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dc.contributor.authorZhou, Jen_NZ
dc.contributor.authorLi, Sen_NZ
dc.contributor.authorWang, Ben_NZ
dc.date.accessioned2020-01-08T22:31:53Z
dc.date.available2020-01-08T22:31:53Z
dc.date.copyright2019-12-23en_NZ
dc.identifier.citationMathematical Problems in Engineering, vol. 2019, Article ID 9547931, 10 pages, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1155/2019/9547931.
dc.identifier.issn1024-123Xen_NZ
dc.identifier.issn1563-5147en_NZ
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10292/13081
dc.description.abstractMore and more high-end brand companies are exploring new markets by extending low-end product lines. When selecting agents in new markets, a principal often faces the problem of identifying the promotional ability of agents. This paper aims to study the dynamic incentive of supply chain under information asymmetry for the information screening in long-term supply chain cooperation. Also, it pioneers the rhythm of information disclosure in the extant literature. By establishing three two-stage supply chain models, this paper analyzes the impact of agents’ information disclosure speed on the brand. We find that it is better to separate agents earlier out of the brand perspective; the semiseparated contract is beneficial for the brand to control information disclosure speed more flexibly and get more profits from the retailer. But, from the perspective of the supply chain, it is also possible to prefer the mixed contract. Under certain conditions, the pooling contract could also increase the profits of supply chain and improve the allocation efficiency of supply chain.en_NZ
dc.languageenen_NZ
dc.publisherHindawi Limiteden_NZ
dc.relation.urihttps://www.hindawi.com/journals/mpe/2019/9547931/
dc.rightsCopyright © 2019 Jianheng Zhou et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
dc.titleInvestigation of Dynamic Incentive of Supply Chain Under Information Asymmetry for Screeningen_NZ
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.rights.accessrightsOpenAccessen_NZ
dc.identifier.doi10.1155/2019/9547931en_NZ
aut.relation.endpage10
aut.relation.startpage1
aut.relation.volume2019en_NZ
pubs.elements-id368111
aut.relation.journalMathematical Problems in Engineeringen_NZ


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