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dc.contributor.authorBhowmik, A
dc.contributor.authorCao, J
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-11T03:02:34Z
dc.date.available2012-01-11T03:02:34Z
dc.date.copyright2011-11-28
dc.date.issued2012-01-11
dc.identifier.citationOnline at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35060/MPRA Paper No. 35060, posted 28. November 2011 03:55 UTC
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10292/3260
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we establish two different characterizations of Walrasian expectations allocations by the veto power of the grand coalition in an asymmetric information economy having finitely many agents and states of nature and whose commodity space is a Banach lattice. The first one deals with Aubin non-dominated allocations, and the other claims that an allocation is a Walrasian expectations allocation if and only if it is not privately dominated by the grand coalition, by considering perturbations of the original initial endowments in precise directions.
dc.publisherMunich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA), Munich University
dc.relation.ispartofseriesnumber MPRA Paper No. 35060, pp.? - ?
dc.relation.urihttp://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35060/
dc.rightsAll papers reproduced by permission. Reproduction and distribution subject to the approval of the copyright owners.
dc.subjectAsymmetric information economy
dc.subjectAubin non-dominated allocation
dc.subjectPrivate core
dc.subjectPrivately non-dominated allocation
dc.subjectProperness
dc.subjectWalrasian expectations allocation
dc.titleOn the core and Walrasian expectations equilibrium in infinite dimensional commodity spaces
dc.typeCommissioned Report
dc.rights.accessrightsOpenAccess


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