A Critical Discourse Study of Indigenous Language Revitalisation Policy in Taiwan

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List of Acronyms

CALP – Critical Approach to Language Policy

CDS – Critical Discourse Studies

CIP – Council of Indigenous Peoples

CLP – Critical Language Policy

DHA – Discourse Historical Approach

DPP – The Democratic Progressive Party (the pro Taiwan independence party)

EAIP – Education Act for Indigenous Peoples 1998

EV – Ethnolinguistic Vitality theory

GIDS – The Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale (Fishman, 1991)

ILDA – Indigenous Language Development Act 2017

KMT – The Kuo-min-tang (The name translates as "China's National People's Party")

LEL – Language Equality Law

LHR – Linguistic Human Rights

LPP – Language Policy and Planning

LSS – Linguistic Stockholm syndrome

MoE – Ministry of Education

NLDL – National Languages Development Law

P.R.C. – People's Republic of China

R.O.C. – Republic of China (Taiwan's official name recognised by Taiwan's Government)

S1 – The Six-Year Plan for Indigenous Language Revitalisation, stage 1 (2008-2013)

S2 – The Six-Year Plan for Indigenous Language Revitalisation, stage 2 (2014-2019)

Attestation of Authorship

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person (except where explicitly defined in the acknowledgements), nor material which to a substantial extent has been submitted for the award of any other degree or diploma of a university or other institution of higher learning.

Chien Ju Ting

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Acknowledgements

Abstract

This interdisciplinary study, at the intersection of language policy, Indigenous language revitalisation, Taiwan studies and critical discourse studies (CDS), investigated the Indigenous language revitalisation policies in Taiwan and explored how they have influenced Indigenous language revitalisation.

In Taiwan, there are 16 officially recognised Indigenous languages and all of them are endangered. Since the 1990s, in line with the international trend, several Indigenous language-related policies have been released by the government in support of these languages. However, these efforts have not born fruitful results. After surveying the literature and the current policies in Taiwan, this study found that the inefficacy of these policies has not been sufficiently investigated via a critical lens. Therefore, a CDS approach was deployed to investigate the power imbalance and ideology relating to the policy discourse. Two sets of data were involved in this investigation: language revitalisation policy documents and interviews with Indigenous participants.

Overall, this study found that, while the language policies construct the government as supportive of the Indigenous languages, at the same time they appear to recontextualise Indigenous language revitalisation that enables the government to brand *Taiwan* as a national identity, steering clear of the China-centric ideology. In response, the Indigenous participants are willing to accept this nation-building discourse with the hope that the government can save their languages. This, I suggest, is evident through a Stockholm-syndrome-like behaviour in the way they talk about language revitalisation. I call this behaviour *linguistic Stockholm-syndrome* (LSS) whereby the Indigenous participants support the government's claims and sympathise with the obstacles the government faces. Even though the participants are framed as the victim under LSS, they later claim their *language ownership* by showing willingness to share their languages with the non-Indigenous majority, thereby also sharing Indigenous language revitalisation responsibilities. This process signals that a language essentialist ideology for language revitalisation within the policy scope is no longer preferred by the Indigenous community and that Indigenous language revitalisation needs to take a broader approach and include non-Indigenous people within the policy ideology.

While this study focuses on Taiwan's Indigenous language revitalisation policies, the theoretical and methodological contributions of this study could be applied widely to studies of minority languages worldwide. Also, a CDS methodology is shown to be appropriate for policy studies relating to Indigenous language revitalisation. In so doing, I hope to raise awareness of the power imbalance and ideology surrounding the Indigenous language revitalisation policies, and also hope that this may assist other Indigenous peoples with their own language revitalisation efforts.

Chapter 1.   What is this study on revitalisation of Taiwan's Indigenous languages all about?

1.1 Introduction

Indigenous languages worldwide are in a very fragile state with many of the languages considered to be endangered or critically endangered. Taiwan's Indigenous languages are facing the same fate. Among the 16 officially recognised Indigenous languages in Taiwan (not Chinese languages), some have very few fluent speakers left, despite the government's recent efforts in encouraging language revitalisation. Given that some Taiwanese Indigenous languages have just a handful of speakers left, many communities are racing against the clock to save their languages. However, it is not only a race against time. More importantly, it is a battle against those who wield the power (i.e., governmental power) to control what languages are used in society, by whom and how.

1.2 How this started for me

I grew up in Taiwan in a small county called Ping-Tung, which is situated in the southern part of Taiwan. It is home to two of Taiwan's largest Indigenous groups – Paiwan and Rukai. I lived just thirty minutes by car from the nearest tribal settlement. Because of the proximity, the non-Indigenous and the Indigenous population live side by side. However, due to the marginalisation, discrimination and social stigma associated with *indigeneit*y, people would hide their Indigenous status, especially during the Martial Law period with its strict monolingual policy (see Chapter 3). Growing up in Taiwan (in the 1980s and 90s), it was 'normal' to only speak Mandarin Chinese – my mother tongue.

When I went to middle school, my best friend was from the Rukai tribe. We played sports together for many years. Much like many urbanised Indigenous populations[1], her father had a position as a civil servant; he was the caretaker of the local sports stadium, and I spent most of my spare time there with her and her family, who lived under the

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[1] After the island's industrial development in the1970s, many Indigenous people moved out of their villages into the towns to work. They use Mandarin for everyday communication with the wider society. They become the so-called（registered）urban Indigenous people and government statistics show the population now amounts to more than half of the total Indigenous people.

stadium (including her grandmother). The time I spent with her family was the first time I heard an Indigenous language spoken. Her grandma used their heritage language to speak to us and her father would then translate and teach us the language. It was fun at the time to learn it. But now, I understand that my friend had lost her heritage language within three generations, which sadly resonates with the pattern of Indigenous language loss worldwide (see the Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale (Fishman, 1991) or GIDS discussed in Chapter 2).

I have always had a passion for languages. After moving to New Zealand in 2003, I studied for my master's degree in Applied Linguistics. My background in sociolinguistic studies made me more aware of language-related issues around the world. When I had my first child in 2004, the theory of language maintenance and shift (see Chapter 2) suddenly became a reality for me. I struggled with the dominant language ideology, with English being seen as the most important and convenient language to use in Aotearoa, New Zealand. By the time I had my third child in 2008, I had lost the battle of maintaining my mother tongue at home. In the beginning, I felt that this was the reality, but now, I feel saddened by the fact that my children do not speak my mother tongue. This feeling essentially underlines the sense of language loss for speakers who have lost their culture and language, Indigenous or not.

In 2016, I decided to pursue my PhD. In the same year, the president of Taiwan, Tsai Ing-wen, announced a public apology to the Indigenous people in Taiwan for the impact of colonisation, which made news headlines around the world. This event reminded me the struggle of the Indigenous people in Taiwan. Despite not having Indigenous heritage, I recognised that a study of the discourses about Taiwan's Indigenous language revitalisation policies could contribute towards a better understanding of the reality of language revitalisation in Taiwan. From this moment onwards, my PhD journey started.

1.3 This study

Recognising that language policy plays an important role in manifesting the dominant ideology (Grin, 2003; Shohamy, 2006), I have set out to explore the connection between Indigenous language revitalisation policies and their impacts on Indigenous language revitalisation in Taiwan. In this thesis I investigate how the government operationalises the policies and how the languages of Taiwan's Indigenous people are constructed in

these policies. I do this by utilising a critical discourse studies (CDS)[2] methodology, offering a textual analysis of selected official written documents produced by the government that have marked recent milestones in Indigenous language revitalisation efforts in Taiwan between 2008 and 2017. I have also met with Indigenous participants to discuss their thoughts relating to the impact of these policies.

Apart from the CDS methodology, this interdisciplinary study drew on different theories, one of which is a sociolinguistic[3] understanding of language. My initial investigation showed that there are many studies about the Indigenous languages in Taiwan relating to language endangerment, maintenance, shift, and ethnic identity (Bradley, 2010; Y.-F. Chang, 2014; Chiung, 2001; Dupré, 2013; Tang, 2011, 2015b). However, a gap in the research exists relating to Indigenous language revitalisation policies and their impact on Indigenous language revitalisation. In particular, language policy research in Taiwan is not critical or reflective enough to offer "unrealized possibilities for change" (Fairclough, 2003, p. 210) to address the current deterioration of Indigenous languages. For example, Hu's (2002) study on Taiwan's education policy and Indigenous language revitalisation culminated in a report on the inefficacy of the policy without critiquing the issues underlying these difficulties. As a result, after decades of research on policies and Indigenous languages, Taiwan's Indigenous languages are still in fast decline. Therefore, I felt that a more critical and reflective approach to the subject was needed.

While it was possible to take a sociolinguistic approach for this study, my interest is in the investigation of ideology, and a CDS methodology was thus deployed. I also found that some CDS scholars, such as Unger (2013) and Wodak and Savski (2018), have also chosen to investigate language issues using a critical discourse approach. Therefore, I opted to focus on the discourse as my objective for analysis. Nevertheless, a sociolinguistic discussion about the concepts surrounding language endangerment, maintenance and shifts was necessary to establish the context of this study (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 3).

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[2] CDS was formerly known as critical discourse analysis (CDA). In recognising the being critical is not just an analysis, it is an attitude to problem-solving, Wodak and Meyer (2016) suggested that CDS is the preferred term now.
[3] Sociolinguistics focuses on three aspects of languages: how languages operate in a society (as a social practice); how individuals or small groups use language; and how linguistic features vary with social factors (Bell, 2014, p. 7).

This study utilised Johnson's (2013) critical understanding of language policy, which views language policies as a social construct. Not only are these policies laws, regulations or planning documents that aim to manage the languages in a country, but they also constitute and are constitutive of social reality. These qualities of language policies qualify them as 'discourse' (see Chapter 4), which is inherently regulatory and powerful (Fairclough, 2010).

When dealing with language issues, the dominant power and ideology of the government almost always materialises in language policies (Grin, 2003). In this regard, a language policy is an ideological construct that represents the dominant ideology of the dominant groups with the power to set the policy scopes (Grin, 2003). Many of the world's dominant powers/languages are using this (policy) mechanism to secure their positions (Shohamy, 2006) resulting in the decline of minority languages. By the same token, language policies also have the power to promote and preserve Indigenous languages, which is at the core of this study.

A language policy is not just the words as they appear on paper; it could be embedded or recontextualised. For example, America's *No Child Left Behind Act of 2002* is an education policy that promotes 'English' as the representation of 'not left behind' (Ardizzone, 2007). This means that English language competency is used as the sole measurement of a child's educational performance. As a result, this Act discourages (Indigenous) bilingual education outcomes. It is essentially a monolingual policy disguised in education policy. This example highlights how language policies could be hidden, recontextualised or 'open to interpretation'. Therefore, I found it was important to select a methodological approach that could address these nuances about language policies, especially when the policies are situated in a complex linguistic-political environment like Taiwan. Moreover, how effective the policies are is often examined only by those who have the power to set the policy scope in the first place. Consequently, when issues such as language endangerment are dealt with, the language speaker's needs are often overlooked, and the loss of their language viewed as something that 'happened' (descriptive). To challenge this naïve view, this study has taken a critical discourse studies (CDS) approach, whereby the discourse surrounding language revitalisation policies was the focus of analysis.

Using a CDS framework, the research objective of this study was to explore Taiwan's Indigenous language revitalisation policies and how they impact Indigenous language revitalisation. Thus, in recognising that the dominant power is the one who set the policy scope, I focused on power and ideology surrounding the official dominant discourse. I also wished to see how the official dominant discourse is responded to by the Indigenous people – the policy users. Following from this objective, three research questions were formulated to guide this investigation:

1. What are the discourses within Taiwan's Indigenous language revitalisation policies?
2. What discourses exist amongst the Indigenous people about their language revitalisation?
3. In what ways do the policy discourses interact with the participants' discourses?

To address these questions, this study involves two types of data: language revitalisation policy documents and interviews with Indigenous participants. Because I grew up in Taiwan and am fluent in Mandarin Chinese, I was able to read the policies and interview the participants in this language. From this data, I sought to find out more about the relationship between language policies and Indigenous language revitalisation in Taiwan and to de-mystify the political powers that have an influence on Indigenous language revitalisation. Below, I elaborate on the application of CDS in this study.

1.4 The methodology of this study – why CDS?

CDS has several characteristics that make it an appropriate approach for this investigation. First, CDS requires research to take an interdisciplinary approach, including critical theory and linguistic theory as the core theoretical foundations. Also, theories relating to the context of the investigation, e.g., sociology, politics, psychology and cognitive science, are also encompassed by the researcher, depending on the subject of investigation (Unger, 2016). While this study has a sociolinguistic component in that it is interested in the Indigenous language situations, it also draws knowledge from the fields of language policy and planning. Therefore, this study can be described as interdisciplinary. The interdisciplinary nature of this study means it is able to get a good sense of the *social wrong* because it looks at the underlying social condition from different theoretical backgrounds.

Second, CDS is considered an appropriate methodological approach for this study because of its focus on power, discourse and ideology. CDS scholars believe that power, ideology and discourse go hand in hand: they create and sustain each other. Since this study follows the view that policy is the manifestation of domination and power (Grin, 2003; Shohamy 2006), a policy is considered a form of discourse of control (Johnson, 2013). Therefore, a CDS approach enabled a better understanding of the ideological perspectives of both Indigenous people and the government (and its policies). The definition of 'discourse' is further explained in Chapter 4.

Additionally, CDS considers "the context of language use to be crucial" (Wodak & Meyer, 2016, p. 5). Since a language policy is the dissemination of the dominant power (Grin, 2003), it signals the uneven power in the social structure within a particular socio-cultural context. Without the exploration of the context in which the data is situated, the analysis could have fallen into a technocratic analysis of policy and would not be able to provide useful knowledge. Thus, the CDS framework further enabled this study to get a better understanding of the relationship between the government and the Indigenous people in Taiwan.

1.5 The significance of this study

The intended outcomes of this research are on two levels. Firstly, this qualitative study fills a methodological gap in Taiwanese Indigenous language revitalisation studies to help identify why the language revitalisation policies are not as effective as they should be. Building on some of the existing CDS studies on language policies, I introduce the use of this methodological approach to the study of Indigenous languages in Taiwan. The CDS view of the policies as a discourse plays an important role in this investigation, which is the first of its kind in policy and Indigenous language studies in Taiwan. Therefore, this study presents a different avenue to investigate the relationship between the government and local communities when it comes to language revitalisation.

Also, while this investigation centres on Indigenous language revitalisation in Taiwan, it has the potential to benefit Indigenous language revitalisation in other countries by contributing to frameworks, strategies and approaches to Indigenous language revitalisation research. A broader extension of this would mean that CDS could be adopted in the analysis of linguistic or visual texts in Indigenous contexts.

1.6 The outline of this thesis

This thesis is composed of eleven chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 is a literature review about language revitalisation that focuses on language endangerment, maintenance and shift, and highlights the aspects of sociolinguistics in the investigation. Chapter 3 takes a more detailed look at Taiwan's linguistic landscape, including Taiwan's Indigenous languages and their speakers. It also provides the context in respect of Taiwan's political situation, which that has impacted upon government ideology and the government's efforts in relation to Indigenous language-related policies.

Chapter 4 elaborates on language policy in general and how language policy should be examined critically by viewing language policies as a discourse and a social construct. Within this chapter, the CDS methodology and its appropriateness to Indigenous language revitalisation policy study are explained, including terminologies associated with CDS.

Chapter 5 presents the design and method of this study. Building upon the CDS framework in Chapter 4, this chapter explains the research design, including data collection and analysis. In order to identify the discourse about Taiwan's Indigenous language revitalisation policy and its impact on language revitalisation, this research incorporates policy documents and interviews with members of the Indigenous communities. The analytical procedures and tools are also elaborated in this chapter.

The analysis and findings are organised into four separate chapters that aim to address the research questions. Chapters 6 and 7 consist of analysis of policy documents. Chapter 6 focuses on the investigation of the government's view on Indigenous languages within two consecutive government policies delivered by different political powers covering the period 2003–2019. This chapter sets out to identify the government's intention for Indigenous language revitalisation and explores the relationship between language ideology and political ideology within the political system. Chapter 7 focuses on one significant piece of legislation, the Indigenous Language Development Act (hereafter referred to as the ILDA), which was promulgated in 2017. This Act coincided with the Stage 2 Six-Year Plan, so has particular relevance when it comes to understanding the government's intention for Indigenous language revitalisation.

Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 present the findings from the interviews with 11 Indigenous participants from Taiwan about their thoughts on and attitudes towards language revitalisation, the policies, and their outcomes. Chapter 8 looks specifically at the research participants' comments relating to language revitalisation policies and the government's efforts. While the findings underscore the voice of desperation from the participants, it nevertheless, suggests a hopeful outlook for the Indigenous language revitalisation efforts to date. This chapter also pays attention to a Stockholm-syndrome-like behaviour in the participants' discourse about their language revitalisation which I discuss in detail. Chapter 9 is centred around the notion of *language ownership* and looks into how the speakers negotiate their power when it comes to the control of their languages. This chapter also addresses the perception of language revitalisation responsibilities of the government and the Indigenous people.

Chapter 10 reviews the findings of the analysis of the discourses of government within the policies and the Indigenous people's responses to the revitalisation of their languages. In comparing these discourses and reflecting on the research questions, this chapter discusses the relationship between the users and those in power who make decisions about language revitalisation so as to gain a better understating of why the policies appear to be ineffective.

Finally, Chapter 11 sums up the main findings of this study. In addition, I present the contributions, limitation and recommendation of the study. This chapter ends with some closing remarks on this PhD journey.

Chapter 2.   Theorising Indigenous language revitalisation

2.1 Introduction

This chapter helps to situate this study in the literature relating to language revitalisation by introducing theories relating to language endangerment, providing justifications for Indigenous language revitalisation and explaining the terminology that is important for this study. I also discuss the roles of language policy in each of the topics mentioned. Linguistic human rights and literature on language ideology as a new field of enquiry into Indigenous language revitalisation is also presented.

Below, I start by providing the background of language endangerment in regard to Indigenous and minority languages in Section 2.2, and Section 2.3 offers justifications for language revitalisation. Section 2.4 looks into some of the terminology that is important in this study, then Section 2.5 discusses several language revitalisation cases around the world. Section 2.6 focuses on the topic of linguistic human rights. Section 2.7 focuses on language ideology as a new field of inquiry in Indigenous language revitalisation studies, and Section 2.8 discusses the terms 'language ownership' and 'legitimate speaker'. The chapter concludes with a summary.

2.2. Language endangerment

This section provides an overview of language endangerment at the global and local levels and explains some of the associated terminology. It has been widely acknowledged that the world's linguistic diversity is diminishing quickly, and this is especially true for Indigenous languages. Crystal (2000) warned that, at the current speed of language corrosion, a conservative estimation indicates that "at least one language must die, on average, every two weeks or so" (p. 25). Even the most optimistic estimation indicates that half of today's oral (Indigenous) languages will have disappeared or at least will not be learned by children by the end of this century (Skutnabb-Kangas, 2013). This is the harsh reality facing Indigenous languages.

Throughout history, powerful countries, such as Britain and France, spread their languages by means such as exploration and colonisation, in a physical sense. In Taiwan, the colonisation by the Japanese and the Chinese has had equally devastating effects on the Indigenous languages of Taiwan (as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3). Nowadays, the mobility of languages has exceeded physical and

geographical boundaries. Dominant languages, such as English, colonise many socio-political, economic and public spheres without physically taking over. This phenomenon is made possible by the advancement of the internet, and the smartphone and its applications. Sallabank (2010) thus regarded the decline in linguistic diversity as "by-products of globalisation and/or international capitalism" (p. 59). While the use of digital media also connects diasporic or geographically distant speakers of minority languages, the mounting pressure to 'keep up' with the world has resulted in many Indigenous communities choosing to use the dominant languages over their heritage languages. What is worst is that many of these minority languages are facing pressure both from domestic and international perspectives. In Taiwan, for example, the Taiwanese Indigenous languages are in competition not only with the socio-politically dominant Mandarin Chinese, but also with the English language as a global lingua franca. For the speakers, this means the struggle for physical resources (i.e., teaching materials and classroom hours) becomes a challenging task for language revitalisation.

However, language revitalisation is not just about physical resources – it is also about the recognition of a language's social status. Many Indigenous language speakers are fighting against the steady current of *language shift* (LS). Language shift means that the language speakers prefer one language to another, and therefore slowly shift to speaking the preferred language for reasons such as social prestige or economic benefit (Fishman 1991). In most cases, it is the dominant languages that are the preferred languages. As a result, the minority language is replaced by the dominant language in almost all domains of life (Spolsky, 2004), although there have been examples of *diglossia* – a stable intergroup bilingualism (Fishman, 1991, p. 73) – such as Finnish and Swedish in Finland (Bell, 2014, p. 47). But, what we see currently is more minority language speakers shifting to speaking only the dominant languages.

Arguably, the word 'shift' suggests that the speakers have a choice about which language to speak; however, given the socio-historical context, often these choices are pre-determined (e.g., by immigration, colonisation, globalisation). Take Taiwan for example, colonisation by the dominant Mandarin Chinese speakers has resulted in a rapid decline of the Indigenous languages. Once the minority language starts to lose its domains of usage (e.g., in public places, at home, or online), the language gradually disappears. This is also known as *language attrition*.

Language attrition is the process of losing a native, or first, language (Grenoble & Whaley, 2006). Grenoble and Whaley (2006, p. 17) adopted Campbell and Muntzel's taxonomy of language endangerment situations and listed four causes of language attrition.

1. **Sudden attrition** occurs when a language loss is sudden and abrupt. It is directly linked to the loss of speakers. The reason for such sudden loss may result from political conflict, colonisation or diseases.

2. **Radical attrition** is similar to sudden attrition, but it is mainly a choice made by language speakers to avoid political persecution and thus distance themselves from the language and their ethnic identity,

3. **Gradual attrition** means a slow loss of language due to language shift. Whether a local language is shifting to a dominant local language or a national language, the shift may be slow and unnoticeable until it has passed the point where revitalisation efforts become difficult.

4. **Bottom-up attrition** is also called the 'Latinate pattern'. It means a language is not used in the family setting and/or most other domains, but is, specifically, used in ceremonial practice. Because of such prestigious use of language (high status) and the wide use by a large population in such a limited domain, the demography and the status of the language may be 'perceived' or self-reported as high. This makes it difficult to assess the vitality of the language.

These four stages are linearly linked. Once language attrition picks up momentum, it results in either the disappearance of the language or the situation in which the language is reduced to being used only on ceremonial occasions and rarely at home, which eventually leads to the language ceasing to be a living language.

Language revitalisation efforts need an understanding of the causes of language attrition in order to select the measures that are the most appropriate for the language to be revitalised given the social or political context. For example, in Taiwan, colonisation was identified as the main contributor to the sudden attrition of its Indigenous languages. Speakers of these languages were physically punished for using their heritage languages under the Mandarin-Only policy. As a result, they began to distance

themselves from the language and their ethnolinguistic identity, thus resulting in radical attrition (see Chapter 3). While identifying the cause of language endangerment is a relatively easy task, the more challenging task is to persuade the Indigenous communities, the government, and the general public that the Indigenous languages are worth saving.

2.3 Why bother saving languages?

The notion of language revitalisation divides opinion. On the one hand, language revitalisation plays a pivotal role in humanity (Crystal, 2000; Fishman, 1991, 2001; Hinton & Hale, 2001). On the other hand, the revitalisation of Indigenous languages is sometimes seen as costly and impractical (see Crystal, 2000). It can be argued that the cost of 'not doing it' is greater. The question then arises, 'why should we revitalise Indigenous languages?' To begin to answer this question, it is useful to consider the two categories put forward by Grin (2003): *moral conditions* and *welfare considerations.*

2.3.1 The moral condition

The moral arguments for Indigenous language revitalisation count on people's moral judgment, which has several aspects. The first moral condition judges language revitalisation as of equal importance to the act of preserving animal or plant species. As biodiversity is the prerequisite for human existence, linguistic diversity can be viewed in the same way (Crystal, 2000; Skutnabb-Kangas 2013). For this reason, it is argued that preserving and revitalising endangered languages that are at a brink of extinction is the 'right thing' to do (Fishman, 1991; Grenoble & Whaley, 2006; Harrison, 2007; Hinton & Hale, 2001; Skutnabb-Kangas, 2013). However, opponents of such arguments assert that linguistic diversity and biodiversity are not comparable. Regardless of the opposition, the moral condition has a stronger argument – the notion of *linguistic human rights* (LHR) (Grin, 2003).

The LHR argument is based on the notion that rights are considered one of the most basic needs of an individual in a democratic society (Grin, 2003). In order for language revitalisation to be seen as the 'norm' and, thus, accepted, the association of human rights with language is an irrefutable normative premise. Since no language can function without its language user, the extension of an individual's rights to use his/her language in a certain domain with certain people is his/her LHR; these are collective rights as well as individual rights (Grin, 2003). Skutnabb-Kangas (2013) reiterated the

concept of linguistic rights as a human rights issue and indicated that to deprive people of their LHR is the equivalent of genocide due to the harm caused to the speakers of a language psychologically and through social displacement. While the idea of 'linguistic genocide' is contentious, it is evident that language loss can be an exceedingly difficult emotional process for the speakers, who see not just their language but their identities and culture gradually eroding away. Hinton and Hale (2001), in particular, related LHR to Indigenous human rights and stressed that "language retention is a human rights issue. The loss of language is part of the oppression and disenfranchisement of Indigenous peoples" (p. 5). In this light, the loss of language is closely linked to the disorientation of people's ethnolinguistic identity.

Ethnolinguistic identity is not only an identity marker for the individuals, but it also contains regulatory properties that are culturally specific and create hierarchical structures which guide an individual's behaviour in society. Denying a person's right to exercise his/her ethnolinguistic identity is seen as breaking up the fabric of a certain society, and therefore is morally unsound.

Despite the above moral debates in favour of the preservation of minority languages, there are arguments which support having a lingua franca as an effective way of stimulating the global economy. These kinds of arguments suggest that people who speak a minority language often also speak a dominant language (i.e., an Indigenous Taiwanese language and Chinese). Therefore, Indigenous language revitalisation could be seen as unnecessary. Although Crystal (2000, p. 40) argued against this view with the "human capital theory", the economic benefit accruing from regarding a lingua franca as a way to minimise the perceived linguistic cost seems to be widely accepted (Crystal, 2000). As a result, the moral debates sought an alliance with an economic approach – the welfare perspective.

2.3.2 The welfare perspective

The second defence for language revitalisation is based on a welfare perspective (Grin, 2003)**.** The welfare approach examines how revitalising a language benefits society as a whole. This approach explores whether society is better off devoting resources to act on language revitalisation. To answer this question, the morality involved in saving endangered languages is secondary because decisions made to revitalise a language

based on the welfare perspective are morally neutral, with the aim being to increase the collective welfare of society, resulting in an economic approach to the language issue.

This approach recognises a language as a *public good*. While it can be argued that language revitalisation requires vast amounts of expert time and funds, the cost of language revitalisation may impact on other aspects of society, as language issues are often an index of other social agendas, such as economy, education, crime, poverty and so on (Fishman, 1991; Grenoble & Whaley 2006; Hinton & Hale, 2001). Therefore, the budgets for language revitalisation need to be weighed against other social revenues, compared to the cost of 'not having it'. In this light, valuing the minority language helps reduce social costs associated with displacement of the minority language speakers (Skutnabb-Kangas, 2013).

Linguistic diversity can be said to be a public good for humanity in three ways. Firstly, while some may argue the loss of languages is symbolic, in reality, it results in the erosion of cultural and environmental knowledge (Crystal, 2000; Freeland & Gomez, 2014; Grenoble & Whitecloud, 2014; Harrison, 2007). An Indigenous language not only contains cultural beliefs, it often contains rich knowledge on and practices of local agriculture, fisheries, horticulture, and forestry. For instance, the Tofa people have some very dynamic words to describe reindeer and the terrain on which they traverse as Siberian reindeer herders (Harrison, 2007, p. 57). These language speakers have used the language for centuries to navigate the wilderness in the absence of a scientific method. They use the language to track time, identify months and seasons, pinpoint locations and more (Harrison, 2007). In this regard, Skutnabb-Kangas (2013) has attributed to these languages a higher degree of accuracy and sophistication than Western scientific taxonomy.

Secondly, our understanding of history is embedded in the language we speak, such as idioms and metaphors. Many of the idiomatic uses of language represent the social condition, history and social structure of the time. In a way, a language 'sees' and 'lives' history. Moreover, the oral traditions of many Indigenous languages use the storytelling of legend and myth as a way of documenting historic events, which in turn provides insight for researchers in other fields, such as botany, anthropology, geology, and so on. In this sense, much of what is known about the world rests with the language

speakers (Harrison, 2007) and when these languages die, so too does the cultural knowledge and history attached to them.

Thirdly, languages contribute to studies of human cognition (Harrison, 2007, p. 18). Harrison (2007) pointed out that a primary goal of linguistics is to uncover the universal properties of all human languages. To lose one language is to lose a variable in which a particular linguistic structure may be discovered. As Harrison (2007) explained, if we only have the major languages to study (i.e., English, Chinese, French, etc), then our understanding of human linguistic cognitive capacity will be "severely handicapped" (p. 19). Also, our cognition of the metaphysical world will be reduced without language. Many languages, in this respect, offer philosophical knowledge and enhance the human experience. In this regard, there is much to gain if the diversity of languages is maintained.

It is clear that languages serve as collective repository of ways of knowing and ways of seeing the world. Crystal (2000) quoted Russian writer Vjaceslav Ivanov, who said that "each language constitutes a certain model of the universe, a semiotic system of understanding of the world, and if we have 4,000 different ways to describe the world, this makes us rich" (p. 47). Therefore, it is daunting to imagine that the disappearance of a language is also the extinction of a significant pool of knowledge.

2.4 Can threatened language be saved?

How a threatened language could be saved depends on three aspects: its history of attrition, its level of endangerment, and the community's attitude towards the language. I have explained language attrition in the earlier sections; now I discuss how to evaluate the endangerment level. In other words, before any revitalisation work can begin, we must find out how threatened a language is.

To evaluate how endangered a language is, Grenoble and Whaley (2006) proposed a simple six-way scheme, as shown in Table 2.1, that categorises language endangerment as safe, at risk, disappearing, moribund, nearly extinct, and extinct.

Table 2.1
Language endangerment scale

Categories	Description
Safe	The language is used by at least three generations and in all domains.

At risk	The language starts to lose domains for speaking, e.g., at school.
Disappearing	People start to shift to speak another language within the communities (i.e., within the home environment).
Moribund	The language is no longer passed on to children.
Nearly extinct	The only remaining speakers of the language are members of the grandparent generation.
Extinct	No remaining speakers.

When a language is *safe*, it is used by at least three generations in all domains. When a language is *at risk*, it starts to be used in limited domains. When a language is *disappearing*, it starts to be replaced by another language within its own community. The final three categories (moribund, nearly extinct and extinct) are characterised by their lack of *intergenerational transmission*, which is an emphasis of Fishman's (1991) Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale (GIDS) that I discuss below.

Fishman (1991) hypothesised an eight-stage language assessment tool – the Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale (GIDS), which is widely used by linguists and anthropologists to assess *reversing language shifts* (RLS). According to this scale, the higher the GIDS level, the more endangered the language in question is. In order for an endangered language to regain its intergenerational transmission, it is important for that language to move from 8 to 1 on the scale, with level 1 indicating the language is used widely in all social domains, which is the ultimate goal of a language policy dedicated to language revitalisation.

Table 2.2 below is a simplified version of Fishman's (1991) GIDS. Each stage is listed with a corresponding 'must do'. Note, the 'must do' is not the only measure needed for each stage, as language revitalisation is multi-layered, but it gives a good indication of the level of language use.

Table 2.2
Simplified version of GIDS

Stages	**Must do**
8. The only remaining speakers of the language are members of the grandparent generation.	To reassemble/document the language and work with those who still know the language.
7. The generation that is not at a child-bearing age knows the language well enough to interact with one another and	To gain a younger cohort and learn the language as Second Language.

are still socially active. There is no transmission to younger people.	
6. The language is used informally and orally by all 3 generations.	The language must also be an inter-family communication tool that is used within concentrated demography.
5. The language is orally used, with some written form used within the community.	Modicum of literacy (guided literacy) is used to broaden functional periphery, but under intra-communal control.
4. Literacy in the language is transmitted through education.	A language revival programme needs to make sure the children are associated with their cultural reward system.
3. The language is used for local and regional work by both insiders and outsiders.	The goal of this stage is ethnolinguistic boundary maintenance.
2. The language is used for local and regional mass media and governmental services.	Be aware of the dominant language influence, and closely monitor the intergenerational transmission.
1. The language is used in education, work, mass media, government at the nationwide level.	Stage one represents 'cultural autonomy'. Still have to be watchful and actively maintain the language.

As Table 2.2 demonstrates, the gradual loss of language use is also reflected in the limited domains in which it is used. With a diminishing speaker population, before the new speaker population can be established it is crucial to capture the remaining speakers' knowledge about the language in stages 5 to 8, which Fishman (1991) referred to as the "inner defence" (p. 104).

At stage 5, while some literature has rejected the Eurocentric language revitalisation view, where literacy is viewed as essential to civilisation (Whiteley, 2003), Fishman (1991) stressed that literacy is important for broadening the functional periphery of language, e.g., for communication purposes. Regardless of the debate surrounding literacy, in order to move from stage 8 to stage 1, literacy is essential if a minority language community wishes to extend the language's domain, increase its mobility, and to communicate with other communities.

From stage 4 to stage 1, while it seems language revitalisation is on the right track, Fishman (1991) further warned about the danger of being in constant contact with dominant languages as the minority language is integrated into the education system and workplaces where the dominant language is used. A minority language speaker might be tempted to work or study in a bilingual or monolingual situation for better pay or other reasons which puts the revitalisation process at risk. Thus, Fishman (1991)

stressed that "any education system inevitably undercuts RLS rather than contributes to it" (p. 102). In the end, keeping a perpetually watchful eye open is what needs to happen throughout the entire course of RLS, and this requires conscious efforts at local and governmental levels. However, the local and government-sponsored efforts are often short-term, which frustrates the language revivalists (Tang, 2018).

Whilst Fishman (1991, 2001) focused on intergenerational transmission within private domains as a measurement of language endangerment, the *ethnolinguistic vitality* (EV) theory (Harwood et al., 1994; Ytsma, et al., 1994) took into account wider prospects to measure the vitality of a language – the more vitality a group has, the more it is likely to survive in an intergroup setting. The ethnolinguistic vitality theory includes three factors: *status*, *institutional support*, and *demography* (Harwood et al., 1994) as demonstrated in Table 2.3.

Table 2.3
Factors of ethnolinguistic vitality

		Ethnolinguistic Vitality (EV)	
Factors	1. Status	•	Social
		•	Economical
		•	Political
	2. Demography	•	Numbers
		•	Distribution
	3. Institutional Support	•	Formal (e.g., government)
		•	Informal (e.g., religion)

While institutional support and demographic factors may be easier to measure, the status factor can be ambivalent; for instance, sometimes a language may still have a large number of speakers but is considered to have less status, and therefore, people may be unwilling to pass the language on to the next generation. This is linked to the community's attitude and beliefs towards this language – the last factor that determines whether a language could be saved. How a community views its language impacts on how much language revitalisation is needed; subsequently, the goal-setting process needs to be adjusted accordingly. However, what counts as successful language revitalisation is often ideologically determined. I further articulate these aspects using the concept 'language ideology' in Section 2.7. Often these factors are not adequately reflected in language revitalisation policies, which may have resulted in the inadequacy of much futile language revitalisation work, such as Taiwan's Education Act for

Indigenous peoples (see Chapter 3). I discuss this aspect under the *good policy condition* (Grin, 2003) in Chapter 4.

Once an understanding of what caused language endangerment and how endangered a language is has been established, the government can start formulating language revitalisation plans. The revitalisation methods for different communities will be vastly different in nature. For example, for languages that have suffered from sudden attrition or have extremely small numbers of speakers left, it may be impossible to establish revitalisation programmes with an aim of increasing the use of the language in the short or medium term. In such cases, language documentation may be the best option. Although language documentation may not necessarily be carried out with the aim of revitalising an endangered language, it is a necessary step towards language revitalisation when the speaker numbers are in fast decline. As Hinton and Hale (2001) proposed, "the most important thing to do when a language is down to a few speakers is to document the knowledge of those speakers as thoroughly as possible" (p. 413).

It is important to understand that these scales and measurements must be examined on a long-term basis. Without establishing some sort of chronology in terms of how a language has shifted over time and how its demography and status have changed, the results of any such evaluations are likely to be unfruitful. As Hinton and Hale (2001) stressed, a language revitalisation process does not stop, it is on-going and will be for generations. Even when the language is not on the brink of extinction, the language still needs maintaining (i.e., education needs to continue) and the revitalisation goals need to be constantly re-evaluated, and so does the language policy associated with them.

2.5 Global language revitalisation efforts

While most of the studies reviewed criticised the linguistic assimilatory effect of globalisation, Grenoble and Whaley (2006) argued that globalisation also has a positive effect on minority language revitalisation. In societies that are increasingly homogenous, both culturally and linguistically, many minority communities have reacted to globalisation by asserting their unique cultural and linguistic identity, resulting in the emergence of many language revitalisation programmes (Grenoble & Whaley, 2006). In this section, I give examples from different countries around the world where there has been some small success with Indigenous language revitalisation.

Despite Grenoble and Whaley's (2006) argument that "an honest evaluation of most language revitalisation efforts to date will show that they have failed" (p. ix), many countries have made dedicated efforts to revitalise and preserve Indigenous languages. At a national level, the preservation of Irish (Grenoble & Whaley, 2006) has been considered, by K.-H. Li and Mathúna (2012), to be a success for its institutional support that raised awareness for the Irish people, regardless of its limited success in language outcome.

Additionally, there are localised bottom-up, community-based efforts. These efforts rely on determined individuals (Grenoble & Whaley, 2006), as has been shown to be the case with the revitalisation of Hebrew (Grenoble & Whaley, 2006; Spolsky, 2004, 2018), the Māori language nest model (Grenoble & Whaley, 2006; Hinton & Hale, 2001), the Master-Apprentice Programme (Hinton & Hale, 2001) and Hawaiian revitalisation (Grenoble & Whaley, 2006). It is worth mentioning that the Hawaiian case is particularly interesting; it differs from the other examples listed above because it was the non-native speakers of the language who were responsible for establishing the language revitalisation programmes (Grenoble & Whaley, 2006). This example also underscores the pressures of language revitalisation endeavours "to confront legal and political obstacles" (Grenoble & Whaley, 2006, p. 70), as the state had regulated Hawaiian as 'foreign language' for its operations. Thus, the success of Hawaiian language programme highlights that legal-political reform is needed from the government "when revitalization is linked to state or federal educational structures" (Grenoble & Whaley, 2006, p. 98).

In many cases, the localised efforts still require some level of government support and language revitalisation needs both 'top-down' (government) and 'bottom-up' (community) efforts. No matter how big or small these endeavours are, they work towards the same goal, that is, language revitalisation of the mother tongue(s). There has been enough success to warrant optimism. However, simply being optimistic is not enough. There needs to be concrete and consistent support, including language policies that are designated to the preservation of these languages. This also means language policy needs to stop viewing Indigenous/minority languages as *a problem* and more as *a right* or *a resource* (Ruiz, 1984).

2.6 Linguistic human rights

While language policy has traditionally been used to view minority languages as problems that required some form of management, in the late 80s to early 90s the orientation of language policy started to shift towards *language as rights* (Ruiz, 1984) as many claimed and reclaimed their linguistic rights or linguistic human rights (LHR) (Bell, 2014; Grin, 2003; Hinton & Hale, 2001; Patrick, 2005; Skutnabb-Kangas, 2013). As aforementioned, the notion of LHR is predicated on the right to speak as a basic individual human right (Grin 2003). Scholars such as Skutnabb-Kangas (2013) had been advocating for LHR in the education sector for decades. Her metaphorical use of 'linguistic genocide' strongly suggests that language use is a human rights issue. Although the use of terms such as 'genocide', or strategies like 'hyperbole' (Hill, 2002) suggests that "linguistic issues tend to be problematised in emotive and moralistic terms" (Dobrin et al., 2009, p. 39), this perhaps also highlights that the loss of language can be a very emotional process for the speakers.

Despite the rise of language rights, a notable gap remains between the granting of these rights to Indigenous and minority groups in policy statements and the actual revitalisation and maintenance of the languages. To revitalise a language is not merely to give the language users the right to speak their heritage languages; other measures are required to ensure the success of language revitalisation, such as providing language resources, moving forward with a positive attitude towards the language and, most importantly, the usage of the language needs to be guaranteed so as to allow the policies to move beyond a symbolic role. This could be achieved via normative policy writing. The normative policy approach concerns itself with the ethics of social and political life (Oakes, 2016). Its interests lie in the features of a good society, the norm. However, what an acceptable 'norm' is can be contentious and ideological. Nevertheless, even with careful consideration of all these aspects, there is no guarantee of success because what people *do*, and what people *think* about the language often do not meet at the same level. Below, I discuss this contradiction using the term 'language ideology'.

2.7 Language ideology

The investigation of language ideology has been seen as a new field of inquiry into language conflict (Irvine & Gal, 2000) and Indigenous language revitalisation (Austin

& Sallabank, 2014). It has also been considered by language policy scholars such as Spolsky (2004) and Shohamy (2006).

Generally, language ideology is associated with language users' beliefs about a language and how these beliefs affect their linguistic behaviours (Austin & Sallabank, 2014; Irvine & Gal, 2000; Woolard, 1998). Woolard (1998) defined language ideology as "a set of beliefs articulated by the users as rationalisation or justification of perceived language structure and use" (p. 4) – the attitude towards a language. Language ideology is thus the general belief that people have regarding who uses their heritage languages and when, how, and with whom they use their heritage languages (Austin & Sallabank, 2014). In relation to society, language ideology can be defined as ideas that a group holds regarding the role of their language in society and "about how communication works as a social process" (Woolard, 1998, p. 3).

These definitions demonstrate that language ideology is a series of socially, culturally and politically loaded positions of and about a language. That is to say, socio-politically constructed ideology influences language ideology. In this light, language ideology is more complex than just an attitude. It is the product of its political, historical, economical and moral judgments.

However, the attitude people hold about their language often does not reflect what they *do* with the language. For example, people might feel their language is very important to them but do not want to use the language in public domains for fear of the social stigma attached to it. To describe situations when language ideology contradicts language practice, Hodge and Kress (1991, p. 3) used the term 'ideological complex' to indicate the contradiction in attitudes and behaviours. Hodge and Kress's definition of ideology emerged from social semiotic theory, but since language ideology is socially constructed ideas about languages, it can be applied in a similar way to explain the conflict between language ideology (attitude towards the language) and language practice (the speaker's behaviour about a language). The mental construction required to manage and resolve this contradiction can be explained by 'consistency theory' (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 84), which requires the speakers to construct or justify their linguistic beliefs and behaviours. Below, I highlight some of the ideological complexes facing the language users which affect their language ideologies and practices.

2.7.1 Ideological complexes facing Indigenous language users

Three ideological complexes facing Indigenous language users are prominent in this study. The first has to do with the *form* of the language, the second is about language practice and the third relates to identity.

The first ideological complex facing the language users is to do with the variations of the language in the future. It entails a *modernist* versus *purist* catch-22. Some speakers believe that for a language to survive the ever-changing world, the language users face the decision to modernise their languages. Shaul (2014) pointed out that Indigenous language users inevitably have to think about the need for new words to keep up with society, for example, computer, Facebook, etc. Without such new creations, they are left with the dominant language as the only option. However, whilst many speech communities welcome the idea of the modernisation of their languages, the traditionalists or purists fear for their heritage languages being 'contaminated' and thus 'not pure' (Hadjidemetriou, 2014; Marquis & Sallabank, 2014; Shaul, 2014). Purist ideology is not only concerned with the creation of new words, but it also fears for the way a heritage language is used. As Indigenous languages are oracy-driven, some purists argued that teaching these languages at school using written materials will distance their people from the language and culture (Marquis & Sallabank, 2014; Shaul, 2014; Whiteley, 2003). Shaul (2014) articulated his concern that "if a language is written down, all of the expression of the spoken word is reduced" (p. 14). It seems the fear of losing the oral tradition is the fear of losing the way of life, the cultural practice (Fishman, 1991; King, 2014; Marquis & Sallabank, 2014; Shaul, 2014; Whiteley, 2003). Therefore, it is essential to understand that the purist movement is not always directed at the language itself but, rather, that it is a manifestation of concerns over the endangerment of culture (Austin & Sallabank, 2014; Fishman, 1991; Shaul, 2014).

Moreover, modernisation as a westernised concept of language revitalisation also means the *standardisation* of the language. There is a concern that, without standardised orthography, it is difficult to establish language revitalisation programmes (Marquis & Sallabank, 2014). However, this is not always the case; as Hinton and Hale (2001) noted, the Master-Apprentice Programme works well with Indigenous groups with a smaller number of speakers focusing on the oral tradition in its everyday context. It seems that the westernised viewpoint about languages does not always translate well

into the context of Indigenous language revitalisation due to different cultural practices, resulting in unfruitful attempts at Indigenous language revitalisation.

Furthermore, to standardise a minority language which contains many varieties may be equated to the homogeneous dominant language assimilation approach, and thus can adversely devalue the language. In the case of Taiwan's language policy, reducing the diverse dialects into 16 standardised languages may have had an adverse effect on the language revitalisation effort as this move brought on the dreadful debate about 'whose language is better?'

The second ideological complex is the conflicting ideology of language value and usage in *private* and *public* domains. Studies have shown that most Indigenous communities laud their languages in private domains, i.e., as the home language. However, when it comes to using the language in public domains, they still prefer the dominant language for socio-economic reasons that are ideological, and this practice is heavily influenced by the dominant ideology. For example, Hadjidemetriou (2014) pointed out that while the speakers of Kormakiti Maronite Arabic (KMA) are proud to be who they are, they do not consider their language 'good enough' to be passed on to the children, resulting in the standardised Arabic being the preferred language for public domains. Similarly, Räisänen (2014) wrote that while Kven is a tight Finnish-speaking community in the Norwegian nation; however, the parents of the younger generation think it would be easier for the children to master Norwegian for socio-economic reasons. Dobrin (2014) also found that the Gapun villagers in Papua New Guinea associate their language with themselves and the land, and wanted the children to learn the language, yet their cultural model prefers the lingua franca, Tok Pisin. In Taiwan, while the Indigenous languages are treasured by their speakers, Mandarin Chinese is the lingua franca – the preferred language in public domains (see Chapter 3) – and even the English language carries a heavier currency than the Indigenous languages (Y.-F. Chang, 2008).

These contradictions are caused by the ideological struggle between speakers' *public belief* and *private belief*, which are influenced by social, economic and political factors, such as colonisation, immigration, and shift in political power. One pertinent description of this problem is labelled the "ethnic revitalisation paradox" (Dobrin, 2014, p. 125), which captures the way people talk about their language and the way they use it can be quite different. Dorian (1998) referred to this underlying issue the 'ideology of contempt', where "a language is despised by association with a stigmatised subordinate

population" (Hill, 2002, p. 123). These assumptions are based entirely on "ignorance about the complexity and expressivity of Indigenous languages" (Dorian, 1998, p. 12). Such a view is often shared amongst Indigenous speakers (Hill, 2002) because of the colonising process (McCarty, 2018). Whilst many public statements of language ideology and beliefs about the heritage languages are positive, often it is the unstated beliefs and ideologies that prevent fruitful effective language policy making and language revitalisation. For this reason, it is important to conduct (*prior) ideological clarification* (Austin & Sallabank, 2014; Grenoble & Whaley, 2006). Consequently, this study looks into the language ideology of both the government and the Indigenous communities to see if there is a mismatch that may be misguiding the language revitalisation efforts.

The third ideology complex is the *essentialist* orientation versus the *indexical* orientation of language, which is closely related to the speaker's identity. The essentialist orientation view languages as directly contributing to what shapes a linguistic community, and thus identity (Di Carlo & Good, 2014). That means that the language essentialists view a language as isomorphically the people themselves. Because the linguistic identity is often taken as ethnic identity, which is an inherited quality, the loss of language is viewed as the loss of identity (Crystal, 2000; Fishman, 1991, 2001; Harrison, 2007; Hinton & Hale, 2001). In light of this connection, Freeland and Gomaz (2014) concluded that a language essentialist orientation views language as "pre-existing categories marked by a set of inherited cultural traits whose change or loss is interpreted as identity loss" (p. 169).

Contrary to the *essentialist* orientation is the *indexical* orientation of language which suggests that "the language associated with an individual's ethnic identity is not necessarily the most important one for a member of an ethnic group" (Freeland & Gomez, 2014, p. 169).) This view suggests that language plays a peripheral role in shaping identity. King (2014) demonstrated the indexical relation between language and identity by showing the different senses of 'who we are' between Generation 1 and Generation 2 Māori language learners. Regardless of a general sentiment that "the Māori language was an essential means of communication between Māori" (King, 2014, p. 224), King (2014) pointed out that the identity of Māori is based on genealogical heritage rather than linguistic practice. For this reason, the linguistic component of Māori identity is not generally supported. Albury (2016) also wrote that many of the

Māori participants in his study did not agree with the statement 'you have to speak Māori to be Māori', because they can trace their *whakapapa* (genealogy*)*, which directly leads them to their Māori identity. A more extreme case of language indexicality is from Gapun in Papua New Guinea (Dobrin, 2014; Spolsky, 2004, p. 6) and the Lower Fungon in Cameroon (Di Carlo & Good 2014), where the locals value multilingualism and see languages as 'valuable goods' – the more the better. Therefore, acquiring other languages becomes a cultural practice that constitutes identity. Admittedly, these language communities are situated in lands of significant linguistic diversity which is the precondition of a cultural practice that values multilingualism. However, when it comes to forming language policies that cater to the language ideology for these areas, it is difficult to single out the factors that account for the language ideology and language practice (Fishman, 1991; Spolsky 2004). In this light, it is important to re-think about the *one-language-one-identity* model and apply this new understanding of the language-identity relation to language revitalisation policy making.

On the one hand, language essentialism proposes that language provides solidarity because the characteristics of a group are inherent and fixed. However, this belief has been proven to be unreliable as history has shown that many conflicts in the world involve nations/groups that speak the same language, for instance, China and Taiwan. Even though the concept of the language community has been described as an *imagined community* "based on the shared charter myth founding the group around language" (Austin & Sallabank, 2014 p. 12), people who share the same language do not necessarily identify with each other as a community. On the other hand, the indexical argument set out above is not saying that the role of language in shaping identity is weak but, rather, the language is a cultural component and culture shapes the identity of people.

Since many Indigenous communities are aligned with the indexical orientation of language and identity for varying reasons, a policy that seeks to preserve a minority language should not be suffused in references that lead to a narrow ethnically essentialist-oriented policy. This may further contribute to the marginalisation of Indigenous languages by restricting the Indigenous communities' (political) activities and voices because "ethnically essentialist policies can contribute to the marginalisation of minority languages by stripping them of their perceived utility" (McCubbin, 2010, p. 460). McCubbin (2010) described, in the context of Irish language revitalisation, how

"Ethnically essentialist language policies may serve to better reflect the ideologies of the dominant non-Irish-speaking population than they do the Irish-speaking community's own beliefs about ethnocultural membership and language ownership" (p. 460).

In reflecting on my own study about Indigenous languages in Taiwan, I share McCubbin's concern that having an ethnic-specific language policy could further limit the minority group's ability to act on social decisions and thus reduce their power in society. This could also impact on their ability to decide what they need to do to accomplish their language revitalisation mission and this possibility leads me to probe ideas surrounding 'language ownership' more closely.

2.8 Language ownership and legitimate speaker

The concept of *language ownership* is often used to reflect the "legitimate control that speakers claimed to have over the development of a language" (O'Rourke, 2011, p. 327). This is simply saying that to claim language ownership is to decide what the language should look like (corpus planning), and how the language is practised (status planning) and learned (acquisition planning) (see Chapter 4), and a language policy can significantly impact these aspects of planning and thus on the sense of language ownership by either giving or taking away the control of the speaker's linguistic resources (see Chapter 4). The latter results in the speaker's struggle "to control the production and distribution of linguistic resources and over the legitimisation of relations of power" (O'Rourke, 2011, p. 327) which eventually leads to how language revitalisation responsibilities are negotiated.

While language ownership is tied to the distribution of resources, it also signifies a 'legitimate speaker' (Bourdieu, 1991). A legitimate speaker is one who not only utters the right linguistic form of the language but does so at the right moment and complying with the right discourse practice. However, the connection between language ownership and the legitimate speaker is not a given, as I explain below.

In the discourse surrounding Indigenous languages revitalisation, language ownership is automatically assumed by native language speakers, regardless of fluency level, as the ownership of their language is linked to *whakapapa* (genealogical connection) (Albury, 2016; King, 2014) and they are seen as the guardians of the language (O'Rourke, 2011, p. 328). This typically includes an affiliation with a specific community or tribe. Thus,

native speakers are seen as the most 'legitimate' speakers (O'Rourke, 2011; Nic Fhlannchadha & Hickey, 2016). However, being a legitimate speaker involves the ability to utter the correct linguistic forms. In the context of language revitalisation, where most of the population are not fluent speakers of an Indigenous language, the idea of a legitimate speaker is constantly contested and negotiated amongst the communities.

Nowadays, there are many *new speakers* (Nic Fhlannchadha & Hickey, 2016) who have a genealogical connection to the language but are considered second-language speakers or learners (O'Rourke, 2011). These types of speaker share the language ownership; however, as second-language learners, the legitimacy to speak is challenged as the words 'second' or 'learner' do not positively connote "speak[ing] with authority" (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 41); yet, they are the majority in many Indigenous contexts, outweighing the number of fluent native speakers. Therefore, what 'legitimate speaker' and 'legitimacy to speak' mean to the Indigenous communities and the policymakers is a challenging negotiation, which has a significant impact on language revitalisation in terms of the distribution of power and resources.

For this study to better align with the current situation in Taiwan, where most of the Indigenous population are not fluent speakers of a heritage language, the boundary of 'legitimate speaker' is extended to the notion of someone who is "authorized to speak and to speak with authority" (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 41), to avoid arguments over 'what form is correct' or 'who speaks better', as advised by Grenoble and Whaley (2006).

When considering the decreasing number of minority language speakers, the responsibility for language revitalisation may be shared with *non-speakers* to ensure the language's wellbeing in a wider socio-political context. Maintaining the wellbeing of a language includes supporting its speakers and the linguistic environment in which the language is used. In this broad definition, it is possible to say that someone who is responsible for decision making relating to a language's wellbeing may be a non-speaker and, conversely, a native speaker may have no influence in the wider socio-political field. This highlights the underlying power struggle within the Indigenous community, and it seems to be an issue that has perpetuated the 'one-size-fits-all' approach in minority language policies. This situation also means that, amongst the different speaker roles, each one of the speakers would need to negotiate their language

ownership with every other speaker. In this process, language ownership is shared, co-constructed, and reclaimed.

In the end, language issues have been understood as political issues and language ideologies are not about language alone (Woolard, 1998; Woolard & Schieffelin, 1994). Claiming language ownership is never just about the language itself but also the construction and legitimisation of power, the production and distribution of linguistic resources, and the construction of social structure. Most importantly, it is the decision about 'who has the right to speak what language' as a legitimate speaker. On this note, Grenoble and Whaley (2006) cautioned that "disagreement in language ownership and authenticity can create an unfortunate rift in communities and destabilise revitalisation efforts" (p. 177), which is an ongoing concern in policy making regarding language issues.

2.9 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have explained concepts relating to language endangerment and the terminology associated with it. I also have shown why the revitalisation of Indigenous languages is a necessary topic for investigation. This chapter provided an important contextual background for my research with LHR, language ideology, language ownerships, and legitimate speakers as key concepts of inquiry. Within these concepts, I highlighted the ideological complexes facing minority language speakers and how this situation may present challenges when conducting language revitalisation, as the speaker's beliefs and practices about their language are often in conflict.

Historically, there have been successes, but this does not mean that the problem has been solved because there are only a few language revitalisation cases that could be described as successful, and they have to be taken on a case-by-case basis. It is a daunting process to lose one's language; it is, at the same time, an incredibly challenging task to revive a disappearing language. This is not to say that the future of Indigenous languages is one of doom. For a language revitalisation programme to be successful, many factors are required to work together to ensure that, once a programme is up and running, it will have the maximum impact to sustain the use of the language. These factors include the language ideology of the people (speakers or not), the language practice of the community, and the related language policy. While these

factors can be unpredictable and multi-layered, it is fair to say that they will not succeed if the goals of language revitalisation are not clear and visible.

In the end, different communities will take different steps to reach their language revitalisation goals. Sometimes, it takes just a handful of committed individuals to drive the success of a language revitalisation programme, and sometimes it needs strong government support to get there. To be able to imagine the future success of language revitalisation, getting a clear picture of the 'now' is pivotal, and this includes the evaluation of the socio-political context. By so doing, the right programme can be established. In the next chapter, I describe Taiwan's history and politics, and how they have influenced Taiwan's linguistic landscape.

Chapter 3.   Taiwan: The political landscape and the decline of Indigenous languages

3.1 Introduction

Taiwan, officially named the Republic of China (R.O.C.), is an island nation 35,980 square kilometres in size, with a population of approximately 23.5 million people[4], of whom approximately 2.4% are Indigenous people belonging to 16 tribes of varying size. Taiwanese Indigenous languages are known as the Formosan languages and are considered the most diverse within the entire Austronesian language family (Bradley, 2010; P. Li, 2008). Unfortunately, the use of these languages is in rapid decline. In spite of the language planning efforts that have taken place since 1996 and the establishment of the Council of Indigenous Peoples (CIP), language decline has continued, and it is feared that most Taiwanese Indigenous languages will become extinct in the next couple of decades "if current trends continue" (Bradley, 2010, p. 74).

In this chapter, I illustrate the complexity of Taiwan's linguistic and political repertoire that is important to understand when it comes to recognising the significance of this study. I start by explaining the history of colonisation in Taiwan by a number of countries and the effects that this has had on its linguistic environment. This is followed by a description of the current political landscape in Taiwan and the tension between Taiwan and Mainland China. Later, I demonstrate the language revitalisation efforts to date, and the criticisms that have been made. Finally, I conclude by arguing that language revitalisation in Taiwan cannot simply be viewed as language management, as these issues are intrinsically political.

3.2 Colonisation history and linguistic repertoire

Taiwan has been colonised by various nationalities in the past four centuries – the Spanish, Dutch, the Japanese and the Mainlander-Chinese. The different colonial governments have treated the Austronesian language speakers differently since their arrival in Taiwan centuries ago. An explanation of the colonisation history of Taiwan is therefore necessary, particularly in relation to its impact upon the Indigenous population and the country's linguistic repertoire.

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[4] National Statistics Republic of China (Taiwan) April 2021 https://eng.stat.gov.tw/point.asp?index=9

3.2.1 Colonisation

Taiwan's colonisation history can be divided into four main stages: 1) European colonisation; 2) early Chinese colonisation; 3) Japanese colonisation; 4) post-WWII Mainlander-Chinese colonisation (Tang, 2011).

Between 1624 and 1661, the Dutch had a trading colony in Tainan, middle Taiwan. Their interaction with the local population was limited to trade, agriculture, and missionary activities. In 1661, following the collapse of the Ming Dynasty, General Zheng Chenggong, who had made a failed attempt to restore the throne of the Ming emperor against Qing dynasty, retreated to Taiwan and expelled the Dutch (Chiung, 2001; Sandel, 2003). Following the retreat of General Zheng Chenggong, Confucianism was introduced to Taiwan along with other aspects of Chinese culture. This period is recognised as the earliest mass integration of people from Mainland China into Taiwan (Tang, 2011). These settlers displaced the Indigenous people who lived on the western coastal plain, resulting in the Indigenous population retreating inland.

In 1895, the Qing Dynasty lost the Sino-Japanese war (甲午戰爭) and Taiwan was ceded to Japan. During the time of the Japanese occupation, a monolingual policy was in place to ensure the colonial power remained dominant in all important domains; consequently, "51% of the population could understand Japanese by the year 1940, and the amount rose to 71% by 1944" (Huang 1995, p. 96, as cited in Tang, 2011, p. 151).

In 1945, at the end of the World War II, Japan surrendered and Taiwan was returned to the Republic of China (R.O.C.), led by the Nationalist party (the KMT[5]). The KMT was later defeated and forced out of Mainland China by the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.), led by the Chinese Communist Party, at the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. Following that event, the KMT occupied Taiwan as the colonial power (Chiung, 2001).

Prior to losing the Chinese civil war to the P.R.C., the Nationalist KMT Government had taken over Taiwan from the Japanese, and Mandarin Chinese was promoted. In 1946, the 'National Language Campaign' (國語運動) was implemented by the R.O.C.

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[5] The Kuo-min-tang (KMT), 中國國民黨, is a Chinese political party that ruled Mainland China 1927–48 and then moved to Taiwan in1949. The name translates as "China's National People's Party" and the party was historically referred to as the Chinese Nationalists.

and served a dual purpose: 'de- Japanisation' and 're-Sinicisation' (Dupré, 2017). By doing this, a sense of 'nationhood' was created and the KMT's power was legitimised and cemented, given there was a lot of political instability post-WWII. At this time, the R.O.C. was still in Mainland China.

After retreating to Taiwan in 1949, KMT's top priority was to secure its power against the Communist China. Consequently, the 'Mandarin-only' approach was a means to ensure the nation was united by 'one language, one government' and the Martial Law was put in place to strengthen the nationalist ideology. Sandel (2003) explained:

> The KMT justified their actions by claiming they were necessary for the war to recover the mainland from the Communist bandits; and it was necessary that Taiwan's population learn to speak the national language, Mandarin, so that it would be prepared to rule on the day it 'recovered' the mainland. (p. 529)

Although the Martial Law's main function was to prevent the penetration of communist members into Taiwan, it was nevertheless a mechanism used to create authority and to secure the KMT's power in Taiwan. During this period, any languages that were not Mandarin Chinese were banned. A 'one language, one nation' narrative was utilised to build a national identity. The idea that a perfect political order consists of "one nation, speaking one language, ruled by one state, within one bounded territory" (Irvine & Gal, 2000, p. 63) was the ideology behind many national projects worldwide (Johnson, 2013; Truscott & Malcolm, 2010), and Taiwan was no exception. Drawing on Anderson's (1991) notion of an 'imagined community', the nation (R.O.C.) was imagined to be a monolingual entity whose sovereignty included Mainland China and Taiwan. Hall (1996) further illustrated how the reinforcement of a nation (or national identity) creates a homogeneous culture, which has a significant impact on Taiwan's linguistic repertoire.

3.2.2 Taiwan's linguistic repertoire

Currently, Taiwan is a multilingual island, with four main home language groups: (i) Mandarin Chinese, 13%; (ii) Hoklo-Taiwanese,[6] 73 %; (iii) Hakka 13%; and (iv) the Indigenous languages, 2%. In the sections below, I introduce the language groups and

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[6] Hoklo-Taiwanese is also known as, Holo, Hoklo, Taiwanese, Southern-Min, Tai-gi, Tai-yii, or Hokkien (Sandel, 2003; Tang, 2011).

the background relating to the impact of the post-KMT rule on the Indigenous languages.

3.2.2.1 Hoklo-Taiwanese and Hakka languages

Hoklo-Taiwanese (sometimes referred to as Taiwanese) and Hakka are considered Chinese dialects, and together they are known as the 'Taiwanese languages' (Tang, 2011). Since the late Ming Dynasty (in the 17th century), a large number of Mainland Chinese from the coastal regions migrated to Taiwan. The majority of the settlers were either from Fujian province, and were the ancestors of Hoklo-Taiwanese speakers, or from Guangdong province, and were the ancestors of Hakka speakers (Tang, 2011). Although the dialects are related to Mandarin Chinese as they belong to the 'Han' language, Mandarin Chinese and these dialects are not mutually intelligible (Tsao, 1997).

Hoklo-Taiwanese and Hakka were the majority languages spoken before the R.O.C. (the KMT Government) moved into Taiwan in 1949. As Dupré (2013) noted, "Taiwanese also played the role of lingua franca before the introduction of Mandarin in post-World War II Taiwan, and in many ways still does in the southern part of the island, especially for older generations" (p. 433). However, since the introduction of the Mandarin-only monolingual policy by the KMT, while the Taiwanese languages are still used in many private domains, Mandarin Chinese is the dominant language in public spheres.

3.2.2.2 The Indigenous peoples and their languages

The recognition of Taiwan's Indigenous peoples today is based on the Japanese classification of 'Indigenous', called 'fan' (蕃)[7] (H.-t. Chang, 2016). In the Japanese colonisation period, only those who had previously inhabited the non-sinicised territory, the so-called 'raw', were regarded as 'Indigenous' with particular social status. Indigenous peoples who had lived under the rule of previous Chinese dynasties – sinicised Indigenous people (the so-called 'cooked'), referred to as *Pinpu*, which means plains – were not administered with special Indigenous status (H.-t. Chang, 2016). After 1949, the KMT Government followed the same principle of Indigenous identification and continued using the two strands of Indigenous status recognition categories set up

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[7] The Japanese Government followed the criterion of Ch'ing Dynasty, which was determined by space (H.-t. Chang, 2016).

during the Japanese period, namely the 'plains Indigenous people' (平地原住民），
and 'mountain Indigenous people' (山地原住民).

During the Japanese colonisation period, nine tribes were identified with Indigenous
status. This is displayed in Table 3.1, where the year of their Indigenous status
recognition shows 1945. Their 'Indigenousness' is categorised by observable linguistic,
social and cultural traits. One of the criteria that separated the tribes was their
languages. Given the growing awareness of the linguistic and cultural differences within
the nine previously recognised tribes, seven new tribes have been recognised in the past
20 years. They are Thao, Kavalan, Taroko (Truku), Sakisaya, Sadiq, Kanakanavu, and
Hla'aroa. As a result, there are now 16 Indigenous tribes recognised in Taiwan (H.-t.
Chang, 2016; CIP, n.d.). Table 3.1 below also gives an indication of the Indigenous
population[8].

Table 3.1
Taiwanese Indigenous population

Tribe	Population	Year of recognition
Amis	213,514	1945
Paiwan	102,730	1945
Atayal	92,084	1945
Bunun	59,536	1945
Truku	32,333	2004
Rukai	13,465	1945
Puyama	14,517	1945
Sediq/Seediq	10,452	2008
Tsou	6,702	1945
Saisiyal	6,730	1945
Yami	4,684	1945
Kavalan	1,490	2002
Thao	817	2001
Kanakanavu	356	2014
Hla'aroa	413	2014
Sakizaya	985	2007
Total (approx.)	560,808	

Although it seems that a population of half a million is sufficient to sustain the language
use, the absence of 'child speakers' is an alarming indication of the future prospects for
the languages (Bradley, 2010). Moreover, the identification of Indigenous status is
based on registration numbers, not speaker numbers. The reality is that there are far
fewer speakers than the Indigenous population suggests.

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[8] Population data taken from CIP website as of January 2020

The ethnic languages of the Indigenous people of Taiwan are termed by linguists as the Formosan languages. The Formosan languages are extremely diverse at all linguistic levels, from phonology to morphology to syntax. These languages are unintelligible to each other, hence the diversity, which suggests that it is the homeland of Austronesian languages[9] (P. Li, 2008). However, the *Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger of Disappearing* first identified Taiwan's Indigenous languages as in various stages of endangerment in 2001 (UNESCO, 2001, p. 39). An updated UNESCO report in 2010 showed that six of the languages are now critically endangered and others are rapidly in decline (Bradley, 2010).

Taiwan does not have a systematic measurement of Indigenous language attrition, and the "attitudes and policies towards the Austronesian languages were negative and discouraging" until the 90s (UNESCO, 2001, p. 30). Yet there has been a multitude of indications of language loss over the past two decades. A 1995 survey reported only 37% of the Indigenous participants said that their heritage language is the most used language at home and only 16% claimed fluency (Tsao, 1997). A telephone survey conducted in 1999 by Taiwan's *United Daily Newspaper* suggested that only 9% of Indigenous children are fluent in their heritage languages (Pawan, 2004). The 2012 R.O.C. National Census showed that Indigenous populations in the Eastern regions retained approximately 20% of language use at home. Indigenous populations in other areas of Taiwan only retained 1 to 5% of home usage. However, the Census did not give any indication of language fluency. Note that, in the Census, people can choose more than one language for language used at home. This further suggests that the home usage of Indigenous languages is unnervingly low. It is clear that, between 1995 and 2012, the home usage of the heritage language has decreased, as has the fluency level, regardless of the tribal population. It is unsurprising that smaller tribes, such as Kavalan, have just "a few dozen" competent speakers left (S. Huang & Hsieh, 2007, p. 93).

3.2.2.3 The arrival of the KMT

With the arrival of the R.O.C. Nationalist KMT Government, all languages on the island other than Mandarin Chinese were restricted, and this included the local Hoklo-Taiwanese (the largest language group), the Hakka language and the Indigenous languages. The relocation of the R.O.C. to Taiwan not only introduced the 13% of so-

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[9] The vast majority of Austronesian languages lie outside Taiwan in the Pacific region, including New Zealand Māori.

called Mainlander Mandarin Chinese speakers, it also significantly altered the language behaviours of the island. While Mainlander Mandarin Chinese speakers only account for 13% of the population, and Hoklo-Taiwanese constitutes 73% of the population, Mandarin Chinese is the dominant language; it was given the status of "Guo-yu" (literally meaning 'national language') and became the de facto official language (Dupré, 2016, p. 430). In the 1950s, in order to propagate Mandarin Chinese, Taiwanese media were still allowed to use local dialects but only on the basis that they would be replaced by Mandarin Chinese once the Mandarin was sufficiently established. In the 70s, it was further stipulated that programmes broadcast in 'dialects' were only to be aired for one hour per day (Tsao, 1997). In 1987, when Martial Law was lifted, the restrictions on language use were also relaxed.

Beyond the National Language Campaign of 1946, in 1956 the Nationalist KMT Government launched the Speak Mandarin Campaign, imposing Mandarin as the medium of instruction in schools and forbidding the use of local languages. Students caught speaking languages other than Mandarin Chinese on the school grounds were punished. In 1963, the Bureau of Culture of the Ministry of Education specified that Mandarin should account for at least 50% of broadcast time. In 1976, the Broadcasting and Television Law (廣電法) formally stipulated local language airing quotas to a maximum of 20%. From 1975, civil servants were required to use Mandarin as the language of the workplace for administrative purposes (Dupré, 2017, p. 40).

As a result of a heavy-handed monolingual policy, over 94% of the population used Mandarin to communicate. This impacted all local languages, especially the Indigenous languages, with a loss of 15.8% in two generations and 31% across three generations (Huang, 1995, p. 227, as cited in Tang, 2011, p. 152). Apart from a general approach of the Mandarin-only policy across the entire island, the Mountain Reserve Policy (Hu, 2002), specifically targeted at the sinicisation of Indigenous people, was reinforced, including two aspects relevant to language: (i) *Political Education*, which was designed to 'de- Japanise' and 're-Sinicise', forbidding the use of the Japanese language; and (ii) *Mandarin Language Education*, which was part of a larger campaign to teach Mandarin to all people living in Taiwan, In addition, "the Ministry of Education officially proclaimed linguistic unity as a national policy on March 24, 1973" (Tang, 2011, p. 152).

3.3 The political situation

Not only does Taiwan have a complex linguistic environment, it also has a multi-layered political history. The political situation is delicate and this impacts on national policies that address the Taiwanese identity, including the Taiwan-China ideology. This section provides background on Taiwan's current political environment, elaborating on the myriad political ideologies. Starting with the KMT versus DPP political struggle, this section then moves onto the minefield of the One-China policy. The purpose of this section is to build an understanding of how political ideology might be influencing the language ideology for Taiwan's Indigenous languages and how this may impact on language revitalisation.

3.3.1 KMT versus DPP

Despite the KMT's economic achievement under the period of Martial Law (1949–1987), the KMT's ethnic and cultural policies were resented by many (local) Taiwanese as Mainlanders have dominated not only the political but also the economic, educational and other social domains, creating ethnic inequalities. These apparent inequalities drove the inception of the *democratisation movement* in the mid-1970s (Dupré, 2017).

The local Taiwanese language speakers viewed the KMT power as foreign oppression, especially after the 'February 28 incident' in 1947 (二二八事件) – a massacre that brutally suppressed protest against KMT corruption. This hostility worsened when the R.O.C. Government retreated to Taiwan in 1949 (Dupré, 2017; Sandel, 2003), and this was followed by decades of political repression, known as the *baise kongbu*, 'white terror' (白色恐怖) (Sandel, 2003). Under the military leader Chiang Kai-shek, the KMT imposed Martial Law that lasted 38 years.

After the death of the KMT's long-term leader Chiang Kai-shek in 1975, his son, Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國), started to increase the representation of local Taiwanese (the non-Mainlanders) in the party and government. Although the creation of opposition parties was initially forbidden under Martial Law, candidates who were independent (*Dangwai*, '黨外', literally "outside the party"), were allowed to stand for local elections. People who were involved in *Dangwai* went on to provide the core leadership for the establishment of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民主進步黨) in 1986 –

Taiwan's largest pro-independence party (Dupré, 2017). The official establishment of the DPP, marked the beginning of the KMT versus DPP era.

In 1987, one year before Chiang Ching-kuo's death, Martial Law was lifted. Succeeding Chiang Ching-kuo as the President of R.O.C. was his former Vice-President Lee Teng-hui, a local Taiwanese. While Chiang had already taken minor measures in the 1970s to enhance the ethnic inclusiveness of the party, Lee's presidency (1988–2000) constituted an unparalleled step towards the 'Taiwanisation' and the 'democratisation' of Taiwan with Lee being the first democratically elected president in Taiwan following the general election in 1996 (Dupré 2017). This marked the true beginning of Taiwan's democracy. Lee Teng-hui's strong Taiwanese stance further paved the way for the victory of Taiwan's first Taiwanese-Nationalist DPP president Chen Shui-bian in 2000. Since 2000, political power has changed hands several times. Table 3.2, below, provides a full list of Taiwan's presidents and their associated political parties. Note that, this study selects Indigenous language revitalisation policies released between 2008 and 2017, which enables the investigation into the political influence in language policy under two different political parties.

Table 3.2
Lists of Taiwan's presidents and their political parties

Period	President	Political party
1949–1975	Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石)	KMT
1975–1988	Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國)	KMT
1988–2000	Lee Teng-hui (李登輝)	KMT
2000–2008	Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁)	DPP
2008–2016	Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九)	KMT
2016–2020	Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文)	DPP

3.3.2 Political ideology and language ideology

DPP supporters and politicians were mainly Hoklo-Taiwanese who resented not only the KMT's Mainlander domination and political oppression but also their linguistic repression (Dupré, 2017). After nearly 50 years of oppression by the Mandarin-dominated KMT, the DPP rose to power as a minority government in the 2000 presidential election, under the leadership of Chen Shui-bian. This event provided an opportunity for DPP to formally change Taiwan's linguistic regime and cultural landscape. In 1999, when Chen was the presidential election candidate, he signed the

'New Partnership Agreement' (新夥伴關係協定)[10] with the Indigenous communities which acknowledged Indigenous people's rights. Chen reiterated this commitment[11] to the Indigenous community in 2002. Although this agreement was seen as a political move for election votes, this new partnership signified a unification of those who were marginalised and repressed.

Although the DPP benefited the most from *Taiwanisation* – an ideological division between the KMT and the DPP – the DPP did little to enhance the status of Taiwanese languages in relation to Mandarin Chinese during Chen Shui-bian's two-term presidency (2000–2008). In 2002, proposals made by the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) to make Hoklo-Taiwanese a "co-official language" were rejected by the DPP Government (Dupré, 2017, p.4). Realising the complexity and sensitivity of the language issues, the DPP quickly proposed to make English a "quasi-official language", which was another short-lived attempt to undermine the language status of Mandarin (Dupré, 2017, p. 104). Instead, the DPP administration submitted proposals for a Language Equality Law (LEL) (語言平等法) in 2003, calling for the recognition of all of Taiwan's languages (Hoklo, Hakka, Mandarin and Indigenous languages) as equal national languages. Later, a version of the proposal re-surfaced in 2007 as the National Languages Development Law (NLDL) (國家語言發展法) – the predecessor of the Indigenous Language Development Act (ILDA) (原住民族語言發展法) of 2017, which was not adopted by the Legislative Yuan[12] in 2007 (Dupré, 2017) but was passed later, in December 2018,[13] as National Languages Development Act.

The DPP's NLDL draft challenged the KMT's China-centric ideology and, at the same time, supported Taiwan as different from China with Taiwan's unique linguistic ecology. However, by the time the KMT came back to power in 2008, little change had taken place in Taiwan's linguistic landscape (Dupré, 2017, p. 4). In the end, the Hoklo-Taiwanese language status had not been successfully recognised under the DPP Government. Nevertheless, the DPP's commitment to the Indigenous communities as

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[10] See 總統出席 2006 年「國中有國：憲法原住民族專章」學術研討會開幕典禮 (The President attended the conference for Indigenous people's constitutional rights) http://www.president.gov.tw/NEWS/10861

[11] See http://www.president.govt.tw/news/918

[12] Legislative Yuan is legislative body of Taiwan, similar to a parliament. The Government of Taiwan consists of the Presidency and five Yuan: the Executive Yuan, Legislative Yuan, Judicial Yuan, Examination Yuan, and Control Yuan.

[13] See Ministry of Culture https://www.moc.gov.tw/en/information_196_96138.html

political leverage against the KMT at the 2000 election seemed to have enjoyed some success and the Indigenous language status has gained some recognition (i.e., in the LEL and the NLDL), and some policies have been implemented more recently (e.g., the Six-Year Plans for Indigenous Language Revitalisation).

In 2008, the Six-Year Plan for Indigenous Language Revitalisation (2008–2013) (原住民族語言振興六年計畫), a long-term plan for Indigenous language revitalisation, was announced. This plan was stipulated under the DPP administration prior to 2008 (in December 2006) as part of the NLDL consultation. However, in 2008, the KMT administered and funded the plan. During the KMT's return to power under President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九）(2008–2016), a second Six-Year Plan (Stage 2 Plan) (原住民族語言振興第 2 期六年計畫 2014–2019) was amended and announced. The KMT lost power to the DPP for the second time when the current president, Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) was elected in 2016 and she officially apologised to the Indigenous community on behalf of the government.[14]

Although both parties have portrayed themselves as the "legitimate protectors of minority interests" (Dupré, 2016, p. 417), given the colonial history and the increasing cross-strait tension with Mainland China regarding the One-China ideology, the approach to language issues is not just about languages. As Bourdieu (1991) explained, language is 'symbolic capital' that producers use, most often unwittingly, "to maximize the symbolic profit" (p. 44) that can be gained in linguistic practices. To put simply, the KMT holds sway in terms of maintaining a One-China ideology by being the Mandarin language dominant party, given that Mandarin Chinese is a synonym of 'China'. On the other hand, the DPP's political position on ethnic inclusion is consistent; thus Dupré (2017) had predicted that the ILDA "will most likely be passed under the DPP government" (p. 135).

The artificially created linguistic habitus (Bourdieu, 1991) shaped the hegemonic status of Mandarin Chinese in Taiwanese society and has given the KMT a favourable position in its negotiation with China regarding the One-China ideology, while at the same time, proclaiming it is defending the status quo and Taiwan's best interests. However, under a rapidly growing Taiwanese-identifying population, the KMT has had

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[14] Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen formally apologised to the country's Indigenous people on August 1, 2016. http://time.com/4433719/taiwan-president-tsai-ing-wen-apologizes-to-indigenous-people/

to restrain its Chinese-centric approach regarding both language and political ideology, so as to remain legitimate in the eyes of the 'new Taiwan' generation.

3.3.3 The One-China Principle

In 1992, P.R.C. and R.O.C. representatives held a meeting on the basis of a vaguely defined One-China Principle (一個中國原則), in what the Chinese government refers to as the "1992 Consensus" (九二共識) (Dupré, 2017, p. 42). The One-China Principle is not just a recognition of political powers, it also has a strong linguistic reference to Mandarin Chinese, especially the idea of "Mandarin as common unifying language across the Strait" (Dupré, 2017, p. 121).

In Taiwan, under the KMT's rule, Mandarin Chinese has long been the de facto national language. Dupré (2016, p. 424) addressed the point that since the proposal for the National Language Development Law (NLDL) in 2007 aimed at turning all of Taiwan's languages into equal 'national languages' ('guojia yuyan', 國家語言, shortened to 'Guoyu'), "it was imperative to rename Mandarin Chinese for the law to make any sense" as the term Mandarin Chinese literally means 'national language' (Guoyu, 國語). However, the renaming of Mandarin Chinese was not easy. It was difficult to decide what term to use for Mandarin Chinese. The new term would have representational meaning for the national ideology (in Taiwan or China) (Dupré, 2016). The attempt to rename Mandarin Chinese was referred to as 'qu-Guoyu-hua' (去國語化), which has a twofold interpretation. It could mean to simply remove the term 'Guoyu' (de-Guoyu); it could also mean stop using the Mandarin Chinese language (de-Mandarinisation), which would be taken as a pro-Taiwan independent move, thus violating the One-China ideology, or would be seen as anti-China as Mandarin Chinese is also known as 'Beijinghua' (Beijing dialect) (Sandel, 2003).

Taiwan's political climate operates under the P.R.C.'s firmly held One-China ideology. The DPP under the Chen Government asserted the 'one county on each side'(一邊一國) political view (Dupré, 2017, p. 54) which caused a stir as this 'state-to-state' political position implied Taiwan's independence. To reassure the people of Taiwan, the KMT's 'one China, two interpretations' position was reinstated under Ma Ying-jeou, and can be interpreted openly. Ma's move relaxed the cross-strait tension until the 2016 election

where DPP's President Tsai rejected the 1992 Consensus, which once again put Taiwan under enormous political and economic pressure from China.

Despite the political and linguistic tension between the DPP and the KMT and their careful manoeuvring around the One-China concept, there have been some Indigenous language revitalisation efforts from both parties. Below I explain the key moments in these efforts.

3.4 Indigenous Language revitalisation efforts in Taiwan

The earliest Indigenous language documentation activities can be traced back to the Dutch missionary period. Some Taiwanese Indigenous languages were preserved by the Dutch missionaries with the help of 'Romanisation', also known as the 'Sinkang Script' (1624–early 19th Century). This was the first Romanisation and the first writing system for Indigenous languages in Taiwan (Chiung, 2001). Strictly speaking, this is not considered language revitalisation and at the time its use was restricted to missionary purposes.

The earliest language revitalisation efforts started with the formation of the opposition DPP in 1986, which emphasised a greater Taiwanese ethnic identity by promoting Hoklo-Taiwanese as a symbol of this identity. Speakers of other languages, such as Hakka, also wanted their language and identity to be recognised. The first official Taiwanese language movement was the 1988 'Give me Hakka back movement'（還我客語運動）initiated by the Hakka language speakers after Martial Law was lifted in 1987. Since the mid-1980s, Taiwanese languages have been reintroduced into formal education, and their domains of use have been expanded into the public domain. Indigenous language revitalisation followed in the 90s. Below I give a brief history of these Indigenous language revitalisation efforts, both from the top-down (from government) and the bottom-up (from the community).

3.4.1 Top-down efforts

Following the momentum of language revitalisation, in 1992 the Second National Assembly amended a constitutional article to ensure "legal protection of (the aborigines) status and the right to political participation". In the same year, the government launched a Six-Year Plan "allocating millions of US dollars to promote Indigenous culture" (Tsao, 1997, p. 6). The Ministry of Education (MoE) also

announced that starting from the 1996 school year one period per week would be allocated in the elementary school curriculum for teaching Indigenous languages. In the same year, the CIP was established. Dupré (2017) described the MoE's ethnic inclusion efforts in the 90s as "concentric circles (同心圓)" (p. 45), with the central area corresponding to Taiwan, the second to China, and the last one to the world. The use of a concentric circle cleverly avoided 'de-Sinicisation' and criticism from the P.R.C. for violating the One-China principle.

Since 2001, with the implementation of a Nine-Year Integrated Curriculum for Primary and Junior High Schools (國民中小學九年一貫課程) by the MoE, all primary school children in Taiwan were required to study at least one local language at school. These classes are known officially as 'local languages education' (xiangtu yuyan jiaoyu 鄉土語言教育) and are generally referred to as 'mother-tongue education' (muyu jiaoyu 母語教學) (Scott & Tiun, 2007; Tiun, 2013).

Although 'mother tongue' is a contestable notion in a multilingual Taiwan, where most people's mother tongue is a language other than an Indigenous language, the legislative effort nevertheless acknowledged the importance of all languages that exist in Taiwan . It is a shift in political ideology from 'one language one nation' to 'a multilingual Taiwan'. This also aligned Taiwan with the international (linguistic) human rights movement in its language policy (Tiun, 2013).

The timeline below presents the government's efforts in Indigenous language revitalisation from the early 90s. This list is not meant to be exhaustive, rather it is intended to highlight the notable steps that have marked Indigenous language revitalisation efforts from the top-down perspective.

1990 The first Indigenous language textbooks were published (Dupre, 2017, p. 89; Tang, 2011).

1993 Indigenous people were allowed to use Chinese characters to spell their Indigenous names by the Ministry of Interior (Tang, 2011).

1996 The CIP was established at a ministry level under the Executive Yuan in Taiwan.

1998 the Education Act for Indigenous peoples was passed.

1999 Local language education became a part of the national curriculum with the announcement of the nine-year curriculum (L. Huang, 2014, p. 73)

2001 Mother-tongue education offered as one class period per week in elementary schools beginning with the first grade (L. Huang, 2014; Scott & Tiun, 2007), including Hoklo, Hakka and Indigenous languages.

2003 The drafting of the Language Equality Law proposal, which includes an Indigenous language development law draft (Dupré, 2017 p. 105).

2005 Indigenous language orthography.

2007 The CIP organised Indigenous language comprehension tests and study programmes for qualified Indigenous people, to raise their language ability (Tang, 2011).

2008-2013 CIP's Six-Year Plan for Indigenous Language Revitalisation, stage 1 (原住民語言振興六年計劃).

2014-2019 CIP's Six-Year Plan for Indigenous Language Revitalisation, stage 2 (原住民族語言振興第 2 期六年計畫).

2017 ILDA (原住民族語言發展法) passed.

2018 The National Languages Development Act (國家語言發展法) passed (The implementation is set to be completed in 2022).

In the list, aside from the respective laws passed to support the Indigenous language revitalisation efforts, it is worth noting that in December 2005, the CIP and MoE also published the 'Indigenous language orthography' (原住民族語言書寫系統) which set up the foundation for the four-year plan for the completion of an Indigenous language dictionary starting in 2007 (原住民族語言字詞典編纂四年計畫) (Dupré, 2017, p. 89). Based on the 16 recognised languages, 16 dictionaries were to be developed in stages. By 2012, 15 dictionaries had been completed, with the last one, the Kavalan dictionary, still to be finished. Furthermore, many of the dictionaries have been digitised and can be

found online at http://e-dictionary.apc.gov.tw (原住民族族語線上詞典) (L. Huang, 2014). These efforts show that there has been a large amount of top-down work from the government to push for the recognition of expertise and resources for Indigenous languages.

In 2014, the Stage 2 Six-Year Plan for Indigenous Language Revitalisation included programmes such as Language Nanny[15] and Immersion School to strengthen Indigenous language usage amongst pre-schoolers; these are largely based on Fishman's (1991) theory of the intergenerational transmission of languages. Government-based Indigenous language immersion programmes, initiated by the CIP, have been implemented in twenty-three kindergartens (Tang, 2018). Finally, the ILDA promulgated in 2017 marked the official recognition of the view that "Indigenous languages are national languages."

Top-down policies, as highlighted here, build the status of the Indigenous languages, which affects people's language choices as these choices are shaped by our attitudes towards the languages. They also push bottom-up, grassroots efforts when the languages are deemed to have higher status. Since the 'top' is often perceived as the 'authority', a lot of language revitalisation responsibilities are naturally placed on these government agencies. However, bottom-up efforts are just as crucial and do not always rely on top-down inputs. Below, I illustrate some bottom-up efforts that are community-based initiatives in language planning and implementation.

3.4.2 Bottom-up efforts

Many scholars have pointed out that language is linked to how we see ourselves and others, which means that the status of a language can be subjectively constructed within the community and with the individuals who are associated with the community. This connection does not rely on government funding or any official recognition, and this standpoint led to many community-based language revitalisation efforts.

In Taiwan, many of the bottom-up efforts for language revitalisation by local communities started in the churches where the Bible is translated into the local Indigenous languages. In my observations, I have noticed that people would gather and

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[15] Language Nanny is a paid initiative for the grandparents, who speak a heritage language, to look after pre-schoolers at home.

read out the Bible in their mother tongue and, sometimes, for the less fluent speakers, there would be a translator present. In addition, there are other community-based language revitalisation programmes targeting youth and younger learners. As McCarty (2013) pointed out, youth play a crucial role in setting informal language policies that decide the fate of a language in the future and the attitude towards these languages. One such example is the Truku language revitalisation programme, which partnered with linguists and anthropologists to explore the ways in which young people are motivated to use the languages (Lin, 2014; Tang, 2015a, 2015b). In her report on Truku community-based efforts, Tang (2015a, p. 111) included five elements that are critical to the language revitalisation programme: 1) community theatre, 2) culture-based and domain-oriented weekly classes, 3) master-apprentice programmes, 4) language documentation and archiving, and 5) university-community partnerships. Most recently, Tang (2018) also looked into a Truku Seediq language immersion kindergarten project. Despite the fact that this is a government-funded project, it still requires communities to come together with cohesive views on language revitalisation.

Regardless of these efforts, Taiwan's Indigenous language revitalisation work still faces many obstacles. Below, I discuss the criticisms that have been made regarding the policies and the obstacles facing the language revitalisation initiatives.

3.4.3 Scholarly criticisms about the language revitalisation efforts in Taiwan

The criticism surrounding Taiwan's Indigenous language revitalisation efforts can be explored from two angles: the policy perspective and the language perspective.

With regard to policy, especially the early education policy, two main criticisms have been made regarding mother-tongue education. First, H.-t. Chang (1996) argued that the initial mother-tongue education movement stipulated by the KMT was a political move. Rather than the policy being based on the needs of Indigenous language revitalisation, the policies were used as a political tool to secure electorate votes. Thus, due to its politically-driven aim, the language related policies did not focus on 'planning the language'. This also demonstrates that the attention given to language revitalisation has been diverted to political pursuits as pointed out in the previous section regarding the KMT–DPP rivalry. The political movement of 'de-Sinicisation' (去中國化) and Taiwanisation overshadowed the true value of all the languages that currently exist on

the island (Tiun, 2013, p. 76) and, by extension, the rights of their speakers. Therefore, it seems, successive Taiwanese Governments' political ideologies have outweighed their intentions for Indigenous language revitalisation (Ting, 2020). As Spolsky (2004, p. 113) cautioned, there are many countries that have the "monolingual but …" policy claiming to protect minority languages but which still have a monolingual ideology. Since the rejection of Hoklo-Taiwanese as a co-official language, Taiwan has maintained its monolingual ideology (see Section 3.3.2).

The second criticism about mother-tongue education was aimed at the curriculum, as the curriculum is geared to the local (dominant) language (such as Hoklo-Taiwanese) rather than 'mother-tongue' education for Indigenous languages per se (Dupré, 2017). Issues like this further highlight the mismatch between language policy and the language ideology and practice of the primary users of the language policy (Spolsky, 2004). Also, another implication with mother-tongue education is that while the government authorities could be seen as responsible for the Hoklo and Hakka language curriculum as the resources are easily accessible, resources for Indigenous language education is scarce and culturally specific; therefore Indigenous people could be regarded as solely responsible for their revitalisation.

Apart from the above criticisms, the policies were also criticised for their lack of implementation (Chao, 2014). Tang (2018) listed some initial issues arising from the government-based language revitalisation programme. The first set of problems are related to teachers and teaching materials, followed by the lack of exposure to the languages. The most frustrating problems are related to the lack of (active) participation from families and communities. The lack of participation from the community is perhaps the manifestation of the language ideology which underscores the colonial sociolinguistic phenomena; as a result, "many community members are unaware of the ongoing process of language loss" (Tang, 2015b, p. 91). This is perhaps one of the biggest challenges facing the language revitalisation process.

Furthermore, in Taiwan's multilingual repertoire, whose language needs revitalising is perennially debated. The government does not seem to be able to agree on how much attention to pay to the individual languages, as the term 'minority language' is not an easily defined term for Taiwan. For example, Hoklo-Taiwanese has the largest number of speakers but it has historically been deemed a 'minority' language by the dominant

Mandarin Chinese language speakers and has been described as "struggling for survival" (K.-H. Li & Mathúna, 2012, p. 176) due to its social positioning; therefore, it deserves to be 'revitalised'. Ironically, it is nowhere near endangered.

So far, there has been substantial language documentation of Taiwan's Indigenous languages, with studies relating to their syntax, grammar, and structures. Accompanied by the completion of the dictionaries, the Indigenous language revitalisation efforts may be evaluated as encouraging. However, questions have been raised regarding the efficacy of these efforts in relation to actual *revitalisation* because language usage is still in decline.

3.5 Conclusion – Towards a critical view

This chapter has presented the historical context of language revitalisation in Taiwan. It has highlighted the impact of colonisation on the Indigenous people and the local population speaking Taiwanese languages. In particular, the Indigenous population has been shown to be the worst affected when it comes to language attrition, as a result of 'Japanisation' and 'Sinicisation'. On top of that, the island has endured an even more controversial political landscape because of the KMT- DPP power struggle and the China-Taiwan political tension.

Earlier policy efforts that attempted undermine the China-centric ideology by raising the status of all languages were unsuccessful because 'Guoyu' has been the synonym for Mandarin Chinese. Yet, the ILDA (2017) managed to do just that, with Article 1 acknowledging that "Indigenous languages are national languages".

This decision has a practical implication. If all languages are national languages, they would have to be given status and resources. At the moment, with 16 named languages, 42 dialects, and limited language resources, this seems impractical. As Spolsky (2004) suggested, the more languages there are, the harder it is to distribute resources and plan for the languages, which significantly impacts on the language revitalisation outcomes. However, as the Indigenous languages are named national language instead of 'official languages' ('quanfan yuyan',官方語言), Mandarin Chinese is still the only official language on the island, which maintains its power and status. A further implication regarding language status is that with just 2% of the population, in comparison to Hoklo and Hakka, the status of the Indigenous languages will impact the existing social

provision allocated to the 85% Hoklo and Hakka speakers in terms of resource distribution, such as classroom hours. This would cause more tension on the island.

To revitalise Taiwan's Indigenous languages within the current politically demanding Taiwanese language speaking communities and the historically dominant KMT Mandarin-speaking ideology would mean that make-or-break pressure falls onto the Indigenous speakers themselves. Since the top-down planning has not been shown to be successful, Tang (2015b) urged that the speakers "must be willing to exercise even limited abilities in the native language under various pressures" (p. 91).

If we think politically, the Indigenous language issue is officially a governance issue as it has been included in the government's official documents. This is a delicate political issue. It means both political parties could use this issue to gain an extra bargaining chip in the negotiation of power. This unfortunately only benefits those who are in politics. If we think linguistically, the more national languages there are, the more difficult it is to use them equally (Dupré, 2016, p. 427; Spolsky, 2004). Thus, in this light, some of the legislative efforts seem counterproductive.

With the promulgation of the ILDA (2017) by the DPP, all eyes have been on the implementation of the Act, which is where previous policies have failed. At the time of writing, it is difficult to say how well this policy is being implemented, but it is safe to imagine that the success of the policy would be a collaborative effort between the top-down and the bottom-up approaches.

To sum up, this chapter has established a broad understanding of Taiwan's political and linguistic environment. Given Taiwan's rich history and linguistic landscape, it is not surprising that scholars have been interested in the linguistic identity of Taiwanese Indigenous people (Hsieh, 2013). More recently, there have been also studies done on Indigenous language maintenance and shifts by academics such as Apay Tang (2011, 2015a, 2015b, 2018) and Lilian Huang (2014). Over the past 30 years, there has been a lot of Indigenous language-related policies released incrementally. This provided a rich material for scholarly work (see Section 3.4). However, the studies relating to language policy are often descriptive (see, for example, Tiun, 2013). While some studies about Taiwan's language policy could be considered critical, the focus is more on the policy-making process and its relation to democracy (see Jean-François Dupré, 2013, 2016, 2017). These studies emanate from different fields of research; nevertheless, they form

an established body of work which has helped to inform this study. However, I felt Taiwan's Indigenous language revitalisation policies could be explored critically, to better understand the relationship between the existing language revitalisation policies and their impact on language revitalisation, which is the aim of this study.

The next chapter introduces concepts regarding language policy studies that are key to this research. I also explain why it is important to incorporate a critical approach in the studies of language policies, and I elucidate the critical approach that I use for this investigation.

Chapter 4. Critical discourse studies and language policy

4.1 Introduction

Language policy is a broad term that is concerned with what language is used, how it is used and who uses it. This affects every nation in the world; therefore, it is not surprising that language policy stands as a specific field of research in academia. In this chapter, I provide background information about the field of language policy studies. This is covered in Section 4.2, including the history of language policy studies and the terminology associated with it.

In Section 4.3, I review the scholarly literature and identify the gaps and the trends in language policy studies. In Section 4.4, I explain how a critical approach is an appropriate way of moving forward. This is followed by an introduction of the methodological framework used in this study – critical discourse studies (CDS). In Section 4.5, I explain the connection between CDS and language policy studies and, in Section 4.6, I detail the theoretical assumptions pertaining to CDS that are relevant to this study. In Section 4.7, I describe how a CDS approach operates within this thesis.

4.2 Language policy studies

In this section, I provide a background to language policy studies that covers a brief history, components associated with language policy studies, and terms central to this study. The academic field 'language policy and planning' (LPP) first emerged in the 1960s. In its early development, 'language policy' and 'language planning' were closely linked and the two terms were sometimes used interchangeably (Johnson, 2013). Although a distinction could be made between these two – that is, language planning covers actions that aim to affect language behaviours, while language policies are the desired outcome of these efforts (Grin, 2003) – Hornberger et al. (2018) argued that "the boundaries between language planning and language policy are difficult to define" (p. 156). Nevertheless, language planning can be seen as the "deliberate efforts to affect the structure (use, corpus) or function (use, status) of languages" (Tollefson & Pérez-Milans, 2018, p. 3), which Spolsky (2004, p. 8) refers to as "language management", one of the components of language policy. Following Spolsky's definition, language planning is seen as part of language policy. For this study, I use the term 'language

policy' to mean all language planning activities at micro (i.e., language use at home) and macro (i.e., government language policy) levels.

At the macro level, language policy relates to the official legislative documents generated by the government (a top-down perspective) that set out an intention to modify the linguistic landscape of the country and the linguistic behaviour of the people. They may be explicit, such as the language revitalisation policies used in this study. Sometimes, they are implicit and are embedded in other policies, such as education policy or foreign policy (Grin, 2003). At the micro level, Spolsky (2004) defined language policy as a practice at all levels and in all domains, and thus the decision to use a heritage language at home by an individual is considered a *home language policy*. This means a language policy does not necessarily need to be written down in official documents (McCarty et al., 2009; Shohamy, 2006). In this light, language policies are seen as multi-layered operations in a multitude of settings.

In principle, Spolsky (2004, pp. 39-40) articulated that, in order for a language policy to be effective, it must take into account three components: 1) language practices, 2) language beliefs and ideology, and 3) the explicit language management (planning) activities that attempt to modify the practice and ideologies of a community. On the one hand, Spolsky's three policy components imply that language practice and language ideology are two important parts of language policy which can be modified by careful language management activities. On the other hand, the language management activities have to consider the vast array of linguistic and non-linguist variables that make up a speaker's language ideology and linguistic practice (Grenoble & Whaley, 2006; Spolsky, 2004). Due to the complexity of any given situation, it is often difficult to decide what form of the language to use, who uses it and how it is used (Grenoble & Whaley 2006).

Below, I offer explanations of the three sets of terms used in language policy studies that are important for this investigation. They are: the status, corpus and acquisition planning typology; the good policy condition; and the de facto language policy. While the clarification of these terms is descriptive, their implications require a critical examination, which I discuss later.

4.2.1 Status, corpus and acquisition planning

Status planning and corpus planning are the two main ingredients in language policy. The dichotomy of status versus corpus planning has been used as a way to differentiate between: a) decisions relating to language use and function (status) (i.e., official language); and b) decisions concerning the structure or form of a language itself (corpus), such as the standardisation of orthography (Johnson, 2013; Shohamy, 2006; Spolsky, 2004).

The third component, acquisition planning, was added to the status-corpus planning dichotomy later (Hornberger, 2006; Johnson, 2013). Acquisition planning was separated out from status planning as being more about the 'users' than the use of a language (Hornberger, 2006, p. 32). Hornberger (2006) explained that acquisition planning covers the "efforts to influence the allocation of users or the distribution of language by means of creating or improving opportunities or incentives to learn them, or both" (p.28). Liddicoat (2013) further classified acquisition planning as language-in-education policy relating to the teaching and learning of languages, especially at school, which often involves status and corpus planning activities. The intricate linkage and application of these typologies can be reflected using Grin's (2003) *good policy conditions*.

4.2.2 The good policy conditions

Grin's (2003) 'good policy conditions' consist of three components: *capability*, *opportunity*, and *willingness*. Ideally, a good language policy must provide the language speakers with resources and the ability to speak the language (capability), the opportunity to speak the language (opportunity), and the desire (willingness) to speak the language.

How these three conditions can be met is difficult to judge for different reasons. For instance, giving a language speaker the opportunity to speak may not be adequate if the speaker does not have the willingness (desire) nor the capacity (competency) to use the language. While the *capability* condition is straightforward, the *willingness* condition is not as tangible because people are faced with choices, some of which are based on other socio-economic factors that are pre-determined.

How and why a language speaker chooses to use a language is a tricky question, and technical analysis of the policy is not sufficient to answer this question. To gain a deeper understanding, I argue, such studies must engage in an in-depth investigation of the language ideology of its users; hence the design of this study (see Chapter 5).

4.2.3 De facto language policy

De facto language policy, also known as the invisible language policy, cover those aspects of policy that are not explicitly written. Even though a de facto policy may be implicit, it is considered to be the "effect, intended or otherwise, direct or indirect, of government policies on language use" (Truscott & Malcolm, 2010, p. 14), which directly reflects the "ideological choice" of the dominant language (Grin, 2003, p. 21).

In propagating the dominant ideology, five mechanisms are used by the West to perpetuate its domination by creating de facto language policy about the English language, as illustrated by Shohamy (2006). These mechanisms are: rules and regulations, language education, language tests, language in public space, and ideological coercion (p. 58). Through these mechanisms "ideology turns into practice" (Shohamy, 2006, p. 54). For example, as I have illustrated in Chapter 1, the No Child Left Behind policy has made English the de facto language for education in the US. Similarly, in Taiwan, Mandarin Chinese was given the official language status for it been the language of education, the court of law and other major social domains (Dupré, 2017).

In this regard, the de facto language policy can be seen as the ideological product of the dominant social group and the dominant ideology (Grin, 2003; Shohamy, 2006) which, consequently, sustains the de facto language policy. Due to the inseparable nature of ideology and de facto language policy, language policy needs to be explored with a critical eye.

4.3 Current issues facing language policy studies – some critical thoughts

As identified in the previous sections, language policies are most likely to reflect the top-down elite's view of languages and their users. This shortcoming has led to several issues arising in Indigenous language revitalisation policies which I identify below.

First of all, given the complex nature and the overlapping categories of language policy, it has become apparent that there is often a blurred line between good policy, policy with a good intention, and effective policy – the three categories are not equivalent, as I have signalled in Section 4.2.2. A policy with a good intention may not be effective, meaning that a well-intended policy may not meet its anticipated outcome. At the same time, a good policy does not necessarily equate to a policy with a good intention, depending on who is the recipient of the policy, even though some policies look good on paper. Therefore, I suggest, a language policy that promotes Indigenous language use needs to do so from the perspective of the main actors – the Indigenous language users. Without taking into account the Indigenous language speakers' perspectives and their language ideology, a policy only perpetuates the dominant point of view, which is the government's ideology of the language. For instance, when a government promotes the language rights of its Indigenous population, it is the government that sets the criteria for what rights are allowed and what constitutes rights.

Secondly, language policies often do not yield fruitful results for Indigenous language revitalisation due to the one-size-fits-all approach. This approach pays no attention to the historical context of a language and the language ideology in a given area, nor does it pay attention to the languages themselves (Grin, 2003). For example, policy relating to an Indigenous culture often negates the oral tradition, which is an important part of the culture. By doing so, it will alter the relationship the speakers have with their heritage language (Shaul, 2014; Whiteley, 2003).

Thirdly, language-in-education policies that aim at strengthening the use of Indigenous languages have often been criticised as inadequate because simply providing classroom teaching hours for an Indigenous language is not enough. Most importantly, only allowing a couple of hours a week for a mother-tongue language class is, in fact, sending the message that this language only deserves two hours a week of attention and, therefore, this language is not important. In Taiwan, since 2001, the mother-tongue education classes were established by the MoE (see Chapter 3). However, this effort has been criticised as the curriculum is geared to the local (dominant) language (such as Hoklo-Taiwanese) rather than mother-tongue education per se for the Indigenous communities (Dupré, 2017). This example shows that it is all too easy for a language policy to overlook its primary or intended users. Subtly, by so doing, a language-in-education policy can be seen as culpable for creating a negative ideology and can be

responsible for the continued decline of many Indigenous languages. Ironically, then, policies that aimed at promoting minority languages sometimes jeopardise the efforts of language revitalisation.

Furthermore, Spolsky (2004) explained that language policy is what people *should do* and language practice is what people *actually do*. However, what people actually do often does not always adhere to the language policy or is not expected within the policy frame. This is often observable in minority language communities. Skutnabb-Kangas (2013) commented that, as much as a language policy might be supportive of a minority language, if the heritage language is considered undesirable then this choice is predetermined within its social context. In this light, language policy studies must take into account the context in which the policy is situated and the underlying ideology that constitutes and is constituted by such policy.

Moreover, a policy is a collective ideological product (Fischer, 2015) but, as mentioned earlier, the resulting policy is the dominant ideological choice (Grin, 2003; Shohamy, 2006). This can be misleading because a policy appears to have come from everyone (especially in a democracy) yet, clearly, the distribution of power is uneven. Therefore, policy analysis needs to shift from the analysis of what is in the policy to the investigation of the production, distribution, and consumption of the policy. I discuss this aspect further in Chapter 5.

Finally, it is important to note that language policy does not only concern the language user's ideology. On the contrary, it is mostly concerned with the policy maker's ideology towards the language. A new direction of investigation into language policy, namely the investigation of language ideology, provides a unique approach to the study of Indigenous language revitalisation. To investigate the ideology of the dominant discourse in this study, a critical framework is thus required.

In short, language ideology, beliefs and language practice do not always align. How and why a language speaker uses his/her heritage language is not always effectively influenced by language policy, but rather by the attitude towards the language and the relation this language has with the society in which it is situated. In light of this understanding, studies that took a traditional approach (i.e., reporting teaching hours or criticising the teaching materials) are no longer deemed adequate in terms of addressing

the problem relating to the continued decline of Indigenous languages and, therefore, I believe a critical approach is necessary for the study of language policy.

4.4 Moving towards a critical approach

Within the field of policy study, Fischer (2007, p. 224) described the traditional approach as a matter of applying assessment to the technical aspects of all policy problems. Such an approach failed to supply "usable knowledge" to policy decision-makers (Fischer, 2015, p. 53) and to address the problems arising between the policy and the real-world that it is intends to be applied to (Fischer, 2007, 2015). Although Fischer's comments are aimed at the field of policy studies, their application extends to the field of language policy studies because all policies are collective ideological products that have myriad layers (Fischer, 2015). Consequently, Fischer (2015) concluded, the technocratic policy analysis limits the policy analysis framework, bypassing the investigation of socially constructed ideology. This is especially relevant in language policy studies since ideology is an integral part of language policy, as pointed out by Spolsky (2004). Moreover, a language policy functions within a speech community inside a complex linguistic ecology (Spolsky, 2004). This emphasises the social nature of language policy. Therefore, the analysis of language policy demands an approach that goes beyond the traditional technical terms or economic value exerted in the policy and investigates the social-historical background that sustained such policy.

In the past three decades, there have been major changes in how language policy analysis and language itself is viewed. In the 1970s, Bourdieu's (1991) notions of linguistic habitus, legitimate language, and social capital laid a critical foundation for the examination of institutional power in relation to the analysis of language within the social structure. In line with the critical tendency, Ruíz (1984) put forward an influential framework that was interested in how a language is viewed (as a problem, a right or a resource) in language policy, and recommended incorporating this perspective to understand the orientation of language policy. While Ruíz did not claim to be critical, his work is significant in that he recognised policy as being able to construct a social reality (i.e., language as a problem or a resource), which signalled a significant step towards a critical approach to language policy studies.

Later, Tollefson's (1991) *historical-structural approach* to language policy analysis took account of the historical elements as an influential variable for individual decision-

making. Tollefson's historical-structural approach conceptualised language policy as "one mechanism by which the interests of dominant socio-political groups are maintained and the seeds of transformation are developed" (Tollefson, 1991, p. 32). Instead of viewing language policy as neutral, he took into account the socio-historical factors that gave rise to certain policies. In Tollefson's eyes, language policy is political and ideological, and is used as a "mechanism of social control" (Wodak & Savski, 2018, p. 96) to serve the interest of the dominant. Later, Tollefson further developed this approach as 'critical language policy' (CLP) (Johnson, 2013), which has been followed by other scholars including Ricento (2000, 2006), Shohamy (2006) and Johnson (2016). Other scholars, such as, Skutnabb-Kangas (2013), Hill and May (2013) and McCarty (2013, 2018), whose focuses are on minority linguistic rights and language education, could also loosely be described as CLP scholars as they have looked critically at the context in which a language policy operates and investigated the social inequality sustained by language policy. This signals an ongoing interest in a critical approach to language policy studies.

With a growing number of scholars interested in the critical exploration of language policy (Barakos, 2016; Barakos & Unger, 2016; Johnson, 2013, 2016; Ricento, 2000; Shohamy, 2006; Unger, 2013), it is clear that the changes in theoretical orientation that have evolved over time favour the view that language policy cannot simply be viewed as words because language policies are used to *do things* (i.e., nation-building, labour market control). In this light, language policies are viewed as actions, one of the manifestations of discourse (Fairclough, 2003) (see Section 4.5 below). Therefore, I argue for language policy analysis to transition from 'policy as text' to 'policy as discourse'.

A distinction has been made between 'Discourse' (with a big 'D') and 'discourse' (with a little 'd') (Liddicoat, 2013). Discourse with a big 'D' is akin to the Foucauldian tradition that sees discourse as a form of knowledge; whereas discourse with little 'd' refers to communicative actions which materialise in their linguistic manifestation. However, since critical discourse studies (CDS) concerns the analysis of texts in their socio-political context, I therefore believe it is not always possible to make a clear distinction between the two and some overlap occurs. For this study, while the analysis focus on the small 'd' discourse, I take into consideration that these discourses are embedded in the wider big 'D' Discourse. I further define discourse in Section 4.6.

To examine the discourse within the language policy in my study, I looked to critical discourse studies (CDS) to provide an appropriate theoretical and methodological framework. In the next section, Section 4.5, I begin with a historic overview, and then I explain why a CDS approach is beneficial to this study.

4.5 Critical discourse studies (CDS) for language policy research

Critical discourse studies (CDS) have evolved since the 1960s. In its earliest manifestation, CDS was first referred to as Critical Linguistics (CL) (Wodak, 2001b) and, later, as Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (Wodak & Meyer, 2016). In recent years, the scholars of critical discourse studies expressed the view that being critical is not simply an analysis, it is a frame of mind, an attitude to problem-solving. Therefore, CDA was renamed as critical discourse studies (CDS) to reflect the nature of the methodological philosophy (Wodak & Meyer, 2016). The approach, in general, follows certain critical social theories (e.g., Marxism) and social theorists such as Foucault, Bourdieu, or Gramsci.

As the name suggests, CDS can be simply interpreted as a critical approach to discourse studies, with scholars seeking to unpack the power dynamic embedded in language use by uncovering the latent ideology. However, to further clarify, CDS is not simply the application of critical theory to discourse analysis. Rather, it is the joining of (other) social theories with critical theory which involves levels of linguistic analysis of discourse; therefore, CDS is an *interdisciplinary* endeavour (Unger, 2016). Because of its interdisciplinary nature, CDS research derives from varying backgrounds and is, therefore, able to provide a better understanding of the social issue at hand. As Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) put it, in CDS "the logic of one discipline (for example sociology) can be 'put to work' in the development of another (for example, linguistics)" (p. 16). In the case of my research, my background in sociolinguistics provided further impetus for the study of language policy in a way that has not been explored.

Since the emergence of CDS, several approaches have established within this particular discipline based on their different research strategies and theoretical entry points. For instance, van Dijk's Sociocognitive Approach looks at cognition as an interface between reality and discourse; Fairclough's Dialectical Relational Approach (DRA) examines the dialectical relation between discourse and other social elements; and

Wodak's Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) "explicitly tries to establish theory of discourse by linking fields of action, genre, discourse and texts" (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 26). Scholars associated with CDS from nonverbal perspectives include Kress and Hodge (social semiotics) and van Leeuwen (multimodality) (Wodak & Meyer, 2016). In addition, Van Leeuwen has contributed a great deal to CDS by bringing new tools to use in carrying out CDS (see van Leeuwen, 2008), which I adopted for this study.

Due to its wide theoretical and methodological origins, criticisms have been made about CDS regarding the interpretation and analysis of data. The "hermeneutic approach to text analysis" has be criticised for the broad context used to interpret the text (Wodak 2001b, p. 4). Also, the diverse application of CDS means the level of linguistic analysis varies from discipline to discipline. Thus, it has received criticism for being "too linguistic or not linguistic enough" (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 32). One other criticism of CDS is how *discourse* is defined. The various uses of the term 'discourse' have stretched "the meaning of discourse from a genre to a register or style" (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 3). Thus, it is imperative for a researcher to define how he or she intends to use this term in any given study. For a CDS researcher, it is also important to make one's (political) stance explicit (Wodak, 2001b), which also has brought criticism to CDS for its subjectivity. To address this criticism, Wodak (2001b) replied that CDS is "always explicit about its own position and commitment" and thus, it is able to be reflective (p. 17).

CDS's insistence on an interdisciplinary endeavour aligns with Ricento's (2006) theoretical view of language policies studies. Ricento (2006) outlined that language policy studies "must be understood as both a multidisciplinary and an interdisciplinary activity" (p. 9). Based on this view, it would seem that CDS is a well-suited set of "conceptual and methodological tools" (Ricento, 2006, p. 9) for language policy studies.

Despite the fact that a number of scholars have investigated language policy critically (see above-mentioned CLP scholars), a CDS approach to language policy study is relatively new. Like Barakos and Unger (see Barakos & Unger, 2016; Unger, 2013), I too advocate for the intersection of language policy with CDS and I recognise the different approaches that have done so – a *critical approach to language policy* (CALP) (Unger, 2013), and a *discursive approach to language policy* (DALP) (Barakos, 2016).

However, I have elected to situate my research under the CDS banner, which shares the same assumptions with CALP and DALP, because my study have drawn on traditional CDS scholars such as Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak, and Theo van Leeuwen (see Chapter 5, Design and method). The key assumptions of CDS in relation to this study are that:

1. The design of this study is geared to exploring the relationship between power, ideology and discourse, which adheres to the traditional CDS approach.

2. This study contains a systemic and detailed linguistic analysis of texts, which is a key feature of CDS. Previously mentioned CLP scholars could not be considered to be using a CDS approach because they did not analyse the language use of the policies themselves.

3. This research takes into account "the broader socio-political and historical contexts" (Wodak, 2001b, p. 29), which is a core concern of a CDS methodology.

4. The nature of this study echoes CDS's focus on an interdisciplinary approach.

Finally, like all critical theory, CDS encompasses emancipatory aims, as Wodak and Meyer (2016) wrote "Critical theories, thus also CDS, want to produce and convey critical knowledge that enables human beings to emancipate themselves from forms of domination through self-reflection. So they are aimed at producing 'enlightenment and emancipation'" (p. 7).

In line with this aim, in this study the hope is that, by demystifying the dominant ideology, the Indigenous communities can contest the domination and challenge the 'symbolic violence' (Bourdieu, 1991) they experience. *Symbolic violence* is described by Bourdieu as an invisible power, which is endowed with *legitimacy* by the socially dominant groups. In this study, therefore, the exploration focuses on the symbolic power and the dominant ideology that is set against Indigenous languages. In the next section, I explain several important CDS terms.

4.6 The theoretical assumptions of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS)

As this study investigates Indigenous language policy from a CDS perspective, there are some key theoretical components that are relevant to this work and that it is therefore

necessary to discuss. In this section, I draw attention to some key concepts that underpin this study. These include the concepts of critique, ideology, discourse and power, and recontextualisation.

4.6.1 Critique

The notion of 'critique' is an inherent part of CDS (Unger, 2013; Wodak, 2001b; Wodak & Meyer, 2009, 2016). The way CDS scholars understand critique stems from the Frankfurt School (Wodak, 2001b; Wodak & Meyer, 2009, 2016). Grounded in critical theory, the term should not be confused with 'criticise', but requires the researcher to exercise 'criticality'. Barakos and Unger (2016) explained that criticality means "adopting a problem-oriented approach" (p. 3) to investigate the social wrong, which echoes Fairclough's (2010) view that CDS not only "addresses social wrongs", it also finds "possible ways of righting or mitigating them" (p.10). Fairclough (2001, p. 126) used the term 'negative critique' to describe the former and 'positive critique' the latter. He stated that CDS should contain "negative critique in the sense of diagnosis of the problem, positive critique in the sense of identification of hitherto unrealized possibilities in the way things are for tackling the problem" (Fairclough, 2001, p. 126).

In light of these explanations, CDS thus encompasses an emancipatory impulse (Wodak & Meyer, 2016, p. 7). It aims to help those who hold less power in society. Consequently, it has become central to CDS beliefs that studies of social science should aim to implement 'change' that improves social conditions.

In the context of language policy analysis, Barakos and Unger (2016) explained that a critical approach to language policy research aims to "expose and seek remedies against social inequalities and injustice and to mediate and improve communication about and around language policy" (p. 2). This study echoes Barakos and Unger's concern about inequality with regard to language policy and the aim of exposing and remedying the social issues identified.

4.6.2 Ideology

Closely related to critique is the notion of ideology because it is ideology that CDS strives to scrutinise. While Geuss (1981) mentioned that ideology could be viewed as a general attitude a group of people have (in a descriptive and non-critical sense), I believe the study of ideology cannot simply be descriptive. In this study, I use the term

'language ideology' to refer to the general attitudes or beliefs that a group of people holds about their languages. Although the description of 'language ideology' may sound non-critical, bearing in mind that language ideology is a set of politically influenced beliefs about languages (see Chapter 2), it therefore aligns with the critical definition of ideology for CDS which I explain below.

The use of ideology in the tradition of critical theory is associated with concepts such as 'false consciousness', 'domination', and 'hegemony' (van Dijk, 2006; Wodak & Meyer, 2009, 2016). Geuss (1981) also suggested that ideology could be seen as the 'worldview' of a group, and that it is used to create social cohesion (Geuss, 1981, pp. 9-10). In this respect, a worldview is a carefully crafted system of beliefs for the purpose of maintaining a higher level of social structure. What counts as a worldview in a critical sense is 'ideological' (Geuss, 1981, p. 11), and is manipulated by power and dominance. Following the critical tradition, ideology has been given a 'bad name' (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, 2016); in particular, when it is operating in the guise of 'common sense', it is viewed as 'hegemonic' (Fairclough, 2010). Ideology is thus used to sustain power.

4.6.3 Discourse and power

Wodak and Meyer (2016, p. 6) defined CDS's understanding of *discourse* as "relatively stable uses of language serving the organization and structuring of social life". In this sense, the *five mechanisms* that I pointed out in Section 4.2.3, which propagate the ideology of the dominant power, could be described as *discourse*. This definition regards language use as a form of social action (Wodak & Meyer, 2016, p. 5) and, therefore, language policy as a way of using language in a particular way is considered a discourse. Within this understanding, discourse is treated as the semiotic dimension (abstract forms of knowledge) of its concrete manifestation – text – and is considered to be socially constitutive, conditioned and consequential (Fairclough, 2003, 2010; Wodak & Meyer, 2016). Most importantly, "it gives rise to important issues of power" (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p. 258, as cited in Wodak & Meyer, 2016, p. 6).

Since discourse can be deployed by anyone as a resource to manipulate others, to support a certain ideology, and sustain power, the engineering of social consent could simply be done through the creation of discourse without it being explicitly uttered. Bourdieu (1991) explained this concept through the power of suggestion:

instead of telling the child what he must do, tell him what he is and thus leads him to become durably what he has to be in the condition for the effectiveness of all kinds of symbolic power that will subsequently be able to operate on a habitus predisposed to respond to them. (p. 52)

This statement suggests that the position of social actors can be manipulated simply by the ways in which their position is presented or suggested. In terms of a policy, a group of people can be depicted as being 'incapable' and as a result their power is taken away from them. Subsequently, they may start to act accordingly, as if they are incapable, which realises the ideological aim of the text creator. To reinforce the ideology, this message can be repeated by using different texts. How different texts work together to form the social cohesion of the dominant in order to sustain power is explained in the concept of recontextualisation in the next section.

Due to its association with power, a policy cannot simply be viewed as a text, it is viewed as a discourse, and thus a policy in operation is a discursive practice. Fairclough (2010, p. 378) considered any discursive practice simultaneously a "regulative" practice. Therefore, a policy cannot escape the realm of control nor can it be rid of the notion of power and ideology. Ideology is not static, it changes over time, sometimes rapidly. Similarly, discourse is not static either. It is simultaneously viewed as action, representation and being (Fairclough, 2010).

Discourse as action is manifested in the use of language associated with it (Fairclough, 2003). For example, the declarative language in a policy is used to 'do things' – a social action. When discourse is viewed as representation, it embodies the institutional practice and ideas. For instance, a language policy embodies the government practice, the government ideology. Finally, discourse as 'being' is the idea of the 'self' or 'identity' – it is the "performance" of particular positions within social practices (Fairclough, 2001, p. 4). In terms of language policy, this highlights the role of agency and the position of the social actor. I believe the performative nature of language policy also impacts on the language ownership of the language speakers and how they deal with power struggles.

In looking at discourse as action, representation and being, my study avoids using the word discourse as a count noun, i.e. discourse of racism, as there can be many different interpretations of racism based on a range of ideological approaches (Unger, 2013).

Therefore, as will be seen in my analysis, I refer to the discourse topics that I have identified in this study (what the discourse is *about*) to avoid a "multiplication of possible meanings" (Unger 2013, p.51).

4.6.4 Intertextuality and recontextualisation

Intertextuality is the 'external' relations of texts; it is concerned with the intertwined "relations between one text and other texts" (Fairclough 2003, p. 39). As Bakhtin (1981) suggested, every text is oriented to the "already known" (p. 279). This indicates that all utterances or discourse are shaped by prior texts/speakers with which they form a dialogue, and by the sequential happenings that they anticipate – each utterance is a link in the chain of communication. Thus, Fairclough (1992) concluded that "texts are inherently intertextual" (p. 102). In light of this understanding, a policy text has a dialogical nature because it responds to the previous policies and the existing social structure and ideologies. It also responds to an anticipated social reaction that in itself is the production of the policy. For example, a *plan* supporting Taiwanese Indigenous languages released by the CIP and the *law* for language revitalisation made by the legislature form a dialogical connection (see Chapter 5 for details) – an *intertexual chain*. The feedback loop of the intertextual chain is, therefore, able to yield a sense of social consent by being 'on message'.

The intertextual chain serves another purpose – recontextualisation (Fairclough, 2003, 2010). The notion of recontextualisation simply means the meaning of an event is interpreted differently when it is put in a different context. In this sense, the meanings of a text move to the next text, often involving the transition from one genre to the next and the exchange between and amongst social actors. In the process of such a transition, a 'genre chain' can be established. A genre chain demonstrates how ideology is moved coherently from one genre to the next in order to determine how the creator of such ideology creates cohesion across different texts. Each text represents a different social practice, with different social actors.

With this thesis focusing on a range of texts over a certain time period and different social actors, recontextualisation plays an important role in the investigation. In the next chapter, I further discuss the language revitalisation policies collected and how *language revitalisation* is interpreted within different policies and by the participants.

Due to the nature of this research, the concept of recontextualisation becomes a crucial part of this study.

At the end of the recontextualisation chain, the meaning of the original text may be 'lost in translation', yet new meaning emerges. In this process, meanings transform, distort and become recontextualised to create cohesion and consistency, and to serve the purpose of the discourse creator.

So far, I have reviewed the important aspects of CDS that underpin this study. In the next section, I outline the approach I have chosen for this thesis that is both contextual and reflexive.

4.7 Analysing Indigenous language revitalisation policy – a critical approach

In this study, I follow Fairclough's (2001) five-stage CDS framework because it enables an investigation that "goes beyond the sole analysis of discourse to a description, an interpretation, and an explanation of the representation of the social world through human action" (Smith, 2013, p. 145). Moreover, as I have previously mentioned, to exercise criticality involves negative critique and positive critique. The five stages, as listed below, allow for the social issues to be identified (negative critique) and, at the same time, offer opportunities to improve them (positive critique).

1. Focus on a social wrong which has a semiotic aspect.
2. Identify obstacles to addressing social wrong.
3. Consider whether the social order (network of practices) in a sense needs the problem.
4. Identify possible ways past the obstacles.
5. Reflect critically on the analysis (1-4).

The first stage requires a focus on a social problem which has a semiotic aspect. This has already been presented in this thesis where I drew attention to the low status of the Indigenous languages and the struggle of their speakers against hegemony as constitutive of a social wrong. With regard to the semiotic aspect, this stage looks at the social wrong manifested in texts, in particular the language policies of Taiwan (see Chapter 3) and how they have affected the Indigenous languages and people. The objective is to identify the discourses about Taiwanese Government Indigenous language revitalisation policy and their effects on language revitalisation.

The second stage where the obstacles to addressing a social wrong must be identified is an indirect way of asking 'what it is about the way in which social life is structured and organised that prevents it (the social problem) from being addressed?' Simply put, this stage asks, 'what is standing in the way of the problem being addressed?' And, in this case, this study will present the formal analysis of relevant texts relating to language policy in Taiwan following a method which is outlined in Chapter 5.

The third stage requires a consideration of whether the social order can be maintained without the identified social problem. In other words, the analysis is asking 'who benefits from the situation if it is maintained?' If it is proven that the social issue is not an inherent part of social order then this issue can be dealt with separately, and social order remains. Otherwise, the social order must also change to mend the social problem. In this study, I look at the language issues and investigate the ways in which they constitute or are constituted by language policy. With the core tenet of CDS – ideology – in mind, stage three focuses on how ideology contributes to sustaining the particular relationship of power and domination.

The fourth stage looks to identify possible ways past the obstacles. In this case, the analysis looks for ways to improve the current condition by forming positive critiques, which means that the analysis identifies possible and yet unrealised potential ways to improve the current struggle of the Indigenous language speakers identified in Stage 1. Given the emancipatory nature of CDS, the aim is to focus on the 'ought to' rather than simply describe 'what it is', which is what is lacking in the current Indigenous language revitalisation studies published in Taiwan.

It is important to note here that stages two to four are closely linked as one cannot critically and reflectively identify obstacles without trying to find ways around them at the same time. Stages two to four are employed in the findings chapters where I identify the discourse and their underlying ideology from the policy document and the participants' interviews.

At the fifth stage, in critically reflecting on the four earlier states, attention is turned to the thesis itself. Since CDS is a form of critical critique, a CDS thesis is open to the same principle of critique mentioned above. The points I put forward in the findings are reflected upon and examined in the discussion chapter, and the aim of 'social emancipation' and 'speaking truth to power' is further considered.

The above sequence of stages is the research framework for this study. However, within this, as expected of CDS, is the analysis of language at the micro-, meso-, and macro-levels, and the research design and method for carrying this out are detailed in the next chapter, along with the tools for analysis.

4.8 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have provided an understanding of language policy and argued for the application of a CDS methodological approach when it comes to the investigation of Indigenous language policies in Taiwan. I first discussed some terms that are used in studies of language policies. While some of the definitions are descriptive, the implications of the terms could be ideological (e.g., status planning). Since language policy is used to modify the linguistic behaviours and attitudes that people have towards a language, the typology of status, corpus, and acquisition planning can be seen as a set of ideological instruments. Although Hornberger (2006) stated that "language-planning types and approaches do not in and of themselves carry a political direction" (p. 30), other scholars, such as Fishman (2001) and Shohamy (2006), questioned how language policy can be devoid of socio-political influence. To say that language policy has no ideological aims would be to neglect the implications of the interconnected language management activities. As such, I used Ricento's (2006) theoretical understandings that recognised language policy as a multi-layered operation to justify how CDS, which operates on interdisciplinary bases, is an appropriate tool for the studies of language policy. I have also described several core concepts of CDS and explained how I utilise them in my study followed by a five-stage approach (Fairclough, 2001) that shows 'how to do CDS' for the study of Indigenous language revitalisation.

It is important to reiterate that ideology gives birth to language policy and language policy, in turn, reinforces the ideology. Therefore, the linkage between language policy studies and a CDS is apparent as ideology is a core tenet of CDS. I believe that when dealing with "fuzzy" concepts such as ideology (Ricento, 2000, p. 2) and a complex process like language policy, a CDS methodological approach can provide a fully rounded view of 'who decides what' and 'who benefits from what'. In the next chapter, I describe the CDS-based research design and method of this study.

Chapter 5.   Design and method

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the design and method of my study based on a CDS approach which is fitting given the nature of my research and the social wrong identified in Chapter 4 regarding the low status of the Indigenous languages and the struggle of its speakers against hegemony.

In Section 5.2, I provide the details of the design and method of my research and the analytical framework is presented in Section 5.3. In Section 5.4, I outline the data selected for this research, namely: official policy documents and Indigenous interview transcripts. Due to the different genres of these data sets, I explain the different analytical tools that are applied to the texts. Finally, in Section 5.5, I conclude with a brief summary of this chapter.

5.2 The design of this research

The objective of this transdisciplinary research is to understand the ways in which Taiwan's Indigenous language revitalisation policies have impacted on Taiwan's Indigenous language revitalisation efforts. In short, the objective is to identify the extent of the relationship that exists between the policy and the people affected by it. I investigate this through an examination of the discourse(s) of two data sets: (i) government policy documents, and (ii) interviews with a selection of Indigenous people from Taiwan. My interest is in understanding the discourses inherent in both of these data sets – particularly as they relate to ideology and power.

While the investigation of language policy could involve material aspects (i.e., resource allocation) or symbolic aspects (in terms of identity politics and language attitudes), or a combination of the two (Barakos & Unger, 2016, p. 3), in this study, attention is paid to the symbolic and discursive practices. This dimension represents the interactional analysis between discourse and people (Fairclough, 2001), and therefore, the analysis of the interaction best supports achieving the research objectives. An investigation of discourse (the symbolic element of the policies) enables me to identify 'what is in the way that stops the issue being addressed', that is, the obstacles to addressing the social wrong; identifying these obstacles, in turn, allows for a better understanding of the

nature of the social wrong (see Section 4.7). To do so, I look at discourse from different perspectives (top-down and bottom-up). In applying a CDS approach, the government policy documents offer a top-down perspective while the Indigenous participants' interviews enable a bottom-up view.

Figure 5.1 below presents an outline of the design of this study that indicates how the different data sets – that is, the policy documents and the interview transcripts – require different approaches within a CDS framework.

Figure 5.1
The design of the study

The first set of data consist of the policy documents that show the top-down perspective inherent in the texts of the different policy genres (see Section 5.4.1). These policies are created by people who represent institutional power, and is therefore examined using a CDS approach to understand the government's ideological position on Indigenous language revitalisation in Taiwan, as demonstrated by the movement in the arrows in Figure 5.1.

The second set of data is collected from interviews with the Indigenous participants. The bottom-up perspectives conveyed through the participants' interview transcripts are investigated to understand any impact of existing Indigenous language revitalisation policy and/or any effect that this has had on the Indigenous people in Taiwan. I am interested to see to what extent the participants' comments legitimise or resist the government's dominant ideology, and what ideological position exist amongst the participants. Finally, how the policy ideology interacts with the participants narratives are examined, which is elaborated in the discussion chapter.

Unger (2013) pointed out that the advantages of using different data sets, such as those utilised here, is that some of the analysis, i.e., the policy analysis, can take place before the fieldwork. By doing so, the interview process is better informed so that the questions are more focused and "the risk that the authors are all following the same 'naturalised' discursive practices" is reduced (p. 5). This means I was able to *triangulate* my findings from the analysis of different data sets, thereby "minimis[ing] the risk of critical bias" (Wodak, 2000, as cited in Smith, 2012, p. 77).

5.3 Analytical framework

Drawing on Fairclough's (1992, p. 73) three-dimensional discourse framework for exploring the linkage between texts, discourse and ideology enabled me to consider the various datasets in the context of language policy and Indigenous language revitalisation. As previously discussed in Chapter 4, language policy functions within a complex social context(s), and therefore, it requires an approach to analysis that appreciates this dynamic nature (Barakos & Unger, 2016; Johnson, 2013). My adaptation of this framework incorporating the specific texts I analysed is presented in Figure 5.2.

Figure 5.2
Three-dimensional discourse and policy analysis

The first dimension, text, is "the main object of discourse analysis" (Smith, 2013, p. 145). This involves the examination of linguistic features and the understanding of how these features are part of a discursive event – in this case, Indigenous language revitalisation. I looked at how the various texts produce and constructs a discourse

about Taiwan and its Indigenous languages. The investigation of the text included analysis of the linguistic features which I explain further in the analytical procedure section.

The second dimension, the discursive practice, focuses on the process of text production, dissemination and consumption. Policy texts are prepared by the government to meet the legislative requirements. Not only is the language used within the policies confined to a certain generic style, the texts are also produced in particular forms for public dissemination (e.g., hard copy documents or on a website). In other words, this dimension asks "why a text might be constructed in a certain way" (Smith, 2013, p. 146). In the process of producing a certain text, a certain ideology is imprinted in the text by the text producer. For instance, the language policies were produced by the government and therefore contain the government ideology. Likewise, the interview transcripts can be examined in the same manner. The interview transcripts represent the participants' discursive practice in relation to language policy, and were produced for the purpose of the research investigating them linguistically in greater detail. This enabled insights to be obtained into the way the Indigenous people talk about the language revitalisation policies and the government.

How the texts are consumed also played an important role in the investigation as the ways of consumption pertain to the question of power. Arguably, the government has the power to decide who sees the text via different ways of dissemination. Vice versa, the readers who have access to the policies have the power to challenge the government.

The third dimension, socio-cultural practices, establishes the context which frames how certain things are understood. Fairclough (2003, p. 205) defined a social practice as "a relatively stabilised form of social activity" (for example, policy writing). These activities have a certain internal logic that is related to the ideology within society that affects how a text might be constructed, which subsequently shapes the attitude and beliefs of people. For instance, attitudes towards Indigenous people and their languages are affected by the ideology embedded in the socio-cultural practices of public policy making. Put simply, this dimension looks at the wider contexts.

While the textual dimension is where the linguistic analysis occurs, "questions of power and ideology may arise at each of the three levels" (Fairclough, 1993, p. 137). Therefore, keeping a critical eye on the subject while exploring the three dimensions is

crucial to the overall analysis. However, these dimensions overlap, and therefore they are not presented as separate sections of the study. Rather, the discursive and socio-cultural practices are integrated into the textual analysis for the purpose of establishing a better understanding of the underlying social conditions and ideologies that constitute the discourse.

5.4 Data preparation and analysis

Below I present the details of the selected texts and the necessary steps in preparing and analysing them. I explain why and how I selected these data sets and the different analytical tools that are applied to them as part of the research design. I start with the policy documents in Section 5.4.1 followed by the interview data in Section 5.4.2.

Although the data sets collected for this study (government policy documents and the transcripts of interviews I conducted with Indigenous people in Taiwan) share a similar function in providing textual material to enable the analysis and understanding of discourses about Indigenous language revitalisation, they represent different genres and differ in nature. Therefore, their preparation and analysis required them to be treated differently. As Fairclough (2016) stated "the particular method of textual analysis used in a specific case depends upon the objectives of the research" (p. 94). This is not regarded as a weakness; rather, it is viewed as a way to triangulate the findings (Unger, 2013).

5.4.1 Policy documents

The policy texts specifically referred to official documentation about Indigenous language revitalisation in Taiwan. These texts played a significant role in the investigation because they provided "non-reactive" data (Wodak & Meyer, 2016, p. 21). That is, they represented the corresponding ideology at the time of the production of such data. The selections only covered those that were significant to Indigenous language revitalisation and were published between 2008 and December 2017, which is the period upon which this study is focused.

The selection criteria required the policy documents to explicitly relate to Indigenous language revitalisation. As previously mentioned, I am interested in the top-down perspective and, for this reason, only official government documents that were related to key events in language revitalisation efforts in Taiwan were selected (see Chapter 3).

These explicit language policies marked the milestones in the Indigenous language revitalisation efforts in Taiwan in recent years (between 2008 and 2017). These milestones and the relevant policy documents are:

Milestone One: the release of the six-year language revitalisation plans in two stages. The two plans and their timeframes are:

1. Six-Year Plan for Indigenous Language Revitalisation Stage 1, 2008-2013 [原住民族語言振興六年計畫 (2008-2013)];
2. Six-Year Plan for Indigenous Language Revitalisation Stage 2, 2014-2019 [原住民族語言振興第 2 期六年計畫 (2014-2019)].

These were the first government plans solely dedicated to Indigenous language revitalisation, signalling a change in the official top-down approach to the Indigenous languages. They were documents for the CIP to obtain Executive Yuan funding for various Indigenous language revitalisation activities. The layout of the plans resembles a 'proposal' in response to the government's initiative to preserve Indigenous languages and culture. The plans contain seven sections, including rationale, goals, and a budget plan. I describe this in more detail in Chapter 6. The two plans were released by the CIP, which operates under the Executive Yuan, and are not considered laws (laws are made by the Legislative Yuan). Nevertheless, the Executive Yuan has executive responsibility for Taiwan's legislative efforts – made by the Legislative Yuan – to preserve Indigenous culture and languages, and therefore, the CIP's two plans show a change in the top-down position to act on Indigenous language revitalisation. Later, I refer to them as S1 and S2.

Milestone two: the release of the ILDA (2017) ［原住民族語言發展法(2017)］.

This was the first law devoted to the revitalisation of Taiwan's Indigenous languages. Unlike the two plans listed above, the ILDA (2017) is an official law passed by the Legislative Yuan, R.O.C. (see footnote 12). The release of this official law, timing-wise, went hand in hand with the change in the governing political powers (see Chapter 3) and coincided with the Stage 2 language revitalisation plan (see above). This signalled a strong political and social change in Taiwan.

All policy documents included in the study totalled around 41,000 words and were accessed and downloaded from the official Republic of China (R.O.C.) government websites:

- CIP website (https://www.apc.gov.tw/portal/index.html?lang=en_US)
- Laws & Regulations Database of the Republic of China (https://law.moj.gov.tw/index.aspx)

Out of the three policy documents listed above, only the ILDA had English versions available via the official websites. If an English version was not accessible on the websites, I translated these myself. My translation was checked by a certified translator (Chinese-English) for accuracy and consistency. When both the Chinese and the English versions were available, I examined them both to see if their content aligned. A discrepancy in the translation of one of the documents was noted which led me to analyse a particular linguistic feature. This is elaborated on later in this chapter.

5.4.1.1 Analytical procedure for policy documents

As a government policy is the legal intention of the government (Coulthard et al., 2016), I decided to focus my analysis of the government's top-down construction of discourse about Indigenous language revitalisation by looking at how it conveyed its intent. However, due to the different generic styles of the policy documents (Plans and Acts) different analytical tools were required to suit each of them, which I explain in more detail below. A summary of the analytical tools is presented in Figure 5.4 at the end of this section.

(i)   The two six-year language revitalisation plans (S1 and S2)

As stated earlier, the two plans are not laws and the language associated with them is more or less 'plain Chinese'. The genre of a proposal provides information about the government's intention – in this case, language revitalisation. Lo Bianco (2009) pointed out the nature of policy texts is that they are "persuasive in intent" (p. 116) while Grin (2003) further indicated that policy documents represent, mostly, the dominant ideology of the government. Therefore, government plans can be seen as a way to legitimise the government's ideology and its intentions. For this reason, I decided to examine the *legitimisation strategies* (Fairclough, 2003; Reyes, 2011; van Leeuwen, 2008) that the government used in its language revitalisation plans to "attempt to justify [taking] action or no action or an ideological position on a specific issue" (Reyes, 2011, p. 783).

Since the plans sought to invigorate greater use of Indigenous languages, this investigation focused on the ways in which the government discourse sought to legitimise its plans.

Moreover, I elected to examine the government's discursive *construction of purpose* (van Leeuwen, 2008) through the linguistic feature of clause construction in the documents when it came to the legitimisation strategies, as it further unpacks the government's intent in how it legitimises its actions, showing "how the purposes of social practices are constructed, interpreted, and negotiated" (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 124). The details of the legitimisation strategies and the discursive construction of purpose are presented in Section 5.4.1.2. This includes their categories for analysis and their corresponding linguistic means for coding the data.

Furthermore, given that the two plans used in this analysis were prepared under two different political powers (see Chapter 3), a comparison of them was necessary to explore whether there was any governmental shift in political and language ideologies. The findings are presented in Chapter 6.

(ii)   The Indigenous Language Development Act

I investigate the Act by looking at three different aspects. First**,** the Act itself represents a product of legitimisation given that it has already gone through the reading process[16] of select committees. The Act is therefore providing information about Indigenous language development without needing to argue why it is necessary. However, I believed that there were still legitimisation strategies inherent within the Act in the ways in which the text positions the government and the language speaker, and I have sought to explore these. As Unger (2013) argued, a "language policy document positions an institution with respect to (speakers of) a particular language" (p. 59). This Act belongs to the genre of a legislative document which means it is confined to being constructed in specific legal discourse and with terminology associated with government legislation. Therefore, I looked to examine the "construction of purpose" (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 126) within the rationalisation strategy (explained in Section 5.4.1.2) to identify 'who is responsible for what' in relation to the government's position on language revitalisation.

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[16] In the Parliamentary Reading process, the pros and cons of a Bill and the results are discussed. The legislative procedure of Taiwan can be found on the Legislative Yuan website http://www.ly.gov.tw/

Second, the literature on Taiwanese policy studies suggests that there seems to be an ongoing interest in the 'rights approach' to policy making (Tiun, 2013). Therefore, following Ruiz's (1984) policy orientation theory (see Chapter 4), I decided to look at the 'language-as-right' aspects of the policy and their discursive functions. Although language rights are a broad field to investigate, Tollefson (1991, p. 210) pointed out that language rights may be measured in the field of education and employment. Therefore, I decided to look closely into how these two fields are constructed.

Third, when selecting the Act as a text for analysis, I also discovered a translation discrepancy between the English and the Chinese version to do with the use of the modal verb 'ying' (it means shall/should) (see Chapter 7), so I decided to investigate further to understand how this might affect the interpretation and meaning of the Act. Since the audiences for the two versions differ (Chinese for people in Taiwan and English for international audiences), the analysis focuses on how this may have an effect on the government's self-representation and thus uncover its intention and the ideology that supports it. Therefore, it is about how the government represents itself in the best light to two different audiences through the choice of language. I drew on Chilton's (2004) modal verb 'rightness-wrongness scale' (see Section 5.4.1.2) to further examine the government's self-representation. The findings from the analysis of the ILDA (2017) are presented in Chapter 7.

5.4.1.2 Analytical tools for the policy documents

In the previous section, I have introduced the analytical procedures used in this investigation of government policy documents. In this section I present more specific information about the tools that I drew on in my investigation, beginning first with those that relate to the legitimisation strategies commonly found in political discourse. This is followed by a description of the construction of purpose – the clausal construction – that serves to indicate the intentions of the writer. Finally, I explain the linguistic features of the modal construction of the word 'ying' that I identified as a discrepancy in the translation of the Act.

Legitimisation strategies

An investigation of the government's legitimisation strategies in the policy documents was used to unpack its intentions when it came to language revitalisation in Taiwan. Reyes (2011) explained that in political speeches, language represents an instrument of

control and manifests symbolic power in discourse and society. Therefore, the strategies of legitimisation can be used individually or in combination with other means (i.e., argument) to legitimise or justify a goal and to seek interlocutor's support. In drawing on the work established by Fairclough, Van Leeuwen and Reyes, I selected four legitimisation strategies to focus on in my analysis, and I describe these below

(i)   Authorisation

An authorisation strategy is legitimisation by reference to the authority of tradition, custom and law, and of persons in whom some kind of institutional authority is vested (Fairclough, 2003). The analysis of authorisation investigates 'who' can exercise this authority and how (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 106). The 'who' figure could be a person, a type of social institution, or a social convention. van Leeuwen (2008) pointed out six types of authority which can be realised by the linguistic means set out below:

1. Personal authority (because *I* say so)
2. Expert authority (the *expert/report* says)
3. Role model authority (the *experienced teacher* said …)
4. Impersonal authority (*it is* compulsory for …)
5. The authority of tradition (we *always* shower before bedtime)
6. The authority of conformity (you should do this because *we all did it* when we were kids)

The linguistic features that realise these types of authority are often found in the transitivity of the verbal process, such as, 'I say', 'the expert says', or 'report'. Further, the mental process of transitivity, such as 'believe' or 'approve', can also be used to indicate authority, for instance, 'the teacher believes'. An authorisation strategy can also be realised by the use of high-frequency modality such as 'always' or 'many' to show 'it is always the case, so we must do it like this'. An authorisation strategy does not rely on a 'process of logical reasoning' to be legitimate; rather, it relies on the 'cultural logic', which is often ideological. This can be realised by the use of 'everyone', 'we all' to indicate a shared understanding, a norm.

(ii) Rationalisation

Unlike the authorisation strategy, the rationalisation strategy requires the readers to see the legitimised statements as being well-reasoned or well thought-through; therefore, these are the 'right things to do'. This process implies a procedure of consultation and

reasoning and I aimed to look at the linguistic features through which this was achieved in the documents. Simply, this strategy can be realised by using words such as 'consultation'. For example, using verbal and mental transitivity process like 'consult' or 'discuss' can be viewed as a rationalisation. It can also be realised in the intertextual connections, i.e., it is based on another document.

van Leeuwen (2008, p. 113) distinguished two types of rationality: instrumental rationality and theoretical rationality. Instrumental rationality legitimises practices by telling the reader 'it will work', i.e., 'do X in order to achieve Y'; or, 'we can achieve Y by doing X'.

Unlike instrumental rationality, theoretical rationality is based on "some kind of truth" (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 116), the way things are. It is realised by words that indicate inevitability; it can also be realised via the existential process of transitivity. For example, 'it is necessary'. Theoretical rationality can also be realised by metaphors that describe an event as 'a natural phenomenon', like 'a flood of immigrants'.

(iii) Moral evaluation

A moral evaluation is conducted in an attempt to justify actions by saying they are 'natural' or 'good'. The linguistic features that realise these things are often adjectives that connote 'natural' or 'good'. Moral evaluation can also be realised by associating the action with something that is 'moral'. For example, 'doing X is like Y'. Y contains moral quality and thus 'doing X' is justified as 'the right thing to do'.

(iv) Mythopoesis or better future strategy

Mythopoesis is legitimisation conveyed through narrative, i.e., storytelling (Fairclough, 2003; van Leeuwen, 2008). This does not mean it is in the genre of narrative, but rather it paints a picture of what 'should be' (Fairclough, 2003) – the ideal situation. A similar strategy that I have identified as more appropriate for this study is the 'better future strategy' (Reyes, 2011). A better future strategy tells the listeners 'if we do this our future will be better'. This can be realised by the explicit use of future tenses 'will' or 'going to' or the use of hypothetical 'if', showing a possibility. This could also manifest in word choices such as 'for our children' (indicating the future generation) or 'it is the trend'.

Next, I demonstrate how the construction of purpose as a legitimisation tool can be used to further unpack the government's intention.

Construction of purpose

The construction of purpose (or grammar of purpose – van Leeuwen, 2008) was studied in the analysis of policies to identify the purpose and the agency of the policies. To be purposeful, three elements are needed: purposeful action, purposeful link and the purposeful statement, i.e., do X in order to achieve Y. 'Do X' is the action, 'in order to' is the purposeful link, and 'achieve Y' is the purposeful statement and, hence, the purpose. 'Achieve Y', in this case, is also viewed as the 'intention' of the speaker. The purposeful clause could be seen as a modalised clause as it shows the intention and preference of the speaker. The purposeful clause could be further analysed by examining linguistic devices that activated, materialise, instrumentalised, and objectivated the government's action (see Van Leeuwen, 2008, pp. 55-74).

There is no English version released for the two Six-Year Plans. Therefore, in analysing these Chinese policies I identified the character 'rang' (讓) as the intention marker, as it demonstrates the will of the speaker and the cause-effect relation (Wang, 2011); therefore it is used as a purposeful link (Ting, 2020). Furthermore, it functions as a modal of preference as 'rang' contains the meaning of 'make – become', which is a "relational process" (Fairclough, 1992, p. 178). In light of this, a transitivity analysis has been adapted to analyse this structure. 'Rang' is further explained in Chapter 6.

Modality

As mentioned in the section above, modality can be used to explore the agent's intention. It was also used in this study to explore how the government positions itself and the language speakers within the Indigenous language devolvement Act

Given the translation discrepancy, I specifically looked at the modal verb 'ying' (應) which could be translated as 'shall', 'could' or 'may' (see Chapter 7). Chilton (2004, p. 59) pointed out that modal verbs are viewed as a positioning device for the 'self' – in this case, the text producer (the government). Chilton's rightness-wrongness scale shows the 'self' is represented as 'right' and 'true'. If something or someone is

positioned further away from the self, it is less true or less right, and vice versa. Figure 5.3 below is a simplified version of Chilton's rightness-wrongness scale.

Figure 5.3
The rightness-wrongness scale

Right   ---   **Wrong**
(self)

will, must, should, ought, can, could, might, may, shouldn't (negative modality)

'Shall' sits between will and ought. Therefore when 'ying' (應) is translated as 'shall', it is closer to the speaker than when it is translated as 'may'. A detailed analysis of the discrepancy is presented in Chapter 7. Figure 5.4 below provides a visual representation that summarises the analytical tools used for policy analysis that have been described.

Figure 5.4
Summary of the analytical tools for policy documents

5.4.2 Interviews with Indigenous participants

The inclusion of interviews with Indigenous participants living in Taiwan, on the subject of language revitalisation, provided the second data set. As Wodak and Meyer (2016) urged, a CDS researcher should "incorporate fieldwork and ethnography, if possible, in order to explore the object under investigation as a precondition for any further analysis and theorizing" (p. 21). The analysis of the policies alone does not show how they may have influenced Indigenous language revitalisation. Thus, to triangulate the findings, interviews with Indigenous participants were necessary. Since I was interested in how policy has affected language revitalisation and how ideology is

manifested in the policy, the participation of Indigenous people in Taiwan helped to validate whether the policy meets the needs of the language users and to show if there are conflicting ideologies between the policy and those who would benefit from it. The participants' comments had the potential to provide a rich source of data for the understanding of language policy in Taiwan, which will further unpack in the construal of the policies.

In the following sections, I describe the processes involved with the ethics approval, recruitment of participants, the procedure of data collection in the interviews, and how the transcripts were analysed.

5.4.2.1 Research ethics

In conducting interviews with Indigenous people for this study on location in Taiwan, it was important for me to first address any ethical issues by gaining approval from the Auckland University of Technology Ethics Committee (AUTEC). My ethics application addressed all the AUTEC guidelines relating to the privacy and confidentiality of the interview participants and the way that the research was conducted. Ethics approval from AUTEC was received on October 10, 2017 (application number 17/340) (Appendix 1). My third supervisor, Professor Chang Hui-tuan, from the National Cheng-Chi University in Taiwan, advised that as my ethics application was approved by Auckland University of Technology it was not necessary for me to gain further permission locally when commencing my fieldwork.

Participant Information Sheets (Appendix 2) and Consent Forms (Appendix 4) describing the nature of this research were provided to the participants (see recruitment method in Section 5.4.2.2). Participants were assured that participation or non-participation would not in any way affect their everyday life. They were also given the option to be anonymised in the final report. In addition, all participants were assured that the information they provided would only be used for this research and were informed of their right to withdraw from the study before the completion of the analysis.

One other ethical aspect I was aware of was my position as a non-Indigenous Taiwanese researcher doing Indigenous research. I was aware of the uneven power relationship created by the colonial history between the non-Indigenous (dominant group) and Indigenous communities, including my socio-cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1991). To mitigate the hegemonic tension that might be present, I opted for potential participants

to approach me instead of me contacting them directly. I also used open-ended questions to allow the participants to express themselves fully. Once they contacted me and we met in person, I felt that my position as an "intimately engaged participant" (Collier, 1998, p. 144) aided my interaction with the participants because of our shared knowledge about Taiwan's history and the Indigenous language situation.

Hill and May (2013) cautioned that Indigenous studies were often not contributed back to the Indigenous community. Instead, many of these studies only benefited the researchers and "many of who were/are non-Indigenous" (p. 47). This concern is addressed by the emancipatory aim of a CDS framework which I discussed in Chapter 4.

Finally, apart from keeping in touch with the participants during the process of completing the transcription to ensure their words were accurately documented, a two-page final report of the findings was sent to the participants for them to comment on before the thesis submission. In this process, the participants are engaged and empowered.

5.4.2.2 Interview recruitment

While some studies have focused on younger participants as they represent the future usage and attitude towards the language (Albury, 2016; Harrison, 2007; McCarty et al., 2009; Tang, 2015a), on the advice of my third supervisor in Taiwan I did not limit the selection of participants to a certain age group so as to capture a wider range of responses, such as generational attitudes, and memories of past language policies.

Four criteria guided the recruitment process to ensure that the participants could be reached and that the data collected was meaningful and relevant:

1. The participants needed to be over 18 years of age, which is the legal minimum age for the participants to give consent.
2. They needed to have 'Indigenous' status which is closely linked to the genealogical clarification of 'aborigine' stated in the Status Act for Indigenous Peoples (2005). The participants must have this status as the rules and regulations are aimed at the Indigenous population.
3. The participants needed to have an overt interest in their languages. This does not necessarily mean they needed to be fluent in the language. Rather, they had

to see their language as important and be actively involved in some language maintenance or learning activities. This could be language activism or simply trying to learn or teach the language.

4. Selecting members of all 16 Indigenous tribes would be outside the scope of this study; therefore, this study aimed to select participants from tribes with a larger population. However, due to the nature of the snowball sampling method, some participants were from smaller tribes.

The participants were recruited using the *snowball sampling method* (Bryman, 2001) through my third supervisor and my own contacts (friends in Taiwan, and those who I met while in Taiwan who asked to be involved on hearing about the research). I was advised by my supervisors that given the richness of the data, this study should aim to recruit approximately 10 participants.

I recruited the participants in three ways. Through my third supervisor in Taiwan, the participants were given the Participant Information Sheets and Consent Forms which explained the aim of the research and the nature of the study (Appendices 2-4). The participants then completed the consent forms if they wished to be part of the study and provided these to me.

Secondly, I contacted friends in Taiwan who connected me with those who met the recruitment criteria and were interested in the research topic. The Participant Information Sheets and Consent Forms were given to the participants beforehand. The participants then contacted me if they were interested. The snowball sampling method means the selection of participants is by no means 'random'; thus, the participants' ages and education backgrounds reflect the recruitment method.

In addition to these contacts, I was also approached by participants when I visited my home county (Ping-Tung county). I met one of the participants while she was working at the Indigenous Art and Culture Centre. She was interested in my visit, and I gave her the Information Sheet to look at; later that evening we arranged to meet. One other participant volunteered on the spot when I was observing the Wutai Primary School's[17] linguistic landscape at the weekend.

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[17] Wutai Primary School (霧台國小) has 58 students from year 1 to year 6. http://wutai.wutps.ptc.edu.tw/

5.4.2.3 The participants

Based on the selection criteria and the snowball sampling method, I recruited 11 members from different Indigenous communities to be interviewed for this study. There was a good mix in terms of age (24-60), and both male (six) and female (five). All of the participants were fluent Chinese speakers; therefore, it was appropriate to conduct interviews in Mandarin Chinese.

The final selection of participants was from four Indigenous tribes in Taiwan – the Amis, Paiwan, Rukai, and Seediq. Nine out of 11 participants were from the Amis and Paiwan tribes, which are the two largest Indigenous groups in Taiwan, occupying just under 60% of the total Indigenous population. Rukai, the sixth largest group, was also selected because Rukai is mainly located in Ping-Tung, my home town, and thus it was a personal endeavour to meet with the Rukai participants. One participant was from Seediq, the eighth largest tribe.[18] Although many of the participants are (semi-)fluent speakers, none of them is a language teacher.

Ten participants gave me consent to use their Indigenous names or a translation of their Chinese names. However, for their privacy and for consistency in the research, I decided to use pseudonyms for all of the participants. Each of the pseudonyms consists of a capital letter that represents their tribal affiliation along with a number to differentiate between tribal members. For example, A1 and A2 mean the first and second participants from the Amis tribe respectively. Table 5.1 below provides basic information on the participants. While this is not intended to be an exhaustive report on the participants, it provides demographics such as their tribal affiliation, age, gender, level of language fluency and occupation or student status.

Table 5.1
Participant information

Participants	Tribe	Age	Gender	Indigenous Language Fluency	Occupation
A1	Amis	24-34	M	Fluent	Teacher (tertiary)
A2	Amis	24-34	F	Semi-fluent	MA student
P1	Paiwan	24-34	M	Semi-fluent	MA student
S1	Seediq	35-50	F	Fluent	Teacher (Tertiary)
A3	Amis	35-50	M	Fluent	Teacher (Tertiary)

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[18] Seediq was grouped as Atayal, the third largest group, by the Japanese. It was not until 2008 that Seediq was recognised as an independent Indigenous population.

R1	Rukai	35-50	M	Fluent	Teacher (Tertiary)
P2	Paiwan	35-50	F	Fluent	Civil servant / Teacher (primary)
P3	Paiwan	35-50	F	Semi-fluent	Civil servant
P4	Paiwan	35-50	F	Not fluent	Civil servant
P5	Paiwan	35-50	M	Not fluent	Civil servant
P6	Paiwan	50-60	M	Very fluent	Civil servant / Teacher (primary)

The participants who met the selection criteria were able to provide more direct and personal accounts regarding their experience with the language and language policy which, in term provided a deeper understanding of the influences the policy has upon Indigenous language users.

5.4.2.4 The interview process

All of the interviews were conducted in Mandarin Chinese, in which I am fluent. They were semi-structured in nature, guided by open-ended questions with probing questions to elicit deeper responses (see Appendix 5). Themes pertinent to language revitalisation that I had already decided on, such as language and identity and language ideology, were included in the interview questions. For example, the participants were asked "What does your mother language mean to you? How do you feel about your language?" These questions were asked first before the policies extracts were presented to the participants to comment on. This was to ensure that the discussion on policy documents did not influence the discussion of the participants' own experiences.

In addition, I provided the participants with excerpts from the policies relevant to Indigenous languages to comment upon (see Appendix 6), in order to see how they responded, as these policies have had considerable influence in shaping Taiwan's linguistic repertoire and are deemed to have a significant impact on people's attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs in relation to their languages. Some of the excerpts shown to the participants were taken from the Six-Year Plans and the ILDA mentioned above, and some were taken from the implicit language policies, which I list below:

- Education Act for Indigenous Peoples (promulgated in 1998) and amendments to the full document of 35 articles (2004).
- Enforcement Rules Governing of Education Act for Indigenous Peoples (2013).

Unlike the Six-Year Plans and the ILDA that I analysed as part of this study, the implicit language policies were used specifically for the purpose of the interviews to elicit each participant's response, which provides a better understanding of the implementation of the language policies. Only parts relating to salient themes identified in each participant's discourse were investigated further. This analysis is presented in the chapters containing interview data analysis (Chapter 8 and Chapter 9).

Eight interviews, lasting from 45 minutes to one and half hours in duration, were fully audio-recorded using two smartphones. Two interviews lasted between three and four hours; however, only one and a half hours of each interview is audio recorded, and the rest of the interview was noted down. The reason for that is that, after the interview ended (questioning and recording stopped), the participants were still interested in talking to me and I did not want to disrupt the flow of the conversation, so I decided I would not turn the recording device back on but, instead, made notes. The interview conducted at Wutai Primary School was not recorded because the participant volunteered on the spot, so it only involved notetaking. All other interviews were conducted in public spaces of the participants' choosing (such as cafés or restaurants).

5.4.2.5 Transcription and translation

All recorded materials were transcribed into Mandarin Chinese for analysis. I transcribed every word the participants said, but I had to decide upon the level of detail to appear in the transcripts. Since I did not intend to conduct a conversation analysis, I did not follow a detailed transcription convention.[19] Pauses, intonations, interruptions and other meta-linguistic features were not included in my transcription. To ensure the information provided by the participants was not misappropriated, all transcripts were sent back to the participants to comment and give feedback on.

In terms of translation, as the interviews were relatively informal, other conversational topics sometimes side-tracked the interview questions. Therefore, I only translated the parts that were applicable to my analysis into English. My translation was sent to a certified translator to be checked for consistency and accuracy (see Appendix 7 for a letter providing a consistency report from a certified translator).

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[19] Such as the *Transcriber's Manual* which Janet Holmes used for her workplace research: http://www.victoria.ac.nz/lals/lwp

5.4.2.6 Analytical procedures for the interview data

The first step for the analysis was to read the transcripts closely, noting what I found interesting and relevant to the research question. Following that, the interview data was uploaded onto *NVivo software* [NVivo 11] for coding purposes. In NVivo, *nodes* were generated for the interview data. A node is a brief description of what was being said in the interview (something interesting and relevant to the investigation); it is not an interpretation (see Appendix 8 for an example). The nodes were then put into *themes* for analysis based on their relevance to each other. Themes generally follow concerns within literature reviews, and, occasionally, themes can emerge from the data. Finally, themes were put together to form discourse(s) given their relevance to each other. The theories pertaining to the analysis are outlined in the literature review chapters (Chapters 2 to 4). Figure 5.5 is a conceptual map of the hierarchy moving from NVivo nodes to theory.

Figure 5.5
Conceptual map of NVivo as a node-to-theory device

The purpose of the interviews was to observe salient themes in each participant's discourse and to answer my second research question. To examine the interview data, I concentrated on themes of ethnolinguistic identity, language ideology, and language ownership because these are the most relevant to my research questions. Comments following questions about language policies were also observed.

Themes relevant to ethnolinguistic identity included, but were not limited to, nationalism, colonisation, bi- or multilingualism, and (self-) identification, and could be realised by various linguistic devices which I explain below. Language ideology was explored by examining linguistic devices that demonstrate the attitudes, beliefs and values with regard to a language. Language ownership was investigated using an analysis of the linguistic devices and strategies that signal the notion of 'legitimate speaker' (Bourdieu, 1991).

The interview transcripts provided a rich source of data. Initially, I found the *legitimisation strategies* mentioned earlier in analysing the language revitalisation policies were applicable for the investigation of social actors justifying their actions (Reyes, 2011). Therefore, I looked to see how the participants justified their views and behaviour in relation to their language usage and the government's position. For instance, I looked at how the participants justified their lack of use of the languages and their beliefs in the government's efforts.

I also found the discursive strategies and linguistic devices from Wodak's (2001a, p. 73) Discourse-Historical Approach framework of CDS useful for the analysis of the interview data; these could be utilised in conjunction with the legitimisation strategies as they are appropriate for the analysis of social actors and groups and their identities. Below, I list the discursive strategies and linguistic devices that I have adopted from Wodak (2001a) to suit the analysis of participants' responses, as they are related to how the participants construct themselves and the government.

- **nomination** strategy is used to construct in-group and out-group identity and can be linguistically constructed using devices that indicate membership categorisation and identity, such as pronoun 'we', possessive pronoun 'ours', lexicon 'Indigenous' or metaphors.
- **predication** strategy is used to identify the characteristics, quality, and features of social actors. While this is geared to describing social actors and groups, I found it useful to apply these descriptions to things, events or actions. For example, as will be evident in Chapter 8, the participants would describe their language as their 'soul'. Since the soul symbolises the essence of a person, the language is thought to be essential to the identity.
- **intensifier or mitigation** strategy is the use of linguistic devices to alter or mitigate the 'intensity' of the speech. It can be realised in the use of vague expressions and the verbs of saying, feeling, thinking. Due to the nature of the interview data (in the Chinese language), participles and tag questions were not applicable as they are not prominent linguistic features in the Chinese language.

5.4.3 From words to discourse

In the design of this study and through the analysis of the two data sets, I aimed to understand points of view about the Indigenous language revitalisation policies in Taiwan from two sides. Looking at the top-down and bottom-up approaches, I believed, would enable me to gain a better understanding of the relationship between the government and the Indigenous people in Taiwan. I wanted to explore whether the analysis of the official documents would provide insights into the discourse of the government and how they legitimised their actions when it came to language policy. But it was also important to see how the interview participants responded to these policies, whether they accepted or resisted the government discourse, whether they felt the policies were effective, and how they identified a 'legitimate speaker'.

In the final step, I focused on how 'Indigenous language revitalisation' is interpreted, constructed and recontextualised. The voices from 'above' and 'below' do not necessarily mean opposition; rather, one constitutes and is constitutive of the other.

5.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have described the design and method of this study when it comes to the analysis of data to answer the research questions. I have also listed my two sets of data: the policy documents confirming the official discourse about Indigenous language revitalisation in Taiwan; and the participants' interview data representing a 'bottom-up' view. Within each of the data sets, I have explained how the data is collected and analysed, and the tools used to conduct the analysis. For the collection of interview data, I have also demonstrated careful consideration of ethics.

The next four chapters present the findings from my analysis using a range of tools and strategies mentioned above. The comparison of the Six-Year Plans features first in Chapter 6 and is followed by the analysis of the ILDA in Chapter 7. These two chapters provide insights into the government/elite discourse surrounding language revitalisation in Taiwan. Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 present the findings of the analysis of the Indigenous participants' discourse about language policy.

Chapter 6. A discourse on nation-building: The analysis of Taiwan's Six-Year Plans for Indigenous Language Revitalisation

6.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the findings from my comparative analysis of the Six-Year Plans for Indigenous Language Revitalisation Stage 1 (2008-2013), and Stage 2 (2014-2019). From hereon I refer to them as S1 and S2 respectively.

Since the policies provide "non-reactive" data (Wodak & Meyer, 2016, p. 21) that corresponds with the ideology at the time of the production of the data, the two consecutive Plans prepared under two different governments with contrasting political ideologies best demonstrate how Indigenous languages are constructed in Taiwan's changing political landscape and how the two powers recontextualise the notion of 'language revitalisation' to support their own political ideologies. In other words, this chapter highlights the inseparable relationship between language ideology and political ideology.

In Section 6.2, I give a brief description of the textual data in order to provide context for the analysis, as CDS considers "the context of language use to be crucial" (Wodak & Meyer, 2016, p. 5). With 'language revitalisation' in mind as the intention, strategies that legitimise this intention are explored drawing on four legitimisation strategies in Section 6.3. The investigation of the legitimisation strategies looks into 'what the policy is about', that is, what the governments were legitimising. In Section 6.4, I further examine the policy rationality using the modality 'rang' (讓) as the purposeful link or intention marker for this investigation, as 'rang' has causative qualities (Wang, 2011). This step unpacks the purpose of the policy – what the policy is for. I discuss the implication of the findings in Section 6.5. Finally, this chapter concludes by reiterating my findings in terms of the government political agendas in Section 6.6.

6.2 The context of the six-year language development plans

I have, in Chapter 3, provided broad contextual information about Taiwan's political and linguistic background. In this section, I give a brief summary of the context, more specially, I focus on the two language revitalisation plans in relation to their corresponding political backdrop.

The two Indigenous language revitalisation plans provide a unique opportunity to study language ideology within shifting political ideologies because the two plans were stipulated under the opposing political powers. The KMT is the Chinese-Nationalist party with a pro-(One-)China ideology, and the DPP is the Taiwanese-Nationalist party which has a strong pro-Taiwan independence stance. As pointed out in Chapter 3, Taiwan was led by the KMT from 1949 to 2000. In 2000, the KMT lost power to the opposition, the DPP, for the first time, and since then political power has changed hands several times (see Chapter 3).

Since 2008, the CIP has released two Six-Year Plans for Indigenous Language Revitalisation covering the period 2008 to 2019. The Plans are:

- Six-Year Plan for Indigenous Language Revitalisation Stage 1 (2008-2013)
- Six-Year Plan for Indigenous Language Revitalisation Stage 2 (2014-2019)

Figure 6.1 below shows the overlapping period of the policy and the changing political powers.

Figure 6.1
Political powers and policy timeframe

The Stage 1 Plan (2008-2013) was drafted under the DPP Government and executed under the KMT President Ma. The Stage 2 Plan (2014-2019) was amended under the KMT Government within the President Ma's eight-year term, but its implementation continued under the DPP Government.

These plans were milestones in Taiwan's language policy because the CIP is a government organisation established under the Executive Yuan whose main function is devoted to the formulation and execution of Indigenous policies. Therefore, the publication of these plans indicates a significant change in the government's attitude towards the Indigenous languages.

The two plans released under the CIP are in the style of proposal for the purpose of obtaining funding and support from the government for language revitalisation activities

and were written in layperson's terms. They are not confined to legal terminology, but they do contain references to the UN declaration regarding language revitalisation. The plans contain seven sections: 1) rationale, 2) goals, 3) current policies and self-assessment, 4) strategies and procedures, 5) budget, 6) expected outcomes and implication, and 7) conclusion.

In recent years, with policy efforts aimed at the promotion of Indigenous languages, both the KMT and the DPP have portrayed themselves as the "legitimate protectors of minority interests" (Dupré, 2016, p. 417). However, given Taiwan's colonial history and the increasing cross-strait tension with Mainland China regarding the One-China ideology, the approach to language issues seems to be signalling other political agendas.

To investigate the political ideologies of the government in Taiwan, in Section 6.3 below, I present my findings about the legitimisation strategies I investigated in the two plans to see how the governments in two different time periods justified their "ideological position on specific issues" (Reyes, 2011, p. 783).

6.3 Legitimisation strategies and their ideological implications

In this section, I illustrate four legitimisation strategies used in the text – authorisation, moral evaluation, rationalisation, and the notion of a better future (Fairclough, 2003; Reyes, 2011; van Leeuwen, 2008). Using analyses of the four strategies, I investigate how S1 and S2 are legitimised and how this legitimisation contributes to the policy discourse.

6.3.1 Legitimisation through authorisation

As I outlined in Chapter 5, the authorisation strategy is used to answer the question 'why should we revitalise the languages?' by saying 'we should, because the authority says we should'. It is evident that both plans use the authorisation strategy as demonstrated in examples (1) and (2):

(1) *The experiences from Western developed countries tell us: language is a 'liberty right'.*

西方先進國家的經驗告訴我們：語言至少是一種「自由權」

(2) *From the experiences and theories of Indigenous language revitalisation in Western countries, we now know that, in order to see results, language transmission needs to be enforced in families, tribes, and inter-generations.*

而且從西方國家少數族裔族語復振的經驗與理論得知，族語的復振唯有在家庭、部落與社區間，父母子孫世代傳承才可以看到成效

Examples (1) and (2) demonstrate that the *West* is constructed as the role model authority. Both extracts show that, because these countries are 'developed*'*, therefore they know best. These excerpts also demonstrate the use of *expert authority*. These western countries are experts because they have 'experiences' and 'theories'. Their authoritative voice comes through via the use of verbal process 'tell' – they told us language is a liberty right, therefore we should help Indigenous languages. Although example (2) uses a mental process 'know', the mental process 'know' shows that the *West told us*, that is how we know. This construction indicates that the Western approach is seen as a proven method.

While the above examples are evident on both Plans, one major distinction between S1 and S2 is the use of the voice of the President as the authoritarian figure in S1. This is demonstrated in example (3):

(3) <u>Like</u> the president said, 'without (<u>our</u>) Indigenous <u>friends</u>, there will be no Taiwan; (if) Taiwan were to <u>stand on its two feet,</u> we must allow our Indigenous friends to stand on their two feet first. (If) Taiwan were to <u>step out</u>, we must allow our Indigenous friends to step out'.

<u>如</u>總統所言「沒有原住民朋友，就沒有台灣；台灣要<u>站起來</u>，就要讓原住民朋友先站起來；台灣要<u>走出去</u>，就必需讓原住民先走出去」. (p. 3)

The president in example (3) refers to President Chen, from the DPP. It is interesting to observe the use of metaphors 'stand on two feet (站起來)' and 'step out (走出去)'. These metaphors are Hoklo-Taiwanese colloquialism. This type of metaphor is not evident in S2 as S2 was formulated by the Chinese-Nationalist KMT. The use of these metaphors highlights the DPP's pro-Taiwan independence stance with 'stand on one's two feet' being a synonym for independence. This indicates DPP's Taiwanese identity and their opposition to the One-China ideology.

The use of 'friends*'*, as in '(our) Indigenous friends', positions the DPP's President Chen and his party as inclusive and friendly – contrary to the colonial power (the KMT). Furthermore, the word 'our', as a nomination strategy, is important in the construction of the Indigenous people and is used to show that not only is the president an authority, but he is supported by 'Indigenous friends', which provides further

legitimation. This echoed the 'New Partnership Agreement' that the President promised in his 1999 election campaign.

In this instance, the DPP has positioned itself as the local Taiwanese Government along with their Indigenous 'friends', and they can make Taiwan 'stand on its two feet', in contrast to the KMT which was the Chinese-Nationalist Government that took over Taiwan, and oppressed the Indigenous languages and other Taiwanese dialects (Hoklo and Hakka). This appears to be an attempt to demarcate the DPP from the KMT. Finally, the use of the word '*like*' (如) reinforces the authority of the president by suggesting his views have been heard previously and are echoed once again in the document. This suggests that people should do what the president tells them. In this sense, the government is positioned as in an advisory role (knowing better).

It seems that the linguistic features used in the DPP's S1 Plan constructed the president as the 'Taiwanese President', which signals two political agendas: first, to establish the DPP as the representative of Taiwan; second, to differentiate the Taiwanese identity from a Mainland Chinese identity.

6.3.2 Legitimisation through moral evaluation

The strategy of moral evaluation is trying to answer the question 'why should we revitalise the languages?' by suggesting it is natural or good. The *natural order of things* can be realised in grammatical features such as the use of the present tense, or by lexical choices such as 'natural' or 'normal'. For instance, the existential verb 'is' in example (1) above, in the phrase 'language is a liberty right', shows that it is natural to see language as an inherent right; therefore, to secure the linguistic rights of the Indigenous people is the *right thing to do*. This statement is evident in both plans and it demonstrates the language ideology of both political powers. It appears that both plans value language rights, but this could simply be the default position of a democratic society where the rights of people are a prerequisite in such a social system. A contrary effect is that, by using the present tense 'is', the historic wrongdoings of the government (i.e., oppression of language and culture) are ignored and 'language as a right' is constructed as 'always being the case' in Taiwan.

Moral evaluation can also be used when a statement contains emotional support and provides a feel-good factor for the listeners. Example (4) below illustrates how a

statement in the form of an apology can be looked at as a moral action (a speech act), especially when there are historic wrongdoings:

> *(4) The <u>death of the Indigenous languages</u> is due to the government's 'Mandarin only, no local languages' policy for the past 50 years [...] so to break out of the <u>unfair</u> Mandarin Only situation.*
>
> 原住民族語言的死寂是因為過去50年國家「獨尊國語、壓抑方言」的語言政策所形成 ⋯ 進而突破長期以來「獨尊國語」這個語言的不公平現象

Example (4) appears to indicate a sense of regret from the government for its historic wrongdoings. The emotive phrase 'the death of the Indigenous languages' followed by the word 'unfair' suggests remorse and the will to restore justice. However, bearing in mind the previous discussion regarding the DPP's attempt to differentiate itself from KMT, example (4) is not an attempted apology from the DPP, but rather a criticism directed at the KMT.

This statement is only evident in S1. The *government* mentioned in example (4) is the KMT Government, which was the colonial nationalist government that ruled Taiwan for 50 years and had an oppressive language regime. The 'Mandarin-only' criticism is aimed at the KMT as the DPP's supporters originally come from the Hoklo-Taiwanese speech community. While the moral and emotional appeal could be interpreted as an apology from the government, it functions as a non-apology with implied criticism, which is transferring the blame to the previous government.

Moreover, moral evaluation involves metaphorical associations with something that is moral. In S1, language is described as 'the window to the soul' (語言是心靈之窗). It is common for language speakers of a minority language to describe their language as the 'soul' (Austin & Sallabank, 2014; Hadjidemetriou, 2014). The word 'soul' has its spiritual connotation and is thought to be the essence of a person. Therefore, saving the languages equates to saving the people, and by extension the nation, which meets the moral evaluation criteria of the right thing to do and the emotional appeal. Yet, it should be noted that this metaphor is not found in S2. It appears that the affiliation with the Indigenous languages in relation of the notion of *a nation* is perceived differently by the two different leading parties. I discuss the implication further in the discussion chapter.

Moral evaluation can also be realised by linguistic terms or strategies that connote a positive intention. This is evident in the following example from S2:

(5) (In order) To <u>make up</u> for the <u>lack of</u> different learning channels in the previous plan (stage 1), this plan (Stage2) will establish a language learning system for learners at different stages of language learning.

為補強第1期計畫中多元化學習方式及學習管道的不足，本期計畫 將因應不同 的學習階段，建構一套系統化的族語學習體系

Here, the use of 'make up for' indicates a remedy for a previous wrong, especially when followed by the use of 'lack of'. Remedying something is associated with a 'good intention'. The non-explicit use of 'in order to' (see bracket) further expresses the intention. Thus, example (5) shows that S2 is a remedy for S1 and, therefore, is better. Remembering again that S1 was developed by the DPP, it therefore seems that S2 (KMT) is criticising S1 (DPP) for its unfruitful language policy. Nonetheless, it can also be seen as an acknowledgment of S1 since the implementation of S1 was within the KMT President Ma's eight-year term.

Another way to express moral evaluation is through the use of analogy – using X to justify Y (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 111). It is answering the question 'why should we revitalise languages?' by saying "because it is like another activity which is associated with positive values" (van Leeuwen, 2008, pp. 111-112), not because it is intrinsically good itself. This strategy is only found in S2, as shown in example (6):

(6) To realise the essence of the Constitution, to eradicate gender bias and <u>promote gender equality</u>, all government agencies and local groups are encouraged to include gender equality awareness in their plans when conducting language revitalisation work. Apart from promoting language revitalisation, personnel involved should develop <u>tolerance towards different values and beliefs.</u>

貫徹憲法消除性別歧視、促進性別地位實質平等之精神，鼓勵各級政府及民間團體推動各項族語振興工作時，將性別認同、性別意識納入計畫中一併考量，除有效提升族語保存語發展工作外，培養參與計畫人員尊重多元，包容差異之價值觀。

In example (6), the promotion of gender equality is linked to 'tolerance towards different values and beliefs'. It shows that, akin to promoting gender equality, Indigenous language revitalisation also demonstrates the quality of 'tolerance towards different values and beliefs'. Therefore, the association with the positive value of gender equality legitimises languages revitalisation. The analogical example assumes that the audience will make a logical link between the objectives that are being compared. This

process is similar to 'rationalisation', which I discuss below. The distinction is that rationalisation strategy does not necessarily have a moral quality.

The statement in example (6) seems to be out of place and there is no specific background for it. However, it seems that, in comparison to S1's use of emotive language (such as 'the soul'), S2 is using gender equality as another argument for its 'normative' policy approach (see Chapter 4).

6.3.3 Legitimisation through rationalisation

In this section, rationalisation strategies are demonstrated in three ways. Firstly, the rationality of the government can be illustrated by using explicit intertextual references that refer the current text to other texts that have demonstrated a process of rationalisation, for example, other laws and regulations. In S1 and S2, the intertextual references are made by directly referring the rationality of the plans to the Constitution Amendments, the Education Act for Indigenous Peoples (1998), and the Indigenous Peoples Basic Law (2005). Put plainly, because other laws have already been put in place that say the society should do this, therefore, people should do it.

Laws and regulations not only imply that debates and discussions have taken place – a rational decision-making process under democracy – they also connote a collective agreement, a collective ideology, of the society as part of the democratic process, meaning the (previous) laws and regulations were agreed upon by the society as a whole. In this light, the development plans for language revitalisation (S1 and S2) are seen as a collective rational decision.

Secondly, the rationalisation strategy can be demonstrated by telling the readers the writer has used some sort of rationalisation process (i.e., research) and therefore what has been proposed will work. Example (7) below shows that S2 has a foundation to build onto and is thus considered a rational action:

> *(7) The stage 2 Indigenous language revitalisation 6-Year Plan is <u>based on</u> the Indigenous language revitalisation stage 1 Plan (2008- 2013).*
>
> 本計畫是推動原住民族語言振興的第2期計畫, 係奠基在「原住民族語言振興六年計畫（97-102年）」上.

As demonstrated earlier, S2 has the advantage in that it is *based on* S1. In this light, it is not a randomly selected action but builds on previous work. The continuation of S2

shows S2 making further efforts from what was decided in S1, which suggests that this was a necessary process and not a refutation of what existed already; therefore, to continue the revitalisation work in S2 shows a process of rationalisation based on the previous good work.

Furthermore, to show 'it works', *instrumental rationalisation* is used (van Leeuwen, 2008), which can be linguistically constructed by using goals-orientated statements or means-orientated structures. Goals-oriented statements can be formulated as "I do *X* in order to do (or be, or have) *Y*". This can then be realised explicitly by a purpose clause with 'to', 'in order to' and so on. In the case of 'means orientation', the purpose is constructed as 'in the action' (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 114), the action is a means to an end. The formula is then either 'I achieve doing (or being, or having) *Y* by *X*-ing' , or 'by means of', 'through' … etc. Note that although the linguistic construction of the goals and means orientation does not require the statement to conform to morality in order to serve as legitimisation, the statement must contain elements of moralisation in its purpose (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 113). The use of the purpose statements and their implications are further unpacked in the 'construction of purpose' section below.

To demonstrate how instrumental rationalisation works and how translation may implicate the government's intention, examples (8) and (9), below, from S1, demonstrate both goals orientation and means orientation based on the same statement depending on how the sentence is translated. These two examples are from the same Chinese statement. As is shown below, the English translation could be constructed differently to show different orientation and meaning that is not explicit in the Chinese version:

> *(8) (in order for) Taiwan to stand on its two feet, we must allow our Indigenous friends to stand on their two feet first;*
>
> *Or*
>
> *(9) By allowing our Indigenous friends to stand on their two feet first, we are allowing Taiwan to stand on its two feet.*
>
> *台灣要站起來，就要<u>讓</u>原住民朋友先站起來*

Example (8) demonstrates the goals-oriented construction. 'Taiwan to stand on its two feet' is the 'purpose' followed by the non-explicit (inserted in the translation)

purposeful link 'in order for'. Conversely, in example (9) 'allowing our Indigenous friends to stand on their two feet' is constructed as a 'means to an end'. Since the English translation works both ways, I used the Chinese word '*Rang*' to identify the purpose of the sentence. This is explained in the Section 6.4, below. This statement can also be constructed as a conditional sentence to indicate a hypothetical future, which I discuss in Section 6.3.4, Legitimisation through a perceived better future.

The third rationalisation strategy is *theoretical rationalisation*, which is based on "some kind of truth" (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 116). Example (10) shows that the wellbeing of the Taiwanese Indigenous community signals how well Taiwan is doing:

(10) *The development of the Indigenous community is closely related to the overall development of Taiwan.*

台灣原住民社會的發展與台灣整體社會是緊緊相繫的

In this extract from S1, the use of 'closely related' signifies the 'true nature' existing in the connection between language and society. It demonstrates a relationship between Taiwan's Indigenous community and the development of Taiwan. Therefore, the coexistence between society and Taiwanese Indigenous people is seen as 'reality' – some kind of truth, the way things are. For this reason, it is suggested that Taiwan must develop and revitalise Taiwanese Indigenous languages. This excerpt from the DPP's S1 further highlights S1's emphasis on the utilitarian use of Indigenous languages to assert Taiwan's self-contained quality (the development of Taiwan). This also serves as a comparison to, and criticism of, Mainlander's intolerance towards minority languages through the KMT's past Mandarin Chinese Only policy.

6.3.4 Legitimisation through a perceived better future

Legitimisation through a perceived better future supports the argument for Indigenous language revitalisation by saying 'if we do this our future will be better', or 'because it is the trend'. In the Future Aspiration section of S1, a better future strategy is realised by inserting 'if' – the hypothetical future.

For instance, examples (8) and (9) above could be translated using a conditional structure. In this case, the statement would be: *if* Taiwan is to stand on its two feet, we must allow our Indigenous friends to stand on their two feet first. The hypothetical future for Taiwan signals a nationalistic approach with the phrase 'stand on one's two

feet' being a synonym for *independence*. The phrase 'step out' in example (3) could also be interpreted as *movement*, which connotes the notion *forward*. Because of this forward movement, the wording points to the future of Taiwan. Although it does not explicitly say the future will be better, it is implied to be the right thing to do by being associated with positive phrases 'stand on its two feet' and 'step out'.

Furthermore, a multilingual approach to language policy is also seen as a global '*trend*' in S1 and S2, and should, therefore, be followed, or else Taiwan will 'fall behind'. This is demonstrated in example (11):

> (11) *From the language development <u>trend</u> of Western multilingual countries who have multilingual language policies [...] help Taiwan's international image, and <u>stand side-by-side</u> with developed countries*
>
> 從西方百餘多民族、多語言國家在「語言發展」的<u>趨勢</u>來看，[⋯]將有助於我國的國際形象， 並立先進國家之林。

As in the previous discussion on the authorisation strategy, where Western countries are seen as 'experts' and 'role models', example (11) also shows if Taiwan follows a multilingual policy *trend* headed by these 'role models', it will help *Taiwan's international image*, so Taiwan can *stand side-by-side* with developed countries. While the Future Aspiration within the rationale section was inspired by the West to give Taiwan a multilingual approach to language policy, the focus is on the establishment of Taiwan's international reputation and its desire to stand on the global stage as a 'country' (not a province of China).

To champion Taiwan, both plans promote 'Taiwan' as the future *leader* of Indigenous research by stating:

> (12) *Taiwan's Indigenous languages will become the <u>leader</u> for international research in Austronesian languages.*
>
> 臺灣原住民族語言將成為國際研究南島語言研究的領導地位

It is clear that both plans intend to elevate Taiwan's status. The word 'leader' not only connotes a high social status but also shows a progressive quality and, in a way, courage. This could be interpreted as Taiwan being courageous in asserting its international recognition, fighting against the internationally accepted One-China principle.

Despite both plans showing a similar enthusiasm for promoting Taiwan's international image a major distinction between S1 and S2 in the Future Aspiration (within the rationale section) is that S1 focuses on language-in-society, whereas S2 focuses on language-as-a-right. S1 starts by stating:

(13) *The development of the Indigenous community is closely related to the overall development of Taiwan.*

台灣原住民社會的發展與台灣整體社會是緊緊相繫的

While S2 starts by saying:

(14) *The development and revitalisation of Indigenous language will <u>follow the lead of the two Covenants</u>[20] international <u>trend</u>, and <u>thus</u> is an important lesson for <u>our nation</u> to raise our international reputation on human rights.*

未來國內對原住民族語言的保存與發展，將在實踐兩公約權力內涵及國際潮流的引領下，成為我國提升國際人權形象之重要課題。

I have used example (13) previously in example (10) in Section 6.3.3 to show that the relationship between Taiwan and its Indigenous population is viewed as 'some kind of truth'. Therefore, it can be seen that the rationale behind S1 is grounded in Taiwan's sociolinguistic repertoire. By contrast, in example (14), the 'two Covenants' are used as *role models* that Taiwan should follow, and this is the *trend*. The conjuncture 'thus' indicates a cause-effect relation, that is, if we follow the trend, the reputation of our *nation* will be better.

These statements not only demonstrate the political ideology of the government (differentiating Taiwan from China), they also demonstrate the language ideology of the government – that is, S1 sees Indigenous Taiwanese languages as an integral part of 'Taiwan', while S2 views supporting Indigenous languages as means to promote Taiwan's international reputation on human rights.

In the next section I further unpack the government ideology by examining the purpose clauses, which were part of the rationalisation strategies, and the implications this may have for the government's intention on Indigenous language revitalisation.

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[20]The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

6.4 The construction of purpose – What the policy is 'for'

The construction of purpose (van Leeuwen, 2008) shows how the purposes of social practices are constructed as part of the rationalisation strategy. The key linguistic feature to be explored in this section is the Chinese character 'rang' (讓). The Chinese character *'rang'* (讓) has causative qualities (Wang, 2011) which also indicate *preference* as it shows the "determination and the desire to control" from the speaker (Wang, 2011, p. 96). Ting (2020), therefore, has concluded that "since it is the desire of the speaker, the clause following 'rang*'* is considered the purposeful clause" (p. 130).

In the following sections, 'rang' is translated as 'make - become' and 'allow'. When translated as 'make - become' it indicates preference. In this light, it can also be treated as a modal verb and the clause that follows as a modalised clause. Below, I illustrate the two different structures of 'rang' and their implications.

6.4.1 Rang structure 1 (make - become)

Rang is translated as 'make - become' when followed by Cheng-wei (成為), which means become. The meaning of 'make *X* become *Y*' shows that, to a certain degree, the speaker 'would like' *X* to turn into *Y*'. For this reason, *rang* is treated as a modal of preference, the speaker's desire.

In *Rang structure 1*, the speaker is doing certain things to the subject in anticipation of a certain effect, via the material transitivity process (make - become). A transitivity analysis of material process is adapted for the analysis of this structure. In this structure, *X* is the Beneficiary, benefiting from the Effect *Y*. Rang structure 1 is illustrated below:

For example, in English 'my mother made me (become) a better person', 'me' is the beneficiary (*X*) and 'a better person' is the effect (*Y*) with 'my mother' being the active agent.

English structure   Active Agent + *make* + **Beneficiary** + *become* Affected/Effect

In rang structure 1 it is [my mother + *rang* + me + *cheng-wei* + better person], as shown below,

Rang structure 1   Active Agent + 'rang' (讓)+ Beneficiary *(X)* + cheng-wei' (成為) + Affected/Effect (*Y*)

Table 6.1 below compares the use of Rang structure 1 in S1 and S2.

Table 6.1
Rang structure 1 (make - become)

S1 (2008–2013)	S2 (2014–2019)
• the written and spoken Taiwan's Austronesian languages […] + rang + **Indigenous language […]** + become the research headquarters for Austronesian languages. 台灣南島語在「口說」與「書寫」方面全面的 …+ 讓 + **原住民語** + 成為國際南島語言研究的重鎮 (p. 4) • make Taiwan the research headquarters + rang + promotion of **Taiwan's Indigenous languages** + become the role model for Austronesian language development. 以營造台灣成為南島語言研究與發展的重鎮+ 讓 +**台灣原住民族語言**的推展 +成為南島國家語言發展的典範。	• the promotion of written and spoken Indigenous languages + rang + ***Taiwan*** + become the research headquarters for Austronesian languages. 推動「口說」與「書寫」全面發展+ 讓 + **臺灣**+ 成為「國際南島語言」的研究重鎮 (p. 6) • in the process of democracy … + rang + **respect for other cultures** +become the bases for ***democracy***. 惟在推動民主化的過程中，…＋讓+ 尊重不同民族文化+ 成為民主的基本素養 • promotion of orthography + rang + **Indigenous languages** + become the medium for reading and acquiring knowledge 藉以厚實族語文字化，＋讓 +族語 +成為閱讀及知識學習的媒介

As can be seen from Table 6.1, the findings reveal that this structure always takes a 'nominalised action or process' in the place of the active agent. This shows that rang structure 1 does not have human agency as an *active agent*. Such structure indicates that *no one* takes responsibility for any actions (no named social agent). The lack of active human agents also means no government agency is constructed as responsible for Indigenous language revitalisation. The analysis also suggests that both plans intend to differentiate Taiwan from China by lexical choices, such as 'Taiwan' and 'democracy', following 'rang'. 'Taiwan' and 'democracy' in this sense could be seen as synonyms of each other. The use of 'Taiwan' instead of its official name Republic of China strongly suggests that the word 'China' is highly controversial within government documents.

However, there is a difference in rang structure 1 between the two plans that is revealed through the difference in Beneficiary. In S2 the Beneficiaries are not always the language, while in the S1 the Beneficiary is always the language (see the bold font in Table 6.1). This means that, in S1, the 'language' is always the one that benefits from the action, whereas in S2 two other social constituents also benefit from the actions. In this regard, S2 contains two other agendas in addition to language issues.

This result resonates with findings in the analysis of legitimisation strategies regarding how the DPP and the KMT legitimise their intention to revitalise Taiwan's Indigenous languages. The DPP's S1 seems to offer a more inclusive language ideology towards Indigenous languages because their language (Hoklo-Taiwanese) was in the same position as the Indigenous languages. Therefore, S1 appears to put Indigenous language at the heart of Taiwan's multilingual repertoire; it has a multilingual = multicultural Taiwan tone. The metaphor 'language is the soul' also shows an attachment to language not only for Indigenous people but perhaps for Hoklo-Taiwanese speakers as well, as their language was also banned by the KMT. This interpretation of the DPP's emotional attachment to languages adheres to the analysis of rang structure 1 where the *language* is the Beneficiary. The strong appreciation of 'local language' underscores the DPP's attempt to create a unique Taiwanese flavour.

The above analysis demonstrates that different social agents construct reality differently by their linguistic means. They also position themselves strategically to meet their political agenda. Next, I look at *rang structure 2*.

6.4.2 Rang structure 2 (allow)

Rang is translated as 'allow' when "agent 1 concedes to the will of agent 2" (Wang, 2011, p. 70), without the explicit 'cheng-wei' (成為). Similar to 'make - become', 'to allow *X* to do *Y*' implies that the speaker 'would like' *X* to be (more like) *Y*. In this sense, the structure contains the modal of preference 'would like', which demonstrates the rationality of the speaker's desire to pursue the selected action.

In the context of the Six-Year Plans, 'allow' is not used as a transitive verb, as in 'to permit'; rather, it is used as an intransitive verb, as in 'to allow *for*', which carries the meaning of 'give consideration to a circumstance' (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). Taking into account the genre and the context, rang structure 2 highlights the position of the 'passive agent' and the future circumstances that are intentionally applied to the agent. This demonstrates how uneven power is exercised between social actors. An English example would be 'the computer programme allows the children to do the activities from home'. In this structure 'the children' are the 'passive agents', and 'do the activities from home' is the purposeful statement. How rang structure 2 is recognised in the texts is set out below, and Table 6.2 provides some examples identified from the

texts. A full list of the instances of rang structure 2 identified in this analysis is attached in Appendix 9.

Rang structure 2   Active Agent + *rang* (讓)+ ***passive* agent**+ future circumstances/*purposeful statement*

Table 6.2
Rang structure 2 (allow)

S1 (2008–2013)	S2 (2014–2019)
(i) Taiwan to stand on its two feet + rang +our Indigenous friends + stand on their two feet first 台灣要站起來，就要讓原住民朋友先站起來 (ii) Taiwan to step out + rang + our Indigenous friends + to step out first 台灣要走出去，就必需讓原住民先走出去 (iii) Create camps + rang + Indigenous people living outside the tribes + establish a sense of belonging. 讓久居外地的族人，能透過參與此「生活體驗營」，回到原鄉，建立起對本族群之認同感	(1) Establish language learning environment for infant + rang + infants + acquired language skills. 若在幼兒時期營造全族語的學習環境，可以讓幼兒自然而然具備族 語聽、說能力 (2) Democracy & multicultural understanding helps with language protection policies + rang + Indigenous language + more accessible. 惟在推動民主化的過程中，也使得社會上大多數人對不同民族的語言文化更為尊重與包容，讓尊重不同民族文化成為民主的基本素養，而這樣一種多元文化觀念的養成，有助於政府推動各項政策保障弱勢之民族語言，並讓營造族語無障礙空間的可能性，將大大的提高。 (3) Strengthen infant immersion school + rang + infant, children and adults + has appropriate channels for learning Indigenous languages 並強化「學齡前族語沈浸式學習」的推動，讓學齡前、學校教育及成人再學習等不同階段，都有相對應的管道來學習族語 (4) Digital platform + rang + different learners + easy access to learning materials 以及建構「族語語料資源整合平台」、「數位學習網」等，讓不同學習者可便利的使用各種學習教材

The findings show that, in S2, there are 15 examples of rang structure 2 while in S1 there are only three. The reason for this could be that S1 is a prototype plan for language revitalisation, with the first government intent being solely aimed at Indigenous language revitalisation. This could be seen as the DPP's lack of experience in Indigenous language revitalisation, a trial-and-error process. This could also be interpreted as the KMT trying to out-do the DPP in its policy writing and showing solidarity with the Indigenous communities.

The analysis also reveals that, in S1, Indigenous people are always positioned as the *passive agent*, in contrast to 'Taiwan' which is the active agent. Similarly, 12 out of the

15 examples in S2 place Indigenous people in the same passive position. Since text repetition builds the cohesion of the discourse (Locke, 2004), this could have a serious impact by implying a *disability discourse* (McCarty, 2013) which portrays the Indigenous community as *incapable* and, thus, jeopardises the speakers' self-perception and consequently the language revitalisation work.

Furthermore, the analysis of S2 shows 14 out of the 15 examples have language revitalisation activities as the purpose, which is fitting for the aim of the plan. In contrast, in S1, there are only three examples using the rang structure 2, none of which contain language revitalisation activities. Instead, S1's purposeful clause contains the phrases 'step out' and 'stand on one's two feet'. The significance of these phrases has been explained through the analysis of legitimisation strategies. The different focus in the purposeful statement in the two plans further highlights the differences in political ideology and language ideology. That is not to say that S1 does not have language revitalisation as its purpose, as both plans aim at language revitalisation. Rather, language revitalisation serves other political purposes.

6.5 Conclusion

The findings presented in this chapter provide insights into how language revitalisation was recontextualised by the two opposing governments to meet their political agendas and to maintain the social order. They illustrate how the KMT negotiated its pro-Chinese ideology within the growing Taiwanese-identifying generation and how the DPP asserted its de-Sinicisation ideology through the Indigenous language revitalisation plans. Noticeably, both plans show a desire to differentiate Taiwan from Mainland China. In light of this finding, I suggest the two texts exemplify a discourse on 'nation-building', with each political party embedding its political ideology in the policy to assert their version of Taiwan's national identity, subtly, using language revitalisation as camouflage.

Both political powers also took the opportunity to undermine each other with the DPP performing a *non-apology* and, in return, the KMT slapping the DPP on the wrist by using the phrase 'to make up for' to indicate the ineffectiveness of the DPP's S1. Also, the differences in their approach to nationalism underline the two parties' different levels of acceptance of the controversial One-China ideology. The combination of these agendas raises intriguing questions regarding the nature of the policy ideology.

One other issue found in the analysis is the lack of willingness to confront language revitalisation responsibilities in both plans, which is evident in the 'rang' structure where *no one* is constructed as the responsible social agent for language revitalisation. This further indicates that the government may be seen as paying lip-service to ingratiate themselves with the Indigenous population. While it is the aim of these documents to promote the use of Indigenous language, there exists a considerable number of institutional obstacles due to the political ideology involved.

Nevertheless, the purpose statements for Indigenous language revitalisation within the texts provide "substantive equality" (Grin, 2003, p. 82) to the Indigenous communities that is supportive of language revitalisation. The legitimisation strategies further demonstrate the will of the government to support Indigenous languages, despite the political arm-wrestling.

Notwithstanding the different underlying agendas, both the KMT and the DPP share the view that Indigenous Taiwanese are part of Taiwan; therefore, to be Taiwan, the Indigenous Taiwanese cultures and languages must be protected, which is empowering to the Indigenous community. As such, both parties have the same motivation when it comes to using Indigenous language revitalisation to enhance Taiwan's international reputation and assert their versions of *Taiwanese identity*.

For the political parties, it appears that their language ideology about the Indigenous languages cannot escape their history with these languages. Therefore, I conclude that while different political parties may share a similar language ideology in relation to the Indigenous languages in Taiwan, the meaning of 'language revitalisation' is recontextualised by the different parties to suit their own political agendas.

In the next chapter, I examine the most recently promulgated legal document on Indigenous language revitalisation – the ILDA (2017), which coincides with the S2 timeframe.

Chapter 7.   The analysis of the Indigenous Language Development Act

7.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the findings from my analysis of the Indigenous Language Development Act (2017) (the ILDA or the Act). With Chapter 6 comparing two consecutive Indigenous language revitalisation plans and identifying the two governing parties' political and language ideologies, this chapter further unpacks the government's intent in a different genre of a legislative act.

In Section 7.2, I give some background about this text, including some participants' responses from the interviews, in order to provide a better contextual understanding of the analysis that follows. In Section 7.3, I investigate the Act by considering the government's 'construction of purpose' as a strategy that would legitimise their actions, focusing on Article 1 as it is the most salient to the objective of the investigation. In Section 7.4, I look at the policy orientations and their discursive function. Section 7.5 discusses issues pertaining to translation discrepancy in modality between the English and the Chinese versions, which demonstrates how different modalities used in different languages may be signalling a diverse representation to the different audiences. Note that, aside from Section 7.5, the English language version of the Act is specifically used for analysis. I conclude the chapter by reviewing the findings of this analysis.

7.2 Description and context of the ILDA

While I have explained the background of Taiwan's Indigenous language revitalisation efforts in Chapter 3, here I recap the role of CIP within the government structure, and the genre and organisation of ILDA, including a response from one of the participants that is relevant to the analysis and discussion to illustrate my goal.

Since the establishment of the CIP in 1996 – the primary government agency in charge of all Indigenous affairs – laws and regulations have been established for Indigenous language revitalisation by the central government to strengthen the language revitalisation process of the Indigenous languages in Taiwan. The purpose of the establishment of the CIP was to "respond to the needs of the Indigenous peoples, as well as to bring Taiwan in line with global trends" (CIP, n.d.). On December 1 of the

same year, the Executive Yuan officially established the Council to carry out coordination and planning of Indigenous affairs. As the CIP (n.d.) reported, the function of the Council is:

> to mark a new milestone in Taiwan's national policy, providing consistent and progressive formulation and execution of Indigenous policies, and coordinated planning for the full-scale development of Indigenous society appropriate for the new century.

However, as mentioned in Chapter 3, many of the laws and regulations relating to Indigenous language have been heavily criticised for their lack of real commitment, including a lack of funding and teaching hours. Twenty years on, the usage of Indigenous languages is still in decline – these laws and regulations aimed at language revitalisation have not borne fruit.

In June 2017, the ILDA (2017) was promulgated. It is dedicated to the endeavour of the promotion of Indigenous languages in Taiwan. This 30-article Act is the first official Act passed by the Legislative Yuan in Taiwan in the name of Indigenous language revitalisation.

Unlike the two Six-Year Plans discussed in the previous chapter that are in the writing style of a proposal, the ILDA is an official law using legal language that is genre-specific. An official government law/act reports the government's ruling. This means, the government reproduces and transforms its power through the production of laws and regulations. Its primary function is to exercise governance; it governs a particular way of life. In this light, an official government law is intrinsically related to the governmental power of control.

This Act contains 30 articles and is officially published in both Chinese and English language. This shows that the Act can be read by Taiwanese people and communities worldwide. The organisation of the Act is typical of official law. In Article 1, the Act sets out the intention of this legislation and articulates its legal and constitutional underpinnings, which says, as intertextual references, that the establishment of the ILDA is based on the Constitution amendment and the Indigenous Peoples Basic Law (2005). Article 2 defines the terminology used in the Act. Article 3 further clarifies the term 'competent authority' and its jurisdiction. From Article 4 to Article 29, various

language revitalisation measures are announced. These activities include promoting Indigenous language use through signage, publications and broadcasting. It also encourages civil servants to take the Indigenous language examination. Moreover, it promotes language classes. Finally, budgets and funding sources are stipulated in the final articles. The Act ends with Article 30 announcing the Act becoming effective from day of promulgation.

During my fieldwork in Taiwan between November 6 and November 29, 2017, I met with a participant who was involved in the drafting of the Act. Although the Act is organised in such a bureaucratic way, the participant said he and a group of people were involved in what he called, the "folk version" of the official Act promulgated in June 2017, which is the draft law. He explained that the folk version of the ILDA has been "reincarnated" several times since 2003, as it had been included in other drafted laws for other political purposes (see Chapter 3). In the interview, I asked the participant how he felt about this Act. He told me that he is 85% satisfied with the promulgated version. As will be shown in Chapter 8, the ILDA was very well-received by all the participants who I have interviewed during my fieldwork. This led me to think that perhaps this Act, regardless of its top-down position, meets the bottom-up expectation. In other words, it is what the Indigenous communities wanted. The implication of this will be discussed later in the discussion.

Below I start by presenting the findings of the purpose of this Act – the legal intention of the government (Coulthard et al., 2016).

7.3 The construction of purpose of the ILDA

This section discusses the purpose – the legal intention – of the ILDA. I draw attention to Article 1 because it explicitly states the purpose of the Act.

> *Indigenous languages are national languages. <u>To</u> carry out historical justice, promote the preservation and development of Indigenous languages, and secure Indigenous language usage and heritage, this act is enacted <u>according to</u> the provisions of Article 10, Section 11 of the Amendment of the Constitution and Article 9, Section 3 of the Indigenous Peoples Basic Law. (Article 1)*

Article 1 articulates why this Act is needed, which conveys the government's intent. It also states the other legal documents the Act is based on with the use of 'according to'.

This highlights the intertextual connections of legal documents. Since legal documents represent the government's position, they perpetuate the government's ideology.

The first sentence of the article states that 'Indigenous languages are national languages.' This statement implies that the status of Indigenous languages is at the same level as Mandarin Chinese, which is currently the only language with official language status in Taiwan. This is clearly not the case, as demonstrated in the literature review chapters. Therefore, this statement could be criticised as 'lip service'. Truscott and Malcolm (2010) described "giving lip service through visible language policy to the languages and interests of non-dominant groups" as a strategy that a linguistically dominant group would use to secure its interests (p. 14). In this case, the linguistically dominant group is the DPP's Taiwanese language speaking group, which has its own political and linguistic agenda (see Chapter 3), that is, to undermine KMT.

As I have mentioned in Chapter 6, Taiwan's DPP has tried different ways to undermine Mandarin Chinese's dominant social status and the KMT's colonial power, including an attempt to make English an official language. In this light, the attempt to make Indigenous languages official languages could be seen as the DPP seeking to undermine Mandarin Chinese again. This comes as no surprise, as Dupré (2017) prophetically wrote before the release of the Act that the Indigenous Language Development Act would "most likely be passed under the DPP government" (p. 135).

Although the Indigenous languages do not have official language status, referring to them as 'national languages' demonstrates recognition from the government, and therefore it bestows *symbolic power* (Bourdieu, 1991) to the Indigenous communities. By including the term 'national languages', it also gives the impression that the government is in *partnership* with the Indigenous community to build a 'nation' (see Chapter 6 about the nation-building discourse).

Furthermore, by saying 'Indigenous languages are national languages', the policy is acknowledging that these languages *were not* previously considered national languages. Thus, retrospectively, this statement could be seen as a form of *apology* for neglecting the status of Taiwanese Indigenous languages/people in the past. Since the history between Taiwan's Government and the Indigenous community is one that has been criticised for its heavy-handed linguistic assimilationism in the past, this statement put the government in a vulnerable position. By admitting historical wrongdoings, the

government is now subjected to criticism and interrogation. The Indigenous community could ask for further clarification about historically unjustified action and insist on further actions being taken.

Alternatively, this independent clause (Indigenous languages are national languages) could be interpreted as a face-saving act for the government. The clause is not linked to the rest of the article; it does not show causal relation. It is stated in a way that is *existential* – it is the case that Indigenous languages are national languages (although from a historical viewpoint, this is not the case). As a result, the statement negated the *historical wrong* and deflected accountabilities.

The second part of the article states that the Act is meant to 'carry out historical justice, promote the preservation and development of Indigenous languages, and secure Indigenous language usage and heritage'. In the extract, the 'to' (in order to) is a purposeful link and there are three purposes following the link. However, the Act is not enacted because of these purposes; it is simply enacted because of the provisions in the Constitution and the Indigenous Peoples Basic Law as the use of 'according to' redirects the cause-effect relation of this statement. In this light, this statement can be viewed as paying *lip-service* to Indigenous language revitalisation.

Moreover, the first purpose, 'carry out historical justice', is contestable because, in a historical sense, there was only injustice and social inequality. Therefore, this clause seems oxymoronic; this is the case in both the Chinese and the English versions. Instead, this should read 'to realise historically (unrealised) justice', which would have the explicit meaning 'to mend historic social injustice'. The strategically paratactic position of 'Indigenous languages are national languages' and 'to carry out historic justice' are uses of *truism* (Fairclough, 2001) as a taken-for-granted value regardless of its actual operation. The second purpose, 'promote the preservation and development of Indigenous languages', presupposes that the Indigenous languages are 'underdeveloped'. The Taiwanese Indigenous languages have been recognised as the origin of the Austronesian language family and have been used by the Indigenous people of Taiwan for thousands of years. It is unclear to what extent these languages require further development. However, from a colonial point of view, the policy stipulates the languages need to have a unified orthography, which conforms to a certain way of representation that fits into the dominant ideology. This is one of the issues

surrounding a westernised policy ideology where the Indigenous communities' needs and views are overlooked.

Additionally, it is suggested by van Leeuwen (2008) that, in order for the statement to be purposeful, the agency of the purposeful action is essential. In contrast to most of the other articles, which have either the central or local competent authority as active social agents responsible for the actions, the social agent is omitted in Article 1, thus making it unclear who is responsible for fulfilling the purposes. While it may be assumed that the agency is the 'government' or 'central competent authority' simply because a policy text conveys the government ideology, leaving out the social agent means that the 'who' is open to interpretation.

The agency could have been purposefully left ambiguous. The use of 'historical justice' indicates that two types of social agents are omitted. Firstly, 'justice' is positioned as a retrofitted social adjustment; for this reason, it is unclear who performed a 'bad' act in the past. Secondly, it is also unclear who will carry out justice in the future. By leaving out the agent, the miscarriage of justice in the past and the current liability are both negated. Nevertheless, because there are no social agents involved, the one who performs justice and carries out justice could also be the Indigenous community; this may be thought of as a collaborative effort between the government and the Indigenous communities. To be collaborative, both parties are assumed to have equal power.

Fairclough (2003) described the ambiguity and the lack of explanation within policies as having the "logic of appearances" (p. 94). This logic is devoid of time, space and responsibility, and the policy portrays "the socioeconomic order as simply given" (p. 95), which contains "descriptions with a covert prescriptive intent, aimed at getting people to act in certain ways" (p. 96). The coercive nature of the writing style means it is subtle and undetectable, yet the readers could be manipulated to assume 'it is the case'.

Notwithstanding the deflection of responsibility and the ambiguity about agency, Article 1 sets the tone of the Act. However, the analysis finds that Article 1 does not actually assume language revitalisation responsibilities. To further investigate whether the ILDA moves beyond a mere symbolic gesture, I used van Leeuwen's (2008) *construction of purpose* to unpack the policy intention.

As highlighted in Chapter 5, to be purposeful, three components are required (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 126): the purposeful action, the purposeful statement, and a purposeful link between these two. The purposeful action and the purposeful statement may be linked by simple conjunctions such as 'in order to'. Or the link may be implicit, so that a purposeful link can be inserted. Note, the analysis of the Chinese character 'rang' (讓) conducted in the previous chapter is not applied here because 'rang' is not used in this official law, which further highlights the different nature of genres and their linguistic manifestations.

To apply the construction of purpose analytical tool to a legislative act such as this one, I modify the structure by adding extra columns 'Condition' and 'Agent' so the attributes of these articles can be made clearer. In this structure, the first column 'Condition' indicates the article is enacted within these conditions. That is, the 'Condition' section shows that some articles' purposes are to be fulfilled when required conditions are met. This is explicated later in the analysis. The second column 'Agent' relates to the responsible party for the 'purposeful action' and the 'purposeful statement' (the purpose). Put simply, the 'Agent' is the one who is to carry out the action. The purposeful actions are the actions required in order to achieve the purpose (the purposeful statement). The purposeful statements are explicitly realised by the use of 'to', 'in order to', 'for the purpose'. I have used brackets () to insert a purposeful link if it is not already stated, i.e., in Article 13, '(so that)' is inserted. Articles within the Act that contain the structure of 'construction of purpose' are listed in Table 7.1.

Before presenting Table 7.1, I use Article 13 as an example to illustrate how these components were identified within the structure.

As demonstrated above, the 'Agent' is 'government agencies', which is explicit and appears twice (see underline). The Purposeful Action, which leads to the fulfilment of the purpose, is 'employ translators for interpretation'. Following the action, the purpose to be fulfilled is '*Indigenous peoples may express their views in their Indigenous*

languages' (see italic). However, there is no explicit conjuncture to link the purposeful action with the purposeful statement (the purpose) in this case. Therefore, a link 'so that' is inserted, which is shown in Table 7.1. The rest of the article 'operate administrative, legislative affairs and judicial procedures' goes into the 'Condition' because it is only within these situations that the purposeful statements are to take effect. Table 7.1 on the next page shows eight articles that contain the construction of purpose structure. Note that Article 13 appears twice because there are two statements within this article that fit into this structure.

Table 7.1

Articles containing construction of purpose

Article	Condition	Agent	Purposeful Action	Purposeful Statement (the purpose)
8		The central and local competent authority	promote the use of Indigenous languages in families, tribes, workplaces, gatherings, and public spaces	**to** create environments for the use of Indigenous languages.
9		The central competent authority	consult all Indigenous ethnic groups	**in** the development of new Indigenous terms, compile dictionaries of Indigenous languages
13	When operate administrative, legislative affairs and judicial procedures	government agencies	all such government agencies shall employ translators for interpretation	**(so that)** Indigenous peoples may express their views in their Indigenous languages
13		The central competent authority	establish a database of Indigenous language professionals	**for** government agencies at all levels to employ as needed.
19	in accordance with the provisions of the 12-year Compulsory Education Native Language Curriculum	The school	provide courses on Indigenous language	**to** meet the needs of Indigenous students
20		The central competent education authority	encourage all institutions of higher education to setup Indigenous language courses and establish relevant faculty, department, college, division, or degree program	**to** foster talents in Indigenous languages
21		The competent authority of special municipality and county(city)	offer classes	**for** the public to study Indigenous languages
27		The central competent authority	designate budgeting and accept donations from private, legal persons or groups to establish the Foundation for Research and Development of Indigenous Languages	**for the purpose** of administering research and development in Indigenous languages
29		the government	designate budgeting ever year	**for the advancement** of all measures of Indigenous language development set forth in this act

Note. **Bold text** indicates the conjuncture which leads to the purpose; () indicates an inserted link.

Table 7.1 shows that, in this 30-article Act, only eight articles contained purposeful statements which directly validate the action as purposeful. Once a statement is deemed to be purposeful it is also considered 'legitimised' because the construction of purpose is part of the rationalisation strategy (see Chapter 5).

Within these eight articles, the purposeful action and the purposeful statement are connected with a purposeful link (e.g., 'to', 'in' and 'so that'). The agent who is responsible for carrying out the action specified by the article is also named (e.g., 'the central and local competent authority'). The purposeful statements made sense for two reasons. First, they are logical – the purposeful action and the purposeful statement have a logical link. This is either explicit by the use of linking words, such as 'for', 'to', and 'for the purpose', or the readers can infer the linkage (see the inserted 'so that'). Second, they often use an agreed moral value or share a public interest, for example, 'to meet the needs of Indigenous students' or 'for the public to study Indigenous languages'. Since an official law in a democratic society is supposed to be a collective agreement of its people, the Act, in a sense, is assumed to have been approved by the public. This perceived public support legitimises these actions by suggesting these are based on rational decisions, which indicates a consultation process, and thus they are the 'right thing to do'.

It seems clear that these eight articles have fitting purposes that are related to language revitalisation; therefore, it can be concluded that the intention of these articles supports Indigenous language revitalisation. However, those articles with conditions (Articles 13 and 19) require more explanation as the conditions restrict the purpose. That is to say, the purpose can only be exercised under certain conditions. See Article 13 below (also see Table 7.1).

> *When government agencies operate administrative, legislative affairs and judicial procedures, Indigenous peoples may express their views in their Indigenous languages; all such government agencies shall employ translators for interpretation.*

The purpose 'Indigenous people may express their view using Indigenous language' echoes the discourse on the LHR movement, where the right to use one's language is a human rights concern (Hinton & Hale, 2001; Skutnabb-Kangas, 2013). However, with the imposed condition (underline), the purpose is restricted to administrative and legal procedures.

Similarly, in Article 19, the purpose is 'to meet the needs of Indigenous students', which should, in common sense, be all needs; however, its purpose is restricted by the '12-year Compulsory Education Native Language Curriculum' condition (see Table 7.1 and full quote below). This means that if the needs are outside the scope of the curriculum, these needs may not be met. Here is the full statement of Article 19:

> *Schools shall provide courses on Indigenous language in accordance with the provisions of the 12-year compulsory education Native Language Curriculum to meet the needs of Indigenous students, and encourage instruction in Indigenous languages.*

The conditions in Article 13 and 19 carry a heavier currency in terms of their influence on ideology because they are related to two influential institutional powers that appropriate ideology: the legal system and the education system.

Moreover, the conditions under which the article statements are to function have a quality that is akin to a conditional clause, like an 'if' statement (van Dijk, 2006). In other words, if the conditions are not met, the statements are not applicable, making the articles redundant. In which case, the statements may be seen as "counterfactual" (van Dijk, 2006, p. 736) – a counterfactual conditional statement that carries the meaning of 'If *X*, *Y* would happen'. Therefore, it suggests that by adding the conditions, what seem to be purposeful actions become social practices controlled by the government.

7.4 The discursive functions

Following the examination of the purposefulness of the Act, I found that many of the statements did not necessarily comply with the construction of purpose structure, that is Actor + Purposeful Action + Purposeful Statement. Recognising that policies are not just words, they are used to 'do things' (see Chapter 4), this section seeks to identify the discursive functions of the Act. In the process, I identified three discursive functions: to empower the Indigenous community, to view language as valuable goods, and to paint a linguistic landscape.

7.4.1 To empower the Indigenous community

The first discursive function is the empowerment of the Indigenous community, which centres around the 'affective dimension' of the policy. The affective dimension accounts for the "socio-psychological" (Unger, 2013, p. 32) aspects of a policy, including elements such as status, beliefs, values and so on. The analysis shows that, apart from

the statements that specify language revitalisation activities, an affective dimension arises from three features that are related to the notion of *rights*: (i) Indigenous languages are officially recognised, (ii) that it is a human right to speak one's heritage language, and (iii) that better work and employment rights are established for the Indigenous people.

The first feature is the official recognition of 'national languages' in Article 1. Romaine (2002) indicated that fewer than 4% of the world's languages have an official status and that the survival of a language does not rely on its official status. However, in cases of endangered languages, having recognition as a 'national language' will symbolically change people's attitude towards the language, which will have an immense impact on the perception of the language (Grenoble & Whaley, 2006) and, in turn, the use of the language. In the language policy and planning typology, this is referred to as status planning (see Chapter 4). The status factor is one of the key elements of linguistic vitality (Harwood et al., 1994; Ytsma et al., 1994). Therefore, having this recognition is important to the revitalisation of Taiwan's Indigenous languages.

The status of the language gives rise to certain *rights* of the language speakers, especially their LHR, the second feature that empowers the Indigenous community. In particular, Article 13 recognises the speakers' right to express themselves using their mother tongue in court and, in such instances, an interpreter is required. This serves to preserve the speakers' basic rights and liberties (Bonotti, 2017). The provision of interpreters not only guaranteed individuals' basic LHR, but it also recognised the speakers' language as significant (having the social standing to be used in court) and, by extension, the speakers themselves are also recognised as significant. A higher language status supported by an official Act, such as this one, would demand more rights for the Indigenous community.

The third feature of the affective dimension is the job opportunities for Indigenous language speakers. This evident in, for example, Article 22, where the Act advocated for Indigenous language teachers to have better contractual conditions and better work rights, as the Act spells out: 'the employment shall be full-time in principle'. Historically, Indigenous language teachers' contracts were on an *as needed* basis, which was not full-time nor was it permanent. Therefore, to have a full-time contract would strengthen the language teachers' rights to sustainable employment conditions, and

more people with language skills would be willing to become language educators. This indicates that the policy is giving deserved recognition to Indigenous language teachers; however, it could also be interpreted as attracting Indigenous people to be teachers and to propagate the dominant ideology.

Nevertheless, teaching as an occupation is traditionally regarded as having high social status in Taiwan; therefore, valuing the language teachers means valuing the language's social status. The specification of the language teachers' employment contract may also suggest more language classes are needed; this signals a revival of the language and culture of the Indigenous community.

Additionally, 19 out of 30 articles in the Act contain references to employment prospects for Indigenous people through language-related activities (e.g., language researchers, teachers, translators, promoters, etc). For example, Article 20 states:

> *The central competent education authority shall encourage all institutions of higher education to set up Indigenous language courses and establish relevant faculty, department, college, division, or degree program to foster talents in Indigenous languages.*

Following Article 20, in order for institutions of higher education to set up Indigenous language courses, they will have to employ qualified language speakers. This is seen as an employment opportunity for the Indigenous community. Implicitly, items in the Act that specified the promotion of language use would require personnel for their implementation; for instance, the media sectors ought to have Indigenous programmes, and this would require language speakers to be employed (Articles 23 and 24). In this light, more job opportunities are seen to be embedded in the Act. Articles that mentioned research into and development of the language would also require 'language talent' to be involved. The use of 'talent' further heightens the status of the language. Not only do these statements stipulate more jobs, but they also require more people to learn the languages. These activities thus constitute the acquisition planning (see Chapter 4) of the languages, which directly contributes to the revitalisation of languages.

The promotion of more employment opportunities through language-related activities showed that the Indigenous languages are socially advantageous. Since language is an

essential part of identity, the elevation of the status of the languages equates to the surety of the speakers' identity.

The analysis indicates that Taiwan's language policy has transitioned to a language-as-right and language-as-resources orientation (Ruíz, 1984; Tiun, 2013). Subsequently, the government can be perceived as 'moral', 'right' and, in some ways, 'modern' and able to stand side-by-side with the (Western) developed countries (Ting, 2020). However, given the contentious and ideological nature of rights, it is unclear whether these provisions serve the rights of the Indigenous communities or the dominant power. Nevertheless, these statements create a feel-good factor, which could be thought to have an empowerment effect for the Indigenous community.

7.4.2 To increase the linguistic capital of the Indigenous languages.

The second discursive function I have identified in the Act is the attempt to increase the linguistic capital of the Indigenous languages, which views the Indigenous languages as *valuable goods*. Bourdieu (1991) claimed that language is 'symbolic capital' that producers use to maximise the symbolic profit that can be gained in linguistic practices. While Bourdieu talked about symbolic value of language in terms of advantages (or disadvantages) that can accrue to individual speakers of those language in social interaction, I felt that the advantages could also be linked to economic values as they eventually lead to the advancement of individuals that use that language. When the use of a language increases in formal contexts, such as schools, the courts of law and other recognised formal domains, the linguistic and cultural capital of this language also increase accordingly. Accompanied by the decline of language speakers, the language comes to be a *commodity*, which can be "owned or managed as a cultural resource' (Shaul, 2014, p. 4).

An example of referring to language as if it has monetary properties is demonstrated in Article 12:

> *The government shall plan and promote policies for international <u>exchange</u> of Indigenous languages.*

The use of 'exchange' extrapolates language values as a type of currency – a linguistic capital, which can be used to achieve certain things such as enhancing Taiwan's intentional reputation (see Chapter 6).

The value of the language is also transferred to people who possess the skill of language, as Article 20 states:

> *The central competent education authority shall encourage all institutions of higher education to set up Indigenous language courses and establish relevant faculty, department, college, division, or degree program to <u>foster</u> <u>talents</u> in Indigenous languages.*

The use of 'talents' in Article 20 demonstrates the attempt to raise the value of the language. In this case, when combined with the use of 'foster', Article 20 shows that people who speak the languages are viewed as resources that can be 'developed'. Consequently, Indigenous languages are viewed as a resource.

Article 13 also views the language (and the speakers) as valuable goods.

> *The central competent authority shall establish a <u>database</u> of <u>Indigenous language professionals</u> for government agencies at all levels to employ as needed.*

It is shown in this statement that a 'database' is established for the 'Indigenous language professionals'. The word 'database' connotes something that is *big* and *can be gathered*. This qualifies as the commodification of the language, from the perspective of the government, because the Indigenous language is constructed as impersonal, something that can be collected and catalogued. Subsequently, it promotes the notion of *language-for-hire*. A language-for-hire concept indicates that the results of language revitalisation can be *harvested* and *stored* in a database, the next step following from 'foster[ing] talents'. In comparison to the notion of *language-use* – a crucial sociolinguistic concept of language revitalisation (see Chapter 2), *language-for-hire* provides an alternative perspective to language revitalisation that has not been widely considered by sociolinguistic studies. Through language-for-hire, the languages are seen as useful or advantageous, which is a turnaround from the traditional view of the Indigenous languages. In this light, the second discursive function can be seen to be an attempt to increase the cultural and linguistic capital of the Indigenous languages.

7.4.3 To paint a linguistic landscape

The last discursive function identified was the creation of a desired "linguistic landscape" that shows the "language that we see around us" (Bell, 2014, p.236). This is done through the use of repetition as a cohesive device (Locke, 2004). Note here it is possible to describe this discursive strategy as mythopoesis (see Chapter 5) as it seems

to be 'painting a picture'; it does not conform to the narrative tradition, yet it could be thought to be an attempt to establish public domains in which the languages should be used. In the examples from Articles 14 to 16 below, I show how the repetitions of word choices or phrases are used as cohesive links to achieve this effect.

> *Official documents of government agencies, schools and public enterprises in <u>Indigenous regions</u> shall be <u>written</u> in **regional languages** (14)*

> *Public transportation, stations and competent authority of relevant agencies in <u>Indigenous regions</u> shall increase the <u>broadcast</u> of **regional languages**. (15)*

> *Government agencies, schools and public enterprises in <u>Indigenous regions</u> shall set up <u>signs</u> in **regional languages**. (16)*

Although there is no linking word (e.g., 'and') to link these articles, the repetition of 'regional languages' suggests the connection. The repetitive use of 'Indigenous regions' and 'regional languages' has several positive effects. First of all, they recognise an Indigenous region's autonomy and its linguistic diversity. This builds a picture of the language repertoire of these regions where Indigenous languages are freely used, like a linguistic utopia. In other words, the Act paints a picture of a self-governing Indigenous region, which realises the linguistic rights of the Indigenous people in the region.

Furthermore, verbs (in various verb patterns) such as 'write' and 'broadcast' show a productive use of language, which demonstrates the active involvement of the Indigenous community using their languages. The word 'sign' could also be viewed as an 'action' in the phrase 'set up signs'.

In addition, 'write' and 'sign' indicate that the languages are *written*. This is essential to ensure the survival of a language in Western language revitalisation theories which have been adopted by Taiwan's language policy (see Chapter 3). Nevertheless, 'broadcast' represents the oral tradition, which is valued by the Indigenous communities.

Moreover, putting 'official documents' and 'regional languages' in one sentence (see Article 14) creates a perception that 'Indigenous languages are official languages', especially when official documents of government agencies are written in regional languages. Although this perception is not factual, it nevertheless empowers the community in the way the languages are viewed. Article 17 further added to this picture by saying that the 'central competent authority shall publish decrees related to Indigenous affairs in Indigenous languages'. The word 'decrees' is associated with

central government power. When the central government publishes decrees using an Indigenous language, this brings the status of the Indigenous language to the national level. This could, however, be interpreted as the government using Indigenous languages to publish decrees in order to control the Indigenous regions. Nevertheless, the sequence of these articles portrays an ideal situation, the 'ought to' for the Indigenous communities.

The discursive functions of ILDA seem to be an attempt to empower the Indigenous communities whilst using their languages as a 'currency' for the government. This suggests that the information in the documents produced by the government is manipulated to suit the government's position. This was evident in the findings from Chapter 6 which suggested that, while promoting the Indigenous languages, the government is also using this opportunity to promote itself. Consequently, a further investigation that looks at the government's self-representation is presented in the next section.

7.5 Representation of the government

In this next section, I show how the government positions itself through the modality 'shall' by examining how the Chinese and English translation fails to demonstrate 'pragmatic equivalence' (Baker, 2018) in three of the articles. Teng (2019) explained that to achieve pragmatic equivalence in translation, the contextual values (what is said, how it is said, how the listeners experience the utterance) must be met. This study shows that the translation discrepancy has distorted contextual values and thus resulted in 'pragmalinguistic failures' (Teng, 2019).

As I have mentioned in Chapter 5 when discussing the tools used for analysis, I identified translation discrepancies between the Chinese and the English versions of the Act surrounding the use of modal verbs. Thus, I decided to look into this further as the different modal verbs construct different power relations between the government and the Indigenous community. Below I start by explaining the use of 'shall' in the Act and how it represents the social actor.

7.5.1 Modality – Shall

'Shall' was found to be the most frequently used modal verb in the Act; this is a genre-specific feature. In the following, the model verb 'shall' is investigated in two ways. It

is examined through the level of obligation and permission, as well as positioning devices for the text producer.

Firstly, 'shall' in legal terms means 'must' or 'should be', which indicates a strong obligation. As a piece of the legal genre, this feature makes the genre "instantly identifiable" (Coulthard et al., 2016, p. 35). In English legal terms, 'shall' has the following meanings, as well as indicating permission:

1. Indication of definite futures – will
2. Indication of a 'should be' future - ought to
3. Strong obligation – must

In this 30-article Act, 'shall' is used 49 times, which shows a strong obligation and the requirement of action from the government and its agencies. For example, Article 6 states 'The central competent authority shall assist all Indigenous ethnic groups in establishing organizations in charge of ethnic language promotions'. This is just one of the 49 uses of 'shall' in the Act. The more that 'shall' is used in the policy, the more the language speakers can hold the government accountable for future action – the government's obligation.

The most common structure containing 'shall' comprises of 'government agency + shall'. The social agent that appears most frequently in the text is the 'central competent authorities', in this case, the CIP. The CIP appears in 15 articles; thus, the CIP is constructed as the most obligated agency. Since the CIP is an Indigenous-based government agency, this gives a sense of control back to the Indigenous communities.

Secondly, 'shall' could be viewed as a positioning device for the 'self' (Chilton, 2004, p. 59), i.e., the text producer (the government). Chilton's rightness-wrongness scale presented in Chapter 5 (Figure 5.3) shows the 'self' is positioned as *right* and *true*. If something or someone is positioned further away from the self, it is less true or less right, and vice versa. Although Chilton's version does not contain 'shall', it can be inserted between must and ought.

In this analysis, the social actor (self) to whom the modal verb refers is the government or the *authority*. Rather than functioning as modal of obligation or permission, the modal verb is used as an approval of the actions that follow. These actions are endorsed

as 'right and true' when led by a positive modal verb such as 'shall'. For example, Article 12 states:

> *the government <u>shall</u> plan and promote policies for international exchange of Indigenous languages.*
>
> 政府應規劃與推動原住民族語言之國際交流政策

With the government is positioned as the *self*, the use of 'shall' validates the things that the government proposes to do, which could be interpreted as 'the right things to do' even though they are written with an existential tone devoid of time and space. In this way, a sense of 'moral government' is created. If a weaker modal verb is used (e.g., could), the 'to-do' action is less right or true. This has a bigger impact on the interpretation of the text as, below, I discuss the different modality used in the Chinese and the English versions of the Act.

7.5.2 Lost in translation?

In the analysis of the Act, I found three articles with translation discrepancies between the modal verb 'shall' and 'could'. 'Shall' is directly translated as 'yin' (應) in Chinese. While in the English version, all of the articles that contain modal verbs use 'shall' (except for Article 13 which I discuss later), in the Chinese version three of the articles (Articles 13, 14, and 15) use 'de' (得), which means 'could', in place of 'yin' (應).

In Article 14, the use of 'shall' between the English version and 'could' in the Chinese version shows a different level of obligation, which significantly impacts how the article is understood:

> *Official documents of government agencies, schools and public enterprises in Indigenous regions <u>shall</u> be written in regional languages.*
>
> 原住民族地區之政府機關（構）、學校及公營事業機構，<u>*得以*</u>地方通行語書寫公文書。

While the English translation uses 'shall' in the articles, the Chinese version uses 'could' (得) 'de' (see underline) in place of 'shall'. As (得) 'de' has an equivalent functional meaning to '可' (can) or '可以' (could) (Liu, 2013, p. 104), (得) 'de' can be interpreted as "almost not enforceable" (K. Li, 2007, p. 54), which is a much weaker modal verb than 'yin'(應) – shall. In this case, I believe, the English version of Article14 should be '*Official documents of government agencies, schools and public*

enterprises in Indigenous regions <u>could be</u> written in regional languages'. The use of 'could' positioned the action of 'writing in regional languages' as less enforceable, and it is left up to the 'Indigenous regions'.

The use of 'could', even when considering 'could' in terms of the stronger modal verb 'can', implies permission (by an agent). This has a two-way power relation depending on who the implied agent is. Due to the absence of the active agent in a passive structure (be written) in Article 14, this could be, in context, interpreted as the central government (the agent) permitting the local Indigenous institutes to use Indigenous language in their official documents. In this case, the central government holds more power. Conversely, it can be viewed as an empowering act for the Indigenous institutes (the agent) situated in the Indigenous regions to decide what language they want to use for their official documents. However, given that the dominant language in all social domains is Mandarin Chinese, this may imply that the use of Chinese is the default position.

The same can be said about Article 15:

> *Public transportation, stations and competent authority of relevant agencies in non-Indigenous regions <u>shall</u> <u>proceed</u> with the preceding item according to the characteristics and needs of local Indigenous people.*
>
> 非原住民族地區之大眾運輸工具及場站，目的事業主管機關***得*** (*could*)視當地原住民族特性與需要，辦理前項事項

While the English version uses 'shall', the actions of 'proceed with the preceding item according to the characteristics and needs of local Indigenous people' is less enforceable and not as desirable following the use of 'de' (could) in the Chinese version. Since it is referring to 'non-Indigenous regions', it shows little government obligation to Indigenous languages outside the Indigenous context.

Alternatively, if 'shall' is replaced by 'could', this means that the Indigenous people have the power to give permission to the 'Public transportation, stations and competent authority of relevant agencies in non-Indigenous regions', with the use of 'according to' further strengthening the power of the Indigenous communities and assert their needs, and thus, positions the Indigenous community as the powerful agent.

In the above two examples, while the English version used 'shall', their Chinese counterparts used 'could'. Although some Chinese-English translation conventions propose that 'yin' (應) and 'de' (得) could both be translated into 'shall' (K. Li, 2007), in this case, I believe the Chinese version holds a significant difference in the power dynamic between the Indigenous people and the government.

Another article that uses 'de' (得) is Article 13, but this time it is translated into 'may'.

> *When government agencies operate administrative, legislative affairs and judicial procedures, Indigenous peoples <u>may</u> express their views in their Indigenous languages; all such government agencies shall employ translators for interpretation.*
>
> 政府機關（構）處理行政、立法事務及司法程序時，原住民**<u>得以</u>**其原住民族語言陳述意見，各該政府機關（構）應聘請通譯傳譯之.

Given our understanding that 'de' (得) is equivalent to could, this part of the sentence should be translated as '*Indigenous peoples could/can express their views in their Indigenous languages'.* This gives the Indigenous community the power to choose which language they wish to use in court, which is empowering. However, given that the court system is established by the dominant, mainstream, ideology, it is likely that an Indigenous person would feel obliged to use the dominant language, the Chinese language, to express him/herself in court to avoid any misunderstanding. Furthermore, if a translator's language ability is not sufficient to fully express the speaker's wishes, this choice is predetermined.

Interestingly, in the Act, where 'the central competent authority' (中央) and 'the government' (政府) are the active agents, the modal verb used is always 'yin' (應), showing a high level of obligation. By comparison, in the three cases studied here (Articles 13, 14, and 15), which used 'de' (得) instead, each case has a different social agent. Article 14 has no named agent in its passive structure. Article 15 has 'Public transportation, stations and competent authority of relevant agencies' as the subject, and Article 13 uses 'Indigenous people' as the agent before the modal verb. This contrasts the level of obligation to conduct language revitalisation activities between the government and the non-government agencies. The overt emphasis on the government's responsibility can also be seen as the hegemonic power obscuring the agentive role of the local authority and community members.

Arguably, the Chinese version is the official version for the nation and the version received by Taiwan's Indigenous communities; the English version is only there for the international community to see and judge Taiwan's language revitalisation efforts by. In the previous chapter, I indicated that Taiwan has a certain level of concern regarding its 'international reputation'. Thus, the English version could be seen as having an image-building intent for Taiwan, within which the government is constructed as obliged to conduct language revitalisation and responsible for doing so.

Despite the discrepancy in the translation, this policy is written in support of the Indigenous languages – it is a *policy with good intentions*. However, a well-intended policy does not equate to *good policy* for language revitalisation. In Chapter 10, I discuss the potential pitfalls of this policy.

7.6 Conclusion

The findings from the participant interviews presented in this chapter show that, while the ILDA is an empowering Act for the Indigenous community, it is deliberately ambiguous about the social agent responsible for 'carrying out justice' for the Indigenous community. This has serious implications as the discourse surrounding 'rights' is neatly tied to the notion of 'justice'. Although the ILDA is empowering legislation, Marquis and Sallabank (2014) succinctly observed that "positive attitudes and awareness-raising cannot in themselves 'save' a language without more concrete measures" (p. 155). This shows that policies that heighten the status of a language without support from other provisions would end up reinforcing a dominant ideology which further boxes the minority language into limited social domains and practices. This poses the risk that this legislation can be criticised as *lip-service*. Nevertheless, some of the ambiguity may play to the power of the Indigenous community, and the interpretation of these articles gives power to the *legitimate speaker* of the languages, which I discuss in later chapters.

Moreover, the findings also suggest that the Government of Taiwan may be using this Act for its political gain, to portray itself as a moral government. Beyond that, the elevation of the Indigenous language status seems to be used as some kind of currency to promote Taiwan's international reputation. This is also evident in the analysis of the translation discrepancy where, in the English language version of the policy document, the government portrays itself as obliged to promote the Indigenous language with a

strong modal verb, 'shall'; by contrast, in the Chines language version, a weaker modal of obligation, 'could', is used. I therefore draw a similar conclusion to Chapter 6 where I argued that, as much as the policy paints a positive picture of revitalising the Indigenous languages of Taiwan, the government is using the policy as a political tool to maintain Taiwan's international image and status.

A follow-up analysis from this point of departure is the investigation of the discourse of language revitalisation from the language speakers' perspective, which is set out in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9.

Chapter 8.   A discourse on hope – the voice of the Indigenous people

8.1 Introduction

The findings from the analysis of the interviews with the 11 Indigenous participants are presented in this chapter and the next. This chapter focuses on the participants' interviews concerning language policies, where the participants were given policy extracts to read and comment, whereas Chapter 9 is concerned with how the participants negotiate their language ownership. The responses to the topics relevant to this chapter were translated and are discussed here. Some extracts from the language policy documents are also included in this analysis as examples to show how the dominant ideology is reinforced.

In Section 8.2, I provide the rationale for the selected themes I identified. I then describe the four themes that constitute the discourse on hope in Section 8.3. The first theme describes how the word 'culture' dominates the conversation about languages, that language is subsumed by culture. This section highlights how top-down policies impacted the participants' perceptions of their language. The second theme investigates New Zealand Māori[21] language revitalisation described by the participants as the 'right way' for Indigenous language revitalisation. The third theme relates to the participants' resistance to equating colonisation with monolingualism. The fourth theme demonstrates the participants' faith in the government's effort, resulting in the participants viewing the government way as 'the only way' to help them with language revitalisation. I argue that a Stockholm-syndrome-like behaviour is noticed in the analysis which shows that while the dominant ideology is often criticised as 'oppressive', the dominant power is also perceived as the 'saviour'. Where relevant, the discursive strategies identified in Chapter 5 are included in the analysis.

8.2 Background information about this chapter

In Chapter 5, I described how some of the language policies were used in the interviews. During the interviews, the participants were asked open-ended questions

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[21] The participants learnt that I live in NZ and were keen to use Māori as a comparison since they presumed my knowledge of this. See Section 8.3.2.

about their thoughts on the policies and their thoughts on language revitalisation, for example, 'what do you know about policies relating to Indigenous languages?'

While most of the participants said they did not have in-depth knowledge about the policies shown to them (some of them had never seen the policy documents), they made comments on how they felt about the question at hand. It is important to note that, due to the nature of an open-ended interview, some of the participants' comments were not related directly to the questions asked; nevertheless they constitute the participants' discourse. Therefore, rather than listing the questions and their associated responses, this chapter selects participants' comments that best capture certain *themes*. These themes contribute the most to the objective of my investigation – the discourses that exist amongst the Indigenous participants regarding Indigenous language revitalisation in Taiwan. Section 8.3 below presents the themes that make up the discourse on hope.

8.3 A discourse on hope

The themes below demonstrate a discourse that shows that, in one way or another, the participants are hopeful for the future of their languages.

8.3.1 Theme one: Culture dominates language

The first theme that captured my attention covers the two distinct ways that participants talked about their languages. On the one hand, the participants talked of the inseparability of language and culture. On the other hand, they talked about language and culture as two distinct entities. It is the latter that constitutes the discourse of hope, which I explain below.

When talking about the language and culture as being inseparable, one participant described language as "*the carrier of culture*" (*語言是文化的載體*). In this example, the word 'carrier' shows that language has a great capability and contains a vast amount of human knowledge. This statement puts 'culture inside language' (hence the use of the image of a vessel). One other participant also said that "*language is the soul of a culture/ethnicity*" (*語言就是一個民族的靈魂*). Since the soul is considered as essential to a person, in a similar vein, language is thus viewed as an essential part of a culture. However, while the language-essentialist view (see Chapter 2) is a taken-for-granted position, language and culture are also constructed as two separate entities by the participants.

During the interview, I asked the participants about the 'cultural resource centre' which was mentioned in the Education Act for Indigenous Peoples, Article 1. The article says that 'school should set up culture resource centres for the Indigenous students'. The participants' responses show that they see the role of the cultural centre as providing various cultural *activities*, as seen in extract (1):

(1) *Interviewer: So, what is the cultural resources centre?*

文化資源中心都在幹嘛？

R1: things like cultural promotion, for instance, dance, traditional skills.

就是做一些文化推動。 假如說: 樂舞類 、傳統類、 技藝類.

In extract (1), it is apparent that the participant felt that 'culture', does not automatically include language. More likely, 'culture' is something people *do*: it represents practical 'skills', for example, dancing, carving, and hunting. Similarly, one other participant [S1] also added "*culture centre [...] it's all about activities*". In this light, culture is seen as the performative visible aspect of language. It should also be noted that some participants mentioned that the instructions in the culture classes were given in Chinese, the de facto classroom language. Notwithstanding that, language also has a performative quality, yet the performative aspect of language is limited to cultural performance within limited domains, such as ceremonial performance. Furthermore, [R1] added *"the cultural aspects of it is closely linked to our land"*. This statement shows that culture is a way of life, which is linked to the tangible skills required to maintain a way of life.

Following extract (1), I then asked a follow-up question to probe further and the response indicated that culture is viewed as a particular set of knowledge, as seen in extract (2).

(2) Interviewer: Does it (culture centre) not include language?
語言沒有包括在裡面嗎?

R1: oh yes, it does, but there is a <u>permanent language teacher</u>. Although I have passed the language examination and enter the job with my language skills, I am a culture education teacher, so I don't really have anything to do with the language side of things. But I suppose, if you work with the culture you <u>more or less</u> know the language.

裡面還是有語言，有固定的族語老師 。 雖然我是用語言考進去的，但是我在裡面做的是民族教育。 所以我對語言還沒有完全的接觸，但是因為你的文化和語言的接觸，其實都會有一些認識和了解。

The response shows that there seems to be an invisible line between the teaching of culture and language, and it is not to be crossed. As the participant said, 'I am a culture education teacher, so I don't really have anything to do with the language side of things'. Even though [R1] is a fluent speaker of Rukai and acknowledges the intricate connection between language and culture, he still somehow kept language at arm's length. Four other participants also showed a similar response. Moreover, [R1] used the phrase 'more or less' to show that he agrees that language and culture are connected, but the use of 'there is a permanent language teacher' stresses the compartmentalisation of language teaching and culture education. This seems to be his way to mitigate the fact that he is not involved in language activities.

In addition, when a participant was directly asked "what are the important Indigenous issues at the moment, including language?", [P1] responded "*I think, ethnic education is important*". Perhaps, he sees ethnic education as either subsuming language or a separate matter from language. The impact of this is that the disconnection between language and culture lessens the awareness of language loss.

It was interesting to find that the above examples are contradictory. On the surface people assume the linkage of language and culture, but the reality is that they seem to also see them as two separate items. However, by subsuming language under the broader term 'culture', an illusion is created that 'a language can be maintained if one just maintains the culture'. As a result, a statement such as extract (3) illustrates a telling impact of the language-culture separation.

> *(3) I feel our ethnic education programme is doing really well, but I don't understand why the language class is not so good.*
>
> *我是覺得我們文化的部分推的還不錯. 可是我又不懂為什麼語言這一塊不怎麼樣 [P2]*

As demonstrated in extract (3), [P2] thought language and culture should go hand in hand, and that is why she is puzzled by the fact the school had promoted culture education but failed the language classes. This example indicates that schooling as a social practice also treats language and culture as if they are two completely different subjects.

[S1] showed her disappointment in Taiwan's Indigenous language education by mimicking the 'education discourse' and said "*if a full mark is 10 I would only give it a 2*". Drawing on the metaphor of grading by 'giving marks' to the government demonstrates her *judging* the government's performance and debunks the Education Act for Indigenous Peoples when it comes to language revitalisation. It seems, as much as ethnic education has language as a component, perhaps language itself is still treated as a subject devoid of culture.

I was quite surprised by the above responses. To understand how the discursive construction of language and culture might have occurred, I looked into the Education Act for Indigenous Peoples (EAIP) as these responses all have something to do with the Education Act.

The purpose of the Act is to protect the Indigenous peoples' rights to education and the key concern of the Act is the ethnic education. However, what constitutes 'rights' is a dominant government's decision, as Article 3 states:

> *General education for Indigenous peoples shall be handled by the competent education administrative authority. Ethnic education for Indigenous peoples shall be handled by the competent Indigenous people's affairs authority, and when necessary, be handled in conjunction with the competent education administrative authority. (Article 3)*

Here, it is interesting to note the two education categories: general education and ethnic education. The use of the terms *general education* and *ethnic education* in the Act shows that although the key concern of the Act is the ethnic education, the Act also functions as the mechanism for the central authority on all education matters (under general education) for Indigenous people. In this light, the EAIP is a subset of the dominant education setting**.** This highlights the fact that Indigenous education is about 'educating Indigenous people in the mainstream curriculum', and not about 'establish(ing) an education system that meets the specific needs of Indigenous peoples', which is the wordings in Article 5. In this regard, Article 3 contradicts Article 5.

Moreover, general education refers to the 12-year compulsory curriculum for education (see Chapter 3). Within the curriculum, the students are required to pick a *local language* to study during their free periods. This means that the Indigenous languages are viewed as one of the local languages within the competing language ideology of all

local languages (which includes Hoklo-Taiwanese and Hakka). This also means, 'language' is taught as part of the 12-year compulsory curriculum, which is a mainstream national curriculum, whereas 'culture' belongs to ethnic education, an explicit separation of language and culture. This sets the boundary for the separation between language and culture, and may have caused the inefficient language teaching and revitalisation results that have been observed.

The separation of language and culture saturates the EAIP as the dominant (and official) discourse of the government. The dominant discourse shows that 'language' and 'culture' are presented as separate entities, things that can be listed or itemised. Article 21 states:

> *Governments at all levels shall provide Indigenous students at preschool, elementary school and junior high school levels with opportunities to learn their respective ethnic languages, histories, and cultures. (Article 21)*
>
> *各級政府對學前教育及國民教育階段之原住民學生，應提供學習其族語、歷史及文化之機會*

As shown in Article 21 above, the itemisation of languages, history, and cultures, with history between the two, gives an impression that each of these is a 'compartment'. A similar construction can be found in Article 26, where language and culture are separated by a comma:

> *Educational institutions at all levels may select and appoint senior members of Indigenous ethnicities or persons with relevant expertise to provide teaching support related to Indigenous ethnic languages, cultures, and arts. (Article 26)*
>
> *各級各類學校為實施原住民族語言、文化及藝能有關之支援教學*

In these examples, language and culture are registered as separate subjects for education purposes in the school system. They are separated either by 'and' or a comma in both the Chinese and English language versions. Article 26 gives the impression that *languages, cultures,* and *arts* are separated matters with the verb 'relate' stipulating that teaching support is connected to each individual element. This suggests the government's approach to language teaching looks at language as a subject rather than part of a culture. It shows the dominant ideology surrounding the concept 'language' has been understood by the participants to be the norm.

Although the 'culture dominates language' theme contradicts the language essentialist view, it highlights how the dominant discourse is propagated via language policies. Notwithstanding this disconnection between language and culture, in the end the participants' narrative indicates that, as long as culture education continues, their language will too. In this light, they are hopeful about the future of their language.

8.3.2 Theme two: Viewing New Zealand Māori as a successful language revitalisation model

The second theme that shows optimism is the reference to New Zealand Māori. The nomination strategies used indicate the participants' affinity to New Zealand Māori. Seven participants talked about New Zealand in their interviews. This is perhaps because the participants knew that I am with a New Zealand university. They were interested in me being New Zealand-Taiwanese, and it is commonly believed by the Taiwanese Indigenous participants that New Zealand Māori revitalisation is successful. Grenoble and Whaley (2006, p. 54) described the Māori language revitalisation efforts as having a "well-earned reputation". The establishment of the 'language nest' (language immersion kindergarten) by New Zealand Māori is viewed by the participants as an important language revitalisation effort.

During the interview, the participants felt that the success of New Zealand Māori can be applied to Taiwanese Indigenous language revitalisation with New Zealand Māori seen as part of a 'brotherhood' which is connected by blood as well as language (with Taiwan's Indigenous languages seen as the homeland of Austronesian language family). One participant described Taiwan as the 'mother home' for New Zealand Māori, as shown in extract (4):

(4) *New Zealand Māori came to look for their mother home.*

那個毛利人來台灣找他的娘家 [P6]

The use of 'mother' in extract (4) demonstrates a strong inclusion. It is also the participant's way of expressing that the Austronesian language has had many *offspring* and, therefore, there will be hope for the language to continue to be spoken. The use of 'mother' also indicates some sort of filial duty for New Zealand Māori to support Taiwan's Indigenous languages. This signals that the participant viewed Taiwan's Indigenous language as having a significant status – an important element of linguistic vitality (see Chapter 2).

A sense of hope is also demonstrated in the comparison between the efforts of Taiwan and New Zealand Māori in Indigenous language revitalisation. It is as if there is a view that there is nothing to worry about, because if Māori language can be revitalised, so too can their Indigenous languages. All they need to do is follow what Māori did in New Zealand, as demonstrated in extract (5):

(5) *so far, I feel our revitalisation is <u>just like</u> Māori 30 years ago.*

目前我覺得要復振我們好像毛利人 30 年前的狀況 [S1]

The use of simile 'just like' as a nomination strategy shows a connection between the Indigenous languages in Taiwan and New Zealand which indicates that 'if New Zealand Māori can be revitalised, so can our languages'. As Grenoble and Whaley (2006) wrote "the Māori program has served as more than a model: it has been an inspiration to a number of different groups" (p. 54). In extract (6), one participant noted this:

(6) I really <u>envy</u> New Zealand […] they are so <u>confident</u> in what they do.

我很羨慕紐西蘭的方式 [...] 他們做這件事情的時候是很有自信的. [A2]

This example shows that Taiwanese Indigenous people look up to New Zealand Māori because they represent a successful example of language revitalisation for the Taiwanese Indigenous community – something to look forward to. Although 'envy' has a negative connotation, in this case, it means it is the participant's desire, admiration, to be as confident as New Zealand Māori. Therefore, 'envy' is not interpreted as jealousy.

The support from New Zealand Māori is also shown in the pedagogical approach to language teaching. Several participants have visited New Zealand and observed Māori immersion schools and language classes. One participant [P6] described that he was 'shocked' to see the teaching method, the Silent Way Method (默示教學法), which is a monolingual teaching method. Although the word 'shocked' has a negative connotation, the participant told me he meant 'surprised and inspired'. He felt, via this method, language learning is not a passive 'I was taught' activity, rather, you 'do' languages' (I am learning). By acquiring the languages this way, the *classroom value* such as passing exam, is removed from the learning objective and language is not a tool or a commodity, it is a way of life. In this light, New Zealand Māori not only provides Taiwanese Indigenous communities with a sense of solidarity, it also literally teaches them 'how to do language revitalisation'. [P6] described how, on his return to Taiwan

from New Zealand, he had "gained power/strength" (功力倍增). His comment also suggests that previously they were 'weak' and with New Zealand Māori they feel better supported and could see a brighter future for their language revitalisation efforts.

Furthermore, New Zealand is a Western developed country, which connotes what New Zealand does is cutting edge and forward, as demonstrated in extract (7):

> *(7) They (New Zealand) are the model for Indigenous language revitalisation.*
>
> *他們就是原住民語言復振典範的國家嘛 [P6]*

The predication strategy shows that New Zealand Māori language revitalisation is viewed as a role model and thus a *trend* (see also the legitimisation strategies in Chapter 5), ironically in a country that functions predominantly monolingually in English.

Since New Zealand is portrayed as the leader of Indigenous language revitalisation, it is proposed that in order to be successful, one would do it 'the New Zealand way'.

> *(8) look at the Māori, they established […]. They have bilingual teaching, right? Taiwan also wants to do that.*
>
> *你看那個毛利人，[…] 。毛利人不是有雙學制嗎? 台灣也想走哪一條路 [P6]*

In excerpt (8), the use of 'Taiwan wants to' shows that what New Zealand Māori does is the desirable way, the good way. It suggests 'if we follow this model it will be efficient and effective'. Consider the following extract (9):

> *(9) Māori has been doing it for 50 years, do we need to do it for 50 years? But with their experience we should only take half the amount of time because we don't have to search for methods. Isn't it easier if you step on the shoulders of a great man?*
>
> *毛利人做 50 年，我們是不是要走 50 年， 不曉得？ 但是有毛利的經驗, 我們應該要縮短到二分之一吧。 不用摸索啊。 踩在偉人的肩膀上不是很快嗎？[P6]*

The predication strategy in extract (9) suggests that following the Māori way is quicker and easier because it saves time – one is using an approved method. It also puts New Zealand on the pedestal of been the leader of Indigenous language revitalisation, as the metaphor 'great man' suggests not only leadership in physical achievement, but also on

moral grounds. The moral aspect also indicates that language revitalisation is 'the right thing' to do.

Furthermore, the use of time indicator shows, in contrast to Taiwan's recent effort, New Zealand Māori has been working on language revitalisation for 50 years. This seems to be an indirect way of criticising Taiwan's lack of Indigenous language revitalisation efforts over the past 50 years.

However, *time* demonstrating an "aspect" or a "portion" of the context as time is a relative concept (Lenz, 1999, p. 4). The time aspect in the example indicates a sense of desperation. Especially, considering the number of speakers is in rapid decline, there is a sense of 'running out of time' as illustrated in extract (10):

> *(10) in 20 years' time, how many people can still speak the language. […] it will be harder than Māori in the 80s.*
>
> *再過個 20 年我們還有多少是可 以說的.[…], 它會比 1980 年代的 毛利還要更辛苦. [S2]*

Although Chilton (2019) claims that "temporal distance typically increases positivity" (p. 259) (people are more positive about the more distant future), extract (10) demonstrates a "budgeting time" strategy (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 83). In this strategy, time is equated to 'money', i.e., saving time or running out of time. In this case, [S2] is saying 'we are running out of time to save the languages' due to the speaker numbers. This, in fact, highlights a significant difference between Taiwan's Indigenous language and New Zealand Māori– the speaker numbers. With just 2% of the population within a Chinese dominant society and the lack of early initiatives by government, when referencing to New Zealand a sense of 'we've got it harder than you' is also noted, as extract (11) shows:

> *(11) In New Zealand at least you can see bilingual signages […] because we are too complicated, we have 16 languages*
>
> *在紐西蘭你可以至少看到雙语 […] 因為我們真的太複雜了, 16 個 族 [P3]*

Extract (11) shows that Taiwanese Indigenous language revitalisation is harder because the linguistic complexity is greater; at the same time, [P3] admires New Zealand Māori, viewing the linguistic landscape in New Zealand as a sign of successful language revitalisation, and thus she is hopeful.

In another extract, the participant mentioned New Zealand in order to contrast the lack of will and implementation of language education in Taiwan:

> *(12) Māori has bilingualism. Taiwan would like to do that too. Back to what I was saying [...] what's the meaning of our Indigenous school? [...] it's ironic everyone just speaks Chinese.*
>
> *毛利人不是有雙學制嗎? 台灣也想走哪一條路。還是回到 剛才講的 [...] 民族學校有意義嗎? [...] 裡面全部都講國語你不覺得很諷刺嗎 [P6]*

In extract (12), [P6] mentioned New Zealand as the model for language revitalisation with its bicultural principle. His use of 'Taiwan would like to do that too' indicates that there is room for improvement in order for Taiwan's Indigenous language revitalisation efforts to be fruitful. But, when he said 'back to what I was saying', he stressed that it is harder for the Taiwanese Indigenous community to keep their languages alive because 'everyone just speaks Chinese'. His frustration was clear. His use of 'what is the meaning' shows his frustration and the use of 'ironic' demonstrates, emotionally, his resentment of the status quo. The use of 'everyone', with the emphasis 'just', highlights that it is not a small number of people who have been affected by the Mandarin-only policy (see Chapter 3). Also, this suggests a lack of conscious and deliberate effort by the government to promote language revitalisation, resulting in 'everyone just speaks Chinese'. Although his impression of the successful bilingual education in New Zealand may be exaggerated, it nevertheless offers optimism for the participants to revitalise their languages.

The New Zealand Māori example shows that, in a post-colonial setting, Indigenous language revitalisation is still achievable. It therefore provides some level of positivity. Another theme concerning colonisation is the reference to Japan, which I discuss next.

8.3.3 Theme three: Colonisation does not equate to monolingualism

Reference to the impact of Japan on Indigenous languages is another recurring theme in the interviews. Japan colonised Taiwan for half a century from the late 1800s to the end of WWII. During the Japanese colonisation period, a strong assimilatory language policy was imposed (see Chapter 3). This was acknowledged by the interviewees. For instance, [P3] said in extract (13):

> *(13) when the Japanese came with their regime, they think everyone needs to learn Japanese*

However, interestingly, the participants also had an overtone of 'assimilation denotes bilingualism' in relation to Japanese colonisation, almost as if Japanese colonisation was viewed in a much more favourable light than the current situation, as demonstrated in extract (14).

(14) <u>actually,</u> for the older generation, they are fluent in Japanese and their heritage language

老人家來講其實用日文跟族语, 他們都非常流利 [P3]

In extract (14), 'actually' is used to "suggest something unexpected" and that it is "a fact" (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). Although a monolingual policy implies a monolingual outcome, it is suggested as being otherwise by the participant, with the use of 'fluent in Japanese and their heritage language' showing a strong monolingual governmental approach and a speaker's ability to use both the dominant language and their heritage languages are not mutually exclusive. This view echoes Spolsky's (2004) insight that a language policy can often produce unexpected outcomes. In fact, this example signals that a monolingual policy has the added benefit of having an additional language as long as the home language can be maintained, as stated by [P6] in extract (15).

(15) Japanese promoted their national language, but they didn't forbid us speaking our language, therefore, our elders can speak. We never heard them saying they couldn't use their mother language, they could use both.

日本有推他的國語， 可是他沒有禁止我們講我們的語言， 所以我們的長輩們都會講啊。我們也沒有聽過他們說不准說族語 ，他們是並行使用 [P6]

Extract (15) highlights the role of home language (intergenerational) transmission (Fishman, 1991). Japanese was mandatory for public domains such as school and civil servant work, yet the home environment was able to maintain the Indigenous language usage. This is a major contrast to the arrival of KMT and its Mandarin-only policy.

Furthermore, the bilingual ability is viewed as resources. For example, [A2] reported:

(16) My grandparent can switch between Bunun and Japanese

我外公外婆也是日語跟卑南語交互使用 [A2]

The use of 'being able to switch between languages' in extract (16) shows that code-switching (switching between languages) is viewed as the ability to adapt; it suggests

that Indigenous people are 'talented' people who can learn other languages. It also shows that the Indigenous community has more linguistic resources than monolingual Mandarin Chinese speakers.

These examples indicate that the participants felt colonisation does not necessarily mean the end of a minority language, thus providing a perspective of hope. However, in contrast, most of the Indigenous people in Taiwan are not bilingual anymore, they are mostly monolingual Chinese speakers. Therefore, these statements could be interpreted as the participants saying that the KMT Government is worse than the Japanese with its oppression. This aspect of the analysis is further discussed in the next chapter.

In the next section, I discuss the fourth theme, which is characterised by the participants' acceptance of the dominant social group – the government.

8.3.4 Theme four: A new type of 'Stockholm syndrome' in Indigenous language revitalisation

The fourth theme that contributes to the discourse on hope focuses on aspects of the participant's *acceptance* of the colonial power, rather than the *rejection* of it – 'de'-colonisation. By accepting the dominant ideology, the participants felt the government could save their languages. Recognising this acceptance, I sought to explain it by adopting the concept of the 'Stockholm syndrome' to signal a phenomenon of the 'oppressed' supporting the 'oppressor'.

During my research, I could not find articles that relate the notion Stockholm syndrome to Indigenous language revitalisation. Although there are a couple of articles that mentioned this concept concerning people's linguistic behaviours, they are only used in the context of English language teaching and no substantive details could be found (Heinrich, 2007; Llurda, 2014). I believe the concept of a 'linguistic Stockholm syndrome' (LSS) can be usefully applied to Indigenous language revitalisation and, by so doing, a better understanding can be gained of the linguistic behaviours of the language speakers whose language has been oppressed over a prolonged period of time.

Stockholm syndrome can be described as sympathy toward one's captors or the development of a bond with the captors (Adorjan et al., 2012). Adorjan et al. (2012) wrote that most formal definitions of the syndrome involve the victims in (1) "develop[ing] positive feelings toward their captors", (2) "sympath[ising] for their

causes or goals", and (3) developing "negative feelings toward the police or authorities" that try to help (p. 458). Although the linguistic situation in Taiwan is not exactly a hostage situation, I find linking the metaphor of Stockholm Syndrome to language revitalisation under the acronym LSS useful in describing the power imbalance between the Indigenous people and the government. LSS also reinforces the idea that the impact of the hegemonic colonial power renders the participants powerless.

The participants responses resemble a 'Stockholm-syndrome-like behaviour' in several ways. First, the oppressed group (the Indigenous participants) have developed sympathy with and gratitude towards the dominant power (the government), exhibiting features that describe the government as the 'saviour' of the Indigenous languages. Second, instead of sympathising with the causes or goals of the oppressor, the interviewees demonstrated a sympathetic understanding of the oppressor's obstacles. Finally, the socially oppressed group has developed negative feelings towards the remedial action for language revitalisation from the government.

Below, I first show the participants have developed a positive feeling towards the government, the oppressor. I then illustrate how they show sympathy to the government, consequently constructing the dominant ideology as 'the norm' or 'common sense', the 'right way' or the 'only way'. Finally, I show the participants have developed a negative feeling towards the language revitalisation activity.

Developing positive feelings towards their oppressor

The first component of Stockholm-syndrome-like behaviour is for the participants to positively construct the dominant social group. In this case, the participants viewed the government as kind and unprejudiced, showing the participants had constructed a positive feeling towards the dominant power, as shown in extract (17):

> (17) *This law initially sounded like just a slogan, but now [...] I feel the government is making an effort [...] they put in a lot of effort to let Indigenous students, not only Indigenous students, also rural students and 'Han' students go to higher education.*
>
> 這個法條的設定因為一開始它就比較像是呼喊口號，到我現在已經 [...] 我覺得政府也蠻用心的，[...] 然後也蠻用心想要讓原住民的學生，可能不只是原住民，很多偏鄉的學生，漢人的學生，能夠有機會進入到 高等 '台清交'. [P3]

This example resonates with the definition of Stockholm syndrome where the victim shows gratitude for small acts of kindness of their oppressor (Adorjan et al., 2012, p. 458), in this case the opportunity to gain higher education. The predication strategy demonstrates that the speaker positioned the government as having the power to provide kindness. Furthermore, instead of 'only' helping the Indigenous community, the government also helps 'rural students and Han', which constructs the government as unbiased. This could also be interpreted as the participant constructing herself as 'not different from Han' to avoid the negative socio-historical stigma attached to being Indigenous. Since "all ideology is in one way or another to do with positioning subjects" (Fairclough, 1989, p. 105), the participant has positioned herself at the receiving end and pictured the government as 'helpful'.

Moreover, the participant's use of 'but now' indicated a period of past time. This suggests that the prolonged suffering may have resulted in the participant's recent positive feeling towards to her oppressor as the oppressor has "rendered the oppressed helpless, powerless, and totally submissive" (Adorjan et al., 2012, p. 458). Furthermore, the use of 'I feel' as a mitigation strategy shows the participant downgrading the intensity of her speech, perhaps realising that not everyone would be seeing the government in the same light.

Next, the participant also openly praised the government for their good work. The government is seen as 'doing good things' in extract (18):

> (18) Like the Taroako train, which has Chinese, Amis, Holo, Haka, 5 languages, I think this is great.
>
> 在是台東的太魯閣號的火車他會有, 中文, 阿美語, 也會有河洛, 客家, 五種語言, 我覺得不錯啊.

In extract (18), the participant *praised* the government for doing well. The two extracts (17) and (18) also show the government's actions were praised across time: extract (17) praises the government's past effort and extract (18) praises the government's current efforts. Based on the current effort, the participant also projected the government's future performance of Indigenous language revitalisation, as illustrated in extract (19):

> (19) I think it's within reach, we really hope they will be real national languages
>
> 我覺得我們指日可待啦. 我們期望未來真的是國家語言 [P3]

Extract (19) demonstrates the future perspectives of the government's efforts with the use of the future tense marker 'will'. Although the use of 'hope' may have a positive or negative connotation, coupled with the use of '*within reach*' it shows that the participant believed the future will be better. A similar sentiment was expressed in extract (20):

> *(20) <u>I am feeling</u> very confident about our government, it's not because I work for the government, but <u>I think</u> it's within reach*
>
> *我對政府其實越來越有信心啦. 不是因為我在政府單位做事, 我覺得倒是指日可待啦. [P3]*

The mental processes 'think' and 'feel' show the participants as the 'experiencer' – the one who experiences this feeling. Thus, it could be interpreted as the participant's way of saying this feeling may not apply to everyone (a mitigation strategy), showing her awareness of the impact of colonisation. Moreover, her optimism seemed to indicate that she felt that, if she is optimistic, then this can happen. The use of 'within reach' suggests it is 'not the case' at the moment, which signals a position of desperation or lack of power, yet she was hopeful. Note that she used 'within reach' in two different statements, which strongly suggests her wishful thinking process.

Sympathising with the oppressor

Another trait of LSS is when the participants sympathise with the government about the difficulties it has faced. This is realised by them putting themselves in the dominant group's shoes and showing a shared feeling, taking the oppressor's perspective.

To take on the oppressor's perspective, the participants first view themselves as 'on the same side' as the government. In extract (21), the participant felt embarrassed for the government by saying:

> *(21) The Constitution Article 5 is a very <u>awkward</u> topic for Indigenous people.*
>
> *憲法第五條對原住民來講是一個很尷尬的題目 [P3]*

The R.O.C. Constitution, Article 5 (1949), states "There shall be equality among the various racial groups in the Republic of China", and the current status quo is quite the opposite for the Indigenous communities, which is embarrassing for the government.

Hence, the use of 'awkward' showing the participant taking the government's perspective and, in some ways, trying to *save face* – a mitigation strategy.

Later, the participant expressed the language revitalisation issue as seen through the dominant Han group's lens, as seen in extract (22):

> *(22) Now the Indigenous languages are national languages, but if you are a Han student, can you accept this?*
>
> 現在國家語言，可是你一個漢人的高中生他們接受這個嗎 ？[P3]

This statement is interpreted as saying 'if Indigenous languages are national languages and have a certain representation at school and society, a Chinese-speaking person would feel very unhappy if he/she is now made to learn or speak an Indigenous language'. To end the sentence with a question appears to be an intensifier strategy, which shows her looking at this issue from the oppressor's viewpoint and advocating for the dominant group, directly putting herself in the shoes of a Han (Chinese) person. Although it sounds like she was resistant towards the idea of making Indigenous languages national languages, this may be her way of highlighting the difficulties Indigenous people face when trying to raise the status of their languages within a competitive language environment with competing language ideologies and social resources, especially when risking confrontation with the dominant group. Her use of 'if you are a Han student, can you accept this?' implies that Han are not accepting of other languages exceeding Han's status and the success of other languages could be seen as a threat to the Chinese ideology. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Mandarin Chinese is at the top of the linguistic food chain and maintains a hegemonic status. This may be her way of indicating the hardship her people face by opposing Han.

Additionally, she signalled the government's will to help in the long run (extract 23):

> *(23) right now we can't see good results, but I feel education takes time to see results, so the first few decades are only the experimentation period.*
>
> 只是目前為止，還看不到有很好的成績. 可是我覺得教育本來 就是要花很 長遠來看. 前面十幾年都像是實驗階段 [P3].

To look at the unfruitful language revitalisation results from the government's viewpoint, she adopted the 'official discourse' by saying language revitalisation is a long-term project and that is why we have not seen satisfactory results, with the use of

'right now' with 'takes time' indicating the participant was justifying the government's actions. 'Takes time' also indicates a distant future which provides a certain positivity (Lenz, 1999) as the effect of language revitalisation efforts is often not immediately visible (Fishman, 1991; Spolsky, 2004). Therefore, 'experimentation' on language revitalisation is needed. It is, however, unclear who is experimenting. It could be interpreted as the government experimenting on Indigenous language revitalisation methods, which would involve policy making, curriculum design and funding sources. It could also be interpreted as the Indigenous population doing the experiment and experiencing a change in attitude towards their language (positive change). My interpretation, based on the use of mental processes (think, feel, see) by the participant, suggests, at least in this case, that the statement is not based on facts but a state of mind.

Moreover, the comment 'the first few decades are only the experimentation period' implies there will be more efforts in the following decades, indicating that she believes the government is putting continuous effort into Indigenous language education. However, the use of 'takes time' could also be a conservative comment about the lack of a definite language revitalisation outcome, as these words indicate an indefinite duration. van Leeuwen (2008) stated "linguistically, the subjective experience of time is realised in terms of the duration of activities" (p. 82). Thus, it could be said, the participant did not feel there will be fruitful outcome in the short run.

This statement also put education at the forefront of language revitalisation, which means language revitalisation is the government's responsibility because the education system belongs to the government. Since the 1998 Education Act for Indigenous Peoples, there have not been positive results, yet the participant did not question how much longer it would take for the results to be visible. This suggests she was not holding the government accountable for the inefficacy of language revitalisation policy. In the absence of any evidence of the failure of current language revitalisation efforts, this cumulatively allowed the conclusion that 'the government has done well'.

Extract (24) below is another example that shows the participant slowly 'watering down' his position to pander to the government's expectation, justifying the 'excuse' made by the government:

> *(24) We said, at the time, the Legislative Yuan is responsible, <u>but they didn't</u>*
> *<u>understand language</u>. Their law-makers were <u>all young people</u> and some are <u>not</u>*

Indigenous. At that time, my version used 'official language', but they removed it in the hearing, <u>they know, (so)</u> they kept the wording 'local languages'. This is <u>just a misunderstanding</u>, they thought local (common) language is official language, national language is official language. Just misunderstood the meaning, <u>we'll communicate about this in the future.</u>

當時我們真的這麼講立法院他們有權責，但是他不懂語言這個東西，他們的法政處理都是年輕人， 甚至非原住民。那個時候，我的版本有寫到官方語言， 他們在審的時候拿掉了。他們知道，（所以）保留了通行語言。這就是認知的問題嘛。 他以為通行語言就是官方語言。他以為國家語言就是官方語言。意義不一樣，再來溝通啦 [P6]。

In the first part of extract (24), although the nomination strategy shows an us/them division, the speaker assigned the responsibility for language revitalisation to the Legislative Yuan, but then quickly removed that accountability of the Legislative Yuan by saying 'they didn't understand language' and 'the law-makers were young' and 'not Indigenous', showing sympathy to government's obstacles. He then accepted the removal of the wording 'official language' and justified it as a 'misunderstanding'. However, the use of 'they know, (so) they kept the wording local languages' indicates it is not a misunderstanding at all. Thus, showing him pandering to the government in the hope of a good result.

Finally, he indicated that the government is 'open to discussion' by saying 'we'll communicate about this in the future'. By being understanding or even appreciative towards the government, the participant constructs the government as doing its best and thus *blameless*; even when they have failed to fulfil their duty, they are seen as the good guy and are doing the 'right thing'.

Nevertheless, the use of future tense 'we'll' provides an element of hope (in the future) for the speaker. The use of 'we' signals that the Indigenous community is part of the decision-making process and thus gaining power at the discussion table, and the use of 'communicate' further indicates a two-way, bottom-up and top-down, collective action.

Noticeably, this statement raised many concerns about Taiwan's legislative efforts in language revitalisations. If a person works in a position in charge of law-making, the understanding of a language, the age of the law-makers and the ethnic group in which the law maker belongs to should not impede the law-makers' ability to do their job. The statement implies that the law-makers in Taiwan are grossly unqualified and without sufficient understanding of the requirements of making relevant laws; it also implies

that there is a fundamental problem in the law-making process. In the end, this example shows the participant is willing to put up with the removal of 'official language' and the lack of knowledge about language revitalisation in the law-makers.

Next, I describe the third characteristic of LSS – developing negative feelings towards the helper.

Developing negative feelings towards the helper

The last component of LSS is for victims to develop negative feelings towards help provided for language revitalisation. In this situation, the participant felt annoyed with the support for language revitalisation. Llurda (2014) exemplified a Stockholm-syndrome-like linguistic behaviour in the English language teaching (ELT) context as "consisting of secretly admiring the native (English) speaker and denying themselves the legitimacy of being rightful language users" (p.108). In extract (25) below, the participants admire the mainstream class and deny the language revitalisation efforts:

> *(25) <u>I feel</u> the heritage language class should be in the formal curriculum [...] <u>but</u> the school, the school is still grade-driven. I found that my daughter told me the teacher uses the time she goes to language class to conduct tests. In this case, my daughter missed out on taking the tests. What can I do? I talked to the teacher [...]. Although the teacher said he/she will pick one of the highest scoring tests from her class tests, but what say she <u>might've</u> gotten a better result in one of those days that she missed.*
>
> *我覺得母語課程可以納入正式課程.[...] 我後來覺得學校喔, 學校還是以成績為主. 像我之前就發現一個問題，我女兒跟我說他們老師會利用他們去上母語的課程時間考試. 那我女兒去上母語課的時候 他就沒有考到試. 那怎麼辦? 我也跟老師說, [...]雖然老師說他會以平時考的成績中挑一個最高的成績來算，萬一他在哪一次考的比較好，就喪失這個考試機會. [P4]*

In extract (25), the participant initially mentioned that language is very important to her (notice the use of 'I feel' as mitigation), but in the end, she was irritated that her child missed the mainstream classes because the child needed to go to the language class. Regardless of the fact that she thought language classes are important, most of the utterances were about how her daughter is missing out on mainstream tests because of her language class.

Also, instead of saying 'I encourage my child to go to language class', she took a passive stance during the interview by saying '*I don't object*' or '*I don't mind*' if kids go to '*this kind of class*' (我不排斥 孩子去上這樣的課) which puts her initial position

about language revitalisation in jeopardy. At the end of this extract, not only was her initial position completely obscured, it even, to a certain extent, sounded like she was complaining about the language classes.

To the participant, the mainstream classes are more important, they represent success. She said, 'the school is still grade-driven', which is a reflection of her own desire. What is more interesting is that the participant is unhappy because her daughter 'might've gotten a better result in one of those days that she had missed'. This statement is entirely hypothetical. Yet, this unknown seems to be what upset her the most. In the end, regardless of a strong feeling for language revitalisation, her case shows that the Indigenous people rely on the mainstream society (the oppressor) and the mainstream system to better their lives, perhaps to free them from social stigma. It is not surprising that [S1] revealed that in one of the language revitalisation projects that she was involved with, *"the parents were the hardest to cooperate with in our project"* (我們的 project 裡面最難配合的就是家長).

It seems that many of the members of the Indigenous communities are unconsciously advocating for the dominant ideology, showing that "with no possibility of escape and as a survival mechanism, they internalize the perspective of their oppressor" (Adorjan et al., 2016, p. 467). In the end, notwithstanding that the government and its earlier language policy has contributed to the language attrition of the Indigenous languages, the participants believe that their oppressor is also their saviour – the good guy. As such, [P1] stated, *"therefore, I think formal education with the current education system should be able to satisfy the needs of Indigenous education"* (所以,我會覺得因應現在 的教育體制用正式授課,目前是可以滿足原住民族需求的教育).

8.4 Conclusion

The findings in this chapter have shown the separation of language and culture is engrained in the policy and is intertextualised in the participants' discourse, which seems to render language 'invisible', resulting in people being unaware of just how serious the language endangerment has become. This echoes Tang's (2015b) concerns regarding the lack of awareness of language loss. Tang did not provide details as to why people are unaware of language loss and I believe this chapter provides the explanation that would help remedy this concern.

The findings also suggest that the participants are positive about their language's future because they felt that 'if New Zealand Māori can, why can't we'. Having a sustainable language revitalisation model to look up to provides hope for Taiwan's endangered languages. The mention of Japan, in combination with New Zealand Māori, shows that the participants perceived colonisation as having added value – bilingualism – and, thus, it provides positivity. Perhaps they were looking for reasons to convince themselves that progress is being made even though the statistics show otherwise.

I also found that the participants' responses resemble a *Stockholm-syndrome-like behaviour* in their agreement with or justification of the dominant choices to the detriment of the Indigenous communities' interests at certain levels. Adorjan et al. (2012) stressed that "the symptoms of Stockholm syndrome, it is argued, may persist long after captives are free" (p. 458). As demonstrated in the findings, remnants of the colonial power and its dominant ideology can still be found within the participants' discourse. The participants, in these cases, construct the dominant as *correct* and express the feeling that the dominant way is the *right way*. In any case, the participants were willing to look on the bright side because they believe the government's way can save their languages, and this qualifies as a discourse on hope. This positive discourse also signals the participants' willingness to be an *imagined community* with their non-Indigenous counterparts.

The phrase 'Stockholm-syndrome' is a much-contested term as the label can be used to negate the view of a person (i.e., 'you said this because you suffer from Stockholm syndrome'). However, this seemed to be how the participants confronted the fear and despair created by the dominant. In this way, it "makes it easier to justify prolonged grief, designate the labels of 'victim' and 'offender', and provide reassurance of the situation we are experiencing" (Bhatia, 2015, p. 11). This process highlights a sense that 'there is no other way' and the Indigenous communities are powerless.

As shown above, under the discourse on hope, there were comments that showed how the participants favoured the government and others that blamed the government for the current state of affairs regarding language revitalisation. It is interesting to note that, when participants praised the government, the mitigating strategy was used to support the government's efforts. This perhaps indicates the participant's resistance towards agreeing with the dominant power wholesale.

Although the findings show the participants in a submissive light, to accept the dominant ideology does not only mean to assume the role of victim – it also gives the participants hope and the means to contest the dominant power and to create linguistic authority. In the next chapter, I show how the participants navigate through their discourse and eventually establish themselves as the *legitimate speakers* (Bourdieu, 1991), and thus gain power over and control of their languages.

Chapter 9.   Negotiating language ownership

9.1 Introduction

This chapter presents further findings from the interviews with the participants, examining the concept of language ownership, which is closely related to ethnolinguistic identity as well as the power to exercise language-related activities and so create the 'legitimate speaker' (Bourdieu, 1991). In the analysis of the transcripts, the speaker's language ideology was revealed, and this eventually led to the question of who is responsible for language revitalisation.

As indicated in Chapter 5, a close reading of the interview transcripts was conducted to identify the discourse(s) of the participants. Unlike the previous chapter, this chapter does not contain participants responses to policy statements. In this chapter, I focus in particular on references to ethnolinguistic identity, language ideology and language ownership. I drew on tools and linguistic features from the DHA and an analysis of legitimisation strategies was applied. Following the analytical process described in Chapter 5, 'nodes' (a description of a feature) were sorted into themes, and then themes were put together to form discourses. I identified the following two contrasting discourses and their associated themes, which I discuss in this chapter:

1) a discourse of negativity that shows the speakers struggling to come to terms with the language loss, and deflecting, mediating language revitalisation responsibility; and

2) a discourse of positivity that constructs the linguistic authority of the speakers who are 'in control' of their language.

Section 9.2 below discusses the negative discourse that depicted the participants as the '(native) speakers' who are struggling to regain control of their languages. Section 9.3 illustrates a positive discourse of how the speakers reclaim linguistic authority and power, which also demonstrates how non-speakers are positioned as 'potential speakers' and, thus, as new speakers who share language ownership and language revitalisation responsibilities. Finally, this chapter ends with a brief summary of the findings.

9.2 The struggles of the (native) speakers to maintain their languages

This section shows the participants' negative discourse about the struggle in coming to terms with language loss. Four themes are discussed: denial of responsibility, conflicting language identity, language deprivation, and self-diminution.

The essentialist orientation (see Chapter 2) views the language as an important part of a person's ethnic identity, and thus, the language is the person. This perspective adheres to the often taken-for-granted perception of language ownership as it is often juxtaposed with notions such as 'mother tongue', which accounts for language ownership as a genealogical connection. However, in Taiwan, most of the Indigenous populations are unable to use their languages adequately. As a result, the speakers' narratives show a great sense of struggle to reclaim 'the lost language' for the Taiwanese Indigenous communities. Consequently, to avoid ridicule or criticism for not speaking the language, the speakers feel a great need to justify 'why I don't speak the language'. In the following sections, I illustrate the four themes used to mitigate the fact that many of the Indigenous people are non-speakers. The first theme is denial of responsibility.

9.2.1 Theme one: Denial of responsibility

The first theme used to mitigate the lack of linguistic competency is to blame something or someone for it. To avoid criticisms for 'not speaking the language', the reason for language loss is often constructed as *circumstantial*, and not the individual's fault. This is similar to the *rationalisation strategy* (theoretical rationality) where the circumstantial reasonings are constructed as 'existential', beyond the participant's control, *the way things are*. It can be realised by a cause-effect clause as seen in extract 1:

> *(1) Because I'm an urban Indigenous person, therefore, I don't have much contact with my heritage language.*
>
> 但是因為我是所謂的都是原住民 ，所以接觸族语的部分是較少 [P5]

The use of 'because' and 'therefore' directly points to the cause-effect relationship. The use of 'being urban Indigenous' is constructed as the cause to the effect 'don't have much contact with my heritage language' with the link 'therefore'. The "existentialisation" (van Leeuwen, 2008 p. 73) of 'being' is to be blamed for the language loss and, for this reason, language loss is beyond the participant's control.

Therefore**,** the current statement indicates that the reason 'I don't speak the language' is because of the circumstance**.**

The circumstantial construction can be reversed by using a negative 'if' clause, for example, the logic of 'because I'm an urban Indigenous person, therefore, I don't have much contact with my heritage language' can be reversed by saying 'if I wasn't an urban Indigenous person, I would have more contact with my heritage language'. The second conditional 'if' further shows the circumstantial nature of the statement and therefore removes the responsibility from the participant.

Another way to show that language loss is caused by the circumstance is to say that it is the result of *social circumstances*. Often, societal circumstances are seen as unbreakable due to the nature of their power.

> *(2) because we live in 'Han' people society; therefore, for languages, <u>even</u> in the tribe people still use Chinese.*
>
> *因為目前整個對於台灣主流的整體印象還是漢人社會. 所以使用的語言，<u>就算</u>在部落 其實大部分還是用中文 [P1]*

Extract (2) suggests that society belongs to Han people[22] (see Chapter 3), which puts the Han in a powerful position, as the owner of the society, and 'we live in Han people society' is seen as *this is the case*, the unbreakable truth. The use of 'even' (就算) further indicates a sense of injustice about the fact that Mandarin Chinese is used so widely amongst tribal members.

Instead of blaming the circumstance, the blame can also be directed at people**.** In this way, the participants construct an *authority* who is to be blamed for language loss.

> *(3) But, for this part (language loss) <u>no one taught us how to</u> <u>manage and plan</u> our home language. Before the promotion of language revitalisation, <u>we didn't know what to do; therefore</u>, our kids lost the opportunity to learn their <u>heritage language</u>.*
>
> *不過這個部分就是<u>以前沒有人教我們家庭語言的**管理和規劃**</u>。當時還沒有推族語的時候，這件事情<u>我們不知道怎麼處理</u>，所以我們的孩子從小喪失學習族語的那樣一個感覺 [P6]*

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[22] 'Han' is the collective term for Chinese people.

In extract (3), the authority is constructed as '*no one*', which shows there is no direct causal agent (de-agentialisation) (van Leeuwen, 2008) and 'not being taught how to manage the home language' positions the participant as the passive agent in this statement and thus defers the language transmission responsibility. It suggests 'it is not my responsibility to know how to, and therefore it's not my fault'. Additionally, the adoption of management discourse ('manage' and 'plan') implies that the home language transmission is not a natural process, it needs to be managed by others who are more knowledgeable or more powerful. It also indicates an appropriation of the dominant discourse in which the government 'manages' the language situation at the national level, traditionally in a negative way by viewing *language as a problem* that needs to be managed (see Chapter 4). Moreover, the use of 'manage' and 'plan' seems to be mitigating a sense of having *no control*. By using a management term, perhaps a sense of control can be restored. Nevertheless, the use of the pronoun 'us' and 'heritage language' further claims language rights and language ownership of the speakers, which also draws the attention to a collective identity of family and culture through language.

Instead of pointing the culpability at *no one*, the authority can also be 'agentised'. This blame-deflecting strategy simply means, '*X* caused language loss', as shown in extract (4):

> *(4) We have a lot of grandparents looking after the kids, but the grandparents always use Chinese [...] the grandparents speak their mother tongue but they (kids) only use Chinese to respond, in the end, the grandparents have to force themselves to use Chinese.*
>
> *我們這邊隔代教育比較嚴重. 可是祖父母就是一直講國語.[...],老人家跟他們講族語他就用國語回. 然後這些老人家就逼自己要用國語. [P2]*

In extract (4) the *X* refers to as the elders in the tribal areas. It shows that grandparents stopped using the languages. As they do not speak the heritage language to the younger generation, they are to be blamed for the decreasing use of the heritage language. In Fishman's (1991) GIDS, the grandparents' generation is positioned as the active agent who passes on the language (see Chapter 2). This theoretical outlook leads to the assumption that language loss is the result of the linguistic behaviour of others. Consequently, the participants relinquish their responsibility by blaming the older generation. Interestingly, the extract says 'the grandparents speak their mother tongue', which means the language is still a home language, but it is restricted to a certain

generation. The use of 'force' ('force themselves to use Chinese') can be seen as a metaphor of the force of Mandarin Chinese only policy because Mandarin is not a home language, hence 'force' is required to impose it. More importantly, this statement highlights the communicative function of the languages which underlines a role reversal of language transmission agency, which I explain further using the two extracts below.

It appears that the grandparents speak Mandarin Chinese to the younger generation because the younger generation cannot use the heritage language to communicate. Consider the next two statements:

(5) You could say that they want to speak to us, but they already are used to using Chinese, mixed with some heritage language.

其實可以說他們想跟我講 但是已經習慣了用中文參雜族語.*[P1]*

(6) You see, our parents stopped speaking our heritage language to us, even the grandparents, in order to communicate with us they also speak Chinese.

你看我們父母那一代 他們就不會跟我們說母語 甚至連我們阿公阿嬤那一代的, 他們為了要跟我們溝通他們也講國語. *[P4]*

Extract (5) suggests that the grandparents' generation 'wants to speak to us' but they have been coerced by the Mandarin-only policy and are 'used to' speaking Chinese. The use of 'you could say' is trying to mitigate the grandparents' responsibility in language transmission. Most significantly, they are not using the Indigenous language because they follow the younger generation's language choice – Mandarin Chinese. This is realised in the use of 'they want to speak to us' in extract (5) and to 'communicate with us' in extract (6).

Although the use of 'but' and 'used to' in extract (5) suggest that grandparents are victims of colonisation and have a defeatist attitude about their languages, the extracts show the grandparent's language choice is determined by the motivation of 'communication with younger generation'. In light of this, the younger generation now plays the role of deciding the language behaviour (McCarty et al., 2009) – the active agent.

Another way to agentise blame can be realised by the use of 'everyone' to construct an *authority*, as is evident in extract (7):

(7) Because before <u>everyone</u> thinks if you want to go to better schools you need to have good Chinese and English, so you can have better jobs. This was <u>the 'truth' we were taught,</u> and <u>you couldn't question it.</u>

因為<u>以前的人</u>就會認為說你都不把你的中文學好跟英文學好你才能跑到比較好的學校, 可能以後會有比較好的工作選擇. 這在 20 年前 30 年前也是真理, <u>都是教出來的真理,</u> 你不會去質疑它. [P3]

In the first part of this statement, not speaking the language is normalised by saying that because this happens to 'everyone', it is a culturally and socially acceptable norm, that it is how things stand. The use of 'everyone' suggests that each participant (as a social agent) is acting in accordance with or on behalf of other social agents. The use of 'thinks' as a mitigation strategy, therefore, indicates this belief is collective, a collective social agreement. In the current example, the use of 'everyone' extends to everyone in the society who are not the dominant Mandarin speakers, not just the Indigenous community alone. Given the Mandarin-only policy, everyone speaking Chinese is the norm.

In the second part of the statement, the participant said, 'this was the truth we were taught', implying that the 'taught truth' is a truth of the political discourse mediated via the means of teaching. This may be taken as criticising the government's Mandarin Chinese policy and the disproportionate emphasis put on English language education. Moreover, the use of 'you couldn't question it' further demonstrates government oppression and the undermined position of the Indigenous community and other Taiwanese language groups. The participant, without explicitly saying Indigenous people are the victims of the government policy, linguistically positioned herself as the powerless party who could not challenge the status quo of the past, and perhaps is still struggling in the present.

The nomination strategy shows the use of 'everyone' sometimes exclusively refers to the Indigenous communities, instead of everyone in the society, as shown in extract (8):

(8) <u>We are like everyone else</u>, Amis, Paiwan, all use Chinese to communication. all other mix-marriages like <u>Han-Indigenous,</u> or mix-tribe, all the same.

我們就像一般人一樣，阿美族、排灣族<u>大家</u>都用華語來溝通. 幾乎原漢通婚、或是異族通婚，都一樣的狀況.[P6]

In extract (8), the collective 'we' (我們), the use of tribal names, and the use of 'everyone' (大家) indicate the statement represents the Indigenous communities as a whole: it is collective, and therefore it is normal. It is true that intermarriage is a common phenomenon in the Indigenous community, which I discuss below. However, it is interesting that the participant equates mixed-tribal marriage to Han-Indigenous mixed-marriage in terms of the impact on language loss. By so doing the participant is saying that mixed-tribal marriage has as harsh an impact on the language as Han-Indigenous marriage. This may be an exaggeration to try to mitigate the responsibility for language loss.

9.2.2 Theme two: Conflicting language identity

The Indigenous communities in Taiwan have a high intermarriage rate (with other tribes or with Han), which affects their linguistic repertoire, language ideology and identity. The phrase 'speaker of an Indigenous tribe' naturally connotes 'native speaker', which inevitably suggests that the participant speaks an Indigenous language and has a monolingual identity. This is, however, not the case in the Indigenous communities in Taiwan due to the phenomenon of intermarriage. To overcome the division of linguistic differences, a multilingual/multicultural existence is considered the *norm*, which participants used to justify 'not speaking a heritage language'. As extract (9) explained,

> *(9) Indigenous people are multicultural, I am <u>only</u> a quarter Paiwan, <u>but</u> I would identify myself with the culture <u>because</u> I grew up in Paiwan culture, [...] if (the kids) want to learn Amis or Ataya I would also be very proud.*
>
> 原住民是個多元的社會，我排灣族其實就是 4 分之一，但是我認同排灣族是因為我在排灣族的文化分為裡長大 [...] 如果他們今天想要學阿美族語或泰雅族語我都覺得都是值得驕傲的. [P3]

In extract (9), the participant described how intermarriage affected her language-identity connection. Her use of 'I grew up in Paiwan culture, so I would identify myself with the culture' demonstrates that culture is not entirely a genealogical connection; rather, it is an identification. As Hall (1996) explained that the culture into which we are born is the "principal sources of cultural identity" (p. 611). The use of 'only'(就是), 'but' (但是) and 'because' (因為) indicates a rationalisation process, and these words also intensify the utterance. This means that the relationship between language and identity is something that she obviously has pondered deeply about. However, her use of 'only a quarter Paiwan' seems to be another way of trying to mitigate the essentialist view on

the language and, therefore, reduce her cognitive dissonance and justify 'not speaking'. After that, she said the kids could learn any Indigenous language, which may be her way of mitigating the fact that she is not a fluent speaker herself thus she 'can't be too hard on the kids'. Furthermore, the multicultural nature of the family unit means language only constitutes a small part of the identity. Consider extract (10) below, which describes how the language-identity connection can be *fluid*:

> *(10) I am a 'local' who is married to here. I am Paiwan, my husband is Rukai. My both parents are Paiwan, or I should say my dad is a quarter Amis. I am fluent in Paiwan, listening, speaking, reading and writing, but only about 80% in Rukai. I passed the intermediate Rukai language test but I never took the Paiwan language test. [...] my husband cannot speak his mother tongue (Rukai), but his parents are fluent.*

> *我是嫁到這裡的本地人. 我是排灣族, 老公是魯凱. 爸媽都是排灣族. 我爸爸應該算是四分之一阿美族. 我的排灣族語是聽說讀寫都會, 然後魯凱大概八成. 我去年有去考魯凱語認證中級. 可是我一直都沒有考排灣語, [...] 我的先生不會講族語, 但是他的爸媽都很會講族語.[P2]*

In extract (10), the participant explained that she learnt to speak her husband's mother tongue even though her husband cannot speak the language. Moreover, she took the language examination in her husband's mother language and studied, at university level, the Rukai ceremonial rituals, her husband's tradition. The implication of this statement is that cultural practice can stand alone without the linguistic component. Her mentioning being the 'local'(本地人), but originally an *outsider*, says that cultural identity is fluid. Moreover, the casual acknowledgement she made regarding her father being 'a quarter Amis' emphasises the widely accepted reality of intermarriage. It seems that Indigenous language ownership is shared widely within the Indigenous communities. In this light, the phenomenon of intermarriage challenges the notion of *native speaker*, *heritage language* or *mother tongue*. When the identity of a speaker shifts, what is considered *mother tongue* or *native* also changes. This highlights the indexical nature of the languages (see Chapter 2), which is often in conflict with the essentialist disposition of the participants.

Here, I provide one other example to demonstrate the nature of the shifting between language and identity and how this may have an impact on language maintenance. [A2] said, she used to tell people she is Amis because her father is Amis (but her mother is Puyuma). When she entered a speech competition in Taipei, she realised there are far

fewer Puyuma speakers, so she started to tell people that she is Puyuma, partly because she felt proud to be representing a much more disadvantaged Indigenous group. Her responses tell me that, the ability to switch between languages (and identity) shows she has more linguistic resources and, at the same time, it underscores the problematic nature of terms such as *mother tongue*. It also implies a misconstrued concept of 'quantity over quality' as she later revealed that she could not say she is fluent in either language. This suggests that multilingualism may be seen as having more linguistic resources and power, thus can be used as justification for not speaking 'one language'.

This phenomenon also reminds us that the Indigenous identity is not always divided by languages but by a broader identification of *indigeneity*. Despite there being 16 officially identified Indigenous languages in Taiwan, the participants identify themselves with a much wider Indigenous community (this is also illustrated in Chapter 8 with the participants' references to New Zealand Māori). When it comes to competing with the bigger *Taiwanese* identity for resources and recognition at the national and international level, a united Indigenous identity has its advantages both in numbers and in representation.

9.2.3 Theme three: Language loss and deprivation

The third theme in relation to the struggle facing the speakers is the notion of *deprivation* in the way that the language had been *taken away* from the Indigenous people, thus creating a sense of loss. By addressing this loss, the participants were able to justify the lack of language skills. Within this theme, a nomination strategy is the most observable as it establishes the victim and the oppressor, as extract (11) shows:

> *(11) Why call it revitalisation because it disappeared, who made it disappear? in Taiwan's history, it's the (artificial) process, it's the result of government discrimination and political 'pillaging'.*
>
> 為什麼叫復振 因為他消失, 誰讓它消失, 在台灣的歷史來說,是加工的過程. 是政府政策的歧視跟掠奪的結果. *[A3]*

By predicating on the government, the participant claimed to be the deprived social agent and, thus, a sense of ownership could be established. That is, if you did not own it, it could not be taken away from you and, therefore, by being deprived of it**,** you owned it in the first place. The metaphor 'pillage' directly places the language speakers at the centre of language ownership by suggesting that they were *robbed* of their

languages. The use of 'pillage' (掠奪) also suggests violence and domination both literally and symbolically from the government, which then connects with the use of 'patch' and 'repair' in the later extracts (15 and 16). The participant also recognised the violent nature of the external force imposed upon the Indigenous community, which he described as a 'process'. A process is seen as a series of actions taken to achieve a particular goal, which connotes a mechanical operation devoid of human characteristics. This can be seen in extract (12) below:

(12) Our tribe was the <u>earliest to be Sinicised</u>, so you rarely see our kids speak their heritage language.

在部落我們那邊是比較早<u>漢化</u>，所以你也很少看到我們下一代孩子講母語.[P4]

The term 'sinicise' (漢化) literally means 'to become Han' – the carrying out of a procedure which also demonstrates an outside force imposed on the Indigenous community, to make A become B. The technocratic term 'sinicisation' shows the influence of past policy efforts to eradicate Indigenous languages and culture. The use of 'earliest' suggests that this process is not a random event – it lasts for generations and has affected a lot of people. This is a recognition that language loss is not a naturally occurring event, it is a human-made phenomenon, which the participants lived through as demonstrated in extract (13):

(13) In their teenage-hood they <u>experienced </u>the policy about <u>Sinicisation.</u>

他們青少年的階段其實就經歷了山地平地化的政策. [A1]

The word 'experience' is used as a material as well as mental process to illustrate that sinicisation is not only a physical force, it is also a mental process which creates emotion (i.e., fear), perception (i.e., self-doubt) and ideology.

Another participant explicitly stated in extract (14) that

(14) <u>My generation</u> is the '<u>mould/template</u>' of the government's <u>destructive oppression</u>.

我們這一代就是政府摧殘之後的樣板 [P5]

Extract (14) shows the force and destruction the participants encountered (destructive oppression). The use of 'my generation' resonates with the use of 'the earliest' in the

previous example, indicating the impact on a large number of people across a prolonged time period.

So far, the Indigenous communities have been constructed as *victims* who have been robbed of their language and culture, However, the participants were able to see themselves as active agents who mend their languages. This restores some power back in the participants' outlook with their language situation, as demonstrated in the extracts below.

> *(15) This is the past policies' fault, we need to start over again, it is harder to <u>repair</u> the damage.*
>
> *那等於是過去政策的錯誤，我們現在要重新再來做，做彌補辛苦一點 [P3]*
>
> *(16) Because there is a 'broken generation' […] to <u>patch</u> it, it is still broken and lost.*
>
> *因為我們那中間那一期 是斷掉, […]在要補回來的話, 就是斷掉, 是失落的. [P5]*

Both extracts (15) and (16) demonstrate that the Indigenous communities are the active agents who 'patch' and 'repair' (補) their broken heritage languages. However, it also suggests that once something is broken, it will not be restored to its original shape, which signals they had lost power and control over the languages. In light of this frustration, the participants demonstrated a 'defeatist' attitude. Through the narrative, the participants created a sense of 'victimhood' that shows the speakers' struggle in negotiating their language ownership within the socio-historical context.

Although portraying the Indigenous community as being 'deprived' seems counterproductive in this situation, it nevertheless suggests that the government is in the wrong and, therefore, assumes the accountability of the government.

9.2.4 Theme four: Self-diminution

The fourth theme the participants used to mitigate non-usage of the language is through creating a sense of not being good enough, or not good enough to use the language. In the socio-historical context, Taiwanese Indigenous people have been rendered 'lower class' or 'barbaric', and 'Indigenous' is often also a synonym for 'uneducated' (Hsieh, 2013; Tsao, 1997). This negative construction constitutes the language ideology, social practice and social structuring of the Indigenous people. As a result of this negative

social construction, the participants speak negatively about themselves in relation to their heritage language, which could be described as self-diminution. In this instance, they self-deprecate, which indicates insecurity, as demonstrated in the extract (17):

> *(17) Although I didn't get involved in the field of language, <u>I feel regretful</u>. Actually it's what I really want to do, but <u>I am scared</u>, because language, to <u>me</u>, it's <u>familiar</u> yet <u>unfamiliar</u>, <u>I fear</u> I <u>wouldn't be able to learn it right and teach it right</u>.*

> *雖然沒有接觸到語言這一塊，但是<u>我滿後悔的</u>，其實是我心裡面真正想要做但是<u>不太敢</u>。因為語言這一塊對我來講好像很熟悉又很陌生。 我怕學不好又教不好. [R1]*

Extract (17) features the use of phrases that signify the inability to use the language adequately and word choices associated with negative feelings (scared, unfamiliar, fear, regretful). The participant explained that he would have liked to be a language teacher and now he felt 'regretful' about not acting upon his desire. The reason he did not become a teacher is because of his self-disbelief in his ability to deliver the language with the use of mental intensifier such as 'feel', 'fear', and 'scared' demonstrating a great deal of subjectivity. That is to say, the ability to speak the language is not judged objectively by others but subjectively by the participant himself. Even though the participant is a fluent speaker, he *believes* he is not. In other words, the participant is saying 'I am not good enough'. As van Leeuwen (2008) pointed out, that mental process demonstrates a "reaction" (p. 57). For someone to fear something, the fear is a reaction to something else. In this light, the use of mental processes is reacting towards a socio-cultural outcome that has been caused by an extended period of oppression, and is possibly on-going. For this reason, it appears that the socio-historical context has reinforced the participant's self-disbelief.

The use of mental process (feel, regret, fear, scared) in extract (17) also demonstrates a great deal of emotion which highlights the agency role of the speaker. Even though the statement seems to indicate a loss of power on the part of the participant in the negotiation of language ownership, by espousing the use of the first person 'I' (I feel) the participant asserted his role as a speaker. Not only is this a way to negotiate language ownership, it is also a way for speakers to mitigate their sense of responsibility for language revitalisation work. This may be the participant's way of mitigating responsibility by saying 'if I am not fluent, I am not fully responsible for language revitalisation'.

Furthermore, the use of 'familiar' shows that language is not simply a subject of school, but something that you can *familiarise* yourself with or *distance* yourself from, which points out the speaker's agentive role in language practice. The mention of feeling regretful for not becoming a language teacher and fearing for 'not teaching it right' further demonstrate that language ideology and language practice are constantly in conflict (Austin & Sallabank, 2014), considering the participant is a fluent speaker who would have liked to be a language teacher.

This theme of self-diminution also extends beyond the individuals and sometimes manifests in a collective sense, as in 'our language is not good enough', which shows a sense that these languages are inferior to the dominant Chinese language. As I have demonstrated in Chapter 2, a minority language speaker might, on the one hand, believe their language is essential to their life, yet, on the other hand, feel their language is not good enough for public domains, such as the school. This is also evident in the responses of the participants about the English language, as in 'it is not as useful as English', showing a feeling of *lesser than* regarding their language, adding to the negative discourse surround Indigenous languages.

While, the participants are struggling to gain power, at the same time, their ethnolinguistic category automatically gave them a sense of ownership of the language, which in turn provides the participants with a sense of authority. In the next section, I discuss how the participants regain a sense of 'control' and negotiate language revitalisation responsibilities.

9.3 Constructing linguistic authorities

In contrast to the previous section that points out the participants' struggle in their construction of language ownership in relation to their ideology about their language and the domination of the 'Han' government, this section presents two dominant themes from the participants' interviews that claimed language ownership by positioning themselves as the 'legitimate speakers' and their language as the 'legitimate language' (Bourdieu, 1991). The first theme shows the participants claiming their power to decide how, when, and where the language is used, and the second theme shows them sharing their languages with non-Indigenous people. This indicates the participants' attempt to reclaim the production and distribution of linguistic resources and their engagement in

language revitalisation activities in order to regain control over "legitimisation of relations of power" (O'Rourke, 2011, p. 327).

9.3.1 Indigenous people should be the ones to have the power over their language

The first theme which constitutes the construction of linguistic authority is the Indigenous participants establishing their power to decide how, when, and where the language is used. To do so, they first differentiate themselves from the dominant society (the other) using a nomination strategy. The nature of indigeneity suggests that if you are not Indigenous, you are the *outsiders*, giving the Indigenous community total power to decide on their language matters. The outsiders are demonstrated in extracts (18) and (19) by the use of *othering strategies*.

> *(18) To let <u>him</u> know who you are.*
>
> *讓他知道你是誰. [S1]*
>
> *(19) To tell <u>him</u> what you are, where <u>we</u> came from.*
>
> *告訴他你是什麼人, 我們是怎麼來的. [S1]*

The two extracts above are the responses the participant made when she talked about motivating young people to speak a heritage language. She indicated that ethnolinguistic identity plays a pivotal role in that it promotes a sense of responsibility for language revitalisation. As seen here, clearly, there is an imagined 'him'. By differentiating 'we' from 'him', the identity of 'us' is whatever that is 'not him'. Interestingly, one of the participants referred to me as 'you', which indicates I (the researcher) am an insider. This is perhaps an attribution of my role as an "intimately engaged participant" (Collier, 1998, p. 144). As a result of the us-and-them division, the participants project themselves as the rightful owner of the language and therefore possess the right to decide how the language is practised.

Three aspects are taken into consideration by the participants when determining how the language is practised: *how the language looks*, *how the language sounds*, and *when and where to use the language*. First, 'how the language looks' is related to the comments on modernisation of the language to *keep up with the world*. Several participants acknowledged that, in order for the Indigenous languages to be used (or useful) in the modern era, they need to be modernised. The notion of modernisation does not only

mean the creation of new words (e.g., computer, internet, etc) or new structures, it also means a new system, the standardised writing system (corpus planning).

To have a standardised writing system is seen as *modern*, which provides a positive connotation to the historically deemed negative word 'Indigenous', thereby elevating the status of the language. Furthermore, given the impact of globalisation, especially the development of information technology, being able to reach out or 'put oneself out there' are seen as a key to success, as demonstrated in extract (20):

> *(20) like the internet, or to communicate with the <u>world's languages</u>, (we) <u>must</u> develop standardised writing system.*
>
> 甚至像是網路或者是和世界的語言溝上面<u>必須要發展出文字系統和標準化的東西出來</u>. *[A3]*

Considering [A3] is a fluent speaker, his statement demonstrates the fact that he sees the inevitability of the modernisation of the languages with the use of 'must'(必須). Moreover, I mentioned earlier that the Indigenous identity is not determined by the language, but by a sense of *indigeneity*. The mention of 'the world's languages' indicates that the Taiwanese Indigenous community would like to reach out to the wider global Indigenous groups, creating a sense of community, an *imagined community* (Anderson, 1991) that supports one another. In addition, the use of 'the world's languages' could also mean the dominant languages (i.e., English). In this case, the statement is viewed as an attempt to raise the linguistic capital of the Indigenous language to compete with the dominant languages. Using a standardised writing system to communicate with the world, the Indigenous communities are able to reclaim their existence (previously, their existence was denied by harsh government assimilation policies) and be a stakeholder of the world's linguistic repertoire, which bestows power and control on the Indigenous community. In extract (21), [A3] further stated that

> *(21) these memories (languages) need to continue <u>moving forward</u>, to show their 'contemporariness', to put plainly, the <u>traditions</u> need to be validated in the <u>'now'</u>.*
>
> 這些記憶 這些傳統是持續往前走的, 持續發揮他的現代性 , 講白一點 其實就是. 這些傳統 是在現代裡面是有效的. *[A3]*

The use of 'these memories' suggests that these are *our* memories (of the languages) – a language ownership marker. The use of 'now', 'the tradition' (past) and 'moving

forward' (future) signifies the guardianship of the language by the Indigenous community across time, which also signals that the future language use is in the hands of the Indigenous people. Although the use of 'validated' seemed to be suggesting a struggle to legitimise the Indigenous culture and languages, by assuming the responsibility for and the use of the language in the modern era, the language speakers are in charge of making sure the language is sustained.

The advantage of written language in language teaching is also noted by the participants, as shown in extract (22):

> *(22) no matter how old you are you can use this media.*
>
> *不管你年紀多大, 你就是使用這個Media 來做. [S1]*

As [S1] pointed out, a written system functions as a standardised medium for acquiring the language, and anyone at any point can learn the language if they understand the writing system. Her advocacy for written language demonstrates her awareness of acquisition planning. Therefore, [S1] further urged,

> *(23) let's just have it written down first before we even think about standardisation*
>
> *現在能用就用, 不管了不標準就用吧. [S1]*

Her use of 'before we even think about standardisation' shows that she is focused more on acquisition planning rather than corpus planning, despite the recommendation that successful language acquisition requires a standardised orthography (Marquis & Sallabank, 2014, p. 159). Her statement could be a way of avoiding the obvious controversy surrounding standardising 42 dialects into 16 languages, which often side-tracks the language revitalisation efforts. Her use of 'let's' also show a mitigation strategy where she is 'down playing' her frustration of the rapid decline in speaker numbers. Therefore, her comments suggest the immediate focus on saving the languages should be put on language acquisition rather than standardisation.

Although scholarly articles have suggested the importance of standardisation (Grenoble & Whaley, 2006), language acquisition without a standardised writing system could still be achieved by focusing on the oral tradition, given that the oral tradition is still very much treasured, as [P6] stated:

(24) I believe our language is incomplete if not spoken.

我只相信口說能力才是 '完道'. [P6]

Extract (24) suggests that having the ability to speak is particularly empowering (as shown in in the intensifier 'believe'), perhaps a key criterion for being a legitimate speaker. Therefore, it suggests Indigenous language as first language acquisition should focus on the spoken language, which touches on linguistic purism as I demonstrate below.

Another way to assert language ownership is to decide how the language sounds, a strong linguistic purist sentiment – to promote an *uncorrupted* language. The purist way of asserting language ownership came through participants stating 'it has to be spoken in this way', for instance, as [R1] expressed in extract (25):

(25) because she (my grandmother) taught me […] when singing about your feelings, you need to sound like the silhouette of the mountain ranges, and when singing about the everyday stuff you need to sound like the rivers […] I would sing to her and she would tell me if I sounded ok.

因為她會教導你 […] 她會跟我說你在唱族語的時候呢, 如果你在唱思念家鄉或者是屬於比較屬於山裡的, 那你的聲線就要像山頭. 但是你如果要唱屬於生活化的 你就要像河流一樣. 要讓人家聽起來你的聲音像流水一樣. […] 我就唱給她聽, 然後她就會跟我說 ok 不 ok. [R1]

Extract (25) shows his use of metaphor (mountain and river) illustrated a 'world' that belongs to his people, and the practice of 'singing', as a cultural practice, strongly suggests 'this is our way of using the language' – indicating a strong intimacy with the language. He also mentioned that when he sings in his mother tongue in singing contests, he sings better with more emotion and gets better results. In other words, he felt more confident and assured when singing in his mother tongue. He mentioned that his grandmother is the one who taught him the art of singing; this emphasises the intergenerational transmission at home, but his case is unique as not many Indigenous people his age can use the language as flexibly as he could. I feel that he is very proud to be a speaker and through singing a sense of *empowerment* and *completion* can be re-established because Indigenous languages were founded on oral tradition.

A purist feeling towards the languages could also be found in the linkage between language and *worldview*. For example, [A1] explained that the word 'mafana' means both 'know' and 'can' in Amis. This means, if you say you 'know', it also means you

'can'. He insisted that the language is used this way, considering his responses in extract (26):

(26) *this is the logic of the language, this is how you see the world*

那你知道這個語言的邏輯, 你知道他怎麼去認識這個世界. *[A1]*

Extract (26) shows that a language is a cultural practice – the interaction this language has with the world. This purist feeling is not restricted to the forms of the language (lexico-grammatical system) but a 'way of being', a sense of 'who we are' (Di Carlo & Good, 2014). In these cases, a purist view is maintained through an understanding of the meaning of the language and its usage in social contexts, instead of fixating on the linguistic forms, which supports McIntosh's (2005, p. 1920, as cited in Di Carlo & Good, 2014) comment that "languages are loaded with particular ontological commitments, including … notions of 'purity'" (p. 251).

The last element of this theme is to decide *when* and *where* to use the languages. Several participants mentioned that in working with their people, having the ability to use the language is advantageous. An example is provided in extract (27) below.

(27) *if you want to do ethnic-related work, it (language ability) is an advantage*

你如果要從事文化相關的工作所以會是個優勢. *[P1]*

This indicates that linguistic authority is constructed by saying our language is *useful* for *our people*. Interestingly, despite the fact that the participants claimed that most people in the tribal area speak Chinese, they still see using the language at home or in tribal areas as 'advantageous' and 'exclusive'. Comments like this are also closely related to communication with the elderly, as demonstrated in extract (28):

(28) for me, it's like a tool for communicating the elders

對我的意義比較像是在於說跟老人家溝通的工具. *[P3]*

Extract (28) underscores the fact that the general perception of Indigenous language for the younger generation is that it is still a *home language* that is used in private domains. Despite the previous comments pointing out that the older generation 'force themselves to speak Chinese in order to communicate with the younger generation', the younger generations aspire to use their mother tongue to communicate with the older people. This signifies a mismatching language ideology between the generations, which I

consider further in the discussion (Chapter 10). The older generation sees Chinese as the new home language, whereas the younger generation sees the native language as the passage to connect them back to their roots. Viewing the languages as home languages is a key to the reclamation of linguistic authority. However, it does not necessarily help with creating more new speakers. New speakers are in fact created outside the private domains, which I explain in the next section.

9.3.2 From non-speakers to potential speakers: A shared language ownership

The second theme which constitutes the construction of linguistic authority is not only about who 'owns' the language but also about the debate as to 'who is responsible for language revitalisation'. Indigenous communities could claim language ownership by directly asserting that the languages belong to private domains such as family and tribal meetings, creating a 'legitimate speaker' (Bourdieu, 1991). Fishman's (1991) suggestion that language transmission at home is the key to the survival of the languages is generally agreed upon by the speakers, as shown in extract (29):

> *(29) Be your own boss, the society doesn't have this responsibility. The outside is the oppressor, […] you can't <u>rely</u> on this, you've got to do it yourself [...] <u>it is in the family</u>, if you don't do it in the family, it is useless no matter how much money you get from the government.*
>
> *做自己主人. 這個大社會沒有這個責任. 因為外面是壓迫你的, [...] 但是你不能依賴 這個復振，自己本身要擔起, 在家庭還是在家庭 [...] 家庭不處理的話 政府給再多也沒有用. [P5]*

Extract (29) shows the participant agreed that the responsibility of language revitalisation ultimately resides within the family domain. However, there is also an indication that some government financial incentives were given to help language revitalisation, which was reluctantly accepted with the participant urging 'you can't rely on this'. By accepting the incentives (reluctantly), the participant accepted the fact that the responsibility for language revitalisation is not always only within the family domain. In spite of the strong suggestion of family responsibility, this signals the perceived responsibility for language revitalisation (responsible agents) does not always sit within the private domains. On the contrary, the responsibility for Indigenous language revitalisation is often constructed as 'belonging to everyone in the society' (including non-speakers, non-Indigenous people), with statements such as "*of course its everyone's responsibility*" (*當然覺得是每個人責任啦 [A1]*).

The obvious problem with this contradiction is that the majority of the group perceived as responsible for language revitalisation (i.e., everyone) is not part of the *family* or *tribal* membership who can pass on the language. This creates an uneven power relation between the speakers and non-speakers, which brings to the fore the question 'if language revitalisation is unsuccessful, would it be the responsibility of the society as a whole when the society is unable to implement language revitalisation activity?' Put plainly, it is saying 'you are responsible, but you are not allowed to act on language revitalisation'. In this regard, the expectation regarding the language responsibility of the non-Indigenous people seems unwarranted.

Nevertheless, this controversy is overcome by suggesting that (non-Indigenous) non-speakers can become new speakers and therefore are also responsible for language revitalisation, as shown in extract (30):

> *(30) <u>The whole society is also very important</u>, because we only have 2% population, it would be a shame if we only promote the language ourselves (in the family) but not <u>allowing</u> the 98% of the population to learn the language.*
>
> *大社會是非常重要的。因為我們的人口就2%左右，如果只有我們自己在推(家裡) 而不<u>讓</u>98%的人口來學這個語言不是很可惜嗎？[P6]*

The use of 'allowing' (讓) highlights the language ownership of the Indigenous community, with the aspect of *sharing* putting the speakers in an authoritative position. That is to say, the Indigenous communities (active agent) are allowing the society to learn the languages and are sharing the languages, as the participants all agreed on the thought that everyone could/should learn a Taiwanese Indigenous language. Such construction of language ownership suggests that the legitimacy of actions fundamentally belongs to the Indigenous people. By encouraging the non-speakers to become (non-native) speakers via language acquisition, language ownership is shared. This position leads to the conclusion that non-speakers are seen as *potential speakers* and, later, *new speakers*, and thus they share domains of the language and the responsibility for language revitalisation.

9.4 Conclusion

This chapter examined how language ownership is negotiated by the Indigenous participants interviewed in this study and identified two contrasting discourses, one that

highlighted the struggle the speakers face in relation to language loss, the other that showed them asserting power as the *legitimate speaker*.

The speakers' struggles mostly come from the language-identity association that conflicts with the language essentialist view. Throughout the interviews, the participants showed a strong language-identity connection, with statements such as "*To me my language means who I am, it's an important way to express myself*" *[P1].* The self-referencing with the use of 'me', 'my', 'I', and 'myself' in relation to the language illustrates the strong bond the speaker had with the language. Predication, such as metaphors, was used by the participants to describe the language as the 'soul' or 'air', which are proofs of a language essentialist orientation. It seems the connection with the language is an integral part of the ethnolinguistic identity. The language essentialist orientation puts forward the assumption that 'if the language is your soul, then you must speak the language'. But, in reality it is the opposite that is the common ground in Taiwan, with the majority of the Indigenous populations unable to use their languages adequately. As a result, the speakers' narratives show a greater sense of struggle with language loss. When the language essentialist view collides with current language practice, the findings indicate that the participants behave in a way that resembles a state of *cognitive dissonance.*

'Cognitive dissonance' means, in order to maintain inner consistency and coherence, a person must find ways to justify his/her actions; also understood as the "consistency theory" (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 84). Once a person internalises certain (ideological) 'rules', such as the essentialist understanding of language, it is hard to break his or her individual assurance towards what he or she believes. Consequently, to avoid ridicule or criticism for 'not speaking the language', the participants felt a great need to justify 'why I don't speak the language', as I have demonstrated in the analysis. Aside from creating an *agent* to blame, they expressed their struggles by negatively predicating the government, and they also mitigated their responsibility by constructing themselves as incapable of doing language revitalisation work.

In contrast to this struggle, I also identified a positive discourse where the participants constructed their legitimacy in and power over language revitalisation activities. This carries great ramifications in regard to how language revitalisation responsibility is perceived and how it acts as *ideological clarification* for language revitalisation work.

By viewing everyone as a potential speaker, the Indigenous communities are shown to be willing to *share* their languages and, thus, the language revitalisation responsibilities too. As a result, different types of speakers co-establish 'whose language it is' and the members of the wider society should all be part of the Indigenous language revitalisation process. However, as shown in the analysis, language ownership and language revitalisation responsibility are two different and contentious concepts, and have different implication in terms of how power is exercised.

In the next chapter, I discuss the conclusions drawn from the findings and how these have addressed my research questions. I further discuss the limitation and ways forward for this project in the conclusion chapter.

Chapter 10. Discussion

10.1 Introduction

This study has explored the discourse of Taiwan's Indigenous language revitalisation policies and unpacked the dominant ideology manifested in them. In doing so, this investigation offers the Indigenous communities the power to contest this domination and challenge the 'symbolic violence' (Bourdieu, 1991) they experience. With this as the focus, this chapter draws together and discusses the findings of this investigation from four analytical chapters and seeks to address the research questions:

1. What are the discourses within Taiwan's Indigenous language revitalisation policies?
2. What discourses exist amongst the Indigenous people about their language revitalisation?
3. In what ways do the policy discourses interact with the participants' discourses?

I addressed these questions through an analysis of the selected language policy documents and the Indigenous participants' interview transcripts using a CDS approach which looked deep into the ideology and power relations embedded in the data. I identified five discourses from the two data sets under this investigation.

1. Two discourses emerged from the policy documents:
    a. A nation-building discourse that is inclusive of Indigenous language (Chapter 6).
    b. A discourse about Indigenous empowerment (Chapter 7).
2. Three discourses emerged from participants' interview data.
    a. A positive discourse of hope for language revitalisation (or the hope that it works) (Chapter 8).
    b. A positive discourse that constructs the linguistic authority of the Indigenous people (Chapter 9).
    c. A negative discourse about the speakers' struggle with language loss (Chapter 9).

With the research questions and findings in mind, in this chapter I discuss four key observations across these discourses. The first observation is about the emergent

Taiwanese identity in the government's discourse that is inclusive of Indigenous languages. I compare the government's discourse on national identity with the participants' view of self-identification. The second observation shows an empowerment discourse of the Indigenous communities that contains a power imbalance between the Indigenous communities and the government. The third observation is an observation on the domains of language usage. Finally, the last observation is based on the notion of *language ownership* which signals how power is exercised between different social agents. These observations show that the findings about the discourses of the policies and the Indigenous people interact in a number of ways. It seems that in some instances they work together and in others they work against each other.

10.2 Nation-building through an inclusive Indigenous language policy

After surveying both the findings from the analysis of the policy and the participants' interview transcripts, I found the policy exhibits a nation-building discourse, which the participants were happy to accept. This finding, although unexpected, provides an interesting view on national identity in Taiwan. The new 'Taiwanese national identity' manifested in the policy shows that a 'one nation one language' ideology is no longer a fitting approach for Taiwan. Contrary to Hall's (1996) claim that the reinforcement of a nation creates a homogeneous culture, the inclusive approach of Taiwan's Indigenous language policy shows encouragement for diversity. However, this could be seen as lip service, which I discuss in Section 10.3. Nevertheless, the findings of this study suggest that the policy documents are strongly focused on nation building, which includes strategies that narrate the nation (Hall, 1996, p. 613). This suggests that national identity is not something we are born with but constructed via careful rhetoric – a discourse.

Despite the political undercurrent in the present-day Taiwan regarding the KMT-DPP opposition, we can see how a discursive strategy of stories being "told and retold" (Hall, 1996, p. 613) was occurring in a way that seemingly de-sinicised Taiwan, yet, at the same time, established *Taiwanese* as the national identity. In the analysis of the two Six-Year Plans (see Chapter 6), it was found that a coherent Taiwanese identity was reiterated through the progress in Indigenous language revitalisation. While each political party took opportunities within the language policies to undermine the other, they also indicated that, to be 'Taiwan', we must embrace the Indigenous languages that

are unique to the island. In such a way, the nation represents a shared experience of a group of people that is inclusive of the Indigenous languages. Interestingly, the official name of Taiwan, Republic of China (R.O.C.), was never used in the two Six-Year Plans.

To form a new national identity, the coexistence between society and Taiwanese Indigenous people is seen as reality – some kind of truth (van Leeuwen, 2008). This constructs Taiwan's Indigenous language repertoire as 'the way it is'. It is seen as "timelessness" (Hall, 1996, p. 614) – a nation-building strategy. The essence of the nation's character is established through its multilingual repertoire. This asserts Taiwan's self-governing quality as a multicultural nation, which brands Taiwan as tolerant, open and able to keep up with the West in its democratic operation (as opposed to Mainland China's intolerance of minorities). Thus, the nation-building discourse could be seen as a branding strategy to portray the government as supportive, so as to create a positive image about Taiwan's Government (for both the KMT and the DPP). This good gesture of the government not only creates a unique Taiwanese ideology, it also helps to improve Taiwan's international reputation, with the Indigenous population in Taiwan symbolising tolerance and openness of the government. This also serves the government's intention to nullify the colonial history, where the past negative influence of colonisation is ignored, and a positive counter-narrative of a prosperous multilingual Taiwan is established as the *new normal*. Within this new narrative, the government is constructed as *obliged* to carry out language revitalisation.

This trajectory of the government's new discourse surrounding Indigenous language revitalisation seems to be creating an "alternative history" (Hall, 1996, p. 614), so as to bring the country together in a united front to resist the One-China ideology (see Chapter 3). However, without directly confronting the One-China ideology, the Mandarin Chinese language dominant ideology remains unchallenged. As a result, how the growing Taiwanese-identified population could resist the ideology about Mandarin Chinese is also going to be a challenge to the government as it would have a significant impact on how effectively Indigenous language revitalisation is carried out. Notwithstanding the government's self-serving intention, the new Taiwanese identity needs its "original people" (Hall, 1996, p. 615), and therefore the inclusion of Taiwan's Indigenous communities gives rise to the authenticity of this national identity.

Since the policy discourse is about establishing *Taiwanese* as the national identity, using the Indigenous language as the currency, the next step is to see if the Indigenous participants identify with this national identity – whether they see themselves as Taiwanese. This step unravels how the political discourse and the discourse of the people merge or diverge.

As highlighted in Chapter 3, Anderson has argued that national identity is an *imagined community* (Anderson, 1991; see also Hall, 1996). An imagined community could be imagined in different ways. While Austin and Sallabank (2014) indicated that a language community could be seen as an imagined community, it has been ruled out in this case as Taiwan currently has a one-language-one-nation approach to national identity. I, therefore, seek other criteria to examine whether the Indigenous communities in Taiwan are able to relate to the policy discourse with regard to their national identity. In other words, I look at how they resist or accept the policy discourse.

In looking at how the participants' narratives respond to the political discourse established by Indigenous language revitalisation policies about national identity, it appears that the participants identified themselves with the new *Taiwanese* identity established in the policy scope, but their motivation appears to be different from the political ideology. The political discourse on national identity was filtered through a Han-dominant lens, including both the KMT and the DPP. While resisting the Han domination, the Indigenous participants also saw their Han heritage as a direct linkage to their Taiwanese heritage. This is due to historical intermarriages. Moreover, the participants mentioned the land as a way to honour their way of life. This point of reference directly connects the participants to Taiwan. Although the participants are not rejecting the national identity, they resist the notion of been categorised as 'the same' as Han. Therefore, in response to the nation-building discourse, the participants were happy to be Taiwanese but, more precisely, *Indigenous Taiwanese*. This perhaps shows that the participants had a certain level of awareness of the nation-building discourse but were trying to resist it.

In the process, the participants also showed the "desire to live together" – a key element for an imagined community (Hall, 1996, p. 616). As I have pointed out, the Indigenous community has a multi-phased relationship with the non-Indigenous dominant groups in Taiwan. As Chapter 3 has illuminated, Chinese migration to Taiwan has had a long

history that started several centuries ago. This means that the Indigenous communities have lived alongside the non-Indigenous people for a long time Indeed, there were conflicts, but there were also collaborations. The current discourse from the participants' perspective shows that they are confident and hopeful that the (current) political power will restore their language (see Chapter 8) and that they are inclined to share their language with the non-Indigenous community (see Chapter 9). This suggests their willingness, and perhaps desire, to co-habit with the non-Indigenous community in the hope of saving their languages and culture, showing that the government's manipulation to get Indigenous people onboard has been successful. Evidently, the findings, in which I have interpreted as demonstrating a new form of Stockholm syndrome – Linguistic Stockholm Syndrome (LSS), illustrate just how difficult it is to resist the dominant power and ideology, demonstrating that the 'symbolic violence' perpetuated by the government has deep roots in the 'habitus' (Bourdieu, 1991) of Indigenous people.

Unger (2013, p. 151) mentioned that national identity is closely related to the concept of cultural heritage. However, whose heritage constitutes national identity is a moot point for the participants. From a historical perspective, the dominant power perpetuates the Chinese heritage. Though many of the participants acknowledged a mixed identity with Han (Chinese) heritage, they still emphasised the 'Indigenous way', which is distinct from Han. Therefore, they show resistance in their voice. For the Indigenous people, their language ideology is closely linked to their identity, and their language is part of the heritage that they will be pursuing to fulfil their concept of 'who they are'. It seems the world where participants resisting the dominant Chinese-centric ideology and the world where they acknowledge their Chinese heritage live side by side.

To resolve this issue, these two diverging viewpoints were made congruent by a new heritage, a mixed Taiwanese identity inclusive of the Indigenous heritage. Although many of the participants still maintained 'I am Indigenous not Han', it seemed that it is the government's vision to move forward with the Indigenous community. As long as the government has not overstated its inclusiveness, in the future, if the government's well-intentioned language policies are able to produce fruitful results, perhaps the Indigenous people of Taiwan would be proud to recognise themselves as Taiwanese alongside their non-Indigenous partners. This give-and-take strategy demonstrates the participants negotiating their own identity within a national identity. They would accept

the dominant ideology and come part-way to it as long as they felt they had control of their languages but also, more importantly, the control of the relation of power to legitimise their existence and construct their social reality.

As found in the analysis by Unger (2013), the participants' transcripts seem conflicting or 'double-voiced'. There are a lot of mixed interpretations and responses. As Holliday (2010) and Mulimbi and Dryden-Peterson (2019) indicated, it is possible for national identity to be an identity alongside the more intimate cultural identity. While these two types of identity are not in conflict, this study showed how they are negotiated at different levels. Throughout history, for the Indigenous population, the 'nation' has shifted several times (from Chinese rule to Japanese occupation, then, back to Chinese domination). The participants' narratives showed that they hold a positive belief that colonisation need not be equated to the loss of cultural and linguistic identity (see Chapter 8 and Chapter 9). Given that the establishment of a new Taiwanese identity is inclusive of the Indigenous people and their languages, the Indigenous participants found room to negotiate their ethnic identity within the national identity.

This section shows that the government's nation-building discourse has been successful and persuasive amongst the Indigenous participants. Although the negative predication of the government was found in the analysis of the transcripts as strategies to resist the domination, a positive voice was also found to show that the participants were hopeful that, by sharing the government's vision, something good will eventuate for their language revitalisation.

10.3 Empowering as controlling strategy

The second observation that arises from this study is that the empowerment discourse of the Indigenous communities within the policy scope cannot be equated to language revitalisation. In fact, it might have an adverse effect. Below, I first discuss the potential pitfall of the empowerment discourse by means of Grin's (2003) *good policy condition* concept mentioned in Chapter 4, the conditions being *willingness*, *capability* and *opportunity*. Later, I look at how policy 'in operation' is considered an *action*, a *representation* and a *self-identification,* and how this may be disempowering the Indigenous communities in Taiwan.

Looking at the findings from the perspective of the *good policy condition*, indeed, to allow a language to be spoken, people need to be willing to speak (willingness). People also need to have the ability to use the language (capability). As shown in the analysis in Chapter 7, the empowerment discourse within the ILDA is largely geared to the status building of the languages and, therefore, will have a positive effect on the willingness factor. However, the lack of capability-building measures (i.e., no curriculum specification) means that perhaps many willing speakers will resort to the dominant Mandarin Chinese as a way to support their desire to carry out cultural and language-related activities. The cultural classes are good examples where the participants expressed how, within their cultural classes, they mainly use Chinese to convey cultural experiences due to the lack of language ability. This reduces and jeopardises the opportunity factor in the good policy condition. Moreover, in most domains, Mandarin Chinese is still the dominant language; as a result, the opportunity factor may be further minimised simply because the opportunity to use one's Indigenous mother tongue is hardly readily available.

Since the law is the legal intention of the government (Coulthard et al., 2016), it suggests that the government's empowerment of the Indigenous communities could then be seen as a form of manipulation to get the Indigenous community on their side for political gain, which results in the limited and controlled use of Indigenous language within the dominant framework. Since the ILDA was, as indicated by the participants, 'the top-down meets the bottom-up' expectation (see Chapter 7), perhaps the Indigenous communities are more comfortable functioning under the dominance of the government as long as they feel they are 'in control' of their languages. In light of the above reasons, the government creating a perception of empowerment may be seen as a smokescreen which hides the fact that the languages are not spoken or learnt.

When considering the problems with the empowerment discourse, there are several points to note based on the concept, discussed in Chapter 4, that discourse is simultaneously an action, representation and being (Fairclough, 2003, 2010). First, discourse as action entails that we use discourse to *do things*, that it is a social action. The pitfall within the discourse of the empowerment of Indigenous people is that this discourse is somehow equated to the action of language revitalisation. Therefore, by having such discourse, it is perceived that the language revitalisation work is done, or is being carried out. This perception in fact takes the power away from the participants

because seeing the policy as solutions to problems is depersonalising or disempowering the language speakers. The policy, by being presented as 'solving language revitalisation problems', replaces the need for the speakers to take action and exercise the power to act.

Second, discourse as representation entails how discourse constructs aspects of the world (Fairclough, 2003, 2010). In this case, the empowerment discourse represents institutional power and practices as well as the participants' perspective on the government and on language revitalisation. It is evident that the government positioned itself within the policy scope as supportive of Indigenous language revitalisation internally (to the people of Taiwan) and externally (to the international communities). Their support is shown by raising the status of Indigenous languages, which is empowering to the Indigenous communities. However, at the same time, the policy scope often positions the Indigenous people at the 'receiving end' and therefore not acting on language revitalisation. This suggests that the participants were not, in actual fact, being given the power to operationalise the policy, to carry out language revitalisation activities. This perspective runs a risk of what McCarty (2013) referred to as the *dis-ability* discourse, where the Indigenous communities are portrayed as incapable of conducting language revitalisation work on their own. This is not to say that the Indigenous communities are taking hand-outs from the government; rather it highlights the fact that the empowerment discourse may be patronising the Indigenous communities with regard to their language revitalisation work.

The government's ulterior motive for suggesting this dependency of the communities having to rely on the government's support could be seen as a control mechanism, resulting in the dominance of the government being ubiquitous within the Indigenous language revitalisation discourse. Due to the inculcation of the dominant discourse, the participants were inclined to interpret the policies' political rhetoric as representing the good-willed government, just as the government has positioned itself as supportive. In this light, the representation of the policy seems to match the participants' expectations. However, the policy discourse has coercive and regulative power (Fairclough, 2010). This power imbalance reflects the concept of the LSS described in Chapter 9 to indicate the nature of the complexity surrounding the participants' discourse on hope in light of the government's plan, even though they had little control over the policy.

The participants' viewpoint was that they believed the language revitalisation work is dependent on their acquiescing to the government's plan in the hope that it will work. However, this suggests a desperate sense that *there is no other way* and the government support having been perceived by the participants as *the only way*. Adorjan et al. (2012) stressed that "the symptoms of Stockholm syndrome, it is argued, may persist long after captives are free" (p. 458). As demonstrated in the findings, the colonial power and its dominant ideology can still be found within the participants' discourse. In these cases, the government's way was constructed by the participants as the *correct way* and it was suggested that they should follow the government's lead. For this reason, they were not fully holding the government accountable for mending or admitting to the historical wrongs. This resonates with the findings on policy construction in Chapter 7 where *no one* is constructed as a responsible social agent when it comes to mending the historical wrongs. The discovery of the 'there is no other way' narrative shows a similarity to Fairclough's (1989, 2003) studies on Thatcherism,[23] where the discourse of Margaret Thatcher has been described as containing the "TINA principle" (there is no alternative) (Fairclough, 2003. p. 99). While the Thatcherist discourse is top-down rhetoric, the participants in this study showed a bottom-up perspective. This indicates that, in difficult times, an "authoritarian commitment" (Fairclough, 1989, p. 176) provides reassurance and hope for people. Amidst the intensified political tension and the desperate effort to save the languages, perhaps believing in the government's way alleviates some anguish for the Indigenous people. Although this may not be the case for other Indigenous issues such as land ownership claims, this attitude came through strongly from a number of the interviewees when discussing their languages. But it is also noted that when praising the government, the mitigating strategy is used to support the government's efforts. This perhaps indicates the participants' awareness of and resistance to dominant power.

Last, discourse as *self-identification* is manifested in the *performance* of the self within the discursive practice. It is the "way of using language as a resource for self-identifying" (Fairclough, 2003, p. 26). This means a text as identification is also "an undertaking, a commitment, a judgement" (Fairclough, 2003, p. 27). In this study, this

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[23] The context of Thatcherism was set in the 1970s where Britain suffered from prolonged economic crisis, which led to intensified industrial struggle, urban decay, crisis in welfare services and an upsurge of racism. Fairclough describes Thatcherism as a "radical response from the right to these deep-seated problems and political failures" (see Fairclough, 1989, p. 177).

issue concerns how the government and the Indigenous people perform the 'self' in relation to language revitalisation within their discourses. The analysis found that the participants were empowered when they felt they had some level of language revitalisation responsibility due to their inherited language ownership (see Chapter 9). This was backed by the policy discourse that stipulated more *language talents* be fostered (see Chapter 7) or policy such as Language Nanny where private domains are the setting for such activities.

While these categorisations of responsibilities seem to be indicating that the Indigenous communities are *doing* language revitalisation, the analysis also found that both the policies and the participants' discourses constructed the Indigenous people as the passive agent. This kind of construction shows that the legitimisation and construction of power are out of balance. One the one hand, the communities are positioned as valued and thus empowered to act; on the other hand, they are constructed as powerless and 'at the receiving end'. Aside from the affective dimension that provides positivity, the actual distribution of the resource is out of the Indigenous communities' hand. This provides insight into why there is a lack of awareness of and progress in language revitalisation efforts.

By identifying the Indigenous people as passive agents in Indigenous language revitalisation efforts, the government has committed itself to having more power over the Indigenous communities and thus is able to exercise domination. Likewise, for the participants, by externalising language revitalisation responsibility (see Chapter 8), they have put themselves in the position that limits their engagement with language practice. However, when the government positions itself as having more power within the policy scope, it had also committed itself the responsibility to act on language revitalisation work. This, in a way, perhaps works in the Indigenous communities' favour. Now, they can hold the government responsible as the acting social agent and contest the elusive *symbolic power*.

10.4 Domains and language transmission

Fishman's (1991) method for reversing language shift regards the use of *home language* as pivotal in the intergenerational transmission of language. However, what is considered to be the home language is shifting in a minority language context. A mismatching language ideology between the older generation and the younger

generation was observed in this study where the *actual* language use and the *wishful* language use amongst the younger generation are in conflict. The disjuncture between language value and language use is not uncommon, as I have illustrated in Chapter 2. However, in this case, while the younger generation still wants to use their native language to connect them with their heritage, they have no ability to do so, resulting in the grandparents' generation using Chinese as the default home language. This turns the theoretical concept of GIDS (see Chapter 2) upside down because GIDS places the older generation as the home-language keepers who fulfil the role for intergenerational transmission (Fishman, 1991). Within the private domains (i.e., the home), while the diglossic language context still exists (Chinese-Indigenous languages), the force is swinging towards a homogeneous language environment with the dominant Chinese language as the favoured language, resulting in policies such as the Language Nanny failing to ameliorate language shift over time.

Attempts to address this change led many scholars to turn their attention to Indigenous youth because they believed that Indigenous youth would lead the changing attitudes toward and the practice of a language (Albury, 2016; McCarty et al., 2009; Shohamy, 2006; Tang, 2011). In my observations, I found that while the Indigenous youth have a positive attitude about their languages, they do not lead the future practice as they do not have the language ability to do so. Thus, a big challenge for Taiwan's Indigenous youth is in how they could turn their positive attitude into language practice as they negotiate the social order of their heritage language in relation to their lives, their identities and their connection with their heritage in a situation of unequal power relations with the dominant Chinese language.

Furthermore, given that a child spends almost 30 to 40 hours per week at school in Taiwan, it is unreasonable to assume the best way for language revitalisation is via intergenerational transmission at home. This perspective shows that Fishman (1991) has underplayed the significance of public language domains for language maintenance. This conclusion indicates that current policy implementation needs to seek a wider understanding of the speakers' language ideology and language practice. This also shows that, while the policy such as Language Nanny restores some power to the community by utilising the home domain, it may end up reinforcing the dominant linguistic practice, the use of Mandarin Chinese, as it is the new home language in the eyes of the older generation.

A general failure of language transmission could also be explained by what Cleave (2019) called *passive appreciation* of the languages. Passive appreciation happens when the participants view their language as an element of cultural performances, not as a means of communication, meaning that language use exists only in the context of cultural exhibition. Having cultural classes specified in language policies seems to be an empowering element for the Indigenous people. However, singing, praying and dancing as part of the cultural revitalisation does not necessarily fulfil language revitalisation aims, as these activities are not designed for communicative purposes. This also creates an illusion that, somehow, the languages are in use if the culture is on display (see Chapter 8). As a result, the linkage between language and culture is somewhat removed or reduced. Subsequently, this reduces the participants' sense of their language-culture connection and thus their sense of who they are. However, the question remains: if a language is not viewed as an essential part of cultural classes then how would cultural maintenance be able to aid language revitalisation?

As mentioned in Chapter 8, the perpetuation of the belief that culture has prevalence over language seems to preclude language revitalisation. Language revitalisation is a daunting process; perhaps it is easier to sing cultural songs, do cultural dance and learn about the culture in a classroom where Mandarin Chinese is the medium of instruction. Perhaps it is easier for Indigenous people not to speak their language as a way of avoiding criticism of their limited language ability. This was demonstrated in Chapter 9 where the participants felt a great need to justify the lack of linguistic competency in their mother tongue. In light of this understanding, it can be said that, while they had a positive outlook on language revitalisation, how the participants positioned themselves has been influenced by the 'symbolic violence' (Bourdieu, 1991) of the government that sets up the social order in which the language functions.

10.5 From non-speakers to new speakers: A shared language ownership

Extending from the previous discussion on domains for language usage, the last observation focuses on the negotiation of language ownership and how the responsibility for language revitalisation is negotiated. This entails the idea that other domains for Indigenous language use may be inevitable. I first discuss how the participants legitimise their language ownership; then, I look at how *new speakers* are given prominence in this discussion.

In Taiwan, it is impossible to assume an Indigenous person would have one mother tongue and thus one ethnolinguistic identity given the complexity of the country's linguistic repertoire. As discussed in Chapter 2, ethnolinguistic identity and ethnolinguistic boundary are strong linkages to how people identify themselves and their languages (Fishman, 1991). In Taiwan, this is a major obstacle for the participants to overcome as they negotiate their way through their ethnolinguistic identity, since it is often tied to more than one mother tongue. For this reason, they felt the need to justify not speaking *one* mother tongue. Ironically, by justifying *not-speaking*, it systematically puts the participants in the *non-speaker* category, and therefore not responsible for language revitalisation. Despite the fact that words such as *Indigenous* and *native* imply a certain level of linguistic competency, an Indigenous person may not be an actual speaker. This appeared to be something that the participants struggled with.

Interestingly, the participants signalled that the responsibility for language revitalisation being given to Indigenous people themselves is the ideal situation but, in fact, it might need to go wider; for instance, it may be given to society as a whole. This perspective is reflected in the participants' assertion that 'everyone can and should learn the Indigenous languages of Taiwan' and, by so doing, the participants gained power as the *language owner* – the legitimate speaker. Nic Fhlannchadha and Hickey's (2018) study on Irish showed that L1 and L2 Irish language speakers expressed "a need to share" and felt "everyone owns the language" (p. 48). However, unlike the study on Irish in the Republic of Ireland where the Irish languages signify the nation, the Indigenous languages of Taiwan do not automatically signify the Republic of China. Yet, given the participants' view on shared language ownership, combined with the policy discourse on a new Taiwanese identity, it may be in the best interest of the Indigenous communities and the Government of Taiwan to see language revitalisation as a joint effort. This means that, while on the one hand (as mentioned previously) the government manipulated the Indigenous community to get on board with the plan to assert Taiwan's national identity, on the other hand, by participating in the direction of the government the Indigenous communities legitimate their place in the political discourse on language revitalisation.

Connected with the above discussion on shared language ownership is the discussion of the speaker's roles. Traditionally, language revitalisation was thought to be a journey that is the sole endeavour of the Indigenous community (Fishman, 1991; Hinton &

Hale, 2001). However, the discovery of shared language ownership highlights the fact that non-Indigenous Taiwanese are viewed by the Indigenous participants as *potential speakers* of Indigenous languages, and therefore they share language ownership and, by extension, the responsibility to preserve the languages (see Chapter 9). This discovery is significant because it invites outsider intervention in an Indigenous space. This view may not be popular with some who worry about non-Indigenous people influencing Indigenous language development. For instance, Hill (2002) criticised the concept of a *universal ownership* of language as a way to involve non-Indigenous people in language preservation work, as it takes power away from the local community. Hill's criticism is, however, aimed at the discourse created by the linguists, the experts. The fact that in my study this view comes from the Indigenous participants shows that while everyone cannot own the language, Indigenous language revitalisation can still be a shared venture. Although this narrative could be interpreted as the participants off-loading some of the responsibilities of language revitalisation, it provides a channel for more negotiation of power on language matters.

Viewing everyone as *potential speakers* also indicates that, at some point, they will become *new speakers*. Currently, most studies on Indigenous language revitalisation focus on the native speakers and efforts within the Indigenous or minority community, and scholars such as Hinton and Kale (2001) articulated the view that "the heart of a language is its native speakers" (p. 32). Sentiments such as 'if there are not enough native speakers left, this language is not going to be successfully revitalised' and 'you cannot learn a language without its culture' are why native speakers of an Indigenous language are the main focus of language revitalisation studies. The new speakers' role in language revitalisation has not been looked at sufficiently. While new speakers could have Indigenous heritage, the emphasis here is on the new non-Indigenous speakers as it has a significant impact on the domains for language use.

The participants' willingness to view non-Indigenous people as potential speakers not only shows how speaker numbers could be improved but, most importantly, it also reveals that new speakers are expected to come from domains that are not traditionally considered *Indigenous*. This also means that the languages, once acquired, are likely to be used in domains that are not associated with *Indigeneity*. This may be challenging for some participants as they value their 'Indigenous way of life'. Furthermore, creating speakers outside the Indigenous community means that cultural practice does not

necessarily come with language practice. That is to say, new speakers are not necessarily equipped with Indigenous cultural knowledge. Therefore, when creating speakers outside the Indigenous communities, it is important to acknowledge and understand that it is possible these new (non-Indigenous) speakers would use the languages in domains and contexts that are not traditionally considered Indigenous. With the current literature focusing on the measurement of language vitality within the Indigenous communities – for example, Fishman's (1991) GIDS – the present study highlights a need for different evaluation tools for Indigenous language revitalisation when the speaker types and language revitalisation strategies change over time.

Benton and Benton (2001) reminded us that "all living languages, whether endangered or not, are constantly re-created by those who speak them" (p. 447). Although Benton and Benton (2001) focused on Māori-speaking families, they are quite right about the fact that the future of a language rests in the people who can speak the language, native speakers or not. Without its speakers, there is no need for the language. Thus, when native-speaker numbers are in rapid decline, ways to create new speakers and allow new domains for language use become an urgent matter. Creating new speakers (acquisition planning) is an important task alongside status and corpus planning, as speaker numbers are crucial to the vitality of the language (Harwood et al., 1994). Thus, having shared language ownership and creating speakers outside the Indigenous communities will better ensure the survival of Indigenous languages, and a regeneration of language use. This is especially so in Taiwan, where just around 2% of the population is Indigenous and there are 16 languages and 44 dialects. In the process, it provides Indigenous languages with new social contexts and domains in which to thrive.

10.6 Conclusion

In the current political upheaval surrounding Taiwan's international recognition and its desire to demarcate itself from China, Indigenous language revitalisation provided Taiwan with momentum to push this political agenda forward, aligning itself with the international trend. While the policy discourse promoted the national identity of *Taiwan* (not Republic of China, R.O.C.), the national identity for the Indigenous people, however, rests upon hope as a path towards a possibly better future for them, resulting in the Stockholm-Syndrome-like behaviour. Although in this study I discussed Linguistic Stockholm Syndrome in the context of language revitalisation, I believe the

sense that the Indigenous people have no other choice but to comply with the dominant ideology could be extended to other social practices for Indigenous people, such as schooling or work. Thus, to pander to the government and accepts its way of doing things may offer opportunities to open doors to obtaining higher levels of education and employment. In this trade-off sense, in the minds of some of the Indigenous people, to lose power is to gain power. Interestingly, as much as the participants accepted the policies aimed at language revitalisation and openly praised the government's efforts, there was still a strong sense of 'us' (the Indigenous people) versus 'them' (the non-Indigenous people). Thus, it appears the value of national identity for the Indigenous community has been positioned as external to their ethnic identity – the internal identity.

Contradictions can be seen in the nation-building discourse. While the nation-building discourse used Indigenous languages to support the national identity within the policy scope, the ethnically essentialist-oriented policies may further contribute to the marginalisation of Indigenous languages by restricting the Indigenous communities' (political) activities and voices in increasingly multi-ethnic and multicultural contexts, which is a concern that McCubbin (2010) discussed. The essentialist-oriented policies limit the use and domains of these languages and confirms social stereotypes and stigma about the participants' minority status, which is counter-productive to the language revitalisation goals. Therefore, I suggest that language revitalisation policies should be for the *language*s and not only for Indigenous people (and the language speakers are treasured). In doing so, speaking Indigenous languages becomes normalised across society and this reduces the need to justify the language-identity dilemma.

To remove the language-essentialist barrier is to accept the languages are a 'public good' (Grin, 2003) and thus could be learnt by everyone in society. This will ensure the languages continue to thrive in wider domains. If the essentialist views such as 'you must know the culture in order to learn the language' are perpetuated, a large number of the *potential* learners/speakers of the language would be excluded. For example, as a New Zealander born in Taiwan, I am also non-Indigenous to New Zealand; however, I have been learning te reo Māori (the Indigenous language here). I can use the language, but not in the (Māori) cultural context (for example, performing *kapa haka*) in my daily life. Although I do not have the culture-language linkage, yet, it is still legitimate to consider myself a (new) speaker. If the Indigenous and non-Indigenous Taiwanese have

shared domains for language activities, it would strengthen the nation as an imagined community where common activities and beliefs such as Indigenous language revitalisation could take place

Indeed, some members of the Indigenous community may be concerned that if a non-Indigenous person (from the dominant group) learns the language, then this person can take away the linguistic resource (Hill, 2002). It is possible that once non-Indigenous people (e.g., linguists) have learnt the languages, it is harder to justify the need for native speakers. However, I believe the world needs native speakers to pass on the endangered cultural knowledge and different worldviews through their languages. As Vjaceslav Ivanov (cited in Crystal, 2000) stated, "if we have 4,000 different ways to describe the world, this makes us rich" (p. 47).

For Taiwan, the power balance between Taiwan's Government and its Indigenous communities is a constant and endless negotiation. Nevertheless, this study has surfaced the fact that the Indigenous communities played a pivotal role in the recognition of the new Taiwanese identity, although it is unknown whether the Republic of China (R.O.C.) will ever change its name to 'Taiwan'. One thing is for sure: while the political parties seem to have the power in the political realm, the Indigenous communities are aware that they and their languages are irreplaceable and unique to Taiwan's every policy decision.

In the next chapter, I recap the key points of this research, discuss the contribution and the limitations of this study, and make recommendations for future studies and for Taiwan's Indigenous language revitalisation efforts.

Chapter 11. Thesis contribution, recommendation, and ways forward

To accept someone's voice is to accept them.
To reject someone's voice, rejects them.
(Bell, 2014, p. 331)

11.1 A recap of the aims of this study

In this study, I sought to investigate Taiwan's Indigenous language revitalisation policies and how these have impacted on the progress of Indigenous language revitalisation. The Taiwanese Government has put in policy efforts to help promote and revitalise the endangered Indigenous languages for over three decades, but the current policies have not produced satisfactory outcomes for Indigenous languages in Taiwan. The lack of teachers, resources or teaching hours within the policy scopes has been repeatedly criticised (H.-t. Chang, 1996; L. Huang, 2014). However, despite these criticisms, the future of the languages is still uncertain. I felt the arguments fixated on the material supports were no longer sufficient to address the lack of language revitalisation outcomes. Therefore, I turned my attention to the exploration of both the political and language ideology surrounding the Indigenous language revitalisation policies of Taiwan by conceptualising the policies as discursive practices.

To investigate the discourse about Taiwan's Indigenous language revitalisation policies, the theoretical underpinning of this interdisciplinary study is grounded in theories of language revitalisation (Chapter 2), language policy (Chapter 4), and CDS (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) with a focus on Taiwan's Indigenous language revitalisation efforts (Chapter 3). Through reviews of the scholarly literature, I highlighted the complexity of Taiwan's political and linguistic landscape. I also argued that Indigenous language revitalisation and language policy studies involve a myriad of layers of efforts and social agents, and therefore the investigation required a methodology that would appreciate a multi-layered perspective. With this understanding, I identified CDS as an appropriate framework. CDS recognises that a policy is a discourse that functions within a multi-levelled social and institutional structures. Thus, with a CDS framework, I focused on how power and ideology are manifested in the data according to the social context in which they were situated.

To address the research questions outlined in Chapter 1, I analysed two sets of data. The first set of data was the Indigenous language revitalisation policy documents. The second set of data was the transcripts of the interviews I conducted with 11 Indigenous participants in Taiwan. Using the analytical tools I laid out in Chapter 5, I examined the policy intentions and their underlying political ideology concerning language issues. The tools I used also enabled me to explore deeper understandings of the participants' view on their languages and the responsibilities for language revitalisation. Below is a summary of the key findings.

11.2 A summary of the key findings

Three key findings emerged out of this study. The first key finding is the nation-building discourse achieved through recontextualisation in the Indigenous language revitalisation policies (Chapter 6). The participants also identified with a broader national identity by affiliating themselves with what they indicated to be a supportive government (Chapter 8). The participants' positive discourse about their languages' future also reflects the policies' empowerment effects for the Indigenous community (Chapter 7). However, while the government appeared supportive of Indigenous language revitalisation 'on paper', this intention is overshadowed by the political agenda relating to the establishment of a new national identity – the Taiwanese identity (the 'not China') and the political arm-wrestling between the KMT and the DPP (Chapter 6).

The second key finding of the thesis emerged from the participants' narratives, which showed their belief that language revitalisation would succeed, which thus qualifies as a discourse of hope (Chapter 8). However, within this discourse, the government's way is constructed as 'the only way'. I linked their acceptance of the official texts to Stockholm syndrome, which I called the *linguistic Stockholm syndrome (LSS)* to show that, rather than challenge the government and criticise any of the policies, the Indigenous people felt they were better to stay on the side of the government. They preferred to show support for the government, maintaining a positive outlook as a strategy to get what they hoped for. Seen in this light, 'hopefulness' suggests an element of desperation, which highlights the hegemonic status of the dominant power perpetuated by the policies rendering the Indigenous community powerless.

The third key finding stems from the concept of *language ownership* within two opposing discourses found in the participants' narratives (Chapter 9). Although the participants spoke about their struggle with language loss, they gain power by reiterating that they are the legitimate speakers with linguistic and cultural capital who are able to share their languages with the wider (non-Indigenous) communities. This indicated that Indigenous language ownership could be shared between the Indigenous people and the non-Indigenous majority in Taiwan, and so could the responsibility for language revitalisation.

In order to see success in Indigenous language revitalisation, the community and the government need to work together to share the same goals, as well as the responsibilities of language revitalisation. But whose goal is to be shared is the moot point. How the top-down (government) efforts meet the bottom-up (Indigenous community) expectations is a constant negotiation. This study has highlighted the inseparable relationship between language ideology and political ideology, and provided a better understanding of the relationship between the government and local community. In so doing, the needs of the Indigenous communities have been better understood and more awareness has been raised for the language speakers to be able contest the dominant ideology.

11.3 The contribution to knowledge and significance of this study

This interdisciplinary study makes several contributions to a number of academic fields, namely, CDS, language policy, and Indigenous language revitalisation. Below, I list and elucidate my contribution to knowledge.

11.3.1 Critical Discourse Studies

For CDS, the application of the analytical tool 'grammar of purpose' to Chinese language policy documents was the first of its kind as I am not aware of this having been done previously. It therefore opens up more opportunities for CDS to be deployed. Moreover, for this study, the CDS framework encouraged the inclusion of the Indigenous voices as well as directing the attention of the analysis to showing how these voices interact with the policy discourse. The participants' discourse about Indigenous language revitalisation in Taiwan highlighted important aspects of the roles and responsibilities of Indigenous and non-Indigenous people. The use of linguistic analysis in the negotiation of language ownership is a good example that shows the advantage of

a CDS research design in going beyond the sentences to unpack what people actually mean, and it provides a model for the studies of language ownership in the future.

11.3.2 Language policy

With regard to the contribution to the study of language policy, the research reported in this thesis looked into the relationships between language ideology and political ideology. As Ricento (2014) pointed out, most political theorists are not language experts and they see language as an 'item' to be managed. However, language issues cannot simply be managed without examining the linguistic politics and the political motivation behind them. As Woolard & Schieffelin (1994) pointed out that language ideology is a set of politically loaded ideas about languages. By incorporating the theories of CDS, showcased by its detailed linguistic analysis of written data, this study investigated 'who does what to whom and how' and showed how government policies are considered *future actions*. This view thus held the government accountable for its decision-making.

In looking at how policy making could improve language revitalisation outcomes, in analysing the discourses I explored the role of *speakers* (native speakers, potential speakers and new speakers) of endangered languages, as I have demonstrated in my analysis on language ownership. Since language policies are geared to the language speakers, these policies (and policymakers) need to address 'who counts as speakers'. As the society progresses, the definition of speakers needs to be broadened or re-examined.

By drawing the attention to the *speakers,* I have also demonstrated that the assumptions in research on the top-down and bottom-up perspectives are not necessarily opposing each other and cannot simply be viewed as opposing discourses, which provides a platform for future studies that wish to look into this complex connection, as I have demonstrated in my thesis.

11.3.3 Indigenous language revitalisation

My decision to include Indigenous participants provided insight into studies about Taiwan's current Indigenous language policies and gave the Indigenous participants a voice. From the analysis of the Indigenous participants' interviews, I identified a reluctant acceptance of the policies through a fear of language loss, which resonated

with the term 'Stockholm syndrome', which I termed the Linguistic Stockholm Syndrome (LSS). My decision to draw on this term was based on the view that the participants seemed to convey a particular attitude identified in people who are captive against their will for a long time (see Chapter 9). The term LSS does not exist in the literature relating to Indigenous language revitalisation predating this study, and it challenges Indigenous studies that *reject* the dominant colonisation force ('de'-colonisation); instead, it shows a reluctant *acceptance* by Indigenous people, out of fear that their language revitalisation will be ignored if they do not pander to the government.

The term LSS shows the victim status of the Indigenous participants but, surprisingly, I felt this particular way of looking at this discourse empowered the participants to hold the government accountable, as the government's agency role is made clear in this perspective. That is, 'the government can help with (our) language revitalisation'. This angle also helps the participants to claim their language ownership. Although the concept of LSS implies the victim status of the participants, I suggest that, in fact, this is more of a strategy that they use whereby they seem to relinquish their power over language revitalisation to ensure the government's continuous support.

This new concept offers an alternative theoretical contribution to studies on Indigenous language revitalisation and offers the participants a way to contest and challenge the dominant ideology and provide insights into their struggle.

11.4 Reflection and limitations

In reflecting on this research and the journey I have taken in an effort to gain a better understanding of the connection between language policy and Indigenous language revitalisation in Taiwan, there are a number of things that I have learned along the way.

First, the interdisciplinary nature of this research required me to survey a broad range of literature but, because of the limitations of time and resources in conducting a doctoral thesis, it still leaves a number of areas open for further questioning and investigation. This includes a closer examination of the process of policy making and a field investigation of the policy implementation. Nevertheless, I was able to gather the information required for this study via a robust review of government documents,

websites, and academic literature. The participants' interviews also ensured that I had a good grasp of the policy implementation.

With regard to the interviews, I am deeply appreciative of the opportunity to conduct 11 interviews with the Indigenous people. These interviews enabled me to identify interesting insights and discourses surrounding language revitalisation. Needless to say, this group is not necessarily representative of the population and I do not claim that they should be viewed this way; rather, it reflects and represents a fragment of time and society, thus, adding value to the understandings of Indigenous studies in Taiwan. Also, I initially envisaged the participants' interview data to be secondary to the policy documents. However, as the investigation progressed, I realised the depth of the interview data deserved more attention. Consequently, the organisation of the analytical chapters reflects this decision. Despite their willingness and openness to talk, during the interviews, I felt many of the participants gave me the *textbook* responses in terms of their views on language revitalisation. This is perhaps due to their interest in my association with New Zealand and their level of education, as New Zealand Māori is perceived as a successful language revitalisation model by academics in Taiwan. Since all of the participants have obtained higher education, they would have read about New Zealand Māori language revitalisation in scholarly literature. In fact, one of the participants actually studied her Master's degree at a New Zealand University. This sample bias was due to using the snowball sampling method (Bryman, 2001) to select participants. I do not claim their comments and experiences are typical, but they show what is possible for Taiwan's Indigenous language revitalisation.

Reflecting on the methodology, it has not been easy to survey the ideology of the Indigenous participants and compare their narratives with the policy discourse. The configuration of themes and the interpretation of data is arguably the most time-consuming part of this process as there is no one way to interpret discourse data. As Fairclough (1992) clearly stated, "there are always alternative possible analysis of discourse samples" (p. 238). That is why a CDS analyst always gives alternative interpretations, counter-arguments and, on balance, makes sure the explanations are detailed and leave no features unexplained. Therefore, by using a CDS framework to unpack the ideology and power relations in the selected texts, it was possible to see the unrealised ways to overcome the obstacles identified. In addition, as the sole researcher, it would be unrealistic to say that my subjectivity could be totally avoided. To mitigate

this, I found Fairclough's five-stage approach, set out in Chapter 4, to be helpful in that it is a reflective process. In following this approach, my subjectivity was scrutinised. I have also demonstrated that a detailed linguistic analysis is a way to avoid the criticisms made about CDS researchers' subjectivity.

Finally, another limitation of my research was that, in December 2018, in the midst of my study, a new law 'The National Languages Development Act' was passed by Taiwan's Legislative Yuan. This Act came out after my data analysis timeframe, and while I decided to refer to its draft form in Chapter 3, I decided to keep the focus of my research on the specific laws and regulations within the timeframe that I had set for data inclusion. This demonstrates that language policies are constantly changing, as was the political environment.

11.5 Recommendations for future research

Based on the above reflection, it would be interesting to see how the discourse might have altered since the promulgation of the National Languages Development Act (2018), and whether the national identity discourse still exists. Also, future investigation of the *official ideology* could include newspapers, public debates, and other genres surrounding Indigenous language revitalisation in Taiwan. Future research may also involve a more representative group of Indigenous and non-Indigenous participants. As I have discussed, non-Indigenous people play a pivotal role in Indigenous language revitalisation. A non-Indigenous person's motivation to learn an Indigenous language is different from those with Indigenous heritage. I recognise there is a lack of research into the language ideology of non-Indigenous people who are learning Indigenous languages. Therefore, more exploration of the non-Indigenous language learner's motivation and language ideology would help us to establish a greater degree of understanding of Indigenous language revitalisation and to formulate appropriate policies and methods for language revitalisation. Finally, future research could build on the concept of LSS to apply to studies in other countries that have Indigenous or minority language revitalisation policies.

11.6 Concluding remarks

Personally speaking, before I started this journey into my doctoral studies, I was aware but not critical of the complexity of language issues in society (even with an applied

linguistics qualification). I came from a military Mandarin-Chinese speaking family, the so-called coloniser in Taiwan. My identity was assured by the language I spoke – Mandarin Chinese. But, unlike my grandparents and my father, I was not born in China, and I never felt a direct connection to the 'Chinese' identity. As a result, the Taiwanese-Chinese dichotomy has always played on my mind. Since embarking on this journey, I have become more mindful and critically conscious of language-related issues and the wider implications of these issues in societies. I have also redefined 'who I am' as a Taiwan-born, Chinese-speaking New Zealander. This is an exciting discovery for me on a personal level.

Being a non-Indigenous researcher doing Indigenous studies has its challenges. When I started this study, I felt like an 'outsider'. In 2019, I joined MAI-ki-Aronui, AUT's Māori and Indigenous PhD student support group. Despite not being Indigenous, MAI supported me as their own. Their *tautoko* (support) was encouraging. MAI's support strengthened my belief in the emancipatory aim of this study and that I would continue to pursue Indigenous language revitalisation one way or another. In 2019, UNESCO also launched the website for the International Year of Indigenous Languages (IYIL2019) (UNESCO, 2019). This event celebrated Indigenous languages and gave me the much-needed boost of positivity in this arduous journey.

I am proud of what I have achieved, and I have no hesitation to share the findings with others, to make people aware of the power relation embedded in the discourse and the perpetuation of domination by the dissemination of the discourse. I believe this study offers another layer of knowledge for language policy studies and Indigenous language revitalisation supported by a unique framework – CDS. As long as there is conflict in the world, there will always be power and domination to be critiqued by CDS analysts.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Ethics approval

AUTEC Secretariat

Auckland University of Technology
D-88, WU406 Level 4 WU Building City Campus
T: +64 9 921 9999 ext. 8316
E: ethics@aut.ac.nz
www.aut.ac.nz/researchethics

10 October 2017

Allan Bell
Faculty of Culture and Society

Dear Allan

Re Ethics Application: 17/340 A critical discourse study of Indigenous language revitalisation policy in Taiwan

Thank you for providing evidence as requested, which satisfies the points raised by the Auckland University of Technology Ethics Committee (AUTEC).

Your ethics application has been approved for three years until 10 October 2020.

Standard Conditions of Approval

1. A progress report is due annually on the anniversary of the approval date, using form EA2, which is available online through http://www.aut.ac.nz/researchethics.
2. A final report is due at the expiration of the approval period, or, upon completion of project, using form EA3, which is available online through http://www.aut.ac.nz/researchethics.
3. Any amendments to the project must be approved by AUTEC prior to being implemented. Amendments can be requested using the EA2 form: http://www.aut.ac.nz/researchethics.
4. Any serious or unexpected adverse events must be reported to AUTEC Secretariat as a matter of priority.
5. Any unforeseen events that might affect continued ethical acceptability of the project should also be reported to the AUTEC Secretariat as a matter of priority.

Non-Standard Conditions of Approval

1. Ensure that the Information Sheet advises on how the contact details have been obtained (via the local supervisor).

Non-standard conditions must be completed before commencing your study. Non-standard conditions do not need to be submitted to or reviewed by AUTEC before commencing your study.

Please quote the application number and title on all future correspondence related to this project.

AUTEC grants ethical approval only. If you require management approval for access for your research from another institution or organisation then you are responsible for obtaining it. If the research is undertaken outside New Zealand, you need to meet all locality legal and ethical obligations and requirements. You are reminded that it is your responsibility to ensure that the spelling and grammar of documents being provided to participants or external organisations is of a high standard.

For any enquiries, please contact ethics@aut.ac.nz

Yours sincerely,

Kate O'Connor
Executive Manager
Auckland University of Technology Ethics Committee

Cc: chienju.agi@gmail.com; philippa.smith@aut.ac.nz

研究計畫參與者須知

定稿日期：

2017 年 9 月 7 日

計畫名稱

A critical discourse study of Indigenous language revitalisation policies in Taiwan 。

台灣原住民族族語復興政策之批判論述分析

邀請函

您好，

我叫丁芊茹我是一個奧克蘭科技大學(Auckland University of Technology) 的博士生。我從台灣到紐西蘭已經 15 年了。 我的研究計畫是要探討台灣原住民語言復振跟語言政策的關聯。 本人很希望能够邀请到您以原住民的角度來探討政府的語言政策。

以下的訊息可以幫助您做決定是否願意參加我的研究。 這份研究對您個人的日常生活是不會有影響的,且您可以完全自由選擇是否參與。 所以如果您願意參與的話,請在閱讀完以下的訊息之後在*同意書*上簽名,謝謝。

我的研究目的為何？

雖然台灣政府設立了許多有關原住民語言的政策,但是這些政策到底有沒有效率和效果仍有待討論。 我的研究計畫是要探討台灣原住民語言復振跟語言政策之間的關聯。 這項研究是我博士論文中的一部分, 也將提高台灣原住民族語言振興的意識。因此這項研究將有利於台灣的原住民族。

為什麼選擇我以及邀請我來做研究?

會邀請您來參加這個研究的原因是 :

1. 您是原住民 。

2. 您年滿 18 歲。

3. 您願意跟我一起來探討原住民語言復興跟政府語言政策的觀點。

研究進行的方式的階段為何？

如果您願意參與的話, 請讓我知道, 我會跟您聯絡。 聯絡完之後我們會約在一個您認為適合的地點見面。 這個面談大概會需要 1-2 小時 。 在面談期間我會問一些 有關原住民語言跟台灣原住民語言政策的問題。 您可以自由的回答也可以隨時退出本研究。 這份研究中搜集來的資料只會用於研究論文等等的發表。且 會以匿名的方式來引用您的回覆。

研究的過程中會有讓我感覺到不舒服的地方嗎?

我們的面談應該是不會有讓您感覺到不舒服的地方。 採訪是採自願參加的方式進行。您不需要談論讓您感到不舒服的事情, 且如果有任何讓您感到不舒服的地方請讓我知道。

這份研究的受益者是誰?

雖然這份研究是我的博士論文的一部分, 我也希望我的研究能夠幫助台灣原住民語言復振。

您的隱私權如何受到保障?

您個人的資料將會保存在我這邊不會讓其他的人取得。 您的口述資料將會在奧克蘭科技大學(Auckland University of Technology) 保存 6 年。 只有我跟我的指導教授們會看到您的口述資料,而且指導教授們不會知道您的本名。 所以您的隱私權是完全受到保障的。

在我的論文中我會以'*原住民*' 來表示受訪者並不會用個人的名字來表示受訪者。 我也會以匿名的方式引用受訪者的回覆, 或是以數字跟性別來表示受訪者。 比如說'一號男性受訪者', 會寫成 '1M'。

請放心,您的參與完全是自願的。 您的訪談錄音將會在騰寫逐字稿後發回給您確認,如果您覺得有任何想要從中刪除的內容, 您可以告訴我。

如果您是張教授得學生, 張教授會將此*研究計畫參與者須知* 轉發給您。您可以選擇是否 參與。

這份研究對您會不會造成經濟上的負擔?

這份研究不會對您經濟上造成任何的負擔。

您有多少時間能夠考慮是否參與我的研究?

我將會在 11 月 7 號來到台灣, 請您在 10 月 25 號之前讓我知道您是否願意參加我的研究。請郵寄到 Chetin88@autuni.ac.nz。

如果我願意參與的話我該怎麼做呢?

您參與這項研究的決定是出於自願的（這是您的選擇), 您隨時可以退出。如果您選擇從研究中退出,您可將 1) 任何可識別為屬於您的資料刪除, 或 2) 允許研究人員繼續使用該資料。但是，一旦研究報告 完成，您的資料可能無法進行刪除。

如果您願意參與的話, 請在閱讀完這份 '*研究計畫參與者須知*' 之後, 在*同意書*上簽名。

研究完成後，我會收到這份研究的報告嗎?

如果您希望收到一份簡短的簡報, 請在*同意書*上打勾。

如有任何疑問, 請於下列方式連絡

以下是連絡人和聯絡方式:

指導教授:

Allan Bell 教授 allan.bell@aut.ac.nz +64-9- 921 9999 ext 9683

Philippa Smith 博士 Philippa.smith@aut.ac.nz

張慧端 副教授 huituan@nccu.edu.tw : +886-2-29393091 分機 51643 [國立政治大學]

訪問員:

丁芊茹(Chie-Ju Ting) Chetin88@autuni.ac.nz

若對本計畫的執行方式有疑慮,請來電奧克蘭科技大學道德委員會, 秘書長 (Executive Secretary of AUTEC) Kate O'Connor，ethics@aut.ac.nz，電話 921 9999 分機 6038。

我若是想了解更多關於本研究的信息，可以聯繫谁？

指導教授:

Allan Bell 教授 allan.bell@aut.ac.nz +64-9- 921 9999 ext **9683**

Philippa Smith 博士 Philippa.smith@aut.ac.nz

張慧端 副教授 huituan@nccu.edu.tw : +886-2-29393091 分機 51643 [國立政治大學]

訪問員: 丁芊茹(Chie-Ju Ting) Chetin88@autuni.ac.nz

研究人员聯絡方式

訪問員: Chie-Ju Ting .Chetin88@autuni.ac.nz

指導教授**聯絡**聯絡方式：

Allan Bell 教授 allan.bell@aut.ac.nz +64-9- *921 9999* 分機 *9683*

Philippa Smith 博士 Philippa.smith@aut.ac.nz

張慧端 副教授 huituan@nccu.edu.tw : +886-2-29393091 分機 51643 [國立政治大學]

或者是郵寄到–

Institute of Culture, Discourse and Communication
Auckland University of Technology
Level 11, AUT Tower
Corner of Wakefield and Rutland Street
Private bag 92006
Auckland 1142
New Zealand

奧克蘭科技大學道德委員會 (Auckland University of Technology Ethics Committee) 於 2017 年 10 月 10 日准予執行
AUTEC 文號： 17/340

Appendix 3: Participant information Sheet (English)

Participant Information Sheet

Date Information Sheet Produced:

   07 September 2017

Project Title

A critical discourse study of Indigenous language revitalisation policies in Taiwan .

   An Invitation

   Nín hǎo

   My name is Chien Ju Ting, I am a Taiwanese PhD student at Auckland University of Technology (AUT). I would like to invite you to take part in a study on Taiwan's Indigenous language revitalisation policy. This study intends to find out how the policy has influenced Indigenous language revitalisation in Taiwan. This research project is part of my PhD study. I am interested in how effective the language revitalisation policy is and how you feel about the policy in relation to Indigenous language use.

   This Participant Information Sheet will help you decide if you'd like to take part in the research. It sets out why I am doing the study, what your participation would involve, what the benefits and risks to you might be, and what would happen after the study ends.

   Your participation in this research is completely voluntary, and you can withdraw at any time. You are under no obligation to the person who provided your contact to me. You will not be disadvantaged in any way if you do not choose to participate in this research. Your participation is much appreciated and if you are happy to participate you will be asked to complete a Consent Form, which is attached to this Information sheet.

What is the purpose of this research?

   The Taiwanese government has established a great deal of laws and regulations to facilitate Indigenous language revitalisation in Taiwan. However, it is still uncertain whether these laws and regulations are accomplishing what they had promised to achieve. The purpose of this study is to understand what influence the Taiwanese Indigenous language revitalisation policies have on Indigenous language revitalisation and whether the policies are viewed as effective by the Indigenous communities. This study will create a greater awareness of Indigenous language revitalisation in Taiwan, thus, the study will benefit the Indigenous communities in Taiwan. Also, this research is part of my PhD study. The findings of the research will be presented in academic publications and conferences.

How was I identified and why am I being invited to participate in this research?

   You are invited to take part in the research because:

- You have had initial contact with me, either directly or through friends, to indicate your willingness to participate in this study.

- You are 'Indigenous'.

- You are over 18 years of age

- You have a strong interest in the Indigenous language situation in Taiwan

How do I agree to participate in this research?

Your participation in this research is voluntary (it is your choice) and whether or not you choose to participate will neither advantage nor disadvantage you. You are able to withdraw from the study at any time. If you choose to withdraw from the study, then you will be offered the choice between having any data that is identifiable as belonging to you removed or allowing it to continue to be used. However, once the findings have been produced, removal of your data may not be possible.

If you agree to participate in this research, you will need to complete the Consent Form attached. You can either hand me the Consent Form in person at the time of the interview or email me the completed consent form prior to the date of the interview.

What will happen in this research?

Prior to the meeting, I will contact you and arrange to meet at a public location that you nominate, such as a local cafe. I can travel to you at a time that is the most suitable for you.

During the interview, you will be asked some questions about Indigenous languages in Taiwan and how you feel about these languages. You will also be asked questions about the laws and regulations relating to Indigenous languages. The questions are open-ended, which means that you will be asked about why, and how you feel about certain things.

The interview is expected to last approximately 1-2 hour and will be recorded, and later transcribed. You can ask to pause, or stop the interview at any time.

What are the discomforts and risks?

No major discomfort or risk to you as a participant is anticipated, though, some people may feel uncomfortable in an interview situation. Please be reassured that you will not be forced to talk about anything that is uncomfortable to you.

How will these discomforts and risks be alleviated?

The interview will be conducted in a friendly manner. You will not be forced to talk anything that you are not comfortable with. We will start the interview once you feel ready. You are free to stop the interview at any time. The interview transcription will be sent back to you for you to feedback, comment and review. You can ask to remove information in the transcription that you do not want to share. You will not be identified by name in the interview and the transcription; therefore, you will remain anonymous to the supervisory team. Your participation will not disadvantage you financially, politically or socially in any way.

What are the benefits?

This is an important research that will benefit the Indigenous communities in Taiwan and raise language revitalisation awareness. This research is also part of my PhD study. I sincerely hope that his research will empower you to have your opinion and voice heard.

How will my privacy be protected?

Your contact information will be kept with me. The information regarding your participation will not be disclosed to anyone else. You will not be named in the transcription and in the interview, thus, the supervisory team will only know

you by the pseudonym given. This is to ensure that you don't feel pressured to participate in this study if you are concern about identifiable information.

In the final report, you will not be identified by name to protect your privacy. Although what you said may be quoted in the research paper, you will be identified by number and gender, for example 1M (number 1 male participant), or be given a pseudonym.

Your Consent From will be kept at my university for 6 years. After 6 years, all your personal data and information will be deleted.

Please be assured, that your participation is entirely voluntary. If you are Dr Chang's student, this information sheet may be distributed to you by her. Please be assured that your participation is voluntary. Your transcription will be sent back to you to comment and feedback, if you feel there is anything that you would like to remove from the study, you can tell me then.

What are the costs of participating in this research?

The only cost will be your time.

What opportunity do I have to consider this invitation?

You have one weeks to consider this invitation. As I will be travelling to Taiwan on 7 November 17, I would appreciate if you can let me know by 25 October 17 if you want to participate in the interview.

Will I receive feedback on the results of this research?

If you would like to receive information about this research, please indicate this on the Consent Form and I will send a summary to you.

What do I do if I have concerns about this research?

Any concerns regarding the nature of this project should be notified in the first instance to the :

Project Supervisors:

Dr Allan Bell allan.bell@aut.ac.nz +64-9-*921 9999 ext 9683*

Dr Philippa Smith Philippa.smith@aut.ac.nz

Dr Hiu-tuan Chang huituan@nccu.edu.tw : +886-2-29393091 ex. 51643

Researcher: Chie-Ju Ting Chetin88@autuni.ac.nz

Concerns regarding the conduct of the research should be notified to the Executive Secretary of AUTEC, Kate O'Connor, *ethics@aut.ac.nz* , +64-9-921 9999 ext 6038.

Whom do I contact for further information about this research?

Please keep this Information Sheet and a copy of the Consent Form for your future reference. You are also able to contact the research team as follows:

Researcher Contact Details:

If you have any questions please contact me, Chien-Ju Ting, on Chetin88@autuni.ac.nz

Supervisor details :

Dr Allan Bell allan.bell@aut.ac.nz +64- 9- *921 9999 ext 9683*

Dr Philippa Smith Philippa.smith@aut.ac.nz

Dr Hiu-tuan Chang huituan@nccu.edu.tw : +886-2-29393091 ex. 51643

Or by post to –

Institute of Culture, Discourse and Communication

Auckland University of Technology

Level 11, AUT Tower

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Project Supervisor Contact Details:

Dr Allan Bell allan.bell@aut.ac.nz +64-9- *921 9999 ext 9683*

Dr Philippa Smith Philippa.smith@aut.ac.nz

Approved by the Auckland University of Technology Ethics Committee on *10 October 2017*, AUTEC Reference number *17/340*

Appendix 4: Participant consent form (Chinese)

研究計畫參與同意書

計畫名稱

A critical discourse study of Indigenous language revitalisation policies in Taiwan .

台灣原住民族族語復興政策之批判論述分析

指導教授:

Allan Bell 教授; Philippa Smith 博士; 張慧端 副教授 (國立政治大學)

訪問員/研究員: 丁芊茹

○ 我已詳閱了定稿日期為 2017 年 9 月 7 日之"研究計畫參與者須知"所提供有關本研究計畫的信息內容。

○ 指導教授和研究人員已為我解釋說明了我有的問題。

○ 我了解我們面試的內容會被錄音,研究人員也會在現場做一些筆記。

○ 我了解我所說的話會在研究人員的學術報告中被引用,但是會以匿名的方式來用。

○ 我了解我隨時可以退出。 這份研究是自願的。 退出的時候對個人不會造成任何的不利。

○ 我同意參與本研究。

○ 是否希望收到本研究報告總結論(请勾选): 是○ 否○

        我希望以邮寄方式收到报: 是○ 否○

        我希望以電子郵件方式收到 是○ 否○

        *若您勾选 '是',请在下方填您的電子郵件或地址。

參與者簽名: ....

參與者全名: ....

參與者联系方式 :

....

....

....

日期 :

奧克兰理工大学道德委员会 (Auckland University of Technology Ethics Committee)

于 2017 年 8 月 1 日准予执行

AUTEC 文号: 17/248

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Appendix 5: Interview Questions

The interview questions are open-ended, followed by probing questions. This list is for the researcher only.

Themes	Questions	probing and follow-up questions	Rationale
A) Basic information	**Can you tell me a little bit about yourself?**	*Name (optional)* *Tribe* *Age* *Education* *Job* *Fluency (can you speak the language?)*	To ease into the interview process, the interview will start with questions that are the most factual and easy to answer for the interviewees. Also, the background questions will be of further use for the analysis of language attitude, value and ideology.
B) Language experience	**Can you tell me about your upbringing? What opportunities did you have to use your heritage language?**	- *Where did you grow up? (city , reserved land)* - *Where do you live now? Do you visit the tribe often? Do you participate in any of the traditional practice (what are they ?), i.e. hunting ?* - *Can you describe your upbringing in terms of language use, e.g. did you use your heritage language at home or in school? Why ?* • *Did you/do you have anyone around you that you can speak the language with?*	This section aims to elicit the user's language experience. The speakers' physical location, as well as the people around them, are all relevant factors that influence their language experiences.
C) Identity & language D) Attitude (language ideology)	**What does your mother-language mean to you? How do you feel about your language?**	• *Do you think you have to speak Atayal (or other tribal languages) to be Ataya, and why?* • *Do you teach your children Atayal? Or, Will you encourage your children to speak Atayal (in public or in private, and why)? What occasions would you use Atayal ?* • *If there is a language course, would you attend (to learn and/or to teach) ? why? Do you have to be fluent to speak? What about broken grammar or a mix of Chinese and Indigenous language?*	This section is designed to see the link between identity and language. This section wants to find out whether the users have essentialist ideas or indexical connections with their languages. This section is also linked the section (E) which aims to understand how the users feel about the language.

E) Language Status	What are some of the most important issues facing Indigenous people at the moment? In your opinion, in what occasions/ situations should the language be used?	• Is language revitalisation an important issues for Indigenous people? - Some people say Indigenous language should be 'home language', what do you think about this ? Where should the language used?	This section aims to understand the perceived status of the language (including users' language ideology and attitudes toward their languages). This section is linked to the section above, some questions may overlap.
	Do you see being able to speak an Indigenous language and advantage or a benefit in life and why?	- What about English? (Do you think English is more important?)	
F) Language Responsibility	Who is responsible for language revitalisation, and why? Who should learn the language?	• The government. • Families and communities. • The education system. • Linguists • Individuals themselves. Do you think it's better to use (heritage language) with (heritage language speaker)? Would you use (heritage language) with other people. Why, why not? - Indigenous people (adult or kids, teachers ...), linguists, Chinese, anyone ?	This section tries to understand, from the language users' viewpoint, who is the main *agent* of language revitalisation.
G) Pre-conception of the policy	Can you tell me anything that you think has changed in the last 20 years in terms of language use?	At home , work , or school .	This section provides the researcher background understanding of the implementation of the policies. Also see below (H)
	Do you know any laws and regulations relating to Indigenous people and their languages?	What's your opinion on this? What is the government attitude towards the languages (in your opinion)?)	
H) Perception of policy	Please have a look at the listed laws and regulations below, do you recognise any? If you do, can you tell me briefly what you know about them and how this has impacted on your language skills, or	- Can you see any implementation of these laws? - Can you remember any consultation process took place?	This section is a follow-up section from (G). This sections aims to understand the more about the participant's' perception of the policy efficacy, to see how the policy is received by the language users.

		anything relating to 'language'.		
		Do you know about the tribal language skill certification?	*What do you think about that? Does it help Indigenous languages? why ? Do you have this certificate yourself ? Has it helped you ?*	
		Do you know anything that has been done locally in terms of language use (in your tribe)?	*e.g. classes, teacher training, etc ? if so, do you think government policy made it happen ? or is there other factors ? Have you heard about any bottom-up policy ?*	
		What do you think is the most important thing that should be included in the policy?		
I)	Language Ideology	What is 'language revitalisation' to you? What does it mean to you and your family? What would you like to see happen in the future for your mother-tongue?		These questions are to round up the interview and to elicit more about future aspiration the participants have.
J)	Ending question	**Is there anything else you can tell me about this matter?**		

Please note : The interview questions were not required to be translated into written Chinese as the researcher was able to speak in Chinese during the interview and the participants were not asked to view the questions. But the participants were shown extracts from the laws and regulations in Chinese set out in Appendix 6.

Appendix 6: Policy extracts shown to the participants during the interviews

原住民族教育法 第 5 條 Education Act for Indigenous Peoples Article 5	各級政府應採積極扶助之措施，確保原住民接受各級各類教育之機會均等，並建立符合原住民族需求之教育體系。 Governments at all levels shall proactively endorse the implementation of an equitable education system that addresses the specific needs of Indigenous Peoples, as well as actively take appropriate measures to ensure their equitable access to all levels and forms of education that shall be delivered to Indigenous students in culturally and linguistically appropriate classroom settings.
原住民族教育法 第 10 條 Education Act for Indigenous Peoples Article 10	原住民族地區應普設公立幼兒園、非營利幼兒園、社區或部落互助教保服 務中心，提供原住民幼兒教保服務之機會， Public preschools, non-profit preschools, community and tribal cooperative early childhood learning centres shall be well established and spread far and wide across Indigenous Peoples' regions, so as to provide opportunities for Indigenous children to receive early childhood learning services.
原住民族教育法 第 14 條 Education Act for Indigenous Peoples Article 14	高級中等以下學校於原住民學生就讀時，均應實施民族教育；其原住民學 生達一定人數或比例時，應設立民族教育資源教室，進行民族教育及一般 課業輔導。 Schools at senior high school level and below shall all provide ethnic education while Indigenous students are enrolled there; when the Indigenous student population within the school reaches a set number or proportion, an ethnic education resource classroom shall be set up for ethnic education and general academic counselling purposes.

原住民族教育法 第 22 條 Education Act for Indigenous Peoples Article 22	各級各類學校有關民族教育之課程發展及教材選編，應尊重原住民之意見，並邀請具原住民身分之代表參與規劃設計. For the purposes of planning, designing, developing, editing and compiling teaching material and culturally based curriculum / curricula for Indigenous-specific Education, educational institutions of all types at all levels shall respect the views of Indigenous Peoples through actively seeking Indigenous Persons' participation and representation at all levels throughout their decision-making processes in this regard.
原住民族教育法施行細則 The Enforcement Rules of the Education Act for Indigenous Peoples Article 7 & 10	本法第十四條第一項所定實施民族教育，以採多樣化方式，以正式授課為原則，並輔以相關課程及其他與原住民族文化有關之教育活動. 第 7 條 The Indigenous peoples ethnic education provided in EAIP Section 14 paragraph 1should be diversified, formal education, as a rule. Related subjects and other education activities relevant to Indigenous peoples ethnic culture may be taught as supplementary subjects, Indigenous peoples ethnic education resource classroom stated in EAIP Section 14 paragraph 1should be established as independent units; organization of integrated classrooms with neighbouring schools may be effected if necessary. 第 10 條 各級各類學校依本法第二十二條第一項規定發展民族教育之課程及選編教材時，得以舉辦公聽會、研討會、問卷調查、實地訪問等方式為之.

	Article 10
	Schools, as provided in EAIP Section 20, should respect the opinion of Indigenous peoples during Indigenous peoples ethnic education curriculum development and textbook selection, therefore the government should hold public hearings, seminars, questionnaire surveys, and interviews for said purpose.
原住民族語言發展法 第 8 條 Indigenous Language Development Act Article 8	中央及地方主管機關應積極於家庭、部落、工作場所、集會活動及公共場所推動使用原住民族語言，以營造原住民族語言使用環境。 The central and local competent authority shall actively promote the use of Indigenous languages in families, tribes, workplaces, gatherings, and public spaces to create environments for the use of Indigenous languages.
Article 22	前項原住民族語老師資格及聘用辦法，由中央教育主管機關會同中央主管機關定之。 The central competent education authority shall train teachers of Indigenous languages, and assist the competent authority of special municipality and county(city) to employ Indigenous language teachers. The employment shall be full-time in principle. The qualification and employment method of teachers of Indigenous languages specified in the preceding item shall be determined by the central competent education authority in conjunction with the central competent authority.
原住民族語言發展法 第 18 條	中央主管機關、中央教育主管機關、中央衛生福利主管機關及直轄市、縣（市）主管機關，應提供原住民嬰幼兒學習原住民族語言之機會。

	The central competent authority, central competent education authority, central competent health and welfare authority, and the competent authority of special municipality and county(city) shall provide the opportunity for Indigenous infants and children to study Indigenous languages.
6 年計畫第二期 6- year plan for language revitalisation stage 2	國民小學全族語教學實驗班 Language immersion classes in elementary schools 原住民族語言由「口說語言」發展到「書寫語言」，事涉語言學有關「語音」、「構詞」及「語法」之知識。必須學習並養成習慣，才可以促進語言書寫之標準化及規範化. The Indigenous languages have developed from 'oral tradition' to 'written languages', this process involves linguistic knowledge relating to the 'phenetics', 'syntax', and 'grammar'. We mush study it, in order to promote the standardisation.

Appendix 7: Letter from a certified translator

To whom it may concern,

This is Dr Wei Teng. I am a holder of NZSTI[1] affiliate membership (Membership no: 1309), a NAATI[2] certified Provisional Interpreter (Practitioner ID: CPN3YM01L), and a practicing translator and interpreter (English and Mandarin Chinese). I am also a lecturer of translation and interpreting studies at the University of Canterbury, and have published a number of academic journal articles and book chapters on translation studies, and contrastive analysis between English and Mandarin Chinese. I am writing this letter to verify that the translation by Chien Ju Ting for her PhD thesis is true and correct to the Chinese original.

Kindly regards,

Wei Teng

11/01/2021

[1]NZSTI stands for New Zealand Society of Translators and Interpreters

[2]NAATI stands for National Accreditation Authority for Translators and Interpreters

Appendix 8: Example NVivo nodes

Nodes for 'discourse on hope'

Name of nodes	Description
General education & Ethnic education	Any mention about general education and ethnic education
Culture v.s. language	Use of language that indicates a separation between language and culture (i.e. I am a culture teaching not a language teacher)
Feel sorry for the government	Use of language that shows sympathise towards the government's efforts.
Agree with the government	Justify for and/or agree with the choice of the government.
Praise the government	Talk positively about the government's efforts (must contain the speech act of praise).
Self-doubt (negative feelings about oneself)	Showing uncertainty about one's comment, (questioning oneself), or showing unworthiness of the self
Extreme negativity	Overtly unhopeful about the government or the languages.
Self-blame	Saying its one's own fault (for anything).
Blaming others	Saying its someone's fault (for anything).
Odd and inconsistent statements	Talk oneself out of the initial position; inconsistency in the statements.
Victimhood	Showing the self as a 'victim'.
I cannot speak the language	Any mention about not fluent in the language.

Appendix 9: Full list of Rang structure 2

S1 (2008 – 2013)	S2 (2014-2019)
) Taiwan to stand on its two feet +rang +our Indigenous friends + stand on their two feet first 台灣要站起來，就要讓原住民朋友先站起來 Taiwan to step out +rang + our Indigenous friends + to step our first 台灣要走出去，就必需讓原住民先走出去 (p.3)	(5) Establish language learning environment for infant + rang + infants + acquired language skills. 　　若在幼兒時期營造全族語的學習環境，可以讓幼兒自然而然具備族語聽、說能力 (p.6)
) Create camps + rang + Indigenous people living outside the tribes + establish a sense of belonging. 讓久居外地的族人，能透過參與此「生活體驗營」，回到原鄉，建立起對本族群之認同感 (p.14)	(6) Democracy & multicultural understanding helps with language protection policies +rang+ Indigenous language + more accessible. 惟在推動民主化的過程中，也使得社會上大多數人對不同民族的語言文化更為尊重與包容，讓尊重不同民族文化成為民主的基本素養，而這樣一種多元文化觀念的養成，有助於政府推動各項政策保障弱勢之民族語言，並讓營造族語無障礙空間的可能性，將大大的提高。
	(7) Strengthen infant immersion school + rang + infant, children and adults + has appropriate channels for learning Indigenous languages 並強化「學齡前族語沈浸式學習」的推動，讓學齡前、學校教育及成人再學習等不同階段，都有相對應的管道來學習族語 (p.11)
	(8) Digital platform + rang + different learners + easy access to learning materials 以及建構「族語語料資源整合平台」、「數位學習網」等，讓不同學習者可便利的使用各種學習教材 (p.12)
	(9) Language nannies are required to use the mother tongue + rang + infants + language immersion and language learning 要求保母使用族語與嬰幼兒互動，讓嬰幼兒沈浸在族語環境中，自然學會族語 (p.35)
	(10) Create camps + rang + Indigenous people living in outside the tribes + **establish a sense of belonging.** 讓久居外地的族人，能透過參與此「生活體驗營」回到原鄉，建立起對本族群之認同感(p.36)
	(11) Strengthen church's function on language preservation + rang+ Indigenous people + learn the language at church

補助原住民教會推動族語根計畫，除強化教會對語言保存與發展的功能外，讓族人在教會中亦有機會學習族語。

(12) Establish open teaching resource platform + rang +people interested in compiling teaching material + exchange information, compile and edit materials
委託機關或民間團體建置開放式族語教材編輯平台，讓有興趣編輯族語教材的人，可透過此平台交流及編輯 (p.36)

(13) Establish multimedia platform + rang + more people + learn Indigenous languages
並建置影音平台開放 在網路上播放，讓更多人可透過便利的網路資源輕鬆學習族語(p.37)

(14) Language skills certification +rang + people that gained the certification + offer training so they can teach the languages
辦理「原住民族語言能力認證合格人員研習」，讓通過族語能力認證考試者，配合其個人專長及興趣，提供其參加族語師資培訓之機會，使其在熟悉族語語言結構，並學習族語教學原理及技巧後，成為族語籌備師資、或在部落或社區大學教授族語、或至國中小支援族語教學，以發揮其所長及所學 (p.38)

(15) Teacher development classes + rang + student teachers + strengthen knowledge in language teaching
提供班級經營、教案撰寫、教學方法、教學技巧、製作並靈活運用教具等專業 課程，讓學員可透過長時間、有階段性的學習過程，強化有關族語教學的專業知 (p.39)

(16) Change attitude + rang + Indigenous people + engage in the operation of this Plan
唯有具體改變族人對語言的態度，形成強烈的「族語意識」，讓族人積極參與本 計畫之執行，才有可能在有限的經費資源下，達到最大的族語復振成效(p.43)

(17) Strengthen language preservation and transmission +rang + language + continue development (of language)
持續強化原住民族語言「保存」與「傳承」的各項復振工作，逐步朝向活化原住民族語言，讓族語可以「永續發展」的目標邁進 (p.48)

(18) Promote and establish learning channels + rang +
learners of different ability + easy to learn
建立系統化的族語學習管道，強化學齡前沈浸式族語

學習的推廣，不止提供讓不同族語能力者便利學習的

機會，亦落實族語學習下紮根的力度與深度 (p.50)。

(19) promote language skills certification + rang + tests +
convenient (accessible)
推動原住民族語言能力認證分級考試，讓族語測驗更

具便利性 (p.50)