

# He Korowai:

The integration of Māori cultural practices and knowledge within  
the New Zealand Defence Force: A case study of Te Taua  
Moana, the Royal New Zealand Navy

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## Abstract

Māori people are significant contributors to the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF). However, Māori knowledge was not formally introduced into the military curricula until 2004. At the cost of sacrificing their indigenous identity, Māori personnel were expected to conform to the dominant Western worldview. Nonetheless, adding indigenous knowledge into military curricula improves the learning experiences of all NZDF personnel (Hohaia, 2015).

The aim of this research is to identify the institutional entrepreneurs and actors who made changes to formally implement Māori cultural practices into the Royal New Zealand Navy (Navy) core business from 1990 to 2005, and to identify who, how and why and they did so. This research will contribute to the knowledge of change within a very hierarchical organisation such as the Navy. In addition, the research was carried out to ensure that the Navy was acknowledged for their efforts in the 1990s to incorporate Māori knowledge and practice, and to make that example available to other organisations.

The research question is “How have key actors enabled the recognition of Māori cultural practices and knowledge within Te Taua Moana, Royal New Zealand Navy from 1990 to 2005? This research will examine the theoretical concepts of institutions and the practices of individuals and collective actors who had intentions of creating, maintaining and disrupting an institution. It has been argued that institutional work conducted by institutional entrepreneurs might be deliberate. However, what those “intentions” may be will differ significantly depending on the dimension of agency that dominates the instances of institutional work that an actor considers. Institutional work perspectives in the past have looked more closely at practice and process rather than to an outcome.

With a kaupapa Māori approach, combined with a Māori-centred framework, the focus in this thesis is on asking why and how institutional work is undertaken by institutional entrepreneurs, and who are those institutional entrepreneurs who act to instigate a divergent change within the norms of an institution. The change that is the focus of this

thesis is the integration of Māori culture into the Royal New Zealand Navy from 1990 - 2005. The detailed analysis of the external and internal factors that drove this change is based on interviews with seven participants who were involved in various aspects of this significant piece of institutional work over a considerable period.

Key findings of the outcome of this institutional work – the integration of Māori culture and practices into the Royal New Zealand Navy – show that change requires trust, leadership, support from people with expertise, and leaders and supporters with vision, determination and energy. The result is that the Navy acknowledges the indigenous culture of its country and it is the only Navy that displays this bicultural relationship wherever it goes around the world.

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## Attestation of authorship

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person (except where explicitly defined in the acknowledgements), nor material which to a substantial extent has been submitted for the award of any other degree or diploma of a university or other institution of higher learning.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'S. R. S.', is centered on a light blue rectangular background.

Signed

31 October 2019

Date



## Acknowledgements

*E hara taku toa, i te toa taki tahi, engari he toa taki tini*

*It is not by my own individual efforts alone that I may succeed,  
but by the collective efforts of those around me.*

He karakia, he hōnore, he korōria ki te atua, he maungarongo ki te whenua, he whakaaro pai ki nga tāngata katoa, korōria ki tō ingoa tapu, Amine

Ka huri au kia ratou kua wheturangihia, ara,  
ki oku taokete e rua e mate mai i roto i toku  
haerenga rangahau  
kia ratou kua takoto mai i te anuanu, i te mataotao  
kia rātou katoa, kua moe mai i te pō nui i te pō roa, i te pō  
tiwhatiwha, kia rātou katoa,  
haere, haere, haere atu rā.

*Ka hoki mai ano, kia koutou, te kanohi ora,*

This research was undertaken to acknowledge the Royal New Zealand Navy and what they did to formally integrate and recognise Māori culture. More specifically, it is intended to acknowledge those non-Māori leaders of the Navy who were instrumental in making this divergent change possible. These changes would also not have been possible without those that had the knowledge, skills and expertise. It was these two key factors that brought this change to fruition.

So, a big thank you to all the participants in this research for giving me their time, willingness to share their experiences and why they made certain decisions. I know there were many people involved with this journey. Therefore, I know I will miss someone's name, so I wish to acknowledge all those involved at some stage in contributing to this change. Kia ora kia koutou katoa, to all those who participated in this journey – thank you for your contribution.

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## Ethics

This research was approved by AUT Ethics Committee, ethics application number 16/240, date of approval June 9, 2016.

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

Māori people are significant contributors to the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF). However, Māori knowledge was not formally introduced into the military curricula until 2004. At the cost of sacrificing their indigenous identity, it was a common expectation that Māori personnel would obey the dominant Western worldview. Nonetheless, the learning experiences of all NZDF personnel was enhanced by adding indigenous knowledge into military curricula.

The topic of this research is “The integration of Māori cultural knowledge and practices into the Royal New Zealand Navy”. The aim of the research was guided by the following questions: What was the institutional environment of the Navy during the period 1990-2005? What roles were the participants in during the 1990-2005 when integrating change(s)? Did they seek support for these changes and how did they go about this? How did participants go about implementing these changes? What did they experience from being able to implement these changes? Why Māori cultural practices? Which changes were the various participants directly involved with? Looking back on these changes, could participants elaborate on whether these changes were effective or not? This knowledge will contribute to the area of change in organisations, but more specifically within hierarchical organisations such as the Navy.

In addition, the research was carried out to ensure that the Navy was acknowledged for their efforts in the 1990s to incorporate Māori knowledge and practice, and to make that example available to other organisations.

Linda Smith (1999) stated that “under colonialism indigenous peoples have struggled against a Western view of history and yet been complicit with that view. We often allowed our histories to be told and have then become outsiders as we heard them being retold” (p. 34). This research has a strong kaupapa Māori methodology approach. It

takes into consideration the current situation of Māori whilst simultaneously seeking to inform our practices through kaupapa Māori. It enabled Māori to have access to and greater control and autonomy over the research process (G. H. Smith, 1997).

Māori are the indigenous peoples of New Zealand. The signing of te Tiriti o Waitangi in 1840 between Māori and the Crown cemented a bicultural relationship. However, since the signing of te Tiriti, the New Zealand government has neglected its obligations, as promised in this agreement, to allow Māori self-determination in maintaining and sustaining their culture and their cultural identity. After the protests by Māori from the late 1970s through to the late 1980s, the New Zealand Government was forced to amend the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1985. This enabled Māori land claims for breaches of the Treaty to be backdated to 1840 instead of 1975. This was a very significant social change for Māori and consequently the State Sector Act 1988 was also amended to reinforce the recognition of Māori and to ensure the aims and aspirations of Māori employees were being met within all public sector organisations.

The Navy, which is the focus of this research, being a government agency was a typical bureaucratic institution with hierarchical structures, stringent rules and beliefs which shape and influence the way people behave. Because of these hierarchical structures and a chain of command, their planning and operating processes were linear, therefore suggesting that they had a closed culture and were unlikely to be open to change. Diversity was an issue to be rectified or possibly required legislation if it was to be met.

Being Māori in the Navy pre-1990 was challenging because many Māori experienced racism. However, they were able to maintain their culture and cultural identity through Māori concert parties. Although these concert parties seemed like tokenism when they performed at cocktail parties, they were an important way in which Māori were able to sustain their identity. The researcher's rationale for this research was based on an article by Hohaia (2015), which explained that while Māori people contribute significantly to the NZDF, Māori knowledge was not formally introduced into the military curricula until 2004.

This study begins with the literature review (Chapter Two) that conceptualises the structures and processes within an organisation as an expression of an organisational culture that is resistant to change. It characterises institutional entrepreneurs within an organisation committed to change as engaged in institutional work and more

specifically their purposive work or action to instigate a divergent change to disrupt and challenge the status quo of an organisation. Through these theoretical concepts this study addresses the research topic of the “integration of Māori cultural knowledge and practices into Te Taua Moana, Royal New Zealand Navy”. It analyses who can effect change, and how and why they do so, not only those with formal authority who could effect change but also those without such authority to drive progressive change. The literature review also summarises the historical and ongoing marginalisation of Māori and explains the context in which Māori within the Navy sought to maintain their culture and identity.

Chapter Three explains the kaupapa Māori methodology approach. Challenging the ‘ordinary’ notion of normal that has been constructed by the dominant culture, is what kaupapa Māori research is about. It also seeks to identify and uphold Māori views, solutions and ways of knowing. It was also providing a Māori voice, processes and knowledge. It has both local and national aspirations, which suggests that research cannot be universalised to one set of Māori knowledge. Also, it is a methodology that takes into consideration the current situation of Māori whilst simultaneously seeking to inform our practices through kaupapa Māori (L.T. Smith, 1999). Finally, it allows more control and autonomy over the research process, making it accessible to Māori (G.H. Smith, 1997).

A kaupapa Māori approach also provides all participants with opportunities to speak within a safe environment especially when the dominant culture and cultural superiority is challenged (Bishop, 1999). It also describes a Māori-centred framework based on three key components of whakapikitangata – to better the position of Māori, whakatuia – to participate with the whole holistic Māori worldview; and finally, mana Māori – allowing Māori to be involved with the full research process. This framework allows the researcher to measure and ensure how this divergent change has been beneficial to Māori.

Interviews were utilised as they offered the best way of understanding what was going on from a participant’s point of view, allowing them to tell their stories and explain what they thought the important moments and factors were. Six participants were identified by the researcher as having a direct role in instigating this change by the researcher. After the first two interviews a further participant was added through the snowball process. During this participant interview it became obvious why his name

was provided, and it confirmed his contribution to instigating divergent change in the Navy. What makes it more important is that he was a senior Māori Commissioned Officer at the time who had a strong interest for Māori in the Navy. Five of the participants were Commissioned Officers of whom four were non-Māori and one Māori, which reflects the hierarchical structures of the Navy. The remaining two participants were non-Commissioned Officers and Māori.

Chapter Four presents the findings, focused on three key themes. It begins with the external factors, namely the New Public Management programme in the early 1980s, which required public sector organisations to adopt private sector behaviours such as adaptability, flexibility and innovation. It also looks at a new programme of Managing Diversity introduced in 1984 and the implications this policy would have for recognising Māori as an indigenous group. The amendments to the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1988 were significant and influenced changes to the State Sector Act 1988 by reinforcing that the aims and experiences of Māori should be met by all government agencies.

Interview data was analysed using a thematic analysis approach as outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006) who state that “thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data” (p.6). It organises and describes the data set in (rich) detail and interprets various aspects of the research topic (Boyatzis, 1998). Information relating to Māori demographics and cultural practices was also sourced from documents on the Navy business excellence programme undertaken from 1997 to 2006 and *Navy Today* (the Navy’s magazine).

Chapter Four then investigates the internal factors driving change beginning with the institutional settings pre-1990 and the need for change. This subsection highlighted some key points from before 1990, such as reframing Māori concert parties as Māori cultural groups and the emergence of “home-grown leadership” instigating change despite colonial leadership still leading the Navy at the time. It looks at the internal changes post-1990 starting with a subsection on the necessary role of those with institutional powers, and how essential these leaders were to leading change. This is followed by a subsection on the role of personal determination and energy to effect change, which highlights that it was not only important to have the role with institutional power but it was also necessary to have the determination and energy to make change occur or support those who had the knowledge to instigate the change.

Finally, the chapter looks at the unique structures developed to support change, such as the Bicultural Working Party which morphed into the Rūnanga, to create, advise and monitor Māori culture and practices implemented, and how the Rūnanga gained power to instigate change. Finally, to cement this journey, the chapter describes the establishment of the marae and its importance.

Chapter Five, the discussion and conclusion, combines the outcomes of the findings with the support of the literature and blending the results into a discussion that answers the research questions outlined earlier. The outcomes of the discussion reaffirm what the literature highlighted and reinforce the actions taken by institutional entrepreneurs and why and how they were able to achieve this divergent change. The Marae signifies this recognition of Māori cultural practices and knowledge within the Navy. It makes this visible daily, not only to our special people who visit the Navy base, but to anyone who walks around Ngataranga Bay, Devonport, Auckland.

Growing up with my grandparents in the heart of the Urewera (located in the western part of the Bay of Plenty, North Island, New Zealand), te reo Māori (Māori language) was the language of the household. Because of this and my fluency with te reo Māori, which is my first language, it was assumed that this thesis would be in te reo Māori. However, this thesis is targeted at the bicultural partner, due to the continuous negative outcomes that Māori have experienced within health and education, and also economically in New Zealand. It is intended to demonstrate that a bicultural relationship does exist, and it can be successful.

The Navy Rūnanga reflects this bicultural relationship. The Rūnanga is a very common iwi-based entity that manage and oversees iwi operations. The Navy Rūnanga operated in the same way and this made it a significant contributor to the Navy. This group of people are recognised in this thesis as institutional entrepreneurs; they were critical, proactive and innovative in ensuring that whatever they proposed was sound and culturally beneficial to both cultures.



## Chapter 2

### Literature Review

*Ma te kōrero, ka mōhio, through discussion/reading comes awareness*

#### Introduction

Te Tiriti o Waitangi has become a central point for many conversations surrounding New Zealand national identity since the signing of te Tiriti between Māori and the British Crown in 1840. Since signing te Tiriti, the Crown has neglected its obligations to meet its commitments, as promised in this agreement, to allow Māori their self-determination in maintaining and sustaining their culture and their cultural identity (Orange 1987). Ironically, from the perspective of this thesis research, it was a Royal Navy officer, Captain Hobson, who instigated te Tiriti o Waitangi. This British connection eventually led to the establishment of the Royal New Zealand Navy (Navy) in 1941 (National Museum of the Royal New Zealand Navy, n.d.). It is through the British Royal Navy, and Captain Hobson who established a Naval Base in Devonport, Auckland in 1841 until the Royal New Zealand Navy was recognised in 1941.

Māori struggles led to many Māori political protests during the 1970s and 1980s (Orange, 1987). As a result of these protests, the Government established the Waitangi Tribunal in 1975, but recommendations from the Tribunal were not made retrospective to 1840 until 1985. The Tribunal's primary role was to rule on claims for the return of land, fisheries and cultural resources, which were confiscated by the Crown from Māori since 1840, contrary to the agreement made in te Tiriti o Waitangi (Jones, Pringle & Shepherd, 2000). Besides, Māori could not take any grievance against any individual or organisation. It also minimised the claims process because most of the Māori land taken from Māori got sold to many buyers other than Māori (Harris, 2004).

While Māori currently represent 16% of the New Zealand population (Statistics NZ, 2016), there is a higher proportion of Māori in the armed forces. A participant to this

research emphasised consistently 30% of the Navy population was Māori in the early 90s. In 2012, within the NZDF, 17.4% of serving personnel were Māori compared to 46% European. In the Navy, meanwhile, 19.9% of personnel were Māori compared to 28.5% European and 51.6% others (NZDF, 2012). Māori have deep historical connections with the Navy (Scoppio, 2010). Given these numbers, and the desire of many Māori to maintain the culture, Māori culture and cultural identity play an essential role for Māori both in the workplace (Durie, 2003) and when representing New Zealand overseas (National Museum of the Royal New Zealand Navy, n.d.).

Implementing change within institutions such as the NZDF can be difficult and challenging due to the already existing structural operations of rules, normalisation and beliefs, such as the combat masculine-warrior paradigm, that already influences the way people behave within these environments. Although Māori practices were occurring within these institutions before 1990, these were *ad hoc* and tokenistic: when these institutions required a Māori welcome or performance, they would call upon Māori members of the Navy to provide this service.

In order to meet these commitments, Māori members would practice in their own time and fundraise to purchase the necessary resources such as piupiu (Māori garment) to meet these commitments. Although the demand for Māori cultural performances has increased and has become a standard feature within all three Military Services (NZDF, n.d.), fundraising for resources and practising of Māori songs was undertaken by Māori members in their own time until 2001.

Hohaia (2015) emphasised that Māori people contribute significantly to the NZDF. At the cost of sacrificing their indigenous identity, in the past it was a common expectation that Māori personnel would conform to the dominant Western worldview. However, more recently, it has been found that adding indigenous knowledge into military curricula improves the learning experiences of all NZDF personnel (Hohaia, 2015). Since 1998, Māori cultural practices have become more evident within the NZDF. For example, each service arm now has its own marae, their individual Cultural Advisors as well as an overall NZDF Cultural Advisor. All members of individual armed service learn their haka and many courses include Māori cultural practices. Māori members of the NZDF have performed internationally at such places like Gallipoli, in Turkey, for the Australia New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) Day celebrations. Many formal processes now include a Māori component to them, such as the change of command

(change of the Commanding officer of ships) ceremonies within the Navy where the symbol of command is a Māori weapon (RNZN, 2017).

The potential to formalise Māori cultural practices and knowledge within the Navy is the subject matter of this study. This study will ascertain *how* it was possible, from 1990 to 2005, for skilled and determined institutional actors, to influence change and *who* undertook this change. It will also identify *how* they were able to instigate this change through their *institutional work* such as creating, maintaining, transforming or even disrupting an institution such as the Navy. Interestingly, given the change that took place in this period, Scoppio (2010) stated that Māori was under-represented in the officer ranks and over-represented in the lower ranks of the NZDF. Therefore, the study will also explore the various sorts of power that were available to those who may or may not have been in leadership roles within the Navy to effect change.

### Institutional settings

The section aims to review relevant research exploring institutional settings through concepts of organisational culture and change, and how these affect military organisations. This section is arranged as follows. First, describing what an institution is, followed by a brief description of organisational culture and change. It will look at Navy culture, the Navy as public sector organisation and finally the role of organisational actors in organisational change.

Organisations such as the NZDF have a setting of institutions who apply some level of pressure on them. *Institutions* consist of systems of structural operations that are generated from rules, normalisation and beliefs, and they shape and influence the way people behave (Garud, Hardy & Macguire, 2007). These institutional environments can provide continuity and stability in organisational processes and practices within society. They describe reality for the organisation by explaining “What is and is not, what can be acted upon and what cannot” (Hoffman, 1999, p. 351). For example, the Navy, as an institution, is characterised by the combat masculine-warrior paradigm (Dunivin, 1994). Therefore, the Navy is an institution that shapes how members behave by institutionalising masculinity throughout the organisation of the Navy.

## Organisational culture

In organisations, there are elements of social life that persist and affect the thoughts, feelings and behaviour of individual and collective actors. If it recognises that human interaction and activity consist of every day or implicit rules and is seen that institutions contribute to social life (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). Hodgson (2006) supported this view by stating that there are systems of established social rules that structure social interactions.

These structural operations of rules, normalisation and beliefs are evident in *organisational culture*, and because they maintain continuity and become stable, they seem to be the norm of the organisation and can be construed as “this is the way we do things around here,” which can pose challenges for change (Lundy & Cowling, 1996; A. Williams, Dobson & Walters, 1994). Findler, Wind, and Mor Barak (2007) argued that culture does impact on employees, business and outcomes and organisations needed to understand the effect this has.

*Organisational change* focuses on the actions of those in formal *leadership* roles. As Gill (2003) pointed out, a key reason why organisational change can be unsuccessful is due to the inadequate leadership style used by change agents. An assumption could be that they also did not take the institutional and cultural factors into account (Findler et al., 2007). Studies on institutional change outline that institutional actors carry out this process of change through their institutional work. The Navy being very hierarchical, a common feature of institutions, raises the following questions: Did actors who made a change within the Navy require a position of formal power in order to make a change? How were a variety of actors able to achieve change?

Garud et al. (2007) stated that although the main actors in each environment may have the authority to force change within an institution, they often lack the motivation to create and champion new practices while peripheral players may have the incentive. Scoppio (2007) outlined that historically, military organisations had tiered structures, with a sequence of command structures with both direct planning and working procedures, were likely to have a closed culture. It also suggests they are less open to change and that they might view diversity as an issue. For organisations to make effective change, they required to have a more open corporate culture. To have an open

culture, organisations needed to have horizontal structures, flexible planning and working processes.

### Navy culture

The military has a culture and a unique way of life characterised by its combat, masculine-warrior paradigm. Firstly, it relates to combat, and its structures and forces are built around combat activities such as ground combat, fighter air wings and naval battle groups. They organise and train around their combat roles, and these are interchangeable between combat and support activities such as disaster relief. However, because their primary role is to prepare for war, the military image is synonymous with the image of combat. The second element of military culture is the masculine-warrior image. It is an institution that has been comprised of men; its culturally historically shaped by men. The soldiering role was known to be masculine and it was notably seen by society as the profession of war, defence and combat, therefore making it men's work. It therefore created a deeply entrenched masculine military culture (Dunivin, 1994) and despite 5.27% (as at 30 June 2019) of women now serving in the Navy, it is a common characteristic within the institution of the Navy today (NZDF, 2012).

Military institutions, such as the Navy, can structure, constrain and enable individual behaviours. The Navy has social structures that deliberately change the behaviour of individuals to meet certain requirements of the institution and, to some degree, impact upon individual habits of thought and action (Hodgson, 2006). Navies achieves this by enabling or constraining their personnel, moulding the capacities and behaviour of individuals in order to change their aspirations. The Navy trains their personnel for the specific requirements of battle, to follow orders with alacrity; therefore, they depend on the activities of individuals. They also provide positive feedback that has strong self-reinforcing and self-perpetuating characteristics.

Behaviours of this nature are linked with three institutional pillars: the regulative – which assists action through pressure and threat of formal sanction; the normative – which guides action through norms of acceptability, morality and ethics; and, finally, the cognitive – which guides action through the very categories and frames which actors know and use to interpret their world (Scott, 1995). Rules contribute to the behaviour of individuals within institutions and provide incentives and constraints for individual actions. However, constraints can open opportunities or enable choices and actions that

would not otherwise exist. For example, “language allows us to communicate; traffic rules help traffic to flow more easily and safely; the rule of law can increase personal safety” (Hodgson, 2006, p. 2).

A psychological contract is designed for employment arrangements whereby mutual expectations of objectives and outcomes are understood between the employer and employee (Schein, 1965). The notion of the psychological contract can be utilised to predict critical outcomes across various occupations such as organisational commitment (an indicator of turnover), job satisfaction and psychological distress (Mallette, 2011; Robbins, Ford, & Tetrick, 2012; Sturges, Conway, Guest & Liefoghe, 2005; Teklab, Orvis, & Taylor, 2012). Psychological contract obligations are linked with job satisfaction and intent to leave (Teklab et al., 2012), while fulfilment has been linked with organisational commitment, job satisfaction and organisational citizenship behaviour (Lambert, Edwards & Cable, 2003). For Māori in the Navy, this is relevant as the status quo of working within a hierarchical colonial institution could be breaching a psychological contract through not meeting their obligations to te Tiriti o Waitangi.

According to Piderit (2000) resistance to change is expressed as a cognitive state, as an emotional reaction and as a behaviour. Those instigating change need to consider the perceptions of the possible changes and to present this as an attractive vision to minimise the negative aspects of the change. If this attractive vision is not clear, then employees are likely to provide reasons why they oppose these changes or engage in any form of resistance to it (Penav & Sehic, 2014).

Another concept to emerge has been the term institutional entrepreneurship. The evolution of the term institutional entrepreneurship came from two theoretical aspects of “institutional work”. Garud et al. (2007) explained traditional work on institutions was more attentive to continuity but not neglecting the importance of change. Although it was challenging to accomplish, institutional entrepreneurship focused on divergent change. Combining and comparing of institutional and entrepreneurial together enables institutional entrepreneurship to provide considerable potential for considering how and why particular new organising results such as innovative practices or new organisational creations that emerge and become well established over time.

Institutional entrepreneurs “are actors who have an interest in particular institutional arrangements and who mobilise resources to create new institutions or transform the

existing one” (Battilana, 2006, p. 654). This definition is very clear in that it only refers to creating new or transforming an existing institution therefore meeting the requirements of divergent change relating to what are institutional entrepreneurs. Battilana, Leca and Boxenbaum (2009) suggested that institutional entrepreneurs are change agents, but not all change agents are institutional entrepreneurs. To be an institutional entrepreneur, you had to initiate divergent changes and actively participate in the implementation of these changes. Much of the literature on change suggest that divergent changes are changes that disrupt the current context of an institution (Amis, Slack & Hinings, 2004; Battilana, 2006; D'Aunno, Sicci, & Alexander, 2000; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996).

Although institutional entrepreneurs can change institutions, in specific instances, it becomes necessary to seek support and allies (Boxenbaum & Battilana, 2005; Fligstein, 1997; Greenwood, Suddaby & Hinings, 2002) develop relationships and seek support (Fligstein, 2001; Lawrence, Hardy & Phillips, 2002; Rao, 1998). They need to have the support of those allies with experience, knowledge and have been embedded within the institution for some time (Lawrence, et al., 2002), such as professionals and experts (Hwang & Powell, 2005).

### **The Navy as a public sector organisation**

Military organisations, such as the Navy, form part of the Government and are examples of bureaucratic organisations with hierarchical structures, stringent rules, clear boundaries, responsibility and authority (Alvinus, 2010a). Soeters, Winslow and Weibull (2006) noted that military organisations are state funded, which suggests they are non-commercial and fulfil the state's core tasks. Alvinus (2010b) suggested that today, governments typically undertake executive control, management and administration of military organisations through a ministry or government department.

In the 1980s, the public sectors of the western world were introduced to a New Public Management (NPM) system (Hood, 1995). NPM was designed for the public sector to behave like the private sector in terms of efficiency, responsiveness and accountability. However, public sector organisations are often under different pressures to change because they face different challenges from those of the private sector. Firstly, business leadership is profit-focused, a motivation which is absent from public service and is not substituted by public values. The whole point of NPM was to force public sector

organisations to act as if they were acting under similar financial constraints – CEOs with Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and responsible for managing budgets and – in some cases, like TVNZ, returning a dividend to its shareholder (the government.)

Secondly, there is an increasing prevalence in the public sector of complex, non-hierarchical coalitions of public and private organisations sharing power and resources, situations which do not lend themselves to hierarchical leadership structures. Thirdly, there is the substitution of an administrative prerogative for values-based decision making in situations in which values are prominent if not pre-eminent parts of problems(s) and solutions (Bao, Wang, Larsen, & Morgan, 2013). Thus, the public sector is more accountable in that it must demonstrate value for money. It also needs to meet the increasing expectations of the general public and politicians regarding service levels and quality (Crouch & Streeck, 1997; Flynn, 1993).

#### **The role of organisational actors in organisational change**

Because of the hierarchical structures of the Navy with a top-down leadership, suggests that institutional power to instigate change can only come from top leadership. However, change is more difficult without the support of others, especially other professionals and experts. Researchers have treated organisational actors as knowledgeable and practical in their affairs (Giddens, 1984). This view is supported by Lawrence and Suddaby (2006), who described actors who are rational and sense they can work with institutionally defined logics of effect or appropriateness and need culturally defined forms of competence and knowledge. They have the creativity to adapt to conditions that are both demanding and dynamic. This suggests that if opportunities arise to instigate change and with the necessary resources and the support, change can occur i.e. those with the skills and knowledge to support the change. Therefore, allowing actors to detract from the norms of the institution of “this is the way it is around here” and suggests that actors are not brainwashed with the norms of the institution’s logics.

In summary, the literature on institutional settings stresses that institutions provide stability and continuity for organisations through their operational structures, rules, normalisation and strong beliefs which pose challenges for change. Military organisations have institutions that are hierarchical, with stringent rules and set boundaries with the institutionalisation of the combat masculine-warrior paradigm,



which tends to imply a male-dominated workplace which makes change very challenging to the integration and management of diversity. So how can change be contested within such environments? The literature also outlines that what has led to unsuccessful efforts to change was the lack of an appropriate leadership style in change agents and the possibility that they did not take into consideration the culture of the organisation.

### **Institutional work by organisational actors**

This section aims to continue with the review of the literature on institutional settings but identifying who can make a change and how do they go about making this change within institutions.

Institutional change is seen to be a highly intricate and ambiguous process, with the outcome difficult to envisage (Battilana, et al., 2009). Barnes (2001) suggested that the study of institutional work focused on understanding institutional actors who engage with and maintain institutions and those who are associated with the creation of new institutions and the disruptions of existing ones. Kraatz (2009) outlined that previous research on institutions and organisations overlooked the vital role that institutional actors play in shaping organisations as institutions through their distinctive institutional work. He elaborated that institutional change refers to the actions or work of institutional actors which indicates that these actors were not necessarily in leadership roles.

A key contributing factor to institutional change has been the role of institutional and interested actors with the resources and skills to act in supportive or facilitative roles (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). These institutional actors “create a whole new system of meaning that ties the functioning of disparate sets of institutions together” (Garud, Jain & Kumaraswamy, 2002, p. 2), therefore reintroducing the concepts of agency, interests and power into institutional analyses of organisations. This view is based on an argument along similar lines outlined by Di Maggio (1988) which suggested that “new institutions arise when organised actors with sufficient resources see in them an opportunity to realise interests that they value highly” (p.14).

Studies on institutional work define institutional work as “the purposive action of individuals and organisations aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, p. 215). Lawrence et al. (2011) suggested that too much

research on institutional work departed from outdated concerns and needed to focus more on the successful instances of institutional change. Much attention was also on cases of institutional entrepreneurship that created new structures, practices or rules (Garud, et al., 2002; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004), social changes that shaped new logics (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005; Thornton, 2002) or the embracing innovation that impacted a new normative order or taken-for-granted status quo (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). What was excluded from these readings of institutions, was the many every day confusing instances of agency and the complex amount of action of those action of actors who were aiming at being successful or not, with their agency and action at the same time being radical and conservative, strategic, emotional, full of negotiations, and prevalent with unintended consequences” (Lawrence et al., 2011, p. 52). They further stated that institutional work needed to look at the work of individuals and collective actors “to cope with, keep up with, shore up, tear down, tinker with, transform, or create a new institutional structure within which they live, work, play and which gives them their roles, relationships, resources and routines” (Lawrence et al., 2011, p. 53).

Within the literature on institutional work there are two primary theoretical ideas. The first is *embedded agency* (Battilana & D’Aunno, 2009) which builds on DiMaggio’s (1988) and Oliver’s (1991, 1992) studies that required the integration of a sophisticated and diverse understanding of agency when considering the relationship between institutions and organisations. This makes it less a paradox than merely a description of how people confront institutions on a day-to-day basis (Creed, Dejordy, & Lok, 2010; Leug, Zietsma, & Peredo, 2014). Ongoing human accomplishments are constructed and maintained through people’s behaviours of thought and feelings within institutions. At the same time, they reflect people’s institutional awareness with the desire to make change happen but also the skills and resources which they marshal to achieve those desires (Hampel, Lawrence & Tracey, 2015).

The second concept of *embedded agency* also refers to those actors who are embedded in an institutional field such as the military or Navy and their cognition processes were influenced through the regulative, normative and cognitive processes, which determined their interests and produce their identities (Clemens & Cook, 1999; Friedland & Alford, 1991;). So, how do they develop these new practices, share them with others or even get others to agree to realise these practices and implementing into a system that is very hierarchical and stringent? Actors are able to create and distribute the structures within

the agency and Garud and Karnøe (2003) suggested that embedding structures do not constrain agency but, instead, provide a platform for the unfolding of entrepreneurial activities.

‘*Agency*’ is described by Emirbayer and Mische (1998) as

the temporally constructed engagement by actors of different structural environments – the temporal-relational contexts of action – which, through the interplay of habit, imagination, and judgment, both reproduces and transforms those structures in interactive response to the problems posed by changing historical situations (p. 970)

Envisioned in this way, institutional structures serve as a fabric to allow for the unfolding of new practices or activities rather than constraining the agency (Garud, et al. 2007,)

Most studies on institutional work have been based around capturing a set of actions that were focused on the relationship between institutions and actors. A study by Lawrence, Leca and Zilber (2013) outlined three areas of institutional work that emerged from the wide-ranging scholarly discussion. These were *how* institutional work occurs, *who* does institutional work, and *what* constitutes institutional work. They briefly explain *how institutional work* occurs in the typology of creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions.

The answer to the question of who engages in institutional work are those with the formal authority and those actors associated with the skills, knowledge and expertise. The response to the question of what constitutes institutional work tends to focus its relationship to agency. Lawrence et al. (2013) argued that institutional work conducted by institutional actors might be intentional. However, what those "intentions" might look like will vary considerably depending on the dimension of agency that dominates the instances of institutional work one considers (Battilana & D'Aunno, 2009, p. 49). Practice and process was a key focus when looking at institutional work by asking - “what” and “when” rather than "why" “who” and “how” to achieve an outcome (Lawrence et al., 2011).

Heclo (2008) referred to the act of “thinking institutionally” (p. 102). Thinking institutionally requires an individual to adopt a friendly perspective that enables one to

acknowledge the present situation, and then make choices and to realise some normative order. This reflects the task of upholding (an) institution and why it was created. Heelo (2008) further argues it provides those with capacity in a contemporary civic society to behave in a way thus allowing them to surpass the complete cognitive influence of institutions. Lawrence et al. (2011) on institutional work also referred to intentionality in research. It enables considerations for and allows the returning of the individual back into institutional theory. They state, there are two critical issues to understanding how the concept of work might connect to institutions – intentionality, whereby the concept of work implies intentionality, however, varied that intentionality might be. Therefore, making it future focused intentionality of consciously and tactically reshaping social institutions. The second and final point, effort – is the lived experience of the organisational actors.

In summary, institutional work is defined as “the purposive action of individuals and organisations aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions”. The literature explores how these purposive actors enact their agendas to make a change. This current study applies this framework to a military organisation with a large degree of inertia and stability, to assess the relative importance in effecting change of formal positions of power. It also explores whether it is possible within a hierarchical organisation setting how purposive actors without formal power can enact their agendas to instigate change.

### **Instigating diversity changes in organisations with a focus on military organisations**

The aim of this section is to review the literature on the challenges of integrating diversity changes and equity issues in organisations.

Social change challenges the heart of the military because it undermines the military combat masculine-warrior paradigm. Nonetheless, if the military is to survive and thrive, cultures and institutions must adapt to changing conditions. The masculine-warrior culture has been challenged over the years with various diversity initiatives which are driving change in our military forces, for example, the profiling of traditional roles through media campaigns such as women in leadership roles and the introduction of policies such as “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” of the US military to allow lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people to serve in the US military (Kamarck, 2016).

Kamarck (2016) defined ‘diversity’ as the variation of traits within groups of two or more people and may include both visible (sex, age, race) and invisible (knowledge, culture, values) traits. The framework on “Managing Diversity” or the many forms of difference weren’t recognised or welcomed in New Zealand in the early 1980s, described by many as a core value of an egalitarian and multicultural society.

When looking at diversity within organisations, diversity impacts on group dynamics, more specifically cohesion (commitment to other members of the group and the group’s shared objectives) and effectiveness (the ability of the group to efficiently meet its objectives, which lead to organisational performance), the results of diversity studies suggest that it has both positive and negative benefits (Karmack, 2016). Fundamental social changes relating to diversity began in military organisations in 1948 when US President Truman implemented an Executive Order stating, “equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the Armed Forces without regard to race, colour, religion or national origin” (Nalty & Macgregor, 1981). Adding to this was the successful repeal by the US Congress in 1991 of legislation which barred women from duties aboard combat aircraft and ships (US Department of Défense, 1991). Women are now assigned to US combat aircraft and ships. In New Zealand in 1977, the Ministry of Defence authorised a similar law but still prevented women from serving in combat roles. In December 1986, 13 women went to sea in a non-combat ship called HMNZS Monowai. Finally, in 1995, the first women went to a combat zone in the Persian Gulf onboard the frigate HMNZS Wellington (National Museum of the Royal New Zealand Navy, 2016).

A study on an English police force outlined two broad opposing perspectives. The first was the resistance and resentment to the diversity terrain in a contemporary working environment dominated by white, heterosexual, male officers. A contrasting standpoint was that females, minority ethnics, gay and lesbian officers’ persistence in the face of this arrogant white, heterosexist, male culture. Minority groups were seeking recognition for their social differences (Loftus, 2008).

Granastein (2007) suggested that Māori, as a minority group, found the military to be one of the few avenues that Māori could take to get reasonable jobs. Scoppio (2007) supports this and argued that, for Māori, due to the social mobility, training and benefits of the military and Police, they offered opportunities to individual youth, especially those with low educational levels or those from areas that provided fewer economic advantages for work. She further states that this was not unique to NZ. Canada and the

United States (US) have similar patterns where minority groups join non-technical roles such as Army infantry. Soutar (2008) supported this in his book *Nga Tama Toa – The Price of Citizenship*, where he noted the number of Māori joining the military was very high and led to the establishment of Te Hokowhitu (Soutar, 2008). Nevertheless, Kanter (1979) argued that opportunities for minority employees within organisations were unlikely to gain access to power and opportunities. This situation was not unique to New Zealand, as other countries such as Canada and the US, where occupations within the non-technical areas of the military such as the infantry in the Army and being a seaman in the Navy were common entry points for minority group members to gain employment (Scoppio, 2007).

With the increasing awareness and acceptance of diversity which centred around an operational model of discrimination with an individualistic approach into the public sector raises critical issues for Māori because it neglected to recognise disadvantaged groups such as Māori and the bicultural relationship of New Zealand. This created some problems, as seen in the following examples. A bicultural relationship study that focused on two entities within the health sector in New Zealand by Jones and Creed (2011) indicated that one organisation was able to converge indigenous and nonindigenous agendas in essential ways and has led to these practices been widely influential internationally. However, the other organisation struggled with the bicultural relationship.

The two entities were the College of Nursing Association (CNA) and the New Zealand Nursing Organisation (NZNO). What was evident from this study is that the CNA incorporated Tikanga (Māori practices) which normalised the presence of Māori ethics and social practices. At NZNO, however, there were many more issues such as problems with fear of power-sharing, unacknowledged resistance, and an unwillingness to address critical issues openly with Te Rūnanga, the Māori component of this board. Te Rūnanga felt their role had been reduced to that of an advisory body dealing only with Māori issues, that they were denied an equal voice in the membership, and that they were repeatedly educating Pākehā board members about Māori cultural perspectives. Partnership in this instance was tokenism rather than representing Māori autonomy. The NZNO board needed to extend to creating governance structures and foster the attainment of Māori aspirations as a people if this relationship is to survive (Jones & Creed, 2011).

## Recognising the practices of indigenous peoples

This section aims to provide a background to Māori issues within a New Zealand context and to outline the challenges confronting Māori when they sought recognition of their practices within an institution such as the Royal New Zealand Navy.

Te Tiriti o Waitangi has become a central point for many conversations within New Zealand about the relationship between Māori and the Crown since the signing in 1840. Te Tiriti was written in both Māori and English, with the latter version being drafted first and then interpreted into Māori by Henry Williams, an English missionary. Both versions had different meanings and interpretations. The Māori version gave Māori “Tino Rangatiratanga,” a right to exercise autonomy over their issues, lands and treasures, and it made New Zealand a British Colony and Māori subjects of the British Crown. The English version was significantly different in that te Tiriti ceded “all the rights and powers of sovereignty” to the Queen, whereas the Māori version only offered “te kawangatanga katoa,” governance over their land (Bryers-Brown & Trundle, 2017). Despite these differences, the broader spirit of the document has been ignored and disregarded materially by the Crown over many years. The rights guaranteed to Māori were violated, and Māori lost most of their land; moreover, the manner of this loss has been very questionable. This led to considerable protest from Māori over the years (Harris, 2004).

Although protection and self-regulation were key aspects provided by te Tiriti o Waitangi, the right of redress towards past breaches, and consultation (Waitangi Tribunal, n.d.), was lacking and many Māori continued to struggle and underperform in an economic sense despite Māori being integrated into New Zealand society. In 1985, changes to legislation and the process for the settlement of Māori grievances allowed a greater involvement of Māori people in the public service (Boston, Martin, Pallot & Walsh, 1996) and, with the rapid growth rate of the Māori population compared to New Zealand Europeans (Statistics New Zealand, 2016a, 2016b), this allowed Māori to create a strong asset base. A Business Economic Research Limited (BERL) report in 2010 outlined that the Māori asset base was estimated value at \$36.9 billion (BERL, 2010). This increased to \$42.6 billion in 2013 (Te Puni Kōkiri, 2013). However, despite these positive developments, there continues to be considerable disparities between Māori and non-Māori in health and education, and the workforce (Ministry of Social Development, 2016). For example, a report by the Ministry of Social Development

(2016) suggests the majority of New Zealanders had higher levels of work-life balance compared to Māori.

This relationship between Māori and the Crown has not been helped by comments made by prominent mainly non-Māori individuals such as historian Michael King who stated in 1985, in his book *Being Pakeha*, that “people who live in New Zealand by choice as distinct from an accident birth, and who are committed to this land and its people and steeped in their knowledge of both, are no less ‘indigenous’ than Māori” (M. King, 2003, p. 235). Trevor Mallard, after being appointed the Minister for Race Relations in 2004, stated that “we are all New Zealanders now” and then further stated “New Zealand has to get its British imperial past behind it. Māori and Pākehā are both indigenous people to New Zealand. I am an indigenous New Zealander” (Mikaere, 2004). Don Brash took Hobson’s use of the phrase “he iwi kotahi tātou” in 1840 and translated it as “we are one people” at a speech at Orewa Rotary Club on January 27, 2004 (Mikaere, 2004). Brash was using this quote to justify a policy of assimilation and wilfully mistranslated this phrase. It is not possible to assume any rangatira agreed with either Hobson's utterance or Brash's interpretation of it. These types of arguments or comments proliferate in many media outlets, which inevitably mislead interpretation, confuse those who lack the knowledge and conjure people to comment without fully knowing and understanding the full history of New Zealand.

Social and economic disparities continue to exist (Kingi, 2007) because the Crown has not always been seen to have honoured its side of the agreement with Māori. In the 1970s the Crown began to address injustices of colonial dispossessions and marginalisation by establishing the Waitangi Tribunal through the Treaty of Waitangi Act of 1975. Its policy architects hoped that “it would act as a mechanism to redress the effects of colonisation” (McAllister, 2007, p. 156). The Tribunal has an inquisitorial role, and it operates as a Commission of Inquiry. Its function is to inquire into Māori grievances and making recommendations to the New Zealand Government on ways to resolve long-standing Māori claims. Initially, jurisdiction only included Crown actions from October 10, 1975, and serviced by the Department of Māori Affairs (Stokes, 1992). Through the 1977 Tiriti o Waitangi Amendment Act, the servicing of the Tribunal shifted to the Department of Justice and the membership of the Tribunal increased from three to a Chief Judge of the Māori Land Court and six others, of whom four had to be Māori. Also, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal extended back to February 6, 1840, the date te Tiriti o Waitangi was signed. The 1988 Tiriti o Waitangi Amendment



Act further increased the membership of the Tribunal to the Chief Judge and 16 members, which allowed for several different tribunals to hear claims at the same time. This increase also included the appointment of a mediator by the Tribunal as an alternative to full Tribunal hearing of a claim (Stokes, 1992).

With the Waitangi Tribunal, and the international indigenous rights movement, pressure on states was increasing to create new forms of relations with indigenes. It was the state's responsibility to support and protect Māori interests as it was determined as a Tiriti o Waitangi obligation. This eventually led the New Zealand Government to change their attitude towards te Tiriti by instigating some key improvements and structures by the state and the economy in 1984. In addition, the governments obligation, to Māori was reinforced by the State Sector Act 1988 requiring the aims and aspirations of Māori to be recognised by public sector management. Therefore, the employment requirements of Māori people in government agencies, had to allow Māori to have a greater involvement in the public service (Boston et al. 1996).

Although the state response to Māori allowed Māori participation in the public service, the advancement of Māori also needed to be demonstrated through other mechanisms such as policies and programmes that contributed to increasing Māori workforce participation and implementation. This was to ensure that Māori were being promoted into higher roles which related to their personal goals and that they aligned with their aims and aspirations, because their concerns were essentially different, to other employees and they were not necessarily the same. Māori being directly involved in the state is important and reasonable if it leads to demonstrable benefits for Māori, as it is more likely to achieve better outcomes for Māori (Durie, 2004). However, research conducted by Brougham and Haar (2013) suggested that a component missing from job satisfaction was the role of cultural identity in the workplace, more specifically for Māori in New Zealand.

More recently, this Māori cultural identity began to diminish even more when the shifting demographics of diverse employees began to emerge within the New Zealand workplace environment. In 1984, the New Zealand government introduced "Managing Diversity" a programme that replaced Equal Employment Opportunities (EEO) policy. It aimed at "identifying and eliminating all aspects of policies, procedures and other institutional barriers that cause or perpetuate, or intend to cause or perpetuate, inequality in respect to the employment of any persons or group of persons" (Jones, Pringle &

Shepherd, 2000, p. 366). It only pertained to New Zealand state sector organisations through Part 58 of the State Sector Act 1988.

In 1991, and because it was not compulsory or legal for the private sector to have the EEO policy, an EEO Trust, a government-subsidised employer collective, was established to educate the NZ private sector in EEO policies and practices. Difficulties arose so a new concept eventuated known as ‘managing diversity’ was introduced. This new framework seemed to address the main issues of difference - such as gender, ethnicity, culture and sexuality - in organisations. This was entirely different from the EEO model of anti-discrimination since managing diversity focused on an individualistic approach. Jones et al. (2000) perceived that “this signalled a move away from identifying disadvantaged groups and towards the many ways employees are different and the many ways they are alike” (p. 368). They further elaborated that group claims within ‘managing diversity’ would not exist nor would claim for indigenous status or a collective function as a difference. What Pihama (1994) and Tremaine (1990) noted is that Māori cultural values will only matter if they add economic value or that they are recognised as a commodity by employers rather than a cultural resource that Māori, as tangata whenua (people of the land), have a right to create in their workplaces. Another crucial factor not considered when developing the new concept of ‘managing diversity’ in New Zealand was the recognition of the Māori–Pākehā relationship through the Tiriti o Waitangi which, as noted above, has been widely seen as the founding document of New Zealand.

When considering assimilation, one can suggest that it is not a principle of democracy any more than suppression of religion being a measure of a fair and decent society. Indigenous peoples such as Māori did not see their aims or aspirations being met by the state, due to their sovereignty being taken by the colonisers and their experience with the colonisers being stained by dispossession and deculturation. Within democratic countries are embedded at least, the principles of justice and fairness to individuals and groups. Otherwise, the principle of equality should be removed by the creation of homogeneity or sameness (Durie, 2004). The recognition of indigenous peoples as being a distinctive populations within nations has grown over time; however, for individual states, they are often unsure about whether to create options that may seem to appear favourable to the indigenous people, over populations within the nation because indigenous peoples are usually a minority and within political arena power lies typically with the majority. Therefore, the claim of the rights of indigenous peoples is seen to be

conflicting to the democratic principle of equality. That has been the power of the coloniser, by assimilating indigenous peoples into the cultural, economic and social areas of the coloniser.

The experience is similar for the indigenous peoples of Australia, Canada and the US (Durie, 2004). As a result, indigenous peoples have called for the cession and creation of independent states to enable indigenous values to succeed, and indigenous peoples can control their indigenous resources. The aim has been to restore pre-colonial sovereignty, but this has been overlooked by the state in favour of greater power-sharing (Dudley & Agard, 1993). However, in most cases, the trend has been towards domesticating indigenous peoples and their cultural identity (Awatere, 1984). In 1993 a working group on indigenous populations, compiled a set of indigenous rights. It became the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples which eventually was accepted by a majority vote in 2007.

New Zealand, Australia, Canada and the US are countries known to be wealthy nations. However, for indigenous peoples within these countries, they often underperform in an economic sense and are among the poorest citizens of their respective countries (Cornell, 2006). This isn't surprising because, when it came to adopting the United Nations Declaration of Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007, there was a majority of 143 states in favour, 11 abstentions and four against – these four being Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the US (United Nations Human Rights, n.d.). New Zealand later signed the declaration in 2010.

Māori are primarily different from their European counterparts and are considered more collectivistic (Hook, 2007; Tassell, Flett, & Gavala, 2010). Therefore, having workplaces that promote collectivism and teamwork (a vital characteristic of the military) may be beneficial to Māori employees. As noted by Brougham and Haar (2013), this is significant, Māori will remain to be an essential part of the New Zealand workforce and environment. Although there is a growing body of literature on Māori language, history, culture and health in New Zealand (M. King, 2003; Ministry of Social Development, 2016), there is also a lack of empirical exploration of Tikanga Māori (Māori customs and beliefs) in the New Zealand workplace (Haar & Brougham, 2011, 2013). The contributions Māori and Māori culture make to the New Zealand workforce deserves more considerable investigation (Brougham, Haar & Roche, 2015).

Nonetheless, Māori culture plays an ever-growing role in New Zealand with cultural identity being highly crucial within the workplace for Māori (Durie 2003). For Māori employees, it is about the acceptance of their cultural beliefs in their workplace which may contribute and influence their satisfaction with their careers (Haar & Brougham, 2011). Providing self-determination and dignity for indigenous peoples, it's essential that it is meaningful, and there are organisations within New Zealand going through the process of modifying existing practices to include Māori values (Durie, 2003). For example, the recognition of cultural values and beliefs is playing a significant role in the work-family interface (Spector et al., 2007).

There is considerable literature on career satisfaction (e.g., D. T. Hall, 2002; Ng, Eby, Sorenson, & Feldman, 2005; Tak & Lim, 2008); however, it appears and there is agreement, for minority and indigenous employees in the workplace, there is a lack of focus on these specific groups (Lopes, 2006). Brougham and Haar's (2013) study suggests if organisations which provides an environment of collectivism, it is more likely to enhance the mental health of those that come from a collectivist group such as Māori , which can result in lower anxiety and depression for Māori employees, as Māori are over-represented in mental health statistics, including anxiety and depression (Baxter, Kingi, Tapsell, Durie, & McGee, 2006; MaGPIe, 2005; Wells et al., 2006). This study by Haar and Brougham (2013) concluded that testing the effects of workplace cultural wellbeing amongst indigenous employees could help strengthen the research on career satisfaction of indigenous employees. Their study also supports Māori cultural identity recognition as important and valued. For Māori in the Navy maintaining their cultural identity was important and being part of the Māori concert parties was a way of maintaining this cultural identity and being a collective group.

## Chapter 3

### Research Methodology/Methods/Design/Data Analysis

*Ma te mōhio ka mārama, through awareness comes understanding*

#### Introduction

Māori culture, language and whakapapa (genealogy) is gained from Māori knowledge accumulated over time. What informs Māori identity is having an awareness of history, customs and traditions, and this establishes an individual's place and part in society. Karakia (prayers), kōrero pakiwaitara (stories), waiata (songs), tauparapara (phrases) whakataukī (proverbs or sayings) are Māori knowledge that is transmitted orally and we can also add the practices of traditions and narratives of cosmological matters such as Matariki (the Māori New Year) (Matamua, 2017). Binney (2004) supported this by explaining that “oral histories of the Māori as a people handed down primarily through song, proverbs and genealogies are intimately bound with the histories of particular families” (p. 203). However, L. T. Smith (1999) suggests the first consideration in research was to ensure that an appropriate process was in place, before even attempting to answer the research question. To begin, and to align to this process, it is important the researcher discloses his association with this research.

I served in the Navy for almost 30 years, being the Cultural Advisor to the Chief of Navy and senior officers for 15 years, both informally and formally. I had a major role during the period of change from 1990 to 2005 which is the focus of this research. Although, I was at the rank of Warrant Officer (the highest rank as a non-commissioned officer), I was later promoted to a Lieutenant (Commissioned Officer) in 2002. However, as part of my role I did provide Māori advice to the Chief of Navy and senior officers, however, I was not privy to any final discussions or decisions that led to integrating Māori cultural practices and knowledge within the Navy.

The aim of this research is to identify the actors within the Navy who were instrumental in making change to integrate Māori cultural practices and knowledge, and to understand why they undertook such a challenging endeavour within a very hierarchical institution with strong colonial connections and practices. It also aims to ascertain how these actors were able to achieve these changes by avoiding institutional capture within the Navy context of normalised behaviours, stringent rules and set boundaries. Lastly, the research aims to ascertain where and with whom the power to initiate this social and political change rested.

## Kaupapa Māori

This section of this chapter discusses what Kaupapa Māori is, and how it came into existence. It then discusses Māori resistance to western theories and discuss some key western theories that are closely associated with Kaupapa Māori approaches. It also briefly outlines why Māori-centred approaches are favoured over hegemonic western methodologies.

Reality is understood by way of the worldviews through which one looks and interprets what is seen (Jensen, 1997; Mkhize, 2004; Sue & Sue, 1999). Mkhize (2004) suggested that worldviews are structured around notions of time, relationships between people and the natural environment, human behaviour and social orientation. Thus, a worldview is defined as a

set of basic assumptions that a group of people develops in order to explain reality and their place and purpose in the world. Worldviews influence our attitudes, values and opinions, as well as the way we think and behave. (Mkhize, 2004, p. 25)

The recognition of a Māori worldview is an important aspect of Kaupapa Māori research. Nepe (1991) described Kaupapa Māori as the “conceptualisation of Māori knowledge” (p. 17). Pākehā knowledge or general knowledge that is translated into Māori should not be confused with Māori knowledge. In a metaphysical base that is Māori, is the origin of Māori knowledge. Kaupapa Māori is research by Māori, for Māori and with Māori (G. H. Smith, as cited in L. T. Smith, 1999; L. Williams & Cram, 2012). A number of critics have commented that it is difficult to define kaupapa Māori, as it is both more or less than a paradigm, it is a form of resistance and agency and a methodological strategy (Bishop, 1996; Gibbs, 2001; Moewaka Barnes, 2000; L. T.

Smith, 1999). Kaupapa Māori in its basic form refers to the philosophy and practice of being Māori. Kaupapa Māori research offers a paradigm that helps Māori researchers to provide a Māori worldview and contrasts it with a Pākehā worldview (Bishop, 1999; L. T. Smith, 1999). Māori culture is situated at the centre of the Māori worldview. Undertaking Māori research, requires an understanding of the Māori culture and it is essential, especially if one wants to get an understanding of the Māori worldview. It is through these underlying principles and understanding that kaupapa Māori developed within the academy.

Kaupapa Māori is underpinned by Māori traditions and values which makes it a research paradigm (L. T. Smith, 2006). Being a Māori-centred theoretical system that consists of epistemologies, ideologies, tikanga (Māori protocols) and knowledge, that provides tools for critically analysing the world from the perspective of Māori (Ka'ai, 1995; Nepe, 1991; L. T. Smith, 1999). Bishop and Glynn (2003) explains that it is based on "Māori philosophy and principles" (p. 61) if you use this research approach. Kaupapa Māori has strong cultural identity, and some authors have suggested that it is also flexible, because it does not require Māori or non-Māori to have control over the research design or directions of the research by and for Māori and non-Māori alike (Walker, Eketone, & Gibbs, 2006). However, in contrast, L. T. Smith, and Reid (2000) argued that kaupapa Māori came from the lived experiences of Māori and emerged as a discourse, reality, theory and praxis which implies that only Māori can use kaupapa Māori approaches.

There are varying views by Māori scholars who see kaupapa Māori as a philosophy, methodology or theory, even to the extent that it has been framed as expectations within practice and methods, even has been associated to Māori conceptions of knowledge. (G. H. Smith, 1997). The main principles of kaupapa Māori research are tino rangatiratanga (Māori sovereignty), self-determination, governance, autonomy and independence (Pihama, Cram & Walker, 2002). What seem to be the key discourses of kaupapa Māori are, firstly, 'resistance' and its capacity to analyse western approaches to research and, secondly, it allows Māori people to view the world and themselves from a distinct ontological and epistemological differences (Jackson, 1996; Mahuika, 2008; L.T. Smith, 1996; C.W. Smith, 2000).

## Māori resistance to western hegemony

Kaupapa Māori emerged because of the colonial dominance of Māori history since the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840. L. T. Smith (1999) stated “under colonialism indigenous peoples have struggled against a Western view of history and yet been complicit with that view. We often allowed our histories to be told and have become outsiders as we heard them being retold” (p. 33). Māori people became dissatisfied with their experience of being researched by Pākehā and their use of their methodologies (Moewaka Barnes, 2000; Powick, 2002). Kaupapa Māori research challenges those aspects that disadvantage Māori such as inappropriate ideologies of superiority, power relations and social practices (Gibbs, 2001; Kiro, 2000). Māori academics did not appreciate the fact that only certain knowledge was legitimate but other knowledge, such as Māori knowledge, was not seen as being legitimate (L. T. Smith, 1999). Thus, Māori challenged the way research on Māori was exploited (Moewaka Barnes, 2000; Powick 2002).

Colonisation, for Māori as the indigenous peoples of New Zealand, was experienced through their ‘capital’ such as the loss of their land, culture, language and the power that comes with it, and this has had vast implications (Eketone, 2008). This is reinforced in the academic context by Jahnke and Taiapa (1999) who noted their concern that in the past, much of Māori research completed on Māori has been proven to be of little benefit to Māori themselves and because it did not provide any benefits for increasing Māori wellbeing it continued to reinforce negative stereotypes. In addition, Bishop (1999) stated that concerns from Māori and other indigenous peoples were related to the power and control that non-indigenous people had over research.

The debate was about gaining power and control for Māori and their cultural understandings and practices, and having a Māori-centred agenda where the issues and the outcomes of research were focused on the needs of Māori (Glover, 2002; Kiro, 2000; L. T. Smith, 1999, 2003; Walsh-Tapiata, 2003). This was supported by Harris (2004) who noted that Pakeha expected Māori to fit into their society in the interests of race relations, however there was nothing to encourage Pākehā to develop any level of understanding of the Māori world. Kovach (2009) stated that knowledge is power and making a choice of a methodology was a political act.



Two differing theoretical perspectives inform kaupapa Māori: critical theory and constructivism. Although few authors would state that kaupapa Māori theory emerged firstly from *critical theory*, drawn from the broad ‘socialist or Marxist theory’ tradition (Crotty, 1998), many writers would acknowledge the similarities and strong relationship between the two. A *constructivist* perspective is based on the belief that society, reality and meaning is our interactions with the world are manufactured, confirmed and validated through our interactions with the world (Crotty, 1998; Tolich & Davidson, 1999).

G. H. Smith (1997) wrote that “Kaupapa Māori theory developed out of a description of the alignment of Critical Theory and Kaupapa Māori praxis” (p. 98). Class distinction is the cause of much of the inequality and injustice that working-class people suffer, a point which was identified by critical theory in a socialist theoretical tradition (Crotty, 1998). Māori, the indigenous peoples of New Zealand, are included in this exploited working class through colonisation. Critical theory holds the perspective that the “social world is characterised by differences arising out of conflict between the powerful and powerless” (Munford & Walsh-Tapiata, 2001, p. 20). They further elaborated that critical theory aims were to empower people to emancipate themselves within a social, economic and political change. Grant and Giddings (2002) initially placed kaupapa Māori in a radical paradigm as it reflected some form of critical social research. However, after further discussions with key people, they concluded that ‘radical’ did not fit because it had negative connotations. The term ‘radical’ was a label for troublemakers within many Māori communities, for people who were outspoken about indigenous issues. The central aim for kaupapa Māori was to reframe and reshape research to make a positive difference for the research within a Māori worldview (L. T. Smith, 1999).

G. H. Smith (1997) explained there are three significant components of kaupapa Māori theory in its connection to critical theory, based on the concepts of Freire’s (1970) *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. The first component, conscientisation, is referred to by G. H. Smith (1997) as “revealing the reality” (p. 38). This process analyses and deconstructs the power or authority of those marginalising Māori knowledge and takes place within a critical theory framework. The second component articulated by G. H. Smith (1997) is “resistance” and he argued this has two approaches: firstly, responding to and challenging the dominant structures of oppression, exploitation, manipulation and containment by reacting to the realities; and, secondly, “proactive activities” where

the aim is to act collectively by changing the conditions to allow wider change to occur. The last component is praxis or, as he defined it, “reflective change”. This is about “achieving a way forward by drawing on and applying what is learnt rather than looking at what has gone wrong” (p. 38). He did conclude that, instead of conscientisation being a prerequisite for praxis, engagement in alternative praxis can lead to conscientisation. A classic example of this is whanaungatanga (the Māori way of engaging). This practice of whanaungatanga is elaborated in the research and design section.

While kaupapa Māori connection with critical theory is close, there is a second theoretical perspective, *constructivism*, that supports kaupapa Māori. A constructivist perspective is based on the belief that society, reality and meaning is our interactions with the world are manufactured, confirmed and validated through our interactions with the world (Crotty, 1998; Tolich & Davidson, 1999). This approach is very familiar to and found within Māori communities. A constructivist viewpoint explains that, through language, we can construct and make sense of our world. From an epistemological (theory of knowledge) viewpoint, a ‘realist’ theoretical standpoint holds that reality is objectively discovered. A constructivist standpoint holds that reality is not objective but is constructed by individuals through language. What we ‘know’ comes from our construction of reality through language and practice (Payne, 1997). Some key factors such as culture, history, politics and economics can influence ‘truths’ when socially constructing or viewing reality. Based on this constructivist approach of knowledge, Māori or, more specifically, iwi would have constructed their own reality because of their own worldview and values and adapted to change where it would be useful and implemented in their worldview. An example of this, was a Māori health model – Te Whare Tapa Whā (Durie, 1994) adopted by the Ministry of Health, New Zealand.

A kaupapa Māori approach to this study avoids a non- Māori perspective imposing on Māori process and application. It takes into consideration the current situation of Māori whilst simultaneously seeking to inform our practices through kaupapa Māori. Kaupapa Māori theory provides a localised (New Zealand) viewpoint and “can at times draw on key assumptions of critical theory but situates them within a Māori worldview” as outlined by G. H. Smith (as cited in L. T. Smith, 1999, p. 186). By doing this, kaupapa Māori theory identifies a perspective that engages critically with both western and Māori cultures, and at its heart are the questions of social justice (Grant & Giddings, 2002). However, the internal debates and the challenges lie in the extent in which kaupapa Māori can accommodate the present-day and various experiences of Māori

since colonisation and urbanisation (Reid, 2010; Webber, 2009). Having a rigid base of what it is to be Māori, instead of others providing a meaning that is unlikely to be attached this phenomenon (Reid, 2010). Nonetheless, what seems to be emerging from kaupapa Māori is that whatever Māori research is done, it must be advantageous and contributes to the progression of Māori knowledge and empowerment and it must also enhance the position of Māori communities (M. Hall, 2014; L. T. Smith & Reid, 2000).

### **Māori-centred framework**

Māori issues, experiences and knowledge need to be considered when undertaking Māori research and is an essential part of the research process (P. King, Young-Hauser, Li, Rua, & Nikora, 2012), the terms 'kaupapa Māori' and 'Māori-centred' research is used interchangeably by researchers. The most appropriate form of Māori research has been identified as kaupapa Māori. Māori researchers and institutions utilises kaupapa Māori because characterises and involves the full control and exclusive use of Māori language, customs and theory (Cunningham, 2000; Hudson, Milne, Reynolds, Russell & Smith, 2010). Nonetheless, kaupapa Māori and Māori-centred research approaches have similar goals in that they look to replace the positivistic approach to research with its problems such as its impact on and limitations for Māori people. Both kaupapa Māori and Māori-centred research approaches achieve this by addressing the critical failings of previous research methodology. Secondly, they utilise traditional Māori values to guide research design and methods in order to recognise Māori aspirations for and expectations of the research. The intent of both frameworks is about making a positive difference for Māori (L. T. Smith, 1999) and Māori knowledge being advanced, allows empowerment and enhancing both the situation and role of Māori communities (M. Hall, 2014; L. T. Smith & Reid, 2000).

A Māori-centred approach (MCA) employs research methods and practices that takes full cognisance of Māori culture, Māori knowledge and the contemporary realities of Māori (Durie, 1998). An MCA also employs both Māori and non- Māori methods and contemporary research and analytical tools (Cunningham, 1998) such as thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). It incorporates Māori aspirations for research and builds the capacity of Māori to do research and to promote appropriate methodologies for use with Māori people. The useful models of collaborative research between Māori and non- Māori by other Māori researchers (Cram, 1997; Durie, 1996, 2001) support

this approach. It also allows non- Māori participants experience to be heard in this research.

It is important that kaupapa Māori is consistently reasserted to allow Māori communities to consider Māori understanding is at the core of this process of research and analysis (Pihama, 2001; L. T. Smith, 2006). Kaupapa Māori is described in this context as the ‘plan of action,’ as outlined by Royal (2012), throughout the research process. This plan was defined by Marsden and Royal (2003) as the ground rules, first principles, and general principles (p. 66). The present researcher is very familiar with these key principles of kaupapa Māori as outlined by L. T. Smith (1999) and Cram (2001), and they have been utilised during the researcher’s engagement with all the participants for this research. These key principles are:

1. Aroha – means love but also means respect
2. He kanohi kitea – means being a familiar face
3. Kaua e takahia te mana o te tāngata – do not trample over the mana of the people
4. Kia tūpato – means being cautious
5. Māhaki – is about showing humility when sharing knowledge
6. Mana – relates to power, dignity and respect
7. Manaakitanga – describes sharing, hosting and being generous
8. Titiro, whakarongo, kōrero – means to look, listen and then speak
9. Whanaungatanga – refers to the building and maintaining of relationships

Taking all the above into consideration and the nine years of the researcher’s work experience with Professor Sir Mason Durie, it is intended to adopt his model of a Māori-centred framework (Durie, 1996, 1997). There are three key principles in Durie’s model which emerged from Māori health research and are used to assist the research process and towards developing the research questions. These are outlined below:

Table 1. Māori-centred principles (Durie, 1996, 1997)

<b><i>Whakapiki tāngata</i></b>	To enhance the position of Māori
<b><i>Whakatuia</i></b>	To engage the holistic Māori worldview recognising connections between a complex range of factors including those between the past and present, individual and collective, their environment,

political power and social and economic spheres.

*Mana Māori*

To ensure the full research process involves Māori.

Whakapiki tāngata, the first strand, literally translated means uplifting people. In this model, to produce benefits for Māori communities, research is necessary to highlight these uplifting benefits. This is important as previous research conducted by non- Māori has led to historical distrust and distaste by extracting knowledge from indigenous peoples and resulted in negatively toned observations, as the authoritative voice on Māori as the ‘other’ (L. T. Smith, 1999). This insight led to the comment by L. T. Smith (1999) that research “is probably one of the dirtiest words in the Indigenous world’s vocabulary” (p. 1). This comment was made because much of the research done on Māori historically always provided negative views of Māori. The capacity of indigenous researchers and the development of research methodologies over the last decade has enabled research to be undertaken in a safe indigenous way and to empower communities to provide their own voice (Mertens, Cram, Chilisa, 2012; L. T. Smith, 1999; Tipa & Panelli, 2009). Ultimately, therefore, whakapiki tāngata ensures indigenous researchers are more accountable to their communities and that non- Māori researchers are more accountable to the people who, in the end, are sharing the information (Jackson, 1996).

Binding together or connecting is literally the meaning of “whakatuia”, the second strand, and it stems from the holistic worldview of Māori. Its principles are based on the spiritual, physical and environmental domains and it considers the past, present and future (Forster, 2003; Reid, 2010). At the same time the genealogical connections that extend from these timeframes, such as the beginning of creation and the ensuing ancestral connections to future generations and those that have yet to be born (Henare, 1998). By this, it means that the indigenous researcher is working for the community, but also is viewed as acting on behalf of whānau (family), hapū (sub-tribe) and iwi (tribe).

Autonomy, control and self-determination best describes mana Māori (Forster, 2003, p. 51), the final strand to Durie’s model. In this context, it suggests and ensures that Māori has the level of authority and control over the research process. This includes planning,

design and execution of the project as well as the dissemination of the research outcomes (Durie, 1997). Being the researcher, and being Māori, with skills in both te reo (Māori language) and tikanga Māori (Māori practices) through my upbringing and my experience in previous roles and positions held, this research has enabled me to maintain in practice these skills because it has strong Māori approaches.

Eketone (2008) argued that Māori academia should not be the only area where Māori understanding, and knowledge exists. She elaborated on this by saying that the voices of those within communities where living is ‘intrinsic’ and ‘everyday’ must be included to contribute to Māori knowledge. Māori culture and protocols underpin the concept of *whānau* (Bishop, 1996, 1999). It pertains to the extended family and the already established relationships, through the connectedness between Māori (whakawhanaungatanga). According to Durie (2001), kaupapa whānau is described as:

- Māori groups who do not necessarily share the same recent ancestors
- Urbanisation
- Common interest or mission
- Subscribe to whānau values
- Flexible rules for engagement and disengagement.

This kaupapa whānau concept is found in the Navy but is not limited to just Māori in the Navy – it includes all ethnicities within the Navy. So, can the Navy whānau be classed as a kaupapa whānau? By consideration all the elements mentioned above, the Navy could be classed as a kaupapa whānau. This becomes more evident and expressed in the “Navy Creed” (Royal New Zealand Navy, n.d.):

### **Our Navy Creed**

I am a sailor of the Royal New Zealand Navy

Te Taua Moana o Aotearoa

I represent the proud heritage of those who have gone before me

I serve to protect our people and our whanau with integrity and mana

I will follow those above me and lead those below me

I embody the navy's Core Values – Courage, Commitment, Comradeship and will challenge those who do not

He heramana ahau, I am a sailor. (p. 1)

Within the Navy Creed are all the elements outlined by Durie (2001) that confirms that the Navy can be recognised as a kaupapa whānau. Many Māori within the Navy are representatives of the different iwi located within New Zealand such as Te Arawa, Tainui, Tūhoe, Ngā Puhi, Ngāti Porou, Ngāi Tahu, etc., and different ethnicities (NZDF, 2012). The Naval Base is in the largest city (Auckland) of New Zealand and is located at Devonport. The Navy's common interest is to "Advance New Zealand's interest from the sea" and their mission is to "serve, protect and care for all the people in New Zealand" (Royal New Zealand Navy, n.d., p. 1).

They subscribe to common values such as those outlined in the Navy Creed. The kaupapa whānau concept is reinforced by the last line confirming who we are, foremost: "He heramana ahau, I am a sailor". This Navy whānau concept (Iwi Heramana as it often has been referred to) is important to understand, as all personnel are trained to work as a team. This is enhanced with long deployments overseas both on ships and posted to faraway places such as Sudan, Africa, and Iraq for peacekeeping duties. These deployments varied from 3 to 12 months depending on the operation the individual was involved with. These examples have shown kaupapa whānau is a central principle of Navy life and therefore when researching the Navy from a Māori point of view, a Māori centred approach is a good fit for multiple reasons.

### Research design and methods

Kaupapa Māori in this context of research design means that Māori researchers feel more comfortable talking about 'our' research than about 'my' research. L. T. Smith (2006) argued that an integral part of a methodology is a tendency to approach cultural protocols, values and behaviours through indigenous methodologies. This is because some methodologies regard these elements as barriers to research and researchers had to acquaint themselves with these protocols to undertake their work with respect of not causing any offence. By saying this, she suggested that these factors are important and that it is necessary for them to be stated explicitly within the research to be thought about instinctively and openly declared within the research design and discussed in the results of the study. She concluded that the results of the research must be shared with those participants involved and the wider community in culturally appropriate ways and in a language that can be understood.

## Interview method

It should be noted that all participants including the researcher have something in common, which is we are all 'sailors' and we all have a passion for the Navy. The Navy Creed also reinforces this passion. This is also reflected in the service time of the participants i.e. two participants had completed 41 years, four had completed 27 to 38 years and the least time served was 16 years. Five of the participants were Senior Commissioned Officers<sup>1</sup> and the remaining two, Senior Ratings<sup>2</sup>. During the timeframe 1990 – 2005 many of the participants would have been in more than two roles as well as been promoted to higher ranks during this time. This is indicative of the hierarchical structures of the Navy. Drawing on westernised research designs for certain kinds of qualitative research such as oral histories, narratives, and case studies, and using methods like interviews and focus groups fits more comfortably within a Māori way of doing (Walker et al., 2006). Therefore, interviewing was the key approach to engagement with participants as an interview offers the best way of understanding what was going on from a participant's point of view. This is reinforced by Silverman (2005) who stated that when it comes to qualitative researchers, they seem to be more interested in the descriptions or stories that people tell one another (and researchers). Nash, Munford and O'Donoghue (2005) acknowledged that within qualitative methodologies realities are socially constructed and thus lived experiences are valued. The intent is to allow the participants to provide their own framework based on their professional and life experience (Walsh-Tapiata, 2003). This also allows the participants a level of autonomy where explanations of terms can be provided, clarification sought and the participants can explain their views as much or as little as they liked (Hollis-English, 2012). Qualitative research allows an approach that studies things in their natural settings and attempts to make sense of phenomena and the meaning that people bring to them. Therefore, gaining the lived experience of the participants is important to this research as this is a missing component within the literature on institutional work.

## Recruitment into the research

What was pertinent to the expressive nature of discussions relating to this research, was the trust built between the researcher and the participants. Seven participants were selected for this research. The participants for this research were identified by the

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<sup>1</sup> Commissioned Officers: see link <http://navy.mil.nz/np/rank-structure/default.htm>

<sup>2</sup> Senior Ratings: see link <http://navy.mil.nz/np/rank-structure/default.htm>



researcher as having a key role in implementing the change for Māori cultural practices and knowledge. For example, all participants, after initial conversations with the researcher, agreed that it was Captain Fleet Support (CFS) at the time of major change who was the key driver of many changes relating to aspects Māori and Māori infrastructure. CFS eventually became the Chief of Navy for the period 2004-2009. The Chief of Navy at the time of the change is also another participant as he would have had to authorise and approve the changes. Other participants for this research were the Navy Marae Manager, and the Warrant Officer of the Navy at the time of the change (who are Māori).

Details about each of the participants are provided in Table 2, below. While maintaining the anonymity of each participant, these details are necessary to understand each participant's status in the Navy and role in the institutional change which is the subject of this research.

Table 2. Participants in this research

<b>Participant No</b>	<b>Navy status</b>	<b>Ethnicity</b>
1	Senior Commissioned Officer	Non-Māori
2	Senior Rating	Māori
3	Senior Rating	Māori
4	Senior Commissioned officer	Māori
5	Senior Commissioned Officer	Non- Māori
6	Senior Commissioned Officer	Non- Māori
7	Senior Commissioned Officer	Non- Māori

In addition to having served with all the participants in this research, the researcher has met informally with them at family gatherings or Navy events since his departure from the Navy. They were informed by the researcher of this research and were asked if they wanted to participate. All were keen to be a part of this research. Prior to meeting each participant formally, a formal invitation to participate in the research was sent via email.

The email had the information sheet attached, to explain the research, and a consent form (see Appendices B and C). The information sheet included details of who I am as the researcher, the purpose of the research, an explanation of how they have been identified, what would happen in this research, and an outline of the likely discomforts and risks, and how these could be alleviated. It also outlined the benefits of this research for the Navy, stated how participants' privacy will be protected, gave them the opportunity to consider the invitation to participate, explained how to participate in this research, and advised them on how feedback on the results of the research can be obtained (see Appendix C).

It was anticipated that other names may have emerged as the interviews are conducted with the initial participants. This is known as the 'snowballing effect'. Snowball sampling is a technique for finding research subjects where one participant gives the researcher the name of another possible participant, who in turn provides the name of a third, and so on (Vogt, 1999). The researcher determined whether the suggested participant had a key role in the change. If that individual was required for this research, information was given to the participant supplying the name of the suggested participant so that they could contact the researcher. If they agreed to participate, then all the processes afforded to the initial selected participants were also be given to the new participant. This method was applied when P3 provided P4's name and explained P4's involvement with both the Rūnanga and Marae project.

Finally, prospective participants were given an opportunity to express any concerns relating to the research. The email also included a statement as follows: "if they have any concerns relating to either attachment forms to inform the researcher as soon as possible". This was intended to allow the researcher to consider any issues prior to our meeting. The interviews were arranged and promulgated to suit the participants.

Deciding on an appropriate space to undertake an interview is important to ensure there is minimal distraction and that the interviewee can feel comfortable to speak freely and in private. Because most of the participants are no longer in the Navy, some interviews occurred at their private homes or a place of their choosing. At the meeting, a hard copy of the consent form was made available, and a signature obtained once the participant had agreed to participate in the study. Maintaining their privacy and confidentiality, is important. The researcher is happy to remain flexible as the needs of the participant is foremost.

According to Durie (2001), kaupapa Māori research involves some clear characteristics, such as the use of cultural values, whānau participation, using the Māori language and customs. These are necessary to provide results that benefit Māori and to contribute to developing a competent and professional workforce, such as other researchers and those working in the same profession of the research. This is reinforced by Walsh-Tapiata (2003) who outlined that Māori concepts also need to be utilised to ensure that Māori protocols are maintained, such as whanaungatanga, “the process of identifying, maintaining or forming past, present and future relationships” (p. 334). These practices enable all participants to acquaint themselves with those present and, in most instances, these relationships could lead to more in-depth information being shared and entrusted to Māori researchers (Walsh-Tapiata, 2003). Wherever the interviews occur, all the above practices were afforded to the participants; however, the researcher was mindful that if the interview were done at the participant’s private dwelling, then he had to wait and follow the lead of the participant.

### Insider research

As noted above, the researcher is known to all participants involved with this study. This relationship has been built over years as a result of serving together on ships and during this period of change where we would meet often to discuss Māori issues due to the nature of everyone’s roles. This relationship did not only remain during working time, but it continued to social events such as children birthdays, weddings, kapa haka (Māori performances) trainings and sporting events. All participants selected for this research are aware of their obligations to the Treaty of Waitangi as the majority have attended the Waitangi Day celebrations in an official capacity over a number of years, especially the three Chiefs of Navy as it was their responsibility to escort the Governor-General to this event on an annual basis when they held this position (for five years in each case).

This close relationship had strengths but also posed challenges for the researcher. L. T. Smith (2006) stated that it is important for the researcher to clearly voice their involvement as an ‘insider’ to the research. As the researcher I am not detached from the topic. Deep insider research is defined as research undertaken by a person who has been a member of the organisation, such as the Navy or a group that is being researched (B. Edwards, 2002). B. Edwards (2002) also explained being an insider does offer substantial advantages and it enables the researcher to experience their own culture

through their role as a researcher, to a point where it reshapes their thinking and experience with both themselves and those being interviewed from the organisation. Kiro (2000) suggested that Māori research is based on the principle that it ‘takes one to know one’ and only an insider can understand the variances of the social phenomena afforded to the participants in the research. The researcher can share and understand both the Māori and Navy culture.

However, L. T. Smith (2006) pointed out that being an “insider researcher has methodological inherent risks as there is a potential for bias because it lacks distance and objectivity and could lead to the researcher playing an advocacy role” (p. 137). Some other likely challenges that were anticipated included trying to keep both the participant and the researcher focused on the questions asked, and ensuring some formality and professionalism was maintained throughout the meeting without getting too friendly and complacent in what needed to be achieved for this research. Finally, at the time of the interviews it had been 15 to 20 years since the changes being researched were made in the Navy, and it was recognised that for some participants – and for the researcher – there could have been challenges in trying to recall information. This could lead to ambiguity and possible conflict with other comments by the other participants.

#### **Other cultural dimensions of Māori-centred research**

Providing a koha (gift) was an important part of this research process. Reciprocity is common amongst Māori and an important factor for this research was to acknowledge the participants’ contribution to this research. Providing a koha into a participant in recognition of their contribution to the research process was agreed and appropriate as outlined by Sporle and Koea (2004).

Māori language can provide pathways to histories, values, and beliefs of Māori people (Powick, 2002), and the information and perspectives, which otherwise would not be possible. However, all participants in this research were not fluent in te reo and many Māori people who are participants of research may only have a basic working knowledge of the language. Hence a mix of English and Māori was useful, and fits with the aims of kaupapa Māori – to revitalise the language. At the same time, utilisation of te reo (Māori language) during some interviews was appropriate and the researcher is comfortable and competent with both approaches.

Māori participants can view certain aspects of their knowledge as highly valued, specialised and tapu “(contains culturally based restrictions around its use) and therefore must be treated with respect and at times requiring protection such as whakapapa – genealogical information” (Jahnke & Taiapa, 2003, p. 334). Therefore, it might be necessary to undertake karakia (prayer) prior to beginning and on completion of our interview. This is to place protection on both the participant and the researcher of the knowledge that was to be discussed and shared. This wasn’t required for all participants

The practice of showing generosity, cooperation and reciprocity is linked to the concept of whānau (Jahnke & Taiapa, 2003). Māori place greater value on research with a collective approach. The concept of collectivism is central in understanding whānau and it enables knowledge to be defined and guarded by a group like the Navy. It provides accountability for the protection and care of data and research findings which is very much a group thing (Walker et al., 2006). What whānau also entails and ensures is that there is a shared vision of research (G. H. Smith, 2003) that can support family members undertaking research.

Whānau are linked to hapū and then iwi. Henry and Pene (2001) commented on the term ‘tribal essentialism’ in reference to knowledge and is defined by Henare (1998) that, “it increases fragmentation of an already minority population into tribal groups which are pitted against each other for meagre resources upon which to base economic and cultural development” (p. 239). Henry and Pene (2001) argued if we were to take a neo-tribalist perspective, it could be asserted that tribal knowledge is the property of the tribe and that only those who belong to that group can access, critique, debate or comment on tribal knowledge and learning. Some would go as far as to assert that the idea of Māori as a collective identity could dissipate and that only tribal identity matters.

This raises some interesting points relating to knowledge and to the unanswered questions as to the re-tribalised Māori society, such as: Should research knowledge and its transmission be confined to members of groups? Can Māori knowledge be considered a universal knowledge for all Māori and other indigenous peoples? Can Māori access both the knowledge and the tribal knowledge institutions such as the established tribal wānanga (Māori Universities) such as Te Whare Wānanga o Awanuiarangi – Tūhoe (A tribe based in eastern Bay of Plenty) or Te Whare Wānanga o Raukawa – Ngāti Raukawa (a tribe based in the Taranaki region)? This line of

questioning has come about from a political system founded on western notions of individualism and competition, underpinned by racist assumptions about Māori people about social and intellectual conflict (Henry & Pene, 2001). These are interesting views, and in the context of this research and foremost for the researcher, is this research was targeting a non-Māori audience. The researcher intent was to demonstrate how successful Māori culture can be integrated successfully within an environment such as the Navy.

### Implementing the Māori-centred framework

Integrating indigenous knowledge and practice into any military organisation is difficult. It was therefore important to ensure that the research questions posed, addressed issues relating to how Māori benefited from these changes from a kaupapa Māori perspective (L. T. Smith, 1999). This was done by following the Māori-centred principles of Durie (1996, 1997) that were described earlier (see Table 3, below.)

Table 3. Indicative interview questions for all participants

Whakapiki Tāngata	<p><i>Participant view or experiences</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Who instigated change to recognise Māori culture?</li> <li>✓ What role were they in to make this change happen?</li> <li>✓ How did they achieve this change</li> </ul>
Whakatuia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Who had the knowledge?</li> <li>✓ What knowledge did they have?</li> <li>✓ How did they gain their Māori knowledge?</li> </ul>
Mana Māori	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Who empowered you to instigate Māori changes?</li> <li>✓ What was required for you to make these changes?</li> <li>✓ How did you go about instigating Māori changes</li> </ul>

Thematic analysis provides a six-phase process in analysing the data from the interviews once they have been transcribed. The process begins when the researcher starts to collect the data. Then the researcher begins to look for patterns of meaning and issues of potential interest in the data. Reporting of the content and meaning of patterns (themes) within the data is the endpoint, where themes are abstract (and often fuzzy)

constructs that the researcher identifies before, during and after analysis (Ryan & Bernard, 2000). Writing is an integral part of the analysis which does not begin at the end of the analytical process, as it does with statistical analysis. This analytical process is discussed in detail in the following section.

## Data analysis

### Introduction

The topic was “The integration of Māori culture and knowledge into the Royal New Zealand Navy”. It focused on how key institutional entrepreneurs went about their purposive work to formally recognising Māori culture. It was also necessary to identify the roles they were in to allow this transformation to occur and to ascertain why Māori culture was identified to be formally recognised between 1990 -2005.

In order to achieve the objectives of this research, key themes from the literature were utilised to create semi-structured questions to explore with key selected participants, the areas that were limiting within the literature. These key themes are outlined below. The intent was to elicit and explore their purposive work and experiences in undertaking change within the Royal New Zealand Navy.

1. What were the institutional settings of the Navy pre-1990?
2. What were the roles/ranks of the institutional entrepreneurs who instigated change?
3. How did they go about their purposive work?
4. Why Māori knowledge and practices?

All participants were asked the same questions. Information relating to Māori demographics and cultural practices were sourced from documents such as the Navy Excellence programme and *Navy Today* (the Navy’s magazine). The information taken from the Navy Excellence programme relates to a Navy-wide strategy that was being implemented within the Navy from 1998 to 2009. This information was relevant to the research question as the period of the implementation of this programme overlapped to a considerable degree with the period of change that is the focus of this research. The *Navy Today* magazine contains information highlighting key Māori practices that were undertaken as a result of the integration of Māori practices, such as the change of command ceremonies mentioned in the Literature Review chapter.

## Thematic analysis

Thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) was the key method utilised for this research. The authors outlined that the aim is to look for patterns across data sets (selected groups of transcripts). Although the kaupapa Māori paradigm is a firm, well-defined analytic framework (Panofo, 2013) being utilised for this research, it is important to note that the main concern was to accurately capture and convey the views of the leaders and key actors who contributed to instigating Māori cultural practices and knowledge into the Navy. Moewaka Barnes (2000), Panofo (2013) and Pihama (2010) outlined that kaupapa Māori does not have a specific method for analysis nor for the conducting thematic analysis such as Braun and Clarke (2006). Although Braun and Clarke (2006) may have argued that thematic analysis can be a methodology, thematic analysis is used throughout this research and it will become an analytic tool within both the wider paradigm of kaupapa Māori and a Māori-centred methodology. This will allow the researcher to 'identify, analyse and report patterns' that is ascertained from the data set. A theme is defined by Braun and Clarke (2006) to be "capturing something important about the data in relation to the research question and represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set" (p. 82).

Braun and Clarke (2006) suggests that within thematic analysis, particular themes can arise from the data (semantic), or they may refer to primary issues (latent), but they are recognized based on the decision of the researcher. Although these themes may be developed through evidence reasoning from the data, they become known as the constructions rather than inherent within the data set (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Thematic examination can interpret various aspects of a research topic (Boyatzis, 1998). Braun and Clarke (2006) suggested there are two key points relating to the way in which thematic analysis varies from other analytical methods, as it seeks to define patterns across qualitative data.

Taylor and Ussher (2001) stated that describing themes as they begin to 'appear' or 'revealed' as an unreceptive account of the process of analysis. This account refutes the way the researcher has in identifying the pattern/themes, by choosing those that may be of interest and reporting this information to the reader. One of these methods is phenomenological epistemology (L. T. Smith, 1999; J. A. Smith & Osborn, 2003) which provides experience importance (Holloway & Todres, 2003) and relates to understanding everyday experiences of people's reality in detail. This is intended to



enable the researcher to understand the phenomenon in question (McLeod, 2001). What is significant and a point to remember, is the different methods suggested share a search for certain themes, or patterns across an (entire) data set rather than within a data item, such as an individual interview or interviews from one person.

This approach acknowledges the participants who make meaning from their experience and, relates it to the broader social context which impinges on those meanings, at the same time, retaining a focus on the information and other limits of reality. Providing a process that works both to reflect reality and to unpick or unravel the surface of 'reality' is possible through thematic analysis. A key point to remember is that with any theoretical framework comes several conventions about the form of the data, what they signify in terms of the 'world reality', and so forth. A good thematic analysis will make this clearer.

Prior to data analysis, I already had a strong awareness of the operations of the Navy in relation to my research, and I also had strong connections with senior leadership, and this is outlined in the methodological literature and my preliminary literature review. Equipped with this experience and knowledge and the development of the research questions, it was important for me to capture and provide the rich descriptions of each participant's experiences and aspirations. How the decisions were made in the work of the Senior Command of the Navy is what I have limited knowledge of, and it is this which leads to the influence of structure and agency within the Navy. As part of their thematic analysis approach, Braun and Clarke (2006) provide a six-step process outlined below. While they present their process sequentially, they also emphasise that the analysis process is repeated and requires constant movement between the phases.

The outline of the process of analysing the data is a guide and does not provide hard and fast rules. The basic outline of the process needs to be applied flexibly to fit the research questions and data (Patton, 1990; Ely, Vinz, Downing & Anzul, 1997). Table 4, below, outlines the phases of thematic analysis.

Interviews were conducted between September 2017 and November 2017. On completion of interviewing all participants, the recorded interviews were transcribed by a professional transcriber operating under an approved confidentiality agreement (see Appendix D). On receiving the final transcripts, all individual interviews were read whilst listening to the replay of the digital recordings to confirm the accuracy of the

transcripts. Minor changes were made, with the majority of the corrections relating to the kupu Māori (Māori words), naval terminology and rank titles, and some minor context-specific language which was unfamiliar to the transcriber. All transcripts were then returned to the participants for their comment and feedback. A period of one month was given to the participants for this process. All seven participants returned their transcripts with minor changes or adjustments. Once all transcripts were completed and returned, a careful re-reading of the transcripts occurred in order to gain a better understanding of the interviews and to acquaint myself with the data again.

Table 4. Phases of thematic analysis

<b>Phases</b>		<b>Description of the process</b>
1	Familiarising oneself with the data	It transcribes data (if necessary), reading and rereading the data, noting down initial ideas (e.g., J. A. Edwards, 1993; Lapadat & Lindsay, 1999)
2	Generating initial codes	It codes interesting features of the data in a systematic fashion across the entire data set, collating data relevant to each code (e.g., Kelle, 2004; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Seale, 2000; Tuckett, 2005)
3	Searching for themes	It collates codes into potential themes, gathering all data relevant to each potential theme (e.g., Braun & Wilkinson, 2003)
4	Reviewing themes	It ensures the themes work in relation to the coded extracts (level 1) and the entire data set (level 2). Generating a thematic 'map' of the analysis (e.g., Braun & Wilkinson, 2003)
5	Defining and naming themes	It is an ongoing analysis that refines the specifics of each theme, and the overall story the analysis tells, generating clear definitions and names for each theme (e.g., Braun & Wilkinson, 2003)
6	Producing the report	The final opportunity for analysis is the selection of vivid, compelling extract examples. The final analysis of selected extracts, relating to the analysis to the research question and literature, producing a scholarly report of the analysis (e.g., Frith & Gleeson, 2004; Kitzinger & Willmott, 2002)

## Some likely pitfalls with thematic analysis

From a learning perspective for beginners, thematic analysis is reasonably easy to conduct. However, there are several potential issues that need to be avoided. A failure to analyse the data could be the first issue. Thematic analysis is not about collecting extracts strung together with little or no analytic account or a series of extracts with analytic comment that simply or primarily paraphrases content. It is important for the researcher to ensure that the extracts are illustrative of the analytic points made about the data. For the data to inform the reader what it does or might mean it needs to illustrate or support an analysis that goes beyond its specific content in order to make sense of the data.

The second issue is using the data collection questions (interview questions) as themes that are reported. This can lead to an absence of analytic work to identify themes across the entire data set or to make sense of the patterning of responses.

Issues that arise where the themes do not appear to work, and where there is too much overlap between themes is the third issue. What can lead themes to be weak or unconvincing analysis is to ensure that themes that are not internally coherent, and consistent. The intent is for the themes to be connected to a central idea or concept. This is only possible if the analysis of the data is adequately captured or it fails to provide a rich description/interpretation of one or more aspects of the data. It is more likely to occur if the analysis fails to illustrate satisfactory examples from the data or if there are only one or two extracts for a theme (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Convincing someone who has not read the entire data set is a necessary and important process to the researcher (Foster & Parker, 1995).

The fourth issue is the likelihood of a mismatch between the data and the analytic claims that have resulted. The researcher needs to remain mindful and aware of the potential for such a mismatch between theory and the analytical claims. It could also come from a mismatch between the research questions and the method of thematic analysis used. When the interpretations of the data are consistent with the theoretical framework, a good thematic analysis is achieved.

### Initial generation of codes

The thematic analysis in this study was conducted manually. The initial codes that began to appear are summarised below alongside illustrative extracts from the data (see Table 5, below).

All coded headings were developed within a Word document which included the relevant data extracts from all interviews.

Table 5. Examples of the initial categorisation of data extract and code examples

Data extract	Codes
“the Navy is a highly structured organisation. They follow the rules and regulations and individuals had to stick to them...I guess that is difficult if I am trying to introduce something new into the system”	Institutional environment Perceived weakness Difficulty in instigating change
“the Navy was autocratic, and you did what those above you told you”	Institutional environment Perceived weakness Leadership control
“by exposing the inwards diversity and how you can exploit leverage off diversity to achieve an outcome that may not have been able to be achieved as effectively without diversity. The Māori part of the Navy was very important”.	Diversity Perceived strength Use of diversity in a different context at international level

### Searching for themes

After perusing through and seeing the data and identifying the connections between the initial codes produced from this data, the themes began to appear. This process involved having to copy and paste extracts and coded headings to group codes alike together. Utilising the word features allowed the researcher to assign the identified codes and themes to different participants and the use of the ‘navigation pane’ of word, meant that I could easily review all the codes throughout the analysis process.

Braun and Clarke (2006) observe that “writing is an integral part of analysis when undertaking qualitative research” (p. 86). This occurred on completion of the interviews and searching through the data and summarising the codes and extracts. A key factor was the relationships between codes and having to continuously write and re-write

codes. It enabled the researcher to clarify the connections among the codes and identify which extracts were relevant or appropriate to be assigned a theme, or whether they should be shifted to other or new themes. Boyatzis (1998) outlined that it was necessary to be mindful when processing the data and it becomes apparent when summing up and paraphrasing the data.

### **Example of summarising for analysis**

“The Māori part of the Navy was a very important part” #5, “There’s Māori culture and Navy culture” #1, “ “it was certainly viewed as being a very exciting ah challenge to establish a marae but also one that would, certainly turn the future of taha Māori within the RNZN”.

The literature review highlighted key areas that were lacking within research, such as the agency of relatively powerless actors to affect or contribute to change, which made it easier to identify the themes as the questions were very specific to areas such as institutional settings and the work of specific actors. The kaupapa Māori paradigm and the research questions was useful and assisted in determining what was going to be meaningful so that appropriate themes could be established. Braun and Clarke (2006) stated that the implication of themes was “not necessarily dependent on quantifiable measures” nor the occurrence of a theme (p. 82). As the themes became obvious across the transcripts, the steps outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006), i.e., familiarising, coding and searching for themes relating to pertinent topic areas of the literature review, became more apparent.

### **Reviewing themes**

Analysing and reviewing the themes is a constant process which is done in correlation with the data extracts. This is to ensure that the themes provided are an accurate reflection of the data. There is a constant to and froing between each individual participant’s views in response to key questions in order to identify similarities in and distinctions between the responses of the various participants. This has been an ongoing process and at times it has been difficult to differentiate which theme a code should reside in. In other words, the response could sit in several themes. Eventually,

consideration of the textual features allowed the data to be collated to a point where there was consistency in the responses and determining a consistent theme that emerged through the participants' responses to questions, for example identifying the key contributors to instigating or influencing this change. In this case, the recurring names that were mentioned by each individual participant were consistent in identifying actors with the formal authority or institutional entrepreneurs in supporting roles.

### Defining and naming themes

Taking into consideration the importance of the information gained from the seven participants, and what the literature was lacking were key aspects to this research. Therefore, determining the final themes enabled the researcher to analyse the data to identify *who*, *what* and *how* institutional entrepreneurs were able to transform an organisation such as the Navy. This process allowed the researcher to ascertain how these institutional entrepreneurs were able to instigate change that led to integrating formally Māori practices and knowledge into the Navy. Institutions such as the Navy have environments where it is difficult to instigate change because of the hierarchical structures and stringent rules which are the norm of many military organisations.

The final themes that were determined are outlined in the Findings chapter.

## Chapter 4

### Findings

*Ma te mārama, ka maatatau, through understanding comes knowledge*

#### Introduction

This findings chapter sets out the key themes that have emerged from the analysis of the seven participant interviews. The thematic analysis process set out in Chapter Three was employed to obtain three main themes. The participants are anonymised and referred to simply as P1 to P7.

The themes begin with the *institutional settings with a need for change*. The period 1990–2005, was a turning point for New Zealand and the Navy, especially relating to diversity and Māori recognition. The chapter then looks at the *external drivers post-1990*. With the New Zealand Government shifting from an Equal Employment Opportunities (EEO) framework to a US model of “managing diversity”. This framework had an individualistic approach moving away from identifying disadvantaged groups, such as Māori. The findings under this theme show how the Navy coped with this change and how they were able to recognise and integrate the Māori culture of New Zealand into the Navy. Finally, the chapter examines the *internal factors for driving change*. The seven participants in this research were identified as contributing to making changes within an institutional environment that had hierarchical structures which tended to be male-dominated and several had formal authority. With the presence of the Royal British Navy still evident, the findings ascertain how institutional entrepreneurs or actors in key roles effected change by disrupting the institutional environment of the Navy.

## Institutional setting and the need for change

Historically, the Navy was a typical military organisation which had hierarchical structures with stringent rules and a chain of command. It also had a closed culture and was unlikely to be open to change, and it viewed diversity as an issue (Scoppio, 2007). Navy leaders had set boundaries with the institutionalisation of the combat-warrior paradigm, which had traditionally implied a male-dominated workplace (Dunivin, 1994). One of the participants had his own take on this when he outlined that the Navy is a highly structured organisation:

They follow rules and regulations and individuals had to stick to them. ... I guess that's difficult if I'm trying to introduce something new into the system.  
(P3)

Adding to the already restricted environment of the Navy was the presence and influence of the British Royal Navy. This colonial influence did not recognise the Māori culture of New Zealand. This lack of recognition for Māori culture was evident when two participants joined the Navy in the early 1970s:

Domination, racism, most of the procedures, practices and customs were from the Royal Navy. There was no recognition of Māori during those times, neither did they make any attempts to recognise Māori or had a distinct Māori focus to it within the Navy. (P2 and P3)

This is what the two Māori Senior Rating participants recalled as young sailors. Due to the hierarchical structures of the Navy, they were unlikely to have made any complaints or risk being seen to be “rocking the boat”. Not everyone experienced the culture of the Navy as racist, however. A participant who was a Commissioned Officer who joined in 1985 stated:

I can't understand racism, because I've never been subjected to or experienced it in the same way perhaps you have or a young friend of mine who was South African. (P7)

With the Royal Navy presence and their attitude towards Māori culture, combined with the institutional environment of the Navy, it did not look likely that change of any kind could be instigated. However, change was needed if a bicultural relationship, which was the intent of te Tiriti o Waitangi, was to be established.



Within this unpromising institutional environment, Māori found some ways to maintain their cultural practices. One important mechanism for the maintenance of Māori culture and identity was through kapa haka groups (Māori concert parties) which only existed on the seagoing ships prior to 1990. In the late 1980s, to ensure Māori cultural authenticity was maintained, a grass roots movement of Māori sailors who were schooled through Kōhanga Reo and Kura Kaupapa Māori (Māori medium schools) advocated, with the support of senior Māori naval personnel, for concert parties to be reframed as Māori cultural groups. They believed it was about the culture and not just singing a few songs.

For Commanding Officers of ships, kapa haka groups were assets for their ships whilst on deployment overseas and it made a point of difference at cocktail parties. The long-term outcome may not have been evident to Māori performers at the time, it did seem it was tokenism from a Māori perspective. (P3)

This reframing of the kapa haka groups was important because it changed the mindset of current serving Māori in the Navy in a sense of not accepting the performances as tokenism. It also reinforced, for Māori, how important their culture was to them and if they wanted it to be recognised it had to be ensured that the culture became more authentic and meaningful. Māori sailors continued to practice in their own time and fundraise for the necessary resources for their performances. They continued to undertake performances to support the Navy in many ways: performing at ships' cocktail parties for example. These cocktail parties were hosted on a ship on arrival at selected ports which were confirmed prior to the ship's deployment from New Zealand. These ports were arranged between the Navy and the Ministry of Trade and Enterprise. Māori cultural groups still exist on the ships.

You must acknowledge the influence of the ship's cultural groups. What is not evident is this group of sailors giving up their free time to perform for the benefit of the ship and the country. (P1)

In 1990, HMZS Waikato was tasked with establishing peace talks with the Bougainville Revolutionary Army. Previous attempts to get this group to engage in these talks had failed. P1, as a Commanding Officer, utilised the ship's Māori cultural group to confront the Bougainville Revolutionary Army on the wharf. His thinking was that this group (referring to the Bougainville Revolutionary Army) would be expecting a whole

lot of white people to step up on the wharf. So, by utilising the Māori cultural group, he showed the inwards diversity of the Royal New Zealand Navy, and how one can leverage off diversity to achieve an outcome that may not have been able to be achieved as effectively without diversity. He reinforced the importance of Māori in the Navy: “the Māori part of the Navy was a very important part” (P1). The peace talks ended with a very successful outcome.

A key strategic advantage for the Navy in terms of instigating change was its location and size. The Naval Base is in Devonport on the North Shore of Auckland, New Zealand’s largest city. This has been the home of the Navy since 1841 and remained so after its official recognition as the Royal New Zealand Navy in 1941 (RNZN, 2017). This location facilitates easy access to both the Northern and Southern hemispheres and to both military and commercial airports. The RNZN is very small in comparison to its key allies such as Australia, Britain, Canada and the US. It had 2,000 personnel in the 1990s of whom 30% were Māori as stated by P4 when he was making submissions or proposals on behalf of the Rūnanga. For the Navy in 2012, 19.9% of personnel were Māori and 28.5% European and 51.6% Others (NZDF, 2012). It seems Māori numbers have decreased since the early 1990s. At the time of writing, in 2019, there were currently 2,184 personnel in the Navy (NZDF, 2019).

Its location and size made it better placed than its NZDF counterparts – the Air Force and Army – in terms of effecting the greater recognition of indigenous culture. The Navy had only one base compared to their counterparts who had their camps and bases located around different regions of the country. For example, the Army has camps located in Papakura, South Auckland; Waiouru, central North Island; Linton Camp in Palmerston North, central west of the North Island; Trentham Camp in Wellington; and Burnham Camp in Christchurch, South Island. The Air Force has bases in: Ohakea, Palmerston North; Woodbourne, Blenheim, at the top of South Island; and Hobsonville, West Auckland.

In addition, 90% of the Navy personnel resided and worked in the Auckland region therefore making it much easier to instigate change. It made it easier to bring people together and to communicate change, a participant explains,

Being a small Navy allowed it to be forward thinking and modern thinking, and they could recognise when things needed to change. It did not have issues that

large Navies must cope with, such as the machinations of trying to make change.  
(P6)

An important finding from the interviews was the sense of belonging that some participants felt as Māori when they joined the Navy. P4 (a Māori Commissioned Officer) outlined how comfortable he felt with the whole institutional environment when he joined the Navy. The military generates a sense of belonging and it is important for an institution to have this in its members from the lowest to the highest level. He elaborated further that it was exactly what whānau (family), hapū (subtribe), and iwi (tribe) is about. Māori would resonate with this as this sense of belonging has similarities to Māori culture because the Navy too had clear tikanga (practices) and kawa (protocols) and this could possibly have contributed to Māori adapting to the military lifestyle much quicker than others. Many Māori also respected their elders and their leaders, hence the respect given to leadership in the military. A participant explains

The Navy achieves inclusiveness because we go around as a group, you're on a ship and really in a way, a marae is a ship. There are rules, there are processes and protocols.

He continues this by relating it to what a ship does.

Because it has a crew you can't go off and do your own thing, you are part of a team. The Navy undertakes the work that the government assigns us, and we remain within the same ship to complete that work. The ship also has rules and processes that helps to protect us. The ship creates that atmosphere of inclusiveness. This analogy can be compared to a hapū (sub-tribe) within an iwi (Navy). We have other ships which are similar, and we would compete against each other to be the best. (P6)

This next material describes the broader institutional setting at the time, which is important but was not discussed by the participants. The literature review expands on these changes and they relate to two pieces of Government legislation. The first the introduction of the New Public Management (NPM) system in the early 1980s (Hood, 1995) and this included the NZDF. This NPM system was designed for the public sector to behave like the private sector in terms of efficiency, accountability etc. P5 introduced the Baldrige Management Framework to provide evidence to the Government on how well the Navy was performing in order to gain more of the Defence budget.

Again, this next point is outlined in the literature review; however, a key point is the protests of the 1970s and the 1980s forced the government to make changes to the State Sector Act of 1988 more specifically to recognise the aims and aspirations of Māori people (Boston, Martin, Pallot & Walsh, 1996). Again, this is important to the research question. What makes this more interesting is that none of the participants had seen anything relating to these two key pieces of legislation or policy.

### External drivers of change post-1990

This section focuses on key events and external factors that may have influenced change in the RNZN post 1990. A key point from the findings was, all participants agreed that 1990 was a positive turning point for change. It was a year of broader political change which led to changes to the State Sector Act 1988. These changes required the public sector management to recognise the aims and aspirations of Māori people and a social shift from a focus on Equal Employment Opportunities (EEO) to adopting “managing diversity”. In government and across society there was a growing awareness of te Tiriti o Waitangi and a greater acceptance of diversity.

In the late 1970s and through the 1980s, Māori held many protests around the country, challenging the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 and wanting land claims to be backdated to 1840. These protests eventually led to amendments to the Act that were introduced in 1985. The most significant change meant Māori were able to make land claim submissions backdated to 1840, the year te Tiriti o Waitangi was signed, instead of only from the date of the initial legislation in 1975. During the 1990s many Iwi began to receive the benefits of their land claims. These events not only made the public more aware of te Tiriti o Waitangi and Māori culture, it also created much angst and debate, mainly regarding the amounts of compensation that iwi was receiving for the loss of their land.

The mood was changing in terms of acknowledgement and recognition of te Tiriti o Waitangi. (P4)

Although it took five years to act on the changes made to te Tiriti o Waitangi Act in 1985, the government began to make some significant changes to recognising the Māori language and their engagement with Māori. In 1990 all government departments were required to have Māori subtitles, and consultants were contracted to teach government departments, including Defence, how best to engage with Māori (P4). Although the

consultancy group made a visit to the Naval Base, only one participant in this research stated he had attended this course. Many of the remaining participants were not aware of any law or policy stating that they had to recognise Māori culture or diversity.

A prominent Māori, Donna Awatere, set up a consultancy group that began to work with government and its departments on how to engage, to initiate meetings with Māori. She also came to the Naval Base and I attended one of these sessions. (P4)

Why many of the other participants did not attend could possibly be due to other commitments such as being on deployment overseas or course training, or perhaps they were just not aware of it. Some may not have been at the appropriate rank level to attend these courses because they were targeting managers.

Another key event occurred around 1991 at the Waitangi Treaty Grounds in the Bay of Islands. The Navy attends this event in an official capacity by providing a ceremonial guard of honour at the Waitangi grounds. Hiwi Tauroa, the Race Relations Conciliator<sup>3</sup> at the time, made an interesting announcement.

It would be good to see some acknowledgment of traditional Māori culture aligned with Military culture. (P4)

Hiwi Tauroa was very familiar with the Navy as he had three children in the Navy (P4). P4, who attended Waitangi celebrations that year and heard this announcement, took it as an opportunity for the Rūnanga<sup>4</sup> to look at the Navy's ceremonial practices.

Although EEO and “managing diversity” is mentioned in the literature review but not by participants, it is important to mention it here because a participant highlighted that the Navy was going through some difficult times over sexual harassment and the changes he instigated were designed to overcome this stigma (P5). These changes are mentioned later in the next sections.

### Internal factors driving change

This section looks firstly at the institutional actors who had the power, resources and skills to support or facilitate change. It also looks at the purposive work of actors and

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<sup>3</sup> Race Relations Conciliator is now called the Race Relations Commissioner.

<sup>4</sup> See Chapter 1 for explanation of Rūnanga

their actions to achieve change in the RNZN. This purposive work is defined as the “action(s) of individuals and organisations aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, p. 215).

### **The necessary role of those with institutional powers**

The Navy’s hierarchical structures meant that leadership from the top was essential in instigating change, for the organisation to achieve diverse membership and for influencing organisational culture (Scoppio, 2007).

In terms of change in the organisation it must come from the top. Question is, was the top ready for change? (P1)

Scoppio (2007) further highlighted that to integrate diversity groups and culture, the organisational culture needed to have an open culture. Therefore, the Navy had to have horizontal structures, flexible planning and operating processes for the organisational culture to be open. Despite the presence of the Royal Navy influence, the current organisational culture needed to change.

The leadership from the top was important. Participants repeatedly spoke of the important role played by those in positions of authority, for example, Captains, Commodores and Rear Admirals (Chiefs of Navy). These were the ranks identified as having the institutional powers to instigate changes or make key decisions. For a Captain in the Navy there is only one level between herself or himself and the boss. This made it easier to communicate and discuss anything directly with the Admiral (P1). This highlights the formal positions of power within the institution, in a top-down model that you would expect within hierarchical organisations:

I think in terms of Navy leadership it really started and stopped with the Admiral. (P7)

However, what the findings highlight is these changes could not have been instigated without the support of other institutional actors with lower levels of official power.

Participants highlighted the importance of the emergence of “home-grown” leaders. They highlighted the contribution made by the ascendancy of leaders who were born in New Zealand and who came through the system before attaining the higher levels of

Command.<sup>5</sup> thus developing a deep understanding of the New Zealand environment. For example, a home-grown leader, shortly after returning from training in the United Kingdom, became the Commanding Officer of a ship. His rank was Captain when he changed pre-1990 dress rules to suit the New Zealand environment. It gives the impression that home-grown officers were intent on the organisation becoming more of a New Zealand Navy. In addition, they were not afraid to make change even though Royal Navy leadership was still leading the Navy at the time.

Another intriguing change that occurred in 1993 when the government of the day approved the purchase of three ANZAC Frigates. The Admiral at the time, who had strong associations with the Royal Navy, proposed that the three new ANZAC frigates be given Māori names. Unfortunately, due to a change in government the Navy only received two ANZAC frigates and they were eventually named Te Kaha and Te Mana. At the time the Admiral had sought advice from Professor Mānuka Hēnare, a Māori academic at the University of Auckland. This Professor proposed these Māori names to the Admiral, which were later confirmed by the government. In the past, the frigates were normally named after key provinces of New Zealand, such as Wellington, Canterbury, Otago and Waikato. Again, another sign of Māori recognition, the Māori Queen Te Atairangikaahu was given the honour of christening Te Mana. After the launching of Te Mana she had a very close association with the Navy.

P6 elaborated on making change within the Navy:

if people wanted to make change or the right developments that should occur, there were no impediments. The gut feeling was we needed to do something, and P5 started the ball rolling. (P6)

This was an indication that the Navy was an organisation open to change.

Another key point relating to change was highlighted by one participant when he was told by many people, both inside and outside of the Navy, that the Navy was autocratic, and people did what they were told by those above them. His response was that

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<sup>5</sup> Command is commonly used to refer to key Senior Officers who were able to make key decisions. They were normally of the rank Captain and above. See <http://www.navy.mil.nz/np/rank-structure/default.htm>

the Navy is not like that anymore. There are more consultative meetings where better decisions are made. (P6)

This consultative approach was demonstrated when P6 recounted working with a Warrant Officer to appoint an ex-Navy civilian back to the Navy to manage the Marae Project, noting:

Now you see what he has produced with the assistance of others. That has been a marvellous outcome. (P6)

Both P6 and P3 had many discussions about Māori issues and the Marae.

Another factor to emerge was access to Command of certain individual actors who were Warrant Officers. While they themselves did not have decision-making power, their positions gave them access to those with the institutional powers in higher levels of Command. This is another sign that hierarchical structures were becoming flexible enough for consultative meetings to occur. This line of communication was seen as having been important by several participants, including Māori participants. It provided opportunities to discuss some recommendations, proposals or issues relating to Māori culture and the possibilities of instigating change (P2). This demonstrates how constructive working relationships and a consultative approach can lead to good outcomes. With home-grown leaders coming into key roles it appeared that the hierarchy was becoming more consultative and it indicated that the organisational culture of the Navy was shifting away from being autocratic towards becoming more open in order to gain better outcomes.

Participants spoke of the Māori cultural knowledge provided to the institutional actors with power by Māori officers of lower rank. This communication occurred initially through personal conversations within the working environment of the Navy and involving people in specific roles: The Chairpersons of the Rūnanga, once it had been established, or the Marae Project Manager. The findings show that actors with lower levels of formal power were still able to exert influence and support change through such means.

#### **The role of personal determination and energy to effect change**

This section presents findings on the purposive work of those institutional actors who found it was possible to effect change even if they did not have a position of



institutional power: that they did not need to be a leader at the top of the hierarchy in order to contribute towards change. Change could happen if participants were determined, energetic, and knew who they needed to get on board.

While, as discussed above, the support of those in positions of formal authority was important, it was not enough to guarantee that change happens. The actors must also be motivated to achieve change. For example, one participant stated that:

There's no pressure for people to make change. I sensed a need for change. Having the ability to sense something that requires changing is a key characteristic of leadership. (P5)

When P5 authorised the establishment of the Bicultural Working Party in 1991 and it later became the Rūnanga, it enabled P4 (Chairperson of the Bicultural Working Party) to instigate these entities. And it is from these entities that he was able to gather naval personnel together to discuss and develop information and processes in respect of how Māori culture was going to evolve within the Navy, and how the Marae was going to be established. Both the Rūnanga and the Marae are discussed further in the next section.

Also, in 1993, P5 also authorised netball courts to be established at Ngataranga Bay, for women. Ngataranga Bay is bordered by a peninsula which is part of the Naval Base. It is where most of the Navy's outdoor sports (soccer, rugby, rugby league, hockey) playing fields are located. It also had a sports complex with a few changing rooms and a place where personnel could relax and have a few drinks or a meal after training or games.

His comments on this:

I saw that it was fair that they have this facility. My intent and desire were never to promote the outcome but to provide the facilities for people who I saw were not getting a fair deal or didn't have the tools to advance the issues themselves. (P5)

When he was seeking funding for the netball courts, P5 got a lot of push back from senior officers of the Navy who were on the Trust for the Navy Central Fund. This fund was established during the 1951 Auckland wharf strikes. Navy, Army and Air Force personnel were required to work on the wharves whilst this strike was in progress. The money came from ship owners who put five shillings an hour into a pot for all the work done by military personnel. The Trustees of this fund were very high-ranking officers,

and support was only gained after a struggle. This implies that P5, through his energy and commitment, was able to drive change despite resistance from his peers.

I've never been one for an ordered approach to things. I'm much more liable to decide on doing it and then apologise to someone who complains that I didn't follow the right practice. You get things to happen much more quickly. (P5)

Around the same time, changes were made to the Navy Promotion Committees that looked at advancement or selection courses for advancement by ensuring that a female was on both the selection board and courses. P5 who was involved in this change said:

Simply being denied opportunities because of your sex, didn't sit well with me.

In the mid-1990s there was some push for women to be able to serve on combatant ships. Although women had been able to go to sea since 1986, they were not able to serve on combatant ships. The change was achieved in 1995 when the first group of women were deployed to the Arabian Gulf on the frigate HMNZS Wellington. Again, this change was achieved despite resistance and those responsible received a lot of flak for instigating this change. A participant who was involved in affecting this change noted that he could walk into a Returned and Services Association (RSA) club and be roundly abused by everyone in the club about what he was doing allowing women to go to sea. He said:

They were red neck attitudes; it didn't have any basis in morality or common sense. (P5)

A key finding here is that while positional power is important, it is not enough by itself to instigate change. Change requires that leaders with such power also demonstrate the energy and commitment to the change they seek to make.

One participant stated that when he moved into a higher-ranking role, he inherited six years of nothing happening from his predecessors, so he had a bit of catching up to do. Many of the initial changes he made were designed to overcome inequities. Elaborating on this, the participant stated:

in the early to mid-90s, the Navy was going through some fairly difficult times over sexual harassment and the things P5 did were designed to overcome this stigma.

He also introduced a policy on sexual harassment, one strike and you're out (of the Navy, that is). He expands on this change, saying that,

when you instigate change, they are subtle signals that things must change. Some of the changes you instigate as a leader can appear to be negative, but they are signals for positive change. There's always a negative reaction to them because the people who have used those arrangements shall we say for their own benefit, are now challenged. (P5)

In 1997 the position of Warrant Officer of the Navy (WON) was established explicitly for that individual to gain and provide feedback from the Senior and Junior Ratings to the Chief of Navy on any issues of importance at the time (P5). It was just as valuable as sending out a questionnaire to every ship. Because of the chain of command within the Navy, an issue at the lower ranks was likely to reach the Admiral in a way that was different to the original issue. The intent of this WON role was to provide unbiased communication directly to the Admiral. Another key point of the role was providing feedback to the Senior Officer Command Board. This feedback enabled this board to ascertain how they would go about planning different policies or procedures for the Navy. The WON is selected by the new incoming Chief of Navy and remains in the role for the same duration as his superior.

This role was highlighted because a participant in this research, who was Māori, became the second Warrant Officer of the Navy from 2000-2004. For Māori, it was advantageous, because the Rūnanga was able to gain information and begin planning well in advance to meet anything that was required of it. It was also a way of keeping up with the Navy. This new position also highlighted the possibilities that Māori too can achieve roles of this status within the Navy. As Scoppio (2007) highlighted, there were many Māori at the lower ranks. Although this role is in the non-Commissioned Officer status, it is the pinnacle role to attain in this rank level. What this suggests for Māori that if you are unable to be a Commissioned Officer, there were opportunities at the non-Commissioned Officer level to strive for.

Around the same time, the Navy adopted the Baldrige Management Framework ("Baldrige") which later became known as the Naval Excellence Programme (NEX). The key reasons for introducing the programme, according to P5, were:

- (i) It provided a way of trying to unite people behind a common purpose and a goal that was visible.
- (ii) It provided evidence to present to politicians on how well the Navy was performing, to get more money. His counterparts were having the same issues.
- (iii) It was a programme that an organisation cannot sustain for a long time. However, it was believed to be right for its time (P5).

P1, who was Captain Fleet Support at the time when Baldrige was introduced, saw that no other Captains on the base were stepping up to lead this project and decided to get together key decision makers in the Naval Base. One of those key decision makers was P7, who eventually led and managed NEX in addition to being newly promoted into the role of head of Navy Command Land and Facilities. This highlight, firstly, the beginnings of P1's determination and energy in driving change and, secondly, demonstrates P7's role as leading the management of NEX in a supporting role in driving change.

Baldrige was felt to have made a significant change by bringing the behaviours more in line with the Navy values that the Navy had not articulated very well. It also brought outside management thinking into the Navy. For those who undertook the programme within the Navy, it did provide them with different thinking regarding management principles, especially those in middle management. Many of the Rūnanga members were in middle management roles; they completed this training and applied these management principles to the development of a bicultural and cultural policy for the Navy (P1). He elaborated further:

much of the work that the Navy did and developed through NEX was adopted by the Defence Force and branded as Defence Force, so there was no attribution back to the Navy. (P1)

Participant Seven stated that the Baldrige programme died when that Captain left the Navy in 2009. They argued that the succeeding Admirals did not want a bar of it, again showing that change required a combination of positional power and a personal commitment to the change. Others saw the demise of the NEX as a natural process, arguing that it might have been right for its time, but that it was a programme that an organisation could not sustain for a long time (P6).

Support for the comments above about the NZDF adopting the Navy's work from NEX comes from P3. He outlined that the Navy always took the lead in developing things Māori. For example, the Navy (through the Rūnanga) developed both a bicultural and cultural policy which neither of the other services had. They took copies of Navy policies and adopted these to suit their specific service. The Navy still contributes to the cultural development of the Defence Force. Many Rūnanga members who developed these policies were Māori Senior Ratings (middle managers), which reflects their learnings from the NEX programme.

P5 also introduced the "Change of Command" ceremonies. This is a formal ceremony where the current Commanding Officer of a ship departs and is replaced with a new Commanding Officer. A symbol of authority is exchanged between the two Commanding Officers which signifies that the change of command has been completed. The symbol is normally a Māori taonga or weapon.

These ideas came from the United States, the Warrant Officer of the Navy and now this Command ceremony. Now all the ships have a Command symbol which tends to be something Māori. (P1)

The two changes introduced by P5 and described above did indeed come from his experience whilst being attached to the US Navy.

P1 was instrumental in driving many things Māori within the Navy. In fact, P1 had similar traits to P5, such as the commitment, intelligence and the energy to not only instigate change but to ensure that it was completed, including the Navy Marae project and all aspects associated with the building of the Marae. Other aspects of Māori practices that we see in current ceremonial activities were also driven by P1: "So, I would say he was an influential player" (P3).

In hindsight, P1 outlined that it would have been nice to have had a higher profile Māori leadership involved with this change relating to Māori cultural integration: "I think it was seen largely as a Māori-led activity." However, P7 saw it differently but reinforces the importance of Māori leadership. When P7 was asked about the best outcome in getting the Marae completed, he stated that "being totally led by Māori was the best outcome". However, the circumstances did not allow that to be possible. This implies that it was not led by Māori, because there was not many Māori, if any, at senior Commissioned Officer level, let alone at Captain level, in the Navy at the time. It was

led by those who had the institutional power (P1, P5 and P6) to instigate change but was supported by those who had the cultural knowledge and other expertise (P2, P3, P4 and P7).

P1 recalled the Navy had never had a Māori Admiral. In comparison he recalls the Army having had at least three Chiefs of Army who were Māori. He then highlighted that the most senior Māori in the Navy (at the time of the interview) was a Captain who was also an engineer and a female. He continues by noting that it was challenging the stereotypes regarding the warrior ethos that is associated with military organisations and that this was changing. He further outlines that there were more Māori joining the Army as opposed to the Navy and Air Force. It should be noted that the female Captain referred to by P1 was promoted to Captain after 2010. What is more important to note is the shifting of this warrior ethos within a military organisation relating to diversity.

Another change that P1 instigated in 2002 was the official role of the Māori Cultural Advisor (MCA). This came about because the Rūnanga needed to provide support to Command due to their exposure to high profile events such as Waitangi celebrations in the Bay of Islands, Northland, as well as other events that had Māori protocols such as VIPs visiting the Marae.

We had to ensure that Command had the relevant levels of speakers or advisors competent in both the language and tikanga. (P3)

Prior to this position being created, whichever Māori was available to support Command at Māori-specific events would attend, and normally this person was drawn from a select few Māori personnel. An outcome of establishing this role is the NZ Army, Air Force and eventually the NZDF instigated a similar role into their organisation.

Although two Commissioned Officer participants did not have institutional powers, they did lead changes in supportive roles. For example, one led the process to establishing the Bicultural Working Party, the Rūnanga and the initial transfer of buildings to the Marae site. The other took over the leadership and management of NEX and construction of the Marae in collaboration with the Marae Project Manager. Their structural engineering backgrounds allowed them to have a key role in the development of the Marae. One also provided advice on Māori culture to Command as the

Chairperson of the Rūnanga. This is what P7 had to say when a senior leader became Captain Fleet Support at the time:

If I didn't have them in my corner, I couldn't have done what I did, no matter how passionate I was. I was still too junior at that point to really make that sort of difference. (P7)

This close relationship between the leader and P7 continued when the leader became Chief of Navy. This is another indication of a situation in which those without institutional powers could contribute to instigating change. P7 was a Commander at the time and it reinforces the level at which institutional powers were recognised. In early 2000, P7 became the Commanding Officer (CO) of the Naval Base, Philomel. He was also Chairperson of the Rūnanga. He began to encounter difficulties as Chairperson of the Rūnanga and this is explained further in the next section.

The two Senior Ratings were a key communication link between those who had the institutional power and other Senior and Junior Ratings. It was a way of keeping those below informed of developments regarding the Marae and Māori culture. One of the Senior Ratings left the Navy in 1993 after 20 years' service and re-joined the Navy in 1997 to become the Marae Project Manager. The other Senior Rating left the Navy, as a Warrant Officer, in 2004 and returned to the Navy in 2013 as a Senior Commissioned Officer, Lieutenant Commander.

In the early to mid-1990s the Navy hierarchy became aware that Māoridom would impact the Navy, yet the NZDF did not know what form that impact would take. The Chairperson of the Rūnanga approached P2 (a civilian at the time) about running some Māori Awareness Courses for Divisional Officers. P2 confirmed this:

I was approached by them in 1994, if I could deliver Māori Cultural Awareness courses for Senior, Divisional and Warrant Officers, which I agreed to. (P2)

The above demonstrates that an individual did not have to have institutional power to instigate change. P1 touched on these courses as a result of his Māori experience in the late 1970s as a Divisional Officer. He outlines how he was exposed to elements of Māori culture that he had not seen or done and concluded that it was a very formative experience. On his return, he wrote a letter suggesting that Divisional Officers' courses should include a Māori Awareness module.

When P3 was a Warrant Officer he became the Chairperson of the Rūnanga in 1997. His skills and knowledge of Māoritanga were a significant contribution to all aspects of Māori culture within the Navy. It was coincidental as well because P2 re-joined the Navy in the same year that P3 became Chairperson of the Rūnanga. They became a formidable team in relation to Māori culture. Their roles within the Rūnanga and the Marae are explained further in the next section.

P6 continued:

Going through that process (Māori culture) was a bit of a minefield and you had to be careful where you trod. You've got to pick the right people to do the right job. All I know is that when I needed advice, I got pretty good advice from the likes of yourself, P2, P3 and P4 in steering me on a few things. (P6)

He then highlighted an interesting point relating to his agreeance that Warrant Officers did have power but only within the Navy.

P7 came into the Marae project when P4 retired from the Navy in 1997. He also did a lot of work with P1. They were both involved with the Marae and they were also working together on NEX. He joined the Navy in 1985 and he felt he was in the Navy but not of the Navy. He explained how, if a person was determined enough, they could effect change:

I always felt that the Navy was a place where change was simple even though it was institutional. ... I think the Navy being open to change is a bit of an exaggeration. We had this culture in the Navy, if you wanted to make change and you were determined, you could make change. (P7)

These were interesting points that P7 highlighted because he was reaffirming that the Navy was possibly open to change, that if a person was determined enough, they could affect change even though the Navy was institutional. Also, his observations reinforce the point that those who did not have institutional powers could also effect change without power.

### Unique institutional supporters of change

This section looks at the unique institutional structures that were established for the purposes of integrating Māori knowledge and practices. These structures were unique



because no other military organisations have such structures. The section also looks at how these unique Māori entities contributed to instigating change despite holding no formal authority.

### *The Rūnanga*

Events relating to Māori, such as protests and te Tiriti o Waitangi issues within the wider communities of New Zealand, did impact on the Navy. Because of this, and after some discussions between P5 and P4, P5 authorised the establishment of the following: The Bicultural Working Party in 1991 which eventually became the Rūnanga in 1992 and the Marae in 1993. The term “Rūnanga” is synonymous with Māori organisations. They are a governing body that administers the affairs of an iwi. In a similar way, the Navy Rūnanga became a key factor to providing advice on Māori knowledge, kawa and tikanga (protocols and practices) to the Command.

P4 became the first Chairperson for the Rūnanga.

I’m not sure whether P5 realised this, when he selected P4, but having a Māori, most people wouldn’t of thought P4 was Māori and being a Commissioned Officer made a huge difference. (P6)

This point raised by P6 about P4 being Māori and a Commissioned Officer is interesting, because the Navy at the time did not have many Māori Commissioned Officers at senior level, i.e. Lieutenant Commander and above.

The Māori entities that were created were important to the organisation because it enabled the Command to get sound information relating to Māori knowledge and practices. From a Rūnanga perspective it enabled them to be authentic in their approach to aspects of Māori culture and it provided an opportunity to contribute and control how Māori culture would look within the Navy. The role of the Bicultural Working Party was to initially establish how both the military (Navy) culture and Māori culture could work in unison without the other dominating. When the working party was established, P4 had an interesting approach to getting members to join the committee. He outlined that he was possibly the only Māori Commissioned Officer in the Navy at the time and took a real interest in Māori activities.

My methodology for getting support for the Bicultural Working Party was not to go out there and actively recruit but to publicise and let people be aware of the

opportunity for change with the hope they were passionate about it and to join. This is how I got people to join the working party. (P4)

Although he was given the authority to establish this group, it was a very interesting way to attract members to such a committee. Personnel would not have known whether this was a legitimate entity because it was unusual for a military organisation. P4 did attract some good members to join and most were at the Senior Rating level. This was probably because it was much easier for Senior Ratings to attend such meetings and, secondly, at the time of the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the revitalisation of te reo Māori was attracting many Māori within the Navy to rekindle and learn their language.

What the Bicultural Working Party eventually suggested was where Māori culture could be used more effectively was through the ceremonial practices of the Navy. An example of this is at the Waitangi celebrations, in the Bay of Islands in Te Tai Tokerau (Northland region), which are held annually. The Navy has an official role in these celebrations. The first part of the Waitangi celebrations is the pōwhiri where the Navy is welcomed onto the Marae, which is the Māori component. The official part of the Navy is the ceremonial guard marching onto the grounds to raise the New Zealand ensign onto the flagpole. This ceremonial guard is led out into the grounds of Waitangi by Māori warriors with taiaha (Māori spears) on the periphery of the guard. It highlights the mix of both Māori and military cultures. It is quite a spectacle to watch and it is a highlight of the day, especially as it is held at sunset (P3). This bicultural practice began in 1994 when the Rūnanga proposal was approved and it now occurs in every aspect of Navy ceremonial practice.

When the Rūnanga was established, their first task was to create a Māori name for the Navy as it did not have one. P5 contributed to the development of the Navy name. He recalled that Sir Apiranga Ngata, in 1938, when gifting the meeting house which currently resides at the Waitangi grounds, referred to the Navy as te Taua Moana (the warriors of the sea). After some discussions, the Rūnanga agreed and proposed the following Māori name for the Navy: Te Taua Moana o Aotearoa, Royal New Zealand Navy. This name became official in 1993. As P3 stated, it had whakapapa (genealogy) or historical authenticity. This name also eventually met the Government's objective of all its agencies having a Māori subtitles. This was P5's response when asked if he got permission to use this name from higher authority.

I didn't go along to Chief of Defence Force and say this is what I want to do or tell the Minister, I just did it. We didn't have a name and why didn't we have a name? (P5)

At some time in 1993, P4 had some old buildings moved from another Navy site onto a section of Ngataranga Bay, Devonport, with the intention that they become the Marae buildings. However, due to a lack of support and funding, these buildings remained dormant for three or four years. This is a key moment for the Marae development because tools and resources were absent.

A key point that P4 consistently raised with his superiors, when making submissions as Chairman of the Rūnanga, was the percentage of Māori in the Navy at the time:

I would state that it shouldn't be the 30% Māori representation in the Navy pushing this for you to do something. (P4)

This constant reminder of this percentage of Māori is important especially if you want to influence or change mainstream culture within an organisation, a group requires to attain a critical mass.

P3 had been a member of the Rūnanga for some time so when P4 retired from the Navy in 1997, P3 became the Chairperson. He acknowledged the work that his predecessor had done but wanted to shift the momentum of the Rūnanga to another level. P3 began to establish subcommittees to focus on some key areas. One looked at events and the design and development of a cultural component that would fit with the specific events within the Navy. Education was another subcommittee looking at how Māori education fitted into the Naval system.

What we needed was to ensure that the Māori component of whatever changes we developed had to be sustained within the Navy. One of those developments was a Māori Awareness programme for Senior Officers to enrich their understanding of Māori culture, another was to develop a Māori introduction course for new recruits. Another committee was establishing a marae and finally a ceremonial portfolio. (P3)

The Rūnanga would have robust discussions and from this they would develop recommendations which all members were required to agree to before submission. They would be passed to P1 as CFS for approval. Once approved, all the associated Naval

doctrine were revised and updated. This demonstrates again how those without institutional powers were able to make change.

From the outset of the Rūnanga being established, the objective of its members was always to find someone to manage the Marae portfolio. However, a key issue for the Rūnanga was that there were not many current sailors who could undertake this role due to their current roles, and many did not have the skills or experience to undertake this role. This was a response by P6 relating to the decision of P5 in establishing the Marae:

People would not have picked P5 necessarily to get the Marae project moving. They would have sensed P5 to be a ‘You’ll do what I say’ person, like previous Commodores. He was difficult at times, but he let things happen. (P6)

However, P4 held a different view of P5, observing that he could be easily reached in relation to information on Māori culture and the submissions he drafted. Another key point highlighted by P5 was the selection of a specific individual for certain projects. He expanded on this:

By selecting a specific individual to lead a certain project you are challenging and channelling a change that you know is going to achieve a positive result. If you know and understand the person that has similar thinking to you, then the outcome is going to be the same. This is another key characteristic of leadership. (P5)

The same approach was made when selecting the Marae Project Manager. From the outset, the Rūnanga was aware that no one within the Navy was available or had the skill set to undertake this project. The Chairperson of the Rūnanga approached P2, who was the Operations Manager at Awataha Marae, a local marae that resides in Northcote, on the North Shore of Auckland. He made a proposal to P2 to consider returning to the Navy to take up the Marae Manager role, which he accepted. After a discussion with P6 (Captain Fleet Personnel Training), P2 re-joined the Navy to take up the role of Marae Project Manager in September 1997. This was P2’s view:

I came recommended from certain people within the Navy. It was certainly viewed as an exciting challenge to establish the Marae. (P2)

What made the above situation unique was that we had a key institutional actor (P6) in a position of power who listened to the Rūnanga’s advice (support actors) and approved

our request to proceed with getting P2 back into the Navy. This again reinforces how those without institutional power, the Rūnanga, were able to convince the hierarchy to agree to a proposal which was logical and culturally sound. These relationships between the people in the upper levels of the hierarchy and those in support roles were built on trust: trust that was developed over years of working together in other areas of the Navy whether they were on ships or shore establishments. These relationships got stronger as everyone attained higher ranks. Therefore, it appears that trust comes with sound relationships and understanding over a long period of time. This was evident with the relationship between P3 and P6. When P6 became Chief of Navy, P3 became his Warrant Officer of the Navy (WON).

P6, as Commanding Officer of Philomel and Chairman of the Rūnanga in 2004, explained that “although the Rūnanga had passionate members, it was not working very well.” The Rūnanga began to lose its impetus after the opening of the Marae in 2000 and the lack of senior personnel on the committee, indicating that Navy Senior Leadership was necessary to support the Rūnanga and the whole concept of cultural integration.

### **Establishing the Marae**

The establishment of a Marae for the Navy was discussed by the Bicultural Working Party and this discussion continued when it became the Rūnanga. Having a Marae was a very important goal for Māori. It would provide visual recognition of Māori culture within the Navy; a space where Māori could practice the authenticity of their culture, and a place where every aspect of Māoritanga could be observed at tangihanga (funerals). Although funerals may sound negative in some ways, just observing the karanga (the calling by women), whaikōrero (oratory), different types of waiata (songs), and listening to whakapapa (genealogy) is very powerful. When VIPs were hosted, they could be welcomed in an authentic Māori way at a venue that connects with the culture of New Zealand and the Navy. More importantly, a Marae would be the fulfilment of a dream for all those past sailors who always wanted to have a marae established at the Naval Base.

These were P5’s thoughts when he authorised the establishment of the Marae:

Moving Māori issues forward was not my motivation for change but based on fairness. I believe it was fair that Māori should have a marae even though I had no interest in the Marae. (P5)

It seems, however, that the Navy was not prepared for the new Marae Project Manager. P2 explained:

I was the only person for the Marae Project. I had a computer, small office and two dilapidated buildings which were to become the Marae. (P2)

In contrast, P2 outlines another project (the construction of a new small boats wharf) that started around the same time he took up his role. In the wharf project, a lieutenant led a team of 10 personnel. They were well equipped and funded and had a large support mechanism. P2 was quite disappointed and disheartened. Others were disappointed too as outlined by P1:

I had a strong sense of fairness. ... Seeing P2 (Marae Manager) walking around the Naval Base wondering how he was going to build the Marae was not fair. ... I was disappointed that my predecessors as Captain Fleet Support had done nothing. ... the organisation had it within its ability to do something. That was a big driver for me. (P1)

This was another example where people (in this case the previous CFSs) having the institutional power is not enough to effect change unless they are determined, energetic and able to get support actors onboard with the knowledge and expertise. The Navy instigated the establishment of the Marae. However, it seems these previous Senior Officers did nothing to support the new Marae Manager. P1 notes that:

It's not as though a white person could build a marae. What was necessary for success is people who understood the culture and those who could free up the money to make it happen. P2 and P3 (two Senior Ratings) were very important support actors.

As mentioned earlier, the Marae project stalled from 1993 to 1997. P4 provides two perspectives as to why the buildings remained dormant before he left the Navy. The first was that they lacked support from Command due to other priorities within the Navy. The second was the buildings had not been blessed when they were moved on site. This latter point is interesting because, from a Māori and tikanga perspective, this process of

the blessing is a necessary tikanga (practice). P4 explained that, once the blessing was completed, they began to receive funding and were able to complete the landscaping and fencing around the Marae. For many Māori, the ritual of blessing of a new building is an important tikanga practice. It is a Māori process whereby incantations and karakia (prayers) are conducted by kaumatua to cleanse the building of any unwanted spiritual elements that may still exist within the house. P4 recalled:

An Army Padre returning to undertake the process of the blessing, Once, this was completed they got funding to complete the landscaping and the fences.  
(P4)

All participants agreed that P1 led the Marae project. He moved it from a slow-moving process to getting the project completed. It was about taking control of the project and saying, “this must proceed”. Working bees began and the people involved were a large cross section of people and they were not all Navy. They were not just Māori; they were people who had never stood on a marae. This was the genesis of it and not accepting ‘no’: “P1 and P7 were instrumental in getting the Marae moving” (P3).

P7 was also involved with many other projects within the Naval base such as, building the new chapel and gymnasium and the new Damage and Fire Fighting School, but his most proud achievement was the Marae.

Prior to getting the Marae established, several Rūnanga members went on a visit to the Army Training Group (ATG) in Waiouru. Waiouru is a little settlement in the middle of the North Island. It is also the location of a training camp for the Army and is where their Marae is located. The purpose of the Rūnanga members going to Waiouru was to ascertain how they went about establishing their Marae.

At the early stages and prior to establishing our Marae, I was with the Army and looking at how they established their Marae – Te Rongomaraeroa o Nga Hau e Wha. (P3)

During those discussions they also talked about women speaking on the Marae. The right for women to speak on the Marae has always been a contentious point within the public arena and more so with non-Māori women, especially those who hold high status roles within their organisations. The Navy and the Defence Force was not immune to this controversy. When the Rūnanga began to develop policies for the Marae, one of the

key issues to emerge was the speaking rights of women on marae. P7 said once the draft policy was out, some women in the Navy kicked up a fuss. This is what P3 as Chair of the Rūnanga outlined:

The Army allowed their women to speak on the Marae and doing a lot of things that mainstream Māori wouldn't do. We have adapted to adhere to tikanga Māori and as close as possible to mainstream Māori. (P3)

A major issue that occurred and contributed to the Marae project being stalled was the lack of resources and funding to complete the Marae. P1 elaborated how he was able to get funding based on his experience working in Resources Branch, Wellington. He wrote letters to both the Chief of the Navy and Chief of Defence Force and was able to justify to them why the funding was needed and its importance to the organisation. He got both to approve the funding he requested to complete the Marae project.

In relation to the Marae project, there is no doubt that P1 led the Marae project until its completion. He displayed determination, had energy and so did P7. They had similar characteristics as they were really task oriented and focused. It is probably for these reasons why they were compatible when working together on the Marae project. P7 did admit that he had wished that he was more culturally aware and that the best outcome for this project was for it to be totally Māori led.

Because the interviews with the participants occurred 17 years after the opening of the Marae in 2000, many of the participants involved with recognising Māori culture reflected on what the Marae still means today. This summed up by P3:

It's heart-warming when Commanders, Captains and Admirals are standing on the paepae (oratory bench) and delivering their whaikōrero in te reo Māori. What is more interesting, and pleasing, is that they are comfortable to stand on another marae to do the same. How many CEO of companies could do this? (P3)

Admirals of today appear to be much more comfortable with speaking Māori.

Our Marae is recognised as being amazing in New Zealand because it is talked about by people at the highest level. (P6)

Finally, this closing comment by P2 on the Marae:



It means a lot to many sailors. The greatness with the Marae, to me, those barriers (to diversity) are gone. (P2)

## Conclusions

The aim of this chapter was to ascertain who were the institutional actors who had the institutional powers to effect change and how those with lesser power could also effect change. What roles did they have to instigate change and how did they go about their purposive work to achieve change?

The first key point to emerge from the findings was that the Navy shifted from being an organisation with a closed culture to an organisation that became open to change. There were some critical views on whether the Navy was an organisation that was already open to change pre-1990. These changes began to eventuate through the emergence of home-grown leaders attaining roles in higher command and the organisation becoming less autocratic and more consultative in seeking better outcomes.

Although leadership was essential to instigating change, the findings suggest that leadership at the top of the hierarchy, who held positions of institutional power, was essential. These actors also needed to have determination and energy as well as the support of people with the cultural knowledge which was essential for bicultural initiatives to be instigated. All these changes were demonstrated within an institution with hierarchical structures such as the Navy, and these findings provide insights on organisational change that the literature was previously lacking.

## Chapter 5

### Discussion and Conclusions

*Ma te maatatau ka ora, through knowledge comes wellbeing*

#### Introduction

The topic of this research was “The integration of Māori cultural knowledge and practices into the Royal New Zealand Navy”. The research was guided by the following questions: to identifying *who* the institutional entrepreneurs were and what roles and ranks they had when instigating change and transforming an institution such as the Navy. The discussion in this chapter also discusses *how* they went about their institutional purposive work and how they gained support from those with less power. Also, the discussion considers how interested actors with less power gained support from those who held the necessary power to enact the desired changes. Finally, the chapter discusses *how* they went about recognising Māori culture through their purposive work. These various aspects of the chapter explain how a range of actors through their purposive work in the Royal New Zealand Navy managed to enact some progressive changes in a hierarchical institution.

The discussion has three main sections, starting with external factors creating pressure for change, followed by internal factors driving change up to 1990 and thirdly the internal factors driving change post-1990. The second and third main sections have subheadings to guide the reader through key topic areas that not only emerged from the findings but also explain how the literature connects with and supports the changes that took place. The chapter ends with a summary of the key points in the discussion, and the thesis conclusions.

## The external factors creating pressure for change

Public sector organisations were forced to change by the New Public Management approach which was introduced in New Zealand in 1984. This approach demanded that they adopt private sector practices to transform their organisations to be more flexible, adaptive and innovative (Orchard, 1998; Parker & Bradley, 2000; Valle, 1999). The public sector was troubled with the inconsistency it found in requiring flexibility and innovation to cope with the changing demands of the environment while maintaining a not-for-profit service and accountability to several stakeholders which was necessary to remain stable, and this prevented any room for innovation. Because of these unique characteristics, public sector organisations may not mirror those of the private sector organisations in several areas, such as the relationship between leadership, culture type, organisational climate and effectiveness. Another key factor was the private sector did not have to comply with the government's requirements around "managing diversity".

However, what was important for the public sector was the need to adopt a behaviour of flexibility, adaptability and openness to change (Afsaneh, 1993; Valle, 1999). Making change within any organisation is challenging, and many factors contribute to the successful or unsuccessful implementation of change. The Navy being an institution and being a part of the government, some changes it must make are unavoidable, such as the changes the government instigated before 1990. These pre-1990 changes also had some relevance for the research topic. The following paragraphs explore some of these changes.

Other key legislation of relevance to the Navy was firstly the introduction of "managing Diversity" introduced in 1984 and changes to the Tiriti o Waitangi 1985 which then influenced changes to the State Sector Act 1988. The latter changes seemed to be very cynical or hypocritical moves by the government in relation to their obligation to Māori and The Treaty of Waitangi. On the one hand, they instigated change by recognising the aims and aspirations of Māori and then, on the other hand, they took away those opportunities and made it more difficult to recognise indigenous status as a difference and thereby disadvantaged groups such as Māori. This ambiguity was a challenge not only for the Navy managers but for most government agencies in meeting their obligations to Māori.

Nonetheless, the changes to the State Sector Act 1988 were important because they highlighted the government's obligation to meet the aims and aspirations of Māori. The Navy, as a government agency, did have an obligation to recognise Māori in some way. At the same time, the findings indicated that all the participants except one, were not aware of any law or policy relating to Māori recognition or the aims and aspirations of Māori.

These pre-1990 changes were important, because there was a need for government organisations to change not just in terms of policy, but also in practice. An important objective of this study is to understand how the Navy met this need for change in practice.

### **The internal factors driving change up to 1990**

Before looking at how the Navy met its requirement for Māori in practice, this section will look at institutional settings of the Navy pre-1990. A key point to emerge from the findings related to the rigid institutional settings of the Navy in that period, as in the description: “the Navy is a highly structured organisation. They follow the rules and regulations and individuals had to stick to them.” It is obvious that this Māori participant understood the institutional environment of the Navy. This point is consistent with the literature relating to institutions. The Navy, being a government agency, is an example of a bureaucratic organisation with hierarchical structures, stringent rules, clear boundaries, responsibility and authority (Alvinus, 2010a).

Typically, such institutions are defined as “rules, norms and beliefs that describe reality for the organisation, explaining what is and is not, what can be acted upon and what cannot” (Hoffman, 1999, p. 351). This constraining of behaviour within institutions as described by Hoffman (1999) is explained by Scott (1995) as being based on three pillars: the regulative – which guides action through coercion and threat of formal sanction; the normative – which guides action through norms of acceptability, morality and ethics; and finally the cognitive – which guides action through the very categories and frames by which actors know and interpret their world. A finding that supports this theory was the hierarchy being outlined by a participant as autocratic. He was told by many people both inside and outside of the Navy “that the Navy was autocratic, and you did what those above you told you”. This meant that if you did not do what you were

told, it could result in a formal sanction of insubordination or disobeying a lawful command.

Scoppio (2007) also supports this description of the institutional setting of the Navy. She states that, historically, military organisations had hierarchical structures, a chain of command and procedures that had linear planning and operating procedures. They had a closed culture, were less open to change than other organisations and had a view of diversity as a problem to be solved or legislated for. This suggests that only the leadership of the Navy could instigate change and the Navy having a closed organisational culture implies that it was less open to recognising Māori culture.

Another example of constraining behaviour, specifically the behaviour of Māori, was given by Hohaia (2015), who emphasised that Māori people have contributed significantly to the NZDF. However, it was at the cost of sacrificing their indigenous identity, and it was a common expectation that Māori personnel would conform to the dominant western world view. This view was also supported by Awatere (1983) in her book *Māori Sovereignty*, where she stated that colonisation neglected our indigenous identity.

The Navy's environment of a closed culture before the 1990s made it difficult to recognise diversity in the first instance, but more so for Māori culture, especially when we look back at history and the experiences that Māori had endured with colonisation. In an organisation with a closed culture where top leadership held decision-making authority, how was it possible for Māori cultural practices and knowledge to be recognised within the Navy?

What added to this already strict environment of the New Zealand Navy was the influence of the British Royal Navy. Two participants who joined the Navy in the early 1970s experienced its colonial influence of domination, racism and the absence of any attempt to recognise Māori. This made it more challenging to formally integrate Māori culture within the Navy. At the same time, it is important to note that not all participants experienced racism. As one participant stated, "I cannot understand racism, because I have never been subjected to or experienced it".

Within this continued strict environment of the Navy and a closed culture with hierarchical structures, and stringent rules, exacerbated by the presence of the British Navy, it didn't seem likely that any change of any form was going to eventuate. The

Navy, therefore, had to have horizontal structures and flexible planning and operating processes before it could attain an open culture

Writing in the 1980s, Orange (1987) outlined that the Crown (and thus, in this context, the Navy) was neglecting its obligations in meeting its commitments as promised in Te Tiriti o Waitangi to allow Māori their self-determination in maintaining and sustaining their culture and their cultural identity. Within this unpromising institutional environment, the findings explore ways in which Māori maintained their culture and identity. One keyway was through the informal institution of Māori “concert parties” on ships. While the original concert parties would practice in their own time during the deployment in preparation for these commitments and were often seen as tokenism, for Māori in the Navy this was a way of maintaining their culture. Although it may have seemed like tokenism at times, their culture and identity were important to Māori.

Although Māori were able to maintain some form of their culture and identity through concert parties in the late 1980s, to ensure Māori cultural authenticity was maintained, a grassroots movement of Māori sailors who were schooled through Kōhanga Reo and Kura Kaupapa Māori (Māori medium schools), with the support of senior Māori naval personnel, advocated for concert parties to be reframed as Māori cultural groups. They believed it was about the culture and not just singing a few songs. This reframing of the kapa haka groups was vital because it changed the mindset of current serving Māori in the Navy in the sense of not accepting it as tokenism. It also reinforced, for Māori, how important their culture was to them, and possibly for the Navy too, if they wanted it to be recognised. Māori sailors also needed to ensure that the culture became more authentic and meaningful. Māori sailors continued to practice in their own time and fundraised for the necessary resources for their performances.

Māori culture plays an ever-growing role in New Zealand, with cultural identity playing a highly significant role for Māori in the workplace (Durie, 2003). How Māori feel about the acceptance of their cultural beliefs in their workplaces could influence their gratification with their careers (Haar & Brougham, 2011). For employment to provide self-determination and self-esteem for indigenous peoples, it had to be meaningful. Some New Zealand organisations have been going through the process of modifying existing practices to include Māori values (Durie, 2003). Therefore, being in workplaces that promote collectivism (such as teamwork), a crucial characteristic of the Navy, may be beneficial to Māori (Brougham & Haar, 2013).

Certainly, the benefits that Māori cultural groups provided were obvious to several participants who had experienced the Māori cultural groups whilst serving on a ship. Ships' cultural groups should be acknowledged and the influence they provided for the ship and their country. The time utilised to undertake these performances were done in their own time which was not always evident to everyone. Māori cultural groups were helpful to the Navy in unexpected ways, as demonstrated in another finding. One important instance in the findings described how the Commanding Officer (CO) of HMZS Waikato in 1990 utilised the ship's Māori cultural group as part of his efforts to arrange peace talks with the Bougainville Revolutionary Army, after previous attempts by other groups and other nations had failed to get the Bougainville Revolutionary Army to engage in these talks.

The CO's strategy was based on his reasoning that "by exposing the inwards diversity [you can] leverage off diversity to achieve an outcome that may not have been able to be achieved as effectively without diversity. The Māori part of the Navy was very important". This CO could be described as an institutional entrepreneur. Perkmann and Spicer (2007) outlined that institutional entrepreneurs are skilled actors who utilise their existing cultural and linguistic knowledge to describe and theorise change in ways that give other social groups reasons to cooperate (Colomy, 1998; Fligstein, 2001; Greenwood, Suddaby & Hinings, 2002; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). The CO's social skills were reinforced by another participant, "He was more aware of Māori issues and knowledge. I think intelligence wise, he was very quick on the uptake, to become immersed in activities".

This Bougainville experience demonstrates the versatile ways in which Māori culture, and indeed indigenous cultures more generally, can contribute to military operations in ways that were not previously possible. This is another positive outcome in recognising how diversity can be utilised. In this case, the CO was quick to sum up the situation and apply a resource that was available to him that gained a positive outcome for both the Navy and New Zealand. He also saw the value of Māori culture. It was one of many experiences with Māori this CO gained during his time in the Navy. He would go on to demonstrate his personal determination and energy in other aspects of this research relating to changes for Māori.

## Changes instituted by home-grown leaders

Although the British Royal Navy presence was still evident in the New Zealand Navy until the mid-1990s, the environment of the Navy needed to change if the recognition of Māori cultural practices and knowledge was to eventuate. Another factor critical to positive change was referred to as “home-grown leaders” and mentioned by both Senior Rating participants. They highlighted the contribution made by the ascendancy of leaders who were born in New Zealand and who came through the system before attaining the higher levels of Command,<sup>6</sup> which meant they also understood the New Zealand environment. This is another important factor because it seems that New Zealand leadership were open to change, as was demonstrated by a home-grown leader after he returned from training in the United Kingdom.

Although this may have seemed a minor change, it made a big difference to the morale of the personnel, and it signalled a move away from the Royal Navy domination. It also showed that the opportunities for change existed, if we wanted to become a New Zealand-looking Navy and highlighted that these home-grown leaders were not afraid to make change even in the presence of British Navy leaders. An increasingly “home-grown leadership” was also important in that the new leaders had a much better understanding of the New Zealand environment and Māori culture.

## Critical mass theory and institutional transformation in the Navy

A comment that a participant used quite often when making submissions or proposals as the Chairperson of the Rūnanga was that “it should not be the 30% Māori representation in the Navy pushing this for you to do something”. In making this argument, the participant was referring to critical mass theory, where the nature of group interactions and the possibilities for change depend upon the size within the larger group of those pressing for change. For a group to transform the institutional culture, critical mass is necessary. If a group exists as a distinct minority within a dominant society group such as non-Māori in New Zealand then the people of this group will assimilate to their environment and conform with the governing rules of that environment, as outlined earlier with reference to the work of Hohaia (2015). However, when a group gets to a specific size relative to the broader group, critical mass theory asserts that a qualitative

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<sup>6</sup> Command were principal Senior Officers who were able to make critical decisions. They were generally of the rank Captain and above. See <http://www.navy.mil.nz/np/rank-structure/default.htm>



change occurs within a group's exchanges, the minority will begin to declare themselves and thus alter the culture, norms and values of the institution.

Having 30% of the workforce being Māori was possibly another contributing factor in the Navy recognising Māori culture. For the Navy, this was important because not only did Māori have the numbers within the Navy at the time, Māori were also contributing to the organisation, not only in their specialised work but in many other ways such as those described in the instances above. A key point to the critical mass theory is that it would have been difficult for Māori to assert themselves within an institution such as the Navy. The results could have severe consequences such as formal sanctions.

Adding to this dilemma was the lack of Māori senior Commissioned Officers who may have been able to drive change for Māori. This was highlighted within the findings. One participant, reflecting on changes relating to Māori recognition and Māori leadership, stated that "being totally led by Māori was the best outcome". This, however, was not the case. The Navy was led by non-Māori. However, that is why this research is important for other organisations, as Māori required non-Māori who were in leadership roles to assist them in achieving their aims and aspirations. As one participant highlighted "you needed people with the funding, and you need those that had the cultural knowledge" (P1).

A key point favouring Māori who wanted to see greater recognition of Māori culture and knowledge was the fact that many Māori sailors adapted easily to the culture and practices of the Navy because the environment was very similar to that of most Māori who had a connection to their personal marae. As noted in the findings, the structure of the Navy offered a sense of collectivist belonging and well-being. One participant even likened the Navy to the structure of Māori society, with analogues of the iwi, hapū, and whānau available within the shared purpose of the Navy.

#### The pre-1990 development of a more flexible hierarchy in the Navy

Another factor to emerge from the findings was the access to Command possessed by certain individual actors, who were Warrant Officers. While they did not have decision-making power, their positions gave them access to those with the institutional powers in higher levels of Command. Greenwood, et al. (2002) and Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) suggested that context is likely to have a significant impact on the extensive strategies being developed and created by institutional entrepreneurs. Studies have

suggested that institutional entrepreneurs working in established environments develop strategies through discussions that appeases those with the interests and values of those that could assist with the change. They achieve this by creating a collective identity that meets the requirements of the actors who will be participate in instigating the new change (Markowitz, 2007; Rao, Morrill, & Zald, 2000).

The position and autonomy of the Warrant Officer was another sign that hierarchical structures were becoming more flexible enough for consultative meetings to occur. The findings demonstrate that this line of communication was useful by Māori participants. It provided opportunities to discuss some recommendations, proposals or issues relating to Māori culture and the possibilities of instigating change. This shows how constructive working relationships and a consultative approach can lead to good outcomes. With home-grown leaders coming into key roles it appeared that the hierarchy was becoming more consultative and it indicated that the organisational culture of the Navy was shifting away from being autocratic towards becoming more open.

Many of the pre-1990 changes described above were necessary for the Navy to begin transforming itself and for formally recognising Māori culture within the Navy. These events also highlight key aspects of how the Navy was also becoming open to change. Māori within the Navy were keen to ensure that Māori authenticity remained intact in order to be formally recognised. The “home-grown” leaders also made a difference, as they were not afraid to make changes and they allowed those that were of lower rank access for conversations to discuss matters of interest. These changes suggest the structures were becoming horizontal rather than having the hierarchical pyramid-shaped structure, and this encouraged flexible planning and operating processes. These are essential elements required for an organisation to have an open culture.

Despite the Navy being a highly regulated organisation, possibilities of change began to emerge pre-1990. Firstly, the kapa haka groups and how they trained in their own time demonstrated commitments to supporting not only their ship, but international events representing New Zealand. Māori culture was flexible as well, because it was not used only as entertainment – it demonstrated how it could be utilised as a way of meeting diversity at an international level. Therefore, the versatility and flexibility of Māori culture became a very important asset to the Navy. The emergence of “home-grown”

leaders was especially important in this regard because, without these leaders, Māori culture may not have been encouraged. The Navy had become more open to change.

### The internal factors driving change post-1990

With all the changes occurring pre-1990 making the internal environment of the Navy more open to change, we must ask: how did the institutional actors within the Navy who sought greater recognition of Māori culture and practice carry out their purposive work within this changing context?

### Institutional entrepreneurs and divergent change in the Navy

Institutional changes involve highly diverse interests and perspectives and are complex social processes. Such changes occur through “convening” (Dorado, 2005). They require shared action: joint actions by a broad group of actors based on shared interests (Emery & Trist, 1965; Marwell & Oliver, 1993) that are beyond the dimensions of individual actors or even a few entrepreneurs. In such environments, institutional change requires collective institutional entrepreneurship (Mollering, 2007). Institutional entrepreneurship could be displayed by an organisation or groups of organisations (Garud, et al., 2002; Greenwood, et al., 2002), or people or groups of people (Fligstein, 1997; Maguire et al., 2004).

The evolution of the term institutional entrepreneurship came from two theoretical aspects of “institutional work”. Garud et al. (2007) explained that, traditionally, work on institutions was more attentive to continuity without neglecting the importance of change. Although it was challenging to accomplish, institutional entrepreneurship focused on change. The merging of institutional and entrepreneurial forces into a single concept of institutional entrepreneurship offers the extensive potential to understand how and why particular new organising solutions, such as innovative workings or the new manifestations of organisations, emerge and become well established over time.

Although there are many definitions of institutional entrepreneurs within the literature, Battilana’s (2006, p. 645) definition (“actors who have an interest in particular institutional arrangements and [who] provide resources to create new institutions or transform the existing one”) is especially salient for this study. This definition is useful in that it only refers to establishing a new or changing an existing institution and emphasising divergent change as an aspect of the work of institutional entrepreneurs.

(Battilana, et al., 2009) suggest that institutional entrepreneurs are transformation agents, however, not all institutional entrepreneurs are change agents. Institutional entrepreneurs are those that both initiate a divergent change and actively participate in the implementation of these changes. Divergent changes involve disrupting the current context of an institution (Amis, et al., 2004; Battilana, 2006; D'Aunno, et al., 2000; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996).

The topic of this research (the integration of Māori cultural knowledge and practices into the Navy) is an excellent example of this new practice and new organisational form, and Māori culture has become well established over time. The findings confirm that through their purposive work, all participants in this research had the necessary characteristics of institutional entrepreneurs, that is, they were actively involved in making and implementing a divergent change in the norms of the Navy.

In this case, disrupting the norms of the Navy was achieved by integrating the indigenous culture of New Zealand, the Māori culture, and it is this culture that makes the Navy distinct from other key allies such as Australia, Canada, Britain and the US. This latter point was reinforced in the findings when a participant stated: “The New Zealand Navy has a point of difference that many other Navies in the world do not have, which is the cultural aspects of our heritage and where we come from, and that is the Māori culture”. This is a new finding as there is no literature about integrating an indigenous culture into any bureaucratic institution such as the Navy and because no other Navy displays or utilises their indigenous cultures in the same way as does Te Taua Moana o Aotearoa, the Royal New Zealand Navy.

Another important finding explores who can instigate change. As one participant put it: “In terms of change in the organisation it must come from the top.”. Although all the participants are recognised as being institutional entrepreneurs, there is no doubt that, within an institution with hierarchical structures like the Navy, there are leaders with institutional powers or what the literature emphasises as the formal authority which is considered a useful resource for institutional entrepreneurs. This formal authority refers to actors who can legitimately make decisions (Lawrence, et al., 2002). The authority of the state (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) also includes those conferred by official positions are recognised as formal authorities. Having formal authority is related to a subject position within an entrepreneur position in the field (Macguire, et al., 2004).

Therefore, a critical institutional entrepreneur legitimises the change, which in turn empowers those with less power to proceed with instigating the change. The findings show that those at the rank of Captain, Commodore or Rear Admiral in the Navy had the formal authority necessary to approve change. At the same time, the findings also highlighted that the changes described in this thesis would not have been achieved without the support of other institutional actors with less official power. While these actors had less power, they had the expertise such as Māori cultural or construction knowledge, dependent upon what change they were involved with. They also had a good understanding of the system and its processes, and relationships with those who had the formal power in the Navy. Finally, they also had the energy, passion and commitment for the change they wished to make.

### **Establishing the Bicultural Working Party and the Rūnanga**

One key observation in the findings was that “in the early to mid-1990s the Navy hierarchy became aware that Māoridom would impact the Navy and the NZDF but didn’t know what form this impact would take”. Within this uncertain context, another participant saw an opening where change was possible: “I sensed a need for change. Having the ability to sense something requires changing is a key characteristic of leadership”. This motive led him to instigate many changes during the period of 1990–2000 and many of these are outlined in this research. This participant possibly began the process which led to the first formal recognition and integration of Māori culture into the Navy. This occurred in 1991, after a personal conversation between a Commodore and a senior Commissioned Officer led to the initial establishment of a Bicultural Working Party initially, which then morphed into the Rūnanga in 1992. In this instance we see the combination of a contextual opportunity for change, and the personal energy and commitment of an actor with the necessary power (this participant held the rank of Commodore).

Di Maggio (1988) argued that “new institutions arise when organised actors with sufficient resources see in them an opportunity to realise interests that they value highly” (p. 14). The findings here show that one key institution was the Bicultural Working Party that was initiated to ascertain how both the Navy culture and Māori culture could be embedded within the Navy environment. It had to consider how these two cultures could work together without one being dominated by the other. What was

proposed to the hierarchy was that these cultures could blend together within the ceremonial processes of the Navy.

A key comment was made by a Commodore when he authorised instigation of this Māori entity: “Moving Māori issues forward was not my motivation for change but based on fairness”. Maguire (2007) suggested that institutional entrepreneurs may have the power to force change, but sometimes lack the motivation; however, other actors may have the incentive to advance or create and champion new changes but do not have the power to change institutions. This latter status would apply to people such as the Chairperson of the Bicultural Working Party and then the Rūnanga.

### Recruiting allies for institutional transformation

The Navy was very fortunate at the time in its choice of the person to chair the Bicultural Working Party and the Rūnanga. A participant in this research, he was a Māori Commissioned Officer and second in command of Navy Command Land and Facilities. Having a Māori at this level was quite rare within the Navy at the time. This was emphasised in the findings by a key institutional actor with formal authority. The Rūnanga Chairperson’s relationship with the institutional entrepreneur with the formal authority is why this project eventuated. The Chairperson had necessary skills, such as Māori knowledge, and his background in construction engineering would later become useful to establish the Marae. It becomes justifiable when increasing the direct level of Māori involvement in the State and it results in demonstrable benefits for Māori, which is the aim of achieving best outcomes for Māori (Durie, 2004). He had the passion; he may not have had the depth of Māori knowledge, but he knew where he could get support. He was instrumental in recruiting an ex-Navy Māori sailor, who had just retired from the Navy, to run Māori Awareness courses for Officers and Warrant Officers.

The literature also highlights, in relation to the reasons why the participant authorised the establishment of these entities. Institutional entrepreneurs have strong social skills and therefore display and use empathy which resonates with potential support actors. As institutional entrepreneurs, they must understand the environment and be able to relate their interests to others’. Institutional entrepreneurs act like brokers; therefore, they need to have strong social skills to sway allies to the view that their project will be mutually beneficial (Fligstein, 1997). This display of empathy was demonstrated by several institutional entrepreneurs with formal authority in this research as they frequently used

the term “fairness”, thereby implying that they had very good social skills. In the findings one institutional entrepreneur with formal authority used the term fairness when he established netball courts for women and another change ensuring that women were on the selection board and courses for advancement. In relation to the recognition of Māori, when he authorised the establishing of the Marae, he stated that it was fair for Māori to have a Marae. Another participant with formal authority used the term fairness when he saw that the Marae Project Manager did not get support from his predecessors as Captain Fleet Support.

The initial challenge that institutional entrepreneurs encounter when imposing a divergent institutional change is that those within the current environment who are favoured and privileged by the existing institutional arrangements are likely to want these arrangements to remain the same and will likely defend the benefits they receive (DiMaggio, 1988). With the possibilities of resistance, it becomes necessary for institutional entrepreneurs to seek support and allies (Boxenbaum & Battilana, 2005; Fligstein, 1997; Greenwood, et al., 2002), and it becomes necessary to develop associations and collaboration (Fligstein, 2001; Lawrence, et al., 2002; Rao, 1998). It becomes essential to gain the support of those allies who have the necessary experience and knowledge, and those who have been embedded within the institution for some time (Lawrence, et al., 2002), professionals and experts (Hwang & Powell, 2005). Institutional entrepreneurs must utilise these people’s diverse skills when instigating a change that they intend to impose. This is what makes institutional entrepreneurship a complicated political and cultural procedure (Perkman & Spicer, 2007).

The Commodore explained his motive for selecting that individual as Chairperson: “By selecting a specific individual to lead certain projects you are challenging and channelling a change that you know is going to achieve a positive result.” What this comment suggests is that the two people concerned had to have met quite frequently to discuss how to proceed with instigating this change, because the Commodore stated that he understood the thinking of the person he selected.

Implementing change requires developing a vision and mobilising people behind the vision and motivating them to achieve and sustain it (Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999). A Captain who became aware of this appointment emphasised “how important it was that the Commodore had selected the Lieutenant Commander as the Chairperson of the Rūnanga.” He also wasn’t sure whether the Commodore was aware that his selection

was a Māori “as many people would not have known he was Māori and being a Commissioned Officer as well indicated the importance of this entity.”

This demonstrates the enormous importance of consultative meetings which again led to some good outcomes. The Navy was very strategic in its selection because the appointed Chairperson was very passionate about his heritage, as he highlighted in the findings, he had whakapapa (genealogy) to the missionary the Reverend Henry Williams,<sup>7</sup> who interpreted the English version of Te Tiriti o Waitangi into Māori. The Chairperson being Māori and a Commissioned Officer was a positive but also interesting, because the Navy at the time did not have many Māori Commissioned Officers at senior level.

This was more of an issue in the Navy as most Māori who joined the military went into the Army (NZDF, 2012). Nonetheless, Scoppio (2007) highlighted that Māori members of the NZDF were underrepresented at the Officer ranks. The Commodore, as a critical institutional entrepreneur, was able to select a strategy and put this into action. He was able to identify a person with both the skills, knowledge and rank to lead this new venture and change (Markowitz, 2007; Rao, Morrill, & Zald, 2000).

The Commodore also had the determination and the formal authority, i.e. rank and role, to make this change, and his formal authority legitimised it within the social system of the Navy; but, more importantly, he knew and understood his target audience and who was capable of undertaking this role (Fligstein, 1997, 2001). As noted earlier, according to the participants, there were no tensions evident when these entities were established.

In fact, for Māori initially this move would have been a surprise, but they would also have been elated at the same time and were more than welcoming to this transformation. This again signalled that the Navy was open to change, and these consultative meetings were becoming very productive. It also suggests that the Navy was being flexible and implementing a change within a public sector organisation which has failed in meeting the aims and aspirations of Māori in the past.

The two committees would become instrumental both for the Navy and Māori. Firstly, the selection and calibre of the individual to lead this change for Māori provided credibility about how serious the Navy was with the establishment of these entities and

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<sup>7</sup> Henry Williams was an British-born Anglican missionary who came to New Zealand in 1823. See <https://nzhistory.govt.nz/media/photo/henry-williams>



with the selection of the individual to lead these entities. They also enabled the Command to receive sound cultural information and advice from a group of senior Māori representatives within the Navy that had the passion, the Māori knowledge and understanding of practices. From a Rūnanga perspective, it enabled them to be authentic in their approach to matters Māori and to maintain the quality of Māori culture, and it provided an opportunity to contribute and oversee and, in a way, control how Māori culture would eventuate within the Navy.

An intriguing finding was how the Chairperson of the Rūnanga recruited members for the committees. Although he had authority, because of his rank and role as Chairperson of the Rūnanga and through the Commodore legitimising the establishment of these entities, he did not actively recruit members. He simply publicised to the Navy that “there is an opportunity for change, and if you were passionate about this, then please join the Bicultural Working Party”. Implementing a change that diverges from the existing institutional environment means institutional entrepreneurs, such as the participants to this research can be challenged to predict the outcome of a divergent change therefore seek allies in to support the implementation, and requires freeing up the institutional embeddedness of those being sought after (Battilana, et al., 2009). A challenge to this comes from those who are comfortable with the current status quo (DiMaggio, 1988; Levy & Scully, 2007) and it is more likely to occur if it is a divergent change which threatens the norms and social position of those within the Navy. Fortunately, there was no resistance. This process of recruiting members onto the Bicultural Working Party may seem unusual from an outsider perspective, especially in relation to an environment with hierarchical structures, because outsiders would think that, with his rank, he might just order people to join the committee.

But there was a different logic at play here. Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) described actors as being rational and sensing they can work with institutionally defined logics of effect or appropriateness; they need culturally defined forms of competence and knowledge, and with those characteristics they have the creativity to adapt to conditions that are both demanding and dynamic. This behaviour challenges the norms of institutions which is “the way we do things around here”. The last thing people within institutions like the Navy want is to be ordered to do something that is voluntary and most people at the time would have been quite sceptical about these entities because, technically, it was very unusual to have such an entity within the Navy. The reason was

that no other military organisations had such committees that are culturally centred for a specific group of people.

As mentioned earlier, agency is not constrained by embedding structures, it can allow for the unfolding of entrepreneurial activities. Therefore, the new Chairperson took advantage of a different approach to attracting members onto these committees. These individuals are knowledgeable agents and they have the capacity to think in ways other than those prescribed as being the norm of social rules and technological artefacts (Blumer, 1969; Giddens, 1984; Garud & Karnoe, 2003; Mutch, 2007; Schutz, 1973).

Māori culture and cultural identity play an essential role for Māori both in the workplace and representing New Zealand overseas (Durie, 2003). The members of the Rūnanga with their existing knowledge and experience of Māori and the Navy would also be capable of undertaking the arduous tasks that were necessary for Māori recognition within the Navy. It would have been trying for Junior Ratings to become members due to their work and training commitments. Fligstein (1997) stated that institutional entrepreneurs are skilled actors, in that social action is about discovering and preserving a collective identity for a set of social groups and the effort to shape and meet the interests of those groups.

Establishing these Māori entities provided an opportunity for Māori to be creative about their culture and provided an opportunity to maintain the authenticity of that culture. However, having these committees established disrupted the norms of the institution because they had no straightforward relevance to the combat-warrior paradigm ethos of a military organisation. It reinforces the point that this was the very beginning of the integration of Māori culture within the Navy. No one knew how this journey was going to unfold at the time.

### **The Rūnanga as an institutional entrepreneur**

The Rūnanga could be described as an institutional entrepreneur as suggested by Fligstein (1997) and Maguire et al. (2004) who outlined that institutional entrepreneurs could be individuals or groups of individuals. When the Rūnanga eventually emerged from the Bicultural Working Party, this entity was also a group of institutional entrepreneurs. Their first task was to create a Māori name for the Navy. They not only developed a Māori name for the Royal New Zealand Navy – Te Taua Moana o

Aotearoa – they also made submissions and developed proposals relating to Māori cultural aspects being incorporated into all the Naval ceremonial doctrine.

The purpose of undertaking this work was to ensure the sustainability of Māori culture within the Navy. They also maintained quality control in all aspects of the Māori culture within the Navy. As Durie (2003) outlines, Māori culture and cultural identity were essential elements for Māori both in the workplace and representing New Zealand. In addition, allowing Māori to have direct involvement in the change the Navy was undergoing was important and justifiable because it did lead to demonstrable benefits for Māori (Durie, 2004). The following is an example of that quality control.

The Rūnanga did experience some issues, firstly in terms of the speaking rights of women on marae, particularly concerning women not being able to speak on the Marae during the process of pōwhiri (the formal process of a Māori welcome). As DiMaggio (1988) and Levy and Scully (2007) highlight, those who benefit from the status quo will rise to defend existing beliefs and practices. The issue of Māori practices is forever being challenged by those that have no appreciation of difference or an understanding of Māori practices. At the same time, Māori also need to be innovative in how we can be more obliging with some aspects of our tikanga (practices). Nonetheless, in this situation, if Māori needed to remain authentic with their culture, they also needed to ensure that control of Māori practices was sustained and not dictated by outside influences.

Another issue for the Rūnanga in more recent times was explained in this way: “Although the Rūnanga had passionate members, it was not working very well. It began to lose its impetus and due to a lack of senior personnel on the committee”. This issue arose after the Marae was officially opened in April 2000. Since then, Māori senior personnel had left and others were planning to leave the Navy, especially those who were participants to this research. A participant, who was Commanding Officer of HMNZS Philomel, the main Naval Base in Auckland, and was also the Chairperson of the Rūnanga at the time, raised these concerns with the Admiral. As a result, the Deputy Chief of the Navy became the Chairperson of the Rūnanga. What this change indicates is that, within a hierarchical structure, the right leadership is essential if change is to occur. Therefore, the Chairperson had to be someone at the rank of Captain or above. In this case it was a Commodore and second in command of the Navy, therefore signalling to the organisation how important this entity is.

If an entity is established to drive change and have relevance, it is necessary at times to have the support of the Chief Executive or second in command to achieve change. It reinforces the point made earlier that one had to be a Captain or above to have formal authority. The challenge for the Marae staff was not only maintaining the culture but also building capabilities and capacity. In addition, they also needed to be innovative in how they could get personnel to build experience in using their newly gained Māori skills, as opportunities were limited within the Navy to maintain these skills due to unexpected postings to ships or training.

### **Māori education within the Navy**

As part of their education portfolio, the Rūnanga looked at how they could build capabilities and capacity for Māori culture within the Navy. With the introduction of a new Navy Education policy, personnel were able to attend a one-year Māori language course. DiMaggio (1988) explained that divergent changes can be instigated within the environment of an organisation and/or within the wider context of the institution in which an actor is fixed (Battilana et al., 2009). After a conversation with the Navy, Air Force also adopted a similar scheme. Again, this demonstrated the innovation and adaptability of the Rūnanga. Another finding relating to education was the delivery Māori Cultural Awareness courses for Senior, Divisional and Warrant Officers.

The intent of these courses was to provide the leadership of the Navy with more knowledge and understanding of Māori culture. These changes indicate that the Navy was becoming more aware of Māori culture and therefore was supporting these changes, which signifies their recognition of the culture. The benefits of these educational opportunities and courses were outlined by a participant who observed that we have Captains, Commodores and Admirals who are comfortable to stand on the paepae (oratory bench) to deliver their whaikōrero (speech) in te reo. It may be short, but they are demonstrating their leadership of this cause and what makes this more interesting and pleasing is that they are quite comfortable to stand on another marae and do the same thing.

The other aspect that this change also highlights is those who did not have the institutional power and were in support roles could also make changes, achieving tasks that were legitimised through the establishment of these Māori entities. Another outcome was the establishment of the Māori Cultural Advisor to the Chief of Navy and

Senior Officers in 2002. The role was designed to provide support to Command due to their exposure to high profile events such as Waitangi celebrations and any events where there was a Māori component, such as the Navy hosting visits by dignitaries or visiting ships at the Naval Base. An outcome from instigating this role is the Defence Force, Army and Air Force all established a similar role a few years later.

Greenwood, et al. (2002) and Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) suggested that institutional entrepreneurs working in mature fields frame discourses so that they resonate with the interests and values of the dominant coalition members, especially when they are unified. If the field is populated by fragmented groups of diverse members, measures to coalesce these members are necessary (Fligstein, 1997). The development of the Marae project shows how institutional actors were able to co-ordinate their interests, enlist the support of those actors whose support was required, and overcome moments of resistance.

In most instances of divergent change, institutional entrepreneurs must look for allies (Fligstein, 1997; Greenwood et al., 2002). In 1997, the Rūnanga was given authority to look for a Marae Project Manager (MPM). The Rūnanga, as an institutional entrepreneur, had to strive to attain positions that enabled them to bring together diverse stakeholders among whom they could champion and orchestrate action (Macguire et al., 2004). The Navy at the time had limited options because those within the Navy at the time did not have the skills, the knowledge or the connections to undertake this role. Other personnel who may have been likely candidates were already committed to other roles. As discussed in the findings, the new MPM was working at a local marae in Northcote, North Shore, Auckland, and delivering the Māori Cultural Awareness courses for the Navy.

The findings show how consultative meetings can be productive not just for Māori but for the organisation because the Navy was able to gain a person who could meet the role, who already knew the operations of the Navy due to his recent retirement, and who had the cultural knowledge and connections. Leadership demonstrated again their willingness to disrupt the norms of the institution by getting someone from outside of the institution to undertake this role. Although the Rūnanga had provided a very logical and culturally sound proposal, trust becomes extremely important in these decision-making processes. This trust is only gained from working together and over time.

Trust is described by Lewis and Weigert (1985) as

a cognitive process which discriminates among persons and institutions that are untrustworthy, distrusted, and unknown. In this sense, we cognitively choose whom we will trust in which respects and under which circumstances, and we base the choice on what we take to be “good reasons” constituting evidence of trustworthiness (p. 970).

Flores and Solomon (1998) suggested “in an ideal case, one trusts someone because they are trustworthy, and one’s trustworthiness inspires trust” (p. 209). This clearly indicates the concept of trustworthiness is central to understanding and predicting trust levels. Colquitt, Scott and LePine (2007) stated that trust concepts are a critical component in social exchange where the absence of formal contract or specified payment schedule creates a built-in vulnerability, with one party risking the possibility that the other will fail to meet obligations, with the result that social exchange relationships cannot develop in the absence of trust (Blau, 1964).

Aspects of trustworthiness are an exchange that can assist in creating a social exchange. Therefore, facets of trustworthiness that demonstrate concern and support or acting on sound principles can be viewed as activities that should engender a motivation to reciprocate on the part of the reciprocating partner. From a social exchange perspective, trustworthiness inspires a social exchange relationship with trust levels acting as one indicator of that relationship. This was the situation with the Chairperson of the Rūnanga and the Captain. This relationship later became more evident when the Captain became Admiral and the Rūnanga Chairperson became his Warrant Officer of the Navy.

However, the new MPM did encounter some issues when he arrived for his new role in September 1997. As outlined in the findings, the MPM was very poorly resourced in comparison to other personnel in similar roles. Success for the project required support from those with authority to approve resources. As seen in the findings, this support came from a Captain who saw the under-resourcing of the MPM as “not fair.” This shows that merely having official power is not enough to effect change. Previous holders of this Captain’s position had the authority to support the Marae but did not do so. It was the power of the new Captain’s position combined with their “sense of fairness” and their determination to empower the project that led them to support those actors with the knowledge and expertise to instigate the establishment of the Marae.

The new Captain provided some insights into how he went about getting resources to get the Marae completed. Based on his experiences working in Wellington at New Zealand Defence Headquarters, in Resources Branch, he wrote letters to both the Chief of the Navy and Chief of Defence Force and was able to justify the reasons why funding was needed and its importance to the organisation. Institutional entrepreneurs can apply pressure on important stakeholders to leverage financial resources to favour a project (Demil & Bensedrine, 2005) and this suggests that larger players are more likely to be successful institutional entrepreneurs, such as this Captain (Greenwood, et al., 2002) since those of Captain rank had formal authority. His applications for funding for the Marae project were successful and allowed it to be completed. It was two years from the time he arrived into this new role until the official opening of the Marae, in April 2000. The opening of the Marae was the cementing of this journey of integrating Māori culture into the Navy. But even at the opening, again we were not immune to challenge. We had a local iwi challenging us on our Māori protocols. What this incident did, however, it encouraged the Navy to be stronger in their stance with their Māori culture they had created. People came together in a way that meant this day was not going to be disrupted by anyone from outside of the Navy.

## Conclusions

This thesis explored the purposive work of institutional entrepreneurs, including the Rūnanga, and identified the roles institutional entrepreneurs held and who had the formal authority to instigating a divergent change which transformed the norms of an institution such as the Navy. Within a hierarchical structure, Navy leadership was essential. It was determined that personnel at the rank of Captain and above had this formal authority. The research also identified how those with less power, such as the Chairperson of the Rūnanga and the Rūnanga itself as an entity, were able to enact change. Finally, the research identified the process utilised by institutional entrepreneurs through their purposive work and the support necessary to integrating the formal recognition of Māori cultural knowledge and practices into the Royal New Zealand Navy.

It achieved the answers to how the Navy went about “the integration of Māori cultural practices into the Royal New Zealand Navy” by firstly ascertaining *who* were the institutional entrepreneurs and *how* did these institutional entrepreneurs go about their

purposive work. It also ascertaining *what* changes they instigated, and *why* they made these changes. It also can confirm that this divergent change was a success.

The significance of this research is that it clearly demonstrates that not only did Māori benefit from these changes, the Navy also was enhanced by Māori culture and it is recognised for this uniqueness by other Navies in the world. There is also an important contribution to knowledge on how divergent transformational change can come about in hierarchical organisations. It also requires those with vision, determination, energy, trust and the support of others if this type of change is to succeed.

### Limitations

The number of participants was limited due to the time constraints of the research. Having a couple of female participants added to this research would have been helpful in possibly providing a different perspective since a qualitative study engaging with a relatively small number of participants did not allow for other perspectives to be revealed.

Another limitation was the disadvantages of being an insider. While being an insider can be of benefit for being a critical researcher, I felt uncomfortable at times reluctant to challenge or probe more deeply in interviews with participants who were my former superior officers. My considerable respect for these participants became obvious when relooking at my interviews, where I detected areas of the interviews where I needed to have probed more to elicit more specific information. At the same time being an insider was also advantageous, because the ability to gain access to these leaders and participants made the facilitation of recruiting very straightforward.

Because this research focused on a specific time period and a single case study, it could be difficult to compare different scenarios or different factors that might be in play in different time periods.

### Future research

It must be noted that this is a single case study and the findings are not transferrable because of the unique factors that pertain to the New Zealand environment only. The importance of what I have done for Māori in the Navy is to show that power can be shared, and bicultural organisations can be created successfully. What was necessary



were the people with vision and those with the expertise to create change. Trust was also necessary if it was to be successful.

Further research could be extended to look at how the Navy, as a bicultural organisation, has met the challenge of maintaining the culture. This could include engaging with a wider range of participants, looking at parallel changes around the same time in other organisations, or navies in other countries where indigenous practice and knowledge have been incorporated to a certain extent. This would be a valuable follow-up to this present research.

### **Personal reflections**

Being able to walk in two worlds poses many challenges, more so here within New Zealand's bicultural partnership. I have been fortunate to have experienced many types of environments from my upbringing in Te Urewera, through my education, and on to the many overseas trips that I undertook whilst in the Navy. Being a fluent speaker of te reo Māori, and a new researcher, I did find aspects of research and academic writing a little challenging. I found that writing in English goes to a totally different level compared to what I am normally comfortable with. It is the same for all students for whom English is not their first language.

One of these challenges was allowing the voice of those who have experienced marginalisation, such as Māori, to be fully heard in this research. While I accept the reasoning behind why it is not possible to use extended quotations from participant interviews, I also don't agree with it. It takes strength for marginalised people to talk about their experiences and it conjures up a lot of emotions. In fairness to this bicultural relationship, it is important to hear the voices of Māori in context and to understand the essence behind these comments which can be lost in translation. It doesn't necessarily have to be many quotes but a select few that emphasise the experience of marginalisation – and that can only come from those who have experienced marginalisation.

As mentioned earlier regarding my upbringing, utilising a kaupapa Māori approach was never in doubt for me as the researcher. It was to ensure that my taha Māori integrity was maintained, and Māori practices and knowledge were used throughout the research. My previous experience in management taught me that utilising a Māori-centred framework would enable me to show how effective the changes were, and how

beneficial they were for Māori. I believe I have largely achieved this during this research.

The Royal New Zealand Navy was my life for 30 years. This research is to acknowledge the contribution of the Navy in formally introducing Māori cultural practices into the core business of the Navy and to present this Māori perspective within a very hierarchical colonial organisation. The intent was to present how effective biculturalism can be achieved and how all the ethnicities involved can benefit. But, more importantly, it is essential that the Navy is recognised for instigating formal Māori cultural practices which led to the development of similar policies within the NZDF.

This research journey has enhanced my learning and understanding as it proved that power can be shared, and bicultural organisations can be created successfully. What public sector organisations require of their leaders is not only formal authority, but also determination, trust, energy and the ability to be flexible and adaptive as well as being innovative. Finally, it also requires the committed participation of those in support roles with the expertise needed for the specific change if it is to be successful.

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# Appendices

## Appendix A: Ethics Approval

9 June 2016

Candice Harris  
Faculty of Business Economics and Law

Dear Candice

Re Ethics Application: **16/240 Te Korowai: The integration of Māori cultural practices and knowledge within the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF): A case study of Te Taua Moana, the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN)**

Thank you for submitting your application for ethical review to the Auckland University of Technology Ethics Committee (AUTEC).

I am pleased to confirm that your ethics application has been approved for three years until 8 June 2019.

As part of the ethics approval process, you are required to submit the following to AUTEC:

- A brief annual progress report using form EA2, which is available online through <http://www.aut.ac.nz/researchethics>. When necessary this form may also be used to request an extension of the approval at least one month prior to its expiry on 8 June 2019;
- A brief report on the status of the project using form EA3, which is available online through <http://www.aut.ac.nz/researchethics>. This report is to be submitted either when the approval expires on 8 June 2019 or on completion of the project.

It is a condition of approval that AUTEC is notified of any adverse events or if the research does not commence. AUTEC approval needs to be sought for any alteration to the research, including any alteration of or addition to any documents that are provided to participants. You are responsible for ensuring that research undertaken under this approval occurs within the parameters outlined in the approved application.

AUTEC grants ethical approval only. If you require management approval from an institution or organisation for your research, then you will need to obtain this.

To enable us to provide you with efficient service, please use the application number and study title in all correspondence with us. If you have any enquiries about this application, or anything else, please do contact us at [ethics@aut.ac.nz](mailto:ethics@aut.ac.nz).

All the very best with your research,



Kate O'Connor  
Executive Secretary  
**Auckland University of Technology Ethics Committee**

Cc: Donald Ripia; Peter Skilling

## Appendix B:

### Participant Information Sheet

**Participants names:**

**Date Information Sheet Produced:**

TBD

**Project Title**

*He Korowai: The integration of cultural practices and Knowledge within the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF): A case study of Te Taa Moana, Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN).*

An Invitation

My name is Donald Ripia, I am a student of Auckland University Technology (AUT). I am beginning a research project that asks:

*“How have key actors enabled the recognition of Māori cultural practices and knowledge within Te Taa Moana, Royal New Zealand Navy from 1990 to 2005.”*

In order to answer this question, I am seeking how have the key actors that enabled the recognition of Māori cultural practices and knowledge within Te Taa Moana.

Before we begin, I would like to inform you that;

Your participation in this study is **voluntary**, whether you choose to participate or not, will neither advantage nor disadvantage you. You may withdraw at any time prior to the completion of data collection (July – December 2016).

**What is the purpose of this research?**

The purpose of this research is to identify the institutional actors who contributed formally to implementing Māori cultural practices into the RNZN core business from 1990 - 2006, and to identify how and why they did so. It is the primary researchers' hypothesis that it was the RNZN that led changes to formalising Māori cultural practices later adopted by the NZDF. This research is for a Master of Philosophy thesis and this research can contribute to understanding the benefits of utilising indigenous culture and knowledge within an organisation. There are possibilities that this study may be published in journal articles as well as the researcher making presentations at relevant conferences in the future.

**How was I identified and why am I being invited to participate in this research?**

In my previous experience with roles within the RNZN I have identified you as one of the key actors that enabled the recognition of Māori cultural practices and knowledge to be formally introduced into the RNZN. Previous informal discussions with you about my research topic and the provision of your contact details has led me to believe that you are interested in participating this study.

**What will happen in this research?**

The majority of the information/data collected for this study will be from interviews and they will be conducted by myself the primary researcher. The main reason for interviews is that they offer the best way of understanding your point of view. They allow you to tell your story and explain what you thought the important moments and factors were. The information/data gained will only be utilised for this study only. In addition, quantitative data will also be collected for demographic purposes.

**What are the discomforts and risks?**

The likely discomforts or risks could be hierarchical differences such as ranks during the time period of the study. A cultural element could exist because some participants are non-Māori who are talking about Māori practices and vice versa. Differences of opinions at the time of making decisions or during discussions on key aspects of changes to Māori cultural practices. If you have any concerns relating to any aspects of this research study, please advise me as soon as possible.

**How will these discomforts and risks be alleviated?**

All participants will not be required to answer any questions that they do not wish to respond to. You can withdraw from the study up until the final date of data collection. Your details will remain confidential

**What are the benefits?**

This study is for a Master of Philosophy in Management thesis by the primary researcher, me. It provides an opportunity for the participants to contribute how the RNZN contributed to formally integrating Māori cultural practices into the NZDF and contribute to acknowledging the RNZN for this change.

**What compensation is available for injury or negligence?**

Not applicable

**How will my privacy be protected?**

Participants will be given the option of an alias/pseudonym name to keep their identity confidential. They will also be given the option of meeting in private or a place that is convenient for them. Interviews with the participants will be at a prearranged agreed venue. A koha or some form of compensation will be provided for their time. Due to the sample size and the whanau concept within the RNZN a limited confidentiality will be afforded

The interviews will take approximately 1.5 -2hours. This will be dependent upon the information provided by you in relation to the questions asked.

**What opportunity do I have to consider this invitation?**

Two weeks. A follow up phone call or email may follow if no response within a week.

**How do I agree to participate in this research?**

Confirmation on whether you wish to participate will be agreed by contacting the primary researcher by phone or email, prior to finalising a meeting time and venue. If you have any questions regarding the information provided on this sheet, it would be good that these are raised prior to the meeting and before you sign the consent form. The consent form will be attached for your perusal and a hard copy will be provided by myself at our agreed place of meeting, should you continue to participate in the study.

**Will I receive feedback on the results of this research?**

Participants will be offered a copy or a summary at the completion of the study. If requested, this will be made electronically.

**What do I do if I have concerns about this research?**

Any concerns regarding the nature of this project should be notified in the first instance to the Project Supervisor, Associate Professor Candice Harris, [charris@aut.ac.nz](mailto:charris@aut.ac.nz), 09 921 9999 ext. 5102

Concerns regarding the conduct of the research should be notified to the Executive Secretary of AUTEK, Kate O'Connor, [ethics@aut.ac.nz](mailto:ethics@aut.ac.nz), 921 9999 ext. 6038.

**Whom do I contact for further information about this research?****Researcher Contact Details:**

**Donald Ripia**, [dripia@aut.ac.nz](mailto:dripia@aut.ac.nz), 09 9219999 ext. 6578 Or 021675892

**Project Supervisor Contact Details:**

Associate Professor Candice Harris, [charris@aut.ac.nz](mailto:charris@aut.ac.nz), 09 921 9999 ext. 5102

Approved by the Auckland University of Technology Ethics Committee on *type the date final ethics approval was granted*, AUTEK Reference

Appendix C:  
Consent Form

**Project title:** Te Korowai: The integration of cultural practices and knowledge within the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF): A case study of Te Taua Moana, the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN).

**Project Supervisor:** Associate Professor Candice Harris

**Researcher:** Tamahou Anthony Donald Ripia

- I have read and understood the information provided about this research project in the Information Sheet dated
- I have had an opportunity to ask questions and to have them answered.
- I understand that notes will be taken during the interviews and that they will also be audio-taped and transcribed.
- I understand that I may withdraw myself or any information that I have provided for this project at any time prior to completion of data collection, without being disadvantaged in any way.
- If I withdraw, I understand that all relevant information including tapes and transcripts, or parts thereof, will be destroyed.
- I agree to take part in this research.
- I wish to receive a copy of the report from the research (please tick one): Yes  No

Participants signature : .....

Participants name :

Participants Contact Details (if appropriate) :

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

Date :

**Approved by the Auckland University of Technology Ethics Committee on *type the date on which the final approval was granted* AUTEK Reference number *type the AUTEK reference number***

*Note: The Participant should retain a copy of this form.*

Appendix D:  
Confidentiality Agreement

*For someone transcribing data, e.g. audiotapes of interviews.*

**Project title:** *Te Korowai: The integration of cultural practices and knowledge within the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF): A case study of Te Taua Moana, the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN).*

**Project Supervisor:** *Associate Professor Candice Harris*

**Researcher:** *Tamahou Anthony Donald Ripia*

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- I understand that all the material I will be asked to transcribe is confidential.
- I understand that the contents of the tapes or recordings can only be discussed with the researchers.
- I will not keep any copies of the transcripts nor allow third parties access to them.

Transcriber's signature : .....

Transcriber's name : .....

Transcriber's Contact Details (if appropriate):

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.....

Date:

Project Supervisor's Contact Details (if appropriate):

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**Approved by the Auckland University of Technology Ethics Committee on *type the date on which the final approval was granted* AUTEK Reference number *type the AUTEK reference number***

*Note: The Transcriber should retain a copy of this form.*