived from our parents. Therefore, a person is not allowed to hurt her body. Ho (2003) points out that filial piety requires children to provide maintenance and emotional support to the parents (Ho, 2003, p. 291). Also, brotherly fraternity suggests that there it is the duty of younger brothers to submit to older brothers (Hwang, 1999).Thus, in a Confucian family, seen as the root of society, children must submit to their parents and younger siblings must submit to their elder siblings. Ho (2003) points out, this in sharp contrast with a liberal society given these values are alive in the East Asian societies. In liberal societies, parents have a duty to look after their children while in Confucian societies children must look after the elderly (Ho, 2003, p. 292). I should point out that there are laws in place in Confucian societies of today, obliging adult children to look after their elderly parents.

In terms of the government, Confucians believed in rulers that set a positive example through a charismatic and virtuous character. By setting an example, the ruler encouraged common people to emulate him. At the same time, Confucians believed in a paternalistic, hierarchal form of government based on meritocracy. They believed that the values and the characteristics of the family should be extended to the community,

society and the government. This meant that under such a rule, the ruler provided welfare and his subordinates provided full loyalty and reverence to him. One of the reasons behind this way of thinking could have been that Confucius and some of his followers lived in an era of chaos and conflict. They did not wish to put restraints on government as they wanted it to secure a peaceful life for the people (Shin, 2012, pp. 106-18).

So far then, it can be said that there are some contrasts between Western ethical values and systems and those of Confucian societies. The latter, as has been explained, promote a social system that emphasises a hierarchal social and political system. Moreover, Confucian values promote the collective good and rule by merit, whereas the Western system of ethics based on liberalism puts emphasis on freedom, individual autonomy and equality. Because the moral convictions of the people of the two regions are different, the political philosophy that relates to social justice is different as well, since political philosophy appeals to moral convictions. The next section will discuss social justice as conceptualized by Confucians.

Confucianism and Social Justice

To begin, it should be said that there is not a clear distinctive term for social justice in the Confucian literature. As Joseph Chan points out, students of Confucianism have given little to no attention to social and distributive justice. The reason for that he argues, is, that there has not been a systematic and explicit treatment of the concept (Chan, 2001). In fact, there is a conspicuous lack of the word 'justice' in Chinese social and political philosophy (Lee, 1995). Therefore, to find out how the Confucians thought about social justice, the following will discuss concepts and discourses that can be found in social and distributive justice debates. Some of these issues to be discussed are: a strong sense of serving the community, giving priority to the worst off, private property, improving the economic condition of the people, equal opportunity (meritocracy), and education for all. These are some of the notions that can be found in Chan's conception of a Confucian social justice.

Communitarianism

For Confucius and his followers, the notion of a harmonious society was important. This could be achieved when individuals led a moral life and practised virtue through serving each other. According to Confucius, human fulfilment does not happen within

an individualistic context; rather, it happens when the individual meets his or her responsibility towards the community (Little & Reed, 1989). Like Western feminist interpretations of social justice, Confucianism is based on the common good and human relatedness. Therefore, according to Confucius, a just society is one in which its members have certain obligations to the community as opposed to a more individualistic society where there is more individual autonomy and choice. For Confucians this began at the family level. They believed that individuals should serve family members, and as Little and Reed (1989) state, there was a strong emphasis on ensuring the welfare of the immediate community. The concept of filial piety had an important role here. Not only should children serve the needs of their parents, but they also needed to curb their own desires and other moral obligations when attending to the needs of their elderly (Bell, 2003, pp. 228-230). Therefore, a just society was one in which there was a strong sense of community obligation and welfare rather than a commitment to one's own goals and welfare. The aim of the government was to make sure that the virtue in individuals is cultivated.

From the government point of view, Confucians believed that the government should take care of the needs of the destitute, that is, worst-off, members of society when they were unable to take care of themselves. According to Mencius the destitute included the following:

> Old men without wives, old women without husbands, old people without children, young children without fathers. These types of people are the most destitute and have no one to turn to for help. Whenever King Wen put benevolent measures into effect, he always gave them first consideration (Mencius as cited in Chan, 2001, p. 238).

Another Confucian master, Xunzi, maintained that the destitute should be given duties (such as employment) according to their abilities so they could take care of themselves and could be included in society (Chan, 2001). A ruler who possessed virtues such as benevolence would therefore take care of the needy. This could be seen within the context of the Confucian ethical system: "government's moral responsibility to care for the needy may be justified by either a humanitarian ideal such as the Confucian ethics of benevolence" (Chan, 2001). It could however also be seen through the concept of impartiality (*gong*). That is, the government should take care of the people without favouring one group and free of discrimination (Chan, 2001).

Taking care of the neediest or the worst-off members of society, however, did not mean for Confucians that the government should be something like the welfare state that takes care of many aspects of the lives of its people. The government's job was rather to secure positive economic conditions for society so that people could take care of their families and their relatives. This is reflected within the Confucian virtue to become a moral person that can serve others. For example, in terms of disabled people, Confucian philosophers have argued that the government should care for them and at the same time give them jobs that were appropriate for them (Chan, 2001). Negligence by government was bad because when people did not have means to support themselves, they would not have "constant hearts". If they were devoid of "constant hearts" they would abandon themselves, abandon morality, and resort to depravity (Mencius III A: 3). Therefore, Confucius himself believed that when people are enriched they can then be educated. Economic conditions were thus given priority over education: "The master said 'make the people prosperous'. When they are already prosperous what more can be done? 'Teach them', said the master" (Confucius as cited in Chan, 2001). Thus, for Confucians the government was responsible for the harmony within society. This was done by providing a level of assistance so that the population could in turn serve each other.

Economic Welfare is an Important Step to Live a Moral Life

Some Confucians, including Mencius, thought that poverty could be the result of political mismanagement. Mencius mentioned, for example, heavy taxation, strict economic control and wrong land distribution policy as the causes of poverty. However, that does not mean he supported a totally free-market system (Bell, 2003, p. 219). For Mencius, enriching the people was important, because when they could make living out of their labour, they would have free time to learn the virtues. When these had been achieved, they could help their family and their parents. However, it did not stop here. As stated earlier, this serving of others could extend to the community and to society from there on (Mencius as cited in Chan, 2003, pp. 237-239). For this to happen, Mencius introduced a 'well-field' system so that the government could improve the economic conditions for all. This was a piece of land (*jing*) on which nine families lived. It was 900 (*mou*), which is about 1.5 acre. Each family held 100 (*mou*). The central 100 (*mou*) was for the state. When each family had worked on the 100 *mou* that was owned by the state, they could go back and work on their own land. This way the state could have control of the land to provide people with resources, including the

worst-off (Bell, 2003, p. 225). For Mencius, this well-field system was important because it meant that the families living on the same (*jing*) could help each other and would thus live together in love and harmony.

Moreover, Mencius made it clear on a few occasions that it was the responsibility of the government to take care of the poor. The government was morally responsible for the death of the people if they died from starvation. He explained that the government should collect taxes so that it could transform it to resources in good periods (when there was plenty) and give it to the needy in their bad times (Mencius as cited in Chan, 2003, p. 240).

In general, the Confucian system of welfare can be interpreted as a multi-layered. The family was the most single important unit within this system which could be seen as an autonomous whole (Bell: 2003: 228). In this system, it was the duty of the family members to assist each other and help the neediest ones. If families could not do that, it was up to the community and the social network to assist the needy (for Mencius those were the people on the (*jing*). If that was impossible, then it was up to the government to take responsibility. Chan (2003) argues that this reflected Confucius' system of ethics. However, most Confucian writers placed a greater emphasis on the ruler's conduct. He was the most virtuous person and needed to show the greatest benevolence towards his subjects. He had to set example as a person. Therefore, he had the greatest responsibility when it came to the people. If the ruler did not share the suffering of his people, a harmonious relationship could not be maintained. Nonetheless, the first and foremost unit in society to provide assistance was still the family. Chan (2003) argues that this could explain why today some East Asians, such as the Chinese, seek help from their family rather than from the government. Moreover, it could also explain why countries such as China, Taiwan and Singapore all have laws that oblige children who are financially well off to assist their parents who cannot take care of themselves. More on this will be explained in the next chapter.

There is further evidence that Confucius himself placed responsibility on the government for the health, long life and resources of the people. He has been quoted as saying government should "secure for men the five blessings and secure them against the six calamities....The five blessings are: ample means, long life, health, virtuous character, and an agreeable personal appearance; the six calamities are: early death, sickness, misery, poverty, a repulsive appearance, and weakness" (cited in Shin, 2012,

p. 110). Shin (2012) also believes that Confucianism's model of government could be compared to Western utilitarianism. This can be seen in one of Confucius' quotes in which he explicitly says that good government is the one that makes those who are near it happy (cited in Shin, 2012, p. 110).

Education and Meritocracy

It was pointed out above that Confucius thought it was the government's responsibility to educate the masses. The reason for this, as explained, was that education was imperative for the development of the virtues of the people, resulting in a socially harmonious society. Therefore, Confucius can be recognized as the first person to advocate universal education. Confucians also believed that education was so important that if all other life necessities were provided but not education, man still could turn into a 'beast' (Shin, 2012) As Lee (1995) explains, however, that is not the only reason why he wanted education for all the people. Another reason could have been that he wanted all the people to have equal opportunity to enter offices. This suggests another important value of the Confucians –meritocracy. For Confucians it was important that all people could enter offices regardless of their social and economic background. For them it was not the policies but rather the people who make up good government. They developed a merit-based system in which people could take examinations to assess their virtues and their knowledge. This way the most talented individuals could rise to the rank of the rulers. Confucians thus rejected the idea of hereditary rule. For them, if someone from the ruling class was not capable and not virtuous, he could be demoted to the position of the common people. If someone from a common background was capable and virtuous, he could be promoted to high-ranks within society. Confucian master Xunzi, for example, said that if commoners were capable of accumulating culture and knowledge and if the behaved accordingly, they could become part of the ruling class (Chan, 2001).

Difference between Western and Confucian Concepts of Social Justice

It has been pointed out that Western notions of social justice are based on the concepts upheld in the West. For example, they appeal to social contract, individual autonomy, utility, liberty and equality while Confucian notions of social justice can be associated with concepts such as communitarianism and harmony. This may be the result of different ethical, social and political philosophies. For example, the Confucian ethical system places a strong emphasis on the common good and hierarchal social relations

such as in the family. The individual is seen as part of a whole (whether it is the family or the community). In the Western ethical system, on the other hand, there is a strong emphasis on individual autonomy and rights. There are certain issues, however, that show some similarities between Western theories of social justice and Confucian interpretations of social justice. For example, some Western theories are in favour of providing for the disadvantaged. Mencius (as cited in Chan, 2001) also argued that it is the government's job to provide for the destitute. At the same time, Confucian writings also support concepts such as universal education, which can be seen in some theories of justice in the West. However, ethical reasons for provision of Universal Education vary between the two philosophies. One places emphasis on common good and cultivation of virtue through education; while some Western theories of justice may support universal education for the sake of achieving equality in the society, or in order to promote the welfare of individuals.

Moreover, one big difference between the Confucian concept of social justice and its Western counterpart could be that while Confucianism believes in support and sufficiency for all, it does not believe that inequalities are unjust (Chan, 2001). One can argue that inequalities are only unjust in Confucianism insofar that they become barrier to meritocracy, which in turn is good for the community. Inequalities cannot be considered unjust if they become barrier to equal opportunity.

It remains to be seen, however, how influential Confucian values are in modern day East Asian societies, especially, in the light of the modernization of those societies. The next section will assess the extent of the influence of Confucianism in the formulation of concepts of social justice by the people of East Asian societies. This will be done by looking at the existing surveys and assessing the social and political institutions of those societies.

Confucianism and Modernization

Since modernization arrived in East Asian in the second half of 19th century, Confucianism has not done very well. This is due to the fact that East Asians began to think that traditional values were responsible for the weaknesses of their countries in the modern age. For nationalists and militarists, Confucianism was the reason why their countries could not withstand Western imperialism while Communists, especially relevant to the history of modern China, regarded some parts of Confucianism as reinforcing feudalism, which in turn hindered progress (Bell & Chaibong, 2003, p.1).

In China for example, the May 4th movement saw Confucianism as their enemy. This was a movement which came into existence after a group of Chinese students that were protesting against Japan's invasion of China were shot and arrested by the British troops on the May 4th, 1915. This movement was not a political organization. It consisted of people such as poets, novelists, journalists and other cultural figures who shared a strong sense of patriotism. They blamed Confucianism as the reason for China's failure or weakness. For them, Confucianism was opposed to freedom of thought. It had made China become a fossilized society and weak. They argued that filial piety lead to individual dependence and oppression of women. They also saw it as opposed to democracy and freedom. The May 4th movement had even a slogan saying, "Down with Confucius and sons" (Rainey, 2010). Writers in the May 4th movement exalted science and democracy while at the same time, deplored the superstitious past. In contrast to the May 4th movement was the New Life Movement. This movement wanted to use Confucian ideas to redefine ideas of loyalty and filial piety for the purpose of developing a code of conduct for modern citizens in terms of being loyal, responsible and obedient. These ideas were used to make people loyal supporters of the National Party (*Guomindang*) Government (Rainey, 2010).

Communists were another group in the 'modern' age that were opposed to Confucianism. They accepted most of the May 4th movement's criticism of Confucianism while at the same time they added another layer of critique to the school of thought: Confucianism was the result of a feudal system which hindered progress (Rainey 2010). Therefore, the most intense anti-Confucianism campaigns began after the revolution of 1949 and the communist take-over of China (Rozman, 1991). As a result, Confucianism seemed to be dead (Rainey, 2010). When Mao Zedong became the leader of the country, he initiated a cultural revolution between 1966 and 1976. Young people were formed into groups known as Red Guards. They were assigned the task of destroying old traditions, habits, and ways of thinking, Buddhist and Confucian temples, arts and inscriptions. After Mao died, however, gradually a more tolerable image of Confucianism was revived (Rainey 2010). "Even so, the notion that vestiges China's pre-socialist and pre-capitalist past largely represent a negative 'feudal' tradition resounds as the dominant message in the 1980s" (Rozman, 1991). However, by the beginning 1990s the communist ideology began to weaken as a result of the collapse of Soviet Union there was a renewed interest in Confucianism. Since then, hundreds of

books have been written on Confucianism and Confucius while at the same time the government has actively tried to revive the tradition (Adler, 2011).

Similar to China, Confucianism was seen as an obstacle to modernization in Korea. At the beginning of the 20th century, the nationalists in Korea began attacking the philosophy as they regarded it a foreign import from China. This was despite the fact that Confucianism had been thoroughly 'Koreanized' over the centuries. Other groups of nationalists saw Confucianism as a barrier to the birth of the modern Korean State. They began emulating and emphasizing Western values. In 1895 for example, new schools were established and they advertised Western languages, philosophy and science (Robinson, 1991). At the same time, nationalist intellectuals began criticizing the Confucian social system. They particularly attacked the human relationships within the Confucian code of ethics. There was a belief among these intellectuals that the arrangement of relationships in the Confucian tradition led to social tyranny. For them, Confucianism was a hierarchal and male-dominated social system, which curbed individual's will and oppressed creativity. These intellectuals further believed that individual freedom was an important part of Western social relations and they saw Confucian values of obedience of the absolute authority and its insistence on hierarchical social relations as opposed to that. Hence, they felt that liberating individuals from these social arrangements was an important milestone towards a modern Korean society. Moreover, in the early 20th century, feminists believed that Confucian values had caused the position of the women to deteriorate in Korean society. They pointed to the fact that in Confucian social relations, emphasis has been placed on the subordination of wives to their husbands and daughters to all the men in their family and the fact that women lost their inheritance rights (Robinson, 1991).

In Japan, the advent of modernization also saw a decline in Confucian values. During the Meiji Restoration (1968-1912), when Japan began moving towards modernization, schools were reorganized according to the Western system of education. Previous to that, the core curricula of the Japanese education system were Confucian moral teachings. That shifted towards knowledge and practical skills, which were used to modernize the country. However, Confucian values were used to legitimize the rule of the emperor during that period. "Confucian values became so rooted in Japanese politics during this time that loyalty to the emperor was mandated by law" (Shin, 2012, p. 34). Later, in late 18th century and the first decades of the 20th century, many philosophers and intellectuals began expressing concern over Japan's over-Westernization and loss of

identity. They turned to Confucian philosophy as a source of a national social code that could facilitate national cohesion and social harmony. Confucian groups and organizations were established with the aim of combating the "material spirit of the West, social unrest and declining public morals" (Collcutt, 1991, pp. 151-152). They endeavoured to influence education by promoting the study of Chinese and particularly Confucian texts. However, since Japan was seeking to modernize the state and at the same time was following a militarist and continental ultra-nationalistic policy, Confucianism was interpreted along nationalistic and imperialistic line. These interpretations provided ideological justification for the Japanese in their colonial aggression. After 1933, Confucian ethics were actively promoted by the government. At the same time, in China and Korea, the Japanese were presenting themselves as the restorers of Confucianism. After the defeat of Japan in WWII, Confucianism was associated with pre-war nationalism and therefore regarded as negative by many people in the country. In that period, the new Constitution, educational reforms, and the push for democracy and economic growth left little to no place for Confucianism.

In Taiwan, Confucianism took a different path. When the National Party was defeated in the Chinese Civil War, it retreated to Taiwan. The government that was established there saw itself as the preserver of the Chinese culture. Therefore, it actively promoted Confucianism in social and political institutions. A new Confucian movement was established which called upon the reconsideration of Confucianism but in more modern and acceptable terms (Rainey, 2012).

Nevertheless, some scholars have pointed out that Confucian values have declined and will continue to do so (Martin, 1990). Others disagree with this and believe that Confucian values have transformed and adjusted to modernity. Some even argue that Confucianism has been the drive behind the successful economic growth of the East Asian region (Chung, Shephard & Dollinger, 1989). However, Linda Martin (1990), among others, argues that the demographic changes and rapid industrialization of East Asia has led to the decline of Confucian values. In terms of demographic changes, she points out that the fertility rate in East Asia has dropped. At the same time, the mortality rate has also deceased, which means there will be more longer living individuals with smaller families (due to the low rate of fertility). Hence, East Asians will have fewer family members but their relationships will be longer lasting. Further, with the rapid increase in industrialization over the past century, production became less family focused, meaning that individuals began spending less time with their family members

and began interacting with other institutions instead. Furthermore, industrialization has led to the migration of family members to different parts of the country. According to Martin, there is also evidence that modernization has led to a change in attitudes towards the family. "With increased income, East Asians may opt for greater privacy in living arrangements, as has been the case in the West" (Martin, 1990).

Another feature of Confucianism that has changed in East Asia has been the patriarchal order of society. The advent of modernization and structural changes in society have made this patriarchal system is no longer relevant. This has been reinforced by changes in laws and attitudes. At the same time, there has also been change in the expectations towards care of the family. For example, throughout East Asia there is less expectation that the elderly and their adult children will co-reside. A survey in Japan showed that those who expected their children to support them in their old age dropped from 55 percent in 1950 to 18 percent in 1988 (Martin, 1990). Also, contact across family boundaries has decreased and people in urban areas have become increasingly less dependent on their extended family for assistance and more dependent on co-workers and friends instead. There is also more contact with the family members of the wife, although more formal occasions are spent with husbands' family (Martin, 1990).

While many scholars are in agreement with these points, they do not necessarily equate them with the disappearance of Confucian culture. This group of scholars (Kahn, as cited in Hofstede & Bond, 1988; Ornatwoksi, 1996; Huang, 2006) believe that Confucian values have been present throughout the process of modernity in East Asia and they have merely been adjusted to modern life. Some of them go further and attribute the rapid adjustments of some parts of East Asian societies and systems in modern life to the Confucian culture itself. An example of this is the rapid economic growth that East Asian countries have experienced in the course of the past 50 years (Bell & Chaibong, 2003). For few of these countries (Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea and Hong Kong), this rapid economic growth has been termed an economic miracle by the World Bank (Zakaria, 2002) and Confucian values have been said to have contributed to this 'miracle'.

In the second half of the last century, the rapid progress made by East Asia and the 'miracle' that ensued occurred at the same time as the Eastern Bloc was facing up to the contractions of communism, insignificant progress was being made in the Third World towards modernity, and some advanced industrialized countries were facing economic

stagnation. East Asian countries, however, continued to thrive during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. The achievements of these countries became so obvious, in comparison with the rest of the world, that there was a need for explanation. Soon after, many social scientists began developing theories, attributing the successes of many of these countries to Confucianism. Max Weber's theory regarding the contradiction of Confucianism and capitalism soon lost its credibility (Bell & Chaibong, 2003). According to Weber (1958), psychological conditions leading to the rise of capitalism were fostered by protestant ethics. He further argued (1951) that there is a connection between economic rationalism and religious responsibility as a result of Protestantism, which is lacking in Confucian ethics.

Since the 1970s there have been many discussions on whether Confucianism has impacted on East Asia's modernization. One of the early commentators on the issue was Herman Kahn, a social scientist and futurist who argued that certain cultural traits and values are 'sticky' and are not easy to change. However, they can be modified. He argued that during the 1980s those countries in East Asia that had experienced economic growth all had Confucian values and in the world economic market, the same values gave them a competitive advantage (Kahn as cited in Hofstede & Bond, 1988).

Japan is a good example of how basic values could be 'sticky', yet modified and adapted to different times and places. Japan's modernization began around the 1870s. Even though the country leapt towards Westernization, there was some level of resistance towards Western values, which stemmed from Confucian values. For example, in Western industries labourers went from company to company seeking higher wages and some Western governments enacted minimum wage and labour laws. The Meiji government in Japan also began thinking about enacting such laws to improve labour conditions. Many industrialists responded to this by pointing out the special relationships between capitalists and workers in Japanese industries. These relationships were based upon 'affection', they claimed, and were similar to that between 'parent and children' or 'master and retainer' (Ornatowksi, 1996). Similar claims were made regarding the role of 'master' capitalists and their subjects. The master, it was maintained, showed 'benevolence' towards the people below him by taking care of them, while at the same time it was expected that employees would show loyalty, the spirit of sacrifice and love for their country (Ornatowksi, 1996). Ornatowksi, (1996) further argues that these values of Confucianism continued in the period after the Second World War within the economic sphere in Japan. He argues that

there was "a certain continuity striking in the unchanging emphasis upon the themes of 'respect for education', 'harmony', 'loyalty', and 'familialism'" (p. 586).

Also, other Confucian values have been recognized as encouraging the development and growth of the East Asian region. Robinson (1991, p. 223), for example, argues that a strong focus on education and self-cultivation has led to mass education in Korea, which, through a combination with other values such as hard-work, diligence and self-discipline, has produced a trainable and hard-driving working-force, which has been behind the economic growth of the country.

While some scholars support the claims that Confucianism has been the engine behind East Asian economic growth, others dispute them and believe it is difficult to measure economic development through culture, since culture is not an independent and autonomous variable (Sang-In, 1990). Nonetheless, it can be said that Confucian values have adapted to other spheres of society besides the economic realm. As mentioned earlier, during Mao's Cultural Revolution, Confucian values suffered an onslaught. Yet it can be argued that even in communist China and during Mao's rule, Confucian values adapted to the system, or rather, Marxist doctrine adapted to the Confucian way of life (Huang, 2006). Huang (2006) argues that foreign ideas have always been rejected by the Chinese people, unless they have similarities with the Chinese culture. He believes that the reason why it is possible for Marxism to fare in China is because it has many similarities with certain Confucian concepts and traditions. For example, there is an emphasis on community rather than the individual in Confucianism, which puts it in line with Marxism. Moreover, he argues that 'Chinese Marxism' has reconciled with Confucianism in a way so that there are more commonalities between the two, more so than "Chinese Marxism with its Marxist origin" (2006).

A similar pattern of modification and adaption to Confucian values can be found in Korea. Robinson (1991) argues that even though Korea has modernized, family values remain very strong in the country. For example, while the sons to not live with their parents after they have married, they remain near the parental home, geographically. At the same time, roles within families have changed. Parents no longer have unconditional authority. However, children offer care for elderly parents as a reward for having providing for them. The focus of the families has changed to become children-focused rather than husband-focused. Furthermore, the idea of filial piety has been transformed to compromise between generations (Robinson, 1991).

Evidence for the Survival of Confucian Values in East Asian Societies

Surveys on Confucianism, Democracy, and Economic Development

There is further evidence that can be provided through public opinion surveys and the examination of institutions that Confucianism has continued to exist alongside modernization, albeit having gone through a process of adaptation. For example, Lee & Tamai (2002) performed a conjoint study between Kobe City University of Foreign Studies in Japan and KPMG SeBit Accounting Corporation of Korea. This study compared the 'Confucian' attitudes of Korean and Japanese students with each other. Some interesting results were found. Despite differences between the scores, certain Confucian concepts seemed to be alive among the students. For example, filial piety was given a higher score by Korean students than by those from Japan. However, as the authors stated, both groups still scored filial piety highly. For example, one of the questions asked the participants if they should love and respect their parents even if they saw many faults in them. The scores were 4.3 out of 5 for the Korean students and 3.7 out of 5 for the Japanese students. Another question asked if older people should always be respected in the community. Koreans student scored 3.8 out of 5 and the Japanese 3.5 out of 5 on this question. Therefore, Lee and Tamai (2002) concluded that filial attitudes are present in both Japan and Korea but they are practiced differently in each country. Yet, the ways in which 'filial' attitudes are practised are different. However, this study compared two Confucian societies with each other. Other studies (Dalton & Ong, 2005; Shin, 2011) have been conducted with the purpose of finding out if there are differences between the values of East Asian countries and other regions of the world. One of the important goals of these studies has been to understand if there are differences in democratic values between Confucian societies and the rest of the world, especially Western countries, and if the people of East Asians countries have values that are hindering them from becoming democracies. Some of these studies have incorporated values in their surveys that are essential to the Confucian way of life. Strong evidence has been found that suggests one cannot talk about Confucian values as a characteristic of the East Asian region as a whole, when comparing the region to the rest of the world. Dalton and Ong (2005) have combined the results of World Values Surveys of 1995-98 and 2000-2002, and based on it they argue that not much difference is to be found between respondents from Confucian countries and Western countries when it comes to some of the values that are known to be Confucian.

Past studies have also found different results concerning Asian values. For example, in a study in the 1980s by Hofstede and Bond (1988) East Asians gave low scores on individualism, high scores on acceptance of powerlessness towards authority and mid-range scores for gender role hierarchies. The first two variables showed a noticeable difference between Western countries and Confucian countries. There are also differences between studies conducted in the 1980s and more recent studies. Dalton and Ong (2005) explain this difference in the following statement:

> There are several possible explanations for our findings and the contrast to earlier cultural studies of East Asia. Most of these East Asian nations have experienced a considerable process of social modernization during the later twentieth century, in which many of these traditional cultural traditions may have attenuated with increasing social and geographic mobility, and the move from rural to urban lifestyles. This might apply especially to the non-family aspects of authority orientations, where opinions overlapped the most between East and West. Partial evidence backing this hypothesis comes by comparing generational differences within each nation (p. 219).

Thus, most recent studies point out that one cannot refer to Confucian values without redefining them within a relevant context.

It is thus not easy to reject or confirm the existence of Confucian values based on such surveys. According to Nathan (2012), some scholars reject the arguments that are based on the findings of these studies as they believe survey-based studies of culture are flawed. These critics argue that culture is a shared experience and one cannot determine the values that are held by individuals as reflecting the whole culture – in the way that surveys attempt to do. Surveys ignore the shared experience between individuals. Second, attitudes are multi-layered and complex but survey questions oversimplify them. Thirdly, rigid categories can be given as options to choose, which cannot truly reflect the beliefs of respondents. Because there is still no better method of determining a large body of beliefs, these issues remain in place (Nathan, 2012).

Furthermore, there are also recent surveys that examine the results of surveys that dismiss Confucian values. For example, research that was done by Soper and Fetzer in 2007 used a different method to gauge the prevalence of Confucian values in Taiwan. They analysed the results of the World Values Survey in 1995 and the Asian Barometer survey in 2001. Soper and Fetzer defined Confucianism as an "ethical system that puts primary emphasis on family loyalty, social hierarchy and social harmony" (p. 148).

Then, they looked at indicators in both of those surveys that corresponded to the three values with which they defined Confucianism. They used different indicators. For the value 'family loyalty', for instance, the following indicator was used in the 1995 survey: should a person make his parents proud and should that be his goal of life? In the 2001 survey the indicator was: should a person put his own interests second to family interests? Their analysis of the surveys showed that support for family loyalty increased from 63.4 in 1995 to 86.2 percent in 2001. There was also an increased support for social harmony and social hierarchy. Soper and Frazer believe that a difference in methodology could be the reason behind the difference in percentage. Overall the indicators in the 1995 survey were very different from the survey of 2001 in both wording and meaning. This might explain difference in the results. As Soper and Fetzer suggest:

> Yet, the very different wording of questions from the two surveys likely explains this apparent revival of Taiwanese Confucianism over the six years. The two items on social harmony may be providing substantially different results because the 1995 indicator could be measuring interviewees' willingness to disobey an unjust order as well as their preference for social harmony (p. 150).

Overall, it can be said that there have been contradictory results in surveys when evaluating the presence of Confucian values. There are some surveys that confirm the presence of these values in contemporary East Asian societies and some that refute their presence. However, there are still indications that even though modernization has changed East Asian societies and the life-styles of many in those societies, the presence of Confucianism can still be felt. Moreover, one cannot talk about one single manifestation of Confucianism. Some Confucian scholars have even argued that it is the essence and the principle that one should stay loyal to. For instance, loyalty and faithfulness are among essential Confucian principles. That means that the objects of such principles can be changed over time, yet the principles remain the same (Zhang, 2002, p. 13). As an example, in Korea, loyalty towards parents has been replaced by loyalty towards children. Even in other regions, certain philosophies do not remain the same over time and are adapted to different situations (Zhang, 2002, p. 14).

Nevertheless, the discussion so far has been whether or not Confucian values are alive in contemporary East Asian societies. One of the main motivations behind this research has been to find out whether 'Confucian' values were behind the rapid economic growth of East Asian societies. Following economic growth, some politicians in the region

claimed that their societies hold different values from Western countries and that the 'Asian values' are incompatible with democracy. Much research has been conducted in Confucian societies for the purpose of finding out whether there are such things as Confucian values and if this is the case, whether they are compatible with democracy or if they are related to economic growth. On the other hand, not many surveys specifically assess the impact of Confucian values on the way people think about social justice. Therefore, in the next section of this chapter I will examine existing surveys in this context.

Surveys Relating to Social Justice

As pointed out, not many surveys have specifically looked at the relationship between Confucian values and social justice. Therefore, in order to find out from secondary data if there is in any relationship between the two, one must attempt to interpret the results in social justice terms. Moreover, as mentioned in the previous chapter, there is no explicit reference to social justice in the Confucian tradition. Social justice itself must be interpreted from Confucian writings. So, before looking at the secondary data, I will need to review the values that I am looking for.

In the previous chapter it was mentioned that for Confucian philosophers the notion of a harmonious society was important. Such a society could only be achieved if its individuals were moral. And individual morality could only be utilized within the context of personal ties. This starts at the basic and the most important unit of society, which according to Confucians, is the family. By serving family members, individuals can learn and practice moral behaviour. Within the context of the family, Confucianism places a special emphasis on filial piety, which is the care of elderly parents.

As discussed above, mass surveys on Confucian values have given contradictory results. However, as pointed out in the last section, the Soper and Fetzer (2007) analysis of World Values Surveys and Asian Barometer data showed clearly that there is support for putting the needs of others before the needs of oneself in Taiwan. By taking Taiwan as an example, one can argue that these societies can be regarded as communitarian and believe in putting the needs of others first. Other surveys have also found support for filial piety, although one can argue that they are relative. A survey conducted by Chow in 1998 (as cited in Chow, 2006) in Hong Kong found that 82 percent of the respondents assisted their elderly parents financially on a regular basis, even though in some cases those parents did not need money (2001). Another study (Kim & Maeda,

2001) conducted in Japan and Korea found that long-term healthcare was provided more often by family members and institutional care was used as the last resort. Similar results were found in Taiwan. Studies found that Taiwanese felt obliged to take care of their frail and elderly parents and relatives (Chow, 2006). However, some scholars argue that modernization has strongly affected Confucian values in East Asia overall. A city comparison study in China found erosion in filial piety relative to the modernization of that city (Cheung & Kwan, 2009). According to Chow (2006), in many respects filial piety has lost its traditional meaning and it is now present in different forms. Shin (2012) conducted a survey to find out whether the principles of Confucianism or Western liberalism play a role in interpersonal conduct between the people in East Asia. He found that the preferred code of conduct is Confucian, endorsed by 52 percent of the population as opposed to the 6 percent who endorsed the Western Liberal model. He further found that the Confucian model of the communitarian life is endorsed by the majority of people (Shin, 2012).

There are also other Confucian values that relate to social justice. In the modern context, filial piety could also be interpreted as caring for the disadvantaged members of the society. Some people might interpret the concept as reinforcing the power of parents. However, by putting it in the context of healthcare one can argue that elderly people are disadvantaged and powerless in today's world. Wang (2002) argues that if filial piety is a consideration when looking at social justice, it means that not only family members should be taken care of, but that care should also extend to society. An indication is the fact that in Confucian societies care for the elderly is family oriented rather than institutionally oriented. "The family, as a natural institution, should play a mediating role between individuals and society" (Wang, 2002). It can also be argued that caring for those who are disadvantaged is similar to welfare state social policy. However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, welfare is not seen completely in terms of providing for the disadvantaged. Rather, it implies the empowerment of people to take care of themselves and their loved ones. So, can evidence be found for the support of welfare systems in East Asian countries?

So far it can be seen that surveys relating to Confucian attitudes and social justice give limited and contradictory results. One of the issues is to identify a more 'Confucian' related concept of social justice. It can be noted that there is no clear distinction in the surveys between what could be termed a Confucian concept and what could be termed a Western or transnational concept. As explained in the previous chapter, social justice in

most classic texts is associated with the distribution of resources. If it is assumed that redistribution is an aspect of a welfare state, then it can be said that social justice is associated with welfare policies. In East Asia, states are known to have welfare systems. However, they are also referred to as "East Asian" welfare systems (Walker & Wong, 2005). This is evident in the literature that discusses such systems, which often endeavours to homogenise them as 'Confucian' (Walker & Wong, 2005). Therefore, by assuming that these welfare states are different from Western welfare states, it is possible to examine if there is public support for welfare policies in East Asian countries.

Julia Tao (2005) believes that Western notions of social justice do not recognize human relatedness and focus more on separateness (individuality). Opposed to this, like Western feminist interpretations of social justice, Confucianism is based on the common good and human relatedness. Tao argues that in Hong Kong, for example, public health is care-based rather than being based on concepts such as social utility, freedom of choice or even 'social justice'. In such a healthcare system, priority is given to care over considerations such as cost-effectiveness and individual choice. "The moral imperative to care is grounded in a general sympathy and concern in society towards the poor, the chronically ill and the old, rather than grounded in justice or equality of opportunity considerations" (Tao, 2006, p. 46). She points to the studies that she has conducted, which found most of the respondents disagreed with using a cost-effective method to ration the resources (Tao, 2006).

So far, the discussion has been around surveys. It can be seen that there is some difference between how people in Confucian societies think about social justice, although this could always be disputed. It can also be seen that the term 'Confucian welfare state' is used in relation to some of the East Asian countries. These welfare systems are evident despite the argument that welfare is more family oriented than institutionalized in these countries. The values of each society are reflected in the institutions that make policies related to welfare. Therefore, another way to understand the values of East Asian societies in relation to social justice is to look at the political institutions of the countries.

Policies and Institutions

Other scholars have attempted to show the different characteristics of an East Asian welfare state. In 1993, Jones was one of the first people to label the welfare systems in

East Asia as 'Confucian' (Holliday & Wilding, 2003). She argued that the welfare systems in East Asia are different because they are characterized by "conservative corporatism without worker participation; subsidiarity without church; solidarity without equality; laissez-faire without libertarianism: an alternative expression might be household welfare state" (Jones, 1993, p. 214). In these systems great emphasis is laid upon the role of family and household to provide welfare. Furthermore, there is an emphasis on the role of education and the importance of social harmony (Abrahmson, 2010, p. 15).

Following Jones, many others have begun contributing to the debate about East Asian welfare systems (Holliday & Wilding, 2005 p. 8). However, some scholars are sceptical about singling out any one system as reflecting one common model that is uniquely different from the rest of the world. The problem is that the countries have different responses to various social problems and these responses are not homogenous. In 2000, Holliday and Wilding argued that there is in fact a way that the policies in East Asian countries can be singled out as one model. He examined five East Asian countries (Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong) and argued that their systems can be called productivist welfare capitalist. "In each country, social policy was subordinated to a primary concern for economic growth in a way that was more explicit and sustained than in the West" (Holliday as cited in Holliday & Wilding, 2003, p. 8). Others have given these systems labels such as oriental, conservative, Pacific, Pacific American and informal security. Nonetheless, there is a consensus that the countries of the region have welfare systems.

Some of these countries in the region, especially Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea (the four 'tigers') have had historically strong institutions for making economic policies. At the same time, they have had weak social policy-making institutions that although significant in their creation, have not been influential. As a consequence, while there has been the development of first-class expertise in economic and industrial fields, there has been a lack of ability in social realms (Holliday & Wilding, 2003).

In terms of public spending in South East Asia, money spent on education is the highest among all regions of the world (Abrahamson, 2010). This spending is especially evident in the four 'tigers'. In general, East Asian countries are among the most advanced nations in the world in educational terms and the academic achievements of East Asian

students are significant. Even if students from affluent backgrounds have a wider choice, there is wide access to education for all sections of the society. No individual is stopped from accessing education. This could possibly be related to the Confucian ideal of universal education. However, Mok (2003) argues that education was an instrument of East Asian economic growth and competiveness in the early second half of the last century. In turn, this growth and competitiveness was important for nation building and political stability (p. 68). This view contrasts with the purpose of a Confucian education in terms of social justice. As previously pointed out, the purpose of education for Confucians was the cultivation of morality and virtue in people's lives, with the broader aim of serving the community.

Other scholars have reached similar conclusions to Mok (2003) with regards to health policies in the region. As with education, the healthcare model is in line with the economic growth in South East Asia. That is the reason why some scholars such as Holliday (2000) call them 'productivist' welfare states. At the same time, governments have sought to minimize their role in providing welfare while maximizing the roles of families and firms. "In other words, the state has been a regulator, not a provider, of welfare benefits" (Park & Jung, 2007). Needless to say, state intervention in education and health remains large in the region. Historically, however, welfare policies have not had strong state institutions backing them. The state, market, community and family have each had role in providing welfare to members. Just recently, some of the countries have moved to set up welfare regimes that are more universal (Park & Jung, 2007).

Also, historically, there has been hostility towards Western style welfare systems. The first reason, as pointed out above, is that social policies have been subordinated to economic growth. The second reason, however, finds its roots in the Confucian culture. One of the issues in accepting a Western style welfare system is the belief that such a system undermines family provision. This subsequently could weaken the family bond and result in social instability. Provision of welfare by the government worries people from Confucian societies because it makes individuals reliant on government. According to Confucian values, government involvement in the provision of welfare encourages people to evade responsibility towards family and the community (Chan, 2003, p. 249). Moreover, there is a belief that welfare assistance is of the best quality when it is given voluntary and when it is given with affection and care. Therefore, a family based welfare system may result in strengthening family and community bonds (Chan, 2003).

Another reason for a strong emphasis on welfare systems based on family and community is to ensure that the culture survives. Hence, "Emphasis on family has not only been practical but also ideological" (Abrahamson, 2011, p. 30). To ensure that traditions survive, several of the countries in the region have passed laws, mandating obligations towards family members (Holliday & Wilding 2005, p. 168). This is the case in both South Korea and Taiwan and family members include children, spouses, parents and even siblings. In Singapore, as pointed out before, laws require children to take care of elderly parents. Family tribunal courts have been set up to deal with cases where children fail to do so. Elders, then, can take their children to court. In Hong Kong, on the other hand, the government provides benefits and tax breaks for children who take care of their parents. Similar legislation is in effect in China. For all this, "the idea of legislation is not that the government has no responsibility to help the elderly. It is rather that from a Confucian point of view caring for the elderly should rest first on the shoulders of their own adult children" (Chan, 2003, p. 243).

So, is there a Confucian welfare system?

It can be argued that the countries in the South East Asian region have followed economic and social policies that can be viewed as one unique model. Different labels have been used for their welfare systems. Research has revealed that there are laws in place that respond to the cultural traditions of the region. The welfare systems of the countries have been largely family based, emphasizing the role of the family in providing welfare. It has been argued that this reflects the culture of the region. However, others argue that governments in the region have largely avoided putting welfare systems in place because their focus is on competitiveness and economic growth. Even in areas where governments have provided welfare, the reasoning has once again been to ensure economic growth and social and political stability. Therefore, some scholars have abandoned the notion of a Confucian welfare system. However, there is disagreement amongst scholars on the definition of a Confucian welfare system, which has been drawn upon a Confucian concept of social justice.

The aim of this thesis is to determine if there is a Confucian-based social justice concept amongst those immigrants to New Zealand from Confucian societies. Research has shown that that it remains unclear if people from Confucian societies conceptualize social justice from a Confucian perceptive. Therefore, I conducted interviews to see if immigrants from Confucian societies hold a Confucian notion of social justice. The next

chapter discusses the results of the interviews. The interviews were used to add emphasis and texture to the findings based on existing research. The chapter also provides a discussion on the potential implications of the presence of a Confucian-based notion of social justice in New Zealand.

Chapter 4: The Confucian Concept of Social Justice within the New Zealand Context

The aim of this chapter is to assess the impact of Confucian perceptions of social justice on New Zealand society and is based partly on the results of interview material and supplemented by other primary and secondary sources. The first part of this chapter presents some of the responses to the questions asked of research participants and evaluates if the answers to the questions reflect a 'Confucian' way of thinking about social justice. The second part of this chapter seeks to understand what it will mean for New Zealand if a particularly 'Confucian' way of thinking about social justice is prevalent among immigrants to the country. As already mentioned, the concept of social justice within the New Zealand context is based on the notions that originated from within Western political philosophy and, thus, are mostly about promoting individual welfare. Maori, on the other hand, have a different way of thinking about social justice, which can be regarded as a communitarian tradition. In addition, as it will be explained in part two, Elizabeth Rata (2011) points out that in the recent decades the recognition of tribalism has become a quest of social justice for many Maori. Rata (2000) argues that 'indigenous capitalism' downplays political mobilization that seeks equality based on class divisions. These assertions are in line with Zizek's (1997) and Pitcher's (2012) arguments about the role of multiculturalism in diverting attention from rising inequalities. Rata (2005) argues further that this racially based economics, which she calls 'neotribalism capitalism', will further erode the universalistic character of the liberal democracy. Among the characteristics that could fade are concepts that are related to Western concepts of social justice such as promoting the autonomy and well-being of individuals. Based on these assertions and my primary research, I argue, perhaps counter-intuitively, that there is *not* a strong sense of a distinctly 'Confucian' way of thinking about social justice present among the participants. Rather, the participants illustrate a sense of familial obligation, and a strong belief in universal education, which could be as reflective of social conservatism as 'Confucianism' *per se*. The notion of social conservatism will be explained further in this chapter.

Results

The first thing I wanted to know was whether immigrants from Confucian societies believe in a more communitarian society whose members have certain obligations to the community, as opposed to a more individualistic society where there is more individual

choice and autonomy. It was challenging to frame a question for this issue. I therefore looked for answers to this overall question in the answers given to other specific questions. I looked for whether or not there is a sense of obligation towards family, extended family and community. The following response was delivered by one of the participants when asked about caring for elderly parents:

Participant A:

> It should be a combine system to work. For example, Kiwis prefer to live in a retirement village and they hire professional staff to look after them and I think it is a good idea. But, we need to go back since we cannot cut the ties between families but for us it like we understand the families and their needs (verbatim).

Participant H responded to the question of caring for elderly parents by saying:

> In our culture the constitution obliges people to take care of their parents. I think in New Zealand it is good that if that happens. Especially those people should be taken care of by the family and the government because they have contributed a lot (verbatim).

Participant B said:

> It can be good and bad. I had a grandmother who we took care of until she was 90. And it took to a point we could no longer take care of her ourselves. But we also visited her quite regularly because we know that we can provide the best support for our grandmother. We know our family better and we can support our family better. I think when you ask help for government it should be the last thing to do when it is needed and necessary. I think it is an East Asian concept but I know that Maori and Pacific communities have similar. ...So you know you have Maori family where they look after extended family children and that sort of thing (verbatim).

Participant F said:

> I am not sure that all the Asian people are equally same. So when it comes to taking care of the family, if the government is taking care of the people and things like health care, then I do not need to worry about it (verbatim).

Most of the responses regarding caring for family members were in line with these four answers. Does this illustrate a sense of care for elderly parents and a strong family bond among Asians that is could be distinct from Europeans. The existing literature shows that there is a stronger sense of responsibility towards parents in Asian cultures. Driven

by the value of filial piety, it is 'expected' that children to take care of their elderly parents in Asian cultures, whereas in Western culture, taking care of the parents is more of a choice. In fact, participant E indicated that it would be an obligation for her to take care of her parents later, while that is not the case for her friends from European background:

> It is not that care for parents is not present among my European friends. But I have always felt like that for them it is more of a choice while for me it is an obligation (verbatim).

Furthermore, the answer of her shows that her grandmother had been taken care of by the family, until the point when it was impossible for them to care of her. This could be in line with some of the existing data, which shows that Asians are more likely to live in multi-generational households. According to Jo Cribb from the website of Ministry of Social Development:

> Some ethnic groups are more likely than others to live in multi-generational households and families. This is a particular characteristic of Asian families, as well as many Māori and Pacific families (2009).

Studies conducted in other Western countries have illustrated similar results. For example, a report that was prepared by Kochhar and Cohn (2011) for PEW Research Center, that living in multi-generational households was most likely to occur among Asian-Americans. As outlined in the previous chapter, governments in some Asian countries oblige children to take care of their elderly parents (for different reasons) and as can be seen above, the participants all preferred strong family ties.

When asked more explicitly of they prefer a Communitarian society, participant G answered:

> A mixture. An individualistic, self-regulatory one (with no legislation) is an ideal that can only be achieved with a high level of education, and it will come to realize itself when such a system comes into being. However, presently I cannot think of a country that has succeeded on that front—at least without heading in to the history books. Till then, there must be an element of community, and governmental involvement (verbatim).

Participant B said:

> I think there should be a more communitarian culture than individualistic one. Not too extreme. One of the issues is that these days the society is too individualistic and they only think

about now and what it means to them and they ignore the general social good or the future good if people and the future generation and it is sort of they want everything now and I think the society needs to think more about community. Even the East Asian countries are changing and becoming more individualistic. It is like I want things now and the way I want them (verbatim).

Other participants' responses were in the same lines. However, overall, one can argue that there is strong sense of obligation towards the family and community while at the same time some degree of individualism is preferred. This is in line with some of the findings in the studies discussed in chapter 2, which found that as the East Asian region has gone through a process of modernization, Confucian values have either weakened or are present but in different forms. Based on the answers I argue that Confucian values are present in different forms. The reason is that most of the candidates illustrated a strong sense of care towards family.

Another concept or idea that is closely related to the Confucian concept of social justice is education for all, which Confucians saw as cultivating virtue in the people. In Confucianism it is "education and not law or punishment which leads to the development of people's virtues and moral lives" (Chan, 2001). In terms of education, participants broadly agreed that there should be universal education for all people regardless of their background or the available resources. They found public education the most important policy of the government. As one of the participants (A) pointed out:

> For Confucian society, education is big part of our life since we believe that education and knowledge is treasure. It is the biggest treasure you can get. Besides that, with education could bring unique individual traits. With education you can train yourselves for well-being for development and to be good person and good behaviour. Education is training. It is training for well-being (verbatim).

It was notable in most of the participants that education should be given priority by the government as well as by the people. For example, participant F said:

> From, a point of view I think China is quite well off. Because everyone in China knows how important education is. That is why they work so hard and not in New Zealand. Because the government cannot give the idea to the people that education is important for your whole life. That is why many people even though they have the chance to get education in their whole life but they do not do anything about it because they do not sense how important education is. Then they become disadvantaged

people in the society and the tax-payers have to support them (verbatim).

Some of the responses on this subject were also in line with the arguments in the previous chapter, which discussed education's importance for development. As it was explained, education is seen as an important instrument for development and economic growth. Among the participants, no strong evidence was found to suggest that their responses could be linked to a Confucian notion of education which in turn relates to Joseph Chan's (2001) perspective on Confucian social justice. Joseph Chan's argument is that from a Confucian point of view, education for all is important for the development of the virtues and the moral lives of the individuals. Participants in this study thought that education was power, education was the source of development, and education was necessary in order to avoid becoming disadvantaged.

Another aspect to a Confucian theory of social justice is that priority should be given to the poor and the needy members of society so that they can be empowered to lead a good life. Generally speaking, according to Confucian scholars, the needy are those people who are unable to take care of themselves. The government should make sure that they are being taken care of or they should be empowered to do take care of themselves. For example, in terms of disabled people, Confucian philosopher Xunzi maintained that the government should give them duties and jobs that they can carry out so that they can take care of themselves (Chan, 2001). Most of the respondents agreed that one of the primary goals of the government should be to help the needy. As one of the participants (H) stated:

> Government should have the proper policy to ensure the social mechanism, supporting and empowering role to ensure social harmony. The government should assist the disadvantaged people. In our culture the government should provide the basic needs of the people. *Isu R zin=* clothes, food, transportation (basic needs). All citizens should have equal chance (from my perspective). Furthermore, in distribution of resources the government should maintain to the principle of equality (verbatim).

Participant B answered:

> The government should take care of the needs of the people and ensure that people are able to do what they want...whether the government is democratic or not (verbatim).

Thus most of the participants agreed that the government should address the basic needs of the people. However, this does not necessary entail a difference between a Confucian

notion of social justice and that of non-Confucians. In many Western theories of social justice and in Western thinking in general, there is an emphasis on helping the disadvantaged members of society. For example, in the survey conducted by the Maxim Institute in 2006, many people believed that in a just society more resources should be given to the least advantaged (Friesen, 2006). Moreover, many people also believed that the disadvantaged must be supported for the purpose of achieving equity in society (Friesen, 2006). As Chan (2001) has argued, Confucianism seeks sufficiency and not equality between individuals. While most of the participants believed in equality, no evidence was found linking care of the least advantaged with the principle of sufficiency. Chan explains that according to classical Confucians, sufficiency means having enough material goods to lead a good life. He states that above the adequacy of material goods (or sufficiency), Confucian justice does not concern itself about inequality of wealth (Chan, 2001). Perhaps, if sufficiency is being been linked to the concept of meritocracy I can assess Chan's assertion and see if the participants believe that inequalities can be ignored. I should explain, however (perhaps in more detail) entails that people with talents and abilities have access to offices and high positions in the society. Chan (2001) points out that Confucian thinkers believed that people who are virtuous and capable should be selected to serve in the government. The selection of such people must happen irrespective of their socio-economic backgrounds. This idea was used by various dynasties in China and it has become known as "Chinese competitive examination system for civil service" (Chan, 2001). Chan points out that Xunzi has been of the strongest advocates of the idea organizing social classes by individual merit (2001). Xunzi has argued that if descendants of royal families lack talents and abilities to rule, they should be demoted to the position of commoners. Conversely, if there are individuals among commoners who can become educated and correct their conduct, they should be promoted to higher ranks of society (Xunzi, 1990). While this idea may sound reasonable because it can be assumed that everyone gets a chance to achieve higher positions, there are also issues with it (from Western egalitarian perspective): meritocracy can be used to justify inequality. Here one can identify the difference between a Western egalitarian view of social justice and a Confucian one. Egalitarians see a just society as "a level playing field in which individuals compete among themselves for resources and rewards throughout their entire lives. The Confucian idea of meritocracy, however, is concerned only about people's actual abilities and the fairness of distributing offices and positions" (Chan, 2001). However, it should be mentioned that even though participants in this study were

asked about meritocracy in explicit terms as well as provided with examples, no evidence was found in their answers that illustrated a belief in meritocracy. In fact, none of the participants thought it was a good idea.

Overall, while there was an emphasis on concepts present in a Confucian ethical system, they were not directly linked to a Confucian concept of social justice. For example, all the participants placed an important emphasis on universal education and they agreed that this stemmed from their culture. However, one cannot conclude that participants believed in education for the sake of becoming more virtuous people who served their community.

Moreover, some of the participant's views on certain concepts were closely related to their political and organizational affiliations. For example, participant D who was a member of the Labour Party believed in universal education, which is funded by the government. On the other hand, participant C who leaned towards a more liberal party believed that universal education should be publicly provided but public needs to understand that everything is not free. This is in line with other participant's responses, which were reflected the sentiments of the more liberal party, believing in private funding and less government intervention in economic and social matters:

> Public health, social security and education and superannuation by far take the biggest share of the national income. Government should not assume that I have the responsibility. Everyone should first assume that I have first the responsibility (verbatim).

The interesting issue was that this participant (C) strongly emphasized a 'traditional way of life' as well as pointing out that Confucianism was an important part of their culture and according to him, "it is stuck in our minds" (verbatim). Furthermore, he thought that a "traditional way of life" is reflected in more individual choice, which for him meant less government interference in certain aspects of life. He also believed that individuals should take responsibility for caring for their family members and that government should be the last resort.

His answer to the question, which highlighted the role of care by family members, was:

> Oh yes, if your son is capable, he should take care of you. That is moral issue but you cannot force him to that. But on the other side, we should agree on family values. Family values have been destroyed in the modern world. Look at the teenagers. If they have done something wrong, you go to family court. And everyone is taking responsibility, like the court, government but

> not the family. Traditionally, it was family that was taking responsibility. But why should government take responsibility for the damage? It should be the family. Government must be the last resort (verbatim).

Following that, I asked the participant: Should there be a collective responsibility? He replied:

> Firstly, the individual, secondly, the family and then the community and then organizations (civil, community) and then it is government (verbatim).

This means that the participant interpreted Confucianism as being more compatible with the liberal party, which he is a member of. Perhaps, one can conclude that Confucianism is still present in East Asian societies, but in different forms (as some scholars have indicated). One can also conclude that Confucianism is being interpreted through different Western ideologies that have influenced East Asian societies from the advent of modernization.

Further, the length of time participants had been in New Zealand varied. Based on this fact, it was assumed that participants who had been longer in New Zealand would have a more Western way of thinking than those who had been in the country for just a few years. However, this was not the case. In order to assess the validity of this assumption two of the participants were compared with each other, both of whom were affiliated with a left leaning party. One of the participants had been in New Zealand for 10 years and the other had been in the country for over 30 years. Both of them, however, reflected quite strongly the views of their parties rather than elements of Confucian social justice. For example, both of them strongly emphasized equality in terms of class and identity. Participant G who leaned towards a more leftist political party said the following about equality:

> In a modern society, where recent economic policies have created greater inequality, government needs to intervene to ensure a just distribution. Inequalities have led to social disorder, so for a society that runs more smoothly, we need to narrow the gap between rich and poor. Economic equality does not exist in New Zealand any more, and recent policies have only served to make things worse. Government seems to have lost its way. That has led to social inequality as well, since the two are closely tied. Sometimes, fairness needs to be legislated into existence for the portions of the population that fight it. There is a gender gap, for instance, and it's accepted by most of the population that that shouldn't exist. Yet it does. Legislation

then steps in to ensure it. People should equal access to political institutions (verbatim).

Participant D, on the hand, who was affiliated with a more moderate leftist party indicated that the government should assist people in at least providing for certain minimums but at the same time she emphasized that it is also the responsibility of the people in a society to take care of each other. Interestingly, this answer could be interpreted from perceptive of Confucian value of taking care of family members and the community. But she also strongly emphasized on equality and equal opportunity in many other moments during the interview. In fact, she mentioned that traditionally Confucianism was being used to justify inequalities.

Overall, it can be argued that the participants were strongly oriented towards family and community while at the same time they also liked some aspects of individualism. This is not to say, for example, that European New Zealanders are less community and family oriented. However, the younger participants who had mixed with both cultures indicated that they had a stronger sense of family and community than their New Zealand European acquaintances. As it was pointed out earlier, one participant believed that being family oriented was an obligation for her while for her friends (from European backgrounds) it was more of a choice. Still, one cannot conclude that the participants saw this through the perspective of Confucian social justice. What is more, the participants did not believe in the concepts that distinguished a Confucian understanding of social justice from that of Western society. As Chan (2001) points out:

> Confucian justice differs from egalitarian justice in that the former does not seek to equalize life chances as such. It does not see natural inequalities (such as unequal natural talents) or social inequalities (such as unequal family background) as inherently unjust. When it comes to matters about people's well-being, material welfare, and life chances, Confucian justice seeks to promote sufficiency for all and not equality between individuals (Chan, 2001).

Most of the candidates rejected the idea that the government should only promote sufficiency; on the contrary, they believed that the government should promote equality not only between individuals but also among groups. Participants believed that as long as this does not hinder development, the government should promote more equality among the citizens. It should be mentioned that the participant's emphasis on equality is in conflict with what is assumed to be a traditional Confucian-based theory of social

justice. The reason, according to Chan (2001), is that Confucianism does not have an issue with natural and social inequalities.

The findings of my study could further be strengthened by the results of Shin's analysis of the World Values Surveys 2005-2008 on the preferred lifestyle of people from Confucian societies. Shin (2012) points out, it can be concluded that one of the most preferred lifestyles was egalitarianism (37%). I should point out three more options were available in that survey. They were: individualism, fatalism and hierarchism. Based on the survey, Shin (2012) concludes, that in Confucian Asia, hierarchism, which is assumed to be prescribed by Confucianism, is not the most favoured cultural type. Instead, egalitarianism is the favoured culture in the region.

Nevertheless, as already pointed out above, participants illustrated some level of obligation towards family and friends, which can strengthen the notion of the familial welfare system. It can be argued, therefore, that the participants' responses were in line with Western social conservatism. As Fitzpatrick (2011) states, social conservatives are people who believe strongly in family values. Moreover, they support state education as an instrument through which families are kept strong and children raised "properly". Also, their concern is mainly concentrated on issues such as keeping order and stability. They tend to believe in social inclusion rather than social justice. Social democrats, and in general people on the left, therefore, criticize social conservatives for their lack of concern for societal outcomes. Social conservatives are also the subject of criticism from feminists because they believe in traditional families. Drawing upon this description of social conservatism, it can therefore be argued that the participants (6 out of 8) favoured some level of social conservatism. In the end, one cannot say that the participants automatically reflected an obviously "Confucian" view of social justice because some of the concepts they did believe in were not in line with traditional Confucian-based social justice. An important principle they believed in was that of equality. Still, one could argue that the notion of family welfare could have had a stronger presence among them. Can this be contributed to the socio-economic backgrounds of immigrants to New Zealand from so-called "Confucian" societies? Does their socio-economic status have an influence on the way they think about social justice?

It has been argued by scholars that groups who have traditionally viewed themselves as more marginalized are more likely to have favourable attitudes toward government's

intervention (Junisbai, 2010) for the purpose of enhancing equality and social justice. Among disadvantaged groups can be ethnic minorities of many countries who have had traditionally less access to resources and political power. One can argue, since immigrants from Confucian societies may feel marginalized, they support promotion of equality. At the same time, these results are against the results of the research that was conducted by Junisbai (2010) who found that ethnic minorities in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were less likely to be concerned about equality. Junisbai (2010) points out that the underlying reason for less concern toward egalitarianism is because the ethnic minorities in those two countries have historically enjoyed privileged positions in the political system as well as industry in those countries. I should mention that participants in this research were mostly from middle-classes, active members of the society and six of them were involved in politics. However, this can also be looked at differently. One of the participants (D) who was deeply involved with work in the Asian community said something interesting regarding equality. She said that many people in the community support equality in terms of group rights. She further pointed out that because of their backgrounds, many Asian New Zealanders do not support the notion of class equality. This means that their socio-economic status may indeed influence the way they think about social justice. But such assumption is hard to make in this study, since participants strongly supported the notion of equality, and because most them were privileged members of the society. Still, support for equality between ethnicities was present in the answers of some of the participants.

Participant F:

> So as I know from the policy, I am feeling that people from different ethnicities are being treated equally which I am very satisfied about it (verbatim).

When I asked participant H about what she thinks of equality, she answered:

> For the political cabinet we have in our country, different representatives for different ethnicities which are advisors to government for the different regions (verbatim).

Furthermore, as Park (2006) points out, there is a general assumption that Asian New Zealanders have a high social-economic status. She asserts that one reason behind this assumption is that 60 percent of Asians have migrated to New Zealand under the business scheme. Thus, they are assessed based on their contribution to the New Zealand economy. Many others also gained entrance to New Zealand through the

"points system", in which points are being given on the basis of their wealth, level of education and work experience. Therefore, many immigrants that have arrived in the country are relatively educated and wealthy. Park further points out that there are many reports about Asians owning expensive cars and living in affluent neighbourhoods, contributing to the perception of "rich Asians". It should be pointed out that her definition of 'Asian' includes Chinese New Zealanders (from China, Taiwan Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore) and Korean New Zealanders. These are immigrants who find their backgrounds in Confucian societies.

However, perceptions about the level of wealth of Asians are questionable (Park, 2006). Census data over the years has illustrated a lower income for Asian New Zealanders than is often assumed (Park, 2006). Park (2006) argues that this result may illustrate the fact that on average Asian New Zealanders are relatively young and many of them are still studying. There are also many Asian immigrants who were out of the workforce because they have not found a job yet. However, Park continues:

> ...Having said that, it could be a case of Asian New Zealanders'
> reported level of annual income not accurately reflecting their
> actual level of wealth - Asian New Zealanders who   have
> substantial assets either in New Zealand or overseas may no
> longer be required to work for additional income in New
> Zealand (Park, 2006, p. 70).

Also, the results of the 2006 census showed that the population of 'Chinese' people in the workforce stood at 51 percent at that time. The national average in the census was 65 percent (Statistics New Zealand, 2006). Robert Didham (2009) points out that the results reflect the fact that many of the Chinese were students. He also points out that on average more Chinese have higher qualifications and more of them are self-employed. Patrick Ongley (2004) draws another conclusion regarding Asians (namely Taiwanese and Koreans in this case). He argues that most ethnic groups, and particularly the Taiwanese and Koreans, are more likely to be running their own businesses. Furthermore, Asians are also overrepresented among professionals, a trait that is attributed to educational aspirations (Ongley, 2004).

Thus, the results of the polls are mixed. More research – based on level of wealth – needed to understand if immigrants from Confucian societies support equality only in terms of group rights. In this research, it is shown that the participants strongly supported the concept of equality. One of the participants was in fact from a wealthy background but still supported class-based equality more so than the other participants.

Implications for New Zealand

In the introduction of this thesis, I pointed out that theorists such as Young and Fraser have argued that justice requires that cultural differences are acknowledged. Young (1990) argues that when different cultures are acknowledged, it becomes difficult for the dominant groups to promote their values as being natural and universal and the 'others' as inferior. At the same time, this promotes a form of communitarianism as opposed to individualism in liberalism. Furthermore, as already mentioned in the introduction, Young argues that ignoring cultural expressions creates a form of injustice and leads to people feeling invisible (Young, 1990). As it was explained, communitarian theorists within the discourse of social justice argue that different groups have diverse views on social justice. One can argue, for example, that cultural expressions in the form of social justice can be recognized in a society like New Zealand. The importance of recognizing cultural expressions, which can be linked to a Western liberal notion of enhancing individual autonomy, has been explained by Joseph Raz (1998). He argues that the autonomy of the individual is realized when they are empowered enough to make choice among a broad range of options of what constitutes the good life. This is ultimately tied with cultural access and the advancement and flourishing of distinct cultures. But the recognition of different cultures and their cultural expressions may also be in conflict of liberal principles of freedom and equality. Liberalism is concerned with promotion of freedom and equality between individuals. On the other hand, as it was explained, not all cultures may value individual-based justice. Recognition of different cultures may entail that distribution of resources and social goods will in line with how those different cultures allocate them. This in turn means that values that are upheld in liberalism may be undermined. For example, equality between individuals or equal opportunity for individuals may be undermined. In the context of New Zealand, It has been argued that recognition of biculturalism has started this process (Rata, 2005).

Biculturalism entails the recognition of two cultures, and is favoured by those who want to highlight the unique position of Maori people in New Zealand (Mulgan, 1989). The concept has gained recognition in New Zealand because of Treaty of Waitangi, which stresses the principle of partnership between the British Crown and Maori people (Mulgan, 1989). It is important to note that in 1985, the Labour Government established a tribunal to which Maori could appeal when there was a breach of the Treaty. Over the next two decades, this tribunal expanded and governments adopted legislation that has

put Maori on a path of self-determination at the national and tribal levels. The burgeoning of Maori interests was further emphasized by the increasing importance of Maori seats in parliament, acting as bargaining chip within the mixed member proportional system that was introduced in 1996. These interests were further highlighted by the increase in devolutionary efforts by the Maori tribes and communities. At the same time, as explained earlier, since the 1980s, there has been a global shift away from social democratic welfare policies towards neoliberal policies based on the market economy. As Pearson (2009) explains, these policies have been particularity disadvantageous towards Maori. Reconstruction of industry, as a result of adopting neoliberal policies has led to rising unemployment among Maori. At the same time and paradoxically, the shift towards market driven neoliberal economic policies has assisted indigenous attempts in attaining collective control over their own fates. Maori have also exploited what has become known as new public management. As a result of now established market political regimes, Maori have been provided with the opportunity to provide services for their communities, alongside the government. They have also been able to influence the reform processes, affecting the Maori. "The effect of the former strategy may be seen in the fast growing provision of semi-autonomous Maori education, form the pre-school to tertiary levels and the growth of independent health and welfare organizations" (Pearson, 2009, p. 44). Neoliberal climate, which provided grounds for Asian immigration has also provided for entrepreneurship as well as what is termed by Elizabeth Rata (2000) as 'neotribal capitalism'.

Rata (2000) explains that 'neotribal capitalism' is a concept that developed as a result of retribalization and acceptance of biculturalism in New Zealand. The concept entails that the Maori tribal unit (iwi) is seen as a corporate economic enterprise, which operates within the framework of a capitalist economy. 'Neotribe' is an entity that possesses an economic and political character based on a traditionalist ideology (Rata, 2011). As she (2011) points out, promotion of biculturalism and the new interpretations of the Treaty of Waitangi since the 1980s have enabled Maori to claim their historical settlement grievances. As a result, since the 1980s the tribes now own 25,000 hectare of land, 35 percent of the New Zealand fishing industry, as well as 200,000 hectare of pre-1990 exotic forests and 400,00 hectare of pre-1990 indigenous forests along with 200,000 hectare of scrub (O'Sullivan 2009a). Moreover, the commercial assets of Maori individuals, families, sub-tribes and tribes now amounts to $16 billion, experiencing an increase of $ 7.5 billion since 2001.

As consequence, Rata (2011) points out that social justice is now seen by Maori within the context of the recognition of tribalism rather than as inclusion of the Maori culture in New Zealand society. At the same time, the 'neotribes' who own assets engage in economic activity within the national and international spheres. Rata (2011) argues that the revival of tribalism has been helpful to capitalism and market-driven liberalism because it is more advantageous to production. The reason for this is that traditional cultures are more hierarchal and therefore justify inequalities. As explained previously, communitarian justice, unlike a universal justice, may not recognize the notion of equality within cultures. These assertions are also in line with Zizek's (1997) and Pitcher's (2012) arguments about the role of the state in legitimating diversity in order to divert attention from rising inequalities in a capitalist economy. Zizek (1997) argues that multiculturalism, in which there has been an emphasis upon ethnic diversity and other identities, has assisted capitalism by diverting attention from critical voices. He further argues that anti-racism movements make markets more efficient as well as justify class inequalities. Pitcher (2012) asserts: "If cultural diversity was once part of the challenge to a mainstream monoculturalism, today it describes an ethical consensus, central to business and management practice, and a key organizing principle of social and cultural life" (p. 2).

This process may be strengthened by the views of immigrants from Confucian societies on certain issues. Although, evidence found in this research illustrated that one cannot speculate strongly the presence of a Confucian idea of social justice among the immigrants that may be recognized. Still, there is some level of sense of obligation towards family and community present among the participants, which could undermine values attached to liberalism in New Zealand. This pattern, which could be linked to a family-based welfare system, could find itself compatible with Neoliberalism and neotribal capitalism. As Armstrong (2006) points out, from the 1980s onwards, the notion of equality that was strongly present in welfare states was being portrayed as suppressing individual choice and ignorant towards personal responsibility. Instead, politicians such as Reagan and Thatcher, emphasized values self reliance by individuals, enterprise and personal responsibility. "…neoliberal politicians promoted an ideal of 'active citizenship', whereby the responsibilities of citizens where primarily couched in terms of duty to be economically self-supporting, to make responsible choices for oneself and one's family" (Armstrong, 2006, p. 78). Since then, the notion of equality that was present in the doctrines of social democracy has been replaced by the narrow

notion of equal opportunity. Moreover, the leftist parties that historically supported social democracy, have adopted the concept of social inclusion of citizens, in terms of trying to include economic inactive members of the society into the labour market. By doing so, they have abandoned the problems that may arise from inequalities on larger scales, such as inequalities between generations. In this sense, belief in equal opportunity that is being promoted by liberal egalitarians has served neoliberalism.

At the same time, most participants in this research favoured the notion of equality. This means that support for egalitarian justice may increase in the future. However, if it is assumed that immigrants from Confucian societies prefer a system in which individuals take responsibility for the welfare of their families, and that the support for equality goes as far as equality between different cultures and ethnicities, as well as equal opportunity, the result will be that support for neoliberal economic policies may become strengthened. It should follow then that the greater emphasis on family care and justified inequality (seen within the context of traditional values and the usefulness of inequality in production), may subvert the class-struggle for equality and traditional notions of strengthen traditional notions of the family, much to the disappointment of feminists and other critical voices.

Furthermore, as pointed out earlier, New Zealanders have traditionally sought to establish an egalitarian society. In fact, one of the reasons for the shift towards neoliberalism was to achieve the traditional goals of the Labour Party. However, if in fact "wealthy" Asians are striving for better socio-economic status, and as a result, they are not in favour of social policies promoting equality, then, other issues may be experienced.

An example of such an issue can be drawn from the United States. Most immigrants in the United States have come from Latin American countries with the present population of Latinos in the United States standing at 47.9 million (Fifield & Garrahan, 2010). This is approximately 15 percent of the entire population of the country (Fifield & Garrahan, 2010). Fifield and Garrahan (2010) argue that Latinos strongly influence voter swing, something that has forced politicians to reconsider their positions in order to obtain the Latino vote. Spoonley and Bedford (2012) point out that change in demographics was reflected in the congressional elections of 2011 in which states that had experienced a growth in the Latino population gained congressional seats. The election showed that the majority of Latinos voted for the Democratic Party in the elections, something

which could disadvantage the Republican Party in the future. Casellas and Ibarra (2012) argue that ideology is one of the underlying reasons for Latinos' support of the Democratic Party. They point out that the Republican Party supports minimal government intervention, while the Democratic Party supports a more active role in the issues that are faced by society. For example, the Democratic Party supports government assistance to the disadvantaged, as well intervention in healthcare and education. These policies are generally preferred by the Latinos of the United States. Rodriguez (2010) argues that the most obvious impact Americans will feel as result of changes in the social fabric is political. This has already led to what he calls the "white anxiety crisis". He asserts:

> Though whites will become a minority in the national population, the vast majority of individual states will probably remain majority white.... A strong white-minority political consciousness is most likely to arise in regions that are nowhere near actually becoming majority-minority. It is in these regions, where white-minority status is more phantom than reality, that politicians and demagogues can best use the rhetoric of white ethno-nationalism (Rodriguez, 2010, p. 42).

He goes on,

> This won't take the form of a chest-thumping brand of white supremacy. Instead, we are likely to see the rise of a more defensive, aggrieved sense of white victimhood that strains the social contract and undermines collectively shared notions of the common good (Rodriguez, 2010, p. 42).

Spoonley and Beford (2012) argue that one of the reasons for this anxiety is the growth of Latino communities who are regarded as culturally/linguistically different 'others'. This is perceived as a challenge to core American values. Will European New Zealanders have the same experience? The results of this research show Most of the participants appreciated the values of New Zealanders, such as equality. But at the same time, the results also illustrate that they may have a stronger sense of obligation towards family, which may be in line with neoliberal policies. This in turn could undermine egalitarian form of justice. Furthermore, Manying Ip (2009) points out that, like many other places in the world, the arrival of new immigrants led to rising anxiety among residents. Both Pakeha and Maori have shared feelings of unease towards what has been termed as the 'Asian influx' (Ip, 2000). Some Maori feared that Asians may become their competitors for resources. Since social justice is now seen in terms of neotribal capitalism, with recognition of biculturalism providing grounds for the tribes to access

resources, the new immigrants are perceived by some Maori as competitors for resources. Hence, Asian immigrants can be seen as potential compromisers of a Maori way of thinking about social justice

Potential for this concern can further be highlighted by reviewing studies about the perceptions of Asians regarding Maori. For example, a study that was conducted in 2009 by Manying Ip revealed that Chinese had negative feelings towards Maori. However, she points out that these negative feelings may potentially be based on the stereotypes that media uses for Maori. Nevertheless, some of the findings in this study relate to my research. Many of the Chinese participants in Ip's study felt under-represented in government and politics. Moreover, some felt that several of Maori's demands on government were 'anti-business'. Some participants also felt unease about Maori political activism, 'the lack of concern by Maori regarding their children's education', and their apparent "laid back" attitude. Ip points out, however, that "the Chinese ideal is to go all out to get ahead, work hard and make good. The social distance between the two groups is partly the result of their different values system" (Ip, 2009, p. 163). But will this be in conflict with the interests of all Maoris? Drawing up Rata's argument, and on the points I made above, it can be argued that there will not be a conflict of interests between immigrants from Confucian societies; affluent European New Zealanders; and the elite Maori within a neoliberal economic system in the near future. However, neoliberal economic policies and stronger support for these policies may widen inequality gap in New Zealand and as a result 'individual choices' for many New Zealanders that may be narrowed.

Limitations

There were several limitations to the study. The first was the limited number of the participants. This meant that I was not able to generalize the research results accurately to the whole population. In order to gain more accurate results, more participants were needed. The issue was that many individuals who were asked to participate in the research were people who had eventful schedules. As previously discussed, one of the issues with 'elite' interviewing is adjusting to these schedules. This was a challenging task. Many of the respondents emailed back saying that they were busy. On other occasions they had to reschedule the interviews. For example, among the interviewees were two people who were running for local board elections. One of them told me that he was able to be interviewed after the elections, given that his schedule may become

less full. Another one initially made appointment but had to cancel it again because of the elections. Also, several of the respondents said while they were aware of the concept of social justice they did not want to make any comments on it as they did not have no real knowledge about it.

Conclusion

Although the term was not widely used until the mid-19th century, this thesis has shown that debates relating to social justice have preoccupied the minds of many people throughout history. The conceptual boundaries of social justice are continuously being changed because its conception in any given moment is dependent on the particular historical and cultural value system in which it operates. Western liberalism and Confucianism can both be used as examples of value systems that influence debates of social justice. It has also been pointed out that debates around policy making have drawn upon various theories. For example, many welfare systems in Western countries find their justification in theories such as utilitarianism or social democracy. These theories are based on cultural values. It can be claimed then, that welfare systems in East Asia, which have been labelled as 'familial' by some theorists, are the products of the Confucian value system. However, as illustrated, modernization has also influenced Confucian societies. Therefore, there has been uncertainty among scholars whether Confucianism is still present as a value system in modern East Asian societies. As a consequence, one cannot talk about a Confucian theory of social justice with certainty.

My aim, however, was to find out if immigrants to New Zealand from Confucian societies conceptualize social justice according to a supposedly Confucian value system. This is important as East Asian immigrants are becoming one of New Zealand's largest cultural groups. Historically, discourse on the nature of a just society in New Zealand was influenced by various philosophies and ideologies that had their roots in Western liberalism. The early immigrants came to New Zealand to seek better lives and to live in a society that was more just than Britain. They were opposed to the social and economic constraints of British society and hoped to create an egalitarian society in New Zealand with equal opportunities for everyone. However, after several decades this vision had still not been realized. As a consequence, the egalitarian concept of New Zealand society changed and became more defined in terms of equality. In the 1930s, New Zealand became a world leader in social welfare programmes. During the 1980s, globalization resulted in the expansion of individual and consumer choice and the country adopted a neoliberal economic policy. At the same time, equality began to be seen through identity rather than social class. An example of this is the recognition of Maori concepts and their inclusion in the structure of the society. From the 1980s onwards and after a change in the immigration policy, people from different backgrounds immigrated to New Zealand. As a result, the country has become more

culturally diverse. The cultural values these different immigrants bring with them are relevant to the concept of social justice. The growing number of East Asian immigrants in particular may have a direct effect on issues relating to social justice, and therefore the political landscape of the country.

Based on the research results, it can be concluded that although the participants in the research were supportive of the concept of family responsibility for welfare of its members, one cannot conclude that participants' perception of social justice was based on the Confucian ethical system. Participants also believed in concepts that are not in line with Joseph Chan's (2001) idea of a Confucian social justice. For example, most of the participants showed some level of preference for individualism. Another example was the positive response to the concept of equality. As already explained, a Confucian concept of social justice does not necessary support the concept of equality. I also endeavoured to explore what the implications of these conclusions would be for New Zealand. Based on the conclusions, I believe that a communitarian-style welfare system, seen in terms of family obligation, could serve neoliberalism, which has already been strengthened by the 'neotribal capitalism' discussed by Elizabeth Rata (2000). This combination could undermine quest for equality (of individuals, classes and gender) even further in New Zealand. As a result, the promotion of welfare and autonomy of individuals, which is an important part of liberalism, may be hindered.

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