Service Shitshows Delivery Prevention: Live-Action Role-Playing (LARP) Bad Service

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Frontline service workers and/or their supervisors delivering clearly inaccurate, bad, and/or unlawful service to customers or other "persons of interest" (POI) that causally precedes negative outcomes is one category of shitshow service-failure performance. The study presents both case studies and findings from national data showing that shitshow service enactments by performing professional public servants (PPSs) occur daily and more frequently in the U.S. than in other economically developed nations. Substantial case evidence supports the view that shitshow performances readily occur even when service protagonists have decades of job experience and/or have trained newly hired professional public servants. "Professional public servants" (PPS) includes employees working in various government agencies, departments, and branches (e.g., clerks in a branch of the U.S. Postal Service, a frontline service provider in a state department of motor vehicles, public libraries, and local/state/federal police officers). This study proposes "LARP" (i.e., live-action role-playing) by PPSs as actors with protagonists, POI (i.e., "person of interest"), and additional collaborative roles) in face-to-face enactments in recorded, actual shitshow performances (i.e., the psychological equivalent of a live virus immunization) provides the emotional heat needed to help prevent subsequent real-life shitshow reenactments.

Keywords: civil rights, emotion, First Amendment, LARP, POI, professional public service, shitshow, training

INTRODUCTION

In the relevant literature, “live-action role-play (LARP)” is a participatory art form defined by its participatory nature. Traditionally, LARPs include no audience and performing a LARP is not usually recorded. Rather, traditionally LARP is experienced exclusively performed in first-person enactments. Instead of a script, LARPs use guidelines and constraints for direction (Harviainen, 2007a, 2007b; Jonsson et al., 2006; Linssen et al. 2014; Mackay, 2021; Petterson, 2014). Participating in meetings and reenacting battles in the U.S. Civil War (1861-1865) is an adaptive example of this category of LARP—frequently identified as a “Nordic LARP” that features collaboration, minimal rules, and artistic expression. Although LARP applications in Nordic countries are principally constructed/enacted for entertainment, the art form resembles scenario-based training adaptable to authentic tasking exercises (e.g., Harding, 2007; Linssen et al., 2014).

The case-study videos in the present research are quite different from the Nordic games’ versions of LARPs. In the study here LARP research includes video/audio recordings when possible of real-life or “on-stage” dramatic enactments of mainly face-to-face encounters of professional (most frequently public) service providers (i.e., “PPS = professional public servant”), and one or more “persons of interest” (POI), and sometimes additional persons in the context/scene, whereby none, one, or more of these persons know the enactment is being recorded. This study advances knowledge, theory, and empirical findings on the natural/pervasive growth in the frequency and severity of shitshow performances by professional public servants and, in some instances, by POIs. The essay here contributes by explaining why policies designed to prevent service shitshows frequently fail. Having PPSs perform staged dramas as active “live” participants in such LARP encounters may improve trainees’ memory recall and activate skills in trainees to prevent PPS-POI meetings from escalating into major service shitshows. Thus, the study here proposes enacting service shitshows in drama/stage enactments rather than in real-life contexts and describes how real-life frequently occurring shitshows by frontline service workers and their supervisors might be attenuated. Private firms who manage to acquire video-recordings of service shitshows performances on their properties (e.g., KGW, 2021; Klint, 2018) have the opportunity of converting these recordings into scripts/plays and include in performing such shitshows in their staff training programs to learn/practice conversations and behaviors to avoid engaging in with customers.

The following example video of the talk and physical, hands-on interaction between a “person of interest” (POI) and a “professional public servant” (PPS) (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZDK50CE0qfE) includes a real-life, live-action role-playing by civil rights activist, Jeff Gray, who is the POI, as well as a highly experienced LARP performer, who provides complimentary training to police officer LT Furr, the PPS. The example videos in the present study elaborate and describe evidence supporting its fundamental proposition (P1): turning up the emotional heat via LARP training-drama productions of prior shitshow enactments having occurred in real-life contexts with PPSs engaging in actors’ roles increases their memory-retrieval skills and communication skills necessary for preventing subsequent, future, real-life, public-service, shitshow performances. Available empirical evidence supporting this proposition is scarce, but the studies that exist and advances in field experimentation provide useful guidelines for the way forward. This essay later details Gray and Furr’s encounter and its outcomes.

METHOD

This study reviews LARP video cases, principally of three highly experienced U.S. civil rights auditors: Phillp Turner (AKA “the Battousai”), Jeff Gray, and “SeanPaul” Reyes. These and additional civil right auditors “partial-LARP” enactments include the auditor going into field settings/contexts (i.e., real-life locations and in the “time, place, and manner” where members of the public are legally able to access public places without special permission (e.g., on public sidewalks, in publicly-owned buildings, in public libraries, U.S. Post Offices, lobbies of government buildings during ”normal hours of operation”). Typically, a civil rights auditor does not announce to anyone that he/she is performing an audit or why they are video/audio recording other than (in some instances) stating, “I am an independent journalist; I am doing a story of what public officials and other people do in public spaces.”

In the United States and most other developed nations, video/audio recording in public in public contexts is legal. No explanation is required to provide to anyone. No announcement needs to be made to video-record in public (i.e., "there is not legal expectation of privacy in public," see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 1967), and making a recording can legally be done unobtrusively subject to relatively minor time, place, and manner restrictions (e.g., being in a lobby in a public building during regular office hours and standing aside of the flow of walking traffic while video recording is a U.S. Constitution First Amendment right. Such civil-rights performance-audits are being enacted because of widespread evidence of civil rights violations by PPSs occurring daily in many locations and all States in the USA—

the review of 254 of these videos for the present study supports the conclusion that the majority (87%) of the PPS-POI real-life actual enactments include unlawful behavior by PPSs. The substantial majority of enactments include the POI informing the PPS that the PPS is violating his/her civil rights, including explicitly describing the specific civil rights being violated. After being informed of unlawful behavior, two-thirds of the enactments include PPSs continuing to commit the unlawful directives and/or behavior.

In many contexts, professional public servants and/or frontline service workers in private service firms and/or their supervisors delivering clearly inaccurate, bad, and/or unlawful service to customers or specific "persons of interest (POI) that is a causally antecedent to negative outcomes are two category of "shitshow" service-failure performances." Woodside et al. (2020) provide several private-firm service worker and customer interactions video-case studies supporting of this observation. Most of the case studies reported in the present study focus on professional public servants (PPSs) rather than service workers in private enterprises.

Jeff Gray Provides Anti-Shitshow Training to LT Arick Furr

The following real-life account (i.e., nonfiction report) is an example of a preventable, moderately severe, professional public service failure (i.e., a PPS-driven shitshow). On January 22, 2022, Jeff Gray, a "person of interest" (POI) and highly-experienced civil rights activist, was handcuffed by police Lieutenant (LT) Arick Furr outside the Alpharetta, Georgia, City Hall and office of the mayor for allegedly "panhandling". Jeff Gray's Fourth amendment (appearing in the U.S. Constitution) rights against unwarranted seizures were violated, and so were his First amendment rights to free speech, free press, and freedom of religion. The following report is a brief story-summary of what happened. This shitshow enactment was video/audio recorded by the POI (i.e., Jeff Gray)—a practice occurring with increasing frequency because local governments increasingly require PPS police officers to wear/activate a body camera anytime they interact with POIs. This case study is unusual/rare because the Alpharetta Police Department "Internal Affairs" completed an investigation/report on the Furr-Gray encounter; this report is available and supports the conclusion that a shitshow was enacted.

Here are details from a news report that includes clips from Jeff Gray's video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7SuPFEdAKaw. Jeff Gray (2023a, 2023b), wearing a black hoody sweater and shorts, was holding a small sign (poster) that he stated orally to persons walking by "God Bless Homeless Vets" while standing on the front steps of Alpharetta's (city in the State of Georgia, USA) city hall. Earlier, a woman rushed by him, entered the city hall building, and a second person shortly thereafter told Jeff Gray, "There is no panhandling here, sir!" Inside the city hall building, these two persons separately told police lieutenant (LT) Arick Furr that someone was panhandling outside on the front steps of city hall. Then, LT Furr "entered the scene" (came on the landing and steps before the front doors of city hall) and immediately confronted Jeff Gray with the following words, "Come here!" "You have to leave.." Jeff Gray responded, "Excuse me?" "I have a Constitutional right to be here, and I am not leaving." LT Furr asked Jeff Gray to produce identification (i.e., his driver's license), "Give me your ID." At first, Jeff Gray declined based on his (accurate) knowledge there was no reasonable articulable suspicion of a crime (as is necessary in the U.S. to legally require compliance to an ID request from a police officer). When Jeff Gray refused to either provide ID or leave the premises, citing his First Amendment rights to freedom of speech, freedom of religion and freedom of assembly at a traditional public forum, LT Furr grabbed Jeff Gray's arm and hand-cuffed Jeff Gray

behind Gray's back and proceeded with an illegal non-consensual search (a violation of Gray's civil rights provided by the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).

Immediately thereafter LT Furr noticed Gray's camera recording the scene with the camera positioned on the seat of a nearby bench. Then, Lt. Furr moved to the camera, turned it away from the scene, and turned it off while Gray objected to these actions. LT Furr then placed the camera in Jeff Gray's pocket (unlawful actions that prevent freedom of the press provided by the First Amendment in the U.S. Constitution).

LT Furr appears to act in a highly emotional state and via hearsay, neglects to do his own investigation or allow for an amicable discussion with Jeff Gray. His immediate demand that the person of interest (POI) leave the grounds for "trespassing" escalated the situation and resulted in multiple civil rights violations. Later, the "Internal Affairs" (IA) investigative report of the Furr service shitshow enactment resulted in LT Furr being suspended for three-days without pay for being in violation of department policy, the law, and the U.S. Constitution—the Internal Affairs report required LT Furr to complete specific actions for additional training in how to perform face-to-face interactions with POIs and for LT Furr to present lectures on what he has learned from this experience. Some of the details in the IA investigation report are stated verbatim here:

> LT Furr's interaction with Mr. Gray did not present patience, resolve or proper investigative steps. LT Furr giving an order at the beginning of the interaction exacerbated the situation and interrupted the opportunity for investigating or amicable discussion. The department's PRIDE [*Thin Blue Line*, 2016] model of decision making recommends the use of time to investigate situations where there is no immediate danger. After Mr. Gray is detained, LT Furr enters his [Gray's] pocket to retrieve his driver's license. *Department policy, Encountering the Suspicious Person 05-05-04 Paragraph A, Investigative Detention: The brief detention of a person to investigate suspicion of criminal activity. The officer should: based upon his/her senses, experience and good judgment, have articulable reasons to support the suspicion. The person's outer garments may be frisked if the officer believes weapons are involved.* There is no apparent justification for LT Furr's manipulation of the camera. After he manipulated the camera, LT Furr said he knows that he should not have manipulated the camera and should have allowed the camera to continue to record." LT Furr said he was frustrated by Mr. Gray and his actions. (These verbatim statements in the IA report are available in the relevant cited videos.)

After obtaining Gray's driver's license, LT Furr called-in Gray's license number and learned that Gray had no outstanding warrants for his arrest. LT Furr then returned the driver's license to Jeff Gray. LT Furr's seizure of this driver's license was a violation of the Fourth Amendment in the U.S. Constitution—this amendment protects citizens from arbitrary or unwarranted searches and seizures by law enforcement. At the end of their meeting, Gray asks LT Furr if he (Gray) can stay and continue to what he was doing. LT Furr responded, "No, you have to leave." Up to the time of the interaction with Jeff Gray, LT Furr was a professional training officer in Alpharetta, training new police officers on how to interact with POIs.

The corrective and follow-up actions that were prescribed by the police Internal Affairs (IA) report included: "Taking all facts and circumstances into account LT Furr will be suspended without pay for 3 administrative days (8 hours per day/24 working hours). LT Furr will provide on-duty and in-service training to the rest of the organization regarding the he lessons learned from this interaction." Subsequently, Jeff Gray sued LT Furr and the City of Alpharetta, Georgia, in federal court for civil rights violations committed on him. Lambert (2024) reports on the final resolution of this shitshow, "Alpharetta, **Georgia, the** city in Georgia, will change its free speech policies and pay $55,000 to settle a lawsuit, more than two years after police arrested a (U.S. Army) veteran for allegedly panhandling. Lambert (2024) further reports, "Another officer "joined in the detention" and "interrogated and berated Gray before eventually releasing him" without charges, according to the lawsuit. But when he tried to resume his sign-holding, police again asked [sic: told] him to leave, and Gray complied. With the help of the nonprofit "*Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE),"* Gray sued the city of Alpharetta in 2023.

The city settled, agreeing to change its policies and pay $55,000. Most of that [i.e., the money] will go to Gray, while a portion will pay his lawyers. "Alpharetta officers tried to run [Gray] out of town because they thought holding a sign was disorderly conduct," FIRE attorney Adam Steinbaugh said in a statement. They'll think twice next time." The city must also provide "two hours of First Amendment training" to each officer per year in 2024 and 2025. The training will mostly focus on freedom of speech and its relationship with assembly rights, the right to record police activity, the use of profanity toward officers [while speaking profanities to officers is legal, Gray spoke no profanities in interacting with the two officers] and refusals to answer officers' questions [not answering a legal non-activity as stated by the Fifth Amendment], according to the settlement.

Additional details of the video recordings relating to Jeff Gray and LT Arick Furr's meeting are available for viewing via Youtube.com at the following website link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pU8fQNiwV78 (arrest video and IA report). For the best sound quality and further details open the following website link: Georgia city to pay $55,000, train officers on free speech after veteran arrested for 'panhandling' | FOX 5 Atlanta. Figure 1 is a photograph of Jeff Gray holding his sign in his context of "presentation-of-self in everyday life" (Goffman, 1959) in city halls, public sidewalks, and other public places when visiting U.S. towns and cities in his testing of members of the public and police officers' observances/violations of his civil rights.

Gray's fieldwork represents a category of "mystery shopper" research (Wilson, 1998, 1998) of public and private service enactments. Figure 2 is a photograph of Jeff Gray and LT Furr with Gray immediately after Furr handcuffed Gray as they walk toward the camera on the bench in front of Alpharetta City Hall. Jeff Gray reports that ninety percent of the more than 150 enactments of him holding his "God Bless Homeless Vets" sign in public spaces generate service shitshow enactments by professional public servants. Created for the present study, Figure 3 shows a "storyboard" including stick figures of persons and distinct scenes, verbal lines (talk), and acts of the Gray-Furr meeting and subsequent events.


Creating storyboards is a useful step in converting real-life PPS-POI meetings/interactions into larp training-exercise stories. Note that the "emotional heat timeline in Figure 3 quickly goes up and stays high during the face-to-face interaction between Jeff Gray and LT Furr and subsequent meetings.

Would LT Furr's first-words to Jeff Gray (i.e., "Come here!" and "You have to leave!") differ if he had played the role that he enacted with Gray in a prior LARP training drama? In comparison, Jeff Gray had prior deep experience in participating in such meetings—though Gray reports that he always feels high emotional heat when a PPS "goes hands-on" and handcuffs click on his wrists behind his back.

FIGURE 1
JEFF GRAY HOLDING HIS SIGN




FIGURE 2
JEFF GRAY HANDCUFFED WITH LT FURR



A key point: based on the First and Fourth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, Jeff Gray had his rights to freedom of the press, assembly, and religious practice (the First Amendment), and the right to privacy (Fourth Amendment) violated by LT Furr, since Gray was not violating laws on the steps of city hall, and thus, Gray had the right to be left alone if a police officer has no "reasonable articulable suspicion of a crime" had occurred or "reasonable articulable suspicion that a crime" will occur. Typically, as in the Furr/ Gray video and in his private, self-lead investigations, Jeff Gray informs the professional public servant (e.g., LT Furr)—who approaches and tells Gray that he must leave—of his (Gray's and all citizens' First Amendment rights)—including the rights of assembly, press, and religion while standing and greeting each passerby with his message when in a "traditional public forum" (i.e., a public space).

In 80 percent of the more than 100 video case studies reported by Jeff Gray, the professional public servants in these episodes enact the following protocol lines, "We have had calls that you asked for money and you can't do that", "You have to leave", and "Show me your ID [driver's license]" in response to Gray's responses about having the First and Fourth amendment rights to do what he was doing and not to provide his ID (i.e., not to surrender "his papers"). "He baited me," is the most frequent viewpoint of public servants in the majority of these cases. When these case studies include follow-up interviews of professional public servants engaging in these and additional more severe service shitshows (i.e., identified as being severe when a POI is handcuffed and/or or thrown to the ground, see Figure 3) and/or when the POI is unlawfully Tazed or shot-and-killed with a firearm. Jeff Gray's response to this charge, "I asked no one to approach me, I informed the professional public servants who did approach me that I have Constitutional rights to do what I am doing, and I requested to be left alone. I never asked anyone for money; I did not bait anyone." The following website link includes excerpts from two additional case studies of the live-action, real-life role performances by Jeff Gray as a POI and public servants: https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=Bqjhquj4Exc&t=2s.

FIGURE 3
STORYBOARD TIMELINE ILLUSTRATION OF THE JEFF GRAY AND LT FURR DRAMA



The case-based example illustrate some of these actions. First, the opening case summary of the service shitshow performance by LT Furr enacting service with POI Jeff Gray includes mention in the Internal Affairs investigative report that LT Furr was frustrated by Jeff Gray's actions—implying that Jeff Gray's warnings to LT Furr triggered LT Furr—Jeff Gray informed LT Furr that he (Gray) should be left alone because his actions were constitutionally protected rights being done at a traditional public forum. Clearly, Gray's response to Furr's directives surprised Furr and led him to unlawfully demand that Gray hand over his ID, a demand Gray denies, leading to Gray's arrest by Furr. LT Furr implies to the IA investigators that Gray is at fault in triggering (i.e., baiting) him (Furr) to commit unlawful actions—most likely indicating that Furr implicitly disagrees that that Gray has a right-to-refuse his (Furr's) demand for an ID.

THEORY PERSPECTIVES FOR PERFORMING SHITSHOW SERVICE TRAINING

This study includes reviews of real-life videos of cases of frontline service workers and/or their supervisors engaging in face-to-face interactions with a customer or other person of interest (POIs) whereby the professional public service worker and/or supervisor delivers clearly inaccurate, bad, and/or unlawful service to the POI—service that is causally antecedent to negative outcomes for the POI. This combination of clearly bad service that causes emotional/physical harm—whether intentionally done or not—represents one category of "service shitshow" performances (the present study is limited in coverage by not examining other service shitshows such as telephone scams, "bait-and switch," "low-ball" selling, and other "sharp sales practices"). The study here identifies four-tiers of face-to-face server-shitshows by very low to very high levels of severity with the most severe (T4*) in some cases including physical violence resulting in the hospitalization and/or death of the POI. The study also focuses on face-to-face service shitshows in the U.S. and presents data supporting the conclusion that the frequency of T4 shitshows continues to increase annually in the U.S. The study reviews policy interventions and training/educational innovations aimed at eliminating or reducing shitshows and proposes reasons for the general failure of these efforts. Finally, the study proposes the design and frequent (i.e., weekly) use of LARP (live action role-playing) enactments of T1-to-T4 service shitshow service performances appearing in Table 1.

TABLE 1
FOUR TIERS OF SERVICE EXCHANGE & LARPS FOR PREVENTING SERVICE SHIT-SHOWS

The table and video links includes interactions that occurred in real-life contexts including positive as well as highly negative talk, behaviors, and outcome. Videos might cause distress to sensitive viewers.

Tier	Description/Definition	Precis & Evidence Sources	Outcomes/Cost-to-Company (COC)	Possible LARP for training in the prevention of service failures
T1	PPS initiates interaction to deliver upon a request by either the firm they represent OR requested by the client/person of interest (POI). Interaction escalates to low tier of agitation for either POI or SP. SP can diffuse the situation to the satisfaction of the client/POI (early on, or within a reasonably short time-frame). Interaction takes place between POI and SP and does not escalate above low or medium level engagement/agitation or confrontation. VERBAL INTERACTION BY SP: Unlawful authoritarian directives/requests by SP from POI; normally claiming policy or legal rights for their demands. OUTCOME: No physical harm but elevated levels of emotional anxiety, angst or stress for the POI. SECOND-ORDER Participants (2OP): This tier does not include second-order external participants (courts, lawyers, mediators, counsellors, internal affairs, auditors) during the interaction.			
T1.1	More than a 100 cases recorded on USA "First Amendment Auditor" web-pages. Example below. Customer (POI), service professional (SP) or both command the other to perform some action; request denied; escalation in demands or emotions in the interaction, resulting in verbal abuse or mistreatment of the POI.	Several cases as recorded in multi-media on "HonorYourOath" at www.patreon.com/HonorYourOath/posts or Audit The Audit website: https://www.bing.com/videos/search?q=audit+the+audit&qpvt=audit+the+audit&FORM=VDRE	Possibly/likely costs related to review committees, fines or penalties. Costs to SPs (as individuals) may range from leave, days without pay to days of community service on personal time. Costs to POI might be legal fees but is likely to be covered when review committees or settlements decide in their favour. Cost to Service Provider Firms (SF) = internal costs to review the recorded interactions (videos, CCTV footage, reflections by staff, onlooker online social media, review comments on social media). PR and penalties costs to SF and/brand. Damage to brand reputation of SF and personal brands.	Continuous mindfulness training LARP co-designed cases Simulated interactions (SI) and face-to-face role-play with props. Sequence-Oriented Problem Identification (SOPI) Critical Incident Techniques (CIT) Regular online training videos.
T1.2	Customer (POI) perceivably tests service professionals (SP) such as security officers or police offers by going about their normal business in public areas. SP commands the POI to leave the premises. POI denies the requests and states first amendment rights such as freedom of speech, assembly, and freedom of religion. Escalation in demands or emotions in the interaction, resulting threats of in verbal abuse or mistreatment of the POI. De-escalation or diffusion of the situation between the two parties with no external parties called upon to intervene.	Jeff Gray – Waveland town in Mississippi Ocean Springs town in Mississippi (MS) Guatier, town in MS– very good treatment https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nGuwJqJRCa0		

Tier	Description/Definition	Precis & Evidence Sources	Outcomes/Cost-to-Company (COC)	Possible larp
T2	Service Professional (SP) initiates interaction to deliver upon a request by either the firm, they represent, OR requested by an (un)identified initiators (other customers, observers, even the POI self). The interaction escalates into the mid-tier range of agitation for both the POI and the SP. The SP is unable or unwilling to diffuse the situation and escalates the interaction through threatening or domineering activities or behaviour. Third parties get involved to assist in resolution or de-escalating the agitation/anxiety/stress of the POI/client. VERBAL & LOW-LEVEL PHYSICAL INTERACTION BY SP: Unlawful directives/requests by SP from POI; Some physical interaction such as grabbing writs, slapping on hand-cuffs OUTCOME: Limited or low levels of physical harm and elevated levels of emotional anxiety, angst or stress for the POI. SECOND-ORDER Participants (2OP): This tier includes second-order external participants (courts, lawyers, mediators, counsellors, internal affairs, auditors, review committees) during and/after the interaction.			
T2.1	Customer (POI) goes about their normal business in public areas. PPS delivers an illegal or profiling-type demand to a POI. POI denies the requests and demands an explanation for the request. SP challenge the request with a counter request or more aggressive demand. The escalation in demands/or emotions in the interaction result in calling on second-tier operants/actors/participants (2OP) to join the interaction.	"Hotel Earl Case" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nGuwJqJRCa0	Cost to PPS firm = internal costs to review the recorded interactions (videos, CCTV footage, reflections by staff, onlooker online social media, review comments on social media). Possibly/likely costs related to review committees, fines or penalties. Costs to SPs (as individuals) may range from leave, days without pay to days of community service on personal time. Costs to POI might be legal fees,but is likely to be covered when review committees or settlements decide in their favour. PR and penalties costs to Service Provider Firms (SFs).	Continuous mindfulness training LARP co-designed cases simulated Interactions (SI) and face-to-face role-play with props sequence-Oriented Problem Identification (SOPI) Critical Incident Techniques (CIT) Regular online training videos.
T2.2	POI (Jeffrey Grey) enters the City Hall on 23 September 2024 to display a poster to honour and army vets – protected by the freedom of speech, freedom to congregate and freedom of religion in public areas. A Policeperson is called and demands the POI remove himself to the pavement. POI engage in a reasonable conversation to explain his First Amendment rights. Police demands the POI to move to the pavement and threaten with the POI with incarceration unless he complies.	Detained, Trespassed, Threatened with Arrest (City of Carthage, Texas) https://vimeo.com/1011767466?&login=true#_=_		

Tier	Description/Definition	Precis & Evidence Sources	Outcomes/Cost-to-Company (COC)	Possible larp
T3	Client/Person of Interest (POI) goes about their general, legal activities (e.g., shopping, attending a hotel, video recording a family event), service professional (SP) approaches client/person of interest (POI) with requests for information (e.g., personal ID, name, Key cards, tickets, purchasing evidence); requests are followed by a physical altercation (minor injuries); arrests made an/or second order participants mediates or resolve the issues/altercation/confrontation/dispute. Concussion, tasering, cracking ribs; injuries to any part of the POI's body. VERBAL & PHYSICAL INTERACTION BY SP: Unlawful directives/requests by SP from POI; escalate the interaction with threats of incarceration, physical harm and use handcuffs or weapons to execute threats. OUTCOME: Some physical harm and elevated levels of emotional anxiety, and stress for the POI. SECOND-ORDER Participants (2OP): This tier most certainly includes second-order external participants (courts, lawyers, mediators, counsellors, internal affairs, auditors, review committees).			
T3.1	Customer, POI, SP or both commands the other to perform some action; request denied; 3rd party called; punches thrown; one/more parties hurt physically; arrests occur before or after possible trip to the hospital.	Traveller Dr David Dao (POI) and Aviation Security Officers (SPs) in engagement before flight on United Airlines Flight 3411. United Airlines (UA) asks a seated passenger to leave his seat for a crew member; passenger refuses; UA calls three aviation security guards; they repeat the request; passenger refuses again; SP punches the passenger and drags him from his seat with excessive force, breaking his nose, two missing teeth and a concussion; Subsequently two SPs service terminated and the third (SP) retires; Senior UA executive denied promotion. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VrDWY6C1178 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_anhvdWf3DM 2017)	SPs/Officers removed from the firm/force SP might receive leave-without-pay or termination of services. Service provider/firm (SF) may investigate staff behaviour SF POI injured (physically or mentally) POI demands public apology POI posts video/photos or review on online media POI interviewed by mass media (e.g. news channels) POI sues for damages or accept. Legal experts involved in suits/legal disputes/mediation.	Simulated interactions (SI) of video recordings Co-design scripts for LARP training Reflect on YouTube Recordings of real-world service break-downs LARP training: face-to-face Coaching Review/Analyse Procedures & Policy documents of professional service firms Post-exchange dispute reviews. News clippings with PR responses by firms.
T3.2	Journalist (POI), SPs command POI to perform some action; POI denies the request; SP throws punches whilst POI is hand cuffed; SP claims injuries; POI taken to hospital for injuries. POI released without being charged.	Citizen journalist Reyes (POI) is approached by a police officer whilst on public property recording an accident on a public road; a police officers, Cagle ask a POI to leave a public spot whilst taking photographs. SP Cagle commands POI to vacate the accident scene; police officer calls second officer Mendoza (SP2); several more request to the POI to leave and stop photographing; SP illegally requests ID from the POI. POI asks for their identification which they produce; SP throws POI to the ground causing bodily injuries (head, face and wrist) without warning or statement of intention to arrest; brutal attack cause SPs to call an ambulance is called by offices, Officer (SP1) claims to be injured in the clash; POI taken to hospital in the back of a police vehicle. POI tied to a bed while in hospital. POI Reyes released after an hour in hospital, as police are called out to another case. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FpD3wu8foxM March 4, 2023		

Tier	Description/Definition	Precis & Evidence Sources	Outcomes/Cost-to-Company (COC)	Possible larp
T4	Client/Person of Interest (POI) goes about their general, legal activities (e.g., shopping, attending a hotel, video recording a family event;, SP approaches POI with requests for information (e.g., personal ID, name, key cards, tickets, purchasing evidence); requests are followed by a physical altercation- resulting in major injuries and long-term repercussions for both parties (e.g. disabilities, physical and/or emotional trauma, even death). VERBAL & PHYSICAL ABUSE BY PPS: Unlawful directives/requests/demands by SP from POI; One or multiple civil rights violations Escalate the interaction with verbal threats; terrorize POI with physical actions: tasering, Stomping on parts of POI bodies, injuries, killing/maiming OUTCOME: Physical harm and elevated levels of emotional anxiety, and stress for the POI. multiple tasering, stamping on body or head, concussion, brain injuries, death. SECOND-ORDER Participants (2OP): Second-order external participants (courts, lawyers, mediators, counsellors, internal affairs, auditors, review committees) are integral to the resolution of the dispute/disagreement and further legal, ethical and moral repercussions from the case; and requires additional resources to resolve/de-escalate the interaction/confrontation.			
T4.1	Officer Matthew Schneider (SP) tasers the unarmed but hand-cuffed 39-year-old Johnny Wheatcroft (POI) 11 times during a traffic stop on July 26, 2017. SP criminally charged for kicking and tasering a handcuffed man, Johnny Wheatcroft, who was the passenger in a vehicle stopped for an alleged blinker violation. In front of his two children, Wheatcroft was tasered 11 times. Schneider delivered the final tase to a handcuffed Wheatcroft by pulling down his shorts.	SP found to use excessive force, a violation of POI civil rights, trauma and emotional harm. Video of the incident exposed 2 years later: 2019. Criminal charges, 2021. Felony aggravated assault charges. "Sadistic abuse of force". [https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/glendale/2023/01/25/no-jail-time-for-glendale-officer-who-used-stun-gun-on-handcuffed-man/69820649007/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jckr9HVE8Eg July 26, 2017	SPs/Officers work terminated/suspended. SP asked to take early retirement of removed from the force with disgraced record. SF pays large penalties, fines and/or legal fees of both parties SF engage in PR recovery and corrective actions SF's handling of the case covered in multiple online and mass media channels. POI POI injured (physically or mentally) or maimed POI posts videos to YouTube and various channels (e.g. HonorYourOath.com) POI posts video/photos or review on online media POI interviewed by mass media (e.g. news channels) POI sues for damages or accept settlement. FBI criminal investigations Attorney General's Office files assault charges Legal experts involved in suits/legal disputes/mediation.	Observation of Senior SPs Coaching Problem-solving & sense-making training Cultural Sensitivity Training Co-designing Mindfulness Role-play & Training LARP as iterative process and multiple repeats Technical training in using firm equipment effectively and safely Changes in Sequence-Oriented Problem Identification (SOPI) Critical Incident Techniques (CIT) Buddy Mentorship Programmes.
T4.2	Angela Jones, a Los Angeles resident, suffered cardiac arrest after being shocked with a Taser gun by police during a traffic stop in on June 4, 2012. The incident, which was caught on video by a California Highway Patrol (CHP) dashboard camera, has once again raised questions about the safety of the weapon. n June 4, CHP officers stopped to check on the welfare of 50-year-old Angela Jones after finding her sitting in a parked vehicle on Haskell Avenue, near the Ventura (101) Freeway. She had no heart beat.	Ms Jones (POI) stopped in legal traffic stop. Police officers (SPs) questioned POI for 15 minutes, suspecting her to be driving under the influence (DUI); asked to look through her purse. POI refuses and runs back to her car. SP tasers POI three times. Jones' attorney Maria Cavalluzzi said her client now has many memory deficits and cognitive issues after the incident. https://www.cbsnews.com/losangeles/news/caught-on-camera-woman-goes-into-cardiac-arrest-during-traffic-stop/ Caught On Camera: Woman Goes Into Cardiac Arrest During Traffic Stop - CBS Los Angeles (cbsnews.com) June 4, 2012		

The study proposes widespread and continual use of LARP training for professional public servants (PPSs), including principally negative, illegal actions by PPSs. PPSs engaging as actors in LARP exercises—especially in performing/engaging in bad service enactments—provides necessary hands-on service experiences to cause PPSs to not engage in such bad service enactments in real-life service enactments; performing "bad LARP exercises" increase servers' abilities to recognize their own possibly unlawful and /or physically harming and life-threatening behavior in situ and finally take steps to prevent their own participation in service enactments resulting in mostly negative outcomes. The case studies in this review mostly include "professional public servants" (i.e., police officers and government workers in professional service roles) who engage face-to-face with a POI and frequently engage with additional actors (e.g., police dispatchers and/or "someone calling for service") before interacting with a POI.

FIGURE 4
THE FROWN, SNARL, PROD, AND PUNCH MODEL OF NEGATIVE PUBLIC-SERVICE FAILURE




Figure 4 is a categorization paradigm for classifying shitshows ranging from verbal to life-threatening violent behavior that is most frequently instigated by the PPS in face-to-face encounters with POIs. The study here notes that frequent key features of shitshow enactments across all levels of severity include PPSs' (and frequently POIs) misunderstandings and inaccurate beliefs/knowledge of what is unlawful versus lawful in planned versus actual service-process enactments during these face-to-face interactions, as well as enacting official but bad policies and procedural steps that support shitshow service performances. The study here investigates the characteristics of service shitshows productions and outcomes, the designing/implementing field experiments for validly assessing the efficacy of how well LARP versus placebo-control reform training programs are in reducing the frequency and severity of service shitshows.

(1413) HonorYourOath Civil Rights Investigations - YouTube is an internet link to a second set of videos collected by Jeff Gray. As of March 1, 2025, a total of 287,000 people subscribed to directly receive new videos available at this website and this website has had 161 million views (https://vidiq.com/youtube-stats/channel/UCIKYGgjBmZ6V_Xu2WboBzzQ/?form=MG0AV3).

A thousand plus videos are available on this site. Most of these videos start with Jeff Gray holding a handwritten sign stating, “God bless the homeless vets,” while standing in a public space. In the majority (i.e., 90%) of these videos, he is quickly approached by an observer (who typically works nearby to the occurring face-to-face exchange) and told that he cannot do what he is doing at that location (e.g., typically Gray is told, “Panhandling is illegal”); Gray is told that he must leave even though Gray never asks anyone for money and panhandling is a form of free speech right as ruled by the U.S. Supreme Court. After this initial exchange, in the majority (90%) of the initial interactions, an observer calls for service for police to remove Gray from the site. In nearly all cases (90%) where a call for service are made, police officers arrive on the scene. In the majority (90%) of cases with police officers on the scene, the officers (1) ask (and in approximately 65% of these cases, under threat of arrest, they require) Gray to “provide ID” (i.e., his state driver’s license), (2) inform Gray that the city has an ordinance that makes panhandling an illegal activity, and (3) inform Gray he must leave the area.

In many cases, Jeff Gray expresses willingness to leave if he receives an official oral notice of trespass from the police officers. Upon receiving such a notice, he physically moves to leave, and in a few such cases, Gray is then told then he can no longer leave without showing/giving his ID. The video (Notice Of Intent To Sue-Waveland & Ocean Springs (Youtube.com)) of his visit to Ocean Springs and Waveland, two towns in Mississippi, USA, are examples of these enactments where Gray is required illegally to hand over his ID and Gray’s subsequent actions in filing lawsuits. Subsequent public calls (by viewers of the Gray’s videos) complaining about the police officer statements in the videos and additional details are available in news reports on these two cases (e.g., Activist claims rights violations after encounters with police at City Hall, Pt. 2 (Youtube.com). This news report includes video highlights and an interview with the Mayor Casey Vaughn of Gautier, Mississippi about his face-to-face interaction with Jeff Gray—the Vaughn-Gray face-to-face interaction is very cordial (i.e., not a shitshow, an example of excellent in service-enactment performance).

Along with Jeff Gray and SeanPaul Reyes, Philip Turner (aka: “the Battousai”) is an especially nationally well-known video civil rights activist. Philip Turner's real-life civil-rights video performances likely had the largest impact on revising police policies/rules and state/federal legal rulings among all U.S. video civil-rights activists. This claim is made based on the “Turner versus Driver” legal case ruling by the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concerning the behavior of Turner and police-officer LT Driver and additional police officers on September 1, 2015. This public-service, face-to-face encounter occurred on the sidewalk across the street from a police station in Fort Worth, Texas. The legal ruling was pivotal in reinforcing the right of POIs to record police officers when in public places. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged the First Amendment right to film police activities in public—reinforcing the idea that recording police is a form of free press; the court also ruled that Turner’s detention and arrest by LT Driver and his partner were not justified by a “RAS of a crime” (i.e., a reasonable articulable suspicion of a crime” is occurring, has occurred or is about to occur that is expressible by a police officer; detaining a POI without having a RAS of a crime is a violation of POI’s Fourth Amendment). Turner was illegally assaulted and “moderately” tortured by Driver and his partner during the episode. “Moderately” here includes twisting Turner’s wrist while he was handcuffed, with tightened handcuffs sufficient to cause physical harm, and holding him inside a police cruiser in a high temperature space to “make him sweat.” The following short (6:36 and 7:11 minute) videos of the Turner/Driver meeting provide two perspective views—one from the Turner’s handheld camera’s lens and the second from Driver’s chest-mounted camera: (1502) 1st Amendment Audit Fort Worth PD Assaulted & Tortured 9/1/2015 - YouTube and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VWgPowcZsEg&list=PLkLIvSABjQpC-Ow6_wubZvElKIY0Zhq4a&index=3. The second video includes details of the assault and moderate torture of Turner. A third (oral only) video relating to Turner versus Driver includes the oral argument before the Fifth Circuit Court that was delivered on December 6, 2016, in which three persons (i.e., a lawyer representing Turner and a lawyer representing Driver present arguments to the appeals judge with the judge questioning the logic of each lawyer’s argument: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eBWPpeHtdSA&list=PLkLIvSABjQpC-Ow6_wubZvElKIY0Zhq4a&index=9.

The Fifth Circuit of Appeals made its ruling on the case on February 16, 2017. The court affirmed that the public has a First Amendment right to record the police, subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. This decision established that recording police officers in public is a protected activity. The court found that the officers involved were entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment claim because the right to record the police was not clearly established at the time of the incident. The court reversed the lower court's decision on the Fourth Amendment claim, finding that Turner's arrest was unlawful and violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The Turner versus Driver case was remanded back to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas for further proceedings. On February 27, 2017, the district court approved an (out-of-court agreed) settlement of $200,000 to Turner for his claims of unlawful detention and arrest. Most importantly, several subsequent cases (e.g., Kokesh v. Curlee; Smith v. The City of Houston; Johnson versus the City of San Diego) reference *Turner versus Driver* in plaintiff's claims that recording police officers is protected under the First Amendment. Minimization of the harm done, denial of culpability (e.g., "we were following policy"), projecting blame on to the POI or a third party), cover-ups (e.g., erasing and losing video evidence recorded on a camera), and scapegoating by assigning blame to the actions of a "rogue officer who violated departmental policies", and combinations of these responses are actions occurring frequently by professional, public-service department heads to criticisms and lawsuits involving clearly identifiable shitshows.

Figure 5 includes brief summaries and video links of four one-sided LARP service training by Philp Turner given to sets of different police officers. In each of these four cases, the police officers perform illegal actions or violate police policy, which Turner records. Turner is arrested in three of the four cases. The PPSs in all four cases experience negative outcomes following their service shitshow performances with Turner. These cases illustrate the highly hubristic responses by PPSs when responding to a highly knowledgeable POI who records their face-to-face meeting and uses social media afterward.

FIGURE 5
PHILLIP TURNER PROVIDES LARP IVIL RIGHTS TRAINING TO PROFESSIONAL PUBLIC SERVANTS (PPS) WHILE THEY RESPOND BY ENACTING SERVICE SHIT SHOWS INCLUDING SHORT-TERM NEGATIVE OUTOMES FOR TURNER AND ADDITIONAL NEGATIVE OUTCOMES FOR THE PPSS

Case 1: While standing 50-feet away, Phillip Turner is video recording police officers and POIs (persons of interest) at a traffic stop; PPPS (professional public servants—police officers) James Mafrey and Jesse Lane stand in front of Turner and shines flashlights (i.e., torches) into the lens of Turner's camera. Turner verbally cites Section 302 of the Austin police Department Policy Handbook to the police officers that their behavior is a policy violation. Mafrey had been a member of the police department for four years. Outcomes: Mafrey receives a punishment of 20-days leave without pay; Lane receives punishment of 10-days without pay. Open/watch link:
https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/in%3Asent+rouxelle/LXphbRLrghxkrJmtWqPHRwltmhvpWltfbGxLZvxrsqB?projector=1

Case 2: Phillip Turner is video recording in public in Galveston, Texas, and is arrested for failure to provide his Identification to a police officer when asked by a Police officers, SGT Archie Chapman, to stop recording and provide identification. Turner refuses to do either and is arrested unlawfully. Police illegally seek out Turner's car using Turner's car key fob; Chapman finds Turner car to end the search and illegally opens and searches Turner's car. Turner's car activates camera and records illegal car search by Chapman.
Outcomes: Chapman is demoted several ranks to patrol officer; Tuner receives $10,000 in an out-of-court settlement with the City of Galveston.
Open/watch link: (1828) My Dashcam Puts $10,000 In My Pocket and Two Sergeants Get Demoted (Memento) - YouTube

Case 3: Phillip Turner requests a police complaint form from City of Princeton, Texas, LT Robert Mishnick, at the police station who tells Turner that Turner must provide details of the complaint to see if giving a complaint form is necessary. Turner leaves the office without a copy of the police form. Turner searches public records online for Mishnick's employment and history of violence against POIs surface.
Officials of the City of Princeton gaslights Turner's behavior on the City's Facebook page in a letter to the public and then issues an apology a few day slater which the officials quickly delete from the Facebook page—after Turner posts video evidence of the gaslighting.
Outcomes: Cit of Princeton Police Department creates a new Facebook page on transparency polices; LT Mishnick is fired due to his employment history of violence. .
Open/watch link: I Exposed This Officer And He Gets Fired

Case 4: Phillip Turner visits police station in Texas to see if unlawful signs are posted on the building stating that photographs cannot be taken in the outside area or pf inside of police cars at the site. Two police officers handcuff Turner after he refuses to provide his ID—go to the ten-minute mark to watch details. Turner provides details of federal rulings on taking photographs in public areas to the two police officers. They arrest him anyway. Turner sues. Turner post Facebook video. All charges against Turner are later dropped. Additional cases against other POIs for public photography are dismissed. Then, several police officers complete two hours of additional constitutional law training .
Open/watch link: (1837) New Tool Is Going To Expose Bad Texas Police Officers - YouTube

REASONS FOR RELATIVELY HIGH PREVALENCE OF SERVICE SHITSHOWS BY PPSs IN THE U.S. IN COMPARISON TO PPSs IN OTHER WEALTHY NATIONS

The comparative numbers of killings of POIs by police officers across wealthy nations is one indicator of how professional public servants enact shitshows generally. The number of police killings in the U.S. is significantly higher compared to other wealthy nations. In 2024, U.S. police killed at least 1,365 people (Yancey-Bragg, 2025). This level of killings is a stark contrast to the levels in other developed countries. For example, in 2019, the annual number of law enforcement killings per 10 million people was 33.5 in the U.S., compared to 9.8 in Canada, 8.5 in Australia, 2.3 in the Netherlands, 2.1 in New Zealand, 1.3 in Germany, and 0.5 in England/ Wales (Jones & Sawyer, 2020).

Most wealthy nations have national standards for police officer training, whereas the U.S. has no national standards or measurement of PPS training effectiveness. “For a variety of historical and constitutional reasons, there are no federally mandated training minimums for our nation’s law enforcement officers. This creates a patchwork of training requirements that vary state by state. Minimums can range from about nine months of basic training in Connecticut to no required basic training in Hawaii” (Institute, 2025). In Germany, police training is standardized across the country, with a comprehensive program known as "Polizeiausbildung." This training typically lasts between two-to-three years and includes both theoretical studies and practical training. The effectiveness of police training is measured through various assessments, including physical fitness tests, psychological evaluations, and practical exercises. Additionally, the “Bundeskriminalamt” (BKA) provides advanced training for CID (i.e., Criminal Investigatory Department) officers and other specialized roles. In Finland, police training is also highly standardized and rigorous. The program lasts three years and combines theoretical coursework with practical experience. The effectiveness of police training is assessed through various measures, including the ability to handle real-life scenarios, community relations, and crime-solving rates (Poliisi, 2025). Performance measures focus on the quality of police work, cost-effectiveness, and public perceptions of the police (Polissi, 2025).

A configuration of several antecedent conditions support the identification of the United States as a national exemplar case in frequent mild-to-severe service shitshow enactments by professional service providers (PPS). In comparison to other wealthy nations, state-mandated police training academies in the U.S. have the shortest median initial required training periods for new police officers. An in-depth management review of 49 (i.e., Hawaii does not have a mandated initial police officer training program) of the 50 U.S. States' Curricula (Cohen, 2021) reports scant time devoted to training topics related to avoiding shitshow enactments. “The result shows police academies have made little to no progress in bridging the gap between the academy curriculum and the practicality of police work. Only 3.2% of basic training curricula focus on public administration training, which is essential for law enforcement” (Cohen, 2021, p. 345). Many regional academies incorporate a small number of reality-based training (RBT) component in their curricula. RBT presents cadets with mock scenarios played by real people (e.g., experienced police officers, volunteer citizens) in which they are asked to demonstrate the actions they would take to deal with the situation at hand. At the end, a debrief is conducted in which officers are asked to justify their decisions, explain the actions they took, and suggest appropriate alternative solutions (Staller & Zaiser, 2015). In a way, RBT allows recruits to practice critical decision making under the pressure of realistic conditions. However, because most states do not mandate RBT in basic training, regional academies can set their own standards (if any), which makes variability in RBT across academies large and difficult to assess in terms of training hours (Choen, 2021). Police policymakers and leaders should recognize the value of enhancing this training and require basic police academies to incorporate it into their curricula. Cohen (2021) recommends that police leaders consider giving *all* officers, not just new ones, additional training in these critically important areas through in-service training programs that can be routinely mandated statewide. Several of the 17 training officers interviewed in Cohen’s 2021 (p. 355) study reported similar comments given by the first interviewee, “Police officers today spend too much time sitting in the classroom learning the law and not learning how to make decisions . . . important decisions . . . under stress.”

What should be clear from Gray's (2023a, 2023b) civil rights audits involving holding a cardboard sign stating, "God Bless Homeless Vets", while saying, "Pray for Homeless Vets" on the steps of city hall, is that the majority of police officers do not know that such behavior by a POI is lawful and most police officers do not know that the POI has a legal right guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment not to provide his/her name when asked/demanded by a PPS in such contexts. Typically, these face-to-face encounters escalate into unlawful demands to leave the area by police officers. About half of these encounters result in "walks of shame" by police officers after PPSs contact their supervisors for instructions on how to proceed. Gray leaves without being unlawfully detained in about 30 percent of these episodes. Gray files lawsuits in about 20 percent of episodes, followed by out-of-court settlements in nearly all cases, with small-to-large financial payments from city governments; the size of these payments depends, in part, on whether Gray is placed in handcuffs during the exchange. Two key points apply here: (1) new and longstanding police officers need to participate in reality-based training (RBT) as LARP actors (with a colleague being awarded the part to play as Jeff Gray in these performances; (2) participating in RBT/LARP is necessary but missing in regard to most "moments-of-truth" (i.e., potentially talk/actions exhibiting high emotional heat) in PPS and POI face-to-face meetings. (3) A short-list of 10-to-15 unique moments-of-truth are identifiable as frequent occurrences. (4) The writing and performing of scripts/plays for LARP enactments can be the creative foundations of "live-action" learning by new and longstanding PPSs.

Another possible reason for the comparatively high frequency of PPS service shitshow enactments in U.S. police departments is a lack of "buy-in" for the need to change and for the efficacy of tools available to reduce the frequency of service shitshows (cf., Archbold, 2021). "We did nothing wrong; policy at the time was being followed by the police officers involved," is a defense frequently voiced at trials of police officers being accused of using excessive force against a POI. Thus, this perspective implies that a service shitshow did not occur. The following example illustrates PPSs denial of a PPS-POI encounter that is clearly a service shitshow—an assessment reflected in the outcomes of the two trials in the story. On October 10, 2015, Northwestern PhD student Lawrence Crosby (CBS Chicago, 2019) was pulled over in his car by Evanston, IL, police and accused of grand theft auto—the police received a 911 telephone call from a woman who watched Crosby seemingly tampering with a (his) car and driving off; she called 911 and decided to follow Crosby—she stated in her 911 call that he might have broken into and driven off in the car. Crosby first noticed that someone was following him, and when the police turned on their vehicle's emergency lights, he pulled over, shut off the motor and exited his car with his hands raised. Six police officers immediately jumped onto Crosby physically and threw him down onto the pavement; three of the officers punched Crosby a total of 11 times; at least six drew their guns and pointed their weapons at Crosby. After Cosby showed proof of purchasing his car and vehicle registration, the police arrested Crosby for resisting arrest and not obeying a police officer's orders. While Crosby was bending over to drop face-down onto the pavement, he was grabbed, picked up, thrown down and pummeled with six-plus punches (video at www.youtube.com/watch?v=SZwMKxFmYKM). After the police handcuffed Crosby and he stood up, one officer said on an open cell phone, "I said, I didn't shoot you, motherf*****, you should feel lucky for that" (CBS This Morning, 2017).

Shortly afterward, the police issued a video defending their actions (since deleted). At Crosby's trial (the Evanston DA decided to try Crosby of the police charges rather than recognize the charges as part of a service shitshow), a judge found Crosby innocent of all charges against him. Crosby sued for false arrest and excessive force and asked for $50,000. In this second trial of the case, a jury found the police guilty of both charges and awarded Crosby $1.25 million (i.e., 25 times more than Crosby requested). An Evanston police spokesperson said the officers followed procedures at the time and did nothing wrong, but that they now plan to revise those procedures. The police department reprimanded none of the officers seen in the video; an internal investigation found that they were applying standard police procedures during Crosby's arrest. Two additional relevant videos are available to view Crosby's arrest, subsequent trial, and outcomes (CBS This Morning, 2017) and a one-on-one interview with Crosby (CBS Chicago, 2019).

Police union contracts that restrict city/county governments from punishing/firing police officers after service shitshow enactments may encourage the continued use of service shitshows (Archbold, 2021). Rushin (2107) analyzed 178 police union contract from the largest police departments across the USA and found that 88 percent of the contracts included at least one provision that limits police leaders'

ability to hold officers accountable—many of these contracts ban civilian oversight of the police; place restrictions on interrogation of officers facing allegations of misconduct; require police agencies to destroy officers disciplinary records; prohibit the collection and investigation of anonymous citizen complaints; and limit the timeframe of internal investigations (Rushin 2017). Such contract provisions provide protection against disciplinary and job terminations of actions by city/county officials of service shitshows by PPSs except when the (1) service shitshow is video recorded, (2) the video recording is seen widely via the popular press, and (3) large numbers of the local, national, and (in a few cases) the global public community move to act (e.g., protest nonviolently in the streets). (4) The principal service shitshow performers are arrested, tried, found guilty, sentenced, and serve time in prison.

Attending unregulated private police training programs in which police officers receive training in using professional service providers' (PPS's) tools, skills, and procedures that actually promote violence and enacting methods that are violations to the U.S. Constitution when in face-to-face exchanges with POIs is another possible reason for the comparatively high frequency of shitshow performances in the U.S. Thousands of police officers receive such training annually in the United States. One or more public agencies in 46 states have paid the firm "Street Cop Training"—an unregulated police training firm that claims to train 30,000 police officers annually (Walsh, 2023). "The Civil Rights Lawyer" provided the following 16-minute video assessment of the training provided by Street Cop Training that include several excerpts of the training sessions of different trainers in the program: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4vjCdHWAmps. The State of New Jersey's Office of the State Comptroller (OSC) provided a written investigative review into Street Cop Training ("Street Cop" or "the Company") after receiving information that public funds were spent to send New Jersey police officers to a six-day conference in October 2021 in Atlantic City that trained officers on questionable policing tactics and contained offensive and discriminatory content (the Conference). Street Cop is a New Jersey-based company and possibly the largest unregulated police training firm in terms of revenue and number of trainees receiving training annually. The link to the full OSC report (Walsh, 2023) appears with the Walsh reference. The following commentary is mostly from the first few pages of the report. To conduct this investigation, OSC's Police Accountability Project reviewed documents, videos, and other materials received from the Street Cop training centers, and various law enforcement agencies and departments with officers in attendance at the Conference, among other sources. OSC also consulted directives, regulations, policies, and case law, and conducted interviews with relevant witnesses. OSC also conducted a sworn interview with Street Cop's founder and Chief Executive Officer, Dennis Benigno.

OSC's investigation uncovered alarming deficiencies in the police training provided at the Conference and a dangerous, potentially costly gap in oversight of private post-academy police training. Currently, the Attorney General, Police Training Commission (PTC), and no other designated entity regulate private post-academy police training in New Jersey. Among other things, OSC found: Instructors at the Conference promoted the use of unconstitutional policing tactics for motor vehicle stops; Some instructors glorified violence and an excessively militaristic or "warrior" approach to policing. Other presenters spoke disparagingly of the internal affairs process; promoted an "us vs. them" approach; and espoused views and tactics that would undermine almost a decade of police reform efforts in New Jersey, including those aimed at de-escalating civilian-police encounters, building trust with vulnerable populations, and increasing officers' ability to understand, appreciate, and interact with New Jersey's diverse population; and The Conference included over 100 discriminatory and harassing remarks by speakers and instructors, with repeated references to speakers' genitalia, lewd gestures, and demeaning quips about women and minorities. This kind of training comes at too high a price for New Jersey residents. The cost of training like this is small compared with the potential liability from lawsuits involving excessive force, unlawful searches and seizures, and harassment and discrimination. State and local entities in New Jersey spend millions of dollars litigating these types of allegations. Between 2012 and 2018, over 100 excessive force lawsuits were brought against officers and departments in New Jersey.1 And in 2022, just one excessive force lawsuit cost a New Jersey county $10 million. The costs of lawsuits alleging discrimination or harassment can be just as expensive. From 2019 to 2023, New Jersey police departments agreed to pay at least $87.8 million to resolve claims of officer misconduct, many of which

involved allegations of harassment and discrimination. Of course, these quantifiable high dollar amounts do not include the immeasurable and hidden cost to the victims, their families, and their communities.

The OSC audit report on Street Cop Training includes nine recommendations. Recommendations 7-9 are the three most relevant recommendations to service shitshow performances and include the following specific actions. 7. New Jersey law enforcement agencies that used public funds to pay for Conference tuition to send officers to the Conference should strongly consider seeking from Street Cop a refund, given that important aspects of the training were incorrect based on settled case law and law enforcement directives that have the force of law, in addition to being discriminatory and harassing. 8. Law enforcement agencies should require law enforcement officers to report to their agencies any work-related training received, regardless of whether that training was self-paid or received during paid time off. Law enforcement agencies should also require officers to certify which private training courses they attend, whether they attended the entire training, and, if not, which hour(s) they missed. Law enforcement agencies should maintain up-to-date training files for each officer on their payroll. 9. The New Jersey law enforcement officers who attended the Conference, in person or online, should voluntarily self-report to their agencies, turn in any copies of the Street Cop RAS Checklist, and be retrained at the direction of the Attorney General's Office and/or County Prosecutors' Offices in relevant areas of the law and on the applicable Directives and policies including, but not limited to, the Attorney General's Use of Force Policy and the New Jersey Policy Prohibiting Discrimination in the Workplace.

Organizational, industry, and national cultural norms that tolerate or support service shitshow performances represent a final line of defense against eliminating them. Police officer Frank Serpico documented multiple service shitshows in reporting pervasive corruption practices in the New York Police Department (Mass, 1973). The details of another example of organization-wide corruption resulting in multiple shitshow cases are available in the June 13, 2024, U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) report entitled, Investigation of the City of Phoenix and the Phoenix Police Department (Justice, January 13, 2024, p. 4). The following executive summary statement opens this DOJ report. "On August 5, 2021, the Department of Justice opened a pattern or practice investigation of the Phoenix Police Department (PhxPD) and the City of Phoenix ("the City" or "Phoenix"). Our investigation revealed systemic problems within PhxPD that deprive people of their rights under the Constitution and federal law. We found pervasive failings in PhxPD's policies, training, supervision, and accountability systems that have disguised and perpetuated these violations for years." Here are a few specifics in this DOJ report:

The Department of Justice has reasonable cause to believe that the City of Phoenix and the Phoenix Police Department engage in a pattern or practice of conduct that deprives people of their rights under the Constitution and federal law: PhxPD uses excessive force, including unjustified deadly force and other types of force. PhxPD and the City unlawfully detain, cite, and arrest people experiencing homelessness and unlawfully dispose of their belongings. PhxPD discriminates against Black, Hispanic, and Native American people when enforcing the law. PhxPD violates the rights of people engaged in protected speech and expression. PhxPD and the City discriminate against people with behavioral health disabilities when dispatching calls for assistance and responding to people in crisis. Our investigation also raised serious concerns about PhxPD's treatment of children, and the lasting impact aggressive police encounters have on their wellbeing. In the years leading up to our investigation, PhxPD officers shot and killed people at one of the highest rates in the country. Some city officials blamed a "more violent population" for the number of shootings, rather than police conduct. But we found a significant number of the shootings did not meet constitutional standards. PhxPD relies on dangerous tactics that lead to force that is unnecessary and unreasonable. PhxPD has taught officers a misguided notion of de-escalation. Rather than teaching that de-escalation strategies are designed to eliminate or reduce the need to use force, PhxPD has misappropriated the concept and teaches officers that all force—even deadly force—is de-escalation. According to one police official, this distorted view of de-escalation is "ingrained in the vernacular of the department." The harm caused by unconstitutional policing is not spread evenly across the City's population. PhxPD targets people experiencing homelessness, retaliates against people who criticize the police, and disproportionately uses force against people with behavioral health disabilities. Officers enforce certain laws, including drug and low-level

offenses, more severely against Black, Hispanic, and Native American people than against white people engaged in the same behaviors. And despite these disparate outcomes and longstanding community complaints, the City still claims it is “unaware of any credible evidence of discriminatory policing.” [The final quote here is the response of the City of Phoenix to the DOJ January 1, 2024, report. The City of Phoenix’s full response is available (Phoenix response to the DOJ, 2024).] (Justice, 2024, p. 4-5)

Multiple communities and states in U.S. have multiple-century-old practices supporting slavery, school and housing segregation, wage-theft misogyny, public murders by lynching, and black Americans’ voting rights denial/suppression. The case history of Police Officer Eric Parker’s physical attack on Sureshbhai Patel is an example of a widespread cultural embed supporting service shitshow enactments by PPSs. Police Officer Eric Parker attacked tourist Sureshbhai Patel, a 57-year-old Indian national, in Madison, Alabama, on February 6, 2015. Patel, who was visiting his son and did not speak English, was taking-a-walk when a neighbor called the police to report a suspicious person. Parker confronted Patel and, within 90 seconds, slammed him head-first, into the ground, resulting in vertebrae surgery and Patel being partially paralyzed. The incident led to charges against Parker being arrested, and two trials in Federal court, but Parker was later acquitted of all charges. Available reports indicated that during Eric Parker's trials, the juries were divided in their guilty/innocent voting along racial lines. All black jurors voted for Parker's guilt, while all white jurors voted for his innocence (Deadlocked, 2015)—in one of the trials, ten white male jurors voted to acquit, and the two black female jurors voted for finding Parker guilty; jury deliberations lasted several days in both trials and no members of the juries changed their votes. The video of Parker’s violent take-down of Patel is available here: (2134) Indian injured by US police speaks out - BBC News - YouTube.

Actions taken by U.S. President Trump starting in 2025 to dismantle DEI (Diversity, Equity, and Inclusiveness) programs are examples of U.S. national cultural embeds favoring service shitshow enactments. President Trump signed an executive order titled "Ending Radical and Wasteful Government DEI Programs and Preferencing" on January 20, 2025. This order mandates the termination of all DEI-related mandates, policies, programs, preferences, and activities within the federal government. It also directs federal agencies to end DEI, DEIA (Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility), and environmental justice offices and positions (Gigante et al., 2025). In the third decade of the 21st century, some states have passed laws supporting “anti-woke” actions to prevent DEI activities that promote tolerance. For example, “Florida's Stop WOKE Act” of July 1, 2022, prohibits workplace training or school instruction that teaches individuals are inherently racist, sexist, or oppressive, whether consciously or unconsciously. This act also bans teachings that suggest people are privileged or oppressed based on race, gender, or national origin, or that a person bears personal responsibility for actions committed in the past by members of the same race, gender, or national origin (Reilly, 2022).

In an action that will effectively nurture increasing service shitshow performances, President Trump ordered the firing of multiple U.S. Inspectors General[8]: in late January 2025, he dismissed at least 17 inspectors general across various federal government departments and agencies. This move has raised substantial concerns about government oversight and accountability. The legality of these dismissals is being challenged in court, and protests and lawsuits are ongoing. Inspectors general (IGs) serve as independent watchdogs within federal agencies, tasked with investigating allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse. Their role is to maintain transparency and accountability in government operations. These officials serve across different administrations and are protected under federal law, which requires the president to give Congress 30 days' notice before any dismissal. On the night of January 24, 2025, Trump announced the immediate firing of approximately 17 inspectors general from various agencies, including the Department of Defense, State Department, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Department of Veterans Affairs, Department of Energy, and Department of Transportation. According to reports, the inspectors general were notified of their termination via email, citing "changing priorities" as the reason for their dismissal (Honderich, 2025).

REASONS FOR THE GENERAL FAILURE OF ATTEMPTS TO REDUCE/ ELIMINATE PPS's SHITSHOW PERFORMANCES

A few recurring reasons explain why nearly all programs designed to eliminate service shitshow performances are typically ineffective in the United States. Effective knowledge and practical skills in how to "change organizational direction" generally and service shitshow performances are developing at an exceedingly slow pace and implementing effective change programs to eliminate PPSs service shitshow performances is very different from going to the dentist and having tooth decay removed and a cavity filled. The literature on "action research" in police context is relevant to this issue. "Action research" is a term first coined by Kurt Lewin, a highly influential social psychologist—a German Jew who completed his PhD in 1914 at the University of Berlin; immigrated to the U.S. in 1933, shortly after Hitler and the Nazis came to power and began one of the top, macro, service shitshows of the 20th century. "Action research" aims to investigate and solve an issue at the same time. "Participatory action research" (PAR) is a term

that expresses the emphasis on including real-life administrators and front-line workers in recognizing the need for a change program, designing an effective change program, implementing the change program, and/or assessing the effectiveness of the performance of the change program; William Foote Whyte's (1991) seminal book is a useful source for improving knowledge and skills related to eliminating shitshow enactments. The scarce reporting of the use of PAR methodology is particularly relevant for the general failure of attempts to reduce/eliminate police officer enactments of shit shows.

Rosenbaum (2024) reviews the failures in attempts to adopt effective police reform strategies that includes PPS-ROI exchanges involving shitshow enactments. Rosenbaum's (2024) is an essay on this topic and his study was published by the National Policing Institute. Rosenbaum (2024) concludes that the United States has sought to increase police accountability and transparency in many ways. "Unfortunately, the main strategies have achieved limited success in building public trust, for the reasons Rosenbaum summarizes in his report" (Rosenbaum, 2024, p. 3). In the discussion of why police "reform decrees" fail, Rosenbaum's (2024) essay focuses on five topics: accountability and punishment, early intervention systems, performance evaluations, consent degrees, and policy changes and training.

Accountability and Punishment

Typically, "police accountability" is an internal process that controls officers through punitive enforcement of rules, regulations, and laws (Chan, 2001). However, strong union contracts and appeals to arbitration mean these investigations rarely result in serious consequences. In one review, roughly half of the fired officers were reinstated (Barker et al., 2021), and disciplinary records from various departments show that officers with multiple misconduct complaints typically receive little or no discipline (Kelly & Nichols, 2020). Most police officers agree that accountability systems are not working. In our national survey, only 1 in 5 officers agreed that "officers who do a poor job are held accountable" (Cordner, 2017).

Several cases are available in police arrests videos on Youtube.com supporting the following observations that illustrate the prominent views of frontline police officers' and senior police administrators' viewpoint that "we have done nothing wrong," "we were following policy," and "no 'police reforms programs' are necessary." After an arrest has been made during a megaservice shitshow enactment where a POI is charged with one felony or (usually) several felonies after actually committing no crime, these videos include senior officials of a police department attempting to keep the focus on the alleged perpetrator and prevent this arrested party from filing a lawsuit in federal court for police civil rights violations by taking one, some, or all of the following actions and where the following features are observable in these cases:

- (1) beefing-up a misdemeanor charge to a multiple felony charge to ensure that the District Attorney (DA) prosecutes the charges against an alleged perpetrator even when the charges are clearly bogus;
- (2) delaying the release of body-worn cameras (BWCs), if available;
- (3) talking with the DA in an attempt to ensure that the DA does not drop the charges;

- (4) apply pressure on the alleged perpetrator to confess to lessor charges and to avoid trial;
- (5) the police hide some/most evidence that strengthens the case of innocence of the alleged perpetrator;
- (6) the city/county's attorney clears the police officers enacting the mega shitshow of any wrong-doing;
- (7) over the course of weeks, a news reporter uncovers news about the mega shitshow and publishers several news releases on the scenes in the mega shitshow enactment and the attempts to hide/coverup the mega shitshow by the police and city/county government officials/
- (8) state-wide, regional, and national outrage and (in some mega service shitshows) marches down main streets with protestors carrying signs occur;
- (9) claim that policies were followed (implemented) when the available evidence indicates that policies were not followed or that the policy implemented was bad police practice;
- (10) allowing the police officer or officers enacting the service shitshow to resign from the police force when the likelihood is high that the officer(s) will receive multiple charges for criminal felonies following a DA's decision to decline to prosecute;
- (11) the DA attempts not to prosecute the police officers enacting the mega service shitshow—doing so only after public outrage moved the Governor to demand prosecution.
- (12) the initial felony charges on the police officers enacting the service shitshow are decreased to misdemeanor charges with no jail time recommendation;
- (13) the victim of the mega shitshow files a federal lawsuit against the police officers involved and files a lawsuit on the city/county government; the city/country argues in court that its officers are entitled to qualified immunity;
- (14) for mega shitshows, the federal U.S. District judge or appellate judge rules (typically) in favor of the victim and rejects the request that qualified immunity is applicable;
- (15) the victim and city/county government begins preparation for financial compensation and punishment trial but reach an out-of-court settlement with confidential terms.

Most (but not necessarily all) of these signifying 15 milestones and processes occur in mega shitshows. The mega shitshow that includes Police Officer Matthew Schneider and three additional police officers assisting Schneider in torturing Johnny Wheatcroft (JW), his wife, and their two young children during an unlawful arrest of Johnny Wheatcroft. JW's wife was driving their car and was backing into a parking space on the side of a hotel in Glendale, Arizona; Johnny Wheatcroft was in the front passenger seat, and the two children were in the backseats. Scheider and another police officer came into the scene after the Wheatcroft's car was already in the parking lot. Before beginning to physically torture Johnny Wheatcroft, Schnider claimed that no turning signal was used in turning the Wheatcroft's car into the parking lot. A brief video of this mega shitshow enactment is available here: https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=1JYOaZrxP18; a longer 7-minute video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jckr9HVE8Eg, shows details of this case study including the pain-management technique that Scheider applies to JW's shoulder, arm, wrist, and hand as well as a few of the eleven Taser strikes that Schneider used on JW's back and bare buttocks (and testicles after Scheider pulled down JW's walking shorts)—JW's body was face-down on the asphalt and in handcuffs when Schneider dropped JWs shorts to Taser JW on his testicles. The 41-page ruling by a federal district judge on whether the police officers were entitled to "qualified immunity" protection in this case is available here: Wheatcroft v. City of Glendale, No. CV-18-02347-PHX-MTL | Casetext Search + Citator.

Here are the key points in this case study related to the present study: (1) in most shitshows the professional public servants frequently take several steps to refuse to recognize, punish, correct, or admit to their own (minor to mega) service shitshow performances; (2) the body-worn cameras (BWCs) videos worn by the police officers were pivotal (i.e., necessary but not sufficient) in moving this case toward justice, punishment, and compensation for the victims; (3) shitshow performances, denials, and coverups reinforce refusals to agree that reforms are necessary in service enactments to eliminate shitshow enactments by public servant professionals; (4) the organization's members and

leaders represent a culture of suppression/coverup and denial in regards to the occurrences of service shitshows and the need to reform and retrain all PPSs and administrative leaders; (5) consequently, before designing and implementing change, skill-building, courses, effective steps in "unfreezing" (Lewin, 1947a,b) the organization collectively and city/county leaders collectively on the actual frequencies, processes, and outcomes of the organization's shitshows are necessary—training on managing, preventing, and mitigating shitshows likely are doomed to failure without including prior unfreezing group-learning via participatory action research to gain cultural recognition/awareness, and acceptance of new skills in shitshow prevention.

Here are a few of the final outcomes of the Schneider and Wheatcroft case study: Police Officer Matthew Schneider was found guilty by Maricopa County Superior Court Judge Patricia Starr of a single misdemeanour count of disorderly conduct and was ordered by to pay $115 in fines and fees; Schneider received no prison time and no probation time. Schneider made the following statement at his sentencing, "I accept full responsibility for my actions on July 26, 2017. I tried to do my absolute best as a police officer and human being that day and it wasn't good enough" (Biscombing, 2023). Separately, "Schneider's personnel file shows that his supervisors have repeatedly praised him for continuously having one of the department's highest arrests counts and being a "bloodhound for criminals." Schneider's file also shows that he has been separately disciplined "at least six different times for using excessive force, workplace harassment, insubordination, improper destruction of a citizen's personal property, and unbecoming conduct" (Biscombing, 2019, p1).

Early Intervention Systems (EIS)

Since the 1990s, large police agencies have widely adopted EIS to address police misconduct. Existing data, such as complaints, are used to identify and intervene with officers whose behavior patterns put them at risk of future serious events Walker et al., 2000). While EISs have substantial potential, no standard set of metrics or interventions exists today. Furthermore, existing EIS programs have been unable to predict problematic behavior with accuracy (Russek & Fitzpatrick, 2021; Worden et al., 2013, 2014). Summarizing the findings of the "Task Force on Policing," La Vigne (2022) warns that relying on existing police records, even if EIS uses fancy algorithms to identify patterns, can lead to "garbage in, garbage out."

Failure of Performance Evaluations of Individuals

When asking officers today, "How does your department judge your performance?," many respond, "Whether I can stay out of trouble." Clearly, they are not being judged or held accountable for "bad policing" or rewarded for "good policing." Traditional performance evaluations lack credibility. Researchers have offered many suggestions for improving internal evaluation systems (e.g., Oettmeier & Wycoff, 1997; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; Walker, 2005), but an officer's work remains largely unsupervised by their boss and difficult to measure with current police records. Furthermore, because human behavior is shaped by immediate consequences, evaluating officers only once per year is not helpful. Civilian oversight: For decades, researchers have proposed independent "auditing bureaus" to collect data on how residents are treated by the police and vice versa (Mastrofski, 1999; Reiss, 1971; Walker, 2005). However, many current civilian oversight systems lack credibility and also lack critical data on daily police-public interactions that matter to the public.

Failure of Consent Decrees

These legal agreements have been implemented in roughly 40 cities where DOJ observed a "pattern or practice" of unconstitutional policing against protected groups. Consent decrees typically seek to improve definition, reporting, early warning, supervision, and investigation of use of force. While these agreements can improve the organizations being monitored, little attention has been given to police behaviors beyond use of force (U.S. Department of Justice, 2017; Walker, 2017). Also, other law enforcement agencies (nearly 18,000) are not required to make the changes outlined in these consent decrees.

Failure of Policy Changes and Training

Over the past two decades, agencies have tried to address public criticism with new policies and training programs focused on the use of force, but these classes are a drop in the bucket and pay little attention to the communication skills needed to build public trust and de-escalate conflict. A nationwide survey found that recruits in state and local law enforcement training academies receive an average of 168 hours of training on firearms, self-defense, and use of force, compared to only 10 hours on communication and eight hours on ethics and integrity (Reaves, 2016).

In the U.S., two ongoing national organizations conduct action research aimed at preventing and/or eliminating police shitshow enactments: the National Policing Institute (NPI) and the National Institute of Justice (NIJ). The National Policing Institute has conducted numerous experiments over the past 50 years, focusing on police effectiveness, policing strategy, and police-community relations. The NPI research includes experimental and quasi-experimental evaluations that support fair and equitable policing. The NPI is funded through a combination of federal grants, contracts, contributions, and private grants. Unfortunately, an independent assessment (by anyone) of the validity and impact of the studies done by the NPI has not been completed. However, the NPI's work as an agency of change is extensive and warrants an in-depth assessment of the validity and impact of its research and the studies it sponsors. The National Institute of Justice (NJJ) is the research, development, and evaluation agency of the U.S. Department of Justice. NIJ's mission is to advance scientific research, development, and evaluation to enhance the administration of justice and public safety. The NIJ is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance; the Bureau of Justice Statistics; the Office for Victims of Crime; the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention; and the Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking. Between fiscal years 2013 and 2016, NIJ awarded 180 grants totaling $910.6 million. Management audits have been done on the work done by the NIJ in awarding grants.

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) has implemented measures attempting to ensure the validity and practical impact of the research funded through its grants. While there is not comprehensive audits specifically focusing on the validity and practical impact of all NIJ-funded research, the NIJ has established performance measures and reporting guidelines for award recipients to assess the quality and relevance of their work. NIJ requires award recipients to submit regular performance reports that communicate progress toward achieving the goals and objectives identified in the program goals and objectives of an NIJ "notice of funding opportunity" (NOFO). These performance measures include the following measurement topics:

- Relevance to the needs of the field: Evaluation by whether the project's substantive scope aligns with the funded project or any subsequent agency-approved modifications.
- Quality of the research: Demonstrated by the scholarly products resulting from the work funded under the NIJ award, such as published, peer-reviewed journal articles, book chapters, or technological prototypes.
- Quality of management: Assessed by factors such as achieving significant project milestones, meeting reporting deadlines, and staying within approved budget limits.

In-depth, independent assessments of the accuracy/validity of these self-reports by grant recipients represent a major gap in assessing the quality of studies funded by NIJ. The Department of Justice's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has conducted audits of the work done by the NIJ in 2009 and 2019 (Audit 19-09, 2019). These OIG reports do not present "deep dives" into the validity and impacts of the studies completed by grant recipients of NIJ's grants programs. NIJ and OIG assessment activities focus almost exclusively on the steps taken to award grants, with little activity or reporting on the validity and impacts of recipients' grant work.

The OIG's 2019 report includes findings from Office of Personnel Management studies comparing the findings of the "Federal Employment Viewpoint Survey" (FEVS) of employees in the NIJ, Office of Justice Programs (OJP) the DOJ, and government-wide federal employees. In FEVS, employee engagement is measured by the Employee Engagement Index (EEI) of the FEVS. The EEI comprises 15 survey questions and has three sub-components: (1) Leaders Lead, (2) Supervisors, and (3) Intrinsic Work Experiences. Each sub-component has five topic-related survey questions. Responses to the "Leaders

Lead" survey questions are intended to reflect employees' perceptions of leadership integrity, as well as leadership behaviors such as communication and workforce motivation. Responses to the Supervisors survey questions are intended to reflect the interpersonal relationship between employees and their supervisors, including trust, respect, and support. "Responses to the Intrinsic Work Experiences" survey questions are intended to reflect the employees' feelings of motivation and competency relating to their role in the workplace. The OIG 2019 report details the latest available findings (2017) for the FEVS and indicates NIJ employees have substantially lower assessments of the NIJ in both EEI and "Leaders Lead Scores." The scores reported in the Audit 19-10 (2019) report for the NIJ would be equivalent to "F" academic grades at a University.

"Based on the reported NIJ FEVS scores and the concerns expressed to us by the NIJ whistleblower and staff, it appears to us that NIJ leaders have not succeeded in improving employee engagement. We discussed the low scores with the NIJ Director and Principal Deputy Director. They told us that they attributed the low scores to NIJ's constant turnover in leadership and recent organizational changes" (Audit 19-09, 2019). The federal government currently has 74 statutory Offices of the Inspector General (OIGs). These offices were established under the Inspector General Act of 1978 to oversee and ensure efficiency, effectiveness, and integrity within federal agencies. Each OIG operates independently within its respective government department/agency, conducting audits, investigations, and evaluations to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse. The DOJ OIG is not one of the 17 OIGs fired by President Donald Trump on January 25, 2025, during his first month in his second term of office. The firings were explained to be due to "changing priorities" within Trump's administration. However, this explanation generated substantial controversy, as critics argued that the firings undermined the independence of these watchdogs and violated federal laws requiring 30 days' notice to Congress before such removals. The shallow reasoning for the firings when they were announced and the rationales for creating the OIG position in the federal government support the perspective that the 17 OIG dismissals qualify as a senior executive shitshow.

Not Focusing on Changing Group Culture/Behavior: The Pivotal Reason for the General Failure of Attempts to Eliminate Shitshow Enactments Performed by PPSs

All or nearly all attempts to eliminate shitshow enactments focus on changing individual PPS behavior, and none include PPS participation in the early stages of creating/designing these change programs. Lewin (1947a, 1951) proposed that for successful change program to be achieved in an organization the unit of analysis must be the group, not the individual, not the organization, and not wider society/culture and the group must participate in designing the change program before its startup. As long as group standards are unchanged, the individual who is a group member will resist change more strongly the farther he is from group standards. If the group standard itself changes, the resistance due to the relationship between the individual and the group standard is eliminated. Lewin emphasized that a group's culture and standards of individual behavior by its members were in states of flux as well as representable by "quasi-stationary equilibria."

The key points to consider here is that given that groups within a PPS organization are engaging in shitshow enactments, the continuing practice of shitshows by members of a group, cover-up attempts to prevent the reporting of shitshows, attempts to coverup/prevent the release of information about specific enacted shitshows, and the thwarting of programs to change by prevent the occurrences of shitshow will very likely continue without high involvement of the group's leaders and rank-and-file group members in designing specific-shitshow prevention programs—a highly visually dramatic shitshow enactment that generates huge amount of national and international protest (e.g., Geroge Floyd's murder by Police Officer Derek Chauvin with three fellow officers assisting) can be expected to result in minimal to no changes to the frequency or severity of future shitshow enactments because the group culture has not changed and no effective training in prevention has been created/implemented by all stakeholders engaging directly and indirectly in shitshow enactments. Collaboration by all stakeholders in designing programs in the effective prevention of shitshows is the first general principle of "participatory action research" (Ross et al., 2010).

However, even though video reports of shitshow enactments continue to occur at a consistently high rate, most U.S. states did enact police reform laws following the murder of George Floyd on May 25, 2020: at least 30 states and Washington, DC, enacted one or more statewide legislative policing reforms,

ensuring greater policy uniformity within each jurisdiction. While the new laws cover a wide range of issues, 25 states and DC addressed at least one of three areas directly related to the circumstances of Floyd's killing: use of force; duty for officers to intervene, report, or render medical aid in instances of police misconduct; and policies relating to law enforcement misconduct reporting and decertification (i.e., the revocation of a person's authorization to serve as a police officer) (Subramanian & Arzy, 2021).

However, Subramanian & Arzy (2021, p. 4) conclude, "It remains an open question whether the latest wave of state-level reforms will truly alter the landscape of arbitrary, discriminatory, and even deadly policing. After all, it was only seven years ago that states enacted a slew of policing reforms following the police killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. And yet the needless death continues." As of March 13, 2025, police have killed 260 people in the U.S.—police have killed one or more persons every day in the first ten weeks of 2025 (mappingpolicevioance.org). What becomes apparent by examining the data on enacting police reform legislation is that the new laws may cause some improvement in reducing the occurrences/frequencies of some specific shitshows, but the rate of shitshows has not been reduced by the actions of state or federal governments in the U.S. The fundamental nature of the immediate group and mega-group (multiple stakeholders) levels of cultures supporting shitshow enactments, coverups, and minimizing penalties must change for substantive reductions in shitshow enactments to occur.

Telling Weaknesses in Study Designs and Data Analyses in Principal Field Experiments Involving Treatments to Improve Police Performance (Not Necessarily Preventing Shitshow Enactments)

The relevant literature includes a few published empirical studies focusing on bad service enactments by professional public servants (PPSs). Three researchers have been recognized globally for their work on this topic: Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, and Michael Kremer. The official announcement of the 2019 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, issued by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, stated that the award was given to Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, and Michael Kremer "for their experimental approach to alleviating global poverty." The press release emphasized that: "The research conducted by this year's [2019] Laureates has improved our ability to fight global poverty. In just two decades, their new experiment-based approach has transformed development economics, which is now a flourishing field of research." The announcement highlighted how their work broke down the complex issue of poverty into smaller, more manageable questions—such as how to improve school attendance or child health—and answered them through carefully designed field experiments. "In the mid-1990s, Michael Kremer and his colleagues demonstrated how powerful this approach can be, using field experiments to test a range of interventions that could improve school results in western Kenya. Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, often with Michael Kremer, soon performed similar studies of other issues and in other countries. Their experimental research methods now entirely dominate development economics." (The use of the bold in this sentence appears in the original announcement.)

Careful reading of several published studies by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kremer indicates that for the much their research (e.g., Banerjee et al., 2021; Duflo, et al. 2012) focuses on using proper scientific designs for experiments of interventions to reduce/eliminate service shitshow enactments—"development economics" is the label u-use by these researchers that reframes these studies to be lifting people in a community out of poverty and improve quality of life in a sustainable, equitable way. The following summary of Banerjee et al. (2021) illustrates this theoretical and empirical approach. Banerjee et al. (2021) describe attempts to induce police departments to reduce a frequent occurrence of the following service shitshow enactment: ore or more citizens walk into a police station to report a crime and meet one or more police officers who refuse to register the crime report via processing the information that the citizen attempts to report, possibly because doing so causes more work than failing to register the crime report and "local police are evaluated based upon crime rates, which are measured by case registration, refusing to register a crime would reflect well on a police station's crime statistics" (Banerjee, 2021, p. 40). To reduce the frequency of this shitshow enactment, a large-scale randomized trial conducted with the police of Rajasthan, India, assessed four interventions recommended by senior police officers: limitations of police officer transfers, rotation of duties and days off, increased community involvement, and on-duty training. Prior field study experiences motivated a fifth intervention: "decoy" (i.e., known in

the marketing literature as “mystery shoppers”14) visits by enumerators to register cases, incentivizing staff to improve service. Banerjee et al. (2021, p. 36) report that “only training and decoy visits had robust impacts; others were poorly implemented and ineffective.” The poor implementation of the other treatments was likely to cause a double whammy effect: negating the possibility of a consistent effect of these specific treatments and impacts the levels of the effects of the treatments reported to have been robust in manners that are undecipherable.

Poor implementation of the treatment conditions designed for the study is one of the telling problems in the Banerjee et al. (2021) study. A second flaw is the failure to use proper placebo controls in the police departments assigned to receive one or more treatment conditions, a flaw that recurs in this study and in additional studies by these researchers and colleagues. These studies define a “control” as not receiving a treatment condition, which is inadequate in a field experiment for several reasons—including raising the possibility that introducing any treatment or contextual conditions could have generated the observed effects. For a proper placebo control, a fake placebo treatment is necessary to implement using the same procedural steps as used for all other treatments--as in medical field experiments to test the efficacy of a new drug on patient outcomes, a “double-blind” procedure should be used in organization field experiments (this recommendation includes development economics) where both the professional public servant (e.g., police officer) and the agent administering the specific “X” is informed about the nature of the “X” being administered. Even when administering a placebo control condition is thought to be impossible in practice, alternative creative designs can overcome this view and improve study quality.

The principal reliance on data analysis via symmetric variable directional relationships (SVDRs) (e.g., multiple regression analysis, MRA) and null hypothesis statistical significance tests (NHST) by Banerjee et al. (2021), Duflo et al. (2012), and related studies (Banerjee et al. 2015) are additional telling flaws in this research program. Though pervasively still in-use research tools by many academic scholars, the literature is extensive in supporting the conclusion that the reliance on using MRA and NHST are bad science practices (Fiss, 2011; Meehl, 1978; Wasserstein, 2016; Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016; Woodside, 2019)—especially the reporting of MRA models that include more than three independent variable terms (Armstrong, 1970, 2012). Gigerenzer (1991) and colleagues (Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009; Gigerenzer et al., 2000) provide substantial empirical evidence supporting the superior performances of asymmetric case outcome modeling (ACOM) via algorithms against SVDR modeling procedures. The practice of reporting NHST findings has been banned in articles accepted for publication in *Basic and Applied Social Psychology* (a behavioral science journal) (Trafimow, 2014; Trafimow & Marks, 2015) and authors are strongly discouraged from reporting NHST findings by four additional reputable academic journals (i.e., *Journal of Marketing*, *Human Communication Research*, *Organization Science*, and *Scientometrics*).

The failure to address critical service shitshow enactments in their research program is a fourth telling weakness in the Banerjee, et al. (2021) study and in their research program on economic development. “Critical service shitshow enactments” refers to performing bad, frequently unlawful, and physically/emotionally harmful actions by a PPS to a POI—typically in contexts where the PPS is violating a POI’s First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth amendment rights stated in the U.S. Constitution. Three streams of video reports document severe instances, and frequent occurrences of these critical service shit-shots in the U.S. First, beginning in 2012, the adoption of body-worn cameras (BWCs) by police officers has captured exemplar instances of severe service shitshow enactments (e.g., Police Officer Matthew Schneider and three additional police officers assisting Schneider in torturing Johnny Wheatcroft as described earlier in this essay). Second, beginning in the early 2010s, the systematic work by “first amendment auditors” (aka: “civil rights activists”) such as Jeff Gray, Philip Turner, and SeanPaul Reyes and many additional researchers in placing themselves in public spaces, engaging in legal acts that are rights guaranteed by the US. The Constitution, and video recordings of interactions with PPSs, support the conclusion that bad, and often unlawful, PPS service enactments occur in most of these videos. Third, news reports on instances of members of the public recording severe service shitshows have been reported from time-to-time in the national press (e.g. George Floyd’s homicide by Police Office Derek Chauvin, assisted by three fellow officers, described earlier, and the 8-minute videorecording by George Holliday of 33 verified baton-strikes onto Rodney King in 1991—video link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5J7xHzI061k&rco=1). The charge here that the study designed and

reported by Banerjee et al. (2021) was overly milquetoast especially in comparison to the monstrous problems of critical service shitshows and the pervasive occurrences of less severe but unlawful smaller-scale service shitshow enactments.

Two particularly positive features of the Banerjee et al. (2012) study are worth considering when planning field experiments to reform or prevent bad service face-to-face enactments. First, 162 police stations participated in the study with about twenty police stations receiving each of the five treatment conditions; consequently, sixty-two police stations were in the control group. The focus on modifying/reforming group behavior rather than individual police officer behavior is a cornerstone principle in social psychology research on successful change management, as advanced by Kurt Lewin. Lewin (1947a, 1947b, 1951) proposed that group norms function as stabilizers and that changing them is key to altering group behavior. Second, Banerjee et al. (2012) advocate and attempt to use "field true experiments" (Campbell & Stanley, 1966) within RCTs (i.e., randomized controlled trials) as a scientific approach for designing effective studies on achieving changes/reforms in organizations and, consequently, in individuals.

The early work on LARP of PPS-POI interactions by Diener, Whitmore, and Munn (1976) is extremely useful reading in creating stories and writing scripts for LARP in police training. While not focused on designing rigorously scientific methods to achieve high efficiency in introducing police reform, Diener et al. (1976) provide important insights into the need for police officer trainees to engage in thinking-conversations-interpreting-action thinking when standing before a person of interest (POI). Diener et al. (1976) present six role-playing exercises that involve conversations between a PPS and POI. The following bullet points are brief summaries of these six LARP exercises:

1. Marital Fight
    - The officer enters a domestic dispute and confronts a man assaulting a woman.
    - Escalation occurs when the officer focuses solely on the man, missing the threat from the woman, who ultimately shoots him.
    - Key dynamic: Officer's tunnel vision and failure to assess both parties escalates the danger.
2. Druggist in Drug Store at Night
    - The officer must determine whether the person inside is a legitimate pharmacist or a thief.
    - Escalation can occur if the officer misjudges the situation and acts aggressively toward an innocent person.
    - Key dynamic: Misidentification and premature confrontation heighten risk.
3. Warehouse Burglary
    - Officer investigates a break-in and may confront a suspect in a dark, ambiguous setting.
    - Escalation depends on how the officer approaches the suspect — too forcefully or without backup could provoke a defensive or violent response.
    - Key dynamic: Tactical missteps can escalate tension with a potentially armed intruder.
4. Derelict in an Empty Shack
    - The person encountered may be a junkie or a construction foreman.
    - The challenge is more about judgment than escalation — mislabeling could lead to embarrassment or missed cues, but not necessarily confrontation.
5. Lady in Distress
    - Officer responds to a woman in apparent danger.
    - Escalation is less likely unless the officer misreads the situation or overlooks a hidden threat.
6. Prowler in a Railroad Yard
    - Officer investigates a report of a prowler.
    - Escalation depends on how the officer handles the unknown—but the scenario emphasizes stealth and caution more than direct confrontation.

Fully scripted lines were not used in the LARP exercises. The police officer trainees were able to adlib lines while engaging in each exercise. This training program was designed with minimal costs and achieved

highly favorable results from engaging in these exercises as Diener et al. (1976, p. 266) report, “The program was implemented with surprisingly little difficulty and cost. The short 2 hours was squeezed into the six-week session on one evening. The trainees have not complained about the extra time; quite to the contrary, they gladly participate, saying it is one of the most exciting parts of the program. The costs have been slight because unpaid students are used as role players and as ‘checkpoints’".

Diener et al. (1976) emphasized, “Psychological research has shown that in order to teach abilities or behavioural skills, simply imparting the knowledge verbally *(i.e.,* lectures) is inferior to demonstration of the behavior and actual practice'. A second reason the lecture approach is insufficient for teaching these abilities is that when an officer is placed in a stressful situation, he is likely to do what "comes naturally" rather than carefully try to remember what instructors have taught him. But if he has rehearsed habitual behaviors, he is more likely to perform them correctly under pressure. Our own observations during the present training program have revealed that, although officers in training usually know the right answers for a test, this knowledge often does not carry over to their behavior.” Yet, minimal use of LARP training remains the norm in police training programs in the U.S. today. LARP training of police officer trainees ranges from zero to twenty hours of training versus training in the use of firearms ranges from varying between states from a minimum of 36 to over 200 hours (Carlson, 2024).

Why Creating/Performing LARP Training for Increasing Professional Public Servant Experiences in Enacting Bad Service Is Pivotal for Reducing Shitshow Frequency

Creating effective LARP training exercises for police officer training benefit from applying principles of case-based learning (CBL) principles. Woodside (2010) provides a useful review of the relevant literature supporting the assertion that case-based storytelling is typically a substantially more powerful pedagogical tool than lecturing. Chen and Luo (2025) provide an exceptionally useful review of the literature on CBL principles that is relevant for creating and using LARP police training exercises. CBL involves story enactment and can include one to several actors performing a story. Chen and Luo (2025) present an empirical (laboratory) experiment showing that attempting to work on the configuration of an unfamiliar and failure cases both increased the overall learning achievement, while unfamiliarity alone increased group knowledge construction and individual reflective thinking. They identified an interaction effect between case familiarity and story ending on learning achievement measured by discussion quality, which suggests the superiority of the unfamiliar failure case in promoting meaningful online discussion. The qualitative analysis of the semi-structured interviews also revealed unique benefits for two types of case narrative design: unfamiliar cases yielded more cognitive and behavioral benefits, while failure cases enhanced analytical thinking. These results inform the design and implementation of effective LARP involving police officers and POIs.

Note that the meeting between Jeff Gray and LT Furr of the Alpharetta, Georgia, police department represents a LARP police training exercise, though LT Furr only began to realize he was an actor in a role being performed/recorded in a video halfway through their meeting. Jeff Gray was fully aware of the LARP that LT Furr was receiving, and Gray warned LT Furr with the first two-minutes of their meeting that he (Gray) was engaged in a Constitutionally protected right in a public space, and in appropriate time and manner—and that Furr should leave him (Gray) alone. LT Furr chose to escalate the problem that he (Furr) created. A second police officer arrived and informs Gray that he (Gray) is looking to cause problems. The Police Internal Affairs (IA) Department and the out-of-court settlement accepted by the federal court makes clear that LT Furr and the second police officer failed to enact public service correctly. The adopted IA recommendations required LT Furr to present lecture to police colleagues on his experiences with his meeting with Jeff Gray and what he (Furr) learned from the meeting and the subsequent outcomes. A valuable follow-up: asking LT Furr if his experiences and subsequent outcomes affected his subsequent interactions/communications with POIs. It’s now possible to watch and study hundreds of these “half-LARP” training videos where the POI is fully aware and has participated in multiple and similar learning exercises while the one or more police officers meeting with the POI has had comparatively limited experience, nor training, in engaging with a POI who insists on his rights as guaranteed by the U. S. Constitution. In most of these case studies, the police officer engaging in the half-LARP has

not fully considered the ramifications of going hands-on with the POI, with the case evolving into lawsuits, fines, and (in rare cases such as George Floyd's murder) prison terms for the PPSs.

Engaging in a LARP service failure by PPSs may provide the best of two outcomes: improved behavioral thinking about what to do versus what not to do during a PPS-POI meeting, with high retrievability of the learning exercise in subsequent real-life encounters with POIs; and avoidance of actions with potentially highly negative outcomes. Unfortunately, cases similar to the following real-life case study are an annual occurrence in the U.S. Sonya Massey was fatally shot by Police Officer Sean Grayson in Springfield, Illinois, on July 6, 2024. Incident summary:

- Sonya Massey, 36, called 911 to report a suspected prowler near her home. Two Sangamon County sheriff's deputies responded, including Deputy Sean Grayson.
- After searching the area, they entered Massey's home and asked for her ID.
- Massey walked to her stove, picked up a pan of boiling water, and said, *"I rebuke you in the name of Jesus."* Grayson responded, *"You better f------ not, I swear I'll f------ shoot you in your f------ face."*
- Massey apologized and ducked behind the counter, still holding the pan. Grayson then fired three shots, one of which struck her in the face.
- The second deputy's body camera captured the entire encounter; Grayson turned-on his body camera only after he had completed all firings at Massy.
- Grayson discouraged his partner from rendering aid, saying, *"She's done. That's a head shot."*
- Massey was later pronounced dead at the hospital.
- Grayson was fired, charged with three counts of first-degree murder, and is currently in custody awaiting trial.
- The case has drawn national attention, with statements from President Biden and Vice President Harris calling for justice and police reform.
- Subsequently, Sean Grayson history of policing was found to include many red flogs of unlawful behavior accusations; despite these red flags, Grayson was hired by six different police departments in four years, raising serious questions about vetting and accountability in law enforcement hiring practices. (NBC News Staff, 2024)
- In an interview conducted August 1, 2024, Sangamon County Sheriff Jack Campbell defended his agency's vetting of Grayson. Campbell, 60, has said he won't resign amid public criticism in the wake of the shooting death of Sonya Massey, a Black woman, at the hand of Grayson, who is white.

Given the shocking conclusion in the final bullet point above, the performance of Sonya Massey's meeting with the two police officers and subsequent murder as a LARP for training police officers alone might be inadequate without careful coaching by LARP trainers during/after performing the killing of Massey as a LARP. However, this case is still active, the final chapters have yet to be written or played.

LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The third decade of the 21st century has seen a rise in partially structured LARP-style real-life enactments, such as civil rights auditors with cameras interacting with PPSs in public spaces. The study here finds the most PPSs are unfamiliar with the civil rights of these members of the public, have inadequate training/experience in communicating with these POIs, and often commit unlawful behaviors that sometimes include the illegal arrests of the POIs, subsequent punishment of the PPSs, and in extreme cases the firing of PPSs, and even arrests and prison terms of the PPS. The cases collected by Jeff Gray, SeanPaul Reyes, and Phillip Turner, and additional civil rights auditors, represent "partially structured larps" because the PPSs these auditors encounter are unaware of, or not fully aware of, the purpose of these learning exercises or the legal requirements for enacting them.

Current training/educational programs for professional public servants (PPSs) do not provide the skills needed to prevent service shitshows in most of these partially structured larp enactments. The extant literature (e.g., Kotler & Rodger, 1977; Woodside, et al. 2021) does not include reports of full

participation by PPSs in drama-enacting performances of service shitshows in their training, the present study just serves to indicate such training may be necessary. Not including actual reports of creating and performing fully structured LARP enactments and researching metrics of the quality of such training on real-life PPSs' performances are the major limitations of the study.

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