

Racism in New Zealand

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ABSTRACT: This article presents how racism is manifested in Aotearoa New Zealand, targets and disadvantages Māori as tangata whenua (the first people of this land), and cannot be understood without reference to colonisation.

KEY WORDS: Marginalization, Pākehā, colonization

The power to impose reality upon marginalised groups represents the ultimate form of oppression. (Sue, 2010, p. 37)

For some time, some New Zealanders have claimed that race relations in this country are better than elsewhere, especially compared with Australia, and South Africa under Apartheid (e.g., Sinclair, 1971). There are a number of problems with this argument and attitude:

1. It is almost exclusively made by non-indigenous, white, Pākehā settlers. (Pākehā is a word used generally to refer to New Zealanders of European descent and, implicitly, white, though the term is the subject of much debate see, for example,

Forsyth, 2018).

2. It assumes the priority (and superiority) of Pākehā over Māori: ‘our good race relations’ with ‘our Māori’ and, thereby, both places Pākehā at the centre while decentring Māori.
3. It ignores the history of colonisation of this country; the fact that Māori rangatira (chiefs) had signed He Whakaputanga o te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tirenī | A Declaration of Independence in 1835 which was recognised by the British Crown; and the equal and reciprocal relationships defined in Te Tiriti o Waitangi signed five years later in 1840 between rangatira and representatives of the British Crown. Interestingly – and inaccurately – in his article, Sinclair (1971) frames the Treaty of Waitangi (presumably referring to the English version of Te Tiriti) as an experiment conducted by the benevolent British ‘to improve race relations in a colony.’ (p. 126)
4. It is invidious and ultimately irrelevant to claim ‘better’ race relations, especially in comparison to other jurisdictions, as if more covert manifestations of racism are, in some abstract statistical way, ‘better’ than less subtle and overt racism.
5. It is simply not true given the impact of colonisation, the rule of the British Crown and a Euro-centric New Zealand government for the past 180 years, as the statistics in Table 1 attest.

This article takes a critical view of the impact of colonisation on the Māori population in Aotearoa New Zealand, beginning with some facts and figures which illustrate various inequities between the indigenous and non-indigenous populations. This is followed by discussion of the narrative that promotes and disguises racism: that ‘we are one people’.

Facts and tears

One of the problems in discussing racism is that both the experience of racism as well as the facts with regard to discrimination and oppression, and the differential treatment on the basis of race - in this case Māori and non-Māori - are often disputed. We think that the evidence is clear that successive British governments in the 19th century viewed Aotearoa as a land that it wanted to colonise, and that they did this in a number of ways:

1. By treaty - by means of Te Tiriti o Waitangi (1840) and its English version, The Treaty of Waitangi, which mistranslated and misrepresented certain key words and concepts in Māori (see Mutu, 2010; Orange, 2011). For a list of government breaches of Te Tiriti o Waitangi see Treaty Resource Centre (2019).
2. By settlement - by encouraging emigration to ‘a Britain of the South [Pacific]’,

primarily through a business model devised by Edward Gibbon Wakefield and promoted through the New Zealand Company (1825–1858) (see Durrer, 2006). This was a clear example of what is referred to as settler colonialism.

3. By conquest - through the New Zealand (Land) Wars (1843–1872).
4. By the confiscation and alienation of land - beginning with the *Land Claims Ordinance 1841*, which gave statutory recognition to the Crown claim of pre-emption, at the expense of Māori rangatiratanga.
5. By governance - beginning with the (British) *New Zealand Constitution Act 1852*, which conceded to settlers the administration of all matters relating to land. This was the beginning of what is referred to as national colonialism.

While these points are historical, their impact and that of colonisation are very present, as may be seen from a series of statistics summarised in Table 1 below:

Table 1: Social measures of inequity in New Zealand

Sector	Māori	Non Māori	Source
Overall % of total population	16.7%	83.3%	Stats NZ (2020c)
Economy			
Earnings (hourly) (2018)	NZ\$24.72	NZ\$30.09 ¹	The Treasury (2018)
Personal income (<\$10,000) (2013)	24.1%	18.4%	Ministry of Health (2019)
2018 Personal income \$100,001+	3.5%	7.6%	Stats NZ (2020b)
Education			
Secondary (NCEA Level 6) ²	3.1%	5.0%	Stats NZ (2020b)
Tertiary - Bachelors (NCEA Level 7)	8.4%	14.6%	Stats NZ (2020b)
School completion (Level 2 Certificate or higher) (2013)	45.1%	64.3%	Ministry of Health (2019)
Teacher employment ³ (total numbers)	8,309	52,405	Education Counts (2021c)
Unemployment			
Unemployment (2018)	8.1%	4.0%	Stats NZ (2020b)
Health			
Visited a GP in the last 12 months (2013/14)	70.3%	74.5%	Ministry of Health (2018b)
Smokers (2018)	28.3%	13.2%	Stats NZ (2020b)

1 This figure excludes Pacific people

2 The NCEA has 10 Levels starting with Level 1 at secondary school (1–6) through to Level 10 at university (see NZQA, 2021).

3 This figure excludes Pacific and Asian people.

<i>Housing</i>			
2013 Neighbourhood Deprivation - living in Decile 10 (most deprived)	24.0%	7.0%	Ministry of Health (2019)
2013 Living in rented accommodation	49.5%	27.5%	Ministry of Health (2019)
<i>(in)Justice</i>			
2018 Sentencing	18%	11%	Stuff (2018)
2020 Prison population ⁴	52.3%	47.5%	Ara Poutama Aotearoa (2020)
<i>Land ownership / guardianship</i>			
1840	100%	0%	
1900	16%	84%	
1920	8%	92%	
2020	3%	97%	
<i>Language</i>			
Māori medium education (2020)	97.1%	2.9%	Education Counts (2021a)
Māori language in English medium schools (2020)	36.0%	64.0%	Education Counts (2021a)
<i>Mortality</i>			
Life expectancy (2013) (years)			Ministry of Health (2018a)
Female	77.1	83.9	
Male	73.0	80.0	

It is said that statistics are facts without the tears, and, in presenting these statistics we are very aware of the tears in and behind such a damning inventory. In order to understand more about both the sadness and the anger arising from the situations that these statistics describe, we examine an historically Eurocentric narrative which we consider reflects both old and new forms of racism in this country.

Old and new racism

The racism of the nineteenth century is sometimes referred to as biological or scientific racism as it was founded on prejudice and discrimination based on perceived biological differences between ethnic or racial groups. White Europeans and their descendants were biologically (and thus scientifically) superior and, therefore, socially superior. In some situations, this was even calculated mathematically. For instance, in 1787, the United States Constitutional Convention decided that a (black) slave would be considered as three fifths of a free man. In Western Australia, the *Native Administration Act 1936* gave the Commissioner of Native Affairs powers over a much wider range of people of Aboriginal descent than

4 0.2 of the population's ethnicity is unknown.

previously, including control over their choice of marital partner (see McGregor, 2002). This was used to 'breed out the colour' of Australian Aboriginal people as part of a 'white Australia' policy. Dr Cecil Cook, the chief medical officer and 'chief protector' of Aboriginal people in North Australia, and an exponent of this policy, argued that by the fifth and certainly by the sixth generation, all native characteristics of the Australian Aborigine would be eradicated because of the biological superiority of the white person. While these more extreme manifestations of such racism are no longer enacted, biological racism still exists in the minds of many people and underpins the actions of extremists associated with the 'alternative right' (or Alt-right), including those of the perpetrator of the mass killing of 51 Muslims in Christchurch on 15th March 2019.

In addition, there are new(er) forms of racism, sometimes referred to as 'cultural racism', 'new racism' (Barker, 1981), 'neo-racism' (Balibar, 2007), or 'postmodern racism', which are founded on prejudice and discrimination based on *cultural* differences between ethnic or racial groups. What is also new about 'new racism' is that its proponents have a new-found confidence: they present themselves as having the right to be racist, and that being racist is even 'cool'. Some of this is linked to a backlash against political correctness and being 'woke' (as in being woke or awake to social injustice), and justified with reference to the right to free speech. In an excellent response to the linking of racism to free speech, Gillborn (2009) analyses the assumptions defended in an interactive radio call-in show, concluding that 'Under the guise of "free speech", White people are free to engage in speculation about the nature of intelligence, without risk to themselves, in a situation where the costs are borne entirely by minoritized groups.' (p. 536) Fundamentally, this is based on a lack of awareness or appreciation of power, and, specifically, differences in power and equity between races and/or ethnic groups - and, in this sense, there is little distinction between the ignorance of old and new racism and racists.

In the next part of the article, we consider how the old narrative - that we are 'one people' is maintained and promoted through both old and new forms of racism in contemporary New Zealand society.

'He iwi tahi tatou' | 'We are one people'

When, on 6th February 1840, Māori rangatira signed Te Tiriti o Waitangi (The Treaty of Waitangi, hereafter '*Te Tiriti*'), William Hobson, then the British Consul to New Zealand, greeted Māori present with the phrase 'He iwi tahi tatou' | 'We are one people'. Given that the rangatira had just signed a document that acknowledged their sovereignty (Article 2) and confirmed a model of co-governance with regard to the two peoples, Māori and Pākehā (Article 1), this was not only rude and presumptive (as Hobson was the guest in this land), it was also inaccurate and misrepresentative. Nevertheless, his intentions - and those of Britain's colonial strategy - was made clearer the next day when he ordered the flag of He Whakaputenga o Te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tireni (the United Tribes of New

Zealand) to be replaced by the British Union Jack. Clearly, Hobson's vision was of 'one people' under British rule - and, of course, and despite vigorous Māori resistance since, that is what took place.

In addition to the *Land Claims Ordinance 1841*, and the (British) *New Zealand Constitution Act 1852*, other legislation confirmed and delivered this strategy, including:

- The *Suppression of Rebellion Act 1863* - which suspended habeas corpus for those found to be in rebellion against the British Crown.
- The *New Zealand Land Settlements Act 1863* - which empowered British authorities to confiscate Māori land in any district where a 'considerable number' of Māori were believed to be in rebellion against the Crown. This alone led to the confiscation of three million acres of Māori land.
- The *Native Reserves Act 1864* - which put all remaining Māori reserves under government control and available for lease to Europeans at very low rentals.
- The *Native Land Act 1865* - which required Land Court hearings to determine land ownership, which had the effect of individualising land titles.
- The *Māori Representation Act 1967* - which set up (only) four Māori seats in what was, in effect, a British/Pākehā parliament. This was in response to settler concerns that, with the individualisation of land titles, voters of iwi (tribal) descent might outnumber Pākehā in some electorates.
- The *Native Schools Act 1867* - which provided for the setting up of schools in Māori villages but in which only English was allowed to be spoken. These schools were established at the expense of Māori: the hapū (sub-tribe) had to provide the land, half the cost of the buildings and 25% of the teacher's salary.

All this - and much more - was enacted within just over 25 years of the signing of *Te Tiriti*, and continues to modern times. *Te Tiriti* is often cited as progressive in its colonial treatment and negotiations with Indigenous Peoples. Yet, there has been ongoing contestations and conflict over the Crown's '(dis)honouring' of the Treaty. Of particular significance is Chief Justice James Prendergast's 1877 decision declaring the Treaty 'worthless' and a 'simple nullity': 'Unfortunately, the Prendergast ruling influenced government policy and legislation for almost a century, allowing Māori interests to be repeatedly ignored and excluded' (Haenga-Collins, 2017, p. 150). As recently as 2006, the Ministry of Health was directing District Health Boards not to make reference to The Treaty (let alone *Te Tiriti*), because of the government's concern about the backlash from 'the general public' (see Treaty Resource Centre, 2019).

Apart from the fact that 'He iwi tahi tatou' represents a misunderstanding and misrepresentation of *Te Tiriti*, its practice and rhetoric disadvantages Māori and advantages non-Māori - with regard to land, law, education, health, justice, and so on. Colonisation has always been about gaining power and privilege for the colonisers at the expense of the

colonised. Here we identify four forms of colonisation which were enacted in Aotearoa New Zealand (see Table 2 opposite).

All of this is based on beliefs about the hierarchy of races and, specifically, the inherent superiority of white Europeans (See: Levine, 2010). In the New Zealand context, becoming one was not (to be) based on a coalition or merger of equals, based on common understandings about land, life, and social organisation, and, indeed, how to talk with each other rather than past each other (Metge & Kinloch, 1978). For Hobson, early and subsequent settlers, the British Crown and subsequent New Zealand Pākehā governments, becoming one people was, rather, based on the forced assimilation of Māori - land, people, and values - into the Pākehā world.

While New Zealand has prided itself on its down-to-earth egalitarianism, and progressive social policies, including in relation to Māori, it has also been a master of state-sanctioned illusions which, at times, has resulted in self-deception on a national scale. For example, two early Acts of parliament which substantiated for non-Maori a belief that New Zealand was founded on an equality between Māori and Pākehā were the British government's New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 and the Māori Representation Act 1867. The first allowed both European and Māori males 21 years of age and over the right to vote. However, qualification to do so was based on European land tenure practices which effectively prevented most Māori, who owned land collectively, the right to vote or participate in parliamentary processes. This resulted in only an estimated 100 Māori men, out of a total population of 5,849 (Māori men 21 and over) able to vote in the first general election of 1853 (Ministry for Culture and Heritage, 2016). The second piece of legislation created four electoral seats specifically for Māori. However, the four seats gave Māori far less representation in parliament than the general seats gave Europeans. For instance, on a per capita basis in 1853, Māori should have had 14 to 16 seats. (Ministry of Culture and Heritage, 2016). Moreover, the New Zealand parliament was, in effect, a Pākehā parliament, designed and imposed by settlers, which not only ignored existing Māori rangatiratanga (sovereignty) and tikanga (values and practices), but also clearly pursued a policy of assimilation:

Resolved, That in the adoption of any policy, or the passing of any laws, affecting the Native race, this House will keep before it, as its highest object, the entire amalgamation of all Her Majesty's subjects in New Zealand into one united people. (*Journals of the House of Representatives*, Thursday, the 7th day of August, 1862 - quoted in Jackson & Wood, 1964, p. 383).

Table 2: *Forms of colonialism as enacted in Aotearoa New Zealand*

Enactment	By 'doctrine of discovery'	By treaty - and by deliberate breaches of treaties	By force	By assimilation
Slogan	'We're claiming the land.' 'What natives?'	'We've come to treat with you (and deceive you).'	'We've come to take your land.'	'We've come to make you like us.'
Example (international)	Colonisation of Australia (late 18th century Common Era [CE]).	Colonisation of North America.	Conquest of Britain by the Romans (43 CE).	Canadian residential school system.
Example in Aotearoa	1841 The appropriation of 'unappropriated' or 'waste' land.	The British attitude to Te Tiriti o Waitangi and the Crown's subsequent breaches of it (see Treaty Resource Centre, 2019).	9th October 1769 The shooting of Te Maro (Ngāti Oneone) and four fishermen at Gisborne by James Cook's crew; The <i>Tōhunga Suppression Act</i> 1907.	<i>Adoption Act</i> 1955 which, on the basis of the argument of 'one law for all', made customary adoptions illegal.
Justification	Terra nullius or nobody's land (a notion which was maintained in Australia from 1788 to 1992).	Settler colonialism, National colonialism.	Exploitation colonialism, National colonialism.	National colonialism - advancing the assimilation of Māori people into Western society.
Philosophical implication(s)	Ontological - an attack on the nature or essence of being and the existence of beings.	Epistemological - an attack on theories of knowledge. Methodological - an attack on philosophies of practice.	Method/practice - of war and conquest, and suppression.	Ontological Epistemological, and Methodological, represented in Method/practice – through paternalistic and superior attitudes towards Māori.
Level of psychological discounting (Schiff et al., 1975)	At the level of existence.	At the level of the existence of problems, and of the significance of stimuli (for instance, of the values of other people).	At the level of existence of options, the significance of problems (i.e., not knowing about local customs), and the changeability of stimuli.	At the level of existence - by negating or incorporating fundamental life principles, cultural values, traditions, protocols, identity, and way of life.

The state's ability to narrate a fair, benevolent, and honourable account of its actions and *intent* towards Māori, despite inequitable and often destructive outcomes, has also provided a template for navigating Māori/settler relationships at more interpersonal and personal levels. It could be argued that many Pākehā New Zealanders echo the state's self-deception of equality and harmony. For instance, within some universities there is a 'diversity quota' or 'Māori entry pathway', yet structural racism within the academy remains and Māori continue to be marginalised as both students and staff (See: Gabel, 2020). Further, non-Māori New Zealanders within their private lives hold and express disparaging views about Māori which many are more uncomfortable with expressing. This is nothing new.

In the 1940s, Earnest and Pearl Beaglehole observed prevalent attitudes of Pākehā New Zealanders with remarks 'that often more correctly represents the real and private opinions of an individual than the guarded statements he issues for public consumption' (Beaglehole & Beaglehole, 1946, p. 308). In interviews with the Beagleholes, Pākehā from various social backgrounds described Māori people as 'liars', 'inferior', 'thieves', 'unfriendly to Pakehas', 'dirty', 'sullen', 'lazy', 'cheeky' and, 'good-hearted but stupid' (pp. 307-309). One un-named civil servant interviewed advised to assume that, 'unless proved to the contrary, all Maoris are liars, stealers, and adulterers. But when proved to the contrary, the Maoris are generally respectful of property and about as moral sexually as the average low-class pakehas' (cited in Beaglehole & Beaglehole, 1946, p. 311). In the 1960s, Harré drew particular attention to a code of acceptable behaviour, where unqualified prejudice against Māori would be seen as 'very bad form' (Harré, 1966, p. 83).

These 'hidden' narratives, which not only marginalise, but also superimpose a dominant cultural reality upon Māori, continue to be played out in political, public and personal spaces within Aotearoa New Zealand. These narratives, or social scripts, are often so nuanced and subtle that calling out certain behaviours or attitudes as 'racist' further marginalises Māori and Pākehā allies who are labelled as 'overly-sensitive,' 'radicals,' or, as former Prime Minister Helen Clark infamously labelled marchers protesting the Foreshore and Seabed Bill (legislation that was enacted in 2004 in blatant disregard of Te Tiriti o Waitangi), 'haters and wreckers'.


That said, there is also a new confidence, and more overt racism, which positions Māori as problematic and an impediment to a successful and united national identity. This confidence can be seen in political rhetoric and the media, and is echoed by individuals who fear Māori are getting 'special treatment' (in education, health, etc. - and hence the importance of presenting facts such as those in Table 1). A clear example of this assimilationist rhetoric was the 'Iwi versus Kiwi' slogan (from the 2005 general election) (Te Ara, 2022), which clearly emphasised that Māori aspirations are harmful to the interests of all other New Zealanders, signalling Māori rights as anti-New Zealand (see Brash, 2014; Forbes, 2016).

We are many people

Hobson's statement has become 'Hobson's pledge,' a right-wing slogan and group that claims equality and unity - not equity - before the law; denies historical facts and realities, specifically Te Tiriti o Waitangi; and believes simply (and simplistically), in 'moving forward as one' (Hobson's Pledge, 2021).

This old narrative finds its modern form in the notion of New Zealand as a multicultural rather than a bicultural nation. As migration has impacted on societies, it has become commonplace for people and governments to claim and celebrate some form of fusion of cultures. Hobson's assertion that 'we are one people' (1840) finds an echo in the metaphor of the 'melting pot' to describe the fusion of nationalities, cultures, and ethnicities in the United States. The phrase is the title of an eponymous play by Zangwill (1908), though the metaphor was in use by the 1780s. However, it is a monocultural metaphor based on an assimilation model for a heterogeneous society to become more homogeneous. If we look at New Zealand society in terms of the (six) ethnic groups as defined in the 2018 general Census, we see: European (70.2%), Māori (16.5%), Pacific peoples (8.1%), Asian (15.1%), Middle Eastern/Latin America/African (MELAA) (1.5%), and 'Other ethnicity' (1.2%) (NZ Stats, 2021). (As respondents could choose to identify with more than one ethnic group, the percentages total more than 100%.) This can be expressed visually - see Figure 1.

Figure 1: A multicultural representation of ethnic groups in New Zealand by percentage of the population (NZ Stats, 2021).



However, this presentation of statistics defines and places Māori as simply another ethnic group. As Ward (1999) points out:

By right of their prior occupation and of the Treaty, Maori expected (and still expect) to retain as much of their identity, property and autonomy as was consistent with shaping the nation state, and not to become simply one of many non-European groups in a multicultural society ... Like other first occupants world-wide, Maori have emphatically rejected assimilation into a homogeneous New Zealand community. (p.2)

Despite this, and despite some lip service paid to biculturalism, in our experience, it is more common than not that Māori are included in a list of ‘ethnic minorities’. As we were finishing this article, the second author went to a concert, at the end of which, and referring to the cultural mix of the concert and of New Zealand society, one of the performers said: “Isn’t it great? We’ve got Samoans, Māori, Italians ...”. Other ways of presenting these figures and thinking about this are shown in Table 3 opposite.

Identifying iwi (tribes) is a complex process and there is a number of different lists, maps, and ways to acknowledge iwi. For our present purposes and after some consultation, we have drawn on the list published by the National Library of New Zealand that associates iwi with 15 waka (canoe) that brought Māori to Aotearoa (National Library, 2021), though we also acknowledge that some iwi/hapū may have a different/additional history. In Table 4, we have noted the number of iwi associated with each waka for the purpose of demonstrating the diversity within te Ao Māori (the Māori world) which parallels that of the non-Māori world, but which is often glossed over when people refer to Māori as if they are an homogenous group. In fact, using the word ‘Māori’ to describe the inhabitants of this land, rather than identifying them by their iwi, is itself a colonial categorisation.

One way of acknowledging Māori as tangata whenua and the increasing ethnic diversity of Aotearoa New Zealand is to refer to our multi-ethnic society in a bicultural nation. We should note, however, that this perspective and politics would probably be regarded as a minority view - which, of course, supports the point this article is making.

The language and attitude of assimilation denies the history of this land, as well as the differences between people(s), and specifically the inequities between Māori and non-Māori, especially Pākehā (see Table 1). Unsurprisingly, the language and politics of oneness, sameness, and ‘equality’ (i.e., assimilation) tends to come from those who are privileged, and who don’t want to acknowledge it. Here we briefly consider two other narratives that contribute to the politics and psychology of assimilation: ‘we are (all) indigenous’, and ‘it’s our language, too’.

From New Zealand historian, Michael King (1999), to Trevor Mallard, a long-serving politician and the current Speaker of the New Zealand House of Representatives (Mallard, 2004), to students this author meets in the university setting, some non-Māori

Table 3: A bicultural framework for the representation of ethnic groups in New Zealand

Māori	Non-Māori	
16.5%	96.1% ⁵	
Waka o Ngā Iwi (National Library, 2021)	Pākehā (i.e., non-Māori people whose ancestors and/or who themselves were born in New Zealand)	Tau Iwi (or 'new bones', i.e., people who were not born in New Zealand) (23.6%)
Aotea (20 iwi) Ara Tāwhao (3) Arawa (12) Horouta (12) Hua (4) Māhūhū (4) Māmari (3) Motumotu Ahi (2) Ngātokimatawhaorua (20) Nukutere (2) Ruakarama (2) Tainui (88) Tākitimu (13) Te Ikaroa a Rauru (4) Tokomaru (5)	Polynesian, British, Irish, French, German, Scandinavian, Chinese, Dalmatian, Dutch, Asian, African, ... and others (Te Ara, 2019)	British and Northern Irish (6.43%) Chinese (2.42%) Indian (1.69%) Australian (1.57%) South African (1.36%) Fijian (1.32%) Samoan (1.27%) Philippino (0.94%) South Korean (0.67%) Tongan (0.56%) American (United States), (0.54%) Dutch (0.50%) Malaysian (0.41%) Cook Islander (0.33%) German (0.32%) Japanese (0.26%) ... and others (4.74%) (NZ Stats, 2018)

are now laying claim to also being Indigenous New Zealanders (for a critique of which see Bell, 1996, 2014; Mikaere, 2011). Such a stance is problematic on a number of levels, but perhaps was best summed up by Bruce Jesson, a prominent New Zealand journalist, author and political figure. In 1986 he said:

Racial conflict was one of the formative experiences of New Zealand society. Pakeha New Zealanders are the products of an invading culture. As individuals we can be magnanimous or guilt-stricken, according to our inclination. But as a society we have this amazing capacity for self-deception. For more than a century we smugly believed that this country was a model of racial harmony, that we were one people. Māori radicalism has put an end to that delusion, and we are now in the process of putting down new layers of hypocrisy (Jesson, 1986, p. 15).

5 As respondents could choose to identify with more than one ethnic group, the percentages total more than 100%

The new layers of hypocrisy Jesson is referring to includes Pākehā claiming an indigenous New Zealand identity. The claim to an indigenous New Zealand identity has been described as a 'Pākehā desire to be cut off from their history as the descendants and inheritors of the privileges of the colonisers of Aotearoa' (Mikaere, 2011, p. 102). For Pākehā New Zealanders, trying to erase a colonial past is part of the colonial condition: by imagining and claiming an indigenous identity is not only another level of self-deceit, but it also opens new ways to continue the colonising process of de-centering Māori.

One unexpected way this has manifested is in the growing use of te reo Māori. For example, over the past decade the number of Pākehā enrolled in Māori language classes has risen exponentially and the use of kupu Māori (Māori words) in government institutions, schools, programmes, and organisations is now commonplace. Many New Zealanders would rather forget that as recently as 1984, a state-employed telephone operator by the name of Naida Glavish faced dismissal for greeting callers with 'Kia ora'. The phrase Kia ora is now universally used within New Zealand and is part of the branding on Air New Zealand, the national airline carrier.

Yet like Air New Zealand, who tried to appropriate the term 'Kia ora' by trademark, seemingly unaware of the disrespect and insult to Māori this would cause, many Pākehā language learners are unaware of the not infrequent hurt and shame experienced by the 75% of Māori who do not speak te reo (Stats NZ, 2020a), including those without the access to social, economic, and/or cultural resources to learn.

To understand this hurt, one must return again to the effects of colonial policies and practices which accelerated the decline of the Māori language by the assimilationist efforts and monolingual desires of state education. Such policies included the Education Ordinance 1847, the *Native Schools Act 1867* (Ka'ai-Mahuta, 2011), and practices such as the corporal punishment of Māori children heard speaking Māori (See: Anaru, 2011; Selby, 1999). The outcome of these policies and practices, prior to a Māori-led language revitalisation effort, can be seen in Table 4.

Table 4. *Māori as a first language for new entrants at primary school (Ka'ai-Oldman, 1988)*

Year	Percentage
1900	>90%
1960	25%
1984	<2%

Therefore, while it is both important and commendable that non-Māori New Zealanders are taking an active role in learning and speaking te reo, it is crucial that this acquisition of knowledge does not further marginalise Māori either unintentionally or more deliberately - and that good intent on the part of Pākehā does not place their

needs above Māori realities. Māori language use by non-Māori without an understanding of Māori values and histories, or a commitment to pursuing a more equitable society, becomes another example of appropriation (in this case, of some te reo) while actually de-centering Māori from their own language. For example, in 2019 during a dispute over a Māori (mana whenua) decision to remove exotic trees from an ancestral mountain and to replant with original native species, non-Māori protesters, claiming to be mana whenua by right, used te reo Māori, which included a karanga (ceremonial call given by tangata whenua to manuhiri (visitors)), to state their connection to the mountain while simultaneously negating Māori stewardship and effectively claiming Māori to be visitors on their own land (Dunlop, 2019).

Conclusion: Decolonisation

‘To honour the Treaty, we must first settle colonisation.’ (Jackson, 2015)

Given that this article is presenting ideas about racism, we have focused on that; and, given the analysis presented in this article, it will be no surprise that our own response to the material is to advocate anti-racism, a subject that warrants a parallel article: ‘This is antiracism’. New Zealand has a long and strong tradition of anti-racism, dating back to the late 1840s when Māori rangatira protested to Queen Victoria about breaches of Te Tiriti o Waitangi (to no avail).

What becomes clear is that racism in New Zealand, as pertaining to its Indigenous population, follows a well-worn pattern. Policies and practices instigated by non-Māori may appear benevolent and progressive, but without a relationship with Māori at the centre are detrimental to, and further marginalise, Māori.

Antiracism demands that Māori are not decentralised from decision making, that Māori are at the forefront of developing and implementing policies and practices affecting them and that non-Māori join with Māori as equals, realising that this means relinquishing power and control and ultimately trusting Māori (Mikaere, 2011).

In Aotearoa New Zealand, as in any colonised country, we cannot understand or deal with racism without understanding the history and current manifestations of colonisation; and, thus, anti-racist practice and theory has to engage in decolonisation. Fortunately, decolonisation is on the agenda in Aotearoa New Zealand, at least, in some circles, and certainly in the public sector, especially education (e.g., Hutchings & Lee-Morgan, 2016), and health (e.g., Came et al., 2020a, 2020b). The challenge remains, however, to continue the work of decolonisation - of all aspects of New Zealand society as well as the hearts and minds of everyone who calls New Zealand home – and to make this work more mainstream. Whilst we acknowledge such work, there continues to be tokenism and backlash. As long as we have the outcomes represented in the statistics

summarised in Table 1, we cannot and should not be satisfied. In this sense, at least for now, as Ranganui Walker (2004) stated it: 'Ka whawhai tonu atu' - the struggle is without end.

Legal statutes

Australia

Mabo v Queensland (No 2) [1992] HCA 23, (1992) 175 CLR 1 (3 June 1992), High Court.

Britain

New Zealand Constitution Act 1852

New Zealand

Adoption Act 1955

Land Claims Ordinance 1841

Māori Representation Act 1967

Native Land Act 1865

Native Reserves Act 1864

Native Schools Act 1867

New Zealand Land Settlements Act 1863

Suppression of Rebellion Act 1863

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