Based on disruptive innovation and Stackelberg noncooperative game theory, the paper focuses on supply chain coordination under the combined effects of block chain technology and random demand. Firstly, both a decentralized and a centralized supply chain decision models are built in a single-cycle newsvendor random demand situation. Then, through revenue sharing contract the study designs a brand-new supply chain coordination model which is Del trust, decentralized, and traded anonymously. Furthermore, the numerical comparative analysis on the optimal decision and supply chain coordination are conducted. It is found that the whole supply chain revenue can achieve and even beyond the performance level of the centralized supply chain with effectively expanding sales market and reducing supply chain risk. When the retail price is stable and supply chain is coordinated with revenue sharing mechanism, decentralized supply chain can achieve minimum optimal revenue. Coordination results have effect on short-term revenues of block chain members only. Implications and suggestions for future research in supply chain coordination are provided.