Security Intelligence and the public interest
Abstract: The attacks of September 11 2001 created an iconic moment where our history can be defined as the pre and post 9-11 period. The impact that this event had on how states organise their national security intelligence apparatus was immediately evident. Within New Zealand this new security conscious era created a polarised debate: on one side were those who demanded that the Government tighten border and domestic security, and on the other side were those who argued that New Zealand's isolation and independence created a condition that reduced the likelihood of the country becoming a target of terrorism or a place attractive to those with terrorist sympathies. When New Zealand was called on by the United States to contribute to the War On Terror, an argument flared within executive government. The political destabilisation manifested itself first within The Alliance, a party that had in 1999 formed a governing coalition with the Labour Party. The Alliance fragmented: on one side, the leader and deputy leader (both Cabinet Ministers) positioned in support of Cabinet's intention to contribute to the conflict, and, on the other side, the remaining caucus members opposed the move. The division became politically unreconcilable and the coalition became fragile through to the General Election late in 2002. Post-Election, the Labour Party and two members of the Progressive Party (a party created by The Alliance's former leader and deputy leader) formed a new coalition government. The new Cabinet decided on a limited military contribution to the War On Terror and embarked on a legislative programme designed to ensure New Zealand remained secure and protected from external and internal threats. Then, in December 2002, an Algerian Imam named Ahmed Zaoui arrived at the nation's border where he sought asylum. Immediately Zaoui was confronted by an environment that was politically and operationally highly sensitised to matters of internal security. Zaoui, New Zealand's authorities soon discovered, had been convicted of terrorism related charges in Belgium and France, and had been convicted in absentia and sentenced to death on three occasions in Algeria. The New Zealand Security Intelligence Service stated that Zaoui was a risk to the nation's security and imprisoned him indefinitely in a maximum security prison pending an assessment of the case by the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security. The events that followed challenged New Zealand's democratic foundations, and created tensions between the governing executive and the judiciary. During this timeframe, the researcher reported on the Zaoui case and in 2004 was lead-author of an investigative journalism-styled book: I Almost Forgot About The Moon – the disinformation campaign against Ahmed Zaoui. This Thesis examines this case-study, analysing why the Inspector General found in Zaoui's favour. The case-study aids the Thesis' enquiry into what affect classified intelligence information has on the national and public interest when that information remains secret and unable to be tested by the wider executive, legislature, the judicial arena, the fourth estate, and the public.