Māori Equity in
New Zealand's Polytechnics

by

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A dissertation submitted in fulfilment of the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

at the

Auckland University of Technology

2020

Acknowledgements

shared experiences of injustice, and a philosophical commitment to confront injustice, while maintaining what it means to have a sense of humour. But most of all I would like to thank my dad, who has long since passed away, but who introduced me to Aristotle, Marx and politics before I was 10. Without his love for world politics I would not have taken this journey at all. I always miss him.

I wish to dedicate this thesis to Johan, my partner, and Alex, my son, who continues the quest for knowledge for knowledge's sake. I leave you with some words that I grew up with:

"These stories I have recounted to you will remind you of what is within you"- *Ibn Arabi.*

Attestation of Authorship

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person (except where explicitly defined in the Acknowledgements), nor material which to a substantial extent has been submitted for the award of any other degree or diploma of a university or other institution of higher learning.

Signed: *Date:* 9th October 2020

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Abstract

This thesis takes a poststructuralist approach to examining outcomes for Māori students in polytechnic education in contemporary Aotearoa-New Zealand, as a site of equity in tertiary education policy. I use the term 'postmodernism' to capture the decline of modernism, which was associated with belief in the superiority of science and Western European culture, and which came increasingly under critique by poststructuralists in the post-WWII period. The failure of the radical political Left and an incredulity towards the 'grand narratives' of capitalism is described as the 'postmodern condition'. Poststructuralism has slightly different philosophical roots, representing a move beyond the structuralist paradigm, which ruled in social science during the modernist era. Poststructuralism is characterised most distinctively by the philosophy of Michel Foucault. The third related term used in the thesis is **(post) qualitative**, which refers to an emergent movement beyond 'traditional' qualitative research methodologies that retain allegiance to modernist frameworks. An effort has been made to reflect poststructuralist sensibilities in study design by collecting empirical data using 'standard' interview methods, which were then processed by writing fictionalised narratives.

Teaching and other polytechnic staff have responsibility for giving effect to Māori equity policy, so this study investigates how staff, including Māori staff, in polytechnics experience and enact Māori equity policies. The importance of equity is a central feature of a second-tier tertiary offering and defines, to a large extent, its raison d'être. Moreover, how Māori navigate the education system provides a special challenge to Aotearoa-New Zealand's settler colonialism through a potential crisis in legitimation.

Technology and technical education share a root in the ancient Greek notion of *technê*. A better understanding of the etymology and genealogy of technê reveals important philosophical contributions to our common assumptions about technical education and undergirds an historical account of technical education and the development of the New Zealand polytechnic sector. The economic philosophy of neoliberalism is a radical version of classical liberalism that was used to reconfigure the New Zealand economy and public sector,

including education systems, in a rapid process initiated between 1984 and 1990. Consequently, the polytechnics were reconstructed as autonomous institutes, responsible for their own strategic direction and meeting government priorities whilst maintaining financial sustainability.

Post neoliberal reform, polytechnics were expected to address inclusion by widening participation in higher education and developing meaningful policies for Māori. There was a policy consensus that achieving Māori equity would need to involve changing the educational milieu from a largely European model to one more responsive to, and inclusive of, Māori culture and values.

The neoliberal experiment disrupted the New Zealand consciousness of being a fair-go society. It posited the free market as a more efficient and effective mechanism for equity. It reconstituted the polytechnic sector, professionals, and students with a new entrepreneurial economic rationale. It remade not only what people do, but who people are, in the polytechnic sector. Learning is constructed not as a right but as a duty. The subjectivities of the learner and the professional have become new sites of exploitation and, therefore, sites of resistance.

Equality remains useful to think with but wedded to a comprised political project. To move beyond neoliberalism's impasse with equity requires a different way of thinking as a philosophical enterprise.

Table of Abbreviations

EA	Education Act 1989
EER	External evaluation and review
EFTS	Equivalent full-time student
EPIs	Educational performance indicators
ERA	Employment Relations Act 2000
FFTO	Foundation-Focused Training Opportunities
IP	Investment Plan
ITOs	Industry training organisations
ITP	Institutes of technology and polytechnics
MoE	Ministry of Education
NZQA	New Zealand Qualifications Authority
PFA	Public Finance Act 1989
PTE	Private training establishment
SSA	State Services Act 1988
TEAC	Tertiary education advisory council
TEC	Tertiary education commission
TEIs	Tertiary education institutions
TEOs	Tertiary education organisations
TES	Tertiary education services

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Prelude

The prelude introduces an insider account of 'the polytechnic crisis' through an imaginary therapy session of the polytechnic on the couch. This narrative foray attempts to introduce a sense of the world produced, in part, from policy and procedural 'lived realities'.

Essentially the crisis is primarily focussed on the political belief, espoused in reports and realised in the Education Act 1989, that equity, and especially Māori equity, could be addressed through the (re)construction of education with a radical market rationality. The Education Act 1989 was the culmination of a radical and rapid series of reforms that re-made the public sector guided by a series of neoliberal economic presuppositions: the selfish individual optimising their interests through a rational operation that yielded the best personal economic outcome; the ability of free markets through competition to distribute resources that in turn served the interests of the whole of society; and in free trade. Yet more than 30 years on from the initial fundamental remaking of education into a private commodity, Māori equity continues to be a perennial issue and the polytechnics find themselves increasingly in crippling and unsustainable financial debt, calling their future into question.

The counsel sought by the polytechnic lays out the how the polytechnic itself feels about the crisis in its everyday reading of policy and procedure. It does with a feeling of financial ruin and the sense of bitterness or rancour for having to work to a rational calculus, in which every decision is construed as an investment with a cost-benefit analysis. The reader is asked to suspend judgement, at least until the main body of the thesis, where these themes are fully articulated through critical exposition.

Story 1: Inside the Polytechnic Crisis - Seeking Counsel

The election of the 4th Labour government in 1984 ushered in an accelerated neoliberal reform programme firstly through its operating rationality followed by specific legislation aimed at public education. The key part of the education reform came in the 1989 Education

Act and its subsequent amendment in the 1990 Education Amendment Act. As suggested above the primary change was to construct an education market, creating semi-autonomous tertiary institutions no longer determined by a centrally planned Department of Education. Instead, the newly constructed Ministry of Education introduced the legislative support for a competitive model of education in policy and procedure that operated at a distance. A system of funding that rewarded increased numbers would also lay the foundations for competing for students.

This marketisation and massification of education may have initially increased numbers of students attending tertiary education but Māori equity continues to remain a persistent issue (TEC, 2018b), polytechnic debt levels have reached unsustainable proportions (Cabinet Social Wellbeing Committee, 2018) threatening the future of the polytechnic's in their current form.

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It had been a few difficult decades for the polytechnics. The extra funding as a result of the changes brought in by the Education Act 1989 and Education Amendment Act 1990 did lead to some years of growth in numbers and money coming in. Most of the polytechnics expanded in response, but the promised independence never quite materialised – yes, they became 'autonomous entities' under the new policy framework, but they still needed to work slavishly to the beat of the government's drum.

Now some 30 years later, there is a financial and Māori equity crisis. Some polytechnics merged in the belief they would gain economies of scale to make financial savings and gain institutional knowledge to better address Māori equity. But the financial gains did not materialise and neither did the polytechnics make any consistent progress in settling Māori inequity in success rates. As a result, the government has commissioned a 'big review' as part of its Education Work Programme (Ministry of Education, 2018a), looking for ways to secure a sustainable future for the polytechnics. In 1990 there were 25 Polytechnics with rising enrolments by 2018 there were 16 polytechnics, a combined deficit of $51.2 million and declining student members, with evermore dependence on international students and continued gaps between Māori and non-Māori (Cabinet Social Wellbeing Committee, 2018; Office of the Auditor-General, 2016b).This has created a great deal of anxiety in an already

stressed polytechnic system. Aotearoa-New Zealand's rural polytechnic sector showcases some of the issues and growing bitterness of what the polytechnics were feeling. Amid this ruin and rancour, the polytechnics have sought counsel, not knowing which way to turn.

The polytechnic had returned from the summer recess and felt somewhat refreshed as the summer break gave it time to recuperate and have some work done on some of its buildings. The marae had been painted and now stood refurbished and proud at the main entrance of the main site. However, the polytechnic's other limbs remained neglected and in need of care. In a brief respite from the constant drive for numbers to save the polytechnic from ever-increasing levels of debt, the summer months allowed a moment of reflection. The polytechnic reflected back on its history, remembering a simpler time. In its youth it aspired to the simple idea of helping people and providing opportunity aligned with the simple idea of everyone was deserving of an education.

This memory was false or at least driven by a false nostalgia. Public institutions grew out of the need for colonial management and then the need to establish the settler state. The institutions were haunted by those initial conditions. Still today, many students in public institutions feel an anxiety, nausea and tightening of the chest. For many that history was contained in the very mortar of the polytechnics' foundation, especially for those on the losing side of history. Truth is not illusory, it is institutional.

The polytechnic was in reflective mood when it entered the room. The polytechnic recounted the summer…

Polytechnic: …money spent on myself, at least my physical state, is becoming harder to come by and parts of me are falling apart. My breathing has become stultified, my older parts still have asbestos in the walls and the walls of my prefabs are crumbling. The toilets were repaired after the summer fire and minor repair jobs have been completed to keep me standing.

The slow trickle of staff has started to come back into the admin offices, counting numbers on this course and that course. I am keen to get an overview but first I need to take stock, as

some of my buildings have been closed in favour of the newly opened building, with their new learning spaces.

As a result of my history I am a mismatch of new designs and open space learning zones, dollied up older buildings, crumbling prefabs, and half-forgotten distant sites. They all have personalities of their own with different histories. Some are old disused school prefabs; others are modern purpose-built modern learning spaces. They are all getting readied for the upcoming year.

The therapy session began. The polytechnic had developed a nervous disposition and was having various breakdowns, so it was time for some therapy. Maybe a little self-examination would help? The polytechnic made itself comfortable on the proverbial couch as the therapist started to recap from their last session.

Therapist: Last time, which was just before Christmas, you told me a rural polytechnic outside of the main population centres, was in a desperate existence, one now determined by risk assessment - a risk assessment run on business principles. Each of your departments had to make money. Please continue…

Polytechnic: Yeah, like I said, now every student that passes through is assessed for their value, their dollar value that is. To serve I have to make money. The money we make is first and foremost. I mean we lost so much money last year I don't know what happened to all the students.

Therapist: Last time you told me the dollars you could generate from each student and the dollars the students could generate after spending time in buildings upskilling. That things had changed so much that where once you cared for the students now they were units in one big huge calculating machine. Everything had to be justified by money in and money out. You said, *"As a result parts of me were decaying diseased and overflowing, whilst other parts were pulsating with life and energy."* How does that make you feel?

Polytechnic: There is a kind of equality now. I don't care what your background is I care what you are worth. Occasionally I reminisce about my more naïve days when I was a secondary pursuit for the lucky, and a social opportunity for second chance learners and those who wanted to learn new things, meet new people, and get the jobs that were being quality controlled. In those days I took care to give opportunities because it was the right thing to do. I served the students. But now I have been reinvented, updated and expanded and given a new lease of life to serve all as long as it adds up. I do miss those halcyon days of slow and deliberate help. Now everyone is entitled as long as it pays for them, for me, for the economy. I don't care where you're from, what you look like, it's all the same to me.

Therapist: But what about your mission to help those who need it? What about social need, the needy?

Polytechnic: I have limited space, time and staff, so I must choose carefully who I make room for. While I was resting this summer, I worked out a few equations to help me think who I should accept. Not every student was worth the same to me. I mean each student had different potential dollar values. How much funding did I get for someone studying a particular subject? How much time did they need to qualify? What jobs would they do? How much help did they need to achieve? Did I have the capability to help them?

Therapist: That doesn't seem to answer my question. I mean, how do you feel about being so singularly focussed? It sounds a bit like you are covering yourself through your colour-blind calculations.

Polytechnic: It's not as simple as that. It's complicated by the rules, I mean I have to work out who is entitled to loans, have they studied before in tertiary? I also had to think about their future. I mean are they going to get a job? I also had to make sure I have counted how many different types of student I was maintaining the appearance of a nice level of diversity of ethnic or socio-economic backgrounds – enough, but not too much. This clashed with my dollar value system but as always there were easy ways around this.

Therapist: It sounds a little like you're rationalising to allow you to ignore wider social issues?

The polytechnic seemed obsessively concerned with its objective calculation and utility measure. It seemed the policy had created a rational ground for defending the 'objective' calculation and the disavowal of prejudice through a colour-blind policy did exactly what it was meant to do: conceal a policy of ignoring the enduring effects of history. The polytechnic continued with its cost-benefit analysis, turning its attention to the foundation courses.

Polytechnic: Just mulling it over... I can make it all pay with a little calculation. Some courses we have to do, like those that support Māori in their language and culture, but how we have to do them is what matters. Those foundation courses, the courses to teach people to be literate, numerate, work-ready, and learn how to learn, are the worst. First, because they are short (6 months to a year max), they attract some of the lowest government funding, are fees free (so we can't charge for them), attract no student loans, and need high support because of the high dropout rates. It has just become tougher because the government is constantly making us compete for the funding.

At the end of the day the costs are higher. The teachers cost the same as most other courses, but the support needs are higher. So, I have done the only thing worth doing - we cut back the numbers, cut some of the teaching staff, made the class sizes bigger, reduced the hours, employed temporary staff where we could, and put them in the old buildings, reserving the new ones for the degree programmes. We have also risk-assessed the students and got rid of the ones most likely to fail. You know, if they have failed school and have behavioural problems, why should we pay the price? I mean we have to put the money in where it is going to help. It's too late for them. I mean the schools should fix that problem. It's their fault.

The polytechnic continued, despite how bad it sounded. If the polytechnic had paused to reflect it may have realised that the cost-saving measures were affecting the same group of students. It would surely realise it was a de facto racist policy because despite strongly disavowing any racial prejudice, the damage was being done through proxy concepts and terms. Terms such as 'school failure' and concepts such as 'the undeserving' hid the truth of an institutional reality. Truth is not illusory, it is institutional.

Polytechnic: You know, I reflected over the years, and some said I had become mean-spirited, selfish, inconsiderate and uncaring. I mean, what would you do? I have no choice. There is no alternative. I mean the place will shut down in debt if I don't do a cost-benefit analysis. I mean, a degree student is there for three years, attracts high government funding, we can charge them, and the students need less help. So what if we stopped taking so many Māori students? We don't do it on purpose, I mean, we act on a colour-blind policy. It was the dollars that mattered. It's not my fault that they wanted to do those lower-level courses. I mean it's not my fault that they didn't pass school. And we made special provisions to support them. What else am I supposed to do?

Chapter One: Finding a Place to Stand

In 2020 the polytechnics are in limbo: a new national entity (a national polytechnic yet to be formally named – but referred to as the New Zealand Institute of Skills and technology)) has been created, but its shape and features are as yet undefined. Any institutional history runs the risk of being already out of date by the time it is finished; this applies especially to this thesis, given the transitional status of the sector in which it is sited. Despite the time-bounded nature of the story at its centre, the value of this thesis lies in its examination of the longstanding thinking that characterizes polytechnic education, and its links to the intransigent educational problem of Māori inequity, which remains of significance today and for the foreseeable future.

By 2018 the polytechnics of Aotearoa-New Zealand were in a perilous state: most showing significant financial losses, and facing an uncertain future in the current wide-ranging programme of educational review (Cabinet Social Wellbeing Committee, 2018; Ministry of Education, 2018a) . As part of this review process, in 2018 the Tertiary Education Commission (TEC) presented the government with a report on the polytechnic sector that included recommendations for regional groupings. The government's response was that the report did not go far enough and would not solve the sector's financial problems, releasing their own report and recommendations with a six-week consultation period (Ministry of Education, 2019c). This report proposes radical new plans for the future of technical education, meeting the needs of employers, and equity for all learners.

The government's new plans centre on re-defining the roles of industry bodies and education providers, creating a New Zealand Institute of Skills and Technology and a unified vocational funding system (Ministry of Education, 2019c). Their recommendations are in contrast with the last 30 years of 'competition' as a policy driver, during which time some polytechnics have merged, others have formed groupings, some have been shut down, and some have been rescued from mounting debts and problems by one-off government bailouts. A general state of nervousness prevails in the sector, and the identity and purpose of polytechnics has been brought once again into question.

This thesis concerns itself with the outcomes for Māori students in polytechnic education in contemporary Aotearoa-New Zealand, as a site of equity in tertiary education policy. Teaching and other staff have responsibility for giving effect to Māori equity policy, and Māori staff play key roles in institutions like polytechnics for their Māori clientele, so this study investigates how staff, including Māori staff, in polytechnics experience and enact Māori equity policies. The importance of equity is a central feature of a second-tier tertiary offering and defines, to a large extent, its raison d'être. Moreover, how Māori navigate the education system provides a special challenge to Aotearoa-New Zealand's settler colonialism through a potential crisis in legitimation.

The polytechnics form a major part of the tertiary sector and are defined in legislation (the Education Act, 1989). Polytechnics occupy an occluded, hidden and closed space in the tertiary sector between the universities and the private providers. In this occluded space, polytechnics have tried to define themselves as serving their respective regions through improving access, widening participation, lifelong learning, and advancing the skills needed in the economy.

> [A] polytechnic is characterised by a wide diversity of continuing education, including vocational training, that contributes to the maintenance, advancement, and dissemination of knowledge and expertise and promotes community learning, and by research, particularly applied and technological research, that aids development (New Zealand Government, 1989, p. 301).

The number of regional polytechnics reached 25 in the early 1990s, but since then has decreased to the current 16 as a result of a funding crisis. The financial crisis enveloping the polytechnic sector comes following a series of funding changes: caps, competitive tendering, cuts to research, loss of funding streams, stricter eligibility rules on funding for courses, and the introduction of performance-based funding, with penalties. After three decades of this continual drive for economic efficiency, nine polytechnics are in fiscal deficit (ranging from -3.6% to -18.7%) with a sector deficit of -$51.2 million in 2018. Modelling suggests only one polytechnic will be operating at a surplus by 2022 (Cabinet Social Wellbeing Committee, 2018). Critical questions hang over the future of the polytechnics, and their mission of educational equality and wider equality of outcome (Ministry of Education, 2009).

Context and background of the research topic

Adequate understanding of some key elements in the history of education in Aotearoa-New Zealand is imperative to underpin critical scrutiny of Māori equity in the polytechnics. Without this understanding, any analysis of the current circumstances would be at best partial and incomplete. The current dominant rationality that informs education and public policy is best described as neoliberal and will be an important focus of this study; however, there are some older, underpinning ideas that influence the sector, derived from the specific socio-political history of Aotearoa-New Zealand. Public institutions are largely formed and reformed through different historically specific rationales. The following four sub-sections present an account of the history and rationales that have informed the contemporary polytechnic sector, to help situate the study in context, and provide critical background information about the research milieu:

Equity and equality in education policy;

Modernity, the Enlightenment, colonialism, and capitalism;

A brief history of Māori colonisation and education; and

The effects of the last 30 years of neoliberal education policy.

Equity and equality in education policy

A number of important neoliberal policy ideas, including public choice, human capital, and new public management, required a change from the avowedly egalitarian approach that had characterised education policy in pre-1984 Aotearoa-New Zealand, when the newly elected Labour government swiftly changed the policy rationale. The significance of the policy paradigm change brought about between 1984 and 1990 requires appreciation of the fact that Aotearoa-New Zealand operated with a broad, far-reaching egalitarian principle that dominated for at least the second century of schooling in this country. The classic statement, below, by educationalists Walter Fraser and Clarence Beeby, gives a sense of the egalitarian spirit that permeates the history and self-concept of Aotearoa-New Zealand.

> The Government's objective, broadly expressed, is that every person, whatever his level of academic ability, whether his is rich or poor, whether he lives in the country, has a right, as a citizen, to a free education of the kind which he is best

fitted, and to the fullest extent of his powers. So far is this from being a mere pious platitude that the full acceptance of the principle will involve the reorientation of the education system (Beeby, 1992, p. 124).

This statement clearly articulates the notion of education as a public good. This statement had been a mantra for educational equality and egalitarianism in Aotearoa-New Zealand for over 50 years (Grace, 1991). This 'fair go' or egalitarian drive is deeply embedded in Aotearoa-New Zealand thinking and society (E. Olssen, Griffen, & Jones, 2011). To replace the egalitarian rationality with neoliberalism required radical change in the fundamental mentality and conduct of public institutions, and those of the professionals working within those institutions.

The egalitarianism of Aotearoa-New Zealand was not just in education, but widespread throughout social policy. Aotearoa-New Zealand was one of the first to introduce voting for women, universal superannuation, and state housing. The Social Security Act of 1938 was one of the landmark exemplars of welfare economics. Furthermore, there was a bias in favour of equity in policy documents, drawing on the popular narrative motif of the 'fair go' society. A government report produced in 1983 defined equity as "social justice, or 'getting a fair go'" (Davey & Koopman-Boyden, 1983, p. 3).

Equity and equality are implicated in the very notion of liberal democracy that underpins the legitimacy of 'Western culture', however that term is understood (von Hayek, 1946). Liberal democracy was premised on the modernist and Enlightenment assumptions of freedom from arbitrary power, unfettered rationality, and autonomy to pursue one's interests. This was in contrast to the ancient rule of sovereign power and the power of the church, which were largely unaccountable in the early Renaissance era. In the dawning age of industrialisation, public institutions needed workers, and formal education systems were needed to prepare workers for the new global capital markets currently being brought into existence through colonial conquest. The line between an economic rationale for education and the idea of individual agency through rational engagement of citizens in liberal democratic theory was blurred (free from the authority of the church) (L. Ward, 2010).

The emerging modernist age ushered in a need for public institutions on a large scale that were not subject to the arbitrary machinations of sovereign or religious restriction. The latter stifled the rate of progress of reason that was fuelling the rise of the industrial age. Tertiary education was central to servicing the needs of industrialisation, colonialism, a new global capital, and bringing the 'new world' under the purview of science. This meant widening participation in tertiary education, giving broader access to skills, and developing new management techniques to administer the slave trade and the colonies. The massification of public institutions burgeoned in the new liberal democracies of Europe, which has had a lasting influence on the nature of nation-states.

Modernity, the Enlightenment, colonialism, and capitalism

To understand Māori equity policy in the polytechnic sector requires an understanding of modernity, which encompassed new global flows of capital, encounters with 'strangers', and new administrative policies and institutions that have laid the foundation of the modern nation-state. The modern nation-state of Aotearoa-New Zealand has controlled the material outcomes since 1852 (the passing of the first Constitution Act). The approach to understanding Māori equity in tertiary education policy taken in this thesis is to see it in part as one consequence of the multifarious forms of encounter of European empire with a non-European 'other'. The struggle for equity is steeped in the language of modernity, and equality is arguably a product and desideratum of 'modernity'.

Broadly speaking, the word **modernity** refers to an era of European expansion (which could be dated since 1492 and the 'discovery' of America and the death of Henry the VIII) through a military and fiscal state engineered by legal and financial frameworks of practice established in early globalising trade. Initial phases of European colonialism were introduced through Spanish and Portuguese exploration, funded by Genoese capital (Arrighi, 2010). This extended Atlantic precursor to Pacific colonialism went through major evolutionary changes and advances in technology, all of which informed the subsequent colonial project in the South Pacific.

Modernity was also synonymous with free rational enquiry as articulated by René Descartes (2008) in *Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences*, first published in 1637, and Isaac Newton (1972) in *Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica* in 1687. The important aspect that marked this new form of enquiry as 'modern' was its basis to establish rationality without religion. European power became overtly accountable to reason.

Modernity saw the rise of European public institutions in new parts of the world, informed by the Enlightenment and new scientific forms of racism, and meeting the administrative needs of industrialisation and colonisation. Inherited in the very DNA of the public institution was the legacy of the nation-state and the traces of liberal capitalism, the Enlightenment, the European empire, and colonialism (Marks, 2015). Modernity haunts contemporary policy because it was in modernity that European power established global trade, foreign policy, hierarchical views of humanity, etc. Today these histories continue to sustain privilege for a white European identity that defined the concepts of policy and the public institution (Arrighi, 2010).

However, a rationality without religion, despite modernity's pretensions, still had significant ties to Christianity (Adorno & Horkheimer, 2016; Asad, 1993, 2003; Derrida, 2002). In modernism, the colonial encounter of missionaries in Aotearoa was a discursive process of "scripturalization" in which indigenous "others" were in-scripted into a cultural and theopolitical European "semiosphere" that was constructed and legitimated by the religious discourse of the Bible (Wimbush, 2012). The Native Schools of Aotearoa-New Zealand played precisely this role, a form of social war:

> The process of colonisation is total, in that it involves cultural invasion and colonisation of the minds of the invaded as well. ... Beginning with the missionaries, the founding fathers of the new nation state were therefore committed to the policy of assimilation. To this end, the missionaries, and later the state, used education as an instrument of cultural invasion (Walker, 2004, p. 146)

In modernity, European countries driven by colonialism and empire constructed the legal administrative undergirding of global trade and the colonies, labour relations, and a view of the non-European Other encountered through colonialism. Today's citizens of Aotearoa-New

Zealand are steeped in this history, whether acknowledged or not. Education policy is arguably more directly subject to these historical influences than most other public institutions. The world of tertiary education in which we find ourselves today is a product of these histories of colonial machinations and administrative invention to an extent that is rarely, if ever, acknowledged in the contemporary discourse of the sector (Trouillot, 2015).

The form of **colonialism** that followed the 'discovery' of Aotearoa relatively late in the British imperialist project is an example of the imposition of cultural, economic and political power by European expansionism on indigenous people in their homelands. The British aim was to gain control of more territory, outside its own, and annex its resources for the benefit of the colonial power (Arrighi, 2010). The other motive was to offload a surplus population from Britain, hence the need to acquire Māori land cheaply (Novitz & Willmott, 1989). Capitalism was the economic system used for establishing this control (Braudel, 1982). Atlantic and New World colonialism evolved over time, but much of the underpinning rationale was formed in the Atlantic phase. In this phase, indigenous people faced genocidal violence, ethnic cleansing, epidemic diseases, and brutal slavery. The so-called explorers, equipped with the technology of war and an entrenched view of the non-European Other as inferior, conquered new lands in all four corners of the globe. The encounter with Aotearoa and the invention of New Zealand was just one project that drew from this overarching legal and administrative archive.

French and British mercantilism overtook Spanish, Portuguese and significantly Dutch colonialism through a new synthesis of capitalism and territorialism. The new synthesis had three interrelated components: settler colonialism, capitalist slavery and economic nationalism.

The form of colonialism inherited by Aotearoa-New Zealand is more specifically termed **settler colonialism** (A. Bell, 2014). Settler colonialism extended the colonial project defined above by adding mass migration of people into conquered and acquired lands, displacing the previous indigenous inhabitants, Māori in this case, from their former homes. Furthermore, settler colonists established socio-political institutions, operating according to European notions of the nation-state. In this sense, settler colonialism is an ongoing condition of life

that underpins practice, today and in the future. Laws and policy frameworks imported from Britain laid the foundations of a settler colonial state, in the process disenfranchising Māori, and alienating them from their land, language and culture (Belich, 2009, 2015). The establishment of a settler colonial state remade Aotearoa as New Zealand, systematically dismantling and disadvantaging Māori practice, custom and law, despite the commitment in the Treaty of Waitangi that this would not happen. The history of settler colonialism in the Atlantic showed that failure to honour treaties with indigenous people was common, as were attempts to annihilate indigenous cultures through assimilation.

As encounters with non-Europeans and the New World increased, so too did the study and urge to classify flora, fauna, and people in the rise of Enlightenment's desire to represent the world encountered beyond the former, Europe-bound horizon of knowledge. The sciences, particularly biology, took on the encyclopaedic task of classifying various domains of nature (see for example Diderot's Encyclopaedia and Linnaeus' binomial nomenclature) (Derrida, 1982; Foucault, 1970). The self-named 'Enlightenment' was an intellectual practice built on the foundations of colonialism in many respects. The intellectuals discussed accounts of what was being found in the New World; discussions that supported the emergence of European exceptionalism. Broadly, the printing press and mass publication allowed new social collectives to form and spurred the effect of the Enlightenment to spread beyond the confines of isolated academics in the universities or other intellectual societies. Accounts of colonial travel from around the known world and beyond started to establish eroticised notions of 'virgin' lands and noble savages. Progress became the modern opium of the masses.

The Enlightenment and the late Renaissance questioned the sovereign unaccountable power of religion and the ruling class (Foucault, 1970). In its place Enlightenment thinkers promoted human reason, democracy and freedom from tyranny (de La Boetie & Rothbard, 2011). It spoke truth to power. But the Renaissance Enlightenment cast a deep dark shadow exposing itself as ideological (Hobsbawm, 1989, 1996). Those bastions of liberal democracy and notions of human reason had excluded great swathes of humanity. The liberal democracies had, in fact, despite the pretensions to human reason, used that very same reason to justify brutal policies of slavery, colonialism, and genocide. A reason that produced scientific racism and sexism, privileged some over others had far reaching consequences on a global scale for

women, indigenous peoples, ethnic minorities, and the environment in which we lived. Importantly the ideas of the Enlightenment inspired institutions, administrative techniques, technologies, legal frameworks (including treaties), new rational moralities brought new understanding of responsibility (utilitarianism, rights etc) to give life to the new liberal democracies (Locke, 2003; Mill, 2002; Rousseau, 1997).

Sustained encounters with the indigenous people and the cultures of the East led to a rationalisation of occidental identity, progress and humanity (Said, 1979, 1994). The view of humanity reflected in the nature of European discourses of cultural Others was part and parcel of an Enlightenment worldview and subjectivity, or concept of what it means to be human. This constellation of ideas led to what is called a 'Whiggish' view of history as a relentless if convoluted march of progress towards the ultimate triumph of reason. From their inception in institutions such as learned societies, universities and museums, the social sciences were birthed (Hamilton, 1996). The cultural encounters of European colonialism led to a view of human nature that was metaphysical, universalist, and essentialist (Heidegger, 1978b). The philosophical view of human nature known as 'philosophical humanism' derives mainly from Enlightenment thought (Pinker, 2018; Popper, 2002, 2020). It continues to be an influential view of society, particularly in certain domains, including educational policy.

The dominant humanist traditions have been accompanied by a meta-narrative that promotes a universal human nature, marked by its rationality and by the possibility of progress. People who did not fit this view were defined as lacking and inferior, or incapable of reaching the heights of their nature, which was necessarily lesser. The contradiction between postulating a universal human nature while simultaneously viewing many humans as somehow less human went unremarked. This contradiction at the heart of Enlightenment thinking casts a dark and indelible shadow, which is excused by current advocates of a return to Enlightenment thought (Rata, 2012) as an erroneous or inessential component that can be remediated through policy.

Philosophical humanism speaks of the 'end' of man in the sense of humanity's ultimate purpose, final destination or 'telos', meaning the fulfilment in political philosophy of the large aims of justice, freedom and equality, which date back as far as Plato (Plato, 2007). These

large social principles persist as ideologies despite the fact that, so few people experience their operation in their own lives. Poststructuralists interpreted 'end' as in dying; as Nietzsche had announced 'God's death' (Nietzsche, 1961) and Freud had denied the sovereignty of the individual (Freud, 2005), the poststructuralist critique dared to suggest that equality and equity were compromised projects in line with what Marx and Engels had argued. Thinkers including Derrida (1976, 1978), Foucault (1990; 1984, 1995), Deleuze (2009) and Lacan (2006) have engaged in examining the very conditions of thought, putting Enlightenment assumptions under critical scrutiny across a wide range of fields.

The legacies of the Enlightenment and settler colonialism are inextricably tied together in Aotearoa-New Zealand. Many issues between indigenous people and settler states are based on the failure of the new settler colonial states to recognise that the universalism within Enlightenment thinking generalised the norms of particular social groups. Settler colonialism fails to recognise this which in turn delegitimises constitutional arrangements.

> So far as Indigenous people are concerned, where they are is who they are, and not only by their own reckoning… to get in the way of settler colonization, all the native has to do is stay at home. Whatever settlers may say—and they generally have a lot to say—the primary motive for elimination is not race (or religion, ethnicity, grade of civilization, etc.) but access to territory (Wolfe, 2006, p. 388).

Colonialism was established out of a long distant economic trade system that spanned large parts of the world, which became **capitalism**. John Locke had laid the foundations for capitalism as one pre-occupied with private property and the exchange of goods in an open market (Locke, 2003). Money or capital invested to make a profit was its defining feature. The expectation was for a good return and this language of a return was fundamental to Adam Smith's development of the Enlightenment economics (A. Smith, 1950) . As already stated, capital as investment formed the backdrop of the earliest ventures of Spanish and Portuguese exploration which was funded by the Genoese. Ferdinand Braudel described how the collapse of the Spanish banks in Barcelona led to the Genoese becoming the merchant bankers of the Spanish (Braudel, 1982). However, this form of capitalism, may have laid the foundations but it still deferred power to the hands of the Spanish aristocrats and Italian bourgeoisie.

The subsequent emergence and development of mercantile capitalism shifted the power centre to the Dutch. Mercantile capitalism was premised on a balance of trade and an assault on the control held by aristocrats and royalty. The emergence of mercantile capitalism was accompanied by a change in the class and type of people behind capitalism, which in turn started to transform the nature of capitalism. The rise of global transnational corporations such as the Dutch East India Company and the British East India Company was critical to the developing enterprise of capitalism in the early 1600s (Braudel, 1984).

This movement towards a new form of bourgeoisie-operated capitalism allowed for the growing importance of the intellectual inheritance from the Enlightenment. Aligned to the new world order, moving beyond and away from the royal divine right, was the rise of the **secular, rational** and **egalitarian** vision, which tied capitalism to **liberalism**. The Enlightenment and the emergence of liberal capitalism was accompanied by the elaboration of systems for standard and uniform measurements, including maps, passports, paper money (promissory notes), legal codes and establishment of new moral concepts of right behaviour, including the notion of personal responsibility as a legal concept contained in contracts (Sullivan & Schmidt, 2008).

Standardisation of measurement, laws and codes drew on the Enlightenment's emphasis on observable empirical facts and reasoned argument, whilst also leading to more efficient markets. The chaotic forces of nature could be subdued and overcome by this new critical form of intelligence. John Locke's introduction of life, liberty and property as the foundation of citizenship formed the basis for a non-divine basis for a liberal state (Locke, 1976, 2003). This concept of citizenship and implied equality of citizenship was influential in the settler colonial states and in the modern Western nation-state, including Aotearoa-New Zealand (Aarsleff, 1994). The **responsibility** of the nation-state in liberal capitalist democracy was to protect individuals and expand markets by means including technology and military might. This concept of the state's responsibility led the laissez-faire imperialist period, led by the British and influential in Aotearoa-New Zealand through the idea of a people bound not by God or King but by a common culture, religion, language and 'race'. Administrative regimes in colonial times were therefore bound to a European and, in the case of Aotearoa-New Zealand, British notion of the nation-state.

Industrialisation fortified by liberal capitalism created a surge in worldwide economic growth that was arguably a product of greater labour productivity rather than industrial innovation (J. G. Williamson, 1984). This in turn needed a labour workforce to operate the machinery to build a nation and labour. The new factories that sprang up needed labour and raw materials, with both having massive impact on indigenous populations (Hobsbawm, 1996). **Imperialism** names a condition in which relatively wealthy, powerful European countries control the relatively impoverished populations of weaker countries for their own socio-economic benefit (Hobsbawm, 1989).

Aotearoa-New Zealand was formed on the basis of double parallel policy tracks, one for Māori, the other for building a nation-state upon liberal democratic capitalist principles. What was particular about Aotearoa-New Zealand was its strong egalitarian emphasis, complicated by the simultaneous disenfranchisement and exclusion of Māori.

As noted above, the 'fair go' concept is deeply embedded in Aotearoa-New Zealand society. Yet, under the conditions of liberal capitalism of the late Enlightenment, governments focused on the equality built into individualism whilst simultaneously oppressing of the working classes (Lipson, 2011; Pitt, 1977; Thompson, 1980). Adam Smith explains how workers are to be regarded:

> [A] man educated at much expense and time to tasks that require dexterity and
> skill may be compared to an expensive machine that adds more to earnings than
> the cost of operating it (A. Smith, 1950, p. 103).

Parliamentary discussions articulated the Darwinian view of human nature that dominated in colonial Aotearoa-New Zealand (Stenhouse, 1999). The Darwinian view held that only those few the abilities and gifts to rise to the top could take full advantage of 'universal' education. A proficiency examination was therefore imposed for entry to secondary education, to separate the deserving from the undeserving. Welfare provisions were often restricted, with conditions that had deleterious consequences for Māori. Oppression ran alongside the egalitarianism believed to be part of the unique Aotearoa-New Zealand character.

There is strong evidence to suggest that equality was a fundamental part of all liberal democracies, but only for the deserving (Mouffe, 2000). Inherent in liberal democracies is the state of exception, which wields a dictatorial power in the interests of the public good (Schmitt, 1976) and lends itself to understanding some individuals in society as less worthy than normal citizens. The notion of the exception also allows for the suspension of citizenship rights and liberties when required, such as in times of emergency (Agamben et al., 2011). Equality through the operation of the exception is paradoxical and hence loaded with inevitable tension.

A brief history of Māori colonisation and education

Signed in 1840 between representatives of the British Crown and an assortment of rangatira (Māori chiefs), the Treaty of Waitangi is a foundational document in contemporary Aotearoa-New Zealand (Orange, 1990) that established high-level principles for Crown-Māori relations (Belich, 2009). The Treaty of Waitangi came late in the era of British colonial policy so was a beneficiary of previous British colonial experience and was subject to the growing influence of the late Enlightenment.

The period from the 1840s to WWII in Aotearoa-New Zealand was violent and colonial; it was a time when practices and laws were established that enabled an ongoing land grab from Māori. From 1840-1890 Māori lost control over approximately 95% of their territories. Over roughly the same period, the Māori population was reported to shrink from about 100,000 to about 36,000, while the European population ballooned from 2,000 to over 600,000. This meant Māori faced an overwhelming power disadvantage that led to a permanent structural inequality (Belich, 2001, 2009).

In Aotearoa-New Zealand's first election in 1853, voting was restricted to male British subjects over the age of 21 who either owned or rented property worth more than a specified amount, as set in the New Zealand Constitution Act of 1852. From a contemporary perspective these restrictions seem severe, but they were actually generous for their time. The right to vote was colour-blind but excluded Māori on the basis that their land was owned as collectives through tribal affiliations at various levels, often referred to as 'whānau, hapū, iwi'. Māori collectivism

acted as a de facto exclusion based on the normalisation of European property concepts and the doctrines of individualism. In 1867, before general male suffrage was achieved, four Māori seats were created to cover the right of Māori to vote. There were four Māori seats against 72 European seats, yet if based on proportional representation there would have been 14 to 16 Māori seats (Belich, 1996).

In 1863, the New Zealand Settlements Act authorised the taking of Māori land, and with it came the normalisation of a specifically British culture as a period of land confiscations followed. Territoriality is settler colonialism's specific, irreducible element (Wolfe, 2006, p. 388) Settler colonialism created a structural inequity that could also be described as a civilizational inequity, based on "…ontologies and epistemologies, [which] arise out of social history of a particular group… [where] no epistemology is context free" (Scheurich & Young, 1997).

Alienation from their land forced Māori to seek paid work in urban centres in the boom times following the end of WWII (Haami, 2018). Māori made up just 17% of the urban population in 1936; by the end of WWII this figure was up to 26% and by the 1986 it was 79% (Pool, 1991). The Social Security Act 1938 was a landmark in welfare economics, yet it largely betrayed Māori. Māori generally worked in low-skilled work with few prospects, long hours and subsistence wages in a culture of persistent institutional racism. Although the Act did not directly discriminate against Māori, its de facto operating principles ensured Māori nearly always got less.

Novels like *Children of the Poor* by John A. Lee (1934) describe poverty in Aotearoa-New Zealand, including Māori poverty in its brutal reality of childhood prostitution and a life of crime. The Hunn Report's careful depiction of overt racism demonstrates the lived reality for Māori. In tertiary education, the number of Māori university students were one-eighth (12.5%) of what it should have been. Māori apprentices numbered only a few hundred when they should have been in the thousands (New Zealand Government, 1960).

The effects of the last 30 years of neoliberal education policy

The New Zealand experiment in neoliberalism has been in place for 25 years. The fourth Labour government introduced neoliberal economic policy in the 1980s, which underpinned the extensive reform of the public sector and of education in particular (Kelsey, 1995, 1997, 2015). Aotearoa-New Zealand's egalitarian principles - the 'fair go' society - that had dominated public policy for over a century was largely dismantled in public institutions (Royal Commission on Social Policy, 1988). The extensive range of market-based economic reforms introduced between 1984 and 1990 de-regulated and privatised large sections of the public sphere: they undermined organised labour, established a free flow of global capital, and slashed tax rates for the rich, largely at the expense of welfare programmes (Dalziel, 2002; Easton, 1997). The reformers disavowed social welfare, economic profligacy, and huge state-funded programmes like Think Big in favour of de-regulation, economic parsimony, and policies of competition and choice (New Zealand Treasury, 1987a). The reforms could be described as "the disenchantment of politics by economics" (Davies, 2017, p. xiv)

The reforms of the 1980s came with the promise of radical change and education for all from a new approach which expressly aimed at making marked improvements in Māori outcomes (New Zealand Treasury, 1987a). The Treasury 'manifesto' introduced the neoliberal experiment, but also retained the notion of public good and some of the egalitarianism of the previous 100 years, when it came to discussing Māori.

Despite the rhetoric, in this context of massifying tertiary education and expressed attention to Māori in the reforms, inequality doubled for Māori in the first decade or so of neoliberalist influence on policy. Blue-collar industries, in which Māori were over-represented, closed down or moved offshore. Māori unemployment climbed to 27.3% and school outcomes for Māori students remained poor. Māori home ownership was 51.2% in 1951, when racism was still overt, yet by 1986, in a time of policy initiatives elaborated specifically to deal with ethnic disparities, Māori home ownership had actually **decreased** to 48.9% (Pearson, 1990) . The material outcomes of the 'New Zealand experiment' have been to greatly increase social inequality (Rashbrooke, 2013, 2014). These patterns of increasing inequality massively

disproportionately affect Māori (Poata-Smith, 2013; L. Smith, 2013) and other ethnic minorities, especially Pacific peoples.

These contradictions exist alongside the liberal ideal of equality that has fundamentally shaped educational thinking in this country from its (imported British) beginnings. The idea of education as a public good and a right of citizenship under the equality of the law underpins national provision of schooling for all children between 6 and 16 years old. The concept of education as a public good creates tensions in policy and practice within the new order of the economic imperative. Whether or not the marketisation of education can work with the notion of public good is yet to be settled. Contrary evidence about equality and equity has emerged, for example, Māori-medium education opportunities have increased as a result of neoliberal reform, yet there is persistent inequality in Māori educational statistics (G. Stewart, 2018), and Māori still seem underserved by educational institutions, including polytechnics. The concept of equity is in tension, if not direct conflict, with education as a commodity.

Research question

This thesis critically explores the question of equality in the ITP (Institutes of Technology and Polytechnics) sector, investigating Māori equity policy implementation. The overall research question guiding this thesis is: **How does the polytechnic sector construct Māori equity, with what outcomes, and what are some possible alternatives?**

Equality has received renewed focus in Aotearoa-New Zealand (Rashbrooke, 2013, 2014) and it has received considerable policy attention for Māori in tertiary education through Māori education strategies and greater monitoring of educational and societal outcomes (Ministry of Education, 2003; TEC, 2018b). In this thesis I focus on policy regarding educational inequality, and how policy makers construct policy through naming, describing and documenting educational inequality, exclusion, marginality as a long standing durable problem (Luke, 2010). The relationship of educational inequality with wider inequality and inequity underlies the concerns in this thesis.

It is worth, albeit briefly, drawing some important conceptual differences in how the problem of distribution is named and where policy makers see its effects residing. Despite equality and equity's interchangeable application in policy and degree of overlap, they differ conceptually in an important way. On a broad level equality in education usually refers to sameness of treatment. Equality requires insuring that learners have equal opportunities to reach educational pathways that lead to better jobs. Here the explicit link is made between the equality of opportunity with equality of outcome (Mckinney, Brayboy, Castagno, & Maughan, 2007, pp. 159-160). Equity, however, implicates a notion of fairness or 'getting a fair go' (Davey & Koopman-Boyden, 1983, p. 3). The reference to fairness implies, as it does in Aotearoa-New Zealand, where settler colonialism has led to a history of structural and institutional disadvantage, that providing justice requires nuanced and group specific action to achieve justice (or equality).

Equality in policy is conceived often as parity of achievement and so equality policy and practice tend to be dominated by the rhetoric of 'closing the gap'. To put it another way equality is a dream deferred, where practice gets us closer but never to parity. This research questions the normative assumption that there is not enough equality (polytechnics and educational establishments should be focussed on closing the educational gap). I aim not to reject the idea and project of equality, as it is useful to think with, but I argue that it is a compromised project. Furthermore, that it is a compromised project because it carries the assumption of the rise of modernism and the enlightenment, which were coincidental with an unprecedented European colonialism. Consequentially the equality problem-solution dynamic has encrypted the assumptions of that period in contemporary policy discourse. Thus, it would seem reasonable to deconstruct that epistemological assumption. By deconstructing the epistemological assumption, we may open the way for an equality to come. After all equality policy is just, but justice is not equality policy.

What brings me to this question?

The motivation for this study comes in part from my own life experiences of inequality. I come from a poor ethnic minority family. The margins formed me: growing up in the tough inner

London boroughs, with cousins on the council estates, as an insider-outsider - a *part of* mainstream normalised life (to be counted, included) but also *outside* the mainstream as being 'other' than normal, as different. At school I experienced policies aimed at minorities and the poor. I encountered these policies again at university, where they felt like incursions in my life, trying to tell me how I should be. Most of the policies just did not work for me. It made me wonder who these policies served, who actually benefited from them.

In the liminal space of the insider-outsider I learned that a counter-narrative can be "a powerful way for minoritised and indigenous groups to creatively introduce concepts and arguments aimed at subverting and challenging the normative narratives of the dominant group" (Rollock, 2012, p. 72). Outsider narratives circulate a different version of events, a counter reality (Delgado, 2000). Three memorable stories I heard as a child are described below.

Story 2: From Behind the Couch: Three Guests' Stories

Between the ages of 7 and 12 I would often sit, unseen, behind the couch in the upstairs flat in my childhood home, listening to stories of other places, as various different houseguests came and went. These stories told pieces of fractured lives: powerful anecdotes from the front-line of the forgotten, the ignored, the exiled. I was an unnoticed witness to their stories of betrayal, exclusion and inequality, which shaped my early understandings about justice, identity, difference and equality. I was myself from predominantly a Pakistani heritage, although my parents were born before the colonial divide between Pakistan and India. Moreover, my father would emphasise our Palestinian heritage and my mother our Iranian heritage. Of course, I did not understand any of this until I started to be called out, interpellated, by government agencies, particularly schools as ethnic and finding my complex past being reduced in ever changing incomplete recycled policies by particular ideology of the government.

My dad turned on the radio for his nightly programme of stories from distant places around the world, as he settled down on the couch. As he drifted off, the radio crackled out the words of Idi Amin: 'you can't run faster than a bullet' and 'in any country there must be people who

have to die. They are the sacrifices any nation has to make to achieve law and order'. My family did not suffer exile in Uganda but the first guest who came to stay with us that I recall did.

First guest: Who am I? The struggle of ethnicity

It was close to bedtime when I heard movement from the upstairs flat. New guests must have moved in while I was at school. I snuck partway up the stairs to listen for clues about the new people. I could hear a girl's voice crying and a reassuring adult voice, but it was hard to make out over Elvis singing *I Saw You Crying in the Chapel*.

A couple of nights later, my dad was walking up the stairs with a bottle of Black Label in hand. I grabbed his shadow, curious to find out about our mystery guests. He walked into the lounge and I slipped quietly into place, toy in hand, to listen to more stories from behind the couch. The night unfolded in conversation and a shadowy tale emerged of colonialism, indentured labour, and a passenger Indian population. I tried in vain to follow the political complexity, but the human side made sense to me, especially the girl's anguish, as I got to know her better. She and her family had run away at night and lost everything they owned, left behind in Uganda. They had lost friends who could not run faster than a bullet, but what stood out for me was how she struggled to understand herself in the context of all that. Who was she in her new home in London, against that violent backdrop? Uganda seemed distant and abstract, but her emotions were raw and here-and-now. Her struggle with her complex sense of self, especially her ethnic self, left a lasting impression on me. She obsessed about how she imagined others saw her ethnicity. Was she Ugandan, Indian, English, or all three? She had lost all her friends as they dispersed to the United States, Canada, and South Africa. Her links to her past had vanished; she was trying to make new friends, but they could not understand her traumatic experiences, and she found it hard to get along with them. The policy incursions could not trace the singularity of her context. Something felt missing, the sense of loss was generational, and that sense of loss united us, seemingly endless in its effects.

Second guest: The paranoia of Palestinian politics

Sometime later, a young Palestinian man stayed while he was at university in London. Unlike some of our other guests, he specifically looked out for me and we spent a lot of time talking

together. This may have been because of our shared roots in Palestine. My father's family had, so he kept telling me, originated from Jericho. Perhaps that's why our Palestinian guest took such a caring concern and interest in me.

He would encourage me to study as he reiterated the importance of education. Education was a way out, a way to be a new person - not because of economic opportunity, but because it gave you resilience, hope, and ideas about ways to change what was wrong with the world. Through education, you could help others. Through education you would find others with ideals, and that too would give you hope.

He implored me not to lose my roots, to stay connected with them. His determination to do well and go back 'home' was overwhelming. He talked all the time about how Palestinians back home were doing. He was constantly fighting against stereotypes and negative images, telling me of ways to be proudly Palestinian. What left the deepest impression on me was his sense of being unheard. The words being said by the United Nations and in the media spoke of peace and expounded all the right things. Despite this avowed confluence of voices wanting justice, and our increasing knowledge and understanding of international wrongs, the peace process was as elusive as ever. I began to understand the immense human cost of living this life. To be suspicious of everyone's motive because their words of sympathy and political support avowed change and justice never came and arguably grew further from becoming a reality. Such ambitions and hopes would make a mockery of your life, making you suspicious of your own life which could only be described as a political paranoia.

Third guest: The journalist
In the late 1970s we hosted a journalist who supported the pro-democracy prime minister of his home country, against the military junta which had recently taken hold of power. After seizing power, the military junta executed the prime minister over claims of voter fraud. The prime minister had been a lecturer who studied Law and Politics at the University of California and Oxford University. Despite the risks, there we were, harbouring a pro-democracy journalist inside our house. Of course, I did not understand any of this, since I was not even 10 years old.

Night after night ensued of ferocious, whisky-fuelled conversation between him and my dad, as I listened, enthralled. They argued about the military takeover, but agreed it was wrong. He argued that journalists had to be the vehement critics of dictators in order to safeguard society. That was not good enough for my dad. They argued about different ideas of what should replace the military dictatorship. In a post-colonial landscape, it was difficult to escape, when all the escape routes relied on recycled old ideas dressed in new clothing. To escape would mean questioning and criticising the very notions of criticism, a critique of critique, suspecting one's own ability to reason, whatever that meant and wherever it led.

Resolution came no closer while dark forces gathered, empowered by images of a pre-colonial time before Western ideas. For a time, political groups drew inspiration from the new Saladins, Kamal Atatürk, and Gamal Abdel Nasser, who had developed modern nation Muslim states 50 years earlier. But these forays into re-invention gave way to repressive forces, emboldened by the military. Regressive theocratic forms started to emerge, laying down the foundations of more violent political alternatives that would take another 30 years to become fully visible on an international stage. These groups defined themselves against the West; in reaction to the perceived harm of the West. My dad and the journalist kept the fight alive; a fight they would ultimately lose for lack of an alternative to the West that did not hark back to some imagined past. I started to understand the specificity of perspective.

One day I found the journalist upstairs, ordering some papers. He was preparing to return home, back to fight the battle in print. His story could very easily have ended in early death at the hands of the military. He did, in fact, die an early death; killed not by the military, but by cancer. By then, new radical forces had taken hold of the national consciousness. His final words before he left created a lasting impression on me. He sat me down and with forceful emotion said 'You must always be on the side of truth. No matter what anyone tells you, what they offer you, whatever they share in common with you, the **truth** is what matters. You must speak the truth'. But from behind the couch I could not tell truth from illusion, the illusion of truth, the truth of illusion, and did not know if speaking the truth was helpful.

These stories connect me to the thesis in three ways. First, rightly or wrongly, I feel a shared experience of British colonial history and its modern manifestation in educational systems

and policies. A second aspect is the sense of being the object of policies, yet to be fully described, that exclude people like me, even while professing to increase inclusion. The third aspect is a sense of sharing with Māori a history of reference to movements of protest and resistance against government policy. This goes along with a deep cynicism, distrustful of the tendency for policy to speak to the disenfranchised in the language of a saviour, or white benefactor.

Overview of the thesis chapters

Chapter One establishes the historical context by focussing on the key intellectual developments of modernity, the Enlightenment, colonialism and capitalism, and broadly relates this context to a brief history of Māori colonisation and education. These historical precedents played a key role in the development of the language of modern education policy.

Chapter Two provides a detailed account of the methodology of the study, organised under the three main sections of theoretical framework, study design, and ethical considerations. The methodology used in this thesis combines elements of critical policy discourse analysis with narrative research incorporating interview data and autoethnographic elements.

Chapter Three presents a critical history of the development of technical education and the philosophical roots of technê, and how these developments played out in the history of the New Zealand polytechnic sector up until 1984. Chapter Four continues this historical account, with a detailed focus on the period of neoliberalisation.

Chapter Five takes a different tack, presenting two sets of three narratives, with commentary, that bring to life the power-knowledge-**self** nexus of Māori equity policy. These stories enrich the analytical mode of the surrounding chapters, grounding those policy analyses in typical everyday experience.

Chapter Six magnifies the focus on the question of neoliberal Māori equity policy and exposes their limitations for achieving any significant change for Māori.

Chapter Seven draws together all the previous analyses to identify the shortcomings of Māori equity policy and proposes necessary changes if their aims are to be realised.

Chapter Eight concludes with a synopsis of the thesis and its key findings and offers some final reflections.

Story 3: Not measuring up

The narratives in this thesis introduce and reflect on the experiences that have brought me to the question and act as entry points to understanding my own experience in context. The experiences in this narrative speak to my threshold or liminal journey in moving from UK to Aotearoa-New Zealand, and the turbulence this move created in my thinking.

It was 2007 and I was in my office overlooking the city of London, gazing into the empty grey of an early winter's day. Outside my window were the tracks of the light railway. On one side of the tracks were pristine high-rise office buildings, full of insurance brokers and bankers, and interspersed with restaurants, cafes and bars that cost a small fortune to eat at. On the other side of the light railway was the 'inner city', eight people to a small house, mosques, and large numbers of Bangladeshi, Pakistani, and Caribbean people – at the bottom of the pile, according to all the usual measures.

I came from the Pakistani community, although to call it a 'community' was a misnomer. Different generations held quite different attitudes, and younger generations found themselves alienated from their own history. This was the aim of the policy, but it had consequences unforeseen by those pushing for assimilation or integration. London had hosted the Olympics two years prior, and in the competition for hosting rights, the city had showcased its diversity, describing itself as "home to 200 communities and 300 languages". The day following the announcement, a group of four young men of Pakistani and Caribbean heritage launched a terrorist attack in London.

Whilst working as a teacher, I was preparing my marking for my annual review meeting with my manager the following day. My manager never seemed to pay attention, but I felt I needed

to prepare well for this meeting, since I had the impression that he was not pleased with me. The demeanour of the management was always disappointment with staff for not realising 'their duty' in terms of results. No matter what contextual factors we pointed out, especially the social backgrounds of our students from one of the poorest boroughs in the country, the retort was always the same. "Such-and-such an area has managed to get good results, so why can't you (never 'we')?" Then there was the second strategy: they would say, "Surely you don't accept that because students are poor, they are not intelligent, or cannot do well?" This was designed to paint the teaching staff into a corner, despite the ridiculous nature of the argument. My manager and I frequently butted heads. I saw him as detached and uninformed - trained as a manager, not as an educator. He always spoke about targets and continuous improvement. He kept talking about excellence and while no one listened, their jobs depended on it.

Earlier in the month I had gently ridiculed him in a department meeting where he said that we had to raise our targets by five per cent across the board, and that he would be measuring us against them. We had to improve the success rates of our students to show continuous improvement. "If you don't measure up, who knows what will happen!" It was a not-so-veiled threat: regardless of circumstance or the social context, we were expected to perform. "But John, that would mean…" I said, trying to contain my laughter, "that would mean getting over 100 per cent. How do I do that?" I felt the target mantra of student success had become part of the furniture but lost all meaning, leading to absurd expectations. He ignored me. Later in the meeting he caught my eye, saying "remember, I will be meeting all of you and coming to observe your teaching as part of your review." It was crazy - he had no idea of education, yet he was coming to observe us.

I had been observed and it had not gone well. Many of my students were absent, and the rest were unusually quiet. I could see John was not impressed. But many were away because it was winter and illness was rife among my classes, which drew from the poorest areas within an impoverished borough. Students were often absent due to family responsibilities or personal illness. Earlier that year the headlines in the London papers had emphasised the poverty of this area, which to this day is the most impoverished in the United Kingdom. The teachers wanted some recognition of the effect of out-of-class factors on learning. No chance.

My boss, John, was from Leeds, and the students did not like his ways and found him difficult. They would often 'shut up shop' when he tried to engage with them. A white guy from a privileged background from the north of England with whom they could not connect.

I was writing up my notes on each of my students. As the only minority teacher, many of the minority students opted to go in my class. They often needed more help and had more things going on in their lives that interfered with their studies. They often sought advice from me. It was time-consuming. They also had the highest degree of dislocation from their courses and frequently suffered from self-doubt, feeling like imposters and suffering from low self-esteem. I had a disproportionate number of classes like this and it definitely took my target average down, but if not me, then who would do it? I was the only member in the team not to get a pay increase based on the targets.

The thing that stood out the most about that meeting was that John did not want to hear about my students' lives, and nor did he care. "Why do you take them if they don't measure up?" He pointed out of the window to the office buildings of banks and insurance brokers. "Don't they want to work there and raise their aspirations? They are not going to get a better opportunity!" He wrote on my review "not measuring up". Twelve months later, those same bankers were held responsible for the global financial crash. Clearly, they did not measure up.

Chapter Two: The 'How' of Research: Methodology

The Enlightenment ideals of scientific progress and personal freedom came under increasing scrutiny as the 20th century proceeded, in the wake of colonialism, European exceptionalism, WWI, then WWII with its fascism and modern genocide. The influence of an emerging globalisation alongside and in association with these world events fertilised an embryonic new paradigm in the philosophy of science. By about 1950 the notion of the inevitable progress of human reason through history was no longer credible, and this loss of belief became a central catalyst and commitment of the school of thought of poststructuralism (Barthes, 1977; Derrida, 1978; Foucault, 1973).

Poststructuralism is one of a number of key words starting with **post-** to be found in this thesis, so it is important to address the methodological implications of the 'post' (Hoy, 2004; Silverman, 1988). With a set of meanings that primarily refer to 'after' in historical terms, and 'beyond' in conceptual terms, what is common to these various 'post' concepts is an important sense that the received portrayal of the world (i.e., through educational curricula and public discourse as represented in texts) is in some basic way outmoded or deluded – whether as a result of social amnesia, propaganda, violence or other means. Postmodernism began as a movement in art and architecture, and took on the mantle of the 'spirit' of the age that followed the decline of modernism, which peaked around 1900 and was closely associated with belief in science as the only proper way of knowing (Popper, 2002), and Western European culture as the apotheosis of human civilization (Fukuyama, 1992; Hegel, 1900). Jean-François Lyotard (1979) described the failure of the radical political Left, and an incredulity towards the 'grand narratives' of capitalism as the 'postmodern condition'. Poststructuralism has slightly different philosophical roots, representing a move beyond the structuralist paradigm, which ruled in Linguistics and related fields of social science during the era of the modernist elaboration of the disciplines (Lacan, 2006; Levi-Strauss, 1966; Saussure, 2011) - a move catalysed most distinctively by the work of Michel Foucault (Dreyfus, Rabinow, & Foucault, 1983; Foucault, 1970).

The third related term that appears below is **(post) qualitative** (St. Pierre, 2011, 2014), which refers to an emergent movement beyond 'traditional' qualitative methodologies that retain a semblance of allegiance to modernist, scientific theoretical frameworks. Clearly, it would be contradictory to claim adherence to poststructuralist epistemology while remaining comfortably within the bounds of qualitative research methodology. In the interests of coherence, therefore, it was necessary to carefully consider how study design might best reflect poststructuralist concerns and sensibilities. As described below, while I collected empirical data using 'standard' interview methods, I processed these data by writing fictionalised narratives, as explained further below in the sub-section *Narratives* (p. 23).

Just as postmodernism does not mean the complete rejection of science and modernism, and poststructuralism does not mean the complete abandonment of meaning and structure, (post) qualitative inquiry does not imply the desertion of every methodological convention. Such conventions are useful for structuring the three main sections presented below under the headings of: theoretical framework, study design, and ethical considerations.

Methodological framework

As noted above, an incredulity towards universalism and related meta-narratives such as humanism is a key theoretical orientation within this research project, which is a (post) qualitative inquiry into Māori equity in the polytechnic sector of tertiary education in Aotearoa-New Zealand. (post) qualitative methodology, still in an emergent state at the time of writing (2019), takes seriously the challenges to science and research posed by poststructuralism. These challenges open up poststructuralist research to approaches such as Foucault's genealogies and Derrida's deconstructions, since it is not clear how qualitative methods could be used in a (post) qualitative inquiry that puts aside humanist assumptions (St. Pierre, 2014). Accordingly, the methods used in this thesis are re-positioned by challenging their assumptions: about foundations, about the essential nature of the human, and about what is generalisable. These challenges are described further below.

Post-universalism refers to a rejection of the commitment to universal laws and principles and other 'totalising discourses'. Post-universalism rejects the assumption, central to science, that it is possible to take a transcendental position (also termed the 'Archimedean point') from which things can be studied. Post-universalism does not reject the impulse to theorise experience, nor the cognitive and ethical values to which science aspires, but admits to the flaws of universalism and modernist science, favouring instead a *quasi-transcendental* position that balances both the empirical and the transcendental by utilising their language without committing to it: a kind of *writing under erasure* (Hurst, 2004; Rorty, 1995). Assertion of cultural difference in the globalised milieu problematises universalist assumptions about humanity.

To choose to identify as Māori in Aotearoa-New Zealand today, for example, challenges the Pākehā assumption of superiority and the colonial project of assimilation, along with the right to dominate the archives of national identity. Such a challenge is problematic for the politics of a liberal democratic country such as Aotearoa-New Zealand, because to allow Māori perspectives serious consideration in the national imaginary would expose the amnesia and deceit on which received versions of the nation's history are built (Foucault, 1980b; Mutu, 2019; Schwab, 2006, 2010).

Post-foundationalism questions the ability of any signifying system to re-present the world unproblematically and one that is isomorphic with the mind. Hence, there is an association of poststructuralism with 'social-construction'. It is important to note that social constructionism does not deny reality, materiality, and a plausible ethics (D. Edwards, Ashmore, & Potter, 1995). One cannot strip away the ideology or discursive regimes to reveal an authentic or true underlying reality, because they are always already entangled in reality. Ideology is not imposed on ourselves, but rather we are enfolded within it. To step out of ideology hurts and is painful; it requires work, resistance, education and growth.

Post-foundationalism is the problematisation of any metaphysical basis for making authoritative statements that sit outside history and society (Derrida, 1982; Foucault, 1970, 2003). Post-foundationalism is also associated with a questioning of the constituting mind, which leads to a breakdown of the authority of the author, a contentious point amongst the

critics of Derrida (Knapp & Michaels, 1987). The author's intended meaning becomes only one possible unprivileged reading amongst many. In these conditions, as Derrida contended, there is no meaning outside of (con)text, and there exists no ultimate context or meta-context to act as an ultimate guarantor for establishing meaning. This loss of authorial authority is potentially a revolutionary idea and is important in reading policy. Rather, the specific contexts of production, including the historical and social conditions in which policy emerges and is received, destabilise the authority of policy makers to guarantee meaning. Such destabilisation confounds attempts to delimit the possibilities through intertextual technologies such as funding rules, league tables, and regimes of quality assurance.

Post-essentialism problematises the idea of a reality which exists independently of discourse, language and ideology, and which can be essentially known – that which is also called the 'Western fantasy' of perfect knowledge, underpinning science. Post-essentialism specifically relates to the rejection of the individual self and its autonomy as a core, a-historical, constituting essence or subjectivity. The relevance in this study is that the 'subject' includes the notion of being subject to something or someone. We are subject to policy as well as acting upon policy. The professional academic self does not exist before any law, policy, social code or norm of behaviour imposed on it. We are born into a context where the laws, norms and social ontology are always already at work upon us. The subject always exists within a specific cultural and historical context, not prior to it. From a poststructuralist perspective the Māori in Māori equity is entangled and enfolded in its discursive and ideological representation in policy, institutions, laws, history etc. The focus is on the textual representation in discourse, especially policy as discourse.

As a consequence of post-foundationalism, post-universalism, and post-essentialism, poststructuralists have focused on the conception of '(hu-)man' inherited from the Enlightenment, imbricated in contemporary policy. The very concept of 'Māori equity' refers to an ideological struggle arising from its built-in assumption that Māori share the same underlying human nature as defined in Enlightenment thinking. At once this marks an apparent contradiction because humanity is defined as singular, which means humanity includes Māori, but it is also used as a divisive point to say different races do not live up to the enlightenment ideal thus dividing humanity. For example, Kant exemplifies these points

by claiming his categorical imperative as universal but in his anthropologies absolutely claims the inferiority of different races (Eze, 1997), as did Darwin specifically about Māori (Bethencourt, 2013). Central policy terms offer entry-points for critical scrutiny through textual production, to expose how totalising practices already infect policy. Such terms, including versions of 'man', responsibility, accountability, freedom, techne and equality, play key roles in the liberal capitalist inheritance, and continue to play key roles in contemporary polytechnic policy.

The methodological consequence of the poststructuralist concepts of post-foundationalism, post-universalism, and post-essentialism is an emphasis on text and the intertextual. As Derrida insisted, there is nothing outside the text. What is knowable is constructed through text and the rules of discourse. Meaning is reached through the economy of discourse. As already noted, this does not mean that reality is textual, but that what we can know and what is knowable about reality is constructed through discourse and text.

Foucault emphasises in his work how the production of discourses is organised by epistemes, which are historical and material processes that delimit our encounter with the world. Different orders or epistemes construct rules and systems of control, and the way discourses are deployed construct regimes of truth within which our experience emanates. Truth has no obvious teleology and happens in an unorderly way, by chance and peppered with discontinuities. Māori equity policy is a discursive and textual practice that governs how we might talk about and institutionalise Māori equity. This thesis turns to text and discourse as a window onto Māori equity.

Foucault's concept of 'discourse'

In *The Order of Things* Foucault defined discourse as 'representation itself, represented by verbal signs' (p. 81). This simple six-word quote captures language, knowledge and power – three large ideas that are inextricably intertwined in Foucault's revolutionary definition of 'discourse', which added supplementary new meanings to the pre-existing linguistic meanings of this word (M. Olssen, 2014). The importance of this concept of discourse in education and research in general, and in Māori educational research and this thesis in particular, is difficult

to overstate. Discourse, as Foucault re-defined it, is the most important theoretical concept in this study; a key element of its methodology.

Different state institutions are associated with different practices, which in turn are governed by an internal logic of the episteme, which is the framework of rationality associated with a particular historical period of time and place. In turn, different epistemes or historical rationalities were imbricated in regimes of power and knowledge 'production'. Foucault's method allows one to disturb or agitate aspects of society, and its rules and regulations that are seen as natural while they do the invisible work of power, inseparable from the production of knowledge. Foucault was more interested in the conditions that produce a discourse than in e.g. documenting particular recurrences of certain utterances within a text or policy – which is another form of 'discourse analysis' (Ball, 2013b).

> Of course, discourses are composed of signs; but what they do is more than use these signs to designate things. It is this "more" that we must reveal and describe (Foucault, 1972, p. 49).

To research policy as a form of discourse in the Foucauldian sense is to look for this 'more' – to see governments, not as responding to pre-existing 'problems', but rather as constructing the problem, in and through discourse. In the case of Māori equity policy, neoliberalism is not responding to a pre-existing problem or condition of equity. Neoliberalism is uniquely constructing the power-knowledge nexus that produces the particular equity problem-solution dynamic. In this sense policy is a set "of shifting, diverse, and contradictory responses to a spectrum of political interests" (Edelman, 1988, p. 16). Policies are about what can be said according to sets of bodies of knowledge, interpretative matrices, concepts and signs, in a way that makes thinking otherwise, outside of the policy, extremely difficult.

It is possible to view discourse from two directions; the conditions of production of policy and what the content of the discourse is saying and the deployment of discourse as a form of performativity. Both are entangled in the epistemic limits of the socio-historical horizon (a contested site). Thus, what we can say about Māori equity is already tied to an entwined mode of power and a form of knowledge. When analysed through governmentality we focus on policy subjects and populations using biopower; for example, equity policy may require

the polytechnic to gather data on outcomes that measures equity on populations. The neoliberal theory of power that overlaps with governmentality uses control through encouraging the learner to optimise her/his investment by encouraging the learner to be a self-entrepreneur by using their (human) capital.

In this sense discourse is both performative and constative. To draw attention to the performative (what we can do with words) and constative (propositional meaning) aspects of language is to disrupt the binary between policy agents and subjects, revealing the level of micro-politics and more complex flows of power through the system (Foucault, 2011b). This is one way for those who are relatively disempowered in society to establish some levels of meaning in both language and action, and thereby reclaim a degree of agency and autonomy. The performative and constative aspects of language emphasise a more nuanced view of Foucault's oeuvre. It allows us to see how equity policy plays out in its everydayness. In this sense adding narratives brings the everyday micro-political of the normal day to life that adds a level of richness to the abstract analysis of policy.

Power-knowledge nexus

Foucault's oeuvre contains several useful conceptual tools related to his key insights about the relationship between power, knowledge and language, with which to critically analyse the contemporary production of equality and equity in the polytechnic sector. Foucault developed a method he called 'genealogy' (Foucault, 2003), which grapples directly with the claims of universalism, and posits a nuanced social and historical subject that arises through his reworking of the notion of power.

Foucault describes power in the postmodern epoch as arising from below, invisibly operating through the micro-practices of everyday life. To govern is to leave to their own 'free will' the actions of individuals, whilst governing what acts are possible, and how it is possible to do them. The postmodern era is characterised by its movement towards 'colonisation' of all social domains, justified in the name of one's own good, or the good of society, where everyone is expected to gladly accept the new orders and social conditions so produced. Its prevailing attraction is that it creates enjoyment and desire. It not only tells what we should be doing, such as studying subjects that enable us to get jobs, but how we should be doing it

– we are exhorted to be work-ready, resilient, to show grit, to enjoy our work, etc (Ehrenreich, 2009).

Foucault argued that 'governmentality' and a 'control' society were the foundations from which grew neoliberalism as a discourse. Resistance, for both Foucault and Heidegger, comes from the margins of society that offer a space in which to think and act differently - a type of liminal space in which a distancing from power can be conceived, but is not necessarily realized. This description seems apt in relation to contemporary Māori identity, which is like a liminal space, both inside and outside the dominant national identity of Aotearoa-New Zealand.

Governmentality and beyond

Foucault never addressed education in a sustained way as he did other public institutions such as prisons and medicine. Nevertheless, his twin terms of governmentality and biopower have been widely taken up in critical accounts of education (for example see Apple, Ball, & Gandin, 2010; Ball, 2013b; M. Peters, 2001). Foucault's delineation of governmentality has two elements: interest in the political rationalities of the state - the 'genealogy of the state'; and the ethical question - the 'genealogy of the subject'. Through the concept of governmentality, Foucault draws links between technologies of the self and technologies of power (Foucault, 2008, 2009, 2011a, 2011b). Power, for Foucault, operates in a parallel way, governing the individual's everyday actions, but should not be thought of as a fixed entity or institution, rather as a realisation of specific historical social practices in our institutions.

Governmentality is composed of these two concepts, for which the original French terms Foucault used were *gouverner* (governing) and *mentalité* (modes of thought). Governmentality denotes the architecture of the neoliberal state, which includes all of its technologies, instruments, strategies, processes and procedures, as they act on the self and on social behaviour through the activities of power. Governmentality is the study of the:

> particular mentalities, arts, and regimes of government and administration… a plurality of agencies and authorities of aspects of behaviour to be governed, of norms invoked, of purposes sought, and of effects, outcomes and consequences

… any relatively calculated practice to direct categories of social agent to specified ends. (Dean, 1991, 2-12).

Governmentality is more encompassing than the broad powers held by the state. It is not to be confused with forms of overt domination; rather, it names the myriad technologies of government that normalise into rigid behaviours, which result in a state of domination. Governmentality is an apt conceptualisation of the labour of becoming a new professional, the calculating professional, or the calculating learner investing in oneself.

The critique of the neoliberal subject

Neoliberalism is in our heads as well as 'out there'. Life is made meaningful and of value through the calculative techniques of counselling, coaching, mentoring and so on. In these regimes we turn our gaze upon ourselves to see if we add up: we audit ourselves. What we become is a:

new type of individual, an individual formed within the logic of competition - a calculating, solipsistic, instrumentally driven, 'enterprise man'. This is the 'remoralisation' of our relation to the state and to ourselves (M. Peters, 2001, pp. 59-60).

The moral compass is reduced to a rational assessment of the costs and benefits of a certain act. The important point is that bio-power and control, much like Heidegger's (Heidegger, 1977) notion of the technological understanding of being, represents a fundamental incursion into all of our everyday practices - shaping us through the micro-politics of everyday. We enjoy it and it brings us pleasure.

The equality that neoliberalism seeks to produce has an intractable emptiness of homogeneity and hegemony. The nature of that equality is such that if it were to be realised, we might ask whether we would want to live in that reality. So the argument is not that neoliberalism does not have the capability to produce enough equality, but the equality produced by neoliberalism is empty, of no value. From this perspective, the equality produced by neoliberal capitalism is its chief danger (McGowan, 2016). This 'danger' relates to how Māori experience educational achievement as coming at the expense of 'being Māori'.

Deconstruction and hauntology

Derrida's late work took a more overt political turn or interest in political philosophy after being criticised for lacking any political implications (Fraser, 1984; Said, 1978; Sprinker, 1980). It was accused of being too textual exemplified by 'there is nothing outside the text'. However, I regard this as a misunderstanding especially if deconstruction is seen as denying reality for language or lacking any political implications. I agree with more recent accounts that deconstruction has important political implications for policy (McQuillan, 2009), education institutions (M. Peters & Biesta, 2009; Trifonas, 2009) and political resistance (Hirst, 2015). Derrida supplements Foucault's analysis of power relations by offering resistance to the reinscription of resistance into the global order and to think the unthinkable (Eagleton, 1981). Derrida's work is important methodologically because it can be treated as a form of textual activism.

The postmodern condition and its suspicion of meta-narratives can be applied to considering the lasting effects of the legacy of history. Derrida urged caution about "the metaphysical concept of history. This is the concept of history as the history of meaning: the history of meaning developing itself, fulfilling itself" (Derrida, 1981, p. 56). This tendency is realised in policy when we view equity as a series of progressions drawing ever closer to equality. Derrida's textual activism reveals this formulation as ideological. This has a two-fold effect, one becomes suspicious of claims of improving equality or seeing equality as long journey with every step bringing us closer to its end and of opening history to listen to a non-linear history, where the whiggish view is challenged. For example, in Aotearoa-New Zealand, a focus on colonial history illustrates there is no life without history and trauma:

> some lives will forever be overshadowed by violent histories, including colonial invasions, slavery, totalitarianism, dictatorships, wars, and genocide. Some murders, including soul murders, are committed by people using sanctioned disciplinary regimes that enforce subjugation and oppression. (Schwab, 2006, p. 96)

Is there a 'spirit' of equity, a dream of equality, or is the dream always already deferred (Pearson, 1990)? Are institutions haunted by the omissions, ellipses, absences in their discourses? Can we read a shadow hauntology between the lines of our ontology? This study

is based on the premise that through close readings of policy texts, we can unveil how our institutional ontologies are haunted. Attention to the ghost reveals a hauntology.

A ghost, which is to say the revenant or the one who returns, comes back to haunt our discourse, but not as a presence, because it is never present. Yet neither can its appearance be denied. In this sense, the ghost does not exist; it is perceptible, but does not interact in the perceptual, visible world. A ghost arrives, haunts, leaves, and returns, yet for many individuals it will not have been noticed at all. The role of the ghost can be considered as a literary and theoretical figure, as speculative, visionary, with a purpose shrouded in mystery, which cannot have the solidity of an ontology. Furthermore, not all forms of the ghost - spectre, apparition, spirit - are equal.

The ghost has three well-documented visitations; firstly, as doxical (the etymology of 'doxa' in Greek was 'to seem' or 'to appear') a shared knowledge; as received ancestral wisdom, which often speaks to a catastrophic experience of desolation. Secondly, there is 'the self as other' or the doubling up; the living as dead, which is always in relation to haunting. Arriving before it arrives, so to speak, as anticipation of the future. The third manifestation of the ghost is that of writing over subjectivity, and the subject's psyche as psychological burden, where memory and the broader historical psychic weight often come together or are tied in knots around each other. The personal and the broader culture coincide but are haunted by a desire for a different place. This temporal aspect of the ghost also reminds one that you are where you are, and you cannot leave. The ghost of the past is outside memory and conscience and invites a different kind of responsibility.

What Derrida is acknowledging is that the past can never be present in the present, which is to acknowledge that the past is legible through traces and inscription. This insight illuminates the inevitable separation between text and context; between word and world (Pilar Blanco & Peeren, 2013). This break or fissure is where the ghost of modernity appears (the written being/being written):

> subject to the traces of historicity, and to those disquieting eruptions that remain
> all too legible, one's being - if it can be expressed thus – is never on time with

itself, its presence and its present always already disturbed by the ghost of itself, and the ghost of all its others (Pilar Blanco & Peeren, 2010, p. 4).

Therefore, any ontology of being, including the social ontology delineated by Foucault, is always already haunted from the start. The house of being is a haunted location. This haunting runs deep; any attempt to exorcise it fails to recognise how deeply it runs. A discursive approach must allow room for resistance to the power-knowledge nexus, or risk being incorporated into the globalised order. Derrida's work offers a radical break, through textual activism, from the incessant work of the dominant order to incorporate difference. This liminal approach to methodology seeks to open up 'being' to all its haunted visions; to allow for new possibilities without being entirely enclosed by the dominant social ontology.

The trustworthiness of research

One of the pervasive influences of the Enlightenment inheritance is how it still structures neoliberal policy on equality. It is important to recognise how the research itself resists being folded back into the global order (Hirst, 2015; McQuillan, 2008). The notion of progress, and the subject and the subsequent ethical position of responsibility provide entry points into countering or resisting policy. To remain consistent with the implications of poststructuralism in (post) qualitative inquiry, I must embrace the challenge of the subject, and by implication the authority of the author/researcher. Questions of trustworthiness, therefore, need to tackle the asymmetry of the value-laden hierarchy of researcher and researched. This challenge is taken up, below, through a critique of responsibility.

Trustworthiness concerns within a qualitative framework have received considerable attention (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, 2008; Lather, 2017). Some of the terms relating to trustworthiness used in qualitative research include authenticity, credibility, confirmability, internal coherence, transferability, reliability, and significance. Questions about trustworthiness have taken on political importance as some research approaches are deemed more scientific, evidence-based, etc, and therefore worthier and more deserving of government funding. The proliferation of validity concepts illustrates the ongoing attraction of a desire for a quasi-scientific discourse that runs counter to the poststructuralist assumptions of this study, and to the flow of the rivers of Māori lives.

In the early development of (post) qualitative inquiry different ideas emerged that attempted to chart a way forward that characterised an era of uncertainties (Koselleck, 1988; Newman, 2007; Polkinghorne, 1988). The antifoundationalism has shown the limits of traditional boundaries for ideas like validity by opening the spaces up but such spaces are fractured and uneven and written over by (re-inscribed) understandings of practices of thought, barely noticeable because of their seeming naturalness (Descombes, 1986). One such notion is techne from which the cognates technology, technical and technique emerge (see chapter 3).

In (post) qualitative inquiry a number of important counter-practices to the certainty and authority that can be summarised in a set of useful frames; simulacra/ironic, paralogy/ neo-pragmatism, Derridean rigour/Deleuzean rhizomes and voluptuous validity/situated validity (Lather, 1993). I briefly point to some of the frames' usefulness and potentiality to this study.

The term simulacra was co-opted by Baudrillard from the Bible Ecclesiastes:

> The simulacrum is never that which conceals the truth--it is the truth which conceals that there is none.
> The simulacrum is true.
>
> (Baudrillard, 1988, p. 166)

The important point to this frame is reality itself has come to imitate the model. Representation no longer becomes the dominant model because it fails to represent what is indexes. Policy reduces Māori to various formulas each inadequate and always destined to be inadequate. The simulacra offers a displacement a copy that disorients, in this case policy representations into narratives (see Chapter 5) that 'mock' or 'subvert' policy designations of Māori as de-politicised subjects of neoliberal policy discourse (Lazzarato, 2009). The point of the narratives is to undercut policy representations.

Lyotard's paralogy as a frame offers a new approach to difference and dissensus and suggests that the world we already seem to know is a story that can be disrupted and obliges us to complicate our simple stories by including difference. Stories invoke language games that can be adapted for a desire for justice and the unknown (Lyotard, 1979). The narratives in the introduction foreground the influences that shaped me and the narratives at the end of this chapter bring them and my theoretical investments into collision with my understanding of Māori, as an institutionally constructed encounter. The meaning, at least in part, of these

narratives is to bring out difference and sameness by juxtaposing shared concerns that end in difference.

Derridean rigour (Hirst, 2015; May, 1997; McQuillan, 2008) forms an important frame that is explicitly developed in the thesis methodology. The theme undermines the stability of reading tertiary education policy by a careful reading of the history of techne back into the development of policy as a kind of absence or unconscious. The point of this theme is to unsettle from within by taking techne from its early classical formulations into historical periods that emphasise a particular knowledge-power nexus undermining their ability to cohesively present a stable policy (Naas, 2006; Sprinker, 1980). Rhizomatic systems build on the space that is created by deconstruction. Rather than emphasising the modernist hierarchical model (encapsulated in tree diagrams) the emphasis is placed on rhizomatic systems where connection, tangled ideas, authority, regularity are creatively worked upon from immanent critique (Deleuze & Guattari, 2009; Deleuze & Guattari, 1987).

Voluptuous and situated themes of validity that build on feminist understandings by producing a political epistemology of position and the local situatedness against the universal/objective claim. This, it is argued, creates the space for the other to enter. Like water that is fluid and finds cracks in the rock structure it can slowly work on the foundations creating fractures and fissures from which to offer new possibilities. It is a form of plasticity flexible, rather than a rigid view (Malabou, 2005; Malabou & Derrida, 2004).

This thesis maintains attention on the messy, rich, uncontrolled nature of the world in which we find ourselves, which is not captured by separating or fragmenting aspects of life into measurable entities. The relentless drive for this kind of certainty is a hangover from the classical modern Enlightenment, where the search for foundations and universals was the fundamental precipice, upon which all knowledge is built. Even more shaky are the alternative versions that with no pretence of universalism. In this study, that universalism also carries a culture imported from Britain to Aotearoa, which was used to dispossess Māori in the name of objective universalism (D. Bell, 2007, 2010; Ince, 2018; Moewaka Barnes & McCreanor, 2019). Such systems of thought entailed an abdication of ethics and politics. Any notion of trustworthiness, in this sense, runs the risk of repeating the dispossession. In this study,

therefore, for epistemological reasons as well as an ethics and politics of engagement, an alternative trustworthiness must be posited, something other than an appeal to a permanent, externally-verifiable authority.

This study takes trustworthiness to mean an ethics of responsibility. Responsibility is a notion at the heart of the neoliberal paradigm, which this study attempts to deconstruct and subvert. The final outcome of a neoliberal responsibility and accountability would see humans turned into rational utility calculators, privileging independence, autonomy, and a monetarisation of value. By contrast, in poststructuralism, responsibility means showing responsibility to the 'Other' (Diprose, 2006; Peterson, 1997) – a process requiring vulnerability, reflexibility, dependence and interdependence. This 'humble responsibility' results in an ethics of credibility and trustworthiness, with a notion of justice, or the spirit of an equality-to-come, at its heart.

Derrida (2005a) argues "to be responsible is both to answer for oneself and for the legacy, before that which precedes us, and to answer, before the others, before that which is coming and remains to come"(p. 139). This quote describes the responsibility I seek. Trustworthiness of research would be justified by the researcher taking "into consideration historical conditions and persisting forms of inequity and oppression while acknowledging the limits of her or his knowledge" (Koro-Ljungberg, 2010, p. 605). Responsibility means "the disavowed beliefs, suppositions and obscene practices we pretend not to know about, even though they form the background of our public values" (Žižek, 2005, February 19, unpaginated).

Responsibility

Responsibility and accountability, as ethical considerations, have a specific genealogy that is already tied to management and capitalist theory in the late Renaissance and Enlightenment (Bernasconi, 2008).

Under the influence of Christianity, ethics became a matter of conscience. Responsibility came into existence as legal relationship "in the context of the advent of representative democracy, shaped as it was by the rise of capitalism" (Bernasconi, 2008, p. 132). In the

Enlightenment, one of the unique features of the emerging democratic states was the notion of the social contract (Hobbes, 2012; Locke, 2003; Rawls & Freeman, 2007; Rousseau, 1997), and later that of contract law. This was connected with a need for lenders who underwrote the colonial project to have some guarantees of payment; hence the importance of the contract to define relations. Through such means, responsibility in the form of conscience became an intimate part of the capitalist democracy, as well as treaty arrangements with indigenous people.

Is it possible to rethink responsibility or must responsibility be abandoned altogether? Sartre (2003) reminds us that responsibility has an originary relationship to property, which ties responsibility to the liberal foundations of the modern nation-state. The theory of possessive individualism (Macpherson, 2011), in which the individual is conceptualised as the sole proprietor of his/her skills and owes nothing to society, lays the foundations of a individualistic notion of responsibility tied to property. This individualist concept of responsibility prevails in polytechnic education, where, for example, each institution is required to justify equity through its 'return' in the form of jobs secured.

The notion of 'productive land' in relation to agrarian labour was used to disposes indigenous people. Settlers justified their right to freely claim unproductive land in the colonies, and as happened in Aotearoa-New Zealand, seizing ownership of such lands conferred suffrage on the settlers. This process entailed important implications for 'democracy'. The notion of responsibility expands to include freedom (Sartre, 2003), which means assuming responsibility for the past.

> Support for affirmative action or for reparations is another way in which people today take responsibility for a course of events that had their origin long ago but whose impact continues to the present (Bernasconi, 2008, p. 141).

Such a view challenges equity as a remedial action to fix a disparity by intervening to create a level playing field, to a notion of historical responsibility or historical debt. Jean-Paul Sartre implored us to accept responsibility for everything except responsibility itself – what might be called a hyperbolic responsibility.

Avril Bell makes the case for an ethics of Māori-non-Māori relations that appeals to Levinas (A. Bell, 2014). Levinas, like Sartre, sees responsibility as meaning more than simply intentions. Both Sartre and Levinas place responsibility in a wider horizon by moving beyond intentions and good conscience. Ethics is not so much a matter of 'what should I do?' but more a question of how ethics is possible, without disregarding one's responsibility. Liberal notions of responsibility are obsessed with duties under contract in good conscience, to act in the spirit of something, but Levinas (1991) challenges us to move to beyond duties. The concept of responsibility taken up in this thesis is a responsibility for everything, for what has already happened and for what is to come (Critchley, 1992, 1999).

> In Levinas, I find myself already responsible in the experience of being called to act by another's suffering: my responsibility is met first in my passivity (Bernasconi, 2008, p. 114).

This infinite concept of responsibility is in harsh contrast with the dominant contemporary notion of responsibility as meaning a commitment to act 'selfishly' in one's own best (financial) interests. For polytechnic education to answer the human capital call to responsibility, by making a profitable return on investment, entails important consequences because it monetarises value and responsibility.

A different relationship puts into doubt the certainty of a good conscience being connected to one's responsibility (echoing the Education Act, 1989, for universities to act as the 'critic and conscience of society'). In '*The Gift of Death*' Derrida argued that Western history could be conceived as a history of responsibility. In this sense it is not a task looking for completion but a state of becoming responsible. We live in a state of debt; a debt we must repay, and moreover one that we must acknowledge. This responsibility is not a supplement, rather it is central in education policy.

Foucault's account of the genealogy of *parrhesia* reflects a critique of responsibility (Bennington, 2016; Elden, 2016; Foucault, 2011b, 2019a; Lyotard, 1979). Parrhesia is a form of brave truth-telling, in reference to a plurality of responses and resistances to power structures, usually coming at personal risk to the truth-teller. In the democracy of Ancient Greece everyone had an equal right to speak, according to the egalitarian principle - *isēgoria*. But this principle is only possible to contemplate in the agonistic game of truth-telling of the

democratic institution, making it an elite practice. In this way, truth-telling undermines democracy. Paradoxically, 'if democracy can be governed it is because there is true discourse' (Foucault, 2011b, p. 184). This study of Māori outcomes in polytechnic education is steeped in the colours of parrhesia, taking the form of a desire to explore the paradoxical nature of policy, and strategies of resistance against neoliberal policy.

History and philosophy of Māori equity policies

Polytechnic equity policies owe a debt to the liberalism of the 18th and 19th centuries: to fully understand the meanings of equity and equality, one must understand the history out of which they arose. Liberalism arose as a challenge to the traditional feudal, sovereign, and religious bases of power, which Foucault termed 'sovereign power' (Foucault, 1972). Sovereign power flourished in the late Renaissance (1520-1700) and early Enlightenment (1685-1730) periods. The Enlightenment challenged the dominance of the church in the realms of knowledge, and liberalism challenged the inherent inequality and unaccountability of the politics of sovereign power.

Liberalism was avowedly shaped by the aspiration to unfettered inquiry and the progress of knowledge and humanity inherent in Enlightenment philosophy, science, and political thought. Ideas of freedom and equality have been central in the constitutional arrangements of liberal democracies. A certain kind of equality, equality of opportunity, is inherent to liberal democracy (Rousseau, 1997). Far from being long-outdated abstract concepts, these same assumptions underwrote the 'neoliberal experiment' of the 1980s (Kelsey, 1997), and also played a central role in the processes of British colonialism in Aotearoa-New Zealand.

The institutions, policies, procedures and standards of professional behaviour, by means of which the public sector is organised, all require an understanding of these assumptions of liberal democracy. Poststructuralist theory makes available the means by which to unpack this influence, in order to expose the liberal humanist 'fairy tale' to critical scrutiny. The task of critical scrutiny is complicated in this case by the fact that we have inherited contemporary modes of critical scrutiny from the same Enlightenment sources that produced the assumptions of liberal democracy (McQuillan, 2007).

In Aotearoa-New Zealand, the legacies of the Enlightenment and of British settler colonialism are intrinsically tied together. Failure to recognise this close linking is one contributor to ongoing unresolved conflicts between settlers and indigenous people (Turner, 1999a). The rationale of settler colonialism is derived from Enlightenment thinking and continues to exert considerable influence on inter-ethnic relations in the contemporary milieu. Captain James Cook was viewed as Adam Smith's global agent of both commerce and liberty, thus bringing together the scientific racism of the age and the emerging ideology of the market. According to the Enlightenment views held by Cook and his scientific company, including Johann Forster and his son George, Māori were people of passion and habit rather than rationality and industry, and only extensive contact with Europeans could alleviate their poor condition. Forster had developed an interest in the taxonomic work of Linnaeus, which included an arguably racist typology of human 'varieties' that was the cornerstone of the classical age (Foucault, 1970). Darwin, on the basis of his observations of indigenous people, equated equality with baseness (Darwin, 1839). Darwin went on to argue that Māori were at the bottom of the human hierarchy (Bethencourt, 2013). Thus, emerging modern science provided new vocabularies of racism that were enthusiastically applied to Māori by the majority of British colonizers. The following extract from an 1863 newspaper illustrates the terms in which these views were expressed:

> The Māori is now known to us as what he is, and not as missionaries and philanthropists were willing to believe him. [In reality, the Māori is] a man ignorant and savage, loving darkness and anarchy, hating light and order; a man of fierce, and ungoverned passions, bloodthirsty, cruel, ungrateful, treacherous (Belich, 1986, p. 328).

Such views still punctuate the grammar of mainstream society. In 2018 Sir Robert (Bob) Jones, a rich-lister and commercial property owner, wrote a 'satirical' column in the National Business Review magazine (his last) in which he proposed a 'Māori gratitude' national day, when Māori could show gratitude for the blessings of colonisation by doing nice things for individual Pākehā people, suggesting a Māori person might, for example, come round and mow his lawn. Sir Jones influence and entangled past did not end there, he played a critical role in establishing neoliberalism in Aotearoa-New Zealand by setting up the Libertarian Party, which he disbanded once it had delivered the fiscal loosening he wanted. Another

apparently anti-Māori commentator is Dr Donald Brash (2019), ex-leader of the National Party, nowadays a spokesperson for the Hobson's Pledge group. Brash appeals to 'one law for all' in the name of equality, as a way of dismissing any suggestion of Māori right to seek compensation, financial or otherwise. The views of both Jones and Brash illustrate the enduring impact in the right-wing end of mainstream society of the intellectual inheritance of the Enlightenment, through appeals to fairness and equality (often by rewriting policy for Māori as unaccountable power), whilst steadfastly ignoring the enduring effects on 'real Māori' of the unremitting cycle of material deprivation that falls to them as the main legacy of their colonised post-European history.

A textual activism involving a poststructuralist approach to discourse has potential in this work. Can the same language used to construct policy also be put to work to expose the normative practices of the Enlightenment, their association with colonialism, and the enduring shadow of a racist worldview in contemporary policy? The theoretical implications are to reinforce the need to pay close attention to propositional content and the performative content of policy, through a close reading of text and discourse. Here, a close reading means paying attention not only to the text, but through key philosophical ideas that represent the norms of that episteme. Textual activism can destabilise the established episteme through deconstructing the hierarchies; for example, by reading Aristotle's discussion of technê as undergirding policies on the poly*technic*, and *techni*cal education, or by showing how the rational subject of the Enlightenment is tied to a racialised view of humanity that is still assumed in equity policy.

Research approach

Textbook expositions of the difference between quantitative and qualitative research in education usually focus on the nature of data: quantitative research uses statistical data, while qualitative research uses textual data. At more philosophical levels, the distinction relates to the positivist-interpretive divide, and associated contrasting attitudes towards various elements of the research process. (post) qualitative research takes another step further away from the science-derived conventions of 'traditional' research methodology,

less interested in what a method is, and more interested what a method can do (Fox & Alldred, 2018). This approach brings a focus on responsibility as a politics and ethics in determining the contours of the study.

This study uses three methods for collecting and analysing data, described below under the headings of interviews, narratives and critical policy discourse analysis. This combination of approaches blurs the conventional methodological boundary between data collection and data analysis. These methods were assembled on the basis of their potential to do work at the level of micro-politics, in the context of this study, rather than by following any established research approach. (post) qualitative methodology is a signal of what follows a problematisation of such traditional, established qualitative research schema (Lather, 2016). In this sense, (post) qualitative methodology is incompletely formulated. It is not delineated by technical procedures, but embraces ethics, ontology, and knowledge, and is perhaps best described as a methodology-in-progress. The poststructuralist critique of knowledge includes a concern for recovery of the subjugated knowledges of the oppressed and the non-Western; to embrace the production of different knowledge, and producing knowledge differently (St. Pierre, 2014).

Interviews

I completed 6 individual, face-to-face, semi-structured interviews with participants who worked in the polytechnic sector. These interviews allowed me to include authentic voices of Māori equity policy actors. Collecting interview data from this set of expert participants enabled me to compile a more extensive library of experiences relating to the research question than available to me based on my own personal experiences. The research voice is then produced not "by a singular subject … but is an enactment among researcher-data-participants-theory-analysis" (Mazzei, 2013, p. 733).

> Thus, we decouple voice – words spoken and words written in transcripts – from
> an intentional, agentic humanist subject and move [to] voice and thought as
> assemblage, a complex network of human and nonhuman agents that exceeds
> the traditional notion of the individuals (Mazzei, 2013, p. 734).

The practical implication is that there are no master themes or fundamental meanings that can be constructed by the researcher from the texts produced by the interview participants. Agency is not located in the individual, but rather is attributed to "a complex network of human and nonhuman agents, including historically specific sets of material conditions" (p. 734). These conditions include settler colonialism, geography, whānau, tertiary institutional discourse, ethnic identity norms, white privilege, the end of equity, policy texts, norms, ambiguities, aspirations, and so on. Put simply, voice is located not in the individual but in the milieu in which the individual is located. This insight might also be expressed by the rule of thumb: 'don't look inside someone's head, look where the head is located'.

Participant recruitment

My participant recruitment strategy could be described as a form of purposeful sampling, since I sought to speak to specific experts. For this project, I defined an 'expert' as someone with 15 years-plus experience working in polytechnics; who had held a position of responsibility for Māori equity, and/or who worked in a senior decision-making position.

Having worked in the polytechnic sector for 10 years and in the post compulsory education sector for over 25 years, I used my formal professional networks to recruit interview participants. My first step was to speak about my planned research during a round of verbal updates at a meeting of the Polytechnics CEO Forum in 2015. The members of this Forum consisted of the CEO or a delegate from each of the 16 polytechnics; a member of the Policy Unit of the Ministry of Education; the CEO or delegate of the Tertiary Education Commission (TEC); and the CEO or delegate of NZQA. This meeting was an opportunity to briefly outline my proposed research, which received a supportive hearing. Following the meeting, some of the attendees wrote to make an email introduction to a suggested participant. In this way I received about 15 introductions to potential participants. I contacted each person by email, attaching a formal letter of invitation (Appendix A). Approximately half those people replied including a telephone number, and I followed up by phoning to discuss participating in the interview research, sending the participant information sheet (Appendix B) to those who were receptive to the idea.

This process resulted in my six interview participants. When each person had agreed to participate, we decided on a suitable day, time and place for the interview to happen.

Interview process

Before beginning the interview, the participant signed a consent form (Appendix C). The interview was guided by the list of questions I had developed (Appendix D), but followed a conversational approach, with the questions acting more as prompts. All the interviews were between 60 and 75 minutes long, and each was audio-recorded. The audio files were transcribed by a professional transcriber, who signed a confidentiality agreement (Appendix E) and the transcripts were then sent back to the participant for checking.

The interview discussions focused on how policy is made at the local level; how policies are often contradictory, recycled, short-lived, and part of a larger history. Discussions turned to how policies are interpreted by specific functions of staff and institutional administration within the tertiary system; and finally, the role that budgets, funding, history and culture played in the implementation of policy for Māori equity in the polytechnic sector.

Interview participants

The final group of 6 participants were all male: all highly experienced professionals who held or had held senior positions in the polytechnic sector. Because of the way that their names had been put forward after the CEOs had listened to me speaking about the research, approximately two-thirds of the potential participants were Māori, and 4 of the final group of 6 participants were Māori. The combined experience of the interviewees covered a wide range of roles and professional positions, including: TEC investment managers, polytechnic council members, polytechnic CEOs and senior managers including quality managers, holders of specific Māori equity roles, teaching staff, and government educational policy analysts. Most of the participants had over twenty years of experience in the tertiary education system and had held multiple roles.

Critical policy discourse analysis

Critical policy discourse analysis is a method of studying policy as discourse, in the Foucauldian sense (Fairclough, 2010, 2013). Two ways to study discourse are, firstly, to look at how a discourse is used; and secondly, to study the effects of a particular discourse. Both approaches emphasise how policy constructs subjects, and tend to underplay subjects as actors - or at least to create a theoretical conundrum, because if we are subject to discourse, then the critical position must also be subject to it (Gale, 2001). This impasse can be avoided by reconceptualising the nature of policy as both text and discourse (Ball, 1993). To focus on policy as text is an opportunity to see how professionals speak back to policy, whilst simultaneously being hailed by the enduring social practices that normalise some, and leave silent what could be said (Foucault, 1980a, 1980b; Gutting, 1994; Kendall & Wickham, 1999).

Critical policy discourse analysis focuses on how policies contribute to the construction of a control society, which involves analysis of a wide range of policies and how they are deployed, the effects of discourse, how meaning-making by professionals operates, tying them in both as subjects reproducing the privileged modes of power/knowledge structures, but also in talking back or courageously talking truth to power. Policy technologies form intertextual webs, which constrain some and leave others unheard, excluding alternatives while still leaving gaps. A wide range of policies be looked at, along with local contexts, observations and networks, including through semi-structured interviews that show how meaning is constructed materially both within discursive regimes but also as *democratic politics*.

Policy enactment involves the creative processes of interpretation and re-contextualisation: the translation of text into action, transforming abstract policy ideas into contextualised practices, a process that involves the interpretation of interpretations (Ball, 2013a; Ball, Maguire, Braun, & Hoskins, 2011). This process is governed by the exact power structure in which each particular government policy is embedded. This approach to policy analysis foregrounds narrative accounts of the real-world experience of those who enact Māori equity policy in polytechnics. The narratives revolve around snapshots in the life of professionals who negotiate and build coalitions out of official policy documents (Ahmed, 2012; Ball, 2013a; Ball et al., 2011). A critical approach explores how agency is constrained but also enabled by

policy. Critical policy discourse analysis considers narratives of social and psychological experience within the real-world context, foregrounding accounts of different explanations of Māori inequity.

Foucault's work has been extensively applied to policy and discourse in education and elsewhere (see for example Apple, 2010; Apple et al., 2010; Ball, 2013b; Ball & Olmedo, 2013; Nicoll, 2008; M. Peters, 2009). For the purpose of this study, policies are considered to be the texts of incomplete pieces of work. Policy requires a degree of reworking, displacing by changing emphasis in a policy that may still be interpreted in an old way, re-inventing, etc, especially in the context of changing governments, ministers and managers. Policies embedded within bigger political frameworks legitimise a particular range of approaches thus policies are bound up with ideology, histories, emotions, psychosocial tensions and cultural battles. It is in this sense they are permeated with relations of power that often get left out of the analysis but are amenable to study. Thus, this study is about capturing policy activity as contestation, negotiation and struggle for different groups who are often neglected in the official construction of policymaking. This casts the polytechnic employee as policy subjects, but this study will also cast them as policy actors making their routine activities and practices - their 'text' - a critical site of contestation.

Policy ignores or under theorises the professional or institution as seeing them as government technologies passive in their relation to policy, as providers. In policy documents this is re-emphasised through the related strategies, procedures, and practices that in written form exclude or suppress the historical components in their detail and tend to talk in decontextualized policy speak of learners as passive recipients or beneficiaries as the targets of those policies.

Policies are not all the same: they may have different life spans or goals; they might be adopted as a legal duty, recommended or suggested. Yet these policies constrain or enable the possibilities of academic staff; they affect 'the order of things', social relations and the management of problems and crises. Some collide, others form mutually-reinforcing actions (Maguire, Ball, & Braun, 2012) In addition, various specialist roles exist, like registrars that play a special role in the policy interpretation for the institution. They try to render the policy

into action as process, structure, target, and practice. This study will focus on how staff also speak back to it. Policies encounter the micro-politics of an organisation and they subtly fuel struggles of recognition, resources, jobs etc. They can empower some and displace others. However, they very rarely get discussed in research as active agents and very rarely are they looked at as mediating agency for equality. Often institutions and academics are studied as reproducing inequalities and in isolation of equality studies that look at learners. This study will specifically look at that relationship.

Narratives

This thesis contains 10 original narratives or stories of three types: personal account, imaginary and fictionalised narratives. These narratives enliven the chapters, present the rich interview data powerfully but anonymously, and magnify for the reader the world of policy by describing lived micro-politics of the production of professional experience in polytechnics. The autobiographical content of the narratives derives from nearly 30 years of working in post-compulsory education, where my professional tenure has largely overlapped with the period of neoliberal reform. I have worked in the country of my birth, the United Kingdom, as well as two European countries, before working in Aotearoa-New Zealand for just under 10 years. I have worked as a teacher/lecturer, in policy units, in middle management, in equity roles, in government advisory groups, governance, and senior management.

Fictionalised interview extracts: I wrote these stories by incorporating relevant extracts from interview transcripts together with the use of creative writing techniques and my insider knowledge of the workings of the polytechnic sector to develop original fictionalised narratives that bring the reader into contact with key 'moments' in the life of Māori equity policy in polytechnics. I curated these stories from an insider's perspective, drawing on my professional experiences and reflecting my personal stake in the scenarios portrayed, to create new meanings and new possibilities of understanding.

Personal account: The two narratives in the introduction are derived from my own experiences. The first one is situated in London, before I immigrated to Aotearoa-New Zealand. This story serves as an entry point, touching base with my prior professional history.

The second narrative acts as a bridge between my former life in London and my new life working in a regional polytechnic in Aotearoa-New Zealand, as well as a bridge in the thesis from methodology to the analytical chapters.

Imaginative: Two of the stories are written in more purely imaginative genres. The prologue personifies the polytechnic sector as a person undergoing a counselling session – it sets the scene of the neoliberal polytechnic. Narrative 7 speaks through the voice of the typical letter used in the polytechnic sector to advise staff that their jobs are at risk. The final narrative 10 is imaginary in a different sense – it is more like a thought experiment, describing a counter-narrative set in an imagined future in which Māori education policy works otherwise than as at present.

The 'narrative turn' in social research has included Russian formalism and post-formalism such as in the work of Bakhtin. Other more recent catalysts are from new criticism, structuralism, and hermeneutics (Czarniawska-Joerges, 2004; Polkinghorne, 1988). What these influences share is an interest in text, not in the author's intentions. Narratives can also function to break open the grand narrative of philosophical humanism and expose the obscene underbelly of 'benign' ethnocentrism: the almost invisible discourses that speak about the indigenous as 'modernising' or 'underdeveloped' or 'premodern' people. Narratives in research help keep alive the question of a 'good life' and the 'good society' (Czarniawska-Joerges, 2004, p. 13). Narratives can open a different trajectory since all narrative experience has a teleology. Narratives are powerful for breaking the normative narrative, to complicate and create doubt in the normative view (Rollock, 2012).

Narratives contrast the subject of homo economicus against homo fabulans (Boje, 2001). There are, according to Boje, a number of narratives (p. 1-5) and 'telling stories' of organisations that disrupt the totalisation of hegemony and give human voice to everyday life under neoliberal policies. These are stories of dissent, of those whose voice is redacted when the policy is produced to provide consensus for the norms. Thematic analysis and taxonomic classifications run counter to the purpose of narration, which is messy, in the process of becoming, and often undoing. These strategies have informed the original narratives in this thesis.

A deconstructive approach is not fixed but moves through 'networks of embedded meaning' of which the analyst is part. In a grand narrative approach, the normative view and monological linear story is shattered by replacing the grand narrative with challenges to its hegemony. Stories often involve a hero, the 'man' who saves the day, which in a polytechnic is often represented as the CEO or a senior person. In micro-stories such a hierarchical assumption is upended to show, like its counterpart micro-politics, a multivocal story of the 'little people'. The 'story network' idea is that a polytechnic or policy unit is constantly creating stories as part of the medium of exchange. It foregrounds those stories and opens them to critical analysis. Intertextual analysis of stories brings forward the polyphony of contradictory voices; a plurality rather than one dominant voice. Stories offer an alternative to causal fields by mapping how stories create or produce norms. The purpose is to disrupt the simple causal linear reading of policy. Ricoeur's theory of emplotment posits that the most basic questions are 'who am I?' and 'how should I live?'

Ethical considerations

The entire process of educational research is soaked with ethicality, and this chapter has dealt throughout with ethics as a philosophical enterprise, and as an axiological framework for decision-making in research. Given that this study includes a set of interviews, it also involves standard interview research ethics of voluntary and informed participation, and protection of privacy, both individual and institutional. Prior to undertaking the interviews, formal ethics approval was obtained from UAHPEC, the University of Auckland Human Participation and Ethics Committee. Ethics approval for this project was granted by UAHPEC because I completed the interviews during my period of confirmed thesis enrolment at that university, prior to transferring to AUT in 2017.

Autobiographical details used in writing research narratives invariably include other people, which necessitates the consideration of 'relational ethics' (Ellis, 2007). The final sub-section, below, returns to the ethical issue of relating to Māori in conducting research on a Māori topic in education research. The researcher's motivations for the study, and the research questions

that are asked, are part of considering how to conduct research in an ethical manner. Familiar in education research are "[d]iverse experiences, issues and persistent questions about Māori and Pākehā relations" (Barnes, 2013, p. 25). Questions to consider, for non-Māori scholars, throughout this study include:

- How are relationships being cared for?
- Who will benefit from this research?
- Is the researcher reflexive, self-critical, aware of Eurocentric power, able to listen?
- Is there a commitment to Māori wellbeing and success?

Protection of privacy

The process of finding interview participants through my own professional networks, and the small size of the polytechnic sector in Aotearoa-New Zealand, made it inevitable that I would already know most of the interviewees. These factors add to the rationale of removing all identifying details during the process of editing the interview transcripts. The identity of each interview participant has been further thoroughly anonymised by incorporating the interview quotes that appear in this thesis into original fictionalised narratives, written to showcase key points about the process of operationalising policy for Māori equity in polytechnics.

Informed and voluntary participation

Each interview participant received an information sheet with details about the research, early in the recruitment process, and an invitation to ask questions before committing to be interviewed. The conditions of participation allowed the interviewees to withdraw their information from the study, without giving a reason, before a certain date. Interview transcripts were returned to participants for checking before use.

In the interview process the researcher can be said to 'hold the power'. The topic under investigation is Māori equity, and Māori participants voluntarily took part, which entails an ethical and cultural dimension. As the researcher, I am personally responsible for ensuring the results of this study benefit the interviewees and their people.

Relational ethics

Narrative research is subject to the same ethical considerations as other more well-established qualitative research methods. I take responsibility as the researcher for protecting the privacy of the people who appear as characters in my narratives, by fictionalizing names and other identifying features. Narrative research is relational in that the narrative data reflect interpersonal connections with others, requiring the researcher to take responsibility for one's actions and decisions in the research, and the consequences thereof. Hence, ethical considerations arise that do not sit neatly under traditional procedural research ethics (Ellis, 2007). Taking care of relationships that are beyond the research "recognizes and values mutual respect, dignity, and connectedness between researcher and researched" (Ellis, 2007, p. 4).

Relating to Māori

This study is motivated by the perceived unfairness of institutional life in polytechnics as experienced by Māori students and staff (as well as other non-dominant ethnicities). During the process of planning and developing my study, on five occasions I met with and received guidance from the Tikanga Committee of my employer institution. Despite the fact that no contact with Māori students is included, this research is undertaken in a spirit of partnership with Māori – an aspiration to partnership that is imagined as the beating heart of Te Tiriti o Waitangi (Yukich, 2018). This research aims to benefit Māori students, and hence the wider Māori community served by polytechnics.

I end this section with a narrative that bridges my past life in the UK with my life in Aotearoa-New Zealand. This narrative illustrates how simple policy ideas interact with the lives of Māori and non-Māori in unpredictable ways. Narratives enable and liberate the voices that are unheard because they do not form part of the official story, out of the colonising gaze (Moewaka Barnes & McCreanor, 2019).

Story 4: Different, but the same

Part I:

The rain poured down as I ran to the library building and paused under the shelter of its eaves. It was my first month working as a senior manager in a regional polytechnic in Aotearoa-New Zealand. Like many before me, I had made my way here from metropolitan London for my own reasons. The rain reminded me of London, yet was not quite the same. I was on my way to my first formal meeting as a senior manager to investigate an alleged staff impropriety. The meeting included the staff member, their union representative, and the HR director. I had read a report about the incident, a police complaint of speeding in a polytechnic vehicle. The police were not pressing charges but had felt the need to bring it to our attention.

The rain fell harder and drummed on the tin roof in an unfamiliar rhythm. The air was warm and tropical, with the scent of strange flowers. I sneezed in reaction - I was an alien. It was late in the day and most people had vacated the premises, leaving me staring at an empty quad. It was a most peculiar feeling: in London there were always people, and the rain was cold - or was it the people? I gathered my thoughts and despite having dealt with many such incidents in the past, a nervous knot formed in my stomach, threatening to cramp my style. A break in the rain appeared and I ran, arriving without getting excessively wet. The others were already there, waiting for me.

The staff member was a student I already knew, to whom I had given a part-time job, since he was struggling to pay for his family as well as his studies - not an uncommon occurrence. In polytechnics, like all second-tier tertiary education institutions, the core business was giving students a helping hand, to raise their aspirations and realise their human capital in work-related qualifications, so the government could be relieved of the need to give them handouts. But human capital theory bears little or no likeness to the realities and hardships of life for second-chance learners.

The rain started again, hammering a more regular beat in the already-dank conditions of a poor old building showing the effects of years of neglect. As I would later come to learn, the

poor condition of the building was another harsh reality of over twenty years of tertiary reform.

After the formalities and a discussion about the process, I started the formal questions: "So, Hohepa, do you want to tell me what happened?" After a bit of hesitation Hohepa explained the event, and then he angrily let spill: "But the only reason I'm here is 'cause I'm brown - and you should understand that!"

The room went quiet and in a split second a whole raft of experiences, like the rain outside, pelted down in my head. How could I not understand, when I had been in so many similar situations before? Whatever he meant, I connected with it – though in a disjunctive way, because how could our experiences be similar? But somehow, I felt a connection.

"I think you are right, Hohepa. I think that's true and I am sure it would have passed off without incident had you not been Māori."

The Pākehā union representative and the HR director looked taken aback. I continued - "So I'm inclined to ask you if you were speeding, and if you were, that we ask you not to again in the future, because you put people at risk if you do speed, and we treat this as an informal warning." He admitted to speeding and agreed to the sanction. The formal meeting ended.

 It was still raining outside, and we were all stuck inside awkwardly together. Hohepa raised his voice above the rain and looked my way, "Thanks, bro - I knew you'd understand." He walked off, followed by a silent union representative. The HR director, for what I assumed were very different reasons, said "That was great, well done." I stepped outside, back into the wet, but this time I did not seek the protection of the eaves – there was too much to consider here, and the rain washed over me unnoticed.

   Part II:
It was another warm day, and I felt a sense of sleepy lethargy as I walked through the grounds of the polytechnic. I heard Ana calling out to me. "You got a minute?" she said in a tight, tense voice. "Yeah sure, what's up?" It was clear Ana was troubled, and she asked to go to my office

as she wanted to talk in private. It was unusual to see her like this and I wondered what it could be about.

Ana was a Māori tutor teaching on the social services degree. She was extremely committed and had a very open-minded attitude to life. She always challenged things in a light-hearted yet serious way. She was pleasant company and we often talked between duties. This was the first time she had asked to speak to me in my office, so I thought it must be something serious. I was in a rush, but I made the time - we were friends, after all.

As we walked through the senior manager's floor and entered my office, I took on a more formal tone. "What can I do for you, Ana?"

"Nothing really, I just wanted to talk to you, I thought you might understand?"

"Understand what?"

Ana explained that the staff in Social Services were drawing up their timetables and deciding who would teach which courses. Ana was the only Māori lecturer in social services at the time, and I found it interesting that she chose to have an office away from the rest of the team. I never asked her why, but I suspected she felt isolated in the department, despite being a confident and well-respected tutor.

"I was so annoyed that the tutors in the team did not see fit to assign me to teach on the Treaty of Waitangi part of the curriculum! I know Susan (a Pakeha teacher) is committed and really does care, but just to dismiss my experience, when they know many of the Māori students turn to me for advice on matters Māori. It felt like being colonised all over again."

In a flash I remembered another Māori tutor on the same course several years earlier, who had raised a similar question about another incident. He had come to see me about complaints by Pākehā students over his dividing the classes into Māori and non-Māori student groups for the Treaty workshops. He was distressed that these students had taken it to the Human Rights Commission, calling it an act of racism. He had spoken to several managers

about it and had a positive supportive response, but he remained despondent. When he came to me and I reacted with disbelief and anger that someone could see this as discrimination, he seemed to calm down. He told me some time later that I was the only one who reacted so emotionally and angrily. He was more upset by the fact that several managers he spoke to seemed to see it as unimportant and said it was nothing to worry about.

I asked Ana what she wanted me to do but she answered she did not know; again, it was the feeling of being dismissed that mattered most, rather than something that broke the policies. It was self-determination that mattered to her, not just addressing the 'issues' faced by Māori, of which she had first-hand experience. She left my office with unresolved feelings, saying as she got up to leave, "you understand, doesn't it drive you up the wall?" She left me to wonder what I could have done, other than listen. I reflected on my inside-outsider status with feelings of impotence.

Chapter Three: History of the New Zealand Polytechnic Sector

In this chapter I trace the term 'techne' from its Greek origins, which gave the concept overtones that it retains to this day. The concept is examined through the ideas of Aristotle, Heidegger and Foucault. The liberal philosophers of the 19th century introduced a form of social demarcation between 'civilised' and 'non-civilised' which lent legitimacy to colonisation and the characterisation of Maori as 'uncivilised' and therefore not appropriate subjects for the same kind of education as Europeans. Technical education went through various formulations, strongly influenced by the two world wars, and later, the massification of higher education, but the polytechnics developed as part of a centrally co-ordinated system of formal education aimed at the public good. The modern Aotearoa-New Zealand education system originates in colonialist theories as espoused by, among others, Edward Gibbon Wakefield (1796-1862).

Wakefield was an important colonial influence on the new settler colonies, because of his systematic theory of colonisation and his direct influence on various settler states, especially Australia, Canada and New Zealand. His work on colonisation and settler colonialism played an important role in influencing two of the most important intellectual voices of the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill (D. Bell, 2010) and Marx (Marx, 1990). He developed his theories whilst in Newgate Prison for the attempted abduction of the daughter of a wealthy family, where Wakefield found himself in the company of prisoners to be transported to Australia. It was here he developed his theory of colonisation and settler colonialism. Wakefield's key argument was that the state should put a price on land – high enough to force people arriving in the colonies into wage labour until they could save enough to buy land for themselves. This kept wage prices lower and ensured labour for the new colonies. It established a vigorous settler colonialism. His ideas proved influential and, for a considerable time, were largely adopted by the British government (Harvey, 2010).

A broader perspective on institutions in colonialism has revealed that access in colonies to dense existing populations and rich resources led to bad institutions. As a result, economic exploitation was achieved through tax and rents. New colonial sites that were bleaker and poorer places, where population and resources were small or hard to exploit, were given enabling institutions in an attempt to encourage European emigration (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2002). A range of labour institutions developed – with extreme coercion at one end to free labour at the other. These institutions of labour production included slavery, indentured servitude, apprenticeships, free labour and their associated educational institutions. Wakefield was key in developing the latter.

The importance of Wakefield will be fully developed later in this chapter but, from the outset, he established the importance of labour to capital, of Anglo-Saxon immigration which was held to be in every way superior (Wakefield, 1849, p. 28), to the colonies and the need for technical skilled labour and its dependence of new technologies for capitalist interests. The complex interplay between technology, technical skills and economic enterprise are not new concerns. Since the development of liberal democracy, capitalism's central aim of economic growth (or progress) has been tied to emergent technologies (e.g., steam, electrification, micro-processor, digital, bio-genetic) and, in turn, the emergent technologies required a new set of skills to operate the new industrial technology to drive growth. Although the Franco-British wars meant that growth was not as substantial as expected in the industrial revolution (J. G. Williamson, 1984). Most growth was, in fact, not a result of capital accumulation but worker productivity (Feinstein & Pollard, 1988).

Humanity's relationship to new technologies, techniques, and the manufacture of tools (which derives from the Latin for hand- manus), is as old as humanity, for example the stone, iron and bronze ages, and has come to define artefactual culture and consequentially technical development. For example, the long-standing racist Pakeha notion of Māori as 'good with their hands' aligns with the belief that Māori are inherently better suited to technical education than academic education (G. Stewart, 2014).

Technology, and technical education share a root in the ancient Greek notion of *technê*. A better understanding of the etymology and genealogy of technê will reveal an important

philosophical contribution to our common assumptions about technical education. The philosophical exposition of technê will undergird the historical account of technical education at the end of this chapter.

Technê, technology, and technical education

Technê is a wide-ranging term that covers several meanings but appears prominently in the myths and philosophies of the Ancient Greeks. It is a term found in some of the earliest Ancient Greek works including Hesiod and Homer, where it is fundamentally presented as a contingent, opportune and enterprising practical form of know-how. It is associated with Athena, the armed goddess, but also the goddess of arts and crafts (technê) and Hephaestus whom Hesiod describes as "skilled in crafts [*technēisi*] more than all the sons" (Hesiod, 2004; 928). Homer's description of Odysseus' deception with the Trojan Horse is also considered technê (Nooter, 2019, p. 38). According to Aristotle, technê "… is a state involving true reason concerned with production" (Aristotle, 2011, p. 89). The overall character of technê was captured well by Agamben who was describing and extending Foucault's notion of a dispositif as "a set of practices and mechanism … that aim to face an urgent need to obtain an effect that is … immediate" (Agamben, 2009, pp. 3-6). All of these share a sense in which technê is associated with the contingent, opportune, production-craftsmanship and know-how as a way of truly knowing.

Technological change has always been part of human development and in early tool culture (Johnson, 2013), where it was said to transform our relationship equally to nature, culture and subjectivity. However, technê and its cognates have not received much critical attention and this, in part, has been because The Enlightenment, positivism, and Anglo-American empiricism have seen technological change as part of the fundamental notion of scientific progress that they unproblematically conceive as beneficial (Scharff & Dusek, 2014). Instead the enlightenment focussed on the immutable and universal which they saw in epistemology, rather than in technê – the contingent and opportune. The implication for philosophy, particularly continental philosophy, was to question these assumptions and recover a sense of technê as a form of truly knowing that was other to episteme, and accepted its contingent

and opportune character (Campagna, 2018; Derrida, 2005a, 2016; Heidegger, 1977; Marx, 1990; Plotnitsky, 1994; Stiegler, 1994).

Technê in myth and philosophy

Technê is defined as a form of knowledge, which means know-how in; a familiarity which grounds all its acts in the fabrication and producing of something which it has intimate knowledge of (Heidegger, 1977). It is craft, art and technique and gave birth to the cognates, technology (technê-logos), technical and technique.

Technê gets its most telling description in Ancient Greece in the story of Prometheus, where its key characteristics are displayed. The story of Prometheus does not have only one version either; in Protagoras we have a philosophical exposition of the story, in Hesiod, Prometheus takes the role of trickster and Aeschylus he is a tragic hero. Prometheus was said to have fashioned (technê) humanity from clay. Humanity is itself the product of technê. All these characterisations are important to the meaning of technê because technê is a philosophic form of knowing, a cunning ploy, deeply subject producing, of economic value and a class marker as I will show (Vernant, 2006).

As Plato (1973) recounts in the dialogue, Protagoras, the gods had given birth to the mortal races and the twin brothers, Prometheus (forethought) and his brother Epimetheus (afterthought) were tasked with giving each mortal race its skills, abilities, or qualities (*dynameis*) so that each has an equal chance of survival. Early in Greek mythic literature is a nascent idea of technê that is perhaps a proto form of (human–animal) capital; the skill, ability and characteristics of the mortal races (including animals) have profound implications for the welfare of the mortal race.

Epimetheus convinces Prometheus to leave him the task of handing out the skills and abilities to all the animals; however, due to a lack of planning, he runs out of abilities and skills by the time he finally gets to humans. This leaves the humans naked and exposed, *lacking* any inner essence, they are a blank slate. This is another early reference to human nature as learned that Locke develops in the pre-enlightenment. To make up for this fault, Prometheus, the

tragic hero-Titan, steals fire from Olympus which he is forbidden to do and for which he pays a heavy price.

Prometheus gives humanity the means to make fire, the wisdom of technê; Prometheus' gift of fire symbolises art, technology and civilisation (technê). Prometheus, in an attempt to make up for Epimetheus's fault, through providing man with fire he gives man the ability (through a supplementary *dynameis*)*,* to an endless source of invention of prosthetic invention – technê-logos (Stiegler, 1994).

This invention is of culture and civilisation itself, the production of identity through technê, making it an opportune and contingent replacement for the originary fault of Epimetheus. As such, artefactual culture, technological 'progress', instrumental knowledge, and the art of the polis (government) precipitates the division of labour and the rise of the urban city. Fire is conceived as lifting humanity into civilisation. The social contract theorists of the Enlightenment drew on the idea of a civilising force that lifts humanity from necessity.

For his deception, Prometheus is chained to a desolate precipice in the Caucasus Mountains. Hephaestus, the master craftsman, reluctantly fabricates unbreakable adamantine chains. Every night an eagle descends and feasts on Prometheus' liver. Everyday his liver grows back and so the punishment is repeated day and night (Aeschylus, 1973).

In the *Nicomachean Ethics,* Aristotle presents one of the most systematic expositions of technê, juxtaposing it against different forms of knowledge (Aristotle, 2011, 1139b). In turn, this juxtaposition allows for an insight into the contemporary policy discourse on equity as a form of technê, where technê is a rational quality concerned with creating, or making, a poesis (the activity in which a person brings something into being that did not exist before), that truly reasons (Aristotle, 2011, 1140a). The other forms in Aristotle's system included episteme (knowledge), phronesis (judgement), sophia (wisdom) and nous (intellect). Episteme combined with nous to form the basis of rationality and sophia and phronesis to form the basis of virtue and conduct. Technê is part of the system of reasoning but stands alone.

Technê has come to be translated as craft, art, skills and/or technique in modern educational discourse; it formed the basis of technical education as skills and technology, as the drivers of capitalist growth and progress. But, this simple translation of technical education as craft or skill, fails to capture its philosophical roots. Whilst technê is the activities and skills of the craftsman, it is also the name of the arts of the mind. Heidegger expanded on Aristotle's account of technê beyond equating it with technology (which I would extend to include technical education) as, not a simplistic idea of the impact of technology, but as a way of being. The focus is not so much the craft but what it reveals.

> *Technē* is a mode of *alethēuein* [getting at truth]. It reveals whatever does not bring itself forth and does not yet lie before us, whatever can look and turn out now one way and now another. Thus what is decisive in *technē* does not lie at all in making and manipulating nor in the using of means, but rather in the aforementioned revealing. (Heidegger, 1977, p. 13)

If we apply the Heideggerian sense of technê to policy, then we can make an important distinction; techne as the craft (skills development linked to technology) and as management by numbers (technical manipulation) or technê as truly revealing something – what does it say and reveal about what use we put the art to?

Technê in its sense relating to a truth that speaks of potentiality ('it reveals whatever does not bring itself...'), about how we see the world and how the world becomes known. Combining this idea with Foucault's notion of governmentality, it adds a dimension to how the governing reveals a mentality. Heidegger introduced the notion of enframing (*Ge-stell*) to help understand technê as revealing. The verb 'stellen' (to place or set) has many meanings but Heidegger was particularly interested in its use in a military context to challenge, or engage, which he saw as fundamental and he used it to mean to call forth, or to set upon. But he linked this notion back to technê:

> It should preserve the suggestion of another stellen from which it stems, namely, that producing and presenting [*Her- und Dar-Stellen*] which, in the sense of poiesis, lets what presences come forth into unconcealment. (Heidegger, 1977, p. 21)

Technê is poiētic unconcealment; to make a different world is to know it differently. This has a number of important implications for both the function of neoliberalism and resisting neoliberalism. Underlying, In many ways, poiētic unconcealment as technê, is a shifting perception as the means by which to critique and question the world. Thus, aesthetics is

central to technê as poiētic unconcealment. We must change the 'frame', change the perspective which, in turn, will lead to a different understanding of the world.

Poiēsis has two trajectories: autopoiēsis (self-producing) and allopoiēsis (re-producing or the creation of the other). These two trajectories are intimately entwined in the domain of technê; technê sets out to create what nature finds is impossible to achieve (Guattari, 2018, p. 145). It is in this sense that technê sets itself up between nature and humanity as a creative mediation. Technê is concerned with the why but how it is achieved is largely through the machinic (Guattari, 2018). In the contemporary world there is a focus on the technicity of technê, its instrumentalisation as technology and technical education, ignoring its mission to unveil the truth.

Techne and deception

An important element of technê in the Ancient Greek myth is its relation and association to apatê, deception and lies (from the god Apatê). In the *Iliad* we recounted the deception of Odysseus through the construction of the Trojan horse that led to the defeat of the Trojans. But it is in the infidelity of Aphrodite, Hephaestus' wife, that technê got its association with deception or ruse. The story captures the modern sense of technê, being *crafty***.**

In the myth, Helios informs Hephaestus that Aphrodite is cheating on him with Ares, the god of war. Hephaestus was the master craftsmen and had taught men the arts alongside Athene. However, he was lame footed and a cripple, gruff and ugly, and known for his grumpiness despite his talents (technê). Aphrodite was quite literally irresistible and enchanting and had countless affairs. Ares was strong, fast and the god of war, known for his handsome complexion.

Hephaestus got to work in laying a trap for the lovers. He forged an unbreakable bronze net, which he secretly attached to his bed. Pretending to depart for Lemnos, the lovers took advantage of his absence, and made for his bedroom where they were ensnared by the bronze net. The next morning, Hephaestus called all the other gods to see the naked and entrapped lovers.

Ill deeds thrive not. The slow catches the swift; even as now Hephaestus, slow though he is, has outstripped Ares for all that he is swiftest of all the gods who hold Olympus. Lame though he is, he has caught him by craft [*technēisi*]. (Homer, 2016, 8.329-32)

In the exposition of rhetoric, we have another example of the cunning nature of technê, from its other property of rule setting or method (Aristotle, 2019). Books on rhetoric were often referred to as *rhêtorikai technai* as was Aristotle's. They were examples of model speeches to be learned. Technê was depicted as connected to the senses and not the underlying philosophic and mathematical nature of 'true' reality of ideal forms (Plato, 1973). Rhetoric was an example of lesser knowledge, contingent, and one that lacked value or understanding of the good life. Rhetoric was considered useless without the deeper knowledge to understand the limited value of rhetoric (Plato, 1971). Thus, technê was often depicted as contingent, opportune (*kairos*) and limited to know-how. It was not practical knowledge (phronesis) or reason either, rather it could be depicted as a middle term: *theoria-technê-praxis,* where technê is not considered inferior.

Technê and economic enterprise

The generation of economic value was an important aspect of the role of technê in the Ancient world. The skill of the artist turns raw material into something of value. Within the development of the city states and urban works, the value of art was diminished and overtaken by technology and technical know-how. But in all these senses, technê was artefact and primarily cultural, distinct from nature and the eternal laws. Any visit to an archaeological museum reminds a nation of the central role of culture to a sense of nationhood and/or belonging through artefact.

In Aristotle, technê was largely seen as craft, where craft was wide-ranging to include state craft – politics – and was largely, but not exclusively, valued for what it produced. But if in modern terms what is produced is commodified, then what happens to memories, history and culture when the use-value is commodified beyond use? What happens to those histories? Does history end up being a commodity?

Technê can be contrasted with epistêmê, a closely related term which was predominantly used to describe the permanent, immutable universe and has been translated as knowledge (scientific). By extension, in education, technical education was associated with product and latterly as commodity or result, and episteme with knowledge. In metaphysical terms, it can be expressed as "the opposition between the infinite and finite, the transcendental and empirical, *logos* and *technê*, from and matter" (Beardsworth, 1998, p. 73).

Technê and subjectivity

One of the most important elements of technê is its relation to subjectivity; if humans are the entity without essence, technê, through artefactual culture, makes up for this lack. Technê, in the story of Prometheus, has already been implicated in humanity's lack of essence through the fault of Epimetheus (Stiegler, 1994). Building on this notion, the verb form of technê, *teuchein*, means to fabricate, to make or construct. In crafts, arts, and technology, humanity constructs, but the relationship of what we construct to the fabricator is not straightforward when the state of humanity is without essence. The object is not drawn from some inner depth as humanity has no essence. Furthermore, in the noun form, *teuchos*, as tool or instrument; the relationship of the tool or instrument is something often construed as something extra-human or external but what if the tool/instrument is an intrusion and intimately tied to who we become? (Braidotti, 2013).

The prosthetic nature of technê would reflect a fundamental mis/understanding of humanity's relationship to technology as something outside, or after the fact (afterthought), or as a foreign body (Derrida, 1995). But technê (especially in the form of technology) is an intimate intrusion entangled into our existence, not prior to or after it, but whose boundaries are not clear. Our existence is crafted in relation to ourselves the world and others. Technê is a bodily-worldly-other entanglement. Artefactual cultures create histories, belonging, and identities (and fill our museums).

Technê, as the product of craft, has significant implications about culture, memory and forgetting – and therefore subjectivity. Man tries to make up for the lack of essence through the construction of artefactual culture, using fire. Thus, man is defined by artefact, and artefact is organised inorganic matter that acts as an aide-memoir, thus placing the product

of technê as inseparable from culture. For Stiegler, the technical is not only a tool, or machine, or some scientific-technical standard, it is the invention of the human: "the evolution of the living by other means than life" (Stiegler, 1994, p. 188). In short, Stiegler implies that, for policy and our context, without the artefacts, no memory of past would be possible and there would be nothing to support the invention of the future. The technical is memory and history, through Epimetheus' forgetfulness, and carries culture. The technical is fundamentally a play of wilful forgetting, the non-performative performative or the thing we know that we do not want to know, as in the case of Prometheus, whose forethought was ignored by himself. Culture is intimately tied to technê, no matter how hard we try to forget. Stiegler reminds us of that wilful forgetting of the original forgetting.

Technê and the division of labour

In ancient Greece, technê became a marker of societal structure, a marker of class. From at least the time of Solon (630-530 BCE), society was marked by distinct classes. Artisans, *moira technigouras,* made up a distinct class in the census. The status of the artisan was likely at its pinnacle in the Homeric age but probably declined thereafter (Vernant, 2006). Artisans formed guilds or brotherhoods in Homer's time producing goods of artistic value or luxury items – they split with other types of technical producers who were associated with utilitarian goods. They, in turn, were split from those technicians who laboured with their hands or who were good with their hands, *cheirotechnês*, manual labourers and those who laboured through skilled work.

Labour stratification was always part of the work of technê and an important aspect of this was class stratification. Technê encapsulated both the creative and productive elements involved with technology but the people who filled these roles were largely banausic, that is related to technical work and considered lacking in seriousness. Cheirotechnês, as we have already said, related to physical work involving the hands. It was largely associated with degrading oppression from ancient times (but notably also included the medical profession). Terms such as 'idle hands are the devil's workshop', the invisible hand of the market, handy idea, manufacture, hands-on approach all appeal and rest on a hierarchical model of work that acknowledges technology as progress but pays little attention to technology as

oppression. Arendt (1998) also explored technê in relation to "the labour of our body and the work of our hands", pressing the distinction in terms of labour and work.

> Locke's distinction between working hands and a labouring body is somewhat reminiscent of the ancient Greek distinction between the cheirotechnes.… Contempt for laboring, originally arising out of a passionate striving for freedom from necessity and a no less passionate impatience with every effort that left no trace, no monument, no great work worthy of remembrance.… Because men were dominated by the necessities of life, they could win their freedom only through the domination of those whom they subjected to necessity by force. (Arendt, 1998, pp. 80-84)

The exploitative nature of cheirotechnês and the discursive practice of portraying the oppressed with representations focussed on kinaesthetic metaphors continues to betray the underlying subject positions. For example, the focus of technical education and the kinaesthetic, 'good with their hands', etc., maps with over-representation of Māori in technical education and under-representation in academic education (G. Stewart, 2014) should be no surprise as it derives from a long history of labour subjugation that has subsequently mapped on to indigenous people; these were defined through settler-colonial and enlightenment lenses that valued and associated science, high culture and urban development with Anglo-Saxon destiny and the non-European with base crass brutality (Eze, 1997).

Many indigenous societies' confrontation with colonialism did not even raise indigenous people to the labouring classes – hence the slave trade and the rise of management science were 'instrumental' in the production of difference (Roediger & Esch, 2012). Liberalism came to seize upon the heritage of technical education. Firstly, technê is a form of knowing associated with doing as producing. As such, technê:

> … was not concerned with the necessity and eternal a priori truths of the cosmos, nor with the a posteriori contingencies and exigencies of ethics and politics. … Moreover, this was a kind of knowledge associated with people who were bound to necessity. That is, techne was chiefly operative in the domestic sphere, in farming and slavery, and not in the free realm of the Greek polis. (Young, 2009, p. 190)

Capitalism, colonialism and the condition of liberalism

The practice of liberal government, particularly, in the 19th and 20th centuries was characterised with biopolitics (and biopower) (Foucault, 1979) and disciplinary power (Foucault, 1995) which were even put into effect through a liberal governmentality (Foucault, 2008, 2009). The two 'techniques' were deployed for the administration of populations in the emergence of the modern state: discipline at the micro-physics of the individual body and biopolitics at the statistical regulatory level of the population, the body politic. They worked together in unison as complementary forces.

The liberal administration of the state brought together the introduction of an emergent democracy which worked through a 'way of life', and populations were managed by this way of life. Biopower, as a productive power, employed population measures to normalise activity, whereas discipline acted on individuals through training and self-scrutiny. Biopower was a power that:

> … has to quantify, measure, appraise, and hierarchise … a normalising society is the historical outcome of a technology of power centred on life. (Foucault, 1979, p. 144)

The enlightenment assumption of progress led to 'increasing demands' for democracy and freedom, combined with the capitalist promise of wealth accumulation presented as an obligation of the state to continuously improve the living conditions for all its people (equality and justice). Hence, slogans such as 'liberty, equality and fraternity', the US declaration of independence, suffrage movements such as those of the suffragettes, increased the demands for equality and started to be realised through legislation such as the Slave Trade Act 1807, the Reform Act 1832 and increased voting franchise, etc. The 1848 revolutions demanding more democratic government broke out widely across Europe. Yet colonialism and settler colonialism continued to express a sovereign authority to kill, exploit, demand and confiscate the lives of the colonised.

Governments, in response, largely started moving towards greater democracy and the semblance of equality and began to systematically measure improvements and how they were adding value to people. One consequence of the attempt to systematically improve conditions for life was how they conceived of the internal 'other' and the external 'other'.

This led to the 'necessary' divisions and stratifications of population into the productive and non-productive, through production of difference – the mad, the lazy (who eventually got their own label, the *underclass*), the weak, the undeserving, the dependent, etc. (Foucault, 2003; Foucault, Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991). They were the unworthy parts of the population and needed scrutiny and were defined as needing retraining – they were different. The non-European other was produced by a governmentality that racialised the difference in a set of binary values that led to exploitation, on a global scale, of large swathes of the world's populations, based on how they were classified.

This structuration or mode of administration created a whole separate bureaucracy of state institutions that, over time, administered the disciplinary and bio-capital practices through a liberal governmentality. The racialisation of the other through biopower characterised the defence of colonial sovereign authority to wage war, exploit, kill, jail, and politically supress the other through a discourse of racialisation.

In colonialism, the British government had to marry the two operations generating wealth and the semblance of equality and justice (and producing new differences) to maintain legitimacy. The discourse of liberal democracy was political, economic and a moral discourse. The promise of wealth in material and social progress inevitably led to a system of differences, including a class system. But in the colonial encounter, difference took on a racist overtone.

Colonial discourse allowed for the expression of the two operations of liberalism: wealth accumulation and the production of incommensurable difference. The radical separation of race allowed for the exploitation of other countries' raw materials, labour and markets. Under the guise of the improvement of the racialised other who, left to their own devices, lived wretched lives rarely rising above subsistence, programmes of paternalistic government or exploitation were both justified.

Inherent differences had developed from plantation management systems from the North Atlantic slave trade. The development of the factory in colonial and industrial age developed plantation management systems into generic management systems:

By gathering the workers under one roof, and subordinating them to one discipline, the new industrial employers were … adapting the plantation model. (Blackburn, 1997, p. 565)

A nascent management science emerged that produced difference and a hierarchy that exploited labour and the response of labour movements (Blackburn, 1997; Rancière, 2012; Roediger & Esch, 2012). Even the fact that management was attributed as a science was part of that production of difference and the ordering system. Management science appealed to epistêmê, the a priori, eternal truths that were entrusted largely to the privileged and European white discourse. Philosophy as epistêmê, was a European innovation and uniquely suited to them. Management was associated with whiteness or European middle-class privilege and, as such, had human capital of intellect, and science, associated with epistêmê that made them uniquely suited to ruling over the 'other' – what some have called civilisational racism (Scheurich & Young, 1997). Kant, Hume, Locke, Bentham and, to a lesser extent, Mill, all expressed variants of this rationale in clear racialised discourse (Eze, 1997; Mills, 1997).

Enlightenment thinkers argued Europe was the pinnacle of civilisation. They argued that indigenous people had neither reason nor philosophy (Dabashi, 2015) but lived in a state of nature and where they had no property rights because they had no notions of private property (Schacherreiter, 2014; Turner, 1999b). Liberal policy and institutions encapsulated the inferior view of non-European people. In this sense, uncultivated lands were seen as free lands. In Aotearoa-New Zealand, when the British parliamentary committee declared a tax on all uncultivated land and that any unpaid taxes could lead to confiscation and buy-up schemes, this led to massive land grabs from Māori to settler. As the parliamentary records show, there was awareness of the consequences as, Robert Bruce, New Zealand Member of Parliament, 1885, who was speaking against the Native Land Court bill, put it:

I believe we could not devise a more ingenious method of destroying the whole of the Māori race than by these (land) Courts. The natives come from the villages in the interior, and have to hang about sometimes for months in our centres of population . . . They are brought into contact with the lowest classes of society, and are exposed to temptation, and the result is that a great number contract our diseases and die . . . (New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, 1885, p. 515)

The explicit assumptions of racial hierarchy were part of normalised European/Pākehā thinking (Belich, 1996). Alienating Māori from their history and their local ancestral connections was the beginning of industrial urbanisation that would move and dislocate Māori as an intentional policy of 'civilising' Māori through getting them into 'work with their hands'.

From early modernity to the colony of New Zealand

Early modernity (circa 1450s-1789) laid some important foundations for liberal nation-states that provide important background assumptions to the colonisation of Aotearoa. In the 1630s, Descartes (2008) provided a foundation to philosophy based on reason. The Age of Reason rejected the scholastic school of philosophy that preceded it and emancipated reason from religious explanation.

The peace of Westphalia in 1648 established the notion of a nation-state as one that exercised supreme authority within its boundaries of territory. Two important political implications followed and have since been enshrined in United Nations proclamations: the principle of territorial integrity and the exclusion of external actors.

In 1642, Abel Tasman, a Dutch navigator, was the first European to become aware of the South Pacific Island that became New Zealand. This marked the beginning of European interest in Aotearoa-New Zealand that accelerated after the circulation of James Cook's accounts of Aotearoa-New Zealand in the late 18th century. From the 1790s onwards, Aotearoa was visited largely by British, French and American whaling and trading ships.

On the 6th of February in 1840, many Māori tribes signed the Treaty of Waitangi that arguably established the claims of the British Crown to 'governorship' of New Zealand'. This initiated the largely British colonisation of Aotearoa. In 1852, New Zealand achieved nominal independence through the passing of the New Zealand Constitution Act. This was consolidated and extended in 1857 beyond the nominal status invoked in 1852. In 1907, the 'Colony of New Zealand' became the 'Dominion of New Zealand' but failed to gain autonomy over foreign affairs. The Governor-General was still appointed by Britain and was the sole

representative of New Zealand to the empire. It was not until the Statute of Westminster Act 1931 and the Statute of Westminster adoption Act in 1947 that New Zealand gained authority over its international affairs. Finally, the Constitution Act of 1986, at the beginning of the neoliberal reform period, revoked all residual legislative power of the United Kingdom.

Britain was motivated to colonise Aotearoa to increase its power over other empires, particularly France. Aotearoa also had large amounts of land and resources and, as Britain was becoming overcrowded, it offered an opportunity to offload populations through colonisation (Novitz & Willmott, 1989). Mineral and gold deposits further attracted British colonists. Britain's population rose from about 16 million in 1801 to 26 million by 1841. The riches made from capitalism, colonialism and industrialisation also deprived many of a subsistence existence from land through the creation of common land enclosures and the invention of machinery that did away with large numbers of labourers. This led to the growth and expansion of urban centres and drew people away from rural Britain. The work of the New Zealand Company and Edward Gibbon Wakefield (who promoted a balance of capitalists and labourers as a solution to the excess population in Britain) had important impacts in Canada, New Zealand and Australia.

Wakefield and the New Zealand Company

Eighteenth century British and French capitalist trade aimed to take advantage of the collapsing Moghul empire and replace Portuguese and Dutch dominance through a radical restructure of political geography (Arrighi, 2010). It did so by innovating its capitalist model through three components: settler colonialism, capitalist slavery and economic nationalism. By relying on settler colonialism, it was able to exploit territories through the private initiatives of private individuals and British companies. Slave labour solved the problem of chronic labour shortages by making plantation more profitable. Economic nationalism provided a critical element that drove colonial exploitation and domestic economy-making. By encouraging individuals and private enterprise, the British and French sought to increase economic activity to pay for colonial protection costs and develop the domestic economy by deploying tax revenues. This not only made war pay for itself, but it also created the economic

conditions at home for linking increased colonial activities to domestic economic fortunes. A successful colony needed a balance of capitalists and labourers.

In 1826, the (First) New Zealand Company ship visited southern New Zealand and its founder Edward Gibbon Wakefield (in 1836) promoted New Zealand to the British in the House of Commons as the best country for colonisation. He believed, through a balance of capitalists and labourers, Aotearoa could be colonised (Burns, 1989). It was under his statesmanship that the first British colonists arrived in New Zealand at Port Nicholson. In 1839 there were a mere 2000 immigrants in New Zealand – by 1852 that had risen to 28,000 thanks to the activities of the New Zealand Company. The Company had not utilised settlers from Australia but, rather, enticed long-term settlers from Britain through the promise of opportunity.

Edward Gibbon Wakefield had established a system to promote a colony that utilised access to money. He charged a reasonable price for land creating a situation where only a few were able to afford to buy land and thereby creating a labouring class with those who emigrated but could not afford land. As I argued earlier, the metropolitan economy in Britain was tied to colony as investors in the company were offered 1000 acres of land to create a capitalist class of entrepreneurs.

Wakefield promoted New Zealand as the Britain of the south and enticed people with a vision of a classless society with equality of opportunity (Harrop, 1928). In the 1840s revolution was fomenting all over Europe with the dissatisfaction of the results of capitalism and colonisation. The promises were fanciful, although they had the initial desired effect; but they soon led to conflict with Māori, especially in Wairau. But settlers came in their thousands over the next century as the government intervened and this led to further company schemes that used assisted and free passage as incentives. The company set the parameters and conditions that were to become standardised and for this reason, let alone for its role in immigration, it remains an important part of the formation of settler New Zealand (Wakefield, 1849).

In the European liberal world, the confluence of trade and capitalist society and industrialisation coincided with European expansion into New Zealand and with it came some important liberal ideas. As Foucault described in *Discipline and Punish*, liberal nations believed

that there were fundamental differences between peoples and fundamental differences within populations. People formed hierarchies of differences. The mad lacked reason (Foucault, 1973) and criminals were their own kind of being, *homo criminalis* (Foucault, 2019b). Within Britain, there was the aristocracy, the new industrial and middle classes and the labourers. There was also the civilised world and the non-European other.

Consequently, liberal society developed institutions and standards of treatment for these differences. The mad were put into the newly created asylums with their specialist programmes, training and classification (Foucault, 1973); prisons were modelled as panopticon systems of self-scrutiny (Foucault, 1995), capitalist financing and financial institutions funded colonisation that needed labourers (Hobsbawm, 1975); and colonisation meant asserting British colonial institutions and customs over indigenous practices (Arrighi, 2010). Indigenous peoples and non-European 'others' never achieved civilised status and either provoked contempt and cruel exploitation (e.g., slavery) or a paternalism modelled on a limited (in ambition) programme of assimilation. Either way, on the measure of things, Europeans stood above everyone else.

Industrialisation and technology promised efficiency, to do more with less and therefore increase profits. Efficiency, at first a mechanical view of work, was deployed on humans as the measure of progress. Liberalism therefore developed standards of measurement, as a way of measuring progress and efficiency. The reliance on observable improvement in efficient use of resources had several important consequences. It became a moral good to seek efficiency (Alexander, 2008). Two identical actions could be differentiated in value by their efficiency. An efficient system is always better than the equivalent less efficient system. From this a relationship and dependence emerged between standards, measures and progress. Yet efficiency is not a moral system. The slave trade, Nazi genocidal machines were all efficient systems and clearly immoral.

Secular scientific explanation also led to advances in science and engineering that fuelled the industrial revolution. Efficiency and industriousness were linked to lifting humanity out of savagery or the state of nature. Exploiting natural resources was linked fundamentally to a mechanistic view of nature and progress. Efficiency implied learning and progress and a desire

to do better with less (and the implied increased profits). It was rational in that it was deliberate and effective. It was also empirical through the measurement of observed differences that marked progress. Efficiency had become synonymous with progress and superior management and was valued as a moral good. Efficiency required standards of measurements and conventions for standards. Efficiency also started out as the measurement of the technical performance of machinery but slowly moved into economics and a measure of human performance. In the early 20th century it was promoted in management by Taylor, Henry Fayol, Henry Ford and Lord Roseberry. The idea of progress had taken on the form of standard measurement and efficiency.

Mill and liberal democracy

Individual agency, independence and the application of reason became the cornerstone of 'Man' and led to the development of *homo economicus* or economic man. John Stuart Mill, argued policy should address a subject who:

> … is concerned with him solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end. (Mill, 1824, p. 285)

For this reason, homo economicus is not defined by the content of his choices but the rational method of his decision making. Moreover, building on rational decision making was the role of property and ownership as central to the role of homo economicus's motivation.

The implications for freedom and institutions in liberal democracies were profound for viewing different sub-groups as fundamentally distinct. Liberal democracy promoted freedom for the privileged European growing middle classes, the *civilised community*.

> The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a *civilised community* [my emphasis], against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant (Mill, 1978, p. 9).

Yet Mill argued for a paternalistic government for the colonised, one that was kind and operated in the name of the interest of the colonised, in direct contradiction to his famous declaration quoted above. How was it possible?

Mill put limits on the liberty he argued for – only European culture had achieved that civilised status. The implication of this was the British would apply a paternalism (utilitarian) to watch

over and support nations and people towards a more civilised state (Mill, 1978). Mill worked as an Examiner in the East India Company and he defended colonial rule. He, like many others of his time, believed colonial rule to be justified partly because of the backward and uncivilised nature of the colonised (Campbell, 2013). Colonial rule was believed to support and develop uncivilised societies (Mill, 1828). Furthermore, he believed in direct rule, rejecting indirect rule by quasi-autonomous native power structures. However, he believed in the interests of the colonies that a paternalism should oversee development and that the treatment of natives should be considerate. He expected the liberal institutions of the 19th century Britain to spread throughout the world (J. Gray, 1989). Mill's views represented a more 'enlightened' view that contrasted with the more commonly held Victorian view of aggrandising whiteness and denigrating otherness (Goldberg, 2000).

The belief of that time, that being British meant that one should not notice government, living wherever one liked, with no passports or identity cards, free from conscription and free to change money (Clark & Taylor, 1965). Furthermore, freedom had many elements, including freedom of thought and discussion, of character and actions. It was an individualism that was positive and sacrosanct and based on being in a civilised society (Mill, 1978).

There are two important points which I wish to draw from the liberalism of John Stuart Mill. The first is that individualism was largely a political idea and economics, important as it was, was secondary in his analysis. Political freedom was generally concerned with the human happiness that Mill's utilitarianism had promoted. In line with his empiricism was his belief in behaviour as acquired, reminiscent of Epimetheus' originary fault of man without essence.

Mill was the liberal thinker par excellence because he tried to marry the desire for economic progress and wealth accumulation with his belief in equality and justice. Mill believed in equality of the sexes. He also fought for wider social equality and against the racial inequality generally promoted at the time (Goldberg, 2000). Mill, much to the annoyance of neoliberal thinkers, turned to socialism late in his life.

Yet, despite these 'progressive' views, he held the view that many societies were incapable of rule and civilisation without intervention, and it was in their interest to be guided to

civilised society through paternalism. Yet his view on freedom, as leading British intellectual, had ruled out intervention for one's good or morality or physical well-being. Although Mill's views are remarkable for the times, they marked the limits of liberal Victorian egalitarianism. In some respects, the social laboratory of Aotearoa-New Zealand encapsulated these Victorian paternalistic limits in its pioneering social reform. Despite the equality stated in the Treaty of Waitangi (article 3), Māori were largely viewed as either needing separate development to bring them to European levels or that they were incapable of developing to that level.

In his writing, the tension between the paradoxical beliefs of the nature of the civilised person driving for economic growth and wealth accumulation resolved only in the othering of non-Europeans as a racialised other (not quite 'human') that foresaw the neoliberal solution to the liberal paradox (of equality and justice and colonial wealth development):

> What race would not be indolent and insouciant when things are so arranged, that they derive no advantage from forethought or exertion. (Mill, 1848, pp. 240-241)

Early liberal thought by contrast posited capitalist approaches only for economic issues and accepted that market excesses would need mitigating social policies. For example, Adam A. Smith (2016) called for a social policy that meant that:

> … they who feed, clothe, and lodge the whole body of the people, should have such a share of the produce of their own labor as to be themselves tolerably well fed, clothed, and lodged. (p. 58)

These later liberal views as enunciated by John Stuart Mill would have a profound impact on how education was viewed, developed and distributed. Liberal education would instantiate these ideas even as policy makers grappled with changing understandings.

Technical education

In policy discourse, technical education interprets technê as skills for industry and is caught up in an *instrumentalism*, where labour and the new technical requirements are pressed into colonial expansion. Royal Charters and charter colonies were issued for companies and corporate entities seeking to exploit the colonies. They also established learned societies, universities and municipalities (especially in the colonies). In New Zealand, the New Zealand

Company attempted to exploit New Zealand on the model of colonisation developed by Wakefield. The development of the industrial revolution, the factory model needed new skilled labour to fully exploit the capitalist drive for profits (Hobsbawm, 1989).

In contemporary human capital approaches, educational policy discourse, in many respects, was a continuation of liberal ideas within a radicalised formula. The radicalised formula rejected liberal production of difference through de jure policy and introduced a universal economic rationality that acted as a new proxy, a de facto production of difference.

The liberal formula was to establish technical schools and policy to establish cheap Anglo-Saxon labour to settle in the colonies, because of their superior ethos and that there was "room for all the classes" (Wakefield, 1849, p. 28), as a model of settler colonialism, at the cost of the colonised. Technical schools and the concern for skills and labour shortages developed the drive for policy on labour and technical education (Hobsbawm, 1989). In Great Britain, this created "historically unprecedented, apparently anonymous and rootless people who formed a growing and, it seemed, an inevitably rising proportion of its people" in urban centres (Hobsbawm, 1989, p. 115).

The need for mass elementary education increased – or at least the need for literacy grew. In an era of mass dislocation and internal migration to urban centres and from urban centres to colonies, society moved from a dependence on oral communication to the need for literacy. Moreover, mass education and the school offered the government an incursion and a reach into peoples' lives that was unmatched, in the time before mass media, for producing good citizens. Numbers attending school in the 1850s onwards rose by manifold levels. Governments also used the enthusiasm for formal education to establish national identity, through official language policies. Mass education and higher education became a necessity in the late 19th century (Hobsbawm, 1996). Science-based technologies were valuable for both economic and military reasons. The rise of Germany was, in part, to their development of *Real Schule*, a technically oriented non-classical secondary school (Hobsbawm, 1996, p. 58).

In the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, the impact of the industrial revolution was not just technological, but cultural and socioeconomic. Technological changes over the centuries

required new technical skills to operate machinery and new systems of management in the factory system. It included the widespread adoption of new materials, primarily iron and steel, the use of coal, the development of the steam engine, electricity and petroleum and the internal combustion engine, all of which transformed industry. The invention of new machines, like the spinning jenny and the loom, led to radically different labour needs and the factory system re-organised work. The rise of machines also led to a new focus on efficiency as a generalised concept of accountability in management as well as in the use of machines. Science was increasingly instrumentalised into the service of manufacturing, mass production and the military. These changes 'revolutionised' the role of technical education and society. It was led in Europe by the *Polytechnique of Paris* and the rise of technical academies (Hobsbawm, 1996, p. 47). The rise of manufacturing and technical progress was glorified through the great exhibitions, like those in London at Crystal Palace or the Rotunda in Austria (as we still see today in the grand exhibitions showcasing the latest technology from Apple etc.).

There are many ways in which I could have divided up the development of technical education. The broad point is to develop a philosophical and political understanding of how technê and colonialism combined to impart a discursive formation, a dispositif. Rather than engage in an extended discussion of colonialism, I have drawn on Mill's and Wakefield's notions to better understand how bio and disciplinary power had operated up until now, with the proviso that the grid of intelligibility they provided diminished over time to be replaced by neoliberal policy. The aim was to give a broad overview of significant legislative and policy changes in technical education and link them to changes taking place internationally and in the wider context of dispossession

Phase 1: 1820s-1914 – colonial education

The colonial phase is a convenient heading that I have given to a period where colonial policy was most explicit regarding education and wider society (Walker, 2004). It has had a continued profound impact on Māori wellbeing (Durie, 2012; Reid, Varona, Fisher, & Smith, 2016). Lieutenant-Governor William Hobson was instructed by British authorities to secure New Zealand for British sovereignty based on Mill's principles – establish a legal basis, to have

humanitarian concern for the welfare of Māori, and persuade them that the change was in their interest (Orange, 1988, pp. 32, 60). Lord Russel, the British Colonial Secretary, sent explicit instruction in establishing the education of the 'aborigines' to secure a successful transition (Ewing & Shallcross, 1970, pp. 26-27).

The Treaty of Waitangi/Te Tiriti o Waitangi established a basis of shared ir/responsibility for the Crown–iwi relationship regarding the administration of the state. In 1852, the New Zealand Constitution Act established the Colony of New Zealand and it was not until 1907 that Aotearoa-New Zealand became the Dominion of New Zealand but there were no substantial differences – the Premier became the prime minister and the 'Members of the House of Representatives' became 'Members of Parliament.' There was little appetite amongst the settlers to break the ties with Great Britain that included significant cultural, economic and political capital. After pressure from other dominions (Irish, South Africans and the Canadians) the Balfour declaration restated the equality of the dominions. But New Zealand did not ratify the Statute of Westminster 1931 until November 1947. New Zealand's prime minister Coates called it a "poisonous document" (Ministry of Culture and Heritage, 2014).

There were explicit European developments in the field of technical education that influenced the development of education. Many European countries had developed and were promoting technical, skilled education to serve the growing industrial economy and their military ambitions.

As already noted, liberal democracy, on the back of the philosophical anthropology (Eze, 1997), produced class and race differences utilising education and particularly technical education to establish a colonial hierarchy. This hierarchy justified more punitive measures as well as the paternalistic attitudes expressed by Mill.

As J. Ward (1839) noted in the British Colonial handbook for New Zealand, based on contemporaneous accounts of encounters with Māori:

> … with the physical powers and passions of men, they have at present the intellect of children, and in moral principle are too often little above the level of brute creation. Such are the unhappy circumstances of a thoroughly savage nation. (p. 62)

When viewed as part of a longer history and context of education for Māori as Māori education through Crown policy a pattern of neglect, underfunding, assimilation and denigration emerges (Barrington, 2008) despite the continued resistance of Māori (Walker, 1996). In 1862, the Director of Education, Strong, exemplified the view in the highest office in education:

> The Māori language has no literature and … the natural abandonment of the native tongue inflicts no loss on the Māori. (Calman, 2012, p. 3)

Aotearoa-New Zealand embarked on an expansive public works scheme to build its infrastructure and it did this through settled colonists, an assisted migrant scheme and Māori labour. Furthermore, Aotearoa-New Zealand had developed an egalitarian streak through government assisted life assurance (1869), assisted migration, workers' rights in the Master and Apprenticeship Act (1865), and minimum wages for apprentices in the Manual and Technical Elementary Instruction Act (1895). By the 1890s, New Zealand had developed a reputation for a 'fair go' egalitarian society and became known as the "social laboratory of the world" (Phillips, 2012, p. 3).

Aotearoa-New Zealand's reputation for egalitarianism grew and particularly so after the economic depression of 1879. Starting in 1893, the Liberal governments of Richard Seddon and Joseph Ward set about mitigating economic depression by passing a series of landmark social welfare reforms. The reforms included providing free textbooks for students, establishing food and drug standards, breaking up large landholdings to provide for settlers, an old age pensions scheme, and compulsory arbitration for work disputes (Marcetic, 2017). These all led to Aotearoa-New Zealand being an international leader in social welfare.

Early school provision (1820s) was made for Māori by church mission schools and was run by three main missionary groups: the (Anglican) Church Missionary Society (CMS), the (Methodist) Wesleyan Missionary Society (WMS) and the Catholic Church. In the 1820s and throughout the 1830s, the CMS significantly expanded schooling provision. The aim of the missionaries was to Christianise Māori and 'civilise them' through cultural assimilation and economic exploitation (Simon, 1998). It was a brutal assimilationist programme (Walker, 2004) that ran counter to the egalitarianism espoused.

Furthermore, the Ngā pakanga o Aotearoa and Te riri Pākehā ("the great New Zealand Wars" and "the white man's anger" respectively) were variously fought wars and disputes between colonial government and allied Māori against Māori and Māori allied-settlers. Many died and colonial settler legislation followed which confiscated large amounts of land which was sold to settlers. This lends weight to the simple argument that settler colonialism has always been about land confiscation and that all indigenous people had to do was to stay where they are to be in the way of settler colonialism (Wolfe, 1999, 2016a, 2016b).

Before formal legislation and complete colonisation, from 1816 to 1840, Māori were educated by missionaries with the explicit aim of proselytising Christianity to the natives (Beaglehole, 1970). More formal legislation was passed in the early years of the Crown Colony period of New Zealand (1840-1852) only to be supplanted by the Native School Act 1867 which replaced the earlier Native School Act 1858. It introduced limited resources and per capita funding that led to further problems in sustaining the schools, which ran on a continued Christian assumption. Two points of note are worth mentioning: firstly, they focussed largely on assimilation (English language and Christianity), and that they were aimed at Māori children – there was not an equivalent for non-Māori, even though, in rural settings, non-Māori attended (Cumming & Cumming, 1978). The 1867 Act established a national policy of village schools that largely concentrated on industrial education. Parliamentary debates at the time expressed the variety of views of liberal thought about the colonies. Richardson, who introduced the Bill, suggested education had intrinsic merit.

Simultaneously, the Māori population since contact (estimated at 100,000 in 1769) declined (substantially due to imported diseases and the Musket wars) to about 60,000 by the time of Francis Fenton's census published as '*Observations on the State of the Aboriginal Inhabitants of New Zealand*' (1859). Land was being confiscated, and adherence to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi/Te Tiriti o Waitangi were largely ignored, as outlined in Chapter one. Furthermore, a racialised discourse culminated in a de facto 'white only' policy in the Immigration Restriction Amendment Act by 1920. New Zealand had been developing a settler colonial society and this meant that much of the egalitarianism that New Zealand came to be known for was built on bloodshed and violence for Māori. Two parallel worlds existed: the

egalitarian settler colonial state and the shrinking world where Māori lived. This inequity was inherent in the construction of the settler state.

The Education Act 1877 created a free, compulsory, primary education system and limited secular secondary education – leaving technical education development largely unaddressed in national policy. Technical education was costly and therefore encouraging the immigration of skilled labour served to allow governments to ignore state funding for technical education. By using immigration, created the foundations of settler colonialism were created as numbers of migrants started to supplant the indigenous population, and colonial institutions and practices started to replace indigenous practices and indigenous institutions.

Technical education never attained the status of the secular free education provided for in the Education Act 1877. Although it received funding for the first time, Aotearoa-New Zealand drew largely on imported technical skills from Great Britain (Abbott, 2000). In 1874, free passage for European immigrants led to 32,118 assisted settlers arriving in New Zealand, the biggest immigrant year of the 19th century. Technical education enrolments of those settled had reached only 16,602 in 138 venues by the First World War falling short of the growing need for technical labour which was largely achieved the emigration from Europe.

Most technical education was taught through schools or technical institutes working out of secondary school facilities during down-times. The demand from industry was for skilled labour and in Europe there was a rapid rise in technical schools and institutes with strong literacy programmes. Literacy rates for countries with strong technical education in Europe went hand in hand with literacy programmes and had single-digit illiteracy rates and were expanding the reach of education beyond the few at secondary level (Cipolla, 1969). Developments in the USA had taken the Polytechnique model and added the first taught engineering courses, thus moving away from the rest of the world which was wedded to the apprentice model that had limited uptake (Hobsbawm, 1996).

The 1882-84 Royal Commission on Technical Instruction (Great Britain Government, 1882-84) carried out an exhaustive survey of technical education in Great Britain and Europe and had concluded that Britain's decline was, in part, due to a neglect of technical education.

Incentives for secondary school to introduce a wider technical education were put in place but largely went ignored in New Zealand. In 1885, Robert Stout the premier and the secretary at the Department of Education introduced some funding for technical subjects but again was met with the view from school boards that secondary schools' job was to prepare students for university. The secondary schools and universities largely chose to ignore these opportunities, preferring to prepare students for careers as lawyers or as doctors rather than plumbers. Most people who attended secondary school were fee paying and most secondary schools were modelled on English grammar schools and catered for only 10% of the secondary school aged pupils (XXX). The episteme/technê class demarcation was strongly at work.

In contrast to the limited investment in secondary education for the few, technical education received its first attention with the introduction of the Technical Instruction Act of 1898. The Act moved away from small grants and allowed local authorities to raise funding for technical education through a local penny rate. The local rate ensured that technical education had a strong association with its region rather than a national uniform policy but remained second class to university education.

In 1886, the Wellington School of Design was founded and several more institutions followed but these remained small in number. Other evening technical schools started offering evening classes: Dunedin Technical School 1889, Auckland Technical School 1895, and Wanganui Technical School in 1892. The lack of take-up and the growing concern led to a government enquiry and this led to the Manual and Technical Instructions Acts 1900, and 1902, which introduced central government spending on land for institutes, for textbook and equipment and technical school inspectors. But again, the schools failed to respond. Secondary schools resisted introducing technical education.

Because of the large-scale failure of these policies aimed at encouraging more technical classes and the lack of desire by employers to release their staff, the government set up new technical high schools (Wellington Technical School in 1901, Christchurch Technical College in 1907). It went further by attaching new technical training to technical high schools.

The focus on apprentices and technical education meant enrolments had reached 16,602 in 138 venues by the First World War. The technical courses were dominated by agriculture for males and domestic and commercial office work for women who made up most of the daytime numbers of 1839 by 1914. Furthermore, government took the unprecedented step of introducing technical high schools, a uniquely Aotearoa-New Zealand approach to vocational education. The world wars had created the need through the development of the early industrial military complex and the consequent necessity for technical training to operate the machinery of war (Abbott, 2000; Abbott & Doucouliagos, 2004).

Phase 2: 1914-1960 – War and the welfare state

There are several points worthy of note at this initial stage: firstly, the establishment of technical schools was still a regional not a national response to needs for technical education; secondly, the lack of opportunity for the majority of learners beyond primary who did not enter university was deliberate; there was a need for technical schools for trades, engineers, and construction workers to build the nation; and finally, the applied nature of the education was a defining characteristic. Thus, class differentiation in education at technical schools and equitable results for the more excluded was a fundamental, if accidental (i.e., it did not come from any national desire or policy), part of the genesis and structure of the emerging polytechnic sector. Secondly, to attract a labour force, the promise of land and property had to be offered leading to some of the most substantial land grabs from Māori. In this sense labour, and the product of labour were technê par excellence and were intimately tied to dispossession for Māori.

The focus on examination boards and competency levels was part of a global trend that, arguably, was used to socially stratify populations, a form of biopower. Historically educational policy produced difference through the observation of class and race which became more technocratic in the advent of standardised measures, like IQ. IQ as the standard bearer received a boost from the industrial–military complex through its mass application to the army and subsequently to school students (Mckinney et al., 2007). In contemporary management practice, the modern use of performance, targets and standardised tests

developed out of that history and employed the same policy technologies updated for contemporary society (J. Scott & Holme, 2016).

Achievement as a form of standardised test has a history: scientific management, measurement and positivism that bears an important responsibility in the production of ethnic and class differences (Powers, Fischman, & Berliner, 2016). Emphasis on measurement to classify and categorise students through standardised tests spread from the US. In the work of behavioural psychologist Thorndike, and under the influence of scientific management,

> … the administrative progressives' goal was to empower experts who would make public schools more efficient and productive by using data and analyses generated by researchers. (Powers et al., 2016, p. 747)

In addition to the intimate development of education, audit and management of standardised practice was the expanding use and development of IQ tests. In 1924 under the influence of the US studies, the New Zealand education department applied the Terman Group Test of Mental Ability to all first-year post-primary school students (Ministry of Culture and Heritage, 2016). It did this on a nationwide basis and was the first to do so for post-primary school students in the world (Ministry of Culture and Heritage, 2016). The Otis test, its successor taken from the US Military, remained in use until the late 1960s. So Aotearoa-New Zealand has shared in this history of achievement tests as the basis of differentiating populations for different life outcomes.

In 1944, the Commission of Inquiry into Apprenticeships led to further legislation culminating in the Apprentices Act of 1948 that made technical education, for many vocations, compulsory. The compulsory element to technical professions would put a huge strain on technical institutions to cater for the demand (ABBOT XXX). Furthermore, the rise of white-coat technical jobs and low-level engineering (which became the remit of technical colleges) put further strain on facilities and resources.

The learners, as was implied above, were attracted to gain further educational opportunities as well as take up hobbies in towns where there were not many opportunities for these. All the while learners were doing this in evenings or as part-time students. Various local authorities started to establish the need to license the trades, such as Wellington City Council

through the education boards and the trade boards, which mandated compulsory classes at the local technical schools (Dougherty XXX). This local licensing spread to other regions until it became a national registration scheme, which slowly extended to other professions.

Arthur Dewhurst Riley, the founder of the Wellington Design School, also established another important innovation, the use of advisory committees. This became standard practice. Advisory Committees would be intimately involved in the construction of the course, the recruitment of instructors and the acquisition of resources. Again, this local innovation became national practice. La Trobe, Riley's successor, introduced the next level of innovations extending on Riley's – full time study, better full-time instructor contracts, and the use of unused school buildings. The liberal government had also introduced scholarships for technical education recognising both the need and the potential of its growing role. Eventually, these local initiatives would form an alternative technical high school. They were largely co-educational and aimed at technical proficiency unlike their secondary counterparts which were single sex and aimed at university (Dougherty, 1999). Technical high schools were a unique Aotearoa-New Zealand innovation. The numbers of students and venues began to grow.

The numbers attending full-time technical education reached 25,304 and part-time and correspondence technical classes reached over 55,000 by the late 1950s (Dougherty, 1999). Technical education became more and more intimately tied to changes in the needs of employers, particularly state licensed professions focussed on developing the infrastructure of Aotearoa-New Zealand. Returning soldiers with skills and technical know-how were to be compensated with land in the form of (often unsustainable) farms, which continued the dispossession of Māori (Belich, 2001, 2009).

The next set of innovations first occurred between the world wars but gained impetus in the 1950s, and that focussed on the range of subjects and the nature of subjects being offered. The growth did not come from trades but from commercial classes such as accountancy, shorthand, typing and bookkeeping all making technical high schools largely obligatory with some parts of the course's compulsory for those fields of study. The technical high schools relied on the 'prestigious' overseas examination boards of the UK (Abbott & Doucouliagos,

2004). Despite there being New Zealand alternatives to the City & Guilds assessments it was not until the late 1940s and early 1950s that the New Zealand Trades Certification Board was formerly recognised. Again, local innovation rather than national policy drove the growth in the service sector options. Policy was often a latecomer or an afterthought. However, the popularity of these options led to overcrowding and inadequate facilities to accommodate the needs of technical students (Dougherty, 1999). Furthermore, when policy did come from the Labour government of 1936 it came from the abolition of the standardised proficiency exam and the extension of compulsory education to age 15, which had a massive impact on post-primary school rolls. This also coincided with a post-war baby boom. It was also part one of the most radical welfare programmes in the Social Security Act (Belgrave, 2012).

The Education Department had decided that the role of technician was the proper training target for technical high schools. This understanding contributed to the developing structure of tertiary education, with the universities being responsible for the professional middle and upper classes and the technical schools for the working classes (Abbott, 2000; E. Olssen, 1973; E. Olssen & Hickey, 2005). These working classes included more and more representation by Māori and later by Pacific Islanders. Access to education as a problem was beginning to be addressed and the main beneficiaries were the technical high schools. By the 1950s, nearly all trades had compulsory classes supplementing work in 'flexible' block, evening, and correspondence courses (Dougherty, 1999).

Rex Mason was the Education Minister on the publication of the *Thomas Report* (Department of Education, 1944), which set up a common, core and free secondary curriculum for all. It also highlighted the growing concern that the metropolitan technical high schools were outgrowing their facilities and that they should become technological Institutes. These institutes were asked to focus on senior levels, and this started the first move away from secondary schools. The technical high schools, which predominated in provincial Aotearoa-New Zealand, were left out of the report with no role defined until 10 years later. This too, focussed on another differentiated role, one that kept the dual role of school and technical trainer. Furthermore, a national correspondence school was suggested to cover the small numbers in some professions.

Phase 3: 1960-1984 – The independent polytechnic

The next phase confronted the decline of the welfare state and the economic crises of the late 70s and early 80s and it also marked the period of the most radical reform of the sector. It was the time where equity was explicitly addressed. This too underwent a transformation in the reforms. The Hunn report also noted the current social changes and the need to urbanise and it encouraged policy development for encouraging the movement of people to where manufacturing industry was situated. The drive for urbanisation had always been part of the raison d'etre of technê.

Manufacturing had developed mass industrial jobs and with them the rise of cities as industrial power houses (Lefebvre, 2014). As a result, policies to encourage movement from the rural economy to the urban city industrial life started to change the shape of modern life. This had a massive impact on Aotearoa-New Zealand. In a short space of time, 100s of years of connection to the land in a particular locality were to be lost to a forced, new, urban opportunism, based on where the jobs were (Haami, 2018).

The Currie Commission supported the separation of secondary education from technical education. The Commission worried about the state of training for manufacturing which needed "specialised craftsmen, technicians, scientists, and technologists to meet the demands of a diversified and expanding industrial economy" (New Zealand Government, 1962, pp. 386-387).

In the 1960s, the Department of Education oversaw the separation and independence between secondary school and a new tertiary institution for technical education. These new tertiary institutions became known variously as institutes of technical education and polytechnics (ITPs) (Dougherty, 1999). The Education Act 1964 recognised several nascent Technical Institutes (Central Institute of Technology 1960, the Wellington Polytechnic 1962, Auckland Institute of Technology 1964, the Christchurch Technical Institute 1965, Otago Polytechnic 1966, and Hamilton Technical Institute 1968). Provincial centres got funding if they could show they met the minimum threshold for demand (enough students to engage 10 FTE staff).

Meanwhile, Labour had started to explore international ideas and Phil Amos, the soon-to-be education minister, influenced by Bob Chapman of the University of Auckland's enthusiastic endorsement of the USA's community college system, put in a manifesto commitment to implement them. In 1972, the government introduced community colleges. They started to receive funding for a mix of adult, technical and latterly, trades education. The first of these was opened in Hawkes Bay in 1975. The documentation of the reform still omitted 'academic' and preferred the term 'non-vocational', keeping the distinction between the university and community colleges. Like the USA, they were to develop two-year qualifications equivalent to the first year of undergraduate studies. This had the potential, it was argued, to give new opportunities for learners to enter university education.

The drive for technical institutions was now becoming firmly established with three official representative bodies covering the institutions – the Technical Institutes Association of New Zealand, union, the Association of Staff in Tertiary Education and students and the Aotearoa Polytechnic Student Union. However, this only symbolised the rising importance of the sector in regional authority consciousness. They were now being seen as desirable economic vehicles for regeneration and raising regional status and there was a clamour for them in most regions. The National government continued to implement provincial institutes. Again, however, there was an implicit undervaluation of community education. As in previous generations, it remained underfunded for its regional remit and the technical institutes remained sceptical of the new community college role, endorsed by a university professor who had no experience of the polytechnic sector.

The community colleges inevitably were integrated into the polytechnic system and together they accounted for about half the tertiary students by 1981 (Abbott, 2000). The polytechnics provided a wide variety of academic, vocational and professional programmes that covered subjects at various levels of specialisation ranging from introductory studies through to diploma studies. They were not able to deliver degrees. The polytechnics were a second-tier, alternative route to higher or tertiary level education to the universities. Unlike the universities, their focus was on foundation and diploma-level courses. Despite expanded degree provision in Australia and the UK for technical education (TAFES and polytechnics)

Aotearoa-New Zealand remained extremely reluctant to allow this. The courses were aimed at those who had not traditionally seen tertiary or university education as an option. They were funded by government grants and run directly by the Department of Education and, if they could show demand, were granted more resources.

Chapter Four: Neoliberal Reconstruction of New Zealand Polytechnics

This chapter explains the thinking and origins of the economic philosophy of neoliberalism as a radical version of classical liberalism. It then traces the rapid process by which the New Zealand economy and public sector was reconfigured, which took place mainly between 1984 and 1990, but which still continues to play out today. These discussions lead into the chapter's focus on the reconstruction, using neoliberal policies, of the polytechnic sector. In this chapter the discussion is about underlying ideology and philosophies that informed the way Māori were to be treated. As such it lays the ground for the chapters that follow that apply this understanding to Māori equity policy. Thus, on the face of it, Māori policy may seem to go missing but only to re-merge in the subsequent chapters carrying the understanding I lay out in this chapter.

Neoliberalism can be broadly defined as an ideology of the free market invested in individual liberty, private property, limited government, and the promotion of an individual, rational actor operating within a competitive economic environment (D. Jones, 2012, p. 2). Neoliberalism has been theorised in many different ways and there continues to be debate on how to treat it (Flew, 2014). In 1927, Mises coined the term neoliberalism as a revision and reworking of classical liberalism and a rejection of communism, socialism, and the Keynesian inspired welfare programmes (Ludwig von Mises, 2005). In the context of Aotearoa-New Zealand, neoliberal reform would roll back a long history of egalitarian policy and belief in a fair-go society and would, therefore, take the form of a rejection of welfarism.

In 1984, after the election of the Fourth Labour Government (and its re-election in 1987), Aotearoa-New Zealand underwent a neoliberal transformation of the public sector. The Fourth Labour government initiated a rapid and substantial reform of the public sector that was either maintained or extended by subsequent governments. Two interrelated areas of

government featured significantly in the reform in relation to this thesis: education and Māori equity (New Zealand Treasury, 1987a, 1987b).

One of the reasons cited by the Fourth Labour government for the neoliberal reforms was the rapid economic decline of Aotearoa-New Zealand in the 1970s. Aotearoa-New Zealand lost favourable export terms with the UK, its biggest export market, when the UK joined the European Economic Community (EEC). The agriculture sector suffered from collapsing agricultural commodity prices internationally (Dalziel, 2002). Furthermore, two oil shocks caused a rapid rise in the price of oil and therefore of energy costs, leading to significant increases in the cost of production and leading to the ban of weekend sales of petrol. All of these factors led to a substantial decline in Aotearoa-New Zealand's GDP and a chronic deficit in the balance of payments (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). Rising unemployment, double-digit inflation and growing public sector debt added to the sense of economic crisis. The National government attempted to maintain the status quo, which only deepened the crisis.

Almost 10 years of Robert Muldoon's National party government worsened the economic conditions leading to a call for radical reform. Regulation was regarded as extremely bureaucratic and the Muldoon government, rather than seek bureaucratic reform, sought to maintain the status quo. It operated a costly Pareto incrementalism – making sure any new policy changes made no one worse off – which just added costs to the Treasury (Easton, 1997). The 'Think Big' economic strategy required huge burrowing for eight projects, several of which did not see the light of day. The projects had some long-term positive benefits, but major short-term economic difficulties ensued from the high levels of borrowing required to fund them. The economic problems led to a nearly two-year long wage and price freeze.

Added to the economic woes was a growing unrest on social matters. Māori continued to dispute land issues with the Crown – there was a 506-day protest held at Bastion Point that symbolised a continued fraught relationship of Māori with the Crown. The refusal to stop the Springbok rugby tour of Apartheid South Africa led to further civil unrest. Muldoon also continued the policy of forcibly removing Pacific Islanders from Aotearoa-New Zealand, the so-called 'Dawn Raids' that were condemned by opposition groups. The policies introduced to shore up the economy had little impact (except negatively) and Muldoon called a snap

election in 1984 hoping to gain a mandate. Bob Jones had created another political party solely aimed at taking votes away from National and it did enough to usher in a landslide Fourth Labour government.

The neoliberal critique of Keynesian economics formed an influential alternative paradigm to the status quo both in Aotearoa-New Zealand and in the industrialised world. Neoliberal thinkers had long argued that protectionism limited growth and stifled the economy. In the UK, Margaret Thatcher had established a narrative to cut back the state and roll out neoliberal policy ideas. Reagan followed a similar pattern in the US. Neoliberal ideas, not always compatible, were gaining popularity in policy circles. But, unlike in the US and the UK, the neoliberal reforms were introduced into the economy of Aotearoa-New Zealand by a left-wing political party, making for fractious party politics. The reforms followed an accelerated path to make up for a perception of lost time, where delay was equated with maintaining risk. The government claimed to have inherited (from the Muldoon administration) a worse crisis than they had at first expected (Reardon & Gray, 2007).

Roger Douglas, the Finance Minister, along with key cabinet treasury positions, advocated successfully for a programme of neoliberal reform, which proved crucial to the success of implementing the new policies (Reardon & Gray, 2007). So instrumental was he that the reforms became known as Rogernomics. Two junior finance ministers, Richard Prebble and David Caygill, with Roger Douglas became known as the 'Treasury Troika' who, with the help of upcoming promising Labour MPs, pushed through a radical and ideologically driven reform programme (Kelsey, 1996). The economic conditions, Douglas argued, created a justification for change. The short notice for an election also allowed for the normal manifesto process to be suspended, allowing Roger Douglas more control and less scrutiny over policies in the manifesto. Douglas forged a path of radical reform despite resistance from traditional left voices within the Labour movement.

The scale of the neoliberal programme left no aspect of government untouched. There were two broad movements to the reform programme that I want to focus on; 'roll-back' focussed on dismantling Keynesian policy and 'roll out' focussed on the introduction of neoliberal institutions (Peck & Tickell, 2002). In Aotearoa-New Zealand, the first term of the Fourth

Labour government focussed on rolling back regulation and other government intervention in the market. In the second term, the government rolled out the wider reforms that corporatised the basis for government, leaving the specific reform of core political activity (like education) to late in its second term. The neoliberal reconstruction of Māori equity is best understood through the whole reform programme. Together, the general and the specific programme of reform, created the framework of the neoliberal polytechnic and its approach to equity.

Classical liberalism reworked as neoliberalism

Neoliberalism has its ideological roots in classical liberalism, encompassing the political and economic thought of John Locke (1632-1704), Adam Smith (1724-1790), Jeremey Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) with whom it ended, with his turn to socialism. Friedrich August von Hayek established the groundwork of neoliberalism through a re-evaluation of classical liberalism and particularly the work of Mill (von Hayek, 1938, 1946, 1948). Broadly, neoliberal political thinkers invoked a minimal state, laissez-faire economics, liberty and the free market from classical liberalism. Unlike the classical liberal thinkers, they extended the ideas beyond the domain of economic activity to all spheres of life (Becker, 1992). This extension radicalised and transformed classical liberalism.

Classical liberal thought was transformed by neoliberal thinkers to such an extent that it implicated a new social ontology (Lazzarato, 2009). Locke had established the principles of government, but it was his defence of private property that proved foundational for neoliberalism (Ludwig von Mises, 2005). From Smith came the central idea of the invisible hand of the market as self-regulating and rational (Friedman, 1981). Bentham developed the idea of a consequential morality based on self-interest and maximising utility which was revised in game theory (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962). It was Mill's notion of the economic man, or homo economicus, who operated in an economic context that would be revised and expanded (Becker, 1976).

The rationale of homo economicus would subtly change to a new regulatory framework, emphasising catallactics, the analysis of all "actions which are conducted on the basis of

monetary calculation" (Ludwig von Mises, 2007, pp. 233-234). Furthermore, the context of operation would not be limited to the economic sphere but would be extended to all of life including education, marriage, and criminality (Foucault, 2008, p. 268). Consequentially, this meant all actions could be viewed as economic. This implied a new mode of being, a new social ontology, with a particular form of rationality.

Neoliberal thought further broke with classical liberalism in how it conceived the function and rationale of the state. Hayek proposed an epistemological basis for the state that would invert classical liberal orthodoxy (von Hayek, 1948). There was a tension between the rationale for a laissez-faire economics (which was both libertarian and anarchic) and the need for a minimal state. Hayek went on to argue that neoliberalism must break from laissez-faire liberalism to show where government is desirable and necessary (von Hayek, 1948, p. 17). The minimal state would also have to account for the marginalist revision of economic actors from the liberal notion that focussed on one engaged in business to also include one who consumes economic goods (Ludwig von Mises, 1976).

Hayek was also suspicious of the classical liberal notion of 'economic man' as the basis of action and instead argued for humanity as fallible, irrational, and error prone (von Hayek, 1948, pp. 8-9). From this assumption, he argued that both individuals, or groups, or government could not know all that is to be known to make economic plans. The inherent limits to knowledge would provide the epistemological foundations for a minimal state.

Hayek's epistemological break from the classical liberal tradition fundamentally changes the basis of government to set up the conditions for institutions remade under neoliberal regulatory norms. In classical liberalism the government would regulate the market excesses,

> … they who feed, clothe, and lodge the whole body of the people, should have such a share of the produce of their own labor as to be themselves tolerably well fed, clothed, and lodged. (A. Smith, 2016, p. 58)

But, in neoliberal thought, this is reversed (Foucault, 2008): *The government must be regulated by the principles of the market.* Furthermore, democracy is insufficient because the majority, in line with his principles of limited capacity, necessarily falls short. He rejects the

all-knowing (or quasi-omnipotence) of the rational actor (von Hayek, 1948, p. 46). His concern is how to arrive at an action in a context where no one person possesses all knowledge.

Hayek argues there are only two philosophical solutions to the problem of limited knowledge: central planning, or competition. By central planning he meant the direction of the entire economic system through a plan. He rejects this out of hand. The latter, competition, best described as decentralised planning of individuals, is what he means by competition. Hayek promotes the idea that everyone understands their own context and circumstances as a form of tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1997), where the market acts as an informational system that makes up for the limited capacity of each individual actor. The market disseminates and co-ordinates the crucial information for making rational decisions in the form of the price mechanism (von Hayek, 1948).

Competition underpins the neoliberal project (Foucault, 2008). Foucault's main point about competition is that it acts as a regulatory mechanism to establish order through price (Foucault, 2008, p. 131). The important point that is being made is that competition is not natural, but is a constructed political ideal that requires government intervention. Drawing on the work of Frank Knight on risk, Hayek argued it is the fact that the market is imperfect that makes competition necessary. It is competition that spreads information that enable possibilities and opportunities (von Hayek, 1948, p. 106). Hence, the role of the government is to remodel itself so that it promotes competition for all aspects of policy and social life: "One must govern for the market, rather than because of the market" (Foucault, 2008, p. 121).

Many of these assumptions would feature in reports, advice and policy documents in Aotearoa-New Zealand. The reform process set out to corporatise the public sector. What was unique (or at least untypical) in Aotearoa-New Zealand was that it was a Labour government that introduced the reforms, whereas the political Labour party had a long tradition and global reputation for social reform. Second was the speed of the reforms. The process of corporatisation (Duncan & Bollard, 1992) was rushed through parliament. Kelsey (1995) had argued that the reforms were ideologically driven; however, much of the Labour

party would not have bought into the reforms and so, arguably, a certain pragmatism also was pertinent.

Much of the reform impetus was driven by Treasury where Douglas, Caygill and Prebble held sway. Douglas wielded more influence on decisions by the fact that many of the cabinet ministers lacked financial and economic know-how and, in a time of economic crisis, this left them vulnerable to suggestion. Easton (1997) noted how six new hierarchical policy rules were introduced to help policy making and predict outcomes. Rule 3 was "committed to an ideology of more market" (p. 90) in line with the definition given of neoliberalism at the beginning of this chapter.

However, there was also a certain pragmatic end (and arguably political and public expediency) that change was needed to improve the government finances that was not necessarily ideologically driven. The Labour cabinet argued to continue to deliver on "poverty and social inequality", as the cabinet Minister Goff put it, they needed to have the finances in order to pay for it (Reardon & Gray, 2007, p. 7).

There was also a need to reform restrictive social and business practices that were highly regulated, like licensing laws. A mixture of political and public sensibilities and practical problems led to a very local response that won the Labour party another term after being locked out of government for almost 10 years and only having had two three-year terms in charge of the country since 1949. Furthermore, Labour delivered more traditional policy on social issues like a nuclear-free Aotearoa-New Zealand that appeased many left-wingers. Also, they left labour relations untouched.

Neoliberal restructuring of the state 1984-1987

From 1935-1949, the first Labour government had created the machinery of government that was largely suspicious of markets and big on government intervention. From 1949-1984, the National government dominated politics with only two brief three-year Labour administrations. The National government slowly adopted more market-oriented mechanisms but, with Robert Muldoon at the helm, remained in the grip of a high degree of

central control and government intervention right up until 1984. In the late 1960s, the economy faced an agriculture-related shock, when its main export products fell in price by 25%. Oil shocks in the 1970s were followed by high energy costs. Despite calls for more market reforms, Muldoon supported old vested interests (Easton, 1994). As in Australia, the impetus for reform came from public sector economists. But, early in the Fourth Labour government, there was no account that clearly outlined the strategy for the reforms. It was not until in late 1987 that a Treasury Briefing, 'Government Management,' outlined in two volumes, the rationale with special attention to education (which was the subject of the second volume) and Māori equity which received multiple entries (New Zealand Treasury, 1987a, 1987b).

The first phase of reforms focussed on the controls and barriers to entry for businesses in trade. In this sense, it followed the classical liberal idea of laissez-faire economics and of economic man being focussed on producers not consumers. The key discourse was 'roll back' (Peck & Tickell, 2002), where deregulation and removal of tariffs, subsidies, and controls formed the first changes. The government liberalised the economy by deregulating the entry licensing into industry, partial deregulation of occupational licensing, and the removal of operating barriers to industry. They substantially decreased tariffs and subsidies, and removed price controls (Duncan, Lattimore, & Bollard, 1992). The roll back assumed a natural regulator and rationalist model to international trade that largely aped Adam Smith's argument for the invisible hand of the market.

The same rationale was applied to tax reform. It is not clear whether tax reform assumed 'trickle-down economics' but it seemed that way. The aim was to broaden the tax base and to simplify the system to increase capital investment. Previously, there had been an explicit aim of taxation to redistribute the excesses of market to support the less well-off to lead a life of dignity free from stigma (Royal Commission on Social Security, 1972). In the reform process, taxation was no longer viewed from a political perspective but was viewed from an economic one. The purpose was to create capital to invest. Therefore, the government lowered top tax rates, introduced the goods and services tax (GST) (regressive as the burden disproportionately falls on the less well-off), and they exempted the financial sector from GST. The argument of reforming tax to create capital to invest was applied to the public sector.

And the reason was, to continue "to combat poverty and social inequality," (Goff quoted from interview in Reardon & Gray, 2007) the government needed to straighten out the finances to pay for it. A discourse that continues to be widely invoked in the industrialised world.

Corporatisation of the public sector

Corporate reform encompassed the most significant change in the operating conditions of the public sector and would include employment law and financial reform. Three Acts of parliament radically reformulated how institutions were funded, how they operated, and the expectations of delivering a service in line with new public management: the 1986 State Owned Enterprise Act, the 1988 State Sector Act, and the 1989 Public Finance Act. The Acts set about establishing financial directives to make a profit, autonomy to encourage entrepreneurial behaviour in line with Hayek's critique of state control, an executive structure with authority to act and implement ideas, and the introduction of competitive practices in the public sector. Reform of employment law came later through subsequent National governments.

The corporatisation of the state sector established market conditions and private business practice as the model for reform. State owned enterprises (SOEs) were re-constructed with two shareholders, the Ministers of Finance and State Owned Enterprises. The SOEs were purchased from the Crown for equity and government debt. This established a balance sheet for the SOEs. Like a private business, the shareholders appointed a board of directors. The shareholders expected a return from their directors, based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model. Furthermore, like private companies, the SOEs were now expected to pay taxes. For all intents and purposes, this made SOEs subject to the market; and to the same legislation as private firms. They no longer had any social objectives; they only had an objective to make a profit (Easton, 1997). Responsibility and accountability lay with boards of directors to do this. Social goals associated with SOEs were abandoned. The assumption was that corporatisation, defined as the application of private business practices to the public sector, was inherently more efficient and effective and overt political goals reduced economic efficiency.

Therefore, the new public management modelled public institutions on private models of business and corporate practice delivering services as a private good (G Scott, 1996; G. Scott & Corringe, 1989). It disbanded institutional rules and practices that were founded on redistributive values with egalitarian ends (Christensen & Lægreid, 2001). New public management had no specific value or principle inherently to address equity, except market share. The model had to be applied to equity (Becker, 1992). For many, the focus on efficiency and the definition of education as a private good was antithetical to equity and egalitarianism (Grace, 1989; Seedhouse, 1994; M. Williamson, 1995).

New public management made targets, measurement, and performance management ubiquitous. Measures were not just aimed at educational goals but also organisational goals, like financial returns. Over time, an external audit was brought into the polytechnic sector to measure the utility of the internal resource (including building utilisation, staff utilisation, staff to student ratios, support staff to student ratio, cost of staff, etc.) and compared to the sector. It was believed that presenting national statistics on efficiency would drive polytechnics to aim for cost ratios as the best in the industry, regardless of operating contexts.

Policy advice from the New Zealand Treasury (1987a) encouraged the privatization and marketisation of services. In the course of time, some services were taken away – justified through reference to the inherent morality of the minimal state. The Treasury instead promoted competition, and consumer choice (Hood, 1991). Furthermore, marketisation re-iterates the neoliberal position that replaces exchange for competition (Foucault, 2008, p. 235). The same rationale would be applied to core government services including the polytechnic sector.

> Markets cannot be relied upon to provide appropriate price signals unless there is competition or the threat of competition. Many feel uneasy with the concept of competition: notions of excessive rivalry do not seem to fit comfortably with the ideals of co-operative endeavour and team work… Competitive activity is, in essence, a discovery procedure – a continuous search to find better ways of meeting consumer needs or to use resources more efficiently. (New Zealand Treasury, 1987a, p. 24)

Here the government aped the definition and the core element of neoliberal policy; competition, belief in the market, and the central place of the customer.

National party 1990-1999 – further and wider neoliberal reforms

Amid Labour party infighting and disagreement, and growing unpopularity from the reforms, the National party won the 1990 election on the promise of a 'decent society' that repudiated the radical reforms of the Fourth Labour government. However, the first budget of Ruth Richardson – the Finance Minister – dispelled any idea that there would be a change from the radical neoliberal programme of Roger Douglas. The Prime Minister, Jim Bolger, much like Douglas before him, announced that the country was in debt and that state of the economy needed to be addressed immediately. This opened the door to rolling back social and welfare policy as National did not carry traditional working-class constituencies. The economic policy of Richardson, in many ways an extension of Douglas's reform programme, focused its attention on social and welfare roll back and rolled out neoliberal programmes instead. Understanding the gravity of the change, Ruth Richardson called her budget the 'Mother of all Budgets'. The National party's first-term budget cuts were so unpopular that it nearly cost National the next election, where it had its big majority reduced down to one seat in 1993.

Neoliberal theory constructed a subjectivity based on an entrepreneurial spirit that encouraged individual responsibility and promoted a discourse that welfare stifled such a spirit. Furthermore, state intervention was largely seen as immoral unless it was propping up the market and encouraging competition. The National government went about reforming welfare with a neoliberal rationality, applying a market ideology and competition. The government propagated the idea that welfare created dependence so to cut welfare back, and to restrict it would create incentives to work. Welfare reform significantly changed from a universal right to a targeted approach and welfare beneficiaries were required more and more to demonstrate their work ethic or risk being sanctioned.

Welfare was seen as problematic, expensive and immoral around the world, and including in Aotearoa-New Zealand (Bedggood, 1999; Worth, 2001). Welfare-to-work programmes not only replaced welfare programmes but also constructed a discourse that introduced the idea that welfare made 'feral families' and an 'underclass' (Beddoe, 2014; C. Gray, 2017). It was a form of discourse that utilised labour discipline ('work readiness' in education or, as the OECD

coined it, 'work activation strategies'), psychological intervention (being poor is due to welfare settings and bad personal choice), and income management (a move away from enough welfare income to not enough to 'encourage the need to work'). Much of the rhetoric stemmed from the academic work of Lawrence Mead in the United States that was called 'workfare' (Mead, 1986), whose academic papers were influential in the Ministry of Social Development (Mead, 1997).

The Fourth Labour government had set up 17 task forces to enquire into social policy to deal with key equity issues whilst curtailing any political notions through the introduction of an 'economic package' that set out their taxation, income maintenance and superannuation commitments. The economisation and financialisation of social policy led to the introduction of user pay services (Royal Commission on Social Policy, 1988). In 1972, in stark contrast, the review on social policy was promoting a Keynesian vision:

> There should be a substantial increase in the benefit system as a whole, which would allow beneficiaries to enjoy a standard of living "much like" that of the rest of the community and which would enable them to participate in and belong to the community. (Royal Commission on Social Security, 1972, p. 72)

The important point here is, for several generations, New Zealanders had been brought up to believe in a fair-go society, one that placed egalitarianism at its heart and, despite the changes, many still held those views dear to them. The project of reform, whether intentionally or not, not only aimed to change public institutional operating conditions and rationality, but they attempted to change the very belief systems of New Zealanders.

The reforms to welfare and worker rights were a substantial change in the rationality of the state and how it should operate. The focus was not going to be on social welfare but focussed on enabling individuals to become more effective economic actors. Human capital (Becker, 1964; Schultz, 1961) approaches radically overhauled classical liberal ideas that treated labour as a commodity (Bowles & Gintis, 1975). The classical liberal model assumed a labour–wage exchange. Human capital firstly accepted that labour "is a produced means of production" (Bowles & Gintis, 1975, p. 74). Furthermore, labour differentiation is a core aspect of the labour force and social institutions are critical in producing labour. This led to human capital arguments over education as being best understood in economic terms

(Becker, 1964). Flexible labour laws would allow businesses to invest in workers and disinvest in workers who no longer had the human capital advantage. In return, workers, who had a human capital advantage, could demand higher wages. This was the new model of distribution – not through taxation but through becoming an entrepreneur of the self (Foucault, 2008). David H Autor (2015) succinctly put the human capital case:

> The primary system of income distribution in market economics is rooted in labour scarcity; citizens possess (or acquire) a bundle of valuable "human capital" that, due to its scarcity, generates a flow of income over the career path. (p. 28)

The implications were not just in overturning taxation as a method of redistribution but also in a wider association of equity and equality. Skills acquired, as labour is produced, become proxies to income, thus income equality is tied to educational equality, where the latter is a proxy for the former.

The Employment Contracts Act 1991 made union membership voluntary, bargaining voluntary – and essentially between employee and employer. Any disputes were to go to employment tribunals which were heavily underfunded, leading to a backlog of about 3000 cases. The new Act incorporated people by making them essentially private contractors, entrepreneurs of the self, who were invested in the means to be more enterprising, or, as Bernstein put it, "[have] the ability to profit from continuous pedagogic reformations" (Bernstein, 2001, p. 235) by offering new skills.

The short-term reality was that contracts would put workers in precarious positions by removing protections, union support and recourse to tribunals. After the stock market crash of 1987 unemployment reached a high of 11.2% in 1991, a rise of 170% (Department of Labour, 2009). To maintain profit margins, mass layoffs occurred including in the public sector. The new experience of work would be a state of insecurity (Bunting, 2005; Lazzarato, 2009). Furthermore, a new corporate reality introduced a performance culture, with measures and targets. Workers would be measured to see if they measured up. Work would be experienced in a new way, with employees more beholden to employers, more accountable for performance, and less able to defend their employment – a permanent state of insecurity and precarity. The unemployed would have to meet conditions that showed their willingness to work to receive welfare support or risk getting sanctioned. It was the freedom

of enterprise and the entrepreneur that were produced and organised in reform (Lazzarato, 2009, p. 120; van der Linden, 2014).

Neoliberal restructuring of the polytechnics

After the general reform of state, the core activities of government, like education and health, were radically reformed through the extension of the market and competition. In tertiary education, and education generally, the policy discourse of social justice and public good was largely dismantled. A new policy discourse emerged that made the primary raison d'être of education economic. As Foucault contended, neoliberalism:

> … involves extending the economic model of supply and demand and of investment-costs-profit so as to make it a model of social relations and existence itself, a form of relationship of the individual to himself, time, those around him, the group, and the family. (Foucault, 2008, p. 242)

The radicality of this new policy discourse is apparent when you compare it to the views of education that had held sway since 1938. Clarence Beeby and Walter Fraser argued that:

> The Government's objective, broadly expressed, is that every person, whatever his level of academic ability, whether he is rich or poor, whether he lives in the country, has a right, as a citizen, to a free education of the kind which he is best fitted, and to the fullest extent of his powers. So far is this from being a mere pious platitude that the full acceptance of the principle will involve the reorientation of the education system. (Beeby, 1992, p. 124)

The values expressed for a fair, egalitarian society were widespread in public education, as a public good, were as much about political ideals (like social justice) as they were about institutional arrangements to accomplish that ideal. The new policy discourse depoliticised education and applied a primary financial goal of being a successful business (Lazzarato, 2009). To achieve this policy intent, the government had to express education as a commodity, whose economic value could be determined (or at least measured); education had to be reconstructed as a private good. The expression of education as a private good not only describes a new idea, the new policy discourse re-establishes the power-knowledge-self nexus in the discourse itself and therefore the very 'soul of man' (Lazzarato, 2014; Rose, 1999).

Several important reports, and advice, legislation and opinion would reveal the challenge and rationale that was emerging where education would be reconstructed in neoliberal terms. The sentiments of Beeby, perhaps shared widely amongst education professionals, were being replaced by a human capital logic. In human capital, education was an investment and, like all investments, needed to show that its return on that investment was worth it. The policy discourse of investments would become more explicit in the course of the 2010s and was a direct development of von Mises' idea of catallactics, the political economy as the knowledge and science of free market exchanges.

Private good replaces public good

A radically new vision for education emerged out of the Education Act 1989 that reconstructed education as a private good. The political discourse on education encompassed a transformation of its rationality. The new discourse would focus on the economic value of education. How much did it cost? What were the opportunity costs? What were the cost benefit analyses indicating?

The new policy discourse would also talk about choice for learners and opportunities to gain skills for the modern globalised economy. The low rate of tertiary participation, especially amongst disadvantaged groups such as Māori and working-class students, would become a focus. The notion of access, widening participation, and lifelong learning were emerging as issues of equality of opportunity. The new emerging policy discourse had adopted the language of human capital theory. Labour was something produced, and public institutions were critical in that production, with a special place for education (Becker, 1964). In the first of the Reports on education (Probine & Fargher, 1987), Probine, who chaired the report on technical education, addressed the Minister in a letter that opened the report, reflecting the human capital discourse:

> Significant issues include low participation rates in tertiary education in New Zealand compared with other developed countries; the rate at which people with technological skills *are being produced*; a highly *centralised style of management* which inhibits the adoption of an *entrepreneurial* approach to the delivery of services; lack of coordination in the delivery of training; and last, but by no means least, the need to provide special help for socially disadvantaged groups such as young unemployed, Maori… (Probine & Fargher, 1987 opening letter to the report; my emphasis).

Equity was being constructed as a problem of centralised planning, implicitly invoking Hayek's critique (von Hayek, 1948). Competition and the adoption of the market were the only ways to plan. New forms of corporate behaviour would be required to operate a globally responsive technical education system which, in turn, would require the imposition of the minimal state to uphold competition and the market as Hayek had justified.

In the two extracts below, the Treasury introduced some important neoliberal precepts to treat education as a private good: competition, scarcity, an economic (rather than political) vision of education, and the central role of the free market (through price) as a mechanism for market information:

> Education shares the main characteristics of other commodities traded in the market place… Education is never free as there is always an opportunity cost to the provider. (New Zealand Treasury, 1987a, p. 33)
> Education can be analysed in a similar way to any other service in terms of interaction and exchange in the face of uncertainty, information costs, scarcity, interdependence and opportunism. (New Zealand Treasury, 1987b, p. 22)

The briefing published by the New Zealand Treasury (New Zealand Treasury, 1987a, 1987b) fundamentally challenged the notion of education as a public good. Instead, the New Zealand Treasury argued for, over two volumes of briefings, a market-based approach that would treat education as a private good or commodity.

Applying the rationale of a private good treats education as something that gives benefit but is excludable and rivalrous. Excludable means it confers private property rights on its owners (an idea derived from Locke) and prevents those who have not paid for it from consuming it. Being rivalrous means use by one prevents use by another. Furthermore, a private good is scarce, thereby creating competition for it. The policy discourse of treating education as a private good turns Beeby's unconditional access on its head. Therefore, pricing education (fees or loans to study as proxies) would allow learners, professionals, institutions, and government to evaluate the return on investment.

Several reports, advice, and papers, covering the whole span of education, proved influential and, taken together, formed the new policy discourse of education as a commodity or private

good. The first was a report on technical and vocational education and it laid the fundamental analyses that, largely, all other education reports followed (Probine & Fargher, 1987). Brian Picot, a supermarket magnate, led the taskforce report on school education that promoted a reform in administration; this followed private business models (Picot, 1988). Many of the recommendations from Picot's Report were based on recommendations from Probine and Fargher. The Hawke Report (Hawke, 1988) was the most important for this thesis, as it addressed tertiary education, and particularly the role of technical education. The government's policy response was the two-volume 'Learning for Life' (Lange & Goff, 1989) document; the Education Act 1989 largely adopted Hawke's key recommendations.

The idea that education should be recast as a private, rather than a public, good was important, not only because it overturned Beeby's 50-year-old notion of education, but that it broadly remade the institution of education into a business (Grace, 1989) – a focus on return on investment became the rationale for education.

Yet, Māori education, in part, continued to be viewed through an egalitarian lens, with a focus on equity, which challenged the private commodity model of education through its implicit reference to social justice (G. Stewart, 2018). How government would marry the egalitarian directive with a corporate vision remained untested. Despite cutting a space in the margins for Māori, the egalitarian political ambition – the inherent elements of public service ethos – was largely dismantled. Public institutions were depoliticised and political ambitions were replaced by financial models and the profit motive. The new leaders of polytechnics were CEOs, equipped, ideally with MBAs, so they could manage risk and opportunity through accounting procedures as required by the State Sector Act 1988.

The Education Act 1989 and the Education Amendment Act 1990

The passing of the Education Act 1989 and the Education Amendment Act 1990 redefined the structure, governance, management, and funding of tertiary education in line with a neoliberal ethos. The Acts reoriented the education system by disbanding the Department of Education, redefining the tertiary subsector roles, introducing a corporate structure, and

introducing a demand-driven funding mechanism. It was a total re-organisation of education that adopted several influential neoliberal theories to re-orient the education system.

The Department of Education (in relation to tertiary education) functions were split and made autonomous for better accountability and to give each area an independent strategic direction linked to performance. The three agencies (here there was an explicit influence of agency theory (Althaus, 1997)) that eventually replaced the Department of Education were the Ministry of Education (MoE), the New Zealand Qualifications Authority (NZQA) and the Tertiary Education Commission (TEC). The MoE became responsible for policy and the framework for education, producing data, statistics, and reports to support decision making. NZQA became responsible for the national qualifications system, approval of programmes and quality assurance. TEC was given the corporate function which set strategic priorities, allocated funding, audited and monitored educational and financial performance. They, too, produced data and guidance notes to support their strategic priorities. Most important was the move away from central planning to guidance and advice from these government agencies.

Before the change, central planning by the Department of Education, was inherently inefficient because it could never effectively sum up the needs of the many and it lacked accountability and transparency. Collectivisms inevitably forced ideological unity for an ideological goal (von Hayek, 1938). Bureaucratic decisions were felt by local polytechnics as arbitrary and any innovation that polytechnics sought to resolve local issues went through a big bureaucratic machine. The innovation rarely got the attention the local polytechnics felt they deserved in a timely manner. So, autonomy solved an important problem of a lack of movement and understanding for change from the Department of Education. The autonomy was largely welcomed (Codling & Meek, 2003). On the other hand, the autonomy also abdicated political goals and weakened the hand of government in this regard.

The polytechnics were reconstructed as autonomous institutes responsible for their own strategic direction and meeting government priorities whilst maintaining financial sustainability. The role of polytechnics was defined in Section 162(4) part b ii) of the Education Act 1989:

A polytechnic is characterised by a wide diversity of continuing education, including vocational training, that contributes to the maintenance, advancement, and dissemination of knowledge and expertise and promotes community learning, and by research, particularly applied and technological research, that aids development.

Within government guidelines, autonomy meant independent decision making on the portfolio of programmes to be offered with a focus on getting students into work. How, where, and what was delivered was now in the control of the polytechnics. Previously, these decisions were largely made by the Department of Education. This was now decentralised to the 23 regional polytechnics which were largely focussed on delivering the needs of their own region.

The polytechnics did not operate in a regional vacuum as part of the strategic duty was to produce a business or investment plan justifying, with data and evidence, their decisions. Furthermore, they had to compete for students with universities, which operated nationally; wānanga, which delivered tailored programmes within a Māori framework; and private training enterprises i.e. for-profit operators, which were initially restricted in their access to public funding, but, over time, were granted equal footing, subject to guidelines, standards and rules. The differentiation created a great deal of competition and a crowded market to service the small population of Aotearoa-New Zealand.

Funding also changed significantly, from a centralised grant in the old system, allocated by bureaucrats in the Department of Education, to a new system of bulk funding, based on demand-driven criteria (the number of students), of all tertiary providers. Bulk funding gave a planned amount of funding to polytechnics that was later reconciled against actual enrolments. The application of a market logic to funding was one of the most significant changes to the polytechnic sector and initially was generally welcomed (Codling & Meek, 2003). Polytechnics entered new markets to compete for students and student participation massively expanded and widened to include those who traditionally did not see tertiary-level education as an option (McLaughlin, 2003).

Further changes introduced by the Education Act 1989 created the systematic changes that introduced a new rationale to the polytechnics of market behaviour, through the introduction of new funding mechanism. Two new funding sources became available: international students (with no cap on numbers) and the introduction of fees (accompanied by a student loan system). In a globalised education market, international students offered a lucrative source of income, where extra costs were largely minimal as the students could be integrated into already existing courses with domestic students. The introduction of fees allowed polytechnics to charge fees for most of their courses within mandated limits creating another source of income.

Funding, over time, became increasingly subject to the market. Different courses (qualifications) received different levels of funding. Generally, programmes with higher costs and at higher levels got more funding. This drove polytechnics to deliver higher-level courses such as degrees (and eventually, postgraduate) which created competition with the universities. Funding levels for courses were maintained and rarely got inflationary uplifts forcing polytechnics to deliver more for less, as staff often received at least inflationary pay rises. The drive for management-led efficiency was part of the expectation on polytechnics to eliminate 'waste'. The government also introduced funding-level pots which were not transferable. This complicated funding decisions for polytechnics as it restricted their ability to respond to the market, but it retained government priorities to areas that did not attract high funding (like level 2 funding that focussed on basic literacy, numeracy, and cognitive skills). This created competition and expanded the market by making the polytechnics compete with private providers who specialised in some of these areas. Furthermore, the government introduced competitive tendering for pots of funding and many polytechnics lost their funding in these areas altogether.

New governance structure, introduced by the 1989 Education Act, were introduced to align with the neoliberal ethos particularly to remove the opacity of decision-making in the Department of Education. The new governance structure was based on a radicalisation of the classical liberal social contract (Ramia, 2002). The new contractualism was based on individual autonomy and emphasised a minimal state through a legal contract applied to state services (von Hayek, 1960). In the polytechnics, this was established by the Employment Contracts Act

1991. For governance, it meant the CEO was contracted by a government-appointed board of directors (the 'council') whose job was to deliver financial and educational performance. The council were expected to performance manage the CEO and answer to the TEC and their board. The board–CEO relationship exemplified the principle–agent contracting notion (Davis, Sullivan, & Yeatman, 1997).

Problems with the new system

According to Foucault, two forces are at work, economic reason, and the historically liberal state administration of governmentality (Foucault, 2008). Autonomy and individualisation were how government utilised the very freedom they granted as a way of enlisting professionals and polytechnics as the active subjects of neoliberal 'control' through the mechanisms of responsibility and accountability.

> The utility of each and all, the utility of individuals and the general utility – will be the major criteria for working out the limits of the powers of public authorities and the formation of a form of public law and administration law … a complex interplay between individual and collective interests, between social utility and economic profit, between the equilibrium of the market and the regime of public authorities. (Foucault, 2008, p. 44)

The legislation made polytechnics autonomous, but somewhat misleadingly so, since the government maintained control at a distance, or utilised the freedom of polytechnics to assert hegemonic pressure to follow the constraints of government priorities (Rose & Miller, 2008). Polytechnics became quasi-autonomous institutions nominally in charge of their own strategic directions.

The Education Act 1989 established control through the 'principal–agent' models of new institutional economics. Agency theory focuses attention not so much on *what* government should do but *how* to do it better. The question of what governments should do is considered settled in neoliberal thinking (until something like a pandemic hits). Through advice and guidance, incentives and sanctions, and results-based accountability, the government could manage at a distance, leaving decision-making to local polytechnic senior management teams, who would be liberated to innovate and become entrepreneurial. The government

enforced their particular priorities using a contractual approach, which is fundamental in agency theory (Althaus, 1997; Hazeldine, 2000).

The polytechnics, through the corporate reform programme, were required to make financial returns, meet targets and deliver outcomes. The point of the profit motive was to encourage competition which, in turn, encouraged innovation to maintain the marketplace. Māori equity was dealt with by the market because competitively driven polytechnics would innovate to bring new ideas to solving educational disparity, and they would be highly motivated to do so as their profits would depend upon it.

The corporate duty of ensuring financial sustainability and educational achievement by TEC has remained problematic for the sector. The financial requirement to secure a 3% margin to maintain a high degree of confidence has rarely been met. In fact, some polytechnics have merged because they could not survive independently. But this has largely been ineffective as the merged entities seem to have carried the financial losses. Like all business environments and competitive industries, it meant creating winners and losers. In 2017, the polytechnics made net loss of $56m (Office of the Auditor-General, 2018). The funding mechanism, used as a tool to drive efficiency, has led to a state-sector-wide debt and a financially unsustainable future (Cabinet Social Wellbeing Committee, 2018; Office of the Auditor-General, 2018).

Furthermore, the duty to return a 3% margin within funding constraints and settings, has encouraged rent-seeking behaviour, as predicted by key neoliberal thinkers (Buchanan, Tollison, & Tullock, 1980; Stigler, 1971). Offering places and courses to maximise profit but with minimal societal value became unintended consequences of this policy shift. Furthermore, courses with societal value, ones aimed at helping those furthest away from the job market, have largely attracted the least amount of funding and are subject to competitive tenders making them less profitable and riskier, creating a disincentive to offer them. Here equity is put into a state of precarity (funding rates have consistently remained lower for lower levels and a competitive tendering was also introduced at foundation levels to drive down prices (TEC, 2018a)).

The danger is that if there is no 'profit/surplus' in parts of education, then a strong rationale would exist to divest the risky low returns. The poor return, in turn, occurred in the least well-funded parts of education which were usually the parts associated with priority groups who were being underserved already and made up much of the unequal educational outputs. Foundation and low-level courses attracted the least funding as they often did not generate a user-pay component and had low levels of government subsidy. Furthermore, they could not be topped up by international students. Such realities would suggest investing in other areas where returns were higher. As a result, at least in part, educational achievement, and particularly the strategic priority of educational parity for Māori set out in all the Tertiary Education Strategies, (discussed more fully in the next chapter), has remained consistently poor – Māori have continued to perform below non-Maori as they are overrepresented in those areas that generate the least surplus.

Professionals, priorities, funding, employment relationships, corporate structures were imbricated into daily polytechnic life. Thus, just like private business, a commercial orientation became the required focus. This ran against the instincts of a system that had long prized its egalitarian roots, even if the egalitarianism for Māori and the working classes were largely a myth (Consedine, 1989).

The neoliberal polytechnic

The Education Act 1989 produced a polytechnic that was crucially autonomous. The autonomy was produced in a milieu of rapid neoliberal reforms – a liberal governmentality. This interacted with the development of economic reason that utilised public administration theories, particularly, public choice and human capital to construct an economic rationality operating at all levels of polytechnic life. Over time, successive governments brought in increasing numbers of policies and procedures that increased competition. The introduction of limited loans and the increasing cost of living as a student made an economic rationality for tertiary choice more 'natural'. The TEC, as a funding agency, constructed education as a private investment opportunity for individuals. These broad level changes produced the institutional settings from which Māori equity would be constructed.

A liberal governmentality was fundamentally different to disciplinary regimes; there was no coercion, it was in fact *freedom* that was its central milieu (Foucault, 2007). Liberal governmentality worked hand in hand to produce the market and enterprise culture. The Education Act 1989 unfolded a programme of reform that created commercial markets and private operators, private training enterprises and business-like practices to the polytechnic sector, and a system of debts for learners.

Funding was to become demand driven so that the polytechnic would be exposed to a competitive market. Various reforms to funding and student loans would establish an investment framework for decision making. Increasing debt for students and increasing competition for polytechnics would act in unison to create a self with a calculating reason adding up the cost and benefits from studying a course. This was the vision of human flourishing based on the utilitarian ideas of liberalism.

In simple policy terms, the polytechnics were constituted primarily to deliver jobs. Education would reread equity as economic liberation through widening participation, inclusion and creating lifelong opportunities to access education (New Zealand Business Roundtable, 1988; New Zealand Treasury, 1987a). Polytechnics had to be flexible and agile as global trade faced rapid, technology-driven changes. The need to adapt to rapidly changing technology and economic change has been constant in the neoliberal analyses of the role of technical or skills education.

> The demands on the education system to fit and refit people for work are increasing enormously. Ironically, at the same time, rising unemployment, often linked to technological change, leads many to see the system as also having to prepare people for non-work, that is for unemployment and leisure. Thus a key current question to be addressed in this brief is whether the mechanisms for change in education policy, which worked well in more leisurely times, are up to the sudden gear shifts that are increasingly required if the system is to adapt to the fast changing and increasingly varied needs of society. (New Zealand Treasury, 1987b, p. 4)
>
> What New Zealand needs from its education system will change as the world of work changes. The major force is technological change. In the last decade, there has been an explosion in device connectivity, disruptive technologies, and rapid advances in automated systems, all of which will change organisations and labour markets. (TEC, 2018c, p. 1)

The emphasis on a rational calculus with outcomes and results-based accountability would place a special importance on the relevance of quantitative measures. Measures would play a central part in the calculus of equality. If a student lacked the 'right skills' then this could be measured and actions to ameliorate this state could be encouraged through the prudent use of sanctions and rewards.

Dismantling terms such as the *right skills* would lead to a set of skills needed in the economy (the right subjects – e.g., the emphasis on STEM (science, technology, engineering and maths), the students that lacked them (e.g., how many and who does or does not possess them?), and an emphasis on the capacity to learn (the rise of courses such as foundation or access – which are focussed on learning to learn, on English literacy and numeracy, and work readiness). Therefore, measuring qualification results becomes an essential measure for equality and a proxy for human capital. The human capital vision of the worker is that of a willing slave, anxious for the attention of employers (Bunting, 2005; Lordon, 2014; A. Scott, 1994).

The polytechnic: freedom as stifling control?

In the polytechnics, how polytechnic staff relate to the organisation and each other is not generally understood to be circumscribed by legislation. But as a key figure in new institutional economics put it:

> Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They are made up of formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (norms of behaviour, conventions, and self imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics. Together they define the incentive structure of societies and specifically economies. (North, 1990, p. 3)

In this sense, the neoliberal knowledge power nexus is imbricated in our lives. But it would be a mistake to believe, somehow, in this pervasive system, that each of us are somehow outside of those institutional structures. The notion of self is produced by the minutiae of details that the discourse of neoliberalism constructed through policy.

Neoliberal policy discourse has constructed a self, built on the classical liberal ideal of homo economicus. In neoliberal form, homo economicus is as an 'entrepreneur of himself'

(Foucault, 2008), profiting from a constant pedagogic reformation of self. He is a competitive human being attempting to maximise the "ends of scarce means which have alternative uses" (Foucault, 2008, p. 235). In this sense, education is an investment opportunity, a chance to get ahead of the competition.

Freedom does not mark the limits of the new rationale of governance – on the contrary, it is the very strategy it utilises for governance. It operates at the level of our aspirations and our desires. It does not tell us *what* we should aspire to or what we should desire, instead it tells *how* we should aspire and desire. It is an intense form of power that is pervasive as it becomes less apparent (Nealon, 2008).

> The new governmental reason needs freedom; therefore, the new art of government consumes freedom. It must produce it, it must organize it. The new art of government therefore appears as the management of freedom. (Foucault, 2008, p. 63)

Thus, for example, the Employment Contracts Act 1991, as described above, is a strategy for employer flexibility, freeing corporations of costs and accountability. The legislation achieves this much, at least. But it is also an account of subjectification –of how we are made into subjects. Instead of being workers, we are incentivised to become contractors, or a company of one. As a contractor, costs are minimised for the employer. For example, in polytechnics fixed term contracts rarely include compensation for vocational breaks, and often pay by the hour. It is not only the cost cutting that is important, it also how the legislation and policy discourse produce selves with an investment logic. Contractors are forced to weigh up every cost and this makes them into a particular kind of subject. The law uses their desire to be independent (free) into an entrepreneurial mentality and thus we are imbricated in the system.

The reforms of the Fourth Labour government drew on a new set of theories that imbricated our own freedom, as individuals, in a new way of being – a new social ontology (Lazzarato, 2012). Foucault's challenge was that the very notion of self is also part of the construction of the free market. Neoliberalism, in a counterintuitive move, establishes an area of freedom through which it implicates its practice (Foucault, 2009). There is no better example of this than education. Human capital makes education a lifelong journey of a constant pedagogic

reformation that can never be complete (Bernstein, 2000). It is a state of becoming, where we are always rushing to keep up with the needs of capital. It is lifelong learning as expressed in the language of policy (Lange & Goff, 1989).

As human capitalist theory contends, 'labour is produced' (Bowles & Gintis, 1976). When the rationality of labour is extended to the whole of life (Becker, 1992), and the ethos by which we should live is predicated on a notion of economic rationality (Henrich et al., 2001), it is not only our institutions, but also our 'selves' that are imbricated in the knowledge–power nexus. Power is productive (Foucault, 1979) and, arguably, seductive (Han, 2017). These themes are explored through narrative genres in the following chapter.

Chapter Five: Narrative Commentaries

This chapter centres on six short narratives, grouped in two sets of three, each set followed by a brief commentary. I completed 6 individual, face-to-face, semi-structured interviews with participants who worked in the polytechnic sector. These interviews allowed me to include authentic voices of Māori equity policy actors. Collecting interview data from this set of expert participants enabled me to compile a more extensive library of experiences relating to the research question than available to me based on my own personal experiences.

These narratives or stories are vehicles for presenting rich interview data in ways that bring to life the space in which staff operate in the policy cycle. They magnify the world of policy for the reader, showcasing examples of lived micro-politics that produce professional experience in polytechnics. The stories are windows on the relationships between material reality, policy, polytechnic practice and the way that the normalising episteme helps construct meaning and value in the 'shared experience' of professional life.

The polytechnic space is both fragmented and factional. To appreciate the complexity of Māori equity policy in polytechnics it is critical to understand the roles of funding, organisational systems and culture, professional alignments, and the wider education system. The following brief description of the artificial construct of *fragmented factions* will help the reader understand the day-to-day operational 'realities' by which Māori equity policy is enacted.

Māori equity policy is used here to refer to wide set of institutional practices and policies who share the explicit aim of a desire to reduce Māori inequity and the tacit assumption that it is a just political ambition. Moreover, Māori equity policy also includes explicit policies, reports, memos, plans, actions, guidance etc that have either direct or indirect impact on Māori equity. In Chapter 7 I explore some of these explicit policies, particularly coming from governing agencies, such as the TEC, NZQA, and the MoE and their impact. Here I present the

lived implications and experience on knowledge-power-self nexus that gives an alternative perspective from which to view the explicit policies especially from the governing agencies.

The polytechnic could be said to operate with multiple internal interests that broadly form four groupings: foundation education, degree/post-graduate education, Māori education and trades education. These groupings relate to other areas of the educations system – school, university, wānanga, and work-based apprenticeships – in a fragmented way, mirroring some aspects of each. The polytechnic is a hybrid system with each grouping never quite reaching full recognition: it occupies an *occluded centre*.

The foundation grouping is associated with schools in an adult environment and focusses on basic skills, work readiness and basic academic thinking to create opportunities to bridge students into higher academic and work opportunities. Many of the staff associated with foundation education have a relationship with schools, secondary education and teaching. Importantly, for Māori equity policy, Māori are overrepresented in these courses and despite its role in bridging education, there are high levels of attrition.

The diplomas and degree (and some post-graduate courses) grouping associates with higher education and, therefore, resemble university education but, unlike university education, they lack the resources and research culture that you might find in a university. These courses receive the highest amount of funding and generally have low levels of attrition. Māori are generally underrepresented in this grouping.

On the other hand, perhaps for obvious reasons, Māori language and Māori arts courses are associated with larger numbers of Māori students. They can often be tied to local iwi, hapū and whanau desires to maintain the local language and culture. They offer courses up to degree level, even if the bulk of the courses are at lower levels. The staff in these subject areas usually inhabit Māori spaces, where possible, and often play an instrumental role in mediating local iwi and hapū relationships.

The trades, broadly conceived, are associated with work and skills-based education. They train from entry-level qualification into more advanced trades qualification at diploma level.

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They are largely taught by industry experts who are employed for their expertise rather than their teaching experience or qualifications. Much of the teaching is practical and resembles simulated workplaces or actual apprenticeships. They have a competitive relationship with the industry training organisations (ITOs) and private training providers who are prominent in this area. They have a high proportion of Māori students (17.2%) (Wensvoort, 2015) and a number of national Māori educational initiatives such as Māori trades training (MPTT) and the engineering education to employment secondary-tertiary pathways project.

Narratives of foundation education

Foundation focussed training opportunities or foundation education is education aimed at levels 1-4 that often involves subject based learning (like trades) but is primarily focus on literacy and numeracy and increasingly on cognitive development around learning how to learn. It often also incorporates work-readiness and Māori culture. Adult foundation courses tend to focus on second-chance learners in level 2 literacy and numeracy programmes.

The first three narratives focus on the politics of foundation education, which is positioned as a significant element of Māori equity policy. It is worth noting the obvious opportunity to 'solve' the underrepresentation of Māori in higher level courses by bridging the foundation students into diploma and degree programmes. On the face of it, this would solve the parity of participation issue at higher levels as well as present a sustained opportunity to work with Māori students supporting them through to completion which, in turn, offers an opportunity to close the achievement gap.

Story 5: The Polytechnic Council Meeting

Part I:

I was outside the Polytechnic executive meeting room, where the monthly Council meeting with the CEO was taking place. I was anxious because the meetings often lacked decorum and became aggressive in tone. Nearly all the ministerial appointments on the council were

accountants and had little patience for educational ideals. Just the previous month I had had a run-in with the Chair, which led with him shouting at me for a good few minutes, caused by the fact that we were speaking from two incommensurable viewpoints. I couldn't stomach the situation.

The executive assistant opened the door and asked me to come in. They were all grabbing a bite to eat and invited me to join them. I had been asked to attend the discussion about Level 2 delivery for second-chance learners, and whether it was sustainable. It was a priority in the government strategy; and the subject of a new government initiative. In an attempt to get better value and better results, all Level 2 funding was to be subject to a competitive tender. All the polytechnics would be bidding against each other, and in competition with private training enterprises (PTEs). The conditions to be met seemed to favour the PTE sector. The business rationale for Level 2 provision was going to be hard to justify to our Council. My stomach continued to churn. I sat down and readied my papers and got ready as everyone took their seats again.

The Council explained their reasoning for wanting to pull out of foundation courses, expressing it crudely as teaching 'the hapless and hopeless'. They listed: the low funding rates; the poor educational outputs; the demographics (by implication an inability to deliver to Māori); the gap in achievement; and so on. They were right: as a revenue stream for a profit centre, Level 2 was unreliable: hard to recruit, with some of the lowest levels of completion. These facts made foundation high risk, low return courses and viewed from an accountancy cost-benefit perspective made the courses unattractive as proposition, especially for polytechnic councils who governed strategic priorities and had a duty to maintain the profitability of the polytechnic.

Part II:

The director of the academic unit, disappointed by the Council meeting, met with the foundation teaching team to let them know that the Council had decided not to commit to so many Level 2 or foundation learners and insisted in larger classes to increase the revenue despite the trade of for time spent with students by the tutor. Consequently, there were going

to be job losses. Moreover, there were going to be strained relations between managers, directors and teaching staff. The director of the academic unit was dreading the conversation. Poor financial performance and poor results from students had become a proxy for poor teaching, so the theory went. Even those teachers who would survive the cuts would be under a cloud as the same financial risks and student results were still present and it was a matter of time for them to emerge in their classes. They might feel relieved that they had 'survived' the latest cull, but they remained resentful that close friends had lost their jobs.

The director handed out letters to all the remaining staff. The letter warned them that low numbers would mean no classes and therefore their jobs were at risk. Cost savings would have to be made. Poor performance would have to be managed. The trouble was, this is what they were told every year. It was a repetition compulsion – every year, yearly results, annual reviews, annual performance reviews, an endless cycle of scrutiny that changed nothing. What the teachers never understood was how a 'decree to do better' would actually help. How was being told that results have to be better supposed to make results better? How long had this gone on for? By focussing on achievement rates on a yearly basis we came to the same reasons for the poor results every year – as if the last year had been wiped from our memories and the problem just carried on repeating itself.

Part III:

The director met with the foundation teachers and the programme manager for foundation, as she wanted to show she was being tough and understood the language of business. The programme manager and she couldn't help thinking that she was telling the director what he wanted to hear. She had learnt enough about management to ventriloquise the language of management. They all played along.

"We have to limit our intake to reduce risk." By this she meant reducing the riskiest students, which meant fewer Māori students – without saying it. Much of the management rationale was code for an ever more punitive system, which was pervasive in the public sector. The rationale was plain: if students failed it was the teacher's fault. For the teachers, it was under-resourcing and therefore management's fault. Everyone was complicit in playing a management language game and the problems kept recurring. And so it was, after performing

enough management-speak about risk and value, it returned to exactly the same formula with just enough changes to suggest action was being taken. This year's action was the risk register, where students were scrutinised for risky behaviour. Each teacher had their register of students and the teacher with the programme manager would go through the students assigning a risk to each student.

Furthermore, government had made (sustainable) employment a broad level goal that made outputs (passing the foundation course) and the outcome, progression onto higher level courses or employment as measures of success. Often, foundation level students were in and out of unemployment benefit and due to wider unemployment policies were expected to take up low paying jobs to retain benefits. Thus, foundation students often took up short term jobs soon after completing foundation courses or during courses which the polytechnics could claim as a successful outcome.

The first teacher gave the programme leader a list of 18 foundation students, which at once pleased management (good numbers) and scared the programme manager (how many would last?). The teacher assured them that he had vetted the students which, for Level 2, counted for little. He knew half these students would probably either not show up, drop out, or not pass. But he played the game. The polytechnic needed numbers; he needed numbers to keep his job and the longer he could delay the inevitable drop-off of foundation students, the less likely the Senior Management Team (SMT) were to cancel his course. The first trick was always to get through the first six weeks, which marked a funding threshold and triggered funding from the TEC to the polytechnic, through sustained efforts to retain the students. The programme management encouraged this as it was one of the strategies to retain students; support up front as drop-out rates were highest in the first few months and, after the first few months, funding could be maintained from initial planning levels.

It was stressful. Of course, the teachers could not achieve the key priority of getting people into sustainable work because the level of the course was so low. The rationality for Māori students investing in foundation courses had become questionable as entry-level jobs often did not require any qualifications. Curriculum was now required to put in units on work readiness, believing that foundation courses were fundamentally about mind-sets at work.

But the demanding effects of foundation education were felt across the institution, because the more foundation courses polytechnics offered, the greater the pressure on other courses to get learners into employment to keep up the percentages of successful outcomes.

The programme leader knew most of the foundation teachers felt a sense of responsibility to foundation education despite spending most of the year complaining about the foundation students. This was where the teachers struggled. No one wanted to listen to the real problems. The issues of poverty, health, social and cultural elements were being ignored or objectified by crude numbers. Each Māori student was being eroded by a multitude of stereotypes.

No one was listening, but everyone was being monitored ever more closely.

Story 6: In the Foundation Staffroom

Coming back to work this year was worse than most years because no one knew what the consequences of the new competitive tendering system for Level 2 funding would be. It was clear the polytechnics (ITPs) were going to be undercut by the PTE sector, and there was a strong suspicion it would have a massive impact on the ITP sector. That suspicion turned out to be justified, as $38 million of funding in the polytechnic sector was slashed to just $6 million.

The prefab staffroom was abuzz as the teachers discussed their workload planners. The workload planners for foundation tutors had become normalised; they had accepted that because foundation tutors were operating at the lower academic end of the scale, they should have more contact hours than other staff. The logic for higher-level courses was that the funding rates for degrees were generally much higher; students enrolled for longer (over multiple years); degree courses tended to have much higher completion rates, and the job prospects were usually better. Return on investment for teaching hour was much higher. The opportunity costs of foundation provision were too high as teachers' costs were largely the

same, but the returns and risks were higher for foundation courses compared to higher level (level 4+) courses.

This year there was a change: every teacher of foundation was expected to have big classes, to deliver to more groups by reducing the contact hours, would be paid less, and was more likely to be employed on precarious, fixed-term contracts. The teachers were expecting massive redundancies. These academic staff were often looked down on by their colleagues, seen as having no expertise, no subject-specific knowledge, and getting poor results. Every year they were targeted. This year was even worse because *all* the foundation teachers, even the permanent staff, were on notice. The polytechnic would not receive confirmation until the early part of the new academic year of the results of the new competitive tender.

They had received their letters…

"Did you get that job?"

"Yeah, but don't tell anyone. I'm thinking they're bound to offer redundancies again. Did you receive the letter informing us that our jobs are at risk if we do not meet our targets?"

"Same as last year. God, I hate it. I should look for another job."

"You know how it goes! Some of us will lose our jobs, only for the decision to be reversed in Semester 2 because they need the numbers. Then you know they'll re-employ you and you don't have to come in for all the other duties. We never get paid for all the extra support and time."

There was a feeling of compulsive repetition. Every year their work was devalued, large parts went unrecognised and served no inherent purpose as far as the administration was concerned. The teachers knew it counted for the students, but they resented the invisible workload of taxing emotional labour.

It surely gave pause for reflection that the investment logic applied to foundation education was at odds with the lived reality of the learners, as well as of the teachers tasked with working in that environment.

"It makes me mad. We are always asked to make sure our students complete and yet the real work it takes is out there."

"I know but you're leaving so what do you care?"

But they did care. It was a strange kind of caring. They rationalised their professional circumstances by empathising with their student body. A student body they often had little otherwise in common with. Only the Māori staff among them had relevant life experience, and were often expected to carry out substantial 'invisible' work, including being called upon to perform Māori protocols. This work was expected, despite receiving little or no official recognition by their employer. It was important, the administration would say, with a maddening lack of further explanation, for 'Māori to succeed as Māori.'

Story 7: The Redundancy Letter Speaks

I was born in the new era of public sector administration and rules. A number of key pieces of legislation – the Public Finance Act (1989), the State Sector Act (1988) and the Education and Education Amendment Acts (1989, 1990) – created the authority and framework for my coming into being. I always was, and still am, just a simple letter. My existence was ordained by the need to consult with academic staff in danger of losing their jobs.

My flesh and bones are a simple blank page and my blood is the ink that is indelibly stamped on that page. I enact the legislation in my theatre, the polytechnics, darling of the stage. What a performance I have given over the years! "Encore, encore!" shout the management.

I was conceived and fashioned out of the nihilism of the new management science being applied to the public sector. Nihilism, by its nature, is dark and destructive. I was created to remind academics who worked in the polytechnics that their existence was precarious and relied on a numbers game. I am the sharp blade of the underbelly of widening participation. Get the numbers or risk being killed off. In this sense, I am a death threat.

My latest iteration is in pro-forma, one that works across course, programmes, departments, staff and years. A similar letter exists in all the other polytechnics and a similar exercise is being carried out there by my fellow letters. My causalities are reported in the local papers. My pro-forma is simple and beautiful, and respects the taboo against saying openly that the threat of death is upon the staff and the students.

Dear

As you may have already be aware, on top of the significant funding challenges we are facing, there are also a number of programmes we are planning to offer to students next year that we are particularly concerned about with regards to enrolling sufficient students for them to be viable.

The current intention is that in semester 1 we will be offering the course of study detailed below, however, this is dependent on both the outcome of the current consultation on funding **and** securing a viable number of enrolled students. I therefore want to confirm to you and your colleagues what the minimum number of enrolments needed for the course to be viable is:

Course / Paper	Location	Start Date	Minimum Enrolments

Enclosed with this letter is a breakdown of the income and expenditure associated with delivery of the course, which I hope provides you with a clearer understanding as to how the minimum level of enrolments figure has been determined.

We also need to acknowledge, however, that, despite our collective best efforts, it is possible that the minimum enrolments level may not be achieved. If this occurs, it is highly likely that delivery of the programme will not go ahead.

I will ensure that you receive regular updates on the level of enrolled students via your work e-mail address.

I appreciate you may have questions and/or comments relating to the contents of this letter and would ask you to direct these as follows:

1. Recommendations on marketing activity to be directed via your Programme Leader, as soon as possible.
2. Comments on the following issues should be submitted by latest, to your line manager
   - Minimum level of enrolments
   - Other issues that you would like to be considered when decision are made with regard to whether to progress with delivery of the course / paper.

The following is a summary of key events and activities between now and the start of semester 1, 2017:

Consultation commences	
Your recommendations on appropriate marketing activity	Ongoing
All enrolments submitted to Enquiries & Enrolments Team (mid-day)	
Your suggestions and ideas on: ~ Minimum viable student levels	

~ Other issues you would want to be considered before a decision is taken on whether the course progresses as planned.	
Decisions re any course cancellations made by the Acting Chief Executive and **conveyed to you** (if necessary)	

If you have any questions or would like some advice relating to the content of this letter, or the potential implications on your continued employment, please do not hesitate to contact the Human Resources Team.

Yours sincerely

Appendix A – Minimum Enrolment Levels – Financial Formulae Explanation

Foundation Studies Level 3

Revenue	
SAC (Govt) Funding per EFT x target enrolled student numbers	$55,215
GSS (Student paid fees) x target enrolled student numbers	$10,595
Class materials fees x target enrolled student numbers	$2,634
Revenue Generated (A)	$68,444

Payroll / Running Costs	
Tutorial salary (average for Programme Area)	$32,310
Directorate Costs charged pro rata per EFTS (E.g. Management, Technicians, and Staff Support etc.)	$8,190
Consumable costs based on actual historic spend per EFTS (E.g. class materials, transport etc.)	$4,590
Direct Costs (B)	$45,090

Contribution Levels

This 'contribution' is used to fund the operating overheads, the salary costs of support functions and re-investment into areas such as premises improvements / upgrading IT equipment etc.

Contribution % = Revenue (A) - Direct Costs (B) ÷ Revenue (A)

The contribution level target for your course of study is 34.1%. The overall average contribution target across all courses of delivery is 45%.

Commentary

The council meeting narrative shows how economic rationalism is ingrained in the very system of governance and, in turn, is responsible for producing the strategy. The council duties include: to set the strategy, monitor the investment plan, strive to ensure the highest standards of excellence in education, to ensure financial responsibility, efficiency and long-term viability (TEC, 2015c). The deliberations of the council show how financial viability, funding rates and excellence in outcomes are resolved by abandoning a commitment to foundation because it literally does not pay.

If the target is to have participation rates that match the local population (regional demographics, so regions with high Māori populations would be expected to have participation rates at least that matched their presence in the whole region). This regional participation target is easily achieved as polytechnics attract a higher number of Māori students because of the nature of their provision as a second-tier institution and institutional failure at school for Māori students. That being so, means that polytechnics quite easily achieve participation rates based on regional presence. The issue is more that the target gives room to polytechnics to stop enrolling those most in need because the need is much higher than the target. The economic rationale of the market leads to polytechnics 'deciding' to not deliver to the neediest to look better in league tables of successful completions.

Narratives of a quest for possibilities

The final three narratives, below, focus on the solution the system offers up. The first outlines the rationale of the solution offered by a neoliberal governmental narrative within the context of Māori equity. The second and third narratives are two different strategic solutions and parts of the neoliberal solution – one focusses on systems metrics to drive competition to better serve Māori and the second an institutional approach to align resources and practices to construct a 'whole of organisation' response. All three offer, ostensibly, a managerial approach of pressing efficiency, the market and data to drive excellence. These narratives take an organisational approach to Māori equity that rarely consider Māori experience of those policies and their 'policy trajectory.'

The final introductory remark I would like to make is related to the technical or technê of polytechnics. Technê is a middle term that has not quite reached its potential. It sits in-between theoria and praxis, as a form of know-how, somehow encompassing both without being either. Theoria, from whence both theory and theatre derive, meant a kind of contemplation or speculation. Aristotle saw it has the highest form of activity contemplating the nature of true reality. But is also carried the passive sense of being a spectator. Praxis derived from the Greek, which meant the engaged activity of free people. It has come to mean the application of a theory or a skill enacted and more radically by Hegelians and Marxists as action oriented to changing the world. For the latter reason, praxis has been an influential idea in Māori scholarship particularly in the work of Graham Smith (G. H. Smith, 1997).

Technê is poiesis, making or constructing the world through know-how. Technê in its sense of relating to a truth that speaks of potentiality ('it reveals whatever does not bring itself…'), about how we see the world and how the world becomes known. Technê is poiētic unconcealment, where to make a different world is to know it differently.

> Technē is a mode of alethēuein [getting at truth]. It reveals whatever does not bring itself forth and does not yet lie before us, whatever can look and turn out now one way and now another. Thus what is decisive in technē does not lie at all

> in making and manipulating nor in the using of means, but rather in the
> aforementioned revealing. (Heidegger, 1977, p. 13)

In order for policy to be thinkable, it must engage in politics. Policy in many respects is a contested idea of how theory translates into practice by becoming law or established practice. The second set of narratives wish to provoke a question of the possibility to imagine a 'counter-policy.' A way to think policy as an intervention in the world that does not separate theory from practice (McQuillan, 2008).

Story 8: The TEC Investment Manager

The [imagined] polytechnic senior manager turned to his investment manager from TEC (Tertiary Education Council), the funders of the polytechnic, and asked, "I don't really understand the change that you are talking about in this approach. Could you just explain it, please?"

"In very simple terms, an investment is looking at a return, but the funding is looking at it as a cost. With the funding, it's very much of an input focus and so all the behaviours that come from there are around trying to be as efficient as possible from that input and so providers look at what is comfortable for them, getting *big classes*, huge staff, and getting, you know, a nice cost-effective model. But that's looking at it from their perspective, whereas an investment is looking at it from the client's perspective. And so, I was talking recently to a guy who was talking about small businesses and he said it like this. He said, small businesses typically employ when they're busy and lay off when they're not. What an investment approach in that case is about is that you invest in planning and you plan your business and you employ the right person with the right set of skills that you need and then you need to plan how you develop that person so that they're able ... you're able to use or utilise those skills in the workplace. If you don't plan for that, then you're likely to get about 15% of those *skills* being used in your workplace. If you plan, that can go up to 75%. So, your return on that investment can be much higher and I'm thinking the same way for the government's investment and leveraging off other interested parties." He went on, "the way we want to measure success would change from the current *pass rates and course completions* to ... we will still use that, but we will also have another one which was around employment outcome.

So, does this learner get a job? And, are they still employed after six months, 12 months? And, their earnings, are they…?"

He went on to explain and relate it to the politics of higher education and tertiary education. "There's a policy point of view. There is the understanding that people with higher education get better returns. So, there's an encouragement for people to have higher education. And higher education usually means universities. So, politically, more funding tends to go to universities. And it goes to universities from the polytechnics and kept around that as we see."

"What about our priority groups and especially our Māori students?"

"If you think about when you did investment plans and we looked at commitments, we always looked at commitments for each of those groups. So, we would look at a commitment for your institution overall and we will look for commitment for the Māori and for the Pasifika. That was done quite separately. There was always an expectation that you would get parity. You know this is the view that if the students are coming in, if you've got equity in enrolment, in other words you're only enrolling students who you expect should be able to become successful. If they're coming in with the same entrance qualifications, they should be going out with the same qualifications. And therefore, why should anything be different for a Pasifika or for a Māori? That's very much the TEC view … we are fully aware that completely overlooks all the family and history-type issues and how much more difficult it is for institutions to do that."

The conversation darted around various background and socio-economic determinants. The investment manager was clearly aware of the subtle issues. That progression between qualification levels was not uniform: rising from level 1 to 2 was not equivalent to rising from level 3 to level 4. Furthermore, although it was clear that the funding changes had removed incentives to work in those areas most needed, TEC would not discuss this at all. Perverse incentives were simply and deliberately ignored. The focus on commercial outcomes had resulted in little educational value. Going into international education to make up the losses

had left many polytechnics exposed in their domestic business, which international was supporting.

Story 9: The TEC Working Group

The tertiary sector was asked for nominations from their staff to join a TEC working group on a new policy initiative. The policy initiative was aimed at requiring all tertiary providers to publish performance information to give students the basis for 'better' information for decision making (TEC, 2016a). Tertiary provider nominees were gathered to discuss what information might students need to help them make decisions about what subject to study and where (including which part of the subsector) to study. The TEC wanted to make it mandatory for every tertiary provider receiving funding to produce data which came to be known as the key information sets.

The nominees were taken from all parts of the tertiary sector to discuss what should comprise the final set of key information for publication, a potential pilot, and how the information should be published in full implementation.

There were two elements to the key information set: first, information about studying the qualification with that particular education provider; and second, national information about the outcomes of studying in that subject area. The former, as the working group were informed, was to include duration, student fees, government tuition fees and successful course completions. The inclusion of the government tuition fees, or how much the government funded the institution for that subject, demonstrated the investment logic that the government was seeking to imbue in the sector.

The TEC had been doing sector updates in the form of a roadshow talking up an investment approach to funding; funding was no longer seen in terms of a per student formula but as a mechanism for central government through the TEC to change polytechnic behaviour by

funding what achieved strategic priorities which the TEC published every few years. The key information was part of this rationale of human capital investment and public choice.

The focus was to be largely on employment outcomes for students within a three-year time span after graduation. The policy embraced a simple (or simplistic) value: qualifications acquisition should lead to tangible work outcomes commensurate with the investment. To avoid further scrutiny, the outcome data were to be represented as a national percentage of students who had studied that subject and what had happened to them within three years (% in employment, % in further study, % on a benefit). This was supplemented by a second set of data on median earnings and an earnings range for people who graduated from that subject from a tertiary institution after three years. The problem was not that this was not useful information, but it was policy discourse as textual enactment – it was performativity. It promulgated a utilitarian analysis as the rational basis for tertiary providers, students and funders. It constructed students as rational actors and it cast tertiary education into that same rationality – an input-output calculation.

The TEC had told the tertiary provider group that there were to be two sets of data (named 'qualification details' and 'return on investment') to be presented at a single point on the tertiary providers' website and on single points on government department websites. The student was expected to make a basic cost-benefit analysis – this was explicit. The TEC had made it clear that the Working Group was part of a wider project to 'measure' value for stakeholders. Therefore, another project would soon be initiated to get feedback from students directly about their experience of studying at specific tertiary institutions through a standard online satisfaction survey. Again, we were informed it would be developed to give graduates a consistent and independent channel to provide feedback on overall satisfaction of a qualification completed and the perceptions of how well the qualification prepared the graduate for work (TEC, 2016c). The 'business speak' of the management class presented their 'vision' of the 'bigger picture' or the intertextual relations and interaction of policy that rebounded and doubled down on how this policy was to be interpreted.

At the first working group meeting, the politics of the tertiary sector were evident from the start. The universities had sent their academic registrars, the polytechnics sent two senior

strategic managers, the wānanga sent one manager, and the private providers sent its sector representative. It was a mishmash of divergent interests and alignments. The registrars were experts at interpreting the details of policy and refracting it through various technical lenses, which they used to resist the policy process through identifying inconsistencies and reliability issues. The reliability issues they raised questioned the association of employment outcomes to the subject they studied after a three-year gap and whether employment related to the subject studied. The polytechnics were uncoordinated and had no strategic response. After all, the policy was a challenge because the polytechnics had always already been about practical work preparation, applied or vocational. If they were not for applied, technical or vocational outcomes, what were they for? Thus, the polytechnic reps fumbled and stumbled in the meeting and ended up unthinkingly supporting the policy and agreeing to pilot it Justifying its inevitability by saying "we can be ahead of the game."

As a representative for the polytechnic sector, I was one of the first to arrive at the meeting room about 10 minutes early and was invited to help myself to a coffee. I was not really sure what to expect because I had received no brief from the polytechnics. In the kitchen there was another early arrival, a representative from the university sector. After some basic formalities our conversation turned to the question at hand.

"It's just another neoliberal invasion of our work" said the university representative. "I mean what do they think they can achieve through this data?" He carried on as if using me as a sounding board, rehearsing the rationale for his resistance to the new policies. "They must be mining tax data or other government data? How could they possibly know what a student is doing three years after study?" I had already thought how big data was beginning to drive every decision. In fact, big data could have been set to an algorithm to make the decision for tertiary providers and students. For all we knew they could have already had established an algorithm for investment into the polytechnics based on the analysis of big data. I kept thinking for some reason the illusion of freedom of choice, for students and institutions was important. Otherwise, *surely*, the TEC could have set an algorithm as a kind of utility calculator? I had heard how the National party government had been working on the use of big data to drive investment in social policy – social investment. I turned back to the conversation.

The university representatives spoke up through one of the registrars "The academic registrars in the university met to discuss the issue last month and we have a number of technical issues which we will raise. How about the polytechnics?" I was about to answer when I hesitated to think about 'what about the polytechnics?' I knew what my answer was. I, too, had gone over it in my head and had made the connections to human capital theory. But I became acutely aware that the polytechnics did not articulate a view to me, at least not a sector view. I responded from a personal view.

"Yeah, I hate it when they reduce education to an investment decision. As if education is just about jobs." He nodded in agreement. Our conversation got interrupted as the meeting was about to start, and we moved into the meeting room.

All the sector representatives had taken their seats around the table. They turned to the one Māori members from the wānanga, to open the meeting with a karakia. She stood up and scratched her head, looked at everyone in the room and began to speak in Māori. Just as she was finishing, the project lead began reading the agenda. The briefest of silences held for a telling moment as the overlap became evident. It was a telling silence, even if almost imperceptible. But it was perceptible to me. Maybe it was the silence of awkward affordance that I knew only too well from my lifetime of ethnic minority experience.

Time was out of joint in that silence and although it was only for a split second, it seemed to let loose spectres and ghosts. The split second became magnified and defied the linear self-presence of time. I looked around the room as the absence made itself known; as ancestral voices whispered to the meeting with a hint of understanding. The invoking of ancestral understandings and spirits was being ignored. A lifetime of learning and invoking the spirit was being ignored even as it was being insisted upon. No one was paying any attention as they ruffled through the papers or looked absently on, flicking through phone messages, glancing up as if to say, "have you finished yet?" It was as if the mere request for a karakia was enough to do justice to a Māori perspective. It acted as non-performative performative; how doing something through invoking Māori custom covered for doing nothing. On the face

of the wānanga representative was a pained expression of emotional and moral labour, of being both in demand and ignored. A token inclusion that signalled a larger exclusion.

The TEC and their project consultants laid out the brief and disarmed most of the meeting by mentioning the number of stakeholders they had already met with, those who had helped them decide on the format and content of the policy. They had completed a two-year engagement with a range of stakeholders. The upshot, before anyone was allowed to say anything, was that feedback indicated support for information to be more learner-centric, and for ensuring the key information set looked more broadly than just at employment outcomes.

It was clear to me that the polytechnics had sent the wrong level of people, poorly briefed and with disjointed views. Not being technical experts, we were outmanoeuvred and asked questions about implementation strategies. We were silenced except in taking a compliant role. It left the polytechnics exposed and, with institutional 'cognitive dissonance,' we accepted the pilot, showing an acquiescent approach that was met positively by the TEC. We were like frogs being slowly boiled to death. As polytechnics we were actively adapting to the policy, but because of the small but imperceptible nature of the incremental steps, we were not noticing until it was too late, and the various polytechnics were faced with financial ruin.

The private representative was a supporter of the programme but was focused on costs of the new requirements and who was going to pay for its implementation and its continued participation.

The university reps seemed to have co-ordinated their response and it felt like they had come with a strategy to obfuscate the requirements of the new policies. They asked technical questions about the reliability of information sources in minute detail, and had the consultants furiously writing away. They had refracted the policy through a lens of obscure technical questions to create barriers. They constantly questioned the trustworthiness and reliability of the methodology – questions the TEC had clearly not anticipated.

The wānanga representative raised a number of important questions regarding Māori perspectives. The first set of questions were procedural around consultation with Māori students, whanau, hapū and iwi. But, just as she was getting started, she was cut off by the chair who moved the agenda on saying "work had to be done" and, as one member remarked, "it can't be all hui and no do-y."

In the tea break I caught up with her and we laughed a kind of awkward laugh of understanding. She said she couldn't bear the meeting anymore and could I make her apologies for her and some excuse. But no one really noticed she had gone until the end of the meeting, when there was no one left to 'do karakia' to close the meeting.

Story 10: The Māori Strategy Group

The relevant people had gathered to take the polytechnic's Māori strategy forward and devise a project to make some key changes. The meeting was a rare combination of academic managers and Māori staff, two groups which rarely overlapped, gathered to hear the proposals. The Quality Manager sat ready to deliver his presentation on excellence. The 'excellence' literature was taking the sector by storm – it was market economics applied as a ubiquitous model, mobilising resources to pursue improved economic performance. The approach had worked well in the UK, and the Quality Manager was keen to implement it here because he believed it could make a real difference to Māori learners. He had consulted the Māori staff and students and was confident he knew what was wrong. He had produced an evidence-based approach, based on the hard data.

After the Kaumātua had opened the meeting, the CEO stepped up to the podium to give a brief introduction.

"We have a small window of opportunity to address a number of challenges. As you know, our results are not great, especially for the Māori students. We need to address this because we are getting financially penalised for it. If we continue to get penalised, we will have to

consider cutting courses. We have presentations today from the Māori caucus and the Quality Manager. First, I will start by giving a brief overview of the polytechnic's results for last year."

The CEO's talk had been written by the Quality Manager. As with previous years and past Māori initiatives, the results had demonstrated a gap between Māori and non-Māori students, excepting the occasional success. The gaps were smaller in the degree programmes, but Māori participation was significantly less. Crucially for the polytechnic's compliance with policy, the overall Māori enrolments were proportional to the percentage of Māori in the region's population. Yet on a national level, Māori under-achieved at school, so could be expected to be over-represented in the polytechnic sector. But appearances were everything to the polytechnic management. The CEO named a few departments that were doing especially well. The arts degree programme had near parity of results for Māori and non-Māori. But there were the usual offenders, notably the foundation courses in literacy, numeracy and work readiness for trades.

The first Māori caucus representative, Matiu, stood up to speak. "Kia ora tātou. In the caucus we discussed many things and the Quality Manager will give a summary of some of it, but I want to give an overview of what we did. We have had several months of hui. We have held several hui with the Māori staff, and a number with whānau and hapū across our region."

As he was speaking, the CEO exited quietly 'to attend other meetings.'

The Māori caucus had shown an impressive dedication to the consultation process. They had visited all the polytechnic teaching sites, and the larger marae in the region. To his credit, the Quality Manager had accompanied the Māori caucus to all the consultation meetings. He felt this was good background for the excellence initiative that he was ready to present, once the caucus representatives had finished.

Matiu continued: "It starts with the senior management team. I mean all management generally. They don't represent our communities. It is just really inappropriate. I'm a great believer in the mix of skills and backgrounds, but what tends to happen is that when someone employs someone else, they'll employ someone like themselves. I think it's automatic

response, subconscious even. So when the whole senior management team is non-Māori and foreign born, Māori applicants have little chance. I think the senior management team got to the point where it was centred on the personality of a leader, the CEO, more than was healthy. Some of the innate problems that existed within the Polytechnic are as a direct result of the lack of diversity within senior management. For example, local people who could pick up the phone and ring the key person and say, 'I went to school with you, do you mind doing this for me?' There is a lack of real connection into the community. I am not aware of any senior managers who sit on any local committees, trust boards or organisations. I'm not talking only about Māori organisations. We employ these people from overseas and give them a company car, and what do they do? As soon as work is finished, they drive out the gate, drive straight home, and spend time with their families. That's cool, but I don't think it creates connections between the polytechnic and the community**."** Most of the managers at the meeting seemed a bit annoyed by the implication of what he said but were nevertheless nodding as if in agreement.

Matiu went on: "I think everything is underpinned by relationships. So if you have a credible set of relationships then you are credible. So when you offer your opinion then most times you'll be listened to. And as long as your voice isn't heard too much, it's all good." He started to lose his way, as the emotions caused by what he was saying became heavy.

"So, looking from a Māori perspective, if we could pull together all the views we heard in the region, and all the resources generated by the economic growth, and capital spend for the next 10 years for Māori, that could be a starting point. All this competition between too many providers is wasting money and time. I think the biggest difference I can make is to bring those resources together into one group … um … my concept is that Māori would shape their own education strategy taking a longer term – 10, 15, 20 years, or a 50-year strategy, and then to put together a team that could actually have a conversation with TEC and they would say this is what is needed for Māori. This is the amount of money you're pumping into education. This is how you're trying to achieve an equitable balance. If TEC would agree, then Māori could invite institutions to say what they would like to provide within that framework."

Everyone in the room was nodding, but very few non-Māori seemed to buy into it. Some were possibly thinking 'that would be a waste of time' or 'you might as well burn the money' despite the Māori caucus having achieved a great deal.

The next speaker was Hoani, a second representative of the Māori caucus. He took a different tack.

"I guess what the TEC aims for … and I agree – is that Māori learners should be achieving at the same level as everybody else. That just seems fair. And they should be participating at the same levels as everybody else. What we're seeing at the moment is that Māori learners are the biggest consumers of tertiary education, but their participation is mostly at the lower levels, in foundation courses. And that's important because it's the degree level and above that are associated with employment outcomes. By employment outcomes I mean how much money they earn and how often they're in employment. So, what we find is that those lower-level courses and entry-level jobs are more exposed to economic conditions. When there's a downturn in the economy, those jobs are the first to go. So, because Māori learners are mostly low skilled, they get those low-skilled jobs more often than everybody else. So, when the economy takes a downturn, they're the ones who are affected the most. So I think it is important where they participate and what they participate in. The second thing is that achievement rates for Māori learners are worse than for everybody else in all levels of tertiary education. So, what that means is that the number of Māori learners getting all the way through and gaining a meaningful qualification that will get them a job is a lot lower than everybody else. Attrition rates are higher for Māori learners and that's important, because they incur quite a significant debt. It's as much as tens of thousands or maybe even hundreds of thousands of dollars, without any real improvement in their prospects of getting a job. You know, tertiary education can make a big difference to a person's life. I've heard it said many times that tertiary education is the great equaliser, but as Māori we're just not participating as much as everybody else in the subjects at the levels that count."

Hoani went on to identify what the next steps should be, and what he saw as the continued problem.

"I think the … you know, the usual approach is a one size fits all. And I don't think enough people are convinced by the research about what works. A lot of that research is on implementing and embedding Māori knowledge and Māori practices into the way Māori people are taught. People are not convinced by that. If you want to embed Māori values and Māori practices into the programmes, it brings in the rangatira and community leaders – the people who have some influence in Māori society. Some would argue that approach gives Māori an unfair advantage. But I think there's a lot of evidence that shows if you do stuff that works for Māori learners, it generally works for all learners."

Hoani then spoke in a more personal voice as he spoke to the meeting about what it had felt like for him at school. "I had teachers rolling their eyes because they thought I was stupid, like, 'Here we go again' – you know what I mean? They weren't willing to give me the extra support I needed. It wasn't that I wasn't capable, after all, I got As for most of my subjects. You know the judgement was – I think it was based on my skin colour. And just the way they taught as well, like you know, you had to keep up or you'll get left behind. And that's how it felt. There was a time when I had been absent because my grandfather passed away and we took him back to the Coast. When I got back to school, I needed to catch up on what I had missed. But none of the teachers considered what it was like for me. It was just like, 'Oh, here we go again, dumb Māoris.'"

The Māori caucus had their say, and it was met with a show of strong support, with genuine sadness and disbelief, but nothing much came of it. It was as if listening to the Māori caucus WAS the change. The Quality Manager spoke next after Hoani and expressed disbelief about the experiences the Māori speakers had shared. He put forward his initiative, which addressed some of the points made by the Māori speakers, but which ignored anything related to what might be called a Māori world view.

"I'm reflecting on what I'm reading in OECD reports, and on what Treasury, MBIE, the Productivity Commission and others are talking about. If you look at the White Paper that came out very recently, they're talking about a more joined-up investment approach by government. The framework I'm talking about is, if you are able to dream and establish a sort

of career, there are several cohorts, there are Māori, there are people in prison, there are school kids, there are career changers, and for me, the system needs to be resilient enough to be able to allow people to succeed wherever they come from, with sustainable employment and progression towards a career, and if those skills are well utilised in the workplace – that doesn't always happen, but if it does happen, then you get profitability and productivity that in turn lead to better income that can lead to well-being and, you know, and people are able to then make choices. The choices that people are able to make get better as the levels of learning increase – the levels of income and life satisfaction increase."

Despite the good intentions, the rationale of the Quality Manager's initiative echoed human capital thinking, with little of specific interest or relevance for Māori. Māori were treated as just another disadvantaged group, ignoring the enduring effects of history that Māori consistently talked about.

Chapter Six: Māori Equity in the Neoliberalised Polytechnic

Polytechnics, as distinct from universities, were explicitly conceived to have a special role to address inclusion by widening participation and encouraging more into higher education (Lange & Goff, 1989). Polytechnics also were expected to develop meaningful relationships and policies with Māori as guaranteed by the Treaty of Waitangi/Tiriti o Waitangi (Ministry of Education, 2003). Furthermore, there was a growing policy consensus that to include Māori learners should involve adapting the educational milieu from a largely European model to a sector more responsive to, and inclusive of, Māori culture and values (Chauvel & Rean, 2012).

Questions about the appropriateness of a largely European model of education has led to a policy discourse that has promoted the value of Māori culturally responsive models (Ministry of Education, 2006, 2009). The models re-examine the learning environment, curriculum and pedagogic practice through a Māori lens (Ministry of Education, 2003). In broad terms, the aim is to produce an inclusive education that is learner-centred and which leads, through job opportunities, to higher standards of living, whilst still allowing Māori to live as Māori (Ministry of Education, 2003). Critically, the policy discourse presents arguments that a culturally responsive approach will lead to better results in education and therefore better employment opportunities (Ministry of Education, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2013a).

Even if the claim that culturally responsiveness would improve and eventually lead to parity of achievement, and eventually equity, it is not clear how a culturally responsive polytechnic would do this and what it should entail. All too often, the desire to be more culturally responsive remains somewhat detached from the day-to-day practicalities of who should be responsible for *it* and what the '*it*' exactly consists of. Addressing the lack of guidance and detail, the TEC has funded a project led by Ako Aotearoa that aims to realise the broad level aims of *Ka Hikitia* (the Māori strategy) – *Hei Toko i te Tukunga* (TEC, 2015b).

At some point, Maori policy discourse enters the work portfolios of professionals where a picture emerges of a 'culturally responsive' polytechnic, as neither straightforward, nor unproblematic, nor obvious. Confusion remains over how cultural responsiveness and Māori language lead to better results. The importance and recognition of Māori in wider society, including in polytechnics, is not a point of contention but what is, is the relationship to parity of achievement. The abstract aether of policy formulation can be suffocating in practice, where Māori cannot always breathe.

The economic rationalism introduced in the late 1980s became the lens through which a Māori equity policy was to be seen which emphasised competition, choice and the market whilst still maintaining a semblance of the notion of a public good (New Zealand Treasury, 1987a, 1987b). Policy was refashioned at an ontological level where it transformed society into an enterprise culture. For the polytechnics, there was a growing need to understand how Māori equity was to be addressed and its ramifications for staff and students, in light of this new political rationality.

Inequity was no longer seen as a collective, society-wide responsibility, to be ameliorated primarily through a progressive tax system and social policy but instead within the policy discourse that promoted "the merit of competition" and individualism for addressing minority interests (von Hayek, 1948, pp. 29-30). This meant competition, efficiency and the market became the new model to resolve the enduring and continued impact of colonialism and racism. Despite retaining some of the discourse of Beeby's egalitarian vision for education much of the wider social circumstances in which education was embedded had been refashioned, which gave a hollow feel to 'talk' of the public good.

Policy discourse embraced its responsibility to Māori, even if the notion of responsibility was no longer recognisable, at least as a state duty. Māori equity had been outsourced to public institutions, like polytechnics. Māori equity received considerable attention in policy documents from the outset (Hawke, 1988; New Zealand Treasury, 1987a, 1987b; Probine & Fargher, 1987). The policy promised a more efficient and effective approach to Māori equity. Perhaps there was also a tacit, arrogant belief that market competition could achieve what

other political systems had failed to achieve; however, it remained to be seen what this new approach actually entailed.

Initially, considerable success was achieved as a result of competitive market-based policies. The change from a block grant to demand-driven funding meant the polytechnics were incentivised to increase their enrolments, which meant polytechnics marketed vigorously to attract more students. As a result, numbers attending tertiary increased and included larger numbers of Māori, but Māori remained underrepresented in tertiary at higher levels of study (McLaughlin, 2003, pp. 6-7). Instead of solving Māori equity, gaps in achievement through the education system became persistent and prevalent over time (Poata-Smith, 2013). Social inequity grew to record levels (Rashbrooke, 2013, 2014). The human capital promise that acquiring skills at polytechnics would lead to greater equity through individual effort was not being borne out by the evidence.

In the early part of the 21st century, faced with the reality of the continued educational and wider social inequity, the government turned to 'guiding the system' through a tertiary strategy. The policies aimed to increase Maori participation rates at higher levels and to reduce the gap in achievement rates through several interrelated policies and guidance papers; including several iterations of the tertiary education strategy (Ministry of Education, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014), a Māori framework (Ministry of Education, 2003) and a Māori strategy (Ministry of Education, 2009, 2013b). A plethora of secondary supporting documents were also released over time that provided the evidence of what was working or needed to be done at a broad level (Chauvel & Rean, 2012; TEAC, 2000a; TEC, 2014b, 2015b, 2018b). In many respects Māori success came to symbolise (unrealistically and unsuccessfully) the promise of education in market conditions.

Since the recognition of educational inequity in policy, the issue of educational inequality for Māori in schools and in technical education continues to be presented as a national concern in policy affecting the life chances and quality of life for Māori (Lock & Gibson, 2008; Marie, Fergusson, & Boden, 2008). The future of the economy, which was part of the justification for the reforms to the polytechnics, was increasingly dependent on the Māori population. The Māori population is set to make up a growing proportion of the total population so concerns

over labour productivity of Māori became an increasing pre-occupation (Office of the Auditor-General, 2016b).

These facts have led to the need for accountability and an increasing focus on making progress. Policy discourse had to bring together the disparate ideas of public service and private good as well as come to terms with a bicultural commitment in education (Waitangi Tribunal, 2011). Some of the ideas from the Currie Report back in the 1960s, like the focus on teacher education, continued to be promoted but, in the new political rationale of neoliberalism, the wider social issues got less focus and arguably neoliberal theory promulgated a wilful ignorance of the impact of poverty and instead promoted individual choice as an investment (Powers et al., 2016).

The strategic approach: the tertiary education strategy

A key element of the approaches adopted by various governments since the turn of the century was to utilise management or, more specifically, new public management and new institutional economics to address Māori equity (Boston, Martin, & Walsh, 1996; Christensen & Lægreid, 2001; Hood, 1991). A Foucauldian analysis of policy suggested a wider governmentality that utilised three key components to frame Māori equity: the discourse of war, economic rationalism and central role of metrics (particularly the promise of data and computational modelling). The economic rationalism is an implicit part of the policy that rarely gets explicit mention accept as normalised discourse.

In Antiquity, strategy (*stratēgos*) referred to a 'military general' or generalship and was linked to war (M. Stewart, 2010). These Ancient Greek roots deployed through the ages were not lost on the TEC, on the contrary, it was a heritage it purposefully cited. In the first iteration of its strategy, the Ministry of Education reflected on the military roots of strategic discourse:

> Military strategy is about making the best use of one's resources to achieve a desired military objective. And in this sense "strategy" is an appropriate term for describing the Government's approach to tertiary education. (Ministry of Education, 2002, p. 4)

Perhaps, consequently, the policy language of government strategies is often explicitly militaristic (like the 'war' on poverty or drugs). But rather than being an innocent metaphor, Foucault argued it was deliberate and of central importance for the rationality of government, or a governmentality. Foucault had long argued that the militaristic metaphors were not coincidental but indicated that, in peacetime, war was waged on social issues in the name of national interests and national identity (Foucault, 2003, 2009).

Foucault argued that what happens under the cover of public good – the productive forces that seek to affirm life – or the biopolitical, disguise the social war that is under way through the technologies of government in the name of the interests of the disadvantaged (Foucault, 2003, 2009). The biopolitical looked to wage war on poverty where it viewed the poor as a *cancer on society*. The overt biologic metaphors expressed policy discourse as a threat, an internal threat, to the future of society, to the ability to compete as a nation in the global economy (Probine & Fargher, 1987, pp. 7-18). The policy warned of a "new education underclass" (Probine & Fargher, 1987, p. 11) and recalled the Currie Report where it was argued that Māori might develop into "an unemployable proletariat" (Probine & Fargher, 1987, p. 17).

It is not without consequence that the language of administration and business is replete with militarised vocabulary – such as deadlines, bullet points, missions, targets, impact etc., regarding Māori and engages in 'invasive' policy initiatives. To the critics who argue that the adoption of military language in the public sector from management is 'just' metaphoric flies in the face of neoliberal policy discourse (Jameson, 2019) that has simultaneously engaged in a dismantling of social welfare policy where welfare beneficiaries have been demonised as the enemy within (Hokowhitu & Devadas, 2013).

Instead of viewing policy through the lens of progress, new policy initiatives, like social investment, workfare, poverty reduction, family planning, can be viewed as examples of warfare, social warfare aimed at governing the conduct of the very people they seek to support in the name of national interests. To be welfare dependent and Māori, for example, is recast as lacking in inertia (auto-mobility – motivation and autonomy) and to be undeserving (Diamond, 2018; Konings, 2015; Nairn & McCreanor, 1997). It is a combination,

in policy, of portraying the poor as lacking and morally wanting, enabled by a welfare system and public institutions.

Another way in which strategy has taken on a specific form in policy discourse is the increasing use of metrics, which is also fundamental to the rationale of neoliberal policy discourse. The ubiquity and promise of big data, analytics, computational analysis, algorithms to construct a more nuanced tertiary education is another way to justify policy interventions that suggest 'agencies' know what is better for you then you do (Daniel, 2015). In tertiary education and across government, data are increasingly being used as a form of algorithmic governmentality (Rouvroy & Stiegler, 2016). Algorithmic governmentality can be described as the use of digital technologies that routinely gather data about the user to create a new government of conduct, of making norms and the production of obedience. Data on facilities, staff positions, student performance, costs etc., promise efficiency and effectiveness and 'better' interventions into Māori lives (TEC, 2015a).

Big data produce individuals as "temporary aggregates of exploitable data at an industrial scale" (Rouvroy & Stiegler, 2016, p. 9). By gathering data about Māori from multiple agencies and over time they reconstruct Māori as a quantified self that becomes the subject of various Māori equity strategies, with little or no oversight from Māori over "data sovereignty" (Hudson et al., 2017). In polytechnics, the TEC has access to 'live' polytechnic data allowing them to 'mine' the data, suggesting foundational regimes of truth that sit under the surface, implying a 'deeper' reality amenable to algorithms. This is a form of representing difference through technology without applying the necessary critical oversight.

The various forms of Māori strategies are largely presented as skilled opportunities as the new access to standards of living (Ministry of Education, 2003), where the idea of individuals as entrepreneurial selves compete for wages in a labour market. Secondly, the militaristic heritage in policy discourse, where Māori equity policy engages in social war, where certain selves, including cultural selves, are underpinned by an entrepreneurial self. The rejection of the economic way of life is a legitimate area for policy to 'wage war' on those who do not conform. The use of data has created an opportunity for a certain kind of research, one that reconstructs Māori as a quantified self, offering opportunities for interventions to produce

more effective ways of re-enforcing the economic way of life and a certain conduct of conduct. It is "educational life as a calculable and regulatory field of economic control and extractable value" (Pierce, 2013, p. 40). It is in these three elements that various policies constructed the idea of a Māori equity policy in education.

The tertiary education strategy

The TEAC defined the need for government strategy:

> to develop a more widely-shared strategic direction and understanding about tertiary education with educators, the research sector, businesses and communities that will enable the New Zealand society and economy to develop more sustainably and rapidly in the future. (TEAC, 2000a, p. 32)

The government believed that tertiary education, since the Education Act 1989, was too fragmented and lacked direction and purpose and, as a result, did not service the future of Aotearoa-New Zealand well (Ministry of Education, 2006). As a result, at regular intervals of 3-4 years, a Tertiary Education Strategy (TES) with a list of relatively consistent priorities was produced. The strategic response was an attempt to conduct the conduct of polytechnics by utilising their freedom, rather than to exercise authority or power directly (Foucault, 2008, 2011b).

The TES strategic priorities have largely focussed on increasing the productivity of labour, aligning skills to workforce needs, offering skills education in a flexible way, ensuring excellence in quality and as entry points into skilled employment (Ministry of Education, 2002, 2010, 2014, 2019a). In short, the economic way of life where every aspect of our lives has appreciable value.

But to some extent, at the top of all the priorities is Māori equity, where Māori equity is constructed as parity of achievement and of participation especially at higher levels of study (TEC, 2018c). In this sense it followed the lead of the Currie Report of 1962. A vision emerges of a measured response for the need to give access and achieve economic inclusion that are "equitable and affordable" and that encourage "participation in society" as full citizens (TEAC, 2000b, p. 12). Again, this was not that new, repeating ideas from the 1960s but the big difference was the reliance on an economic approach and the place of wider systemic issues such as poverty, which were largely ignored.

Achievement gaps were used as justification to produce equity policies that geared resources towards ameliorating those gaps. A prominent place was given to cultural responsiveness of tertiary education as the missing ingredient to ameliorate outcomes (TEAC, 2001b). "The importance of raising achievement levels and reducing current disparities between ethnic groups" (TEAC, 2000b, p. 16), was the primary way that equity was constructed. As a consequence, audit, funding and strategies aimed primarily at interventions around Māori at polytechnics were encouraged under a broad 'education for all' as well as the progress to parity for 'priority groups' under the vision of the TES (Ministry of Education, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014).

The investment plan

By law, polytechnics, to secure funding, had to respond to the TES with a detailed plan containing detailed financial and educational targets, called the 'investment plan' (IP). The IP is where the polytechnic makes a case for its education provision based on stakeholder needs, especially Māori. This is achieved through an iterative intertextual process, where the TEC and the polytechnic eventually achieve agreement and the IP gets approved. It is primarily an exercise in new public management, where it is believed that performance management has superior methods to achieve results based on largely ideological grounds (Kilkauer, 2013). By instigating a rigorous performance management system tied to targets, staff and students can be made to align to key priorities.

Much of the IP outlines past, current and future performance of the polytechnic as it relates to Māori. Programme by programme it identifies dis/parity between Māori and non-Māori. Disparities receive considerable attention and come with an expectation of action plans to reduce and eliminate any negative disparity. But these plans are always situated in a commitment to be financially sustainable, which is not necessarily aligned to Māori equity initiatives (TEAC, 2000a, 2001a, 2001b; TEC, 2014a).

IP present the world as easily identifiable characters and easily understood plans, through the application of data and financial reports. Meanings are pre-determined, familiar and linear. The reader has only to consume the information as policy text. By using standard practices in

representation, polytechnics hide elements that open up the text to multiple contested readings. They lead the reader to a conclusion of uncontested and consensual 'truth.' In this sense, the IP seeks consensus with the TEC and other stakeholders by controlling the signifying process by integrating data, economic rationality through an agreed mission. The mission is the militaristic element of the policy discourse that, in the name of good outcomes (for whom?), conducts a social war on those who do not fit in or refuse to play their part.

On the other hand, the IP is experienced 'at the coal-face' as a messy reality full of disagreements. The messy *underbelly* of IP focuses on what people do and, in particular, the challenge to hierarchical order of any given social arrangements (Rancière, 2010). A disjunction emerges between a drive to produce policy as consensus (as agreed upon), which reduces difference (to produce conformity against the idea of policy discourse as something fought over), a site of contestation over the perceptual and conceptual order in which the social arrangements are embedded. An IP, as experienced by those who contest its meaning, ultimately aims at a change of how we 'enframe' the world and thus as a policy challenges the policy actors to revisit the order they create as a contested construction.

In addressing Māori equity in the TES, the IP is the key vehicle outlining how changes are going to be achieved. In the TES the government states what they are going to fund, defund and how they expect to get better outcomes based on data analysis. However, IPs construct Māori equity in a way that equity is not encountered and thus the budgeted version of Māori equity seems detached from institutional experience. As a result, year-end budgets are constantly made and remade in an attempt to hold on to a fabricated consensus that drifts further and further away from lived actuality of the policy.

Policy discourse interprets Māori aspirations within economic rationalist trajectories. Polytechnics engage in a social war of turning Māori aspirations into a 'war' on themselves, forcing economic rationalist visions. Big data expurgate 'raw data' to remove all signs of context to justify the exercise. As a result, budgets and commitments in the IP risk constructing Māori needs out of a 'white gaze,' what the dominant settler colonial discourse imagines to be the needs of Māori or what it needs Māori to be. It is a fantasy that has been stripped back to a number or a disparity which, in itself, interprets Māori ambitions ontically

(the facts of existence) rather than ontologically (the meaning of existence). The focus on the ontic as metrics of educational value has had important consequences for tertiary education that are far-reaching (Lather, 2018).

Across the world, in influential bodies of research standards, there has been a promotion of research methods that are 'scientific' and 'positivist', making funding for (post) qualitative marginalised. This continually reproduces inequity in measures and fails to grapple with the meaning of inequity as experienced by Māori. To elevate the ontic is to misconstrue equity as disparity, rather than to see disparity as an entry point for philosophic challenge to the order of things. To imagine research methods outside of a neoliberal containment, as post-neoliberalism, is to make knowledge differently and make a different knowledge which implies a philosophical ethnography (Lather, 2006).

The policies on Māori equity should be viewed as a knowledge–power nexus from which Māori is constructed. Māori selves are legitimised as entrepreneurial selves: Maori can succeed as Māori as long as it serves economic inclusivity or 'success.' Māori achieve as Māori *and* lead successful economic lives; the two are intimately connected and the former is justified as serving the latter.

The TEC has been working and supporting big data projects that include integrating tax data, completion data, outcomes data, student evaluation of courses data, and how students make decisions increasingly as techniques to justify interventions into Māori lives (TEC, 2014a, 2014b, 2016b, 2016d). Moreover, the TEC has been closely examining similar projects across the world, for example how Georgia State University has been using data to produce 'better results' (TEC, 2017).

As part of the economic rationalist approach, the focus of the TEC to achieve some conformity has been largely focussed on sanctions for poor performance. Poor performance with Māori (and Pasifika) students has led to the government threatening financial sanctions ($9m) (RNZ, 2019).

Forecasts, planning and commitments in IPs often run into large overspends, or unbudgeted expenditures, as well as being built on optimistic forecasts on student numbers. In turn, such budget deficits are met with the pressure to restructure or find savings which, all too often, cut spending where it is most needed, where the results are hardest to come by, where inequity is most prominent. Hence, policy discourse tends to produce a trajectory that further erodes equity. Data exercises only re-iterate the failed model of equity as parity and uncritically apply data analysis to re-affirm those models by 'playing the game' (Gerritsen, 2020).

The hegemonic policy processes have led to an environment where difference, dissensus, and argument cannot thrive. As Māori equity is fundamentally about difference and acknowledging that difference both within the community and between communities and experimenting with it, Maori equity policy is rarely conducive to producing equity. In fact, evidence of using more uncritical sources of data promulgate a poor model of equity through constructing a quantified self and focussing on 'potential selves' as ones who have realised their work potential (TEC, 2014b).

Maori strategy – Ka Hikitia

Ka Hikitia was a national response for the education system to address Māori concerns from a Māori perspective and, along with the Māori Tertiary Education Framework, set out an overall goal to enable *Māori to enjoy and achieve educational success as Māori* (Ministry of Education, 2003, 2009, 2013b). It filled in some of the gaps in the TES and its broad-level approach to the whole of tertiary education.

Ka Hikitia explained that Māori enjoying success as Māori is when "Māori students have their identity, language and culture valued and included in teaching and learning in ways that support them to engage and achieve success" and when they "know their potential and feel supported to set goals and take action to enjoy success" (Ministry of Education, 2013b, p. 13). The government re-iterated their commitment to 'cultural responsiveness' for tertiary in its recent evidence for a forthcoming TES under the newly reformed polytechnic (Ministry of Education, 2019a). It promoted the idea that cultural responsiveness, as defined above, would lead to better results and, eventually, parity.

Ka Hikitia and TES have been supported by a number of secondary policy texts that largely took the form of syntheses of research findings, adding credibility to the strategic priorities within Ka Hikitia (Alton-Lee, 2003; Blank, Houkamau, & Hautahi, 2016; Chauvel & Rean, 2012; Sciascia, Rangi, Ruanui, & Awa, 2017; TEC, 2015b). Together they promoted four broad initiatives: firstly, the need to implement teaching and learning approaches in tertiary that engage Māori students, in an enjoyable manner. Polytechnics should have high expectations for their Māori learners that focusses on their potential. Evaluating and auditing Māori should include tracking and monitoring what works to achieve *excellent* educational and job outcomes for Māori students. Finally, to have productive relationships with Māori communities including whānau and iwi to help achieve economic success. There was a growing need to acknowledge their Treaty of Waitangi commitments in more explicit forms (Waitangi Tribunal, 2011).

In contrast to deficit models that emphasise a focus on student failure, Ka Hikitia promotes success through the support of Māori self-development and self-determination. This focus mirrors the international literature, where the need to promote self-determination as the ability to define what is best for oneself or one's own community is key to achieving equity (Cochrane-Smith, 1995; Lomawaima & McCarty, 2006; Nieto, 2010).

Recently policy has identified Ka Hikitia's focus on 'systems-wide' changes to institutional settings particularly relating to institutional racism as critical to change (Ministry of Education, 2019a, pp. 2, 18). The return of the focus on systems-wide changes and institutional racism point to a possible post-neoliberalism (Lather, 2020), where issues such as poverty are not viewed only through a strategic neoliberal vision.

The post-neoliberalism has grown in the face of neoliberalism's crises (Challies & Murray, 2008), such as its inability to deliver equity and a growing divide in society between the haves and the have-nots. For example, the crisis of the polytechnics where national strategies were supposed to solve turned out to be exercises in hegemonic process of governmentality. Strategy has been cascaded down not as a process of deliberative critical exposition drawing on staff input, even as it calls for that input. Instead strategy is presented as a set of

authoritative and inevitable decision for which there is little room for debate, a fait accompli. After almost two decades of strategic posturing, the polytechnic sector faces unstainable losses and Māori continue to be failed by the system (Chair Cabinet Social Wellbeing Committee, 2018; Office of the Auditor-General, 2016b, 2018).

Māori equity policy discourse: a critical commentary

Beeby's appeal to egalitarianism and the subsequent remaking of public institutions called for by that appeal (Beeby, 1992), despite being largely dismantled in the late 1980s, still echoes and resonates with the public at large. There is an intuitive appeal of giving everyone a fair go, to addressing Māori equity issues; the desire to have equitable participation rates, so Māori can enjoy tertiary education and all that it brings is laudable. Equally desirable is the idea that Māori should achieve at least on a par with all students. Furthermore, there is a sense of fairness to the idea that Māori should have more of a say in how education should be delivered; including Māori educational perspectives, values, culture and language. On an intuitive level, there seems a reasonable argument that Māori models may offer new ways of doing education policy that benefit society as a whole and that uphold the principle of partnership between Māori and Pākehā (Bishop, O'Sullivan, & Berryman, 2010).

But instead of achieving Māori equity, income and wealth inequality have risen massively (Rashbrooke, 2013, 2015) and Māori educational disparities remain persistent and consistent in polytechnics (Office of the Auditor-General, 2016a; TEC, 2015b, 2018b), where differences

> … between ethnic groups persist, even after controlling for previous achievement, choice of provider, field of study and other factors. Māori students are less likely to pass and complete in Level 5 to 7 certificates and diplomas, and bachelors degrees than other students… Some socioeconomic factors also have an association with achievement. (Earle, 2018a, p. 1)

Despite decades of focus on administrative structure, competition, strategic approaches and monitoring progress through regular audits and evaluation there still has not been substantial progress (Earle, 2018a, 2018b). How much longer does government persist with neoliberal policies? Is it time for something beyond neoliberalism?

The challenge of Maori equity to the neoliberalised polytechnic

A post-neoliberal approach starts by questioning a number of neoliberal premises to critically expose their shortcoming. Market economics, competition and efficiency no longer seem adequate to think with and, furthermore, the calculative and instrumental thinking that is normalised in policy has fallen short. Furthermore, applying this calculative thinking to funding and cultural responsiveness has not achieved the desired results and is not likely to make the differences being promoted (Krzyzosiak & Stewart, 2019).

Cultural responsiveness and the resourcing of te reo Māori have been framed as entry points to achieve academic success. In turn, academic success (especially parity between groups) has been framed as equipping individuals with the skills to access employment opportunities. It is the relationship of economic inclusion to cultural responsiveness that seems problematic. How does being fluent in Māori make your chances of passing a carpentry course better?

A post-neoliberal approach might reject the economic rationalism and the concomitant calculative reasoning for an ethic of a democracy-to-come. If the democratic project means anything in the education sphere, surely it is that the culture and language of the indigenous people, of Māori, are valuable to support in themselves. These should be promoted as part of the rich tapestry of Aotearoa-New Zealand.

Furthermore, how cultural responsiveness is to be understood and incorporated into education for both Māori and non-Māori needs careful consideration. There are risks to incorporating Māori knowledge and Māori custom; there is the risk of oversimplification (Krzyzosiak & Stewart, 2019), domestication (G. Smith, 2012) and who the burden of responsibility falls upon (G. Stewart, Tamatea, & Mika, 2015).

The intuitive appeal to cultural responsiveness promoted in policy discourse begins to get more complicated when it enters the work portfolios of staff in polytechnics. The complications start to arise when staff look to the elements – curriculum, pedagogy, cultural practices, language, physical learning environments and Māori community involvement – and ask exactly what cultural responsiveness actual means in each of these cases? Does it work?

For example, one of the most common elements that is practised is the adoption of Māori cultural practices which, despite all the good will, remains problematic in practice.

The experience of incorporating Māori cultural practice is far more complicated in the politics of equity discourse in actuality than the desire to 'use' it recognises. At some point, someone has to be tasked with carrying out a cultural practice like a pōwhiri, whakatau, karakia, etc. Often in polytechnics only a select number of Māori staff are skilled and knowledgeable enough to carry out many of the cultural practices, let alone have the relationships with iwi at the appropriate level to organise formal community cultural involvement. These are real issues.

Yet the consideration to knowledge and resource are rarely factored in; often it is done at short notice, with little consideration for the organising staff. For example, increasingly indigenous cultural welcomes are expected in polytechnic conferences but largely remain detached from the actual proceedings, detached from the context that a cultural welcome is typically performed and detached from any understanding of how it positions Māori staff (G. Stewart et al., 2015).

The danger of *not* doing it too is that non-Māori staff demand Māori staff turn up to deliver cultural practices. In doing so, non-Māori staff may perpetuate stereotypes and institutional practices that marginalise Māori staff in an attempt to be inclusive. Of course, there may very well be instances where non-Māori are quite adequate in delivering cultural practices but the stated desire in policy discourse runs substantial risks without considered reflection in a context of wider systemic change and the place of Māori culture in wider society. Otherwise the risk is run of 'doing the equity *document*' rather than doing equity (Ahmed, 2007).

This is important because, unlike the other issues, this is the issue that most polytechnics grapple with: what cultural responsiveness actually looks like. Should it be the same for Māori and non-Māori? The risks of widespread, ill-considered adoption of cultural responsiveness are many. Consider, non-Māori staff performing Māori culture; there might well be more risks of this, where complex, historically rooted cultural practices are simplified beyond meaningful

recognition, where non-Māori staff learn to "go through the motions," without any "real" commitment to transformative practice (G. Smith, 2012, p. 12).

Funding Māori equity policies is a multifaceted issue that invokes resourcing plans, staff, students and specific courses. Polytechnics and other agencies would need to align processes, rationale and practice. Student loans, for example, were introduced as both a way to pay for widening participation to tertiary education and as a method to give students without resources with the chance to invest in their future. It was built on the premise that to have incurred some form of economic risk would lead to 'better' decision making, to construct would-be entrepreneurs (Field, 2007).

Field had argued, after an exhaustive consideration of variables, that land titling programmes (one of the mainstays of neoliberal housing policy) produced more human capital through productivity gains as shanty town dwellers now had a 'vested' interest. But, like the original study of Field, loans did not create the vested interest but just another debt (Ministry of Education, 2019d).

Using funding as a mechanism to dis/encourage polytechnics into particularly fields of study has instrumentalised the rationale of polytechnics – 'to follow the money'. This has made important aspects of education, like foundation education, unattractive because of the overall poor returns and high risk of poor results. Market mechanisms have failed.

Metrics, utility, achievement gaps – a miscalculation?

A central issue for the neoliberalised polytechnic is the increasing consequences of the drive for efficiency and competition. The 'moral case' made for efficient use of public funds is well documented and has become a common trope in politics (Alexander, 2008; Cameron & Duignan, 1984) and explicit in the Education Act 1989 as well as part of the neoliberal rationale. The drive for efficiency has put strains on funding Māori initiatives that are not tied to increases in achievement.

In educational policy, the 'obsession' with metrics and measuring success meant that jurisdictions that promoted neoliberal solutions placed a substantial emphasis in policy on results in standardised tests. Comparisons in institutional performance (also internationally, PISA, in the OECD countries) became the driver for competition.

Performance in standardised tests has become equated with quality and quality with educational success, where educational success is reconstructed in the vapid discourse of excellence. These discourses focus education on the enterprising qualities of employees and stress self-reliance in the pursuit of improved economic performance as the model of education (T. Peters & Waterman, 2004; Pierce, 2013). Teachers, as entrepreneurial selves, are the innovators on which Māori equity is built. Staff, through performance management and new performance contracts, in this model are the engines of change but research into support for diversity programmes from staff shows a complex picture where understanding for key terms such as 'diversity' (Avery, 2011), or 'Māori succeeding as Māori' are rarely uniform (Krzyzosiak & Stewart, 2019).

But, instead of solving Māori equity with market competition, staff have experienced competition and innovation not as the engine of innovation and success but as precarious, threatening and stressful work scenarios. Internationally, a pattern of dismantling labour laws has emerged with a growing emphasis on temporary work, zero hour contracts, on-call work, casual labour, freelance work, internships and a rise in self-employment (Groot, Van Ommen, Masters-Awatere, & Tassell-Matamua, 2017). Workers have had little control over their own destiny and increasingly job security has become dependent on the 'goodwill' of superiors. In Aotearoa-New Zealand in 2018 Labour promised, in recognition of the withering of conditions of work, minimum redundancy conditions and a review of work precarity.

Insecure work comes with the regular threat of restructure and departmental closure, or even polytechnic merger, where revenue losses are made up primarily by staff cuts (New Zealand Council of Trade Unions, 2013; Pacheo, Morrison, Blumenfield, & Roseburg, 2016). In an economic rationalist policy discourse, labour is no longer a relationship between employer and employed but more a (labour) market, where workers compete for incomes based on their value to employers.

The upshot is often that the staff, the programme areas, and where Māori students predominate have borne the brunt of restructures. This has meant the capability and competence of articulating the importance of cultural responsiveness, the interphase with Māori communities and the interests of Māori students have often been the first to be threatened, creating a demoralised Māori workforce, student body and wider community.

Metrics around staff achievement often favour staff who do not take on 'difficult' students. Thus, the management revolution of new public management functions as a means to disincentivise working with the disadvantaged, particularly Māori. If you want a pay rise, then it *literally* pays to not enrol or teach courses with high levels of Māori.

The value in education

Achievement gaps have come to be the primary priority in Māori educational strategies; remove the gap and the problem of educational inequity goes away paving the way to remedy wider income inequality (David H Autor, 2015; Becker & Tomes, 1986; Goldin, 2014). In this version of human capital, a human being cannot be "separated from their knowledge, skills, health, values in the way they can be separated from their financial and physical assets" (Becker, 2008, p. 1). Everything, the whole of life, can be viewed as a series of investments that either appreciate or depreciate your value as a productive person. The more you are informed about the balance of your decisions, the more likely you are to make economically rational decisions that appreciate your value (TEC, 2015e, 2016b).

Human capital theories focus on reducing the constraints on a person's ability to invest by providing barrier-free access to education. By providing a 'culturally responsive' education, you remove barriers for Māori students by providing the psycho-social and cultural connections needed for achievement.

But this idea is dependent on achievement gaps on national tests being an indicator of merit and human capital potential. The first problem to address is the idea that equity should be measured by achievement gaps. There is little dispute that achievement gaps are indicative of an educational equity problem and the desire to eliminate the gaps is laudable. However,

a closer critical reading of achievement gaps raises a number of issues that make the aim of reducing or eliminating these gaps not as straightforward as it may first seem.

Although the focus on achievement gaps occurred before many of the neoliberal changes (New Zealand Government, 1960), the special focus on achievement gaps as the primary strategic goal for educational equity in policy only occurred in education reports in the immediate lead-up to the New Zealand experiment in 1984.

Achievement gaps measure comparative differences in performance over the duration of a course/qualification and act as a signal to employers about the skills of a student (TEC, 2014a). One could say, in this vision, that the student is a product to be sold to potential employers.

Yet there seems a serious philosophical problem at the heart of this approach; institutional factors point to wider societal issues where achievement gaps are indicative of structural issues that can only be understood within a wider socio-historical context, a problem at the heart of almost all educational institutions. Arguably, education is not uniquely placed to solve such problems but uniquely placed to reproduce those wider inequities (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977).

If this is true, then polytechnics have little or no control over these wider conditions. It may be that mass education developed in modernity is problematic because it was constructed, particularly in the case of technical education, from a Eurocentric model that was intent in developing a labouring class that serviced the capitalists' needs for growth. Furthermore, technical education also serviced a colonial model of exploitation that produced racist structures on which educational institutions were built. So, the call for systems-wide changes (Ministry of Education, 2013a) or to deal with institutional racism (Ministry of Education, 2019a) is to challenge the industrial model of education, itself a product of power relations, which predominates in the Western world.

What happens if you set a directive to improve outcomes in a system that is meant to produce difference? There is a strong argument to be made that achievement gaps are a logical outcome of wider historical context and policies, rather than institutional practices in the here

and now (Ladson-Billings, 2006). For example, the liberal and colonial education policy heritage described in chapter three had enormous intergenerational impacts on Māori that arguably make achievement gaps better viewed as a logical outcome of a deliberate policy to dispossess Māori through state action and benefit the coloniser (Walker, 2004).

Policy discourse has emphasised the rational economic actor and application of an economic outlook to the whole of life. Most contemporary policy on Māori equity in polytechnics emphasises economic inclusion founded on a self who applies an economic rationale. The economic approach to life takes on a form that favours particular members of society when you consider the object of skills-based policies is to get people into better salaried jobs. On closer inspection, businesses are likely to favour people who stay on the job (persistence), who are geographically mobile, who are members that are well connected to powerful groups and thus, profit-driven motives do not always favour the disadvantaged. Hence society, and as a result, tertiary education policy, seem driven by economic factors that emphasise goals such as productivity, creativity and problem solving (Elias & Feagin, 2016; Feagin, 2006). It is a way to enframe people in a discourse that makes thinking of a 'self' outside of an economic rationality a costly exercise. So, rather than oppression and domination, neoliberal educational policy enfolds students and polytechnics in the productive and creative – it creates a desire to be productive (Žižek, 1999).

The importance of skills for work has deep historical roots connected to the capitalist need to urbanise and produce compliant workforces for industry (Bowles & Gintis, 1975; Bowles, Gintis, & Osborne Groves, 2005). In Aotearoa-New Zealand, a somewhat similar pattern of urbanisation particularly affected Māori, even as they resisted state attempts to dominate them (Gagné, 2013; Walker, 1996, 2004). The loss of ancestral rural land and the subsequent 'forced' urbanisation of Māori into poor housing (Haami, 2018), poor jobs, few educational opportunities (Gagné, 2013) have led to a continued legitimation crisis in public institutions (Walker, 2004). Such 'realities' create material differences as well as cultural challenges for Māori that translate into measurable differences in life chances between Māori and Pākehā (Carpenter & Osborne, 2014; Thrupp, 2007). Differences that are a result of racism and class.

Rethinking racism in Māori equity policy

Despite significant change announced in the 2019 Education (Vocational and Training Reform) Amendment Bill, the government re-iterated its commitment to Māori equity including continued support for Ka Hikitia. It formally and specifically adopted core ideas from Ka Hikitia within the legislation; to "hold inclusivity and equity as core principles … and meet the needs of those underserved, including Māori" by having "'culturally responsive delivery approaches, whether on campus, in the workplace, online, or otherwise" (New Zealand Government, 2019, p. 79).

Furthermore, the most recent evidence set out by the Ministry of Education in preparation for the 2020 TES reiterates the commitment to the strategic approach to Māori educational equity (Ministry of Education, 2019a).

Recent policy discourse recognises the urgent need to tackle institutional and interpersonal racism.

> It is important to understand the pervasive nature of institutional bias and racism, and how this impacts Māori… (Ministry of Education, 2019a, p. 18)

Yet a close reading of policy documents leaves a significant amount of doubt as to how key ideas like 'systemic', structural, institutional and interpersonal racism are to be understood. What can be gleaned from the policy discourse is incomplete and largely under-theorised around these forms of racism. It is surely important to define these terms; terms that help to unpack the socio-political meanings associated with Māori equity. What can be assumed is a neoliberal framework; where Māori equity policy discourse conforms to a computational and utilitarian rationale and continues to encourage the belief that there is a best way to address Māori equity and it is universal and all should adhere to it.

Racism has largely been described in policy as an individual responsibility and particularly of teachers. It emphasises personal choice, decisions-making and rational behaviour. The language of policy focusses on "experiences of racism and discrimination" , "low teacher

expectations" and poor institutional support with Eurocentric curricula viewed as a problem of cultural responsiveness (Ministry of Education, 2019a, p. 18).

Important as these points are, they account and address racism largely as an individual responsibility ignoring other approaches such as structural and colonial views of racism. The individualist view of racism, focussed on responsibility, plays to the dominant discourse that has big holes in it – holes that Māori fall through. By limiting the analysis of racism in policy to individual dimensions, policy analysts recommend solutions that target teachers. In this sense, the individualist approach to racism is unlikely to achieve equity, because it could be said to under-theorise racism. Other approaches would include an understanding of equity that includes structural elements and history. As such, the focus is largely on teachers (training – more cultural competency) and polytechnic procedures (risk and alert systems) and practices (more explicit Māori culture). Not surprisingly, the language of Māori policy discourse mimics the analysis of neoliberal analyses of discrimination (Arrow, 1971; Becker, 1957, 1992) and the value of economic rationalism (Fogel & Engerman, 1974).

Unconscious bias and individualism

Taking the example of unconscious bias, which has increasingly become a focus in policy and policy research in Aotearoa-New Zealand (Blank et al., 2016; Ministry of Education, 2019a; Wilson, Gahlout, Liu, & Mouly, 2005), can highlight the consequences of individualist assumptions. Unconscious or implicit bias is a bias that happens when people make quick judgements without being aware that they are doing so, and this is especially so for outgroups where racist attitudes can be automatic and 'natural' (Dovidio, 2010; Dovidio, Gaertner, Niemann, & Snider, 2001). They straddle an evolutionary need to take quick decisions (operate fast thinking) in the face of danger, rather than slow, deliberative thinking (Kahneman, 2011).

Much of the research focusses on training and HR interventions to counter unconscious bias that look to changes in organisational culture, practical interventions on personal biases, breaking habits, modelling positive behaviours and building positive relationships (Blank et al., 2016; Devine, Forscher, Austin, & Cox, 2012; Forscher, Mitamura, Dix, Cox, & Devine, 2017). Furthermore, it has led to organisational actions such as 'colour-blind' employment

applications processes to avoid implicit cues and racist outcomes (Wilson et al., 2005; Wood, Hales, Purdon, Sejersen, & Hayllar, 2009).

The first problem with such a view is to accept a superficial view of how racism primarily operates through overt or explicit cultural references (like someone's name on a CV). Adopting practices such as colour blind applications may, on the surface, deal with such issues, however, it is to greatly under-theorise racism. The accrued disadvantage of a life hindered by racism is not solved by removing someone's name in an application process. The experience of racism is in every aspect of the CV, such as the opportunities in previous workplaces.

The explicit association with names, or skin colour, or any other explicit feature under-theorises that racism resides deep within the experience of an individual and deep within history; this is not easily remedied other than through a radical appraisal and confrontation with history and the very nature of being.

Important as these interventions might be, they treat racism as an individual act needing individual-based interventions. If biases exist because of the involuntary absorption of prejudice in the world around us, then how do we challenge them without challenging the way we enframe the world. The absorption of prejudice from the world around us surely implies history and the histories we learn in school (Tuffin, 2008). How can long-term changes be made 'to the world around us' if the history we tell and repeat denigrates, ignores and represses Māori perspectives and denies fuller or counter-historical narratives that largely portray settler-colonial society as benign and often as 'progressive' (Wetherell & Potter, 1992).

Another implication is that the prejudiced world around us has been purposefully constructed as such and that it is a logical conclusion, rather than an aberration. Viewing the prejudice in the world around us as a logical conclusion can implicate reason itself, at least the inheritance of Enlightenment reason in the very structure of racism.

> Metaphysics – the white mythology which reassembles and reflects the culture of
> the West: the white man takes his own mythology, Indo-European mythology, his

own logos, that is, the mythos of his idiom, for the universal form of that he must still wish to call Reason. (Derrida, 1982, p. 213)

Poststructuralist theory, particularly that of Foucault and Derrida, focussed much attention to the notion of 'invention of Man' that arose out of Renaissance and Enlightenment Europe that was universalised out of a particular culture. The grand narrative of emancipation of Man from religion led the Enlightenment uniquely to be blind to the fact that it was still particular. After all, the term 'secular' implies a globalism, an acultural mode of being. The secular finds its acultural sense in the human as a biological organism, unproblematically taken to be a scientifically universal. The narrative of liberation to be free from chains, was premised on others living in servitude. The idea of Christian redemption is an inherent notion in the secular, believing that Western native model of reality is reality-in-itself.

The circularity of institutional racism

Institutional bias and racism is another element increasingly referred to as a problematic dimension of polytechnic practices. It is the idea that the elimination of interpersonal racism is not enough to eliminate racism, as racism operates at the institutional level (Bonilla-Silva, 2010). It is those established laws, customs and practices which systematically reflect and produce group-based inequities (Carmichael & Hamilton, 1967; J. M. Jones, 1972). Institutional racism is often defined by its outcomes.

But this explanation is circular: group-based differences are a sign of institutional racism, which is, in turn, defined by group-based differences. Māori disparity in achievement is a sign of institutional racism, which is defined as Māori disparity. This focusses the problem of Māori disparity on the mismatch between Māori and the institution. One resolution to such an issue is to remake the polytechnic that pays attention to, in part, Māori models of educational success.

This circularity inevitably focuses on culture as a solution as it tries to tackle group-based differences in policy discourse elements of how it is conceived are elaborated:

> Institutional racism and bias must be addressed seriously and urgently. There is considerable evidence that learners achieve well when educators actively value

and reflect their culture, language and identity. (Ministry of Education, 2019a, p. 2)

Firstly, it is worth noting that the government document recognises the issue as urgent but (as might be expected from an individualist framework), it focuses on 'educators' as the key actors to mitigate institutional racism. Furthermore, the solution, by implication, is constructed as an issue of training and employment practices. If colour blind processes of employment are introduced, more Māori will be employed. If a model of Māori teacher competencies for non-Maori are developed and put into practice, institutional racism could be solved. In tertiary education, the TEC has a work area initiative dedicated to produce quality educators of Māori learners, in order to improve Māori achievement (Sciascia et al., 2017; TEC, 2015d).

If there was any doubt that the policy discourse primarily means to address teachers, then it is cleared up later within the same document.

> For learners to thrive they need to be free from both interpersonal and institutional racism and discrimination, including the bias of lowered-expectations. (Ministry of Education, 2019a, p. 18)

Here we see the interpretation of institutional racism being defined in acts of unconscious bias, stereotype threat and other such psychological phenomena.

And, in the final reference to institutional racism, we see a recognition of institutional racism and bias as prevalent in producing iniquitous outcomes. Again, a circular operational definition of institutional racism as group-based differences being a sign of institutional bias which is, in turn, defined by group-based differences. This circularity leads to an under-theorisation of institutional bias (Ministry of Education, 2019a, p. 18).

Foucault offers an alternative way to understand institutional bias, not as aberrations, but again as a logical conclusion of a political rationality which seeks to divide and make difference the reason for institutional practice. Foucault argued, using the example of the Normans, how they tried to force on the 'other' or indigenous Saxons a system of government by arguing their systems of law and state apparatus were a way of imposing upon them which was much

the same as waging war (see Chapter five Foucault, 2003). Foucault, like Arendt (Arendt, 1958), argued against the conventional view of viewing race's early use as non-polemical (Gates, 1997, p. vii), but was rather the beginning of a politicisation of race as social and race war. Early use of race did not have the modern meaning of a humans divided into subgroups with more or less value. Race was used to denote social and cultural difference. Thus the Normans imposed a social order through a political rationality realised through overwriting their institutional practice on top of or over Saxon practice that constructing a social order and waged a social war on Saxon practices trying to remove reference to them by writing over them. What is important is the idea of imposing a system on others as means of waging social war to purge the system, or scrape it clean – a tabula rasa – of what was there before, a kind of pure reason.

Structural explanations

Policy discourse recognises, through inference and explicit reference, system-wide and socio-economic factors (Meehan, Pacheco, & Pushon, 2017; Ministry of Education, 2013a, p. 50; 2019a, p. 18). Clear evidence shows how socio-economic factors have played a critical role in distribution of opportunities and constructing inequalities (Thrupp, 2007). Neoliberal policy has constructed equity as something largely solved by teachers and institutions and therefore a large focus on improving education has been dedicated to school factors (Hattie, 2008; Sciascia et al., 2017) at the cost of including any substantial policy on out-of-school factors (Snook, Clark, Harker, O'Neill, & O'Neill, 2010).

Viewed from this perspective, structural racism is a form of government that impinges on individuals and their relationship to themselves and others. It is to appraise Māori equity from the perspective of the productive forces of life. The subject under disciplinary power is not subject to repression but is an effect of power. For Foucault, as I have argued, there is a movement outside the institution-centred perspective to establish a link between polytechnics and the broader socio-political framework. In this sense, racism is both a disciplinary logic that targets the body but also a political technology that targets the body politic. To effect change is to understand how we enframe the world into which we are thrown (Guattari, 2018).

Structural racism differs in that it is the normalisation and the legitimation of an array of dynamics – historical, cultural, legal, institutional and interpersonal – that routinely advantage and privilege Pākehā while producing cumulative and chronic adverse outcomes for Māori. However, I, following Derrida, radicalise this definition by arguing that Enlightenment reason is from where the problem of structural racism emanates (Derrida, 2002, p. 68). This is to move away from institutions and individuals as the source of racism (Foucault, 2009, p. 120) but instead to focus on a broader socio-political framework as the source of racism, realised through order of things embodied in institutions and notions of selves.

The shadow of pure reason – political rationality as racism

Performance management rests on the assumption that competitive advantage is something real and discoverable, something out there waiting to be found (Ezzamel & Willmott, 2010) and that choice and competition are the only 'real' ways to motivate institutions to improve outcomes for 'minorities' (von Hayek, 1948).

Solutions within policy largely target institutional practice and teachers thus creating the framework for performance management and new public management. Such approaches make teachers and polytechnics amenable to a utilitarian rationale, "How much value do you add?" and "What's the return on my investment?". This reconfigures questions of equity in terms of measurement techniques which, in turn, reduce the role of education to a matter of market freedom or choice – playing to the ideas of competitive advantage through developing value added measures (Pierce, 2013).

So, dealing with racism and the development of metrics (for excellence and accountability) are key elements in understanding how the government frames Māori equity policy discourse. Both are constructed within a neoliberal framework that established the legislation, policy and practices within which Māori equity is conceptualised. Race, at least as a biological and scientific idea, has been debunked as something 'real' but can usefully be viewed as an empty or floating signifier, a signifier without referent (Mehlman, 1972), where the word is more concrete than what it describes, making the signifier performative.

Furthermore, 'race' is produced by racism not the other way around (Coates, 2015); there can be no race without racism. And instead of viewing racism as a moral problem of bad individuals it is best viewed as a result of a political rationality (Foucault, 2003, 2009). The moral dimension we might give racism is part of the way racism is constructed in political rationality as a problem of a 'few bad apples.'

Derrida recalls Foucault when he suggests "pursuing war by other means [to] impose surreptitiously a discourse" (Derrida, 2002, p. 79), a discourse that seeks to eliminate the internal threat posed by uneducated sectors of the population to economic productivity. Derrida describes it as a process of auto-immunity, which is where the Enlightenment and religion share the same drive: the underlying unity behind their very opposition consisting precisely in this quasi-mechanical desire for purity. As a technology of power, biopolitics functions like an immune system: it devises "security mechanisms [to] optimize a state of life," and "regulatory mechanisms [to] establish an equilibrium, maintain an average, establish a sort of homeostasis and compensate for variations" (Foucault, 2003, p. 246). The purpose of any political rationality is to maximise life, yet neoliberalism seems to imitate sovereign power in that it holds the power of death over its subjects. Neoliberalism is a political rationality that enframes the world and, to change it, we must challenge the frame.

Chapter Seven: Deferring Neoliberal Nightmares

In this chapter, I discuss the limits and some possible ways beyond the neoliberal impasse; how do we *think* differently, past neoliberalism, to new ways to frame equity and technical education to achieve justice? If neoliberalism is a political rationality that 'enframes' the world, how do we challenge the frame? How do we allow for new or different ways of being, for respecting the heterogeneity of democracy, without erasing difference in the name of sovereignty?

Democracy enlists sovereignty in an attempt to protect democracy; it essentialises the plurality of the *demos* as it must contain and restrain the demos in a sovereign community – the nation (Derrida, 1997, 2005b, 2006). The demos as heterogeneous must become, to a significant degree, homogenous. This necessity leads to exclusions. The national narratives reveal how we frame that homogeneity and what is excluded from it.

Neoliberalism does not explicitly or directly exclude, but through policy and practice, it conducts a social war on those who fail to fit in. A neoliberal policy discourse emerges that attempts to govern the conduct of conduct through public institutions. For example, education policy constructs a milieu where it is almost impossible to make a living outside of the 'entrepreneurial' way of life. The policy classifies those who fail as an internal threat to their own well-being, as an "educational underclass" or "an unemployable proletariat" that threatens economic productivity, not least for themselves (Probine & Fargher, 1987, pp. 7-18).

Aotearoa-New Zealand's national narrative of a 'fair-go' society, although prominent in the national psyche, has withered under neoliberalism (Consedine, 1989; B. Edwards, 2017, January 18; Marcetic, 2017; Rashbrooke, 2017 September 22). Instead of egalitarian policies, successive governments have invoked the idea of fairness through the operations of a market, competition and free choice (New Zealand Treasury, 1987a). The idea of equality is an explicit

promise of neo/liberal democracy, something we progress towards. In this sense equality is a "dream deferred" (Pearson, 1990), something that Aotearoa-New Zealand is always moving towards but never quite reaches. But is equality, at least as it is conceived in neo/liberalism, a flawed project, despite its intuitive appeal of equality to the 'fair go' national narrative?

Instead of achieving equity under neoliberal-influenced educational policies, gaps between the haves and have nots have widened in Aotearoa-New Zealand (Rashbrooke, 2013, 2015), and in Anglophone countries (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010). Furthermore, the gaps are pervasive and consistent across social, political, economic and educational dimensions (Cingano, 2014; Kawachi & Subramanian, 2014; Piketty, 2014, 2020). Education, under the influence of neoliberal theory, has neither alleviated nor addressed long-standing inequities (David H. Autor & Dorn, 2009; Wylie, 2013). Instead, Aotearoa-New Zealand has become even more of a deeply riven society with deep ethnic and class divides (Mila, 2013; Poata-Smith, 2013; L. T. Smith, 2013; Workman & McIntosh, 2013). From this perspective, the policy of the last 40 years represents a democratic failure.

The promise of markets and competition, applied to the education system, has not imbued Aotearoa-New Zealand with any special solution to equity and has, instead, left the polytechnics in a desperate financial state with an uncertain future (Cabinet Social Wellbeing Committee, 2018), having never achieved Māori equity across the sector (TEC, 2015b). The Education Act 1989 and its amendment in 1990 narrowly defined the polytechnics and their relation to technê to skills for work, limiting their transformative potential. The wider legislative policies have, more importantly, worked against the drive for equity by making equity work high-risk low-reward work, where the prime motive of institutional behaviour, to maximise utility, has made such work unprofitable. In the context of substantial losses across the sector, unprofitability becomes an untenable position and the possibility for equity diminishes.

I have argued that market rationality, instead of being the engine of equality has, in fact, led to inequality, reproducing wider societal inequities and exacerbating them. Regressive taxes, lower and conditional welfare payments and fewer employment protections have necessarily led to greater inequality. In this sense, educational policy continues the explicit programmes

in neo/liberal democracy, where technical education, amongst its many roles, was primarily a means to stratify society and opportunity by class and race for the benefit of capital (Cipolla, 1969; Hobsbawm, 1996).

Finally, viewed as a political rationality (Foucault, 2003), neoliberal educational policies act as a system of control and access that has purposefully restricted opportunities through its inherent rationale (Deleuze, 1992). Polytechnics, in this way, are part of a system of control and access, despite the policy rhetoric of technical education's liberating potential. The class and ethnic disparities are not aberrations, or an unfortunate consequence, but a deliberate policy of unequal inclusion – stratifying class and ethnic opportunities.

Thus, to achieve social justice through equality and the polytechnics, we must first resist the neoliberal solutions by forming a strong opposition or resistance. One form of resistance has been the call to include more voices, to consult with stakeholders and particularly Māori (Ministry of Education, 2006). In the narrative (Story 10), "the Māori strategy group" the second speaker from the Māori caucus, Hoani, demands that policy lives up to its promise of parity of participation and achievement and by implication wider equality.

In such instances, democratic institutions are prevailed upon and critiqued for their lack of representation within constituted power, where constituted power is the formal state power in the legislature which is fixed in central authorities. This approach might be called *pragmatic* and offers some immediate improvements within the system and therefore a chance of various stakeholders being listened to because policy already has a built-in mechanism to allow what is permissible and perceptible, despite its limitation for achieving radical change (Rancière, 2004, 2010).

Resistance movements seek to overturn bad legislation, poor representation, etc., as a way of constructing more democracy. Protest is a form of challenge to the government, a dissensus or rupture that challenges state classifications. *Constituent power* (Negri, 1999) is a strategy that places demands upon the state or seeks a change in the policies of the government at hand through demonstrations in public space. This form of resistance can be revolutionary, but it largely follows a pragmatic trajectory offering alternatives to current

policy, and it must always wrangle within state power. It is important to critically examine democratic life and the conditions that make its citizens visible, audible and perceptible. In this sense democratic inclusion is not just institutional but an event that constructs the visibility of everyday life (Rancière, 2001). Democracy is itself an idea constructed out of institutional support and practice and therefore needs to be interrogated. For example, in settler-colonial states the settlers often outnumber the indigenous populations and hence democracy explicitly suppresses the indigenous, like from the example of the Normans, it wipes the indigenous practices from our memories and through the reason of democracy the practices are overwritten by the settler institutions.

A second way to resist may take a less pragmatic form and be more philosophical, disengaging with current policy and rethinking policy in new frames that do not engage with state power or the "constituted power". This form of philosophical resistance recognises the risk of a pragmatic approach, the dangers of being assimilated into state power or constituted power through further avenues of control and access. There are inherent risks to approaches such as cultural responsiveness in educational policies because of how they are incorporated into the body politic, into institutional life; their inclusion risks the dangers of domestication, oversimplification and marginalisation, when decoupled from justice (Krzyzosiak & Stewart, 2019; G. Smith, 2012).

Instead it recognises neoliberalism's ability to assimilate opposition attempts to incorporate difference into sameness, and its ability to reform governments. Governments, despite avowed policy to make changes, have shown an inability to make significant change and change has readily been incorporated, not as liberatory politics, but as willful ignorance. Therefore, a call for something different that sits outside of, rather than in opposition to, the state is needed (Agamben, 2014; The Invisible Committee, 2009, 2015).

In the final discussion, I take both a pragmatic and a philosophic approach to a number of recurrent themes around equity and the polytechnic. I address possible ways beyond neoliberalism that lean on both pragmatic and philosophic approaches.

Equity as an equality-to-come

A large part of the polytechnic sector's ability to deliver equity derived from their status as second-tier tertiary institutions delivering opportunities to learners who otherwise did not see tertiary education as an option. As I have documented, this meant a rise in the importance of educational policies that promoted equality of opportunity, educational equity with a focus on outcomes (not to be confused with equality of outcomes). The focus on outcomes was more about polytechnic settings that should mirror the needs of the economy and business. Choice, personal responsibility and individualism, through the actions of the market, formed the basis of prominent egalitarian arguments in support of capitalism (Dworkin, 1985). The purpose of legislation, policy, and practice was to construct the conditions of the market for equality of opportunity, despite the failure of this approach to equality, continue to remind us of the need to resist the allure of equality under neoliberalism.

Equity policy and ignoring poverty

Equity was stripped of wider societal context, devoid of direct government intervention and considered to be an issue of access (equality of opportunity), educational equity and a job-relevant outcome. The disenchantment of politics by economics meant the withdrawal of government into the economic rationality of the market (Davies, 2017). Rather than government programmes or intervention, it meant the innovation of institutions in the marketplace. This meant a special focus on measurement – value added metrics – that showed the value of polytechnic practices and their teachers.

Wider social contexts, such as the impact of poverty, were purposefully diminished or ignored (Powers et al., 2016). Furthermore, the policy focus has continued to emphasise curriculum and teacher interventions as the effective site of intervention (Hattie, 2008, 2010; Ministry of Education, 2019a) as part of the *what works* policy, despite obvious shortcomings in the what works approach (Biesta, 2010b). Consequently, policy largely minimised wider social factors, despite criticism (Snook et al., 2010) as the legitimate focus of equity (Grace, 2010).

Government outsourced equity to polytechnics, which inevitably developed parallel student metrics focussed on institutional, departmental and teacher performance. Students were

reconstructed as leaners (Biesta, 2010a), where the focus shifted to appreciating one's human capital by maximising their return on their investment. Thus, polytechnics were made morally responsible for utilising data to put on job-relevant curricula, a focus on regional skills gaps and were held accountable for their decisions and decision-making (TEC, 2020). Learners were immersed in data that equally held them to be responsible to take (economically rational) decisions.

The educational lexicon in policy emphasised a certain system of calculative reasoning in an emerging individualist framework of moral responsibility. Terms such as 'widening participation', 'lifelong learning', access, would express an implicit moral imperative of learning as a duty. Instead of Beeby's right to education couched in a wider societal context in which institutions had to be re-organised to ensure that right, education equity turned its focus in the new policy discourse to a new idea: the 'learner', who was constructed on the basis of their ability to profit from pedagogic reformation. Acquired skills gave a learner the opportunity to generate a flow of income over a lifetime (David H Autor, 2015). instead of a tax and welfare system acting as a check on inequality or the ability to live a dignified life, this responsibility became a question of free choice or lifestyle which, by definition, turned the focus on to individuals (Hawke, 1988, p. 73).

Parity of participation and achievement have become the proxies for a wider equity. It is assumed that achievement in skills-relevant subjects will give access to job opportunities and an income to furnish one's lifestyle choices.

Rethinking equity

A number of issues arise from this conception of equity as parity. There is the problem of measurement, addressing poverty and dealing with racism. In the following section I briefly outline how resistance and pragmatic change may lead to some new possibilities. I start by framing them around the more philosophical issue of measurement and the problem of calculative reasoning.

The problem of measurement

Instead of focussing on *what* to measure and whether policy measures the right thing, I want to approach the question of measurement from another perspective. I have argued that the problem is with how the question of measurement, and a certain calculative reasoning, prevail in an economic rationale on decision-making. The pervasiveness of measuring and the way it frames the world draws on a certain technological way of being, a way of reasoning that has risks to *how* we value and *what* we value at a fundamental level of being. Let us consider the point in relation to parity of achievement for Māori.

In the parity of achievement policy discourse, Māori equity is produced as countable, and we count on its value to evaluate and audit ourselves, whether as professionals or as polytechnics. The numerical value, such as '% participation rates', may give a clear value but it is not clear that the analysis of the meaning of that value captures the non-numerical entity, human flourishing.

The reduction of equity to an ontic question of economic utility reduces the possibilities of how better to ask the question of equity. Perhaps this is the growing thoughtlessness of calculative thinking that Heidegger warned against (Heidegger, 1978a). The thinking required for an ontological appreciation of equity may not have an easy kind of utility and may be obscured by calculative thinking. Any form of planning or strategy reckons with the conditions that are given; we account for them. Calculative thinking is not just concerned with numbers, it is a technological way of being; it computes

> … ever new, ever more promising and at the same time more economical possibilities. Calculative thinking races from one prospect to the next. Calculative thinking never stops, never collects itself. Calculative thinking is not meditative thinking, not thinking which contemplates the *meaning which reigns in everything that is.* (Heidegger, 1969, p. 46 my emphasis)

Heidegger warned that calculative thinking can become paradigmatic and conceal other forms or possibilities. The promise of algorithms and of big data gives ever more reasons to intervene in the lives of those who are defined as wanting. Inspired by human capital, Aotearoa-New Zealand has started to adopt this language whose very meaning justifies further incursions into the lives of the vulnerable in the name of their interests. It also identifies interventions throughout the lives of the vulnerable, particularly early on, and

encourages the gathering of data as if it reveals some foundational truth (New Zealand Treasury, 2016).

A model of how measurement could be extracted was outlined in the formative human capital analysis of slavery (Fogel & Engerman, 1974). This was to be the case, par excellence, of how the role of calculative reasoning was to be adopted by education that has led to the development of data-driven ideas of performance management (Pierce, 2013). The complexities of labour relations would disappear into capital. The human capital approach would rely on a calculative reasoning and an idealised subject, as an entrepreneurial self, who would appear in guises like the lifelong leaner and the professional subjects constructed in an audit culture.

These incursions into the lives of the vulnerable imply an understanding of the vulnerable better than they understand themselves. It encourages metric and data mining that further implicates some foundational information in the belief that everything can be captured by raw data that need no analysis. Challenging the place of calculative thinking is an important part of reconceptualising equity as an ontological project. Different ways of thinking, such as meditative thinking (Heidegger, 1969, 1978a), offer a different ontological basis for understanding equity as parity of participation or achievement. Through a deconstruction of thinking (education) (M. Peters & Biesta, 2009), new possibilities might emerge, either beyond or behind current Western metaphysical notions and, though such exercises are fraught with risk, the journey is unavoidable (Derrida, 1981, 1989, 2016; Heidegger, 1968, 1977). Such questioning may open a 'clearing' for new possibilities, including Māori forms.

I am not arguing for the abandonment of the ontic, of measuring, but for exposing its limits as, not the end or goal of equity, but the starting point of questions that ask what it means to flourish in democracy and maintain the heterogeneity of the demos, to maintain difference without framing it in calculative trajectories.

Rethinking poverty in equity work

The first problem and obvious point of contention is the failure of market systems to properly address the long-term dis/advantages from poverty and wealth. I have already detailed how

poverty is largely ignored as a significant component in neoliberal theories, but I want to briefly consider some pragmatic approaches as well as some more radical ways beyond or behind equity as parity of participation and achievement.

One such approach arose in the narratives – the idea of a relational co-dependence of a community. This approach was developed by Matiu in the Maori strategy group story 10 pp138-139 . In some ways this idea could be used to deconstruct the human capital element of educational policy by emphasising success as something communal, something shared. Poverty as a communal condition might require a simple solution of insisting not on consultation with community groups but *developed out of* community groups. One such recent development that might hold some potential is participatory budgeting (PB).

PB arose out of political movements in Brazil (Marquetti, Schonerwald da Silva, & Campbell, 2012) and Argentina (Rodgers, 2010) that specifically rejected formal models of delivering services that did not incorporate local ideas of social justice (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014). It is a form of budgeting that promotes democratic processes and breaks with "exclusionary" governance (Wampler, 2012). Simply put, the citizens take control of the whole cycle of the budgetary process (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014).

From its origins in the Workers Party in Porte Alegre (of the neoliberal post-dictatorship) PB broke from the formal apparatus of governments. Unlike government funding, PB has taken a focus on distributing resources to low-income communities organising itself around thematic policy issues that matter locally. The aim of the programme is social and political change. Such approaches might make simple changes, such as inverting market models by offering higher rates of funding to equity work, like foundation courses and by making the courses free for students that also attract a living wage whilst studying, making it possible to study without worrying about basic needs. PB might fund more time for support and reward teachers who engage in equity work more. These are possible simple solutions but offer a different way to envision political and social justice as collaborative local enterprises. They could also justify more radical national approaches. Of course, more radicalised version of PB has thought up many ways to block elites from taking over such ideas.

One such radical programme of public finance has been the rethinking of welfare economics for a post-covid world where a better understanding of need is practised as a form of left governmentality. Instead of starting with equality of opportunity, a key neoliberal assumption of the perfect market, one might start with equality of condition. The big difference in the approaches is the former largely views poverty and ethnic inequality as irrelevant in shaping educational opportunities, even in its most progressive forms (Powers et al., 2016). Instead, equality of conditions directly addresses such dynamics of policy and institutions. Equality of conditions starts by recognising equality as an assumption (Rancière, 2007) that opens up questions of what conditions and institutions allow for the hierarchies to persist and what can be done to make sure all essential needs are addressed.

One solution offered from this perspective is to re-envision the welfare state in the 21st century by asking again what, no matter how much or little we make, "makes our lives possible – and worth living"? (Coote & Percy, 2020, p. 1). Such questions present more meaningful engagement with equity. One answer to such questions of inequity is to provide universal basic services that include shelter, sustenance, health care, education, transport, information and legal services within a localised context. It is *services* as "collectively generated activities that serve the public interest. *Basic:* services that are essential and sufficient to enable people to meet their needs. *Universal*: everyone is entitled to services that are sufficient to meet their needs, regardless of ability to pay" (Coote & Percy, 2020, p. 1). This kind of solution is more radical in that it looks beyond neoliberalism, draws on welfare notions from the past but updates them.

These are just some ways in which poverty and inequity could be re-imagined.

Rejecting racism

I have also argued about the centrality of racism in determining contemporary material hardships. Rather than accepting definitions of racism that start from an individualist perspective, although individual racism is significant, I have argued for defining racism as part of a political rationality which I have defined as biopower and the autoimmune nature of democracy. This is to offer a philosophical assessment of racism.

To offer something as a problem is to define it, and in this sense a definition produces the problem, rather than simply finding it. In policy, equity has long been equated (at least since the Education Act 1989) as parity of participation and achievement (TEC, 2015b). The logic is simple: if the other students are performing better than Māori students, it is because the teacher or institution is doing something wrong and needs support. Often, the response to a definitional production of poor performance is to invoke inclusive practices and the work of Māori scholars and practitioners, who offer alternative paradigms for looking at the issue.

Alternative Māori paradigmatic frameworks or interventions have grown out of years of analysis and grappling with structural and institutional assumptions and, often, long, hard-fought 'battles' spanning decades of work and lived experience (Royal 2012). The adoption or mention of these paradigms often becomes non-performative because they focus on what institutions (and teachers) fail to do and ignore what institutions are doing. This is to produce poor Māori performance as something someone is failing to do, rather than what the institution is actually doing. Moreover, the psychological and sociological modes enter into this analysis of institutional practice; 'the problem is ill-trained teachers', 'lack of understanding of Māori lives', etc. This is to individualise the problem and place it within a liberal frame of progress: all polytechnic staff need is to be better educated about Māori. We recognise our own shortcomings, feel bad, and in feeling bad we feel good because we have recognised the problem (Ahmed, 2006). But routine polytechnic practice is ignored as being unproblematic. Māori practices are used without careful consideration of the meanings of such incorporations (Bishop, 2012; Cooper, 2012; G. Stewart, 2017).

The forms of racism are better understood, not as aberrations, but as logical outcomes to policy and political ideology. Thus, I think it misses the point to offer cultural curriculums as solutions to underachievement. To do this is to compound one problem (measurement as neoliberal practice) with another, culture as the solution to poor educational outcomes.

The justification for cultural curricula to incorporate Māori perspectives must be on the basis of values, not the need to achieve parity. It is hard to see, to put it in stark terms, how knowing Māori language helps in a physics paper on quantum theory. This is to instrumentalise Māori knowledge, culture and practice. Māori culture has a central place in Aotearoa-New Zealand.

It is a different question of how society and education specifically should go about addressing the value of Māori culture and how that might challenge current hierarchical orders. Perhaps making Māori language compulsory, re-writing history so we recognise the nature of colonial settler societies and the practices that came with them. These are open-ended questions in desperate need of continued, considered, meditative thought.

Rethinking the polytechnic

Polytechnics are currently being rethought by the Labour-led government. I have described the moment polytechnics find themselves in, as encapsulated in the first narrative. They are the Cinderella service. The internal competitive aspects of inter-polytechnic rivalry have been largely lost in unifying the polytechnics under one umbrella. Cost savings are also possible by reducing duplication and the cost of competition. The single, unified polytechnic will offer some advantages that will be felt as welcome by the staff as long as jobs are protected. They also signal a move away from neoliberalism.

But much in the restructure of the polytechnic sector into one unified national polytechnic have yet to be determined. Work-based skills, cultural responsiveness (Ministry of Education, 2018b) and demand led funding (Ministry of Education, 2019b) have remained fundamental to the new system (Ministry of Education, 2019e). At the heart of the model remains the notion of an entrepreneur of the self, which leads to a radical site for resistance, *your:self*.

Resist your:self

The neoliberal self, as entrepreneur of the self, is atomistic, autonomous, self-motivated and self-directed. It is an idealised subject constructed in policy and media discourse. It is a fundamentalist project of government to construct the conditions for such a subject to thrive. Education has been remade to service this subject, with polytechnics remade as a habitat for such a subject to prosper from themselves. Using measures and a calculative reasoning as instrumental to its operations, it seeks learning as a duty, a moral responsibility to appreciate its value. Therefore, to resist neoliberal policy is to resist your:self.

Moral responsibility in neoliberalism is to maximise one's utility, which means repudiating our interdependent, vulnerable, and dependent selves and valorising independence and autonomy. This split is narcissistic in the sense that it promotes a view of merit based on individual effort by abstracting the individual from their socio-historical context.

Failure to achieve, to take skilled opportunities are reconceived in individual terms as character flaws that rest on individualist models of education and promote an individualised notion of learning (Birdwell, Grist, & Margo, 2011). As in *Ka Hikitia*, aspects of character that are promoted are self-motivation, self-regulation, self-direction (the autos). On the other hand, largely in welfare reform, the other side of the binary, characterises individuals negatively, as being lazy, underserving, and unbecoming. Such accounts promote a view that encourages dependence and vulnerability as characteristics of the undeserving poor, the underclass (Murray, 1984).

Such splitting of communities into the vulnerable and dependent is contrasted with the independent go-getters and has consequences for equality (Layton, 2014; McGowan, 2013). This splitting promotes notions of selfishness and self-centredness that most people experience as troubling,

> … the effects of neoliberalism have become increasingly pervasive in public and private life over the past 35 years, promoting and/or exacerbating particular forms of narcissistic and perverse states. (Layton, 2014, p. 161)

The privileged subject in policy discourse haunts discourse with a kind of narcissism. The promotion of an environment that demonises poverty as bad choices facilitates a lack of recognition of the other. The capacity for assertion is divided in such policy discourse with the capacity for connection. The capacity for connection includes a need for empathy, care, and recognition of others as full human beings. Furthermore, it fosters a mutual recognition and interdependence and the importance of subject–subject relations.

But the neoliberal self is anomalous because its focus on atomistic autonomous individuals of human capital represses the subject–subject relations, which relate to recognition of the other. To repress subject–subject relations is to instrumentalise our relations to those of subjects to objects. Furthermore, the autonomy prescribed and imbricated in policy discourse

as a responsibility to maximise utility inscribes learners in tertiary policy with an omniscience and omnipotence they do not have. To make a utility-maximising decision means to know all the choices available for everything that you do and to apply an economic rationality and to arrive at the optimal point. That is why Ayn Rand describes her theory of self in capitalism as objectivist (Rand, 1997). Yet this is an absurd proposition and undermines autonomy not only because of its impractical implications (I would have to be omniscient) but because every decision would be pre-determined by an objective calculation, rendering freedom, the supposed core of the neoliberal project, mute.

Self-interest, which is at the centre of motivation of the self in neoliberalism, undergirds the educational policy discourse and claims a connection to human nature. Freud's great discovery was that people consistently act contrary to their self-interests. For Freud, acting out of self-interest is a psychological impossibility as people are not motivated but are driven. Freud's basic proposition was maintaining the self required subversion of self-interest or sacrificing self-interest (McGowan, 2013). If we followed our self-interest and impulses, we would commit endless 'crimes' against others, thus the ego and superego place limits on our drives, diverting, repressing and subverting them.

Psychoanalytic theory has problematised such an idealised abstracted individualism by impugning self-interest as a form of narcissism. The wounds inflicted from a neoliberal self-interested narcissistic individualism are the result of living in differently valued subject positions within social hierarchies. The wounds are handed down from generation to generation, illustrating the relational aspects of subjectivity that "are marked by the effects of projection of repudiated parts of self onto others, by domination and submission – and by the eroticization of positions of power and weakness" (Layton, 2014, p. 167). Policy expressions that invoke identity as homo economicus must repress and demonise "connection and approval precisely by jointly projecting repudiated parts of self onto the reviled other" (Layton, 2014, p. 167). By 'commanding' us to be rational, self-interested, independent, autonomous beings, we project and revile those who become, in one way or another, uncommitted to neoliberal identity politics.

Autonomy in charge of its destiny (autotelic) and an autonomy that is motivated to change (automobilic) need critiquing if new, as yet unconceived, notions of self are to prosper – a deconstruction of the autos (Naas, 2006). After all, where would the vision of *Ka Hikitia* be without identity at the heart of the claims to resistance, independence, and sovereignty? How can we make sense of Māori equity in policy texts if autonomy (and the automobilic and autotelic) are found wanting? As Drichel (2013) puts its starkly:

> Attacking the autos, deconstruction cannot but rekindle latent memories of a prior traumatized state—a colonial shattering of identity, or a wound inscribed at the heart of an identity no longer coinciding with itself—the recurrence of which is being anxiously defended against. (p. 49)

The neoliberal identity formation is problematic and only its critique will open new possibilities to explore. These identities would recognise their historical formation, dependence, interdependence and vulnerability. Resistance to neoliberalism refuses the economisation of life. In whose name? I would argue not in the name of an identity or essence, but in the name of an equality.

Beyond technical education

In rethinking the polytechnic, of central importance is how policy constructs technical education. As described in chapter four technical education was largely described as a second-tier education aimed at delivering skills for work. But what if we reconnected technical education to technê as poietic unconcealment, a way of revealing new possibilities of how we make the world through the technical. After all, artefactual culture, what we make through the practice of technê, has played a central part in imaging who we are. This is why museums urge us to muse or think how artefactual culture constructs us as cultural beings. The fault of Epimetheus was to forget to give us an essential skill, attribute or essence, leaving it to be constructed by the invention of artefacts (Stiegler, 1994).

The production of artefactual culture and tool use has led to a re-working of human development where tool culture has increasingly been understood to have played a central role in the development of human intelligence (Leroi-Gouhran, 1993). The argument essentially suggests that the development of the upright posture freed the hands for tool use which freed the jaw for language and freed the brain to develop symbolic thought. This

developmental trajectory inverts traditional views of development: "intelligence and the capacity for symbolic thought are not the cause of tool-use but an effect" (Bradley, 2011, p. 12). In technical education, policy skills education is instrumentalised as a means to getting a job, furthermore, as also an opportunity to insert cognitive skills; yet it might well be the effect of reducing the technical to a calculative rationale that limits its possibility.

In 'Questions Concerning Technology' Heidegger refers to other possibilities of humanity (he) and techne as opening new relationships in technical education that tackle how we enframe the world and ourselves through our relationship with material production.

> [L]earning is not merely practice, to gain facility in the use of tools. Nor does he merely gather information about the customary forms of the things he is to build. If he is to become a true cabinetmaker, he makes himself answer and respond above all to the different kinds of wood and to the shapes slumbering within wood – to wood as it enters into man's dwelling with all the hidden riches of its nature. In fact, this relatedness to wood is what maintains the whole craft. Without that relatedness, the craft will never be anything but empty busywork, any occupation with it will be determined exclusively by business concerns. Every handicraft, all human dealings are constantly in that danger. The writing of poetry is no more exempt from it than is thinking. (Heidegger, 1977, pp. 14-15)

Technical education has more potential when it is considered as part of its longer intellectual history and philosophical tradition; delimiting technical education to skills for work draws on but a limited part of that intellectual tradition. A further issue that technical education must contend with, and resist, is its development alongside technology as a means of lifting humanity from nature, of labouring to control nature, cheirotechnês.

Here, to Marx's analysis of technology, and we could add technical education, somewhat also falls into an Aristotelian limitation that there exists an untrammelled essence where technology plays a supplementary and alienating role, particularly under capitalist organisation. Marx argued that, in the machinic stage of industrialisation, labour becomes increasingly alienated by the desire to drive capital profits (Marx, 2000). But a re-interpretation of Marx is important in light of alienation which has always already been present as humanity acts of self-exteriorisation into technical artefacts (Stiegler, 1994). Technical education is not something that happens to us, it is always already at work on us as an originary alienation.

Marx re-interpreted, through an examination of technê as originary form of alienation, a number of important lessons for technical education and the role of technology that challenge the simplistic notion of 'skills-for-work' in contemporary policy. Technology (and consequently technical education) is not what is separate from humanity, placed in front of him/her as prosthetic but is an intra-thetic experience within humanity. What we teach and use is part of us, it is inside us, and remakes us and reveals the world as it makes it. The trivialisation of technê to skills equally trivialises labour, making it a machine to generate capital, alienating us from within.

If the polytechnic is to contend with equality, then it would follow that the polytechnics must examine their role in producing the subject and institution of technê, technology and technical education, as a second-tier labouring class. The status of polytechnics must re-examine their relation to technê. By promulgating the skills view of technical education, they delimit the polytechnic's potential. In such a context, some polytechnics have opted to become more university-like, trying to deliver higher education associated with the universities, attract higher rates of funding whilst implicitly accepting a hierarchical model of episteme and technê. There are multiple avenues of possibilities that polytechnics could pursue through reengaging with technê as a form of enframing the world and possibly changing it.

Concluding remarks

The neoliberal New Zealand experiment dismantled the egalitarian experiment of the social laboratory that was deeply embedded in the New Zealand consciousness as a fair-go society. Instead, it claimed to offer a more efficient and effective mechanism: the free market. In doing so it reconstituted the polytechnic sector, professionals, and students with a new rationale – an entrepreneurial economic rationale. In this regard, it not only remade what we do in the polytechnic sector but *who we are*. Learning, in this new conception, was constructed not as a right but as a duty and a 'will(ingness) to learn' formed the newly constructed subject: the learner. The learner sought to profit from self-reformation through the acquisition of skills, through a mental toughness, incorporated in curriculum as resilience

and a work ethic. Consequentially, I have argued that learner and the professional subjectivities have become new sites of exploitation and, therefore, sites of resistance.

Equality remains useful to think with but remains wedded to a comprised political project. Equality (and equity) are rogue concepts the use of which have always been excessive and abusive. They need to be re-thought. New experiments that resist the subjectivities produced by neoliberalism are needed that are open to the otherness of democracy.

What is clear is that to move beyond neoliberal's impasse with equity we must resist, first and foremost, its reasoning. We must problematise measurement and equity as parity – not to reject it but to re-invigorate it to lead to question the meaning of life under neoliberalism. Policy cannot continue its trajectory of blaming poverty on bad decisions or bad character but must recognise its intergenerational structuring affects.

Instead of consulting with Māori groups, like iwi, new funding models, like PB, offer ways to radicalise educational agendas from the ground up.

I have offered a number of possible ways, by no means limited to those, in which poverty could be engaged within policy. Policy could simply make equity pay by improving funding for programmes, like foundation, that explicitly engage with equity and provide more intense support mechanisms. Furthermore, we could make this more attractive by free fees and giving students a grant that allows them to live, based on circumstances, thus removing essential barriers to learn. More radical ideas might involve accepting education as part of a wider system of universal basic services, without which citizens cannot live meaningful and worthy lives.

Further analysis might require an engagement with racism and rather than seeing it as an aberration, policy might accept it as a product and conclusion of a political rationality. This engagement will allow a formal start to addressing issues of racism, inherent in settler colonialism.

But we cannot rethink Māori equity in the polytechnic without rethinking technê and decoupling its priority with work and occupational trajectories must be key to that change. I have offered some basic insights for that process.

Chapter Eight: Conclusion

This thesis critically examines the relationship between equality and education policy, in the context of technical education, by posing the question: **How does the polytechnic sector construct Māori equity, with what outcomes and possible alternatives?**

Equity remains a relatively neglected policy area of systematic critical analysis. This research shows the critical importance for equity of second-tier tertiary education institutions. Polytechnics, as well as other second-tier institutions, have been the subject of a great deal of policy focus in the Anglophone world: a focus that has emphasised the need and potential of technical education to face workforce needs, to respond to technological change, and to critically expose their role in equality.

The emphasis on technical education has had a revival, with secondary schools expanding technical work-oriented curriculum and qualifications, and universities increasing development of a primary focus on preparing students for work. A few generations ago, these were more marginal concerns for policy analysts. This thesis critically exposes technical education policy.

A similar argument could be made for equity and equality, where more nuanced critical discussion is needed on the role of education in servicing the need for equity policy. Democratic countries are built on the core idea that they serve the demos (the people) and a key part of their political justification is their role in arbitrating opportunities on the basis of fairness and merit, not on unaccountable vested interests, or privilege.

The fact that inequality, especially in the developed Anglophone world, has grown at an extraordinary rate as a result of neoliberal reform suggests that a critical focus on the reform is needed. But equally important, Māori, as tangata whenua, face the sharp end of inequality making it a crisis of legitimacy. Māori inequity makes any analysis of equity an important focus to any critical exploration of equity in education. It is especially important in Aotearoa-New

Zealand because of the status of Māori as the indigenous population and co-signatories to the Treaty of Waitangi/Tiriti O Waitangi.

This thesis concerns the outcomes for Māori students in contemporary polytechnic education in Aotearoa-New Zealand, which is considered a 'site' to explore the concept of equity in tertiary education policy. Teaching and other staff have been handed responsibility for giving effect to Māori equity policy, and Māori staff play key roles in polytechnics for their Māori clientele. This study shows how Māori staff in polytechnics have experienced and enacted Māori equity policies. How Māori have navigated the education system provides a special challenge to Aotearoa-New Zealand's complacent image of settler colonialism.

The importance of equity is the striking feature of policy in second-tier tertiary institutions around the world, and specifically of polytechnics in Aotearoa-New Zealand; it defines, to a large extent, their raison d'être. In this sense, to critically examine the polytechnics is to examine equity because they are intimately tied projects. Polytechnics amongst the many things they do, exist to give opportunity to those who have not achieved in secondary education, to those who need to retrain and also makes appeals to those who have never seen higher education as an option. The abject failure of secondary schools to deliver educational success to Māori on par with non-Māori continues to be a key driver of polytechnic education.

This thesis has critically examined the liberal rationale and its re-invigoration in neoliberalism, to see how equality and equity are constructed by the polytechnic sector to show how things have changed with the new policy initiatives of neoliberalism, and to propose alternatives.

Synopsis of the thesis

Before neoliberalism, material forms of colonisation established a lopsided co-existence of Pākehā and Māori that allowed neo/liberalism to profit from the Māori view on many social issues, especially in relation to the aims and forms of education.

The country (nation-state/whenua) of Aotearoa-New Zealand is small enough to operate as a 'social laboratory'. Wakefield first promoted the notion of a new colonial social experiment; a new settler colonialism built on class stratification of labour and capital. It was largely able to do so at the cost of disenfranchising Māori, by confiscating land, replacing Māori institutions and suppressing Māori culture and language.

Aotearoa-New Zealand became known as a 'social laboratory of the world', a reputation it earned from the progressive liberal reforms of 1890-1920. After the Great Depression the first labour government (1935-1949) introduced one of the most progressive social reform programmes in the world. Fraser, the minister of education, together with educationalist Clarence Beeby, pioneered a far-reaching, egalitarian vision of education, which had a lasting legacy that still resonates today, of a fair go society where everyone has the opportunity to receive an education. But the fair go society has always been haunted by the spectre of colonialism.

In the 19th Century *technological* advance became a driver of mass education as a result of perceived pressures for capital growth as a result of the industrial revolution. As a consequence, the need for new industrial companies to develop *technical* education and new *techniques* of management loomed large and governments developed new institutions, policies and practices that laid the foundation for a new political rationality for global trade and colonialism.

Behind technical education, technology, and the new management techniques of government and industry was technê: part of a complex intellectual system of thought that gave rise to many strands of intellectual development throughout the entirety of humanity, including the development of large sedentary communities. Technê was construed as the set of abilities and skills required to lift humanity above necessity. But technê was based on subjugating many to laborious physical work and in the process creating a social stratification based on the labour of bodies. These basic distinctions have been retained in European languages and had a decisive impact on views about technical education.

Aristotle gave technê systematic analysis, as poietic unconcealment, or a way of revealing truly through craft. Over time, and particularly in the Industrial Revolution, narrow definitions of technology and technical education emerged, chained to the interests of capital. This narrow view developed a technological understanding of being that has narrowly fixated on a calculative, utilitarian instrumentalism, at the cost of other modes of thought. Consequently, machine paradigms of efficiency became influential in early management theories and policy, fixated on the idea of translating metaphors of machine efficiency to costs of running organisations. These have shaped the delivery of mass education across Europe and the Anglophone colonies. What emerged was a factory model of education for the new industrial centres and developing colonies.

Aotearoa-New Zealand embarked on an egalitarian legislative reform programme that was the envy of the world but was largely aimed at the settlers. Technical education legislation, seen in conjunction with wider policy, showed how it was intimately tied to land grabs and establishing European institutions that replaced Māori practice and institutions and provided further justification for financially supporting settlers to come to New Zealand.

As a result of continuous pressure from Māori, successive governments promised to address Māori concerns. These promises included concerns about inequality and unfairness. Consequently, educational policies, particularly technical education policies increasingly focussed on issues of fairness and equity, gaining sustained recognition in policy (the National Committee on Māori Education 1955, The Hunn Report 1960, and the Currie Report 1962). The Currie Report drew attention to the gap in participation and achievement between Māori and non-Māori that has ever since shaped educational policy discourse, which was influential in defining the characteristics of 'modern education' associated with Beeby's egalitarian principles.

In the mid 1980s, concerted policy attention was given to address Māori concerns about inequality, unfairness and historical injustice. Education was given a special role and special attention to address inequity. This happened, and was partly justified in the terms it unfolded, amid a massive reform programme of the economy to better meet the economic drivers of globalisation. This reform remade the Aotearoa-New Zealand economy according to the

notions of neoliberalism. A notion of learning based on human capital became the new paradigm for equity policy, nationally and internationally.

Under the influence of various neoliberal thinkers, education has been recast as serving the needs of the economy. As a result, polytechnic education has been increasingly given the task of skills acquisition, especially for those who have fallen through the cracks of schooling on the belief that preparing them for work would deliver equality.

In the polytechnics, Māori outcomes have been particularly implicated and increasingly used as the measure of effectiveness/efficiency which cannot work on principle (since it is based on a fallacy). Moreover, the human capital paradigm exacerbated inequity and despite early promise of increased participation rates in polytechnics the polytechnics system is in financial ruin and the government has set about a new series of reform, moving tentatively away from some of the neoliberal platforms.

I have argued that to usher in any meaningful change needs a concerted effort to continue to resist neoliberalism at both pragmatic and philosophical levels. Resistance needs to move beyond the failed neoliberal ideas, which means questioning the value of the goal of equity as educational parity.

For more radical change, educational equity as parity of participation and achievement should be taken as a starting point for critical discussion. It is important to critically examine democratic life and the conditions that make its citizens visible, audible and perceptible. In this sense democratic inclusion is not just institutional but an event that constructs the visibility of everyday life (Rancière, 2004).

Resisting neoliberal notions of self, particularly, human capital notions is an important element of any critical enterprise to deliver justice. It is through the nexus knowledge-power-self that the population experiences inequality. Māori identity has been one of the main planks for resisting and rejecting neoliberal ideas of the self or person and social group. Māori ideas of 'te iwi' allow Māori community values to prevail over neoliberalism ideas of rights of the individual to profit.

Other areas of resistance include funding, finance and rethinking the place of poverty. From such critiques a new polytechnic can emerge that gasps a different future. By questioning the primacy given to technical education as a means to employment, technical education policy can open different ways to think about learners and professionals that will allow policy discourse to move beyond neoliberalism.

The democracy on offer under neoliberal policy must be resisted in the name of a democracy to come, where the democracy is open to alterity. Māori-Pakeha relations have somewhat stymied attempts in neoliberalism to apply a more Atlantic driven neoliberalism of austerity. Māori fundamentally challenge the influence of Britain and Māori continue to offer a different set of views and assumptions that open new possibilities that do not easily sit within the nation defined in British-European terms.

Limitations of this research (and strengths)

The (post) qualitative research methodology of this thesis results in limitations *and* strengths because it is relatively unstructured, with a next-generation status of being not yet finalised and formalised. I followed a critical discursive approach, influenced by Foucault and Derrida, which involved considerable focus on policy discourse, and a genealogical inquiry into key systems of intellectual thought. Perhaps unusually for such an approach, however, I also included a set of qualitative interviews, following standard qualitative procedures.

I interviewed six people with extensive experience working in polytechnic policy, Māori equity, and education. In a broadly poststructuralist framework, it would be somewhat anomalous to try to represent 'reality'. Jean Baudrillard's idea of a copy (simulacra) that develops its own truth, rather than tries to recreate reality, may be appropriate. The approach taken is limited since I cannot reflect reality, nor am I perverting reality or have any pretence to reality, but I am using a copy as a means to 'deconstruct' an ideal or privileged position, and thus the limitations of that 'copy' are my own.

Instead of standard qualitative interview research using thematic analysis, I used my interviews as part of a broadly philosophical-ethnographical approach (Lather, 2006), in order to "move from what needs to be opposed to what can be imagined out of what is already happening, embedded in the immanence of doing" (Lather, 2018, p. 114). By writing narratives that combined interview data with my own experience as source materials, I exaggerated the political content of the interview extracts. This process produced fictionalised narratives that nonetheless capture typical quotidian reality for an academic manager of a polytechnic. In this way, I showed how market rationality is deeply embedded in the very tissues of our everyday lives. Foucauldian research focussed on the knowledge-power-self nexus, for understandable reasons, often limits analysis to discourse. I wanted to illustrate triple entanglements between knowledge-power-**self**, so used my own limited imaginary, with as much empathy as I could muster for the cast of actors of Māori equity in the polytechnic sector, to create my research narratives.

Another important limitation of this research is that it is primarily about Māori inequity, yet draws largely on policy discourse, which limits the involvement with Māori content. This lack leads to another important question: why would I, as a non-Maori doctoral researcher, conduct a study about a Māori topic?

Firstly, whether one is Māori or not, we are all implicated directly in the policy discourse on Māori: it is inescapable. One can choose to ignore, avoid and even repress it, but it is always there. My own ethnic experience in the UK of belonging to a minority drew me to this project as an outsider: a standpoint that I believe gives me a certain insight into the policy dynamics on display in Aotearoa-New Zealand and opens up new possibilities that an outside perspective can provide.

A second reason to engage in research about Māori, linked to this idea of a shared experience of injustice, is the responsibility that we all have to one another for addressing injustice. I have formed friendships and professional relationships with a large number of Māori people who have encouraged me with aroha to undertake this work, still unfinished. The aroha that has sustained this work can be considered one of its greatest strengths.

Key findings

There are three key findings to focus on:

1. Māori equity policies that are pursued in polytechnics, and perhaps in education overall, are incoherent.

2. The polytechnic sector reflects a reductionist understanding of technical education, which has a much richer potential.

3. Neoliberalism has shown itself to be completely bankrupt in relation to the promises with which it was introduced in New Zealand, as reflected in the reforms for polytechnics and schools introduced by the 2017 elected Labour-led government.

Each of these key findings is briefly discussed below.

1. Māori equity policies that are pursued in polytechnics, and perhaps in education overall, are incoherent.

The core of the thesis involved a detailed examination of Māori educational equity policy in the polytechnic sector. The focus of the policy discourse on Māori equity was based on two core principles repeated over a large number of policy; a focus on the goals of educational equity and a culturally responsive system.

Wider social equality can be achieved through through educational equity as parity of particpation and achievement in education in national qualifications (standardised tests). Simply put educational equity are proxies for social equity in an economic rationalist system, where learners are motivated to maximise their utility and where polytechncis only offer programmes of study aligned to the employement market and employer's needs.

According to the same policy, the most important function of a polytechnic, after institutional-work alignment, is to to promote a cutlurally responsive polytechnic to Māori, which is where polytechnics need to focus their resources. There is some recognition of the importance of interpersonal and instutional racsim but this remains insufficiently detailed to understand what it might involve.

These two core principles individually are incoherent and, moreover, together, they contradict one another in practice. Education parity does not lead to wider social equality and there is no reason to think it does. The human capital assumption, of the acquisition of skills required by work lead to flows of income over a career supported by economic analysis has not achieved the ends it set out to achieve 40 years ago. On the contrary, there is substantial evidence that the construction of market based economy and education system has excerbated inequality as I exemplified through foundation courses where inequity is most visible.

The inclusion of Māori culture, or culturally responsive polytechnics promoted in policy is an incoherent notion in terms of parity of participation and achievement. There is no doubt that there is an ethical argument to include a substantial Māori perspective from the educational curriculum to values, however, it does not follow that it necessarily improves achievement. To instrumentalise Māori culture, like this, is to reduce its value in wider society on its own terms. In fact, there is a stronger argument to be made that the neglect of racism and its poor conceptualisation is tied to poor achievement and participation.

Finally, and equally importantly, is to situate achievement in standardised testing within a problematic history of population management techniques, like IQ, that were developed to reproduce social differentiation. Taken together with the willful neglect of poverty in policy discourse leads to pessimistic views on policy discourse and its ability to address inequity. Inequity should not be viewed as an aberration but as a conclusion of the application of political ideology and rationality.

2. The polytechnic sector reflects a reductionist understanding of technical education, which has a much richer potential.

Technical education has adopted a very narrow definition of technê as skills for work, which in turn has instrumentalised education, making it subject to the demands of employers. In this sense, students have become products to be sold to companies. This limited conception

of technical education has increasingly meant that skills acquisition becomes susceptible to exploitation.

As a result, technical education policy has progressively emphasised the need for cognitive skills that focus on aptitude, attitude, character and work readiness. This has invited employers into the psyche of learners, and allowed policy to control the conduct of learners. Employers have become steadily more directly involved in curriculum decisions, and gradually come to act as auditors of technical education's relevance. Relevance has become an increasingly important demand made of polyetchnics.

In this way, employers have conducted war on workers, by insisting on certain subjectivities and blaming poor productivity on character, rather than work conditions, which have come under withering assault from neoliberal policy changes. Neoliberal policy not only affects the conduct of workers, but also insists on a narrow framing of the world.

In light of the narrow definition, neoliberal readings of technê are best viewed as ways to stratify class and opportunity. Polytechnics act as machines that grant limited access to democracy by setting up administrative mechanisms, such as performance in standardised tests, which limit possibilities and operate as 'class sorting' mechanisms.

Polytechnic staff have also been subjected to this rationale, in that policy is designed to measure the value added by staff, using abstract calculations. Furthermore, polytechnic staff have experienced the effects of years of labour reform in which they are vulnerable to restructures: they can literally find out that their work does not extract enough value anymore from one term to the next. Operation of these policies produce poor staff morale, which especially affects Māori staff, who are expected to undertake cultural and emotional labour as part of their workload with little recompense or recognition. This work is not highly valued since it rarely contributes to any basis for better pay or conditions.

3. Neoliberalism has shown itself to be completely bankrupt in relation to the promises with which it was introduced in New Zealand, as reflected in the reforms for polytechnics and schools introduced by the 2017 elected Labour-led government.

The accelerated introduction of neoliberal policy in Aotearoa-New Zealand has been part of a wider pattern in Anglophone and Western countries, who have sought, through global bodies like the International Monetary Fund, OECD, etc., to construct global markets that every country is forced to follow. The pursuit of these policies in Aotearoa-New Zealand and other Anglophone countries has intensified inequalities and widened the gap between the haves and the have nots.

The global financial crisis in 2007-2008 and the pandemic in 2020 reveal the fact that neoliberalism has been an abject failure according to its professed aims. These crises have demonstrated the unfairness of its effects, whereby Māori are more likely than other groups to suffer.

The pandemic revealed the impotence of the market by showing that the majority of the 'essential workers' were technical professionals who were largely poorly paid. The most important workers, who have kept the economy and the nation ticking, are mainly the working poor, who cannot make a living from the wages they earn in fulltime work without government support, which would indicate that the labour market is not working.

Most damning of all to the efficacy of educational policy discourse is the reduction of working conditions. Most workers experience work as a condition of permanant stress, where work has become precarious. Most people do not enjoy the experience of the neoliberal workplace.

Policies for cultural responsiveness, which entail the demand for Māori to perform Māori culture, have not been experienced as wholly positive. These expectations are usually poorly resourced and carry little recognition for the staff concerned. Māori staff are unduly affected by this policy demand, and little attention has been given to the impact on them. There are many risks involved in encouraging the widespread use of Māori culture in education without due attention being given to its application, by whom and for what. Many Māori staff feel pressured to engage in emotional and moral labour, the costs of which are not recognised.

Neoliberalism has not solved Māori equity and it has largely left the polytechnics in a debt ridden state, where longevity is no longer tenable without further bailouts or reform.

Final thoughts and the future

In 2018, the Labour-led government announced a significant reform of the polytechnics. The polytechnic sector is to merge into one national institution, with delivery in regional centres. There will be a new funding model, likely to be a combination of a grant-based and demand-driven system. Industry and Māori will be given greater say. The reform that is currently underway is a significant change, involving reduced competition, at least between polytechnics, although not with other parts of the tertiary sector. Fundamentally, the system remains wedded to a human capital model of tertiary education. This new plan may improve some aspects, but retains neoliberal models that I would implore theorists, academics and students to continue to resist.

Liberal and neoliberal models of tertiary education are compromised projects; equity policies under their influence are bound to fail. Yet despite the failures, the ideas of equity and equality remain strongly attractive. These ideas point to the possibility of fairer times. An important area of research is how to re-imagine equality and equity to break it out of its neo/liberal heritage. Is it possible to retain an idea of equity and equality outside of the neo/liberal paradigm?

Certainly, one area to promote in policy (or counter-policy) would be alternatives to calculative thinking and instrumental reason. An important area for further philosophic inquiry is to apply different kinds of thinking to the ideas of equity and equality, such as meditative thinking, as promoted by Heidegger. What if Māori values such as whanaungatanga were applied and thought through outside of neoliberalism? These values came up repeatedly in the narratives, but inside a neoliberal paradigm, it is difficult to see how a collective concept of relationships could work together with the individualistic atomism of an entrepreneurial self.

There is much research documenting inequality, but less on the impact of inequality on the lives of those who are affected by it. (Post) qualitative approaches have the potential to promote new possibilities and change minds. Narratives are powerful ways to illustrate the effects of policy and bring to life experiences of marginality. Narratives also create connections, whereas theory can feel cold and de-humanised. Theory and narrative work together to provide a powerful basis for remaking the world and changing the frames we normalise.

Technical education in Aotearoa-New Zealand needs to be completely re-thought. Heretofore, technical education has been largely restricted to work skills. Important as this is, technical education would be well served by exploring wider conceptions drawing on its roots connected to know-how or 'knowing truly' (in Heidegger's words). What is produced through technê has the potential to build nations. Its products fill our museums; it is fundamentally culture-producing. As such, technical education should reconnect with how it can reveal the world differently. Māori notions of craft, amongst other notions, offer possibilities for revisiting technê.

The future of technology risks making many jobs potentially redundant, thereby undermining the investment logic of a skills-based approach to technical education. Many professional jobs, as well as labour intensive jobs, are at risk of becoming obsolete. Wealth, as we are already seeing, will increasingly fall into the hands of the owners of these new technologies. There is a growing need for critical research on technical education relating to technology and its role in creating inequality.

Notions of craft, derived from technê, need to be expanded so that technical education is not a set of competencies for human capital but enshrines wider values that reflect the world we want to live in. The production-consumption model tied to growth is leading to environmental challenges, whereas craft and technical know-how to produce new ways of thinking about the world have become necessary to lead us out of the current impasse.

Significant risks remain, particularly in the developments associated with technology and especially big data, which are increasingly consuming the work of policy analysts. New policy

ideas such as social investment exert significant influence on government agencies. But instead of liberating populations, these policy ideas are experienced as uncritical, invasive techniques, which continue to intensify forms of social control. What I have called digital governmentality poses many risks to those diverse kinds of selves and their ability to flourish in a neoliberal economy. More detailed research is needed to extend the tentative propositions of this thesis, in order to understand the full extent of this area of policy.

It remains important to be open to equality outside of neoliberalism; to an equality-to-come. Parity is too limited a conception for educational equity but remains a useful starting point to think with. Can we continue to ignore poverty and its impact? Will policy ever resolve equity without critically examining poverty and privilege? By engaging with wider notions of technê, polytechnics have the opportunity to re-engage in philosophy, and thereby to re-connect us with the wonder of life.

To change the world, we need to change the way we frame it, and this requires fundamental rethinking. In Aotearoa-New Zealand, the principle of a 'fair go' society still resonates. It could even be argued that the Treaty of Waitangi/te Tiriti o Waitangi enshrines equality for both Māori and Pākehā in its third article; and that without fundamentally tackling the principle of equality, we are unlikely to live up to a democracy worthy of the name.

Glossary of Māori Words

Ako Aotearoa	National Centre for Tertiary Teaching Excellence in New Zealand
Aotearoa	A Māori name for New Zealand
Aroha	The nearest Māori word equivalent to 'love'
Hapū	Small kin group
Hei Toko i te Tukunga	Policy framework for enabling tertiary Māori student success
Hui	Meeting, gathering
Iwi	Large kin group
Ka Hikitia	National Māori education strategy
Karakia	Incantation, prayer
Kaumātua	Male elder
Kaupapa Māori	Māori philosophy, cause, strategy
Kia ora tātou	Greetings, everyone
Māori	Indigenous peoples of Aotearoa
Marae	Māori community centre
Mātauranga Māori	Māori knowledge, Māori education
Pākehā	Non-Māori (White) New Zealander
Pōwhiri	Formal welcome ceremony
Tangata	Person
Tangata whenua	Hosts, traditional owners
Te Tiriti o Waitangi	The Treaty of Waitangi
Tikanga	Customs, protocols
Wānanga	A Māori form of tertiary institution (modern meaning)
Whakatau	Less formal welcome
Whānau	Family (extended or metaphorical)
Whenua	Land

Appendices

Appendix A: Letter of invitation

Invitation to Participate in PhD Research Interviews

Date:

As part of a doctoral research project, I am exploring how professionals enact policy regarding Māori equity. In particular, I am interested in how staff working in a regional polytechnic experience equity policy. A main aim is to understand how reform of tertiary education, from the mid 1980s untill now, has affected how staff have enacted equity policy. The research is particularly interested in how more business-like practices introduced through that reform have affected the ways in which equity is experienced and enacted at the 'coal face'.

Data will be collected in this study through observations, interviews, and policy document analysis. The interviews will explore how staff members at various levels interact with government agencies or management tiers to understand what they should do.

The interview will take about 1 hour. There will be a series of open-ended questions that you should feel free to answer as you see fit. The interview will be more like a conversation than a question-and-answer session. The interview will be recorded and later transcribed.

Your participation in the interview is completely voluntary. You have the right to withdraw from further participation at any time without having to give a reason, and with no adverse consequence.

The interview research has been approved by the University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee.

Please email me on kbak985@aucklanduni.ac.nz

Appendix B: Participation Information sheet

Faculty of Education,
The University of Auckland
Tai Tokerau Campus
PO Box 1326,
Whanagarei 0140

PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET (Manager)

Project title: Staff experiences of ethnicity, indigeneity and inequity in regional tertiary institutions in Aotearoa New Zealand

Name of Researcher: Khalid Bakhshov

I am a PhD student in the Faculty of Education, University of Auckland, and my research is a qualitative study on how staff in the polytechnic enact policy around Māori equity. A main aim is to understand how reform of tertiary education, from the mid-1980s until now, has affected how staff have enacted equity policy. I am particularly interested in how more business-like practices introduced through that reform have affected how equity is experienced and enacted at the 'coal face'.

There are three elements to the study: observations, interviews, and policy document analysis. The interviews will explore how various levels of staff interact with government agencies or management tiers to understand what they should do. You are being invited to participate in the research because of your specific and important role.

As well as being of considerable academic interest, there are expected to be useful implications for the polytechnic, in terms of how they engage with and respond to equity, as well as for other tertiary institutions in similar situations who may be interested in learning from this study.

The interview should take about 2 hours. There will be a series of open ended questions that you should feel free to answer as you see fit. At any given time you can stop the interview and ask to withdraw from the study. If anything in the process should cause you distress, support will be provided and the interview stopped on request.

Confidentiality

Interviews will be recorded and fully transcribed. The recordings will be stored in a secure location for up to six years and only the researcher and supervisors will have access. People's names or job titles will not be included in reports to secure anonymity. The transcript will be prepared by a professional who will sign a

confidentiality agreement. Participants will be offered a copy of their interview transcript and provided with the opportunity to take out or amend any part of it that they do not wish reported in the findings.

We hope you will be able to help with this important area of research. If you agree to take part please complete the consent form. You are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. None of the information will or can be used by the researcher against the participant.

How will the results be used?

The data from this research will be used for:

1. PhD thesis
2. Academic research papers and presentations
3. A summary report to be circulated to all interested participants or participating organisations.

Please indicate on the consent form if you would like to receive a summary of the results.

Please get in touch if you would like further information:

Khalid Bakhshov - 0297700889; kbak985@aucklanduni.ac.nz

Chair contact details: For any queries regarding ethical concerns you may contact the Chair, The University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee, The University of Auckland, Research Office, Private Bag 92019, Auckland 1142. Telephone 09 373-7599 extn. 87830/83761. Email: humanethics@auckland.ac.nz.‖

Appendix C: Consent form

Faculty of Education,
The University of Auckland
Tai Tokerau Campus
PO Box 1326,
Whanagarei 0140.

Consent form (e.g. Manager)

Project Title: Staff experiences of ethnicity, indigeneity and inequity in regional tertiary institutions in Aotearoa New Zealand

Researcher: Khalid Bakshshov

I have read the Participant Information Sheet, have understood the nature of the research and why I have been selected. I have had the opportunity to ask questions and have them answered to my satisfaction.

▢ I agree to take part in this research.

▢ I understand that I am free to withdraw participation at any time, and to withdraw any data traceable to me up to a specified date (give an actual date) / period.

▢ I agree / do not agree to be audiotaped.

▢ I wish / do not wish to have my tapes returned to me.

▢ I wish / do not wish to receive the summary of findings.

▢ I understand that a third party who has signed a confidentiality agreement will transcribe the tapes.

▢ I understand that data will be kept for 6 years, after which they will be destroyed.

Name _____
Signature _____ Date _____

APPROVED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND HUMAN ETHICS COMMITTEE ON …….FOR (3) YEARS REFERENCE NUMBER ..../…

Appendix D: List of questions (guide)

Interview Schedule

(Brackets are prompts or further areas to explore)

1. ***What are the major issues for TEIs in New Zealand?***
   (Of equity?)

2. ***What policies on equity affect your interactions and in what way?***
   (What difference do they make? How does that make you feel? E.g. Treaty of Waitangi)

3. ***Have you ever considered making a complaint about equity issues?***
   (Who would you go to and why? Why did you think they could help?)

4. ***Can you think of any incidents in your time that you saw as involving equity (ethnic or Māori)?***
   (Any Student incidents? How does that make you feel about work?)

5. ***How do you use your knowledge to interact with students around equity?***

6. ***Do you think your identity affects the way you experience equity?***
   (In what way?)

7. ***Does your sense of who you are have any impact on the student's experience of tertiary education?***
   (Why? Give me some examples?)

8. ***Is there anything you do to bring about change, in equity?***

9. ***What would you include in equity policy that you think is not covered in current policies?***
   (Why? What difference do you think this would make?)

10. ***Do you have any specific recommendations to improve the equity policies?***
    (If you could change anything tomorrow in your organisation what would that be?)

Appendix E: Transcribers confidential agreement

Faculty of Education,
The University of Auckland
Tai Tokerau Campus
PO Box 1326,
Whanagarei 0140.

TRANSCRIBER CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT

Project Title: Staff experiences of ethnicity, indigeneity and inequity in regional tertiary institutions in Aotearoa New Zealand

Researcher: Khalid Bakshshov

Supervisor: Dr. Georgina Stewart

Transcriber:

I agree to transcribe the audiotapes/videotapes for the above research project. I understand that the information contained within them is confidential and must not be disclosed to, or discussed with, anyone other than the researcher and his/her supervisor(s).

Name: _____

Signature: _____

Date: _____

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