

**Nomination Committees:
A Governance Feature of New Zealand National Sport
Organisations**

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Abstract

Nomination committees (NCs) are key to “constructing a value-creating and well-composed board” (Kaczmarek & Nyuur, 2016, p. 100). Yet, despite their centrality to ‘good governance’, NC research has been described as neglected in the for-profit sector and as negligible in the nonprofit sport sector. Within the context of New Zealand national sport organisations (NSOs), NCs are at the centre of a power struggle between the traditional community logic and the new corporate logic approaches to director selection. The overarching aim of this thesis is therefore to reduce the NC knowledge deficit and contribute to improved director selection processes and outcomes.

The research project is situated within the critical realist paradigm and has a broad exploratory/explanatory purpose, namely, to examine NC attributes and determinants within nonprofit sport organisations. The research is presented as two studies, each with their specific purpose(s) summarised as follows:

- (1) Study 1 (NC emergence and classification) – to verify the emergence of NCs as a governance phenomenon of New Zealand NSOs, to describe the structures of these NCs, and to critically examine the NC structures from a democratic theory perspective.
- (2) Study 2 (NC adoption and design – explanatory case studies) – to explain the internal and/or external drivers of this NC adoption and design within a selection of New Zealand NSOs.

Study 1 utilised thematic framework analysis, combined with document analysis and associated strategies, to examine 88 New Zealand NSO constitutions to affirm NC emergence and develop a fourfold NC classification based on NC composition and powers. The four NC types were then critically examined utilising a new democratic concepts schema. The findings demonstrated the different extent to which Warren’s (2017) three democratic objectives and seven democratic practices were promoted within the structures of each NC type. Each NC type reflected either a protective or developmental approach (Held, 2006) to democracy.

Study 2 applied a critical realist approach to four NSO case studies (one NSO from each of the NC classification types). A morphogenesis-morphostasis approach (Archer, 1995), applying multiple organisational change theories, was used to explain the NC change drivers and describe identified symbolic, relational, and material change mechanisms (Hampel et al., 2017). The key findings highlighted the power of inertia (or morphostasis) and the challenges of balancing the co-existing community (i.e., democracy/representation) and corporate (i.e., efficiency/professionalisation) logics. A model was developed demonstrating the role of the

identified causal mechanisms, and the relationship between structure (e.g., institutional isomorphism and resource dependency), culture (e.g., institutional logics) and agency (e.g., strategic choice and institutional work) in the adoption and design of the selected NSO NCs.

From these studies and associated literature reviews, the most significant contributions to knowledge are to advance multiple theoretical models for application to sport governance and organisational change generally and to advance the conceptualisation of NC adoption and design. Of particular note are: the response to calls for multi-theoretical approaches to sport governance (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2020; Shaw, 2016); a re-conceptualisation of nonprofit sport board role/objectives/functions (advancing the recent synthesis by McLeod (2020)); the addition of director selection to the integrated board performance model (Hoye & Doherty, 2011); the contribution to nonprofit sport director selection and NC knowledge (advancing the recent synthesis by Molloy, Dickson and Ferkins (2020)); and an NSO NC 'structural' contribution to the emerging NSO NC 'process' knowledge (adding to Stenling et al., 2020, 2021b).

In summary, this research is important because it contributes to the baseline knowledge about NSO NC attributes (structure) and determinants (change drivers). The results are important for future NC design, for a better understanding of case-appropriate logics balance, for informing future NSO NCs' structures and processes, and for assisting future evaluations of NC effectiveness. The studies can help scholars and practitioners realise the potential of NCs to improve NSO director selection and governance.

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Attestation of Authorship

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person (except where explicitly defined in the acknowledgements), nor material which to a substantial extent has been submitted for the award of any other degree or diploma of a university or other institution of higher learning.

Chapters 3.2, 3.3, 4 and 5 of this thesis represent separate manuscripts that have either been published in or have been submitted to peer-reviewed journals (or equivalents) for consideration for publication. My contribution and the co-author contributions to each of these manuscripts are outlined in the “Co-Authored Works” summary, below. All co-authors have approved the inclusion of the joint work in this doctoral thesis.

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December 21, 2022

Co-Authored Works

Chapter publication reference	Author %
<p>Chapter 3.2</p> <p>Molloy, T., Ferkins, L., & Dickson, G. (2020). Sport board performance: A contribution to the integrated board performance model. In D. Shilbury & L. Ferkins (Eds.), <i>Routledge handbook of sport governance</i> (pp. 318–332). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429440250-23</p>	<p>Molloy 85%</p> <p>Ferkins 10%</p> <p>Dickson 5%</p>
<p>Chapter 3.3</p> <p>Molloy, T., Dickson, G., & Ferkins, L. (2020). Director selection, development and evaluation. In D. Shilbury & L. Ferkins (Eds.), <i>Routledge handbook of sport governance</i> (pp. 333–350). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429440250-24</p>	<p>Molloy 85%</p> <p>Dickson 10%</p> <p>Ferkins 5%</p>
<p>Chapter 4</p> <p>Molloy, T., Ferkins, L., & Dickson, G. (2022). Nomination committees: Designing the way to democracy? <i>Journal of Global Sport Management</i>. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1080/24704067.2022.2062029</p>	<p>Molloy 85%</p> <p>Ferkins 10%</p> <p>Dickson 5%</p>
<p>Chapter 5</p> <p>Molloy, T., Dickson, G., & Ferkins, L. (submitted December 2022). Director selection: Drivers for the adoption and design of nomination committees by New Zealand national sport organisations. <i>Sport Management Review</i>.</p>	<p>Molloy 85%</p> <p>Dickson 10%</p> <p>Ferkins 5%</p>

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On my sport governance learning journey, I very much appreciate the opportunities provided to me through my early roles as a director of Touch New Zealand Incorporated and the Federation of International Touch Incorporated. Little did I know, at the time, the career- and PhD-shaping benefits I would experience.

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On my life journey, to my friends and family who sustained me through-out this (almost) never-ending PhD project...

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Ethics Approval

Ethical approval for this research project falls under the auspices of the Auckland University of Technology Ethics Committee (AUTEC).

For Study 1, ethical approval was not needed as the data (constitutions) were obtained from public records (New Zealand Companies Office).

For Study 2, ethical approval was granted by AUTEC under the reference 15/222, “The emergence of nomination committees as a governance feature of New Zealand national sport organisations” (with an expiry of 31 December 2022 – Appendices A1 to A5).

Chapter 1: Introduction

*Hutia te rito o te harakeke
Kei whea to kōmako e kō?
Ki mai ki ahau
He aha te mea nui o te Ao?
Maku e kī atu,
he tāngata, he tāngata, he tāngata...*

*If the heart of the harakeke was removed,
Where would the bellbird sing?
If I was asked what was the most important thing in the world?
I would be compelled to reply,
it is people, it is people, it is people...*

(Ngaroto, as cited in Quince, 2018, para. 4–5)

I open with this whakataukī (Māori proverb) as it resonates with my personal values and experiences, my research philosophy and the motivation for the studies which are the subject of this thesis. As an Aotearoa New Zealand woman with a predominantly Irish/Scottish heritage, my family stories and values are imbued with strong anti-colonialism (and associated anti-power/land alienation) sentiments and even stronger concepts of justice (for the marginalised) and ‘*empowering people*’ through democracy. As a sport administrator of 25+ years, a guiding principle I apply to challenging decisions is ‘will this get more *people*, playing more quality sport, more often’? As a researcher, subscribing to a critical realist paradigm, I acknowledge the ongoing interplay within and between *people* and the structures they inherit, maintain, disrupt and/or create. The motivation for this research project, then, on the use of nomination committees (NCs) as part of national sport organisation (NSO) director selection processes, is to help non-profit sport organisations get the right *people* (directors) in the right places (on NSO boards) at the right time, to best meet the current and future threats/opportunities for their organisation and its *people* (members).

The whakataukī is also, importantly, not just about people in the individual sense, it is about whakapapa, the people to whom we are connected, past, present, and future, and the collective treasures of their knowledge and experiences (Quince, 2018). The metaphor of the pa harakeke, the flax bush, can be likened to an organisation with the rito (baby shoots) representing the current and future stakeholders, being guarded by the matua (outer ‘parent’ shoots) or directors, who also draw from the healthy roots (or history) of the plant (or organisation) itself. This whakataukī was uttered “by Te Aupouri wāhine rangatira (female chief) Meri Ngaroto in the early 19th century... making a plea for the lives of a group of [visitors] to her marae” (Quince,

2018, para. 2–3) and, by necessity, their ancestors and unborn descendants. So, too, in some smaller way, through this research project, I seek to better understand and respect (protect) the past, and how it drives contemporary action (or inaction), in order to maximise the future potential of NCs and, hence, of NSO board performance. This motivation is consistent with a critical realist’s pursuit of emancipation through explanation.

Having introduced you to my values and research motivation, I now further outline the research context, rationale, and purpose of the study, the thesis structure and contributions, and associated conference presentations and research publications.

1.1 Research Context and Rationale

I contend that director selection, of which NCs are an increasingly visible component, is critical, in both the temporal and substantive sense, to the good governance equation. NCs have been described in the for-profit literature as the foundational governance [sub-]committee (Clune et al., 2014) and the “primary institutional mechanism designed to strengthen director selection processes” (Kaczmarek et al., 2012, p. 474). In the nonprofit sport sector, NCs are acknowledged as an “emerging international phenomenon” (Stenling et al., 2020, p. 638). In the expanded integrated board performance model, I proposed that,

to enjoy the performance-enhancing benefit of directors with the appropriate backgrounds and skill sets (individual factors) to compose a board with appropriate diversity (board factor, structure) that will constructively engage (board factor, intragroup dynamics) with relevant practices and policies (board factor, process), such directors must first be identified and recruited (Molloy, Ferkins & Dickson, 2020, p. 329).

Following that rationale, the NCs’ role in director ‘identification and recruitment’ must now be acknowledged as critical to good governance. Yet, despite this importance and increasing visibility, there is negligible scholarly attention directed to nonprofit sport NCs and the role they play in the director selection process.

In the international sport context, there is evidence, in some jurisdictions, of longstanding NC use by NSOs (Stenling et al., 2020), with many studies referencing the role of NCs as part of broader sport governance investigations (Bradbury & O’Boyle, 2015; Brunzell & Söderman, 2012; Enjolras & Waldahl, 2010; Ferkins & Shilbury, 2010; K. Ingram & O’Boyle, 2018; Stenling et al., 2020). However, at the outset of this research project in 2014, there was no known nonprofit sport research with NCs central to their research question. As at early 2022, there were two published studies focussing on NC processes in Swedish NSOs (Stenling et al., 2020, 2021b) and one study (Study 1 of this thesis) focussing on NSO NC structures in New Zealand (Molloy et al., 2022). In the for-profit sector, where the NC research has been described as

'neglected' (Nachemson-Ekwall & Mayer, 2018), there is evidence to support NC effectiveness in relation to board diversification (Kaczmarek et al., 2012), shareholder protection (Eminet & Guedri, 2010) and overall board performance (Vafeas, 1999) but also under-delivery in relation to anticipated behaviours and processes (Clune et al., 2014; Walther & Morner, 2014). Given the different imperatives (profit versus member/social benefit) of the for-profit and nonprofit sectors respectively, the NC roles, objectives, attributes, determinants, and effects explored in the for-profit sector may not neatly transfer to the nonprofit sector. To further examine these NC factors and maximise the NCs' NSO board-shaping potential (Stenling et al., 2021b), research specific to nonprofit sport NCs is required.

In the New Zealand context, there is evidence of NC use by NSOs (Bradbury & O'Boyle, 2015; Ferkins & Shilbury, 2010; Swimming New Zealand, 2012) consistent with the government sport agency (GSA) corporate logic approach to its good governance recommendations (Sport New Zealand [Sport NZ], 2021). The Swimming New Zealand report (2012) noted that nine out of the nine NSOs reviewed had adopted NCs as part of their director selection processes. Of personal interest to me, as a sport governance scholar, was the composition and powers of these NCs. Tennis New Zealand's NC had the power to appoint four directors and recommend, to the regions, the remaining four directors for election (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2010). New Zealand Cricket's NC had the power to appoint all the directors but with the major association chairpersons having a majority vote on the NC "as the 'owners' of the organisation" (Bradbury & O'Boyle, 2015, p. 359). New Zealand Rugby League, as a result of their high-profile governance review ("NZRL Board Agrees to Report Changes," 2009), adopted an NC dominated by GSA appointees. This GSA-dominated NC had the power to appoint the majority of the NSO directors and recommend the balance, with no member choice other than a right of veto. Whilst these changes, adopting a more corporate (including professionalisation/efficiency) logic approach to director selection and governance, may have been driven in good faith, they raise potential concerns regarding the impact on the community (including democracy/representation) logic (Capling & Marjoribanks, 2004; Stenling et al., 2021b) traditionally associated with these organisations. Thus, a question could be posed regarding the extent to which the 'state', and/or other external, intervention should override the self-determination of these member benefit organisations.

From a personal experience perspective, as a director of Touch New Zealand in the late 1990s and of the Federation of International Touch from circa 2000 to 2012, I had observed other NSOs field criticisms of the debilitating effects of personality, politics and parochialism within their director selection processes. However, my experience within Touch did not reflect these criticisms. I had been recruited by the board from outside the game for my attributes and skills

(gender, sport, and law), in a situation where a regional incumbent voluntarily did not stand again for his position, and I was then endorsed by the membership via election. I reflected that for other NSOs perhaps the crux of the problem lay in the director selection structures and processes themselves, not with the people within the structures/processes. In a democratic governmental election process, there is a public contest between candidates and policy, with a media critique provided, for voter review, before the elections. My observations of a typical NSO elections were that little, if any, information was provided, regarding the needs of the organisation or the candidates' skill sets, prior to the elections. How could an NSO voting member make a quality director selection decision in the absence of quality information on which to base that decision? Little wonder, then, if some decisions reverted to politics and personality.

So, my curiosity was piqued... How to enhance director selection structures, processes, and outcomes for the benefit of NSOs and their members? How to respect, and learn from, the heritage (whakapapa) of the NSOs and their people? How to balance the competing tensions between the corporate/professionalisation and community/democratic logics? How to empower the member voice in these member benefit organisations within a democratic nation? The rationale for this research project is therefore founded on these reflections; the personal (a sense of unease at the potential erosion of democracy within emerging NSO director selection processes), alongside the practical (a desire to help NSOs get the 'right people' on board at the right time), and the conceptual (a need to better understand and conceptually frame the contribution of NSO NCs to quality director selection and governance). This rationale, whilst focussing on the NC's board-shaping potential attached to director selection (Stenling et al., 2021b) has potential application to director development and evaluation as well (Molloy, Dickson, & Ferkins, 2020).

1.2 Purpose of Research

The overarching aim of this research project was to start an NC research programme designed to reduce the identified NC knowledge deficit and contribute to NSO director selection processes and outcomes. With so little known about NCs, there was scope to do so much, including exploring issues such as NC roles, objectives, attributes, determinants, and/or effects. Potential questions concerning NSO NCs related to the what (e.g., NC attributes – structure), the why (e.g., NC determinants – with explanation assisting future emancipation/enhancement), the how (e.g., NC attributes – processes, intra-group dynamics), and how well (i.e., NC effects/performance). Ultimately, I decided to start at the beginning with the 'what' and 'why' questions, reserving the 'how' and 'how well' questions for future knowledge generation.

The research project therefore has a broad exploratory/explanatory purpose, namely, to examine NC attributes and determinants within the nonprofit sport board context. The research is presented as two studies, each with their specific purpose(s) summarised as follows:

- (3) Study 1 (*what*) – to verify the emergence of NCs as a governance phenomenon of New Zealand NSOs, to describe the structures of these NCs, and to critically examine the NC structures from a democratic theory perspective.
- (4) Study 2 (*why*) – to explain the internal and/or external drivers of this NC adoption and design within a selection of New Zealand NSOs.

In addressing the ‘what’ and ‘why’ of New Zealand NSO NC adoption and design, these purposes guided the work to explore and explain the past (whakapapa) to better understand the present and plan for future NC contributions (‘how’ and ‘how well’) to NSO director selection and governance.

1.3 Thesis Structure and Contributions

This thesis follows Auckland University of Technology’s Format Two – Manuscript Structure (Auckland University of Technology [AUT], 2022) whereby “students may include in their research submission for examination manuscripts that have been prepared as they progress through their degree” (p. 91). In terms of contributions, I have demonstrated “extensive knowledge of the wider subject in which the topic for intensive investigation is situated” (AUT, 2022, p. 25) and produced “original contribution[s] to knowledge in a discipline or field of study to an international standard” (p. 26). I have done this in six chapters (see Table 1.1) including three manuscript publications, one manuscript under development and one further manuscript recently submitted to an academic journal.

The present chapter, Chapter 1, provides the context and rationale for the research project, the research purposes, as well as the thesis structure and contributions, and associated conference presentations and research publications. Chapter 2 outlines my personal research philosophy and the overarching research design of the project, with the relevant methods further detailed in Chapters 4 and 5 on the empirical studies. Chapter 3 is a review of the literature on nonprofit sport governance (to set the thesis context), sport board performance (to position director selection and NCs in the good governance equation), and director selection (including NCs), development and evaluation (for context and to serve the nonprofit sport sector by capturing the extant, but limited and often overlooked, knowledge in this domain). Sub-chapter 3.1 (nonprofit sport governance) is presented in manuscript format (under development). Sub-chapters 3.2 (sport board performance) and 3.3 (director selection, including NCs) are comprised of chapters published in *The Routledge Handbook of Sport Governance*, a peer-reviewed

research handbook (see Table 1.2, below). Chapter 4 (Study 1) is an exploration of the emergence and structural design of New Zealand NSO NCs. This chapter addresses the first set of specific research purposes, and associated research questions, applying democratic theories to critically examine the extent to which democratic legitimacy is promoted within the NC structures of New Zealand NSO director selection processes. Chapter 5 (Study 2) is an exploration and explanation of the internal and external drivers for the adoption and structural design of four New Zealand NSO NC case studies. This chapter addresses the second specific research purpose and applies relevant organisational change theories to explain the governance change and identify lessons for future NC adoption, design and/or change. Chapters 4 and 5 each consist of an article published in or submitted to a peer-reviewed journal. Chapters 3 to 5, containing publications, therefore begin with preludes to explain how each chapter is connected within the overall narrative. Finally, Chapter 6 provides a general synthesis of the learnings from the literature review, the two empirical studies, their relationships with the generic and specific literature and theory development, an acknowledgement of thesis limitations, practical applications, suggestions for future research, and conclusions.

In terms of contributions to knowledge, the literature review Chapters 3.1 and 3.2 offer a conceptual advancement to the nonprofit sport governance and sport board performance theory respectively, and Chapters 4 and 5 offer empirical contributions to what is known about the adoption and structural design of nonprofit sport NCs, reducing the significant knowledge deficit about these topics. Chapter 4 also proposes a new democratic concepts schema for NSOs and a new fourfold NC structural classification system for New Zealand NSO NCs. Chapter 5 adapts a critical realist (CR) approach to examining organisational/governance change (NC adoption and design) and applies the previously under-utilised Hampel et al. (2017) mechanisms approach to institutional work.

Table 1.1
Thesis Structure, Content, and Contributions

Chapter No.	Chapter Title	Chapter Content/Contributions
1	Introduction	Content - Research context and rationale - Research aim and purposes - Thesis structure and contributions - Conference presentations and research publications - Manuscript format statement
2	Research Philosophy	Content - Research paradigm - Research design - Methods overview

Prelude (Chapter 3) – an overview of the literature review topics and their thesis locations		
3	Literature Review	
3.1	Sport Governance Wheel	<p>Contributions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Proposes a hierarchical terminology taxonomy for sport governance – role, goal, objectives, functions, and activities - Proposes a new model to conceptualise the alignment and application of sport governance principles and structures, board objectives and functions, and associated theories and models
3.2	Sport Board Performance: A Contribution to the Integrated Board Performance Model	<p>Contribution</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Critiques the Integrated Board Performance model (Hoye & Doherty, 2011) and adds two factors (director selection and intra-group dynamics)
3.3	Director Selection, Development and Evaluation	<p>Contributions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Summarises and organises director selection concepts for nonprofit sport - Identifies the emergence of NCs in the nonprofit sport sector and the associated knowledge gap relating to NC attributes, determinants, behaviours and/or effects/performance - Identifies the potential role of NCs to enhance director selection, development, and evaluation practices in an ongoing succession planning cycle
Prelude (Chapters 4 & 5) – an overview of the empirical studies’ purposes, and their locations in, and contributions to, the overall thesis		
4 (Study 1 – NC Emergence & Classification)	Nomination Committees and National Sport Organisations: Designing the Way to Democracy?	<p>Contributions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Verifies the emergence of NCs within the director selection processes of New Zealand NSOs - Describes the structural design features of New Zealand NSO NCs - Develops a fourfold structural (composition- and powers- based) classification for New Zealand NSO NCs - Proposes a new democratic concepts schema for NSOs - Models a holistic democratic problem/objective- and practice-based approach (Warren, 2017) to examining democratic legitimacy (in the context of NSO NC structural design) - Identifies the director selection model/methods and democratic objectives/practices associated with the four NSO NC types

		- Identifies the 'low planning' emphasis reflected in the constitutionally required NSO NC responsibilities (functions/activities)
5 (Study 2 – Change Drivers for NC Adoption & Design)	Director Selection: Drivers for the Adoption and Design of Nomination Committees by New Zealand National Sport Organisations	Contributions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Proposes a model for applying a CR morphogenetic-cycle (Archer, 1995) based approach to sport management studies - Applies the under-utilised Hampel et al. (2017) mechanisms approach to institutional work - Identifies internal and external drivers (causal mechanisms) explaining NC adoption and design for the selected NSO case studies - Identifies the role of institutional work (and logics) and the relationship between structure, culture and agency in the adoption and design of the relevant NSO NCs - Provides nonprofit sport examples of the co-existence of, and recalibration between, multiple logics - Highlights the power of inertia (morphostasis) and affirms strategies for overcoming such inertia
6	Discussion and Conclusions	Content <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Synthesis (including a summary of contributions to knowledge) - Limitations - Future research - Practical applications - Conclusions

Whilst this research project is situated within the New Zealand NSO context, it has broader application to NSOs in other jurisdictions operating within similar federated network structures. Indeed, there are lessons here for any nonprofit and/or for-profit organisation with the flexibility to design their own NC structures in the pursuit of improved director selection processes and outcomes.

1.4 Conference Presentations and Research Publications

Sub-chapters of the literature review and the Chapters 4 and 5 (empirical studies 1 and 2) have been presented at conferences and/or submitted for publication (see Table 1.2 below). The nonprofit sport board performance and director selection sub-chapters were published in 2020 in *The Routledge Handbook of Sport Governance*, a peer-reviewed research handbook. The

manuscript presented in Chapter 4 (Study 1) was published, in 2022, by the *Journal of Global Sport Management*. The manuscript presented in Chapter 5 (Study 2) has been submitted, in December 2022, to the *Sport Management Review*.

Table 1.2
Publications

Conference	
Literature review – Nonprofit sport governance	Molloy, T., Dickson, G., & Ferkins, L. (2016, November). <i>The Governance Wheel: A new conceptualisation of nonprofit sport governance terminology and theories</i> [Paper presentation]. Twenty-second Sport Management Association of Australia and New Zealand (SMAANZ) Conference, Auckland, New Zealand.
Study 1	Molloy, T., Dickson, G., & Phelps, S. (2014, November). <i>Director selection methods: The emergence of board nomination committees in the governance of New Zealand national sport organisations</i> [Paper presentation]. Twentieth Sport Management Association of Australia and New Zealand (SMAANZ) Conference, Melbourne, Australia.
Study 2	Molloy, T., Dickson, G., & Ferkins, L. (2021, December). <i>Sport governance change: Revisiting the power of inertia (New Zealand national sport organisations' nomination committee adoption and design)</i> [Paper presentation]. Twenty-seventh Sport Management Association of Australia and New Zealand (SMAANZ). (Online conference)
Research Handbook (Peer reviewed)	
Literature review – Sport board performance	Molloy, T., Ferkins, L., & Dickson, G. (2020). Sport board performance: A contribution to the integrated board performance model. In D. Shilbury & L. Ferkins (Eds.), <i>Routledge handbook of sport governance</i> (pp. 318–332). Routledge.
Literature review – Director selection and nomination committees	Molloy, T., Dickson, G., & Ferkins, L. (2020). Director selection, development and evaluation. In D. Shilbury & L. Ferkins (Eds.), <i>Routledge handbook of sport governance</i> (pp. 333–350). Routledge.
Journal	
Study 1	Molloy, T., Ferkins, L., & Dickson, G. (2022). Nomination committees and national sport organizations: Designing the way to democracy? <i>Journal of Global Sport Management</i> . Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1080/24704067.2022.2062029
Study 2	Molloy, T., Dickson, G., & Ferkins, L. (submitted December 2022). Director selection: Drivers for the adoption and design of nomination committees by New Zealand national sport organisations. <i>Sport Management Review</i> .

1.5 Manuscript Format Statement

Given that this thesis is submitted under AUT's format two (manuscript structure), where relevant chapters contain manuscripts submitted to journals or equivalents, there is some duplication in my discussion of the literature (i.e., between sub-chapter 3.3 and Chapters 4 and 5) and the methods (i.e., between Chapter 2 and Chapters 4 and 5).

In terms of authorial voice, Chapters 1, 2 and 6 are written in the first person, by personal preference, for authenticity. Sub-chapters 3.2, 3.3 (and, for consistency, sub-chapter 3.1 replicates the 3.2 and 3.3 format), and Chapters 4 and 5 are written according to the author guidelines of the relevant publication to which they were submitted, and in the passive voice. The thesis versions of these publications have been altered only to ensure consistency of paragraph/table/figure labelling and referencing format throughout the thesis. The precludes to the sub-chapters in Chapter 3, and the precludes to Chapters 4 and 5, provide overviews of the relevant chapters and position them in the cohesive whole.

Chapter 2: Research Philosophy

In this chapter I outline my research philosophy. I cover three key paradigm choices from an ontological, epistemological, and axiological perspective, and identify and justify my personal choice. I also outline the methodological choices made for Study 1 (NC emergence and classification) and Study 2 (change drivers for NC adoption and design), with a brief summary of the relevant methods, deferring a more detailed research methods summary until the chapters on those studies: Chapter 4 (Study 1) and Chapter 5 (Study 2).

2.1 Research Paradigm – Ontology, Epistemology and Axiology

Guba and Lincoln (1994) defined a research paradigm as “the basic belief system or worldview that guides the investigator, not only in choices of method but in ontologically and epistemologically fundamental ways” (p. 105). Within each paradigm lie distinctive approaches to not only the questions of ontological and epistemological beliefs, but also axiological beliefs. Grant and Giddings (2002) described ontological questions as relating to the nature of humanity and reality, and epistemological questions as relating to the nature of knowledge, the veracity of knowledge acquisition and “the nature of the relationship between enquirer and known” (p. 12). Axiology has been positioned by Giddings (2012) as the ‘missing link’ in the above equation, with Farquhar (2012) relating axiology to the values that drive a particular study. Lincoln, Lynham and Guba (2011) extended the concept of axiology to include ethics and spirituality, and noted a shift in their position to include axiology as embedded within the basic belief system of the researcher. As with any belief system, it ultimately comes down to personal choice. My preferred belief system, in terms of ontology, epistemology and axiology, is justified on the basis that: it makes sense to me, it is how I relate to the world, it is better (to me) than the alternatives and “it is a well thought through and coherent perspective on the world” (Easton, 2010, p. 128).


2.1.1 Ontology

From an ontological, or worldview, perspective there have traditionally been two contrasting positions; realism and idealism. Realism, otherwise described as objectivism (Bryman & Bell, 2011) or a nomothetic approach (Farquhar, 2012), posits that there is an “external reality which exists independently of people’s beliefs about or understanding of it” (Ritchie et al., 2014, p. 4). Idealism, also described as constructionism (Bryman & Bell, 2011) or an ideographic approach (Farquhar, 2012), “asserts that reality is fundamentally mind-dependent: it is only knowable through the human mind and through socially constructed meanings, and no reality exists independently of these” (Ritchie et al., 2014, p. 5). Personally, I prefer the middle ground provided by critical realism (CR). Ritchie et al. (2014) described this ontological perspective as a

variant of realism; however, in my view, it provides a bridge between realism and idealism. CR asserts a *depth ontology* (O'Mahoney & Vincent, 2014) with three levels of reality: the *real*, the *actual* and the *empirical* domains. Drawing on the seminal author Bhaskar (1978), Easton (2010) and Tsang (2014) described the real domain as one in which reside the *structures* and *mechanisms* which contribute to the events that occur in the actual domain, in which events occur regardless of whether they are observed, or not, and the empirical as the domain in which those events are observed or experienced. Tsang (2014) provided the analogy of a volcano, whereby the volcano, and its associated processes and mechanisms, sit within the real domain; the eruptions, whether observed or not, sit within the actual domain; and those eruptions which are observed, sit within the empirical domain (**Figure 2.1**). It is this stratified and nested approach to the nature of reality which, to me, makes the most sense.

Figure 2.1

Representation of Tsang's (2014) Critical Realism Volcano Analogy



The empirical domain is, I believe, the realm from which we generate our knowledge of the world through the experience or observation of events.

2.1.2 Epistemology

From an epistemological perspective, Ritchie et al. (2014) described two contrasting philosophies, namely, positivism and interpretivism. Positivism, aligned with a realist worldview, applies the deductive logic of the natural sciences whereby knowledge is waiting to be discovered and the appropriate method of discovery is one in which “logically derived propositions or hypotheses are tested against observations” (p. 6). The axiology attached to positivism is one where facts are objective truths and value-free inquiry is not only possible but also necessary (Hiles, 2008). Interpretivism, aligned with an idealist worldview, applies an inductive logic so that “knowledge is produced by exploring and understanding the social world of the people being studied, focusing on their meanings and interpretations” (Ritchie et al., 2014, p. 12). As such, the axiology attached to interpretivism is clearly subjective, such that values are central to the construction of knowledge (Hiles, 2008). Again, there is a third epistemological approach, another bridge between the two worlds. Drawing on pragmatic concepts, rather than wholly subscribing to Morgan’s (2007) pragmatism, a pragmatic approach (Farquhar, 2012; Ritchie et al., 2014) asserts intersubjectivity and relies on “a version of abductive reasoning that moves back and forth between induction and deduction, thereby recognising the limitations of a purely inductive or deductive approach to reasoning” (Farquhar, 2012, p. 26).

Critical realists have described abduction as an explanatory logic “combining observations, often in tandem with theory identified in the literature review, to produce the most plausible explanation of the mechanisms that caused the events” (O’Mahoney & Vincent, 2014, p. 17). Wynn and Williams (2020) subscribed to two types of abduction: retrodiction (applying previously identified mechanisms to explain event/s in a new context) and retroduction (identifying new mechanisms to explain event/s). Other scholars have suggested that abduction and retroduction are two distinct forms of logic (O’Mahoney & Vincent, 2014) or seem to conflate these concepts (Saxena, 2021), with some using retroduction to cover both retroduction and retrodiction (McAvoy & Butler, 2017) and others promoting their complementary nature (Mingers & Standing, 2017). In this thesis, I resile from resolving any such ambiguities and apply a generally abductive approach involving “iterative cycles of reference to theories and observations ... lead[ing] to increas[ed] understanding of causal mechanism and causal context” (Fox & Do, 2013, p. 744) from which I can infer transitive knowledge about the intransitive domain of the real.

2.1.3 Axiology

The axiological position of the abductive approach is described as intersubjective: “a state in between objectivity as preferred by the positivists and the subjectivity of the interpretivists” (Farquhar, 2012, p. 22). Ritchie et al. (2014) described a similar state of ‘empathic neutrality’ whereby neutrality (avoiding conscious or systemic bias) is pursued whilst acknowledging that “all research will be influenced by the researcher and there is no completely ‘neutral’ or ‘objective’ knowledge” (p. 22). In the CR context, reflexivity is particularly crucial (Quraishi et al., 2022) when applying judgemental rationality to compare “the explanatory power of alternative theories in the transitive dimension ... to generate the most accurate representation of the ‘real world’ given our existing knowledge” (Wynn & Williams, 2012, p. 795). My personal choice, in relation to epistemology and axiology, therefore, lies with a ‘pragmatic’ abductive approach whilst applying empathic neutrality during the exercise of judgemental rationality.

2.1.4 Paradigm Overview

In terms of the labels attached to each collection of beliefs (ontological, epistemological, and axiological), Donmoyer (2008) referred to the concept of paradigm proliferation. Donmoyer drew on Lincoln and Guba (1985) to identify two early approaches: the positivist and naturalist paradigms. These approaches have since been expanded to include the positivist, post-positivist, critical, constructivist (previously known as naturalist) and participatory paradigms (Lincoln et al., 2011). Donmoyer asserted that the critical paradigm, as distinct from critical realism, is actually a metaparadigm as it encompasses “a number of other paradigms including (but not limited to) the neo-Marxist, feminist, participatory, poststructuralist, and postmodern paradigms” (“Kuhn’s Construct in the Social Sciences,” para. 6). Personally, I see the paradigm dilemma as a choice between three overarching positions with the preferred labels of positivism, critical realism, and constructivism as summarised in **Table 2.1**, below. The critical theory and associated approaches then become a subset of the constructivist paradigm or a reflection of research project design implications such as research purpose, methodology and/or theoretical perspectives. Whilst **Table 2.1** is, for simplicity’s sake, presented as three distinct positions, I acknowledge that such sharp distinctions rarely reflect actual practice (Morgan, 2007), with a sliding continuum within and between the paradigms and any subsets likely needed to capture the paradigm, and associated methodological, choices of others.

Table 2.1
Personal Paradigm Overview

Paradigm	Positivist	Critical Realist	Constructivist
Ontology (Nature of reality)	Realism (Objectivism / Nomothetic Approach)	Depth Realism (Stratified layers of reality; real – objective, actual – objective, empirical – subjective)	Idealism (Constructionism / Ideographic Approach)
Epistemology (Nature of knowledge acquisition / creation)	Positivist (Objective – applying deductive logic)	Pragmatic (Intersubjective – applying abductive logic, including retrodiction / retroduction)	Constructivist (Subjective – predominantly applying inductive logic)
Axiology (Role of values)	Objective (Value free, no bias)	Intersubjective (Empathic neutrality, avoiding conscious or systemic bias, with the application of judgemental rationality)	Subjective (Value laden, bias embraced)

To conclude, my paradigm of choice is that of the critical realist, adhering to the ‘holy trinity’ (Quraishi et al., 2022) of ontological realism, epistemic relativism, and judgemental rationality. Consistent with this ‘holy trinity’, CR has been described as methodologically pluralistic (Brönnimann, 2022; Wynn & Williams, 2020), enabling a range of research design choices. The choices for this research project are outlined in the next section.

2.2 Research Design

Research design has been described as “a framework for the generation of evidence that is suited both to [relevant]... criteria and to the research question” (Bryman & Bell, 2011, p. 40). It must be consistent with the personal paradigm choice and with the purpose of the particular research project. I now consider the purpose(s) of the two studies within this research project and the methodological and theoretical approaches, together with a brief identification of the chosen methods of data collection, analysis, and quality (such methods to be further summarised, and justified, in Chapters 4 and 5 on Study 1 and Study 2 respectively).

2.2.1 Research Objectives

Ritchie et al. (2014) asserted that there are four key research objectives:

- “• Contextual – describing the form or nature of what exists;

- Explanatory - examining the reasons for, or associations between, what exists;
- Evaluative - appraising the effectiveness of what exists; and
- Generative - aiding the development of theories, strategies, or actions” (p. 31).

This project, and associated research purposes and questions, spans three of the four objectives (contextual, explanatory, and generative), with a planned post-doctoral project capturing the evaluative objective, as summarised in **Table 2.2**, below.

Table 2.2

Project Design – Research Objectives, Purpose, and Questions

Study	Objective	Research Purpose/Questions
Study 1	Contextual & Generative	Purpose – to verify the emergence of NCs as a governance phenomenon of New Zealand NSOs, to describe the structures of these NCs, and to critically examine the NC structures from a democratic theory perspective.
Study 1 – NC Emergence	Contextual (descriptive)	Question – what has been the rate of adoption of NCs by New Zealand NSOs?
Study 1 – NC Classification	Contextual (descriptive/ exploratory) & Generative	Question – what have been the design features (i.e., composition, powers, and responsibilities) of NCs within New Zealand NSOs? Question – to what extent is democratic legitimacy promoted within the NC structures of New Zealand NSO director selection processes?
Study 2 – Explanatory NSO-NC Case Studies	Contextual (exploratory), Explanatory & Generative	Purpose – to explain the internal and/or external drivers of NC adoption and design within a selection of New Zealand NSOs.
Planned post-doctoral study – Evaluative NSO-NC Case Studies	Evaluative & Generative	Purpose – to examine the selected NSO case study key stakeholder perspectives on: - how their NSO’s NC is composed, and - how, and how well, their NSO’s NC is performing its role (including functions and activities).

The exploratory elements of Studies 1 and 2 recognised the dearth of knowledge about NCs as a governance feature, with NC research being ‘neglected’ by for-profit scholars (Nachemson-Ekwall & Mayer, 2018) and almost non-existent in the nonprofit sport sector (Molloy et al., 2022). As such, the studies, particularly Study 2, were subject to refinement as relevant data was collected.

2.2.2 Study 1 – Methodology, Methods and Theory

Study 1, the NC emergence and classification studies, provided the contextual description (the 'what') of the key *events/outcomes* (New Zealand NSO NC adoption and design) under examination in Study 2 (the change drivers for the NC adoption and design). It involved identifying, counting, and classifying NCs in the New Zealand NSO environment, sitting broadly within a descriptive interpretive methodology (Smythe, 2012). Whilst 'counting' is commonly associated with the positivist/objective realm, in this case, the completion of the Study 1 data collection and analysis required 'interpretation' to determine what 'counted' as an NC and to what 'class' a particular NC belonged. In addition, a descriptive approach was required at the outset due to the relatively unexplored nature of the phenomena, to meet the CR case study requirements of Study 2.

In terms of methods, the data for Study 1 were comprised of a comprehensive sample (Miles et al., 2014) of 88 NSO constitutions collected from the New Zealand Companies Office, Incorporated Societies Register, and stored electronically (NVivo12). From these constitutions a judgement sample (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008) of 26 constitutions with clear evidence of the existence of an NC was taken, with a fourfold descriptive NC classification (Bailey, 2011) developed from the data in these constitutions. The abductive logic applied to the data analysis followed a six-step thematic framework approach (Ritchie et al., 2014; Srivastava & Thomson, 2009) complemented at relevant steps by qualitative content analysis (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008), document analysis (Bowen, 2009), and the compare, contrast, and cluster tactics of Miles et al. (2014). The resultant partially ordered NC meta-matrix records the data summaries from which the NC classification was developed (Appendix B).

The theoretical framework for Study 1 served an overall generative function (Ritchie et al., 2014), as well as CR's emancipatory function (O'Mahoney & Vincent, 2014). Having ascertained the 'what' of New Zealand NSO NCs' constitutional composition, powers, and responsibilities, I then critically examined these NC structural design features utilising Warren's (2017) democratic objectives and practices approach. In doing so, I hoped to assist future NSO NC adoption/change design choices achieve a case-appropriate balance between the traditional community logic (representation / democracy) and the new corporate logic approach (professionalisation / efficiency) (Capling & Marjoribanks, 2004; Stenling et al., 2021b) to nonprofit sport governance and director selection.

2.2.3 Study 2 – Methodology, Methods and Theory

Study 2, focussing on the NC adoption and design change drivers, provided the opportunity to infer the 'why', the *causal mechanisms and structures* at play in CR's *real domain*, based on the

events/outcomes described in Study 1 and the stakeholders' *observations and experiences* of the *associated events*, occurring in CR's *empirical domain*.

In terms of methodology, a morphogenesis-morphostasis (Archer, 1995; Lipscomb, 2009) approach to CR is taken utilising CR multi-case comparison design (Easton, 2010; Kessler & Bach, 2014; Saxena, 2021; Tsang, 2014; Wynn & Williams, 2008, 2012, 2020). The morphogenesis-morphostasis (M-M) approach has been identified as useful in the study of sport organisational change and policy implementation (Lusted, 2018). In particular, it is valuable for identifying the mechanisms at play in the morphogenetic/static cycle whereby structural conditioning impacts the socio-cultural interactions within and between structures and agents, with resultant impacts (morphogenesis or morphostasis) on the relevant structures (Archer, 1995; Lusted, 2018). A case study approach is appropriate as the research purpose raises the questions 'why?', and 'how?' (added during the course of the study), focussing on contemporary phenomena (NC adoption and design) in an uncontrolled environment (NSO governance and director selection) where the boundaries between context and phenomena are not clear (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Yin, 2009). Saxena (2021) acknowledged a distinction between the positivist (Yin, 2017) and the interpretivist/constructivist (Andrade, 2009) approaches to organisational case studies, and suggested that the CR case study goes "beyond statistical regularity (as in positivism) or thick description (as in interpretivism) ... [to look] for the existence of causal mechanisms (Mingers & Standing, 2017) that result in the phenomena of interest" (p. 20). CR's alignment with case study design acknowledges the openness of social systems, encouraging in-depth examination of the layers of reality utilising abduction, and a variety of methods to achieve the fundamental aim of causal explanations (Easton, 2010; Tsang, 2014). Consistent with the Wynn and Williams (2020) synthesis of recent CR case studies, a five-step framework was developed and applied. The five steps were:

- (1) Case selection;
- (2) Thick description of the phenomena and associated structures and agents;
- (3) Causal framework development, including relevant background theories and candidate mechanisms;
- (4) Empirical corroboration utilising template analysis to eliminate, confirm, or identify additional, plausible explanation/s via
 - (a) within-case analysis of key informant interviews, and then
 - (b) cross-case analysis of key informant interviews; and,
- (5) Application of judgment rationality to compare and evaluate competing theories including triangulation (with organisational documents) and reflexivity.

In terms of methods (within the case study design), purposive case selection was applied using both 'selecting-for-similarity' criteria (four New Zealand NSOs which have adopted NCs) and 'selecting-for-difference' criteria (one from each different quadrant of the fourfold NC structural design classification) (Kessler & Bach, 2014). The data for the four NSO case studies were collected from key informant interviews and organisational documents. The key informant interview participants were selected utilising purposive and snowball sampling (Bryman & Bell, 2011), seeking to gain a wide range of perspectives from "multiple stakeholder groups that [had] an influence on or [were] influenced by the sequence of events" (Saxena, 2021, p. 23). Consent was obtained through the distribution and signing of Participation Information and Consent forms (Appendices C and D respectively). The interviews followed a semi-structured interview 'Indicative Questions' guide (Appendices E1 and E2), were audio-recorded, transcribed (intelligent verbatim), and participant-checked with pseudonyms assigned. The interview transcripts were stored electronically, with NVivo12 software supporting their analysis. Template analysis (TpA) was applied, a paradigmatically 'flexible' form of thematic analysis (TA) commonly associated with organisational studies (Brooks et al., 2015; King & Brooks, 2017). Again, the positivist-constructivist philosophical divide, highlighted by Wiltshire and Ronkainen (2021), between the constructivist 'reflexive' TA (Braun & Clark, 2019) and the neo-positivist 'codebook' TA (Boyatzis, 1998) approaches to TA is recognised. Whilst not overtly following either Wiltshire and Ronkainen's (2021) proposed CR stratified theme types or Fryer's (2022) "tripartite structure" (p. 11) approach to TA, the layers of experiences, events and causal mechanisms were considered as I proceeded abductively through the seven-step TpA process. The final (TpA) template records the hierarchical theoretical/thematic categories developed from the interview data (Appendix F). For the organisational documents, relevant material was collected from the NSO case studies and public sources, including constitutions, annual/special general meeting documents, annual reports, and governance review documents, particularly for the year before, of, and after, NC adoption. These documents were retained and coded in hard copy using a simplified version of document analysis (Bowen, 2009), as a triangulation activity, to seek confirmatory or contradictory evidence on which to base 'justifiable', as opposed to 'true', results and/or explanatory theories (Easton, 2010).

The theoretical framework for Study 2, like Study 1, also served generative and emancipatory functions. The initial causal framework focussed on the 'why', utilising organisational change theories. I predicted that the operation of *mechanisms* such as normative/mimetic/coercive isomorphism (Slack & Hinings, 1994) and resource dependency (Slack & Hinings, 1992) would explain the NSO NC adoptions and that strategic choice (Kikulis et al., 1995; Phelps & Kent, 2010) would explain the range of NC designs. What I failed to anticipate were the strong themes relating to inertia (or morphostasis) and the *mechanisms* by which key agents overcame inertial

forces. The final analysis templates therefore drew on themes relating to institutional work (Hampel et al., 2017; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Meyer et al., 2021; Nite & Edwards, 2021; Robertson et al., 2021) and associated creation activities, focussing on the question of 'how' to implement such change. In this way, I hoped to assist NSOs avoid reactive change and promote instead a more timely, pro-active, and constructive approach to organisational/governance change, in particular, NC adoption and design.

2.2.4 Quality

Quality, trustworthiness, rigour and/or validity are all terms attached to the judgements made about the knowledge claims of researchers (Ronkainen & Wiltshire, 2021). Constructivists have previously attempted to mirror the positivist 'validity' approach by applying, for example, credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability criteria instead of internal validity, external validity/generalisation, reliability and objectivity criteria respectively (Shenton, 2004). However, critics of this approach suggest that such 'mirroring' is philosophically incongruent due to the differing ontological and epistemological positions of the respective paradigms (Ronkainen & Wiltshire, 2021).

In applying the CR approach to quality, it is not a matter of uncovering 'the truth' but 'a' truth that is acceptable and well-reasoned (Easton, 2010). For Study 1, this was achieved by applying data quality (Bowen, 2009) and results trustworthiness (Bowen, 2009; Elo & Kyngäs, 2008) criteria. For Study 2, this was achieved by applying the CR-consistent principles of ontological plausibility, empirical adequacy, and practical utility (Ronkainen & Wiltshire, 2021). Overlaying these strategies for both studies was an ongoing process of depth-reflexivity (Quraishi et al., 2022), whereby my perspective as a person (including age, gender, socio-economic, pro-democracy factors), an industry insider (previously as a national and international sport organisation director, currently as an NSO NC member) and sport governance academic are acknowledged, and mitigated, in an attempt to achieve empathic neutrality (Ritchie et al., 2014).

Chapter 3: Literature Review


Prelude

At the outset of this journey toward an MPhil (2014), subsequently converted to a PhD (2016), there was no known nonprofit sport governance literature, and limited for-profit governance studies, on the use of NCs in director selection processes. The literature review for this thesis therefore commenced with a baseline review of sport governance theories and models in which to situate the NC and its relationship with such theories and models. Support was found for the alignment of NC design with a particular organisation's governance configurations (positioned along with recommendations relating to terminology harmonisation for the discipline to make better sense of such configurations). The assumption that NCs, being part of director selection processes, would impact board composition, and hence board and organisational performance, was then examined with a review of the Hoye and Doherty (2011) integrated board performance (IBP) model. Drawing on the foundational sources of the IBP model, and other relevant literature, evidence was found for adding a director selection factor (including the use of NCs) and an intra-group dynamics factor, resulting in the expanded IBP model (Molloy, Ferkins, & Dickson, 2020). Next, a baseline review of director selection, development, and evaluation, including the potential contribution of NCs, was conducted in the sport governance context. An argument was developed for the potential use of NCs beyond director selection, to include director development, with these objectives being both informed by and informing evaluation "in an ongoing succession planning cycle" (Molloy, Dickson, & Ferkins, 2020, p. 347). These three topics, sport governance, sport board performance and director selection, development, and evaluation, are presented in this literature review chapter, as displayed in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1 also identifies the location of additional literature relating to NCs and democracy theories (in Chapter 4's literature review) and NCs and organisational change theories, including institutional isomorphism, resource dependency, strategic choice, and institutional work (in Chapter 5's literature review). These two chapters identify an emerging NC research agenda focusing on NSO NC structures (Molloy et al., 2022) and processes (Stenling et al., 2020, 2021b). Interestingly, these authors have all (independently) observed the potentially competing community and corporate logics (Capling & Marjoribanks, 2004; Hampel et al., 2017) at play in both the structure and processes of these NCs. Key learnings from sub-chapters 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 and Chapters 4 and 5 are integrated into the overarching thesis synthesis and conclusions (Chapter 6).

Figure 3.1

Representation of Literature Review Topics and Thesis Locations



As indicated in the introduction chapter, Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are presented in their ‘publication’ format. Chapter 3.1 is presented in draft manuscript format to ensure consistency with sub-chapters 3.2 and 3.3, which have both been published.

3.1 Sport Governance Wheel

Prelude

This sub-chapter comprises an early draft manuscript intended for further development and submission (after PhD completion) to an appropriate peer-reviewed sport management journal.

3.1.1 Introduction

In acquiring the foundational knowledge of the cognate field, a student of sport governance is likely confronted with a confusing array of terminology. There is varied use of this terminology, with key terms such as theories, models and/or principles, and board roles and functions, often subject to inconsistent and/or conflated use across scholarly and industry literature. Such variation can make it difficult for the student to understand, the scholar to advance, and the practitioner to apply these key ‘concepts’ for the betterment of sport governance.

This variation in terminology is potentially even more problematic when considering the recommendations for multi-theoretical approaches (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2020; Hoyer & Doherty, 2011; Shaw, 2016) and the strategic alignment of sport governance structures and processes in order to maximise performance (Bradshaw, 2009; Parent et al., 2021; Seaworth, 2016). Other disciplines (Kahn et al., 2014; McGrath & Whitty, 2015; Rozensky et al., 2015; Ward, 2012;

Winniford et al., 2009) have recognised the advantages (communication clarity, enhanced sense-making and cumulative theory building) of utilising, and the opposite disadvantages of not utilising, a consistent terminology framework. Yet despite the growth in sport governance scholarship (Dowling et al., 2018; Parent & Hoye, 2018; Shilbury & Ferkins, 2020), there remains an opportunity to better harmonise relevant terminology so that the impact of sport governance research might be enhanced.

This sub-chapter therefore calls for the development of a hierarchical terminology taxonomy (Ward, 2012) for sport governance and a model with which to view the practical alignment of relevant sport governance concepts. These objectives are promoted through, firstly, noting a preferred governance definition and identifying a range of descriptions of the nonprofit sport board 'roles' with the proposed hierarchical terminology approach re-framing these 'roles' (as role, objectives, functions, activities, and tasks). Next, a summary is provided of other key nonprofit sport governance concepts, including governance theories, models, and principles associated with the nonprofit sport board role. Finally, a new interactive model (the Sport Governance Wheel) is offered to support the overt recognition and alignment of relevant structures, objectives, functions, theories and/or models in the fulfilment of the nonprofit sport board 'role' and/or in any governance system design or re-design.

3.1.2 Governance Definition and the Role of the Board

There is no agreed definition for the term 'governance' in the sport governance literature (Dowling et al., 2018). Some authors have preferred a generic definition focussing on elements such as the responsibility to monitor, control, guide and/or provide strategic direction for the organisation (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2010; Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007; Shilbury et al., 2013). Others have taken a more operational approach, with definitions of governance including reference to setting mission (Hums & MacLean, 2004) and management performance criteria (Sport NZ, 2021), policymaking (Hums & MacLean, 2004; Sport NZ, 2021), and risk management (Australian Sports Commission [ASC], 2012; Sport NZ, 2021). This sub-chapter applies the generic definition of governance as "the system by which [organisations] are directed and controlled" (Cadbury Committee, 1992, para. 2.5). This is consistent with recent attempts to reduce definitional confusion in relation to governance and associated terms (McGrath & Whitty, 2015) and is broad enough to capture key types of governance, for example, organisational/corporate, systemic, and political governance (Dowling et al., 2018; Henry & Lee, 2004).

The aforementioned operational elements then form part of the activities of the board in the pursuit of effective control and direction, or 'good' governance. The challenge lies in determining the board activities necessary to contribute to this good governance goal. In the

literature, board activities have been variously described as roles (Cornforth, 2001; Miller-Millesen, 2003), functions (Cornforth, 2001; Nicholson & Kiel, 2004a, 2004b), tasks (Cornforth, 2001; Ferkins & Kilmister, 2012), or behaviours (Miller-Millesen, 2003). The balance of this section further explores this variation and then proposes a hierarchical terminology taxonomy approach as a way to initiate terminology harmonisation discussions within the discipline.

Overview of Identified Board Roles and Functions

In terms of the role of the board, the for-profit literature historically has focussed on “the two primary roles of the board in first, ensuring conformance by management and, second, enhancing organizational performance” (Hoye et al., 2012, p. 226). Ferkins and Kilmister (2012) repositioned these roles as oversight (conformance), foresight (performance) and added a third role, insight (deeper level reflection and the application of complex decision-making).

Within the for-profit and nonprofit governance literature, further variation has occurred with, for example, Green and Griesinger (1996) describing nine areas of board *responsibility* and 33 *activities*; Cornforth’s (2001) outputs including five board *roles* capturing 17 *functions/tasks*; Nicholson and Kiel describing seven key board *functions* (2004a) and three key *activities/roles* (2004b); and R. T. Ingram (2015) listing 10 basic *responsibilities*. In the nonprofit sport governance literature, similar variation has occurred, including Inglis’ (1997a) 17 *roles* and four *factors*; Shilbury’s (2001) seven *roles*; Yeh and Taylor’s (2008) 11 *roles*; Yeh et al.’s (2009) 29 *roles* and six *factors* (noting their distinction between directors and supervisory board members); Walters et al.’s (2011) nine *roles*; and Bradbury and O’Boyle’s (2015) four *responsibilities*. In addition, the grey literature has contributed to this potential confusion with, for example, the ASC’s (2012) three key *issues* and six governance *principles*, and Sport NZ’s (2016) key board *duties* and nine *responsibilities*.

Bradbury and O’Boyle (2015) provided a useful summary of nonprofit sport perspectives regarding the key content of these ‘roles’ of the board, including financial, strategic, and legal (Walters et al., 2011), mission setting, planning, CEO management, public relations, and associated sub-tasks (Inglis, 1997a), with a priority placed, by board members, on strategy planning and financial management, including budget allocation, roles (Shilbury, 2001). Yeh and Taylor (2008), in their comparison of the role of the board in the profit, nonprofit, and sport sectors, summarised the role of the board in the sport sector as strategy and policy development, executive engagement, monitoring and management, public relations, member and stakeholder communication, legal compliance, financial management, risk management, and board self-evaluation and development. Whilst no major ‘role’ updates were evident in the more recent synthesis by McLeod (2020), Shilbury and Ferkins (2020) have identified five key

themes in the sport board ‘functions’ literature: monitoring and compliance, strategy formulation, managing stakeholders, integrating regional entities, and integrating network actors/stakeholders.

A review of the aforementioned ‘roles’ reveals that some of these activities sit clearly within the board’s oversight mode (e.g., legal compliance), some within the foresight mode (e.g., strategic planning), some within both oversight and foresight (e.g., financial management) and some activities are lower-level tasks (e.g., budget allocations). The allocation of activities to the ‘insight’ mode is less tangible but is anticipated to be a fruitful area for future scholarly attention with its potential to contribute to the ‘X-factor’ of quality governance and/or address the increasing number of issues arising in the realm of ethical governance and leadership (Constandt et al., 2020; Kihl, 2020).


Hierarchical Terminology Taxonomy Proposal

To synthesise the above, and initiate discussions toward the ‘harmonisation’ of terminology, it is proposed that the nonprofit sport board’s “overarching *role* [emphasis added] is that of governance” (Ferkins & Kilmister, 2012, p. 141), to govern (direct and control) their organisation, with the *goal* being good (quality) governance, achieved through the pursuit of three *objectives*: oversight, foresight, and insight. Under each of these objectives the actual activities of the board sit within varying levels – for example, the higher-level financial planning and lower-level budget allocations. In the absence of agreed, ‘absolute’ terminology approaches in business and in recognition of the ‘relational’ nature of such activity-based terms (Nickols, 2016) a provisional terminology hierarchy is proposed, with “*functions* [as the] high level events that are then decomposed into finer grained [sub] functions that are then decomposed into processes of *activities*, that are then broken down into *tasks* [emphasis added]” (Sarafinchan, 2013).

Figure 3.2 provides an overview of the proposed upper layers of the hierarchy, the *role*, *goal*, *objectives*, and *functions* of the nonprofit sport board. From the previously identified roles, responsibilities, tasks, etc., the foresight *objective* would include the *functions* of strategic planning, resource management, human resource (HR) management, and stakeholder relationships. The oversight *objective* would include the *functions* of legal status protection, risk management (with the development of further sub-functions recommended), human resource management, stakeholder accountability and policy and process.

Figure 3.2

Nonprofit Sport Board – Role, Goal, Objectives, and Functions



The insight *objective* remains ‘neglected’ and ‘underplayed’ (Ferkins & Kilmister, 2012) but includes philosophical reflection on societal-level questions such as: “What does sport offer to community cohesion? What contribution does sport make to moral development?” (p. 138). Ten years on from Ferkins and Kilmister’s (2012) chapter, this neglected objective appears even more critical as nonprofit sport boards grapple with complex issues of internal and external import. Internally, boards face issues such as determining “their role in organisational culture” (Sport NZ, 2021, p. 4) and modelling/upholding sport integrity (Kihl, 2020). Externally, broader societal issues include the ‘West is best’ assumptions of sport modernisation agendas (Henry, 2021), the impact of ‘settler colonialism’ on sport management practices and research (Chen & Mason, 2019) and sport’s role in combatting global climate change (United Nations, n.d.). The insight *function* has therefore been tentatively described as critical reflection with two *sub-functions*: internal (organisational) reflection and external (societal) reflection.

Figures 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 present examples of the next level of the terminology hierarchy, key board *activities* under the board foresight, oversight, and insight *objectives/functions* respectively. Again, tentative *activities* for the insight *sub-functions* are proposed: identifying sport’s contribution to societal level issues and associated ethical decision-making (under external reflection) and principles/culture setting and ethical decision-making (under internal reflection).

By way of example, director selection related activities (and associated tasks) would fall under the foresight HR function – as the ‘board succession planning’ activity (see Figure 3.3) – and the oversight HR function – as the ‘board nomination committee appointment’ activity (see Figure 3.4). The tasks attached to foresight’s board succession planning could include environmental scanning, reviewing board/director performance evaluations, development of board needs matrices, etc. The tasks attached to the NC oversight activities could include the review by the NC of board evaluations and needs matrices, etc. It is proposed that the NC recruitment and selection activities would then include investigations (tasks) directed towards ascertaining candidates’ abilities to contribute to insight’s critical reflection function (see Figure 3.5).

Figure 3.3

Nonprofit Sport Board – Foresight Functions and Activities




Figure 3.4

Nonprofit Sport Board – Oversight Functions and Activities





Figure 3.5

Nonprofit Sport Board – Insight Functions and Activities



To further advance this sport governance terminology harmonisation discussion would require some consensus within the discipline as to the need, as well as the motivation, to develop a discipline-specific terminology harmonisation for governance structure and processes akin to Kahn et al.'s (2014) proposal in the field of paediatric research. Such harmonisation could then be harnessed to contribute to enhanced sense-making and cumulative theory building (Rozensky et al., 2015; Ward, 2012).

3.1.3 Sport Governance Theories, Models and Principles

In the pursuit of good governance, there have been a range of theories, models and principles applied to describe, explain, and/or guide the nonprofit sport board. The discussion below captures definitions for the concepts of governance *theories*, *models* and *principles* and draws on seminal for-profit/nonprofit governance literature, and the academic and grey nonprofit sport literature to outline key governance theories, models, and principles relevant to nonprofit sport boards.

Governance Theories and Models

In simplistic terms, the 'model' describes, and the 'theory' explains (Nilsen, 2015), with theory "inform[ing] practice and vice versa" (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2020, p. 22). To expand, a theory comprises "statements of constructs and their relationships to one another that explain how, when, why and under what conditions phenomena take place" (Cunningham, 2013, p. 1). A model can describe how the pieces of a system fit together (Magretta, 2002) providing a "structural representation" (Doherty, 2013, p. 7) or "visual picture [of] the proposed causal linkages between specific constructs drawn from a theory or theories" (Carpiano & Daley, 2006, p. 565).

Nonprofit sport governance scholars draw heavily on theories and models generated in the for-profit and general nonprofit governance disciplines. Of particular relevance is the nonprofit governance discipline, given its similarity to nonprofit sport, whereby organisational objectives go beyond the primarily pecuniary motive of the for-profits to encapsulate a wider range of member and/or social benefits. Cornforth (2004), a leading nonprofit author, provided a useful comparison of key theoretical perspectives on organisational governance as summarised in Table 3.1 below.

Table 3.1*A Comparison of Theoretical Perspectives on Organisational Governance*

Theory	Interests	Board members	Board objective	Model
Agency theory	Members and managers have different interests	Member representatives	Conformance	Compliance model
Stewardship theory	Members and managers share interests	Experts	Improve performance	Partnership model
Democratic perspective	Members contain different interests	Member representatives	Political	Democratic model
Stakeholder theory	Stakeholders have different interests	Stakeholder representatives	Political	Stakeholder model
Resource dependency theory	Stakeholders and organisation have different interests	Chosen for influence with key stakeholders	Boundary spanning	Co-optation model
Managerial hegemony theory	Members and managers have different interests	Member representatives	Symbolic	'Rubber stamp' model

Note. Adapted from "The Governance of Cooperatives and Mutual Associations: A Paradox Perspective" by C. Cornforth, 2004, *Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics*, 75(1), p. 20. Copyright 2004 by CIRIEC.

Applied in isolation, the above theories have been criticised for being "rather one dimensional, and ... for only illuminating a particular aspect of the board's work" (Cornforth, 2004, p. 19). As noted in the preceding discussion on the role of a board, the board has multiple objectives, functions, activities, and tasks, with the key objectives being to provide oversight, foresight, and insight in the leadership of the organisation. The oversight objective is consistent with agency theory and the foresight objective is more consistent with stewardship and/or resource dependency theory, with the insight objective also aligning to stewardship/resource dependency theories and potentially a broader 'societal' stakeholder approach. It is not a choice of one over the other, but a matter of balancing, and mediating between, the relevant objectives, functions and tasks, and the associated theories and models. Cornforth (2004) elaborated further by exploring the tensions between the selection of representative or expert boards, between conformance and performance roles, and between controlling and supporting management. In order to effectively balance such tensions and paradoxes (Cornforth, 2004) and the ever-changing contingencies (Bradshaw, 2009), boards, in any governance redesign, must "consciously reflect ... on their governance configurations and [make] strategic choices about their own alignment, taking into account their values, missions, and subjective assessments of the contingencies (Bradshaw, 2009, p. 65).

In the sport sector, models describing common governance configurations include the traditional (federated delegate system) and Carver policy models (Hoye et al., 2012) and the

kitchen table (Kikulis et al., 1992), board-led, executive-led, professional, and corporate archetypes (Parent et al., 2021). In terms of explanatory theories, Hoye et al. (2012) argued for the relevance of stewardship, resource dependence and stakeholder theories whilst resisting the application of agency theory. Conversely, Ferkins and Kilmister (2012) applied agency theory as a possible explanation for the performance-diminishing board behaviour of prioritising the oversight objective ahead of the foresight objective. O'Boyle (2012) also acknowledged the place, and limitations, of agency theory in the nonprofit sport context and explored the relevance of resource dependency, institutional and stakeholder theories, concluding that a multi-theoretical approach is likely the most appropriate. Additional theories and concepts, to add to this multi-theoretical, or paradoxical, approach to sport governance, include leader-member exchange theory (Hoye, 2006), institutional theory (Robertson et al., 2021), board strategic balance (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2015a), stakeholder-stakeowner (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2015b) and collaborative governance theories (Shilbury et al., 2016, 2020) to name a few (see also Ferkins & Shilbury, 2020).

The interface between governance and leadership is another emerging field of sport governance enquiry with concepts such as ethical leadership and decision-making coming to the fore in both industry sources (Australian Institute of Sport [AIS], 2015; ASC, 2012, 2016; Sport Canada., 2011; Sport NZ, n.d.-c, n.d.-d, 2021; UK Sport, n.d.) and academic sources (Cikaliuk et al., 2015; Erakovic & Jackson, 2012; Ferkins et al., 2018; O'Boyle et al., 2020; Shilbury et al., 2020; Welty Peachey et al., 2015). The field of leadership, being ethical and reflective, and seeking to formulate the right questions as opposed to solving only the current questions (Nahkies, 2009), has been earlier proposed as fertile ground for the future development and understanding of the insight objective of the board.

Governance Principles

Regardless of the governance theory or model applied to the role of the board, the board directors are in a position of power and trust, with fiduciary duties (Law Commission, 2013) to the organisation they govern. As such, a principled 'good faith' approach to the fulfilment of the board role is required. Here, a distinction is made between governance principles or 'principled' governance (including the identification and prioritisation of fundamental principles, such as integrity and transparency, to be applied to the governance process), principles-based (guidelines), and rules-based (legislation and regulation) governance. This is consistent with the plain English meaning of 'principle' as "a moral rule or a strong belief that influences your actions" (Oxford University Press, n.d., para. 1) also cited by Thompson et al. (2022).

As early as 1992, the Cadbury Committee promoted three key principles of governance: “openness, integrity and accountability” (para. 3.2). However, this concept of governance principles seems to have lost its way. Whilst the grey literature does recognise the importance of governance principles with concepts such as ethics and integrity featuring in good governance guides (AIS, 2015; ASC, 2012, 2016; Sport Canada, 2011; Sport NZ, n.d.-c, n.d.-d, 2021; UK Sport, n.d.) such guides do not take a comprehensive approach to governance principles but add a principle, or two, as part of an overall ‘to do’ list for the board. Industry documents also appear to eschew, at times, the plain English meaning of ‘principle’ by assigning a numeric function to the term in setting out their ‘to do’ lists for NSO boards (ASC, 2012). Accordingly, despite efforts such as those by Kihl (2020), governance principles, for example, integrity, are often marginalised amongst a set of primarily *activity*-based guidelines.

In academic circles, attention has recently been directed to the concept of sport governance principles (Chappelet & Mrkonjic, 2019; Henry, 2021; Parent & Hoye, 2018; Thompson et al., 2022). The most recent systematic review identified 258 unique governance ‘principles’, including accountability, autonomy, transparency, integrity, democracy, sustainability, equality, and inclusivity, with transparency, accountability and democracy identified as the most ‘popular’ (Thompson et al., 2022). Importantly, the governance principles conversation has acknowledged the “lack of a consistent ... conceptualisation of governance principles” (Parent & Hoye, 2018, p. 21) with calls for a “common conceptual and empirical language” (Chappelet & Mrkonjic, 2019, p. 23) including the purposeful use, and definition, of terms (Thompson et al., 2022) whilst recognising the need to contextualise for factors such as size and culture (Chappelet & Mrkonjic, 2019; Henry, 2021; Parent & Hoye, 2018; Thompson et al., 2022). In light of this need to contextualise, one study stated a clear preference for harmonising the “*processes* [emphasis added] through which sport governance principles should be decided, rather than in the imposition of definitive principles *per se*” (Henry, 2021, p. 206). Of interest, and to further illustrate the need for harmonisation, Thompson et al. (2022) then proceeded to ignore their own cited definition of ‘principle’ (as a guiding moral rule or strong belief) and instead use the word as an ‘overarching’ term to capture principles, guidelines, and indicators, and also to categorise as principles, non-moral based concepts, such as strategic focus and stakeholder engagement, which under this sub-chapter’s proposal would be categorised as board functions.

To conclude, governance ‘principles’ could benefit from inclusion in the proposed board ‘roles’ harmonisation process. Also of note, a ‘morals-based’ approach to governance principles aligns with the critical reflection function of the proposed insight objective of the nonprofit sport board. As earlier proposed, this issue of ‘principled’ governance naturally partners with the insight objective, in particular in providing ethical leadership (M. E. Brown & Trevino, 2006;


Constandt et al., 2020) and should be given greater, and distinct, prominence. Rather than being absorbed across a range of functions/activities (or being subject to misnomer), governance principles such as transparency, accountability, democracy, and integrity (Thompson et al., 2022) should be recognised as a distinct 'category' essential to the organisational and board culture and the academic research agenda.

3.1.4 Sport Governance Wheel

How then to synthesise, in a harmonised way, the aforementioned governance concepts such as board role, objectives, functions, activities, and governance principles with a paradox/contingency approach to theories and models, in a way which both reflects the dynamic nature of the board at work and encourages conscious alignment of governance configurations? In order to capture this complexity, a new visual conceptualisation is offered – the Sport Governance Wheel (Figure 3.6).

As depicted in Figure 3.6, the Sport Governance Wheel is placed on the foundational platform of the organisation's chosen governance principles. It then has concentric circles radiating out from the common centre, or goal, of 'good governance'. Each circle can rotate around the centre independently of the other circles. The rotating capability of each circle reflects the changing nature (contingencies), and activities, of organisations and their boards. The circles closest to the centre, such as governance structure and director selection methods, are context specific and those least subject to repeated change. The circles toward the outside, such as board functions and associated explanatory theories, changing on a day-by-day basis, and even a meeting-agenda-item-by-agenda-item basis. It is contemplated that these circles be populated with key/common content for each circle with scope for flexibility and additional material. The 'pointer' is placed at the top of the wheel with the function-set circle indicating the current activities of the board to which all the other circles should align in a manner which is consistent with relevant theory and the structure of the focal organisation. The position of the pointer and the alignment of the circles with that pointer can then be readily understood from both a multi-theoretical (scholarly) and applied (practitioner) perspective.

Figure 3.6
Sport Governance Wheel



Note. An online version of the Sport Governance Wheel, with links to further information, including relevant board activities and descriptions of associated governance theories and models, is under development.

For example, in the New Zealand NSO context, on Figure 3.6 the inner circles 1 and 2 depict the key governance (Sport NZ, 2021) and director selection (Molloy, Dickson & Ferkins, 2020) structures. In this context, an NSO might have a current federated (traditional) governance structure, with a mixed/hybrid model of director selection utilising election (by members), delegation (to represent members/interest groups), co-option (by the existing board) and/or appointment (including by nomination committees). When engaging with the HR management function in *foresight* mode, the CEO- and board-related activities are future/strategic focussed, reflecting a partnership model (explained by stewardship theory). Alternatively, if a strong affinity for a collaborative network model approach (potentially explained by stakeowner theory) were selected, then these would guide the scope, philosophy, and direction of such activities. When engaged in CEO and board performance assessment/management-type activities, the wheel would turn to align with the HR management function *oversight* mode, potentially explained by agency, resource dependency and/or institutional theories. As previously identified, the platform on which this wheel sits consists of the fundamental governance principles (e.g., transparency, accountability, integrity), as determined by the organisation, which form the overarching and guiding belief set for the organisation and its board.

To spin this wheel without *insight*, without a deeper level of understanding of the meaning, relationship between, and alignment of these factors, is to play roulette. As previously suggested, the *insight* objective could address the need for a more ethical, culturally inclusive, and 'principled' approach to governance by our sport leaders.

Effecting a strategic alignment of the concentric circles will enable the board to better understand, and hence perform, their board *role, objectives, functions, and activities*. Similarly, for any governance re-design, this visual conceptualisation of the multiple *principles, models, and theories* at play will better enable practitioners to consciously and strategically align their governance configurations and scholars to apply multi-theoretical explanations. It is proposed that this dynamic conceptualisation may go some way to answering Tricker's call "for a new conceptual framework that can 'light up the entire stage and all the players'" (Cornforth, 2004, p. 21; Tricker, 2000, p. 295).

3.1.5 Conclusion

Nonprofit sport governance is a developing discipline, with early sport governance publications appearing in the late 1990s/early 2000s (Shilbury & Ferkins, 2020) and growing to a reported 243 sport-governance-related publications by 2018 (Dowling et al., 2018). The response to calls for 'indigenous' theory development (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2020), to escape self-imposed 'iron

cages' (Washington & Patterson, 2011), and the application of multi-theoretical approaches (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2020; Shaw, 2016) are made all the more difficult with inconsistent use of terminology.

Other areas have recognised the difficulties created “for academics and practitioners alike to communicate and share knowledge and develop best practices” (Winniford et al., 2009, p. 161) by such confusion and suggested that “conceptual confusion indicates immaturity of [a] discipline” (p. 161). In the sport governance ‘principles’ context, there is evident support for a common language (Chappelet & Mrkonjic, 2019), the purposeful definition and use of terms (Thompson et al., 2022), and consistent conceptualisation (Parent & Hoye, 2018). This sub-chapter has therefore sought to advance this ‘harmonisation’ conversation in furtherance of our discipline’s progression from ‘adolescence’ to ‘maturity’.

3.2 Sport Board Performance: A Contribution to the Integrated Board Performance Model

Prelude

This sub-chapter comprises the accepted manuscript of the chapter “Sport Board Performance: A Contribution to the Integrated Board Performance Model” published in the *Routledge Handbook of Sport Governance*, available online: <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429440250-23>

3.2.1 Introduction

An effective board is a critical determinant of a sport organisation’s performance, at grass roots, on the podium, on the balance sheet and in securing stakeholder confidence. This is the message communicated by government sport agencies to their national sport organisations in a range of ‘good governance’ documents (e.g., AIS, 2015; ASC, 2012; Sport Canada, 2011; Sport England & UK Sport, n.d.; Sport NZ, n.d.-e, 2015). In academic circles, many authors support these industry assertions however there has been limited scholarly focus on verifying the relevant sport board performance factors, associated sport industry guidelines, and their contributions to sport board and organisational performance (Hoye & Doherty, 2011; Parent & Hoye, 2018). This chapter therefore concentrates on board performance in overviewing the environmental and internal factors considered influential in the successful performance of a sport board. A review and critique of the Hoye and Doherty (2011) integrated board performance model (IBP) provides the basis for this overview which is then expanded to capture contemporary work and to advance this model.

This chapter is organised in the following manner. First, a summary of the IBP model and the for-profit and nonprofit models on which it draws. This provides both a vehicle for exploring the relevant concepts and a platform from which to critique the IBP model. Next, the critique identifies grounds for a conceptual advancement, expanding the IBP model to include a distinct director selection factor and a board intragroup dynamics factor. In Chapter 24, the expanded IBP (EIBP) model then provides the framework through which to identify a significant gap in sport research related to director selection factors and associated board processes of director development and evaluation.

3.2.2 Board Performance

In any examination of board performance, it is necessary to determine the board roles against which to assess such performance. Board roles have been described in various ways but

generally fall within the objectives of providing oversight (compliance-related functions and tasks), foresight (performance-related functions and tasks) and insight (higher-level critical/ethical thinking) on behalf of an organisation (Ferkins & Kilmister, 2012; Nahkies, 2009). For the purposes of the IBP model, board performance is “defined as how well the board fulfils its role in relation to setting and monitoring the mission, planning and policy development, appointing and monitoring the CEO, and managing external relationships” (Hoye & Doherty, 2011, p. 276). This definition provides the basis for the ‘integration’ of three nonprofit board performance models and three for-profit models (the foundation models). The nonprofit foundation models are those developed by Cornforth (2001), Miller-Millesen (2003) and W. A. Brown (2005). The for-profit foundation models are those developed by Zahra and Pearce (1989), Nicholson and Kiel (2004a, 2004b), and, Murphy and McIntyre (2007). Following is the aforementioned summary of first, these foundation models, and then, the IBP model.

A Summary of the Foundation and Integrated Board Performance (IBP) Models

In the earliest nonprofit foundation model, Cornforth (2001) examined postal surveys from 737 charity boards in England and Wales and proposed an input (board structure and processes) – output (performance of board functions) model. Examples of these input, structure, process and output factors, and their allocation under the IBP model and subsequent EIBP model, are provided in Table 3.2. Ultimately, the Cornforth (2001, p. 217) study suggests that:

Board inputs and three process variables are important in explaining board effectiveness, namely; board members have the time, skills and experience to do the job; clear board roles and responsibilities; the board and management share a common vision of how to achieve their goals; and the board and management periodically review how they work together.

The chief weakness of the model is found in its simplicity (Hoye & Doherty, 2011). Cornforth himself, whilst taking some assurance from the similarity of his findings to the Bradshaw et al. (1992) study, acknowledged the likelihood of other causal variables and possible explanations.

The Miller-Millesen (2003) study offered a theory-based typology of board behaviour using three theoretical perspectives: agency, resource dependence and institutional theory. For example, in the director recruitment context, agency theory (where the board monitors and controls management on behalf of the owners/members) suggests that directors are likely recruited to better manage such power dynamics. Resource dependence theory explains the recruitment of directors with links to the external resources required for organisational survival/success. Institutional theory (where the board secures legitimacy by conforming to institutional pressures – mimetic, normative and/or coercive) might explain board diversity not as ideologically motivated but as a response to these external pressures. Ultimately, the theory-

based typology “identifies the conceptual links between two environmental factors, three organizational factors and board behaviours” (p. 523) with these environmental and organisational factors also influencing composition. This suggests a link between director recruitment practices and board performance of its functions. The relevant factors are summarised in Table 3.2. See also the Miller-Millesen (2003) tables for useful summaries of “normative board roles and responsibilities” (p. 523) and the “theoretical origins of best practice literature” (p. 529).

W. A. Brown (2005) also included a theoretical component within his framework. In a study involving data (surveys and financial data) from 202 American nonprofit organisations (mainly in human service, health care and public benefit sectors), Brown tested his board performance model. The model proposed relationships between three major governance theories, six board performance dimensions and organisational effectiveness. The nonprofit governance theories are agency, resource dependence and group decision-making theories. The six board performance dimensions are those developed by Chait et al. (1991): contextual, political, strategic, analytic, educational and interpersonal. Organisational performance is measured through financial performance indicators and perceptions of organisational performance (W. A. Brown, 2005). Examples of the performance dimensions and their allocation under the IBP model are provided in Table 3.2. In conclusion, Brown found support for all three theories and described positive associations between five of the board performance dimensions (excluding education) and organisational performance. The strongest support lies in the strategic board contributions to financial performance with such contributions also accounting for executive perceptions of organisational performance. Interestingly, the interpersonal dimensions are also linked with financial performance (net financial surplus) and account for both executive and board member perceptions of organisational performance (W. A. Brown, 2005). Again, there is acknowledgement that the factors under examination, in this case the six board dimensions, are likely incomplete. Of the three nonprofit board studies, only the Brown model “explicitly explored the link between board and organizational performance” (Hoye & Doherty, 2011, p. 275).

Table 3.2

Allocation of Integrated Board Performance (IBP) Factors

Model Authors	Model Summary	Factors (as allocated from the foundation models' factors by Hoye & Doherty, 2011, to their IBP model factors, then re-allocated as proposed by the authors of this chapter, with re-allocation noted by the grey strike out for deletions and italics for new/shifted allocations)						Board Performance (of its role/responsibilities/ activities/ functions/ outputs)
		Environmental	Individual	Organisational	Board Factor - Structure	Board Factor - Process	<i>Board Factor - Dynamics / Behaviours</i>	
IBP Model								
Hoye & Doherty (2011)		Institutional pressures, interorganisational relationships, etc.	Age, education, motivation, competencies, etc.	Size, professionalisation, age/lifecycle, etc.	Sub-committees, composition, etc.	Meetings, group dynamics, decision making, etc.	<i>Group dynamics, decision making (e.g., group-think) etc.</i>	Roles – set/monitor mission, plan/develop policy, appoint/monitor CEO, manage external relationships.
Nonprofit Foundation Models								
Cornforth (2001)	Inputs engage with the board structures and processes to translate into outputs or board performance of its functions.		Inputs – right mix of director skills & experience, appropriate time committed (now commonly described as the 'skill and will' inputs)		Board structures – size, meetings (frequency, attendance rates), sub-committees, written job descriptions, induction/training, etc.	Board processes - 14 items spread under six main headings: common vision, clear roles and responsibilities, regular board-management reviews, board management communication, conflict management and meeting practices (notices, agenda, etc.).	<i>Communication, conflict management,</i>	Outputs - 17 tasks under the five function headings of: strategy and policy-making, stewardship, supervising and supporting management, board maintenance (e.g., recruitment), & external relations and accountability.
Miller-Millesen (2003)	Environmental and/or organisational factors likely influence board behaviour, both directly, and through their impact on board composition, thus	Resource/funding pressures Institutional/regulatory pressures	<i>Composition - demographic characteristics</i>	Age (lifecycle), organisational stability, professionalisation, constitutional requirements	<i>Composition - board size</i>	<i>Director recruitment practices (Note –proposed re-allocation to a new EIBP factor –</i>		Board behaviours in the context of performance of its functions (x 3) – monitoring (e.g., evaluate CEO, strategy), boundary spanning (e.g., raise money,

	suggesting a link between director recruitment strategies and board behaviour			relating to board composition and recruitment practices		<i>director selection factors)</i>		enhance image) & conforming (e.g., legal compliance, implement mandates).
W. A. Brown (2005)	Six board competency dimensions contribute to board and organisational performance with the strategic and interpersonal dimensions being the most significant	Political (e.g., community connections)		Contextual (e.g., organisational history, mission)-		Strategic (e.g., long term planning), analytic (e.g., effective decision-making, processes), educational (e.g., role descriptions, orientation processes), interpersonal (e.g., group relations)	<i>Interpersonal (e.g., group relations, collegiality, cohesion, etc.)</i>	Board competencies (x 6) – contextual, political, strategic, analytic, educational & interpersonal - with organisational performance measured by financial performance indicators & perceptions of organisational performance.
For-profit Foundation Models								
Zahra & Pearce (1989)	Internal & external contingencies influence four board attributes, their relationships with board performance of its roles and organisational performance (the temporal relationship between the attributes is indicated by the ordered numbering in this table, with interactive relationships contemplated).	External contingencies, e.g., industry type, legal requirements	<i>Board attribute (2a) – characteristics (director background), e.g., age, education, values, experience</i>	Internal contingencies, e.g., ownership type, size, life cycle, CEO style, corporate resource situation	Board attribute (1)– composition, e.g., size, insider vs. outsider directors, minorities Board attribute (3) – structure, e.g., number, types, membership of committees, unitary vs. dual board leadership	Board attribute (4) – process, e.g., meeting frequency & length, formality, CEO-board interface, level of consensus, self-evaluation Board attribute (2b) – characteristics (board personality), e.g., style, independence from management influence	<i>Board attribute (2b) – characteristics (board personality), e.g., style, independence from management influence</i>	Roles – service, strategy & control - with organisational performance measured by corporate financial performance.
Nicholson & Kiel (2004b)	Inputs (through the application of board	External environment	BIC (individual – human), e.g.,	Inputs, e.g., organisation type,		BIC (team – structural), e.g.,	<i>BIC (team – structural), e.g.,</i>	Board (individual/team) effectiveness in relation to

	intellectual capital (BIC), in the context of the performance of board roles, as impacted by internal/external environmental context factors), are transformed into the outputs of board (individual/team) effectiveness and organisational effectiveness.	(context), e.g., socio-economic trends, competitive environment <i>Inputs, e.g., relevant legislation</i>	director knowledge, skills, experience BIC (individual – cultural), e.g., director morals/ motivations <i>BIC (individual – social), e.g., extra/inter-organisational relationships</i>	constitution, history/culture /values, resource allocation strategy <i>Internal environment (context), e.g., fit between the board & the organisation's culture/people/ systems.</i>		routines re agenda, minutes, etc, policies & culture including board values/norms BIC (team – social), e.g., intra-board, board – management goodwill, & extra-corporate relationships	<i>culture including board values/norms</i> <i>BIC (team – social), e.g., intra-board, board – management goodwill, & extra-corporate relationships</i> <i>“Board dynamics are the ‘sparks’ that fly from... the ‘flints’ of intellectual capital” (p. 452)</i>	the functions of - control/monitor, advice/counsel, & access to resources- - with organisational performance noted as usually measured by accounting/market-based indicators in the for-profit sector, and, fulfilment of members’ mandate, in the nonprofit sector. (Note - the Nicholson and Kiel, 2004a, model also includes strategy as a distinct board function.
Murphy & McIntyre (2007)	Board characteristics influence board functionality, both independently influence board performance, with internal and external contextual variables moderating the relationships between board characteristics & performance, characteristics & functionality and functionality & performance, with board performance influencing organisational performance	Moderating variables – external, e.g., operating environment, competitive pressure, globalisation	Board characteristics, e.g., director tenure, age, race, <i>gender, skills, expertise, experience, values</i> <i>Board functionality, e.g., director commitment</i>	Moderating variables – internal, e.g., organisation size, life cycle stage, product life cycle	Board characteristics, e.g., size, inside vs. outside directors	Board characteristics, e.g., meeting frequency, agenda processes Board functionality, e.g., director commitment, group – social capital, trust, role clarity, team satisfaction	<i>Board characteristics, e.g., team personality elevation vs. team personality deviation</i> <i>Board functionality, e.g., reflexive, adaptable, flexible, group social capital, trust, mutual respect, team satisfaction</i>	Activities expected of a well-functioning board - environmental scanning, monitoring, strategic advice, feedback/guidance to CEO, external resourcing – financing, e.g., financing, networks, knowledge, and succession planning - with a variety of financial indicators referenced as the traditional organisational performance measure.

In the earliest of the for-profit foundation models, Zahra and Pearce (1989) synthesised the empirical studies on board contributions to corporate financial performance. Studies relating to board composition, board/director characteristics, and board structure and process are summarised along with their effects on organisational financial performance. Zahra and Pearce utilised four corporate governance theories, legal (with a board focus on legal responsibilities), class hegemony (board preservation of capitalist elite power structures), resource dependence and agency theories, to explain these contributions. Each theory drives the production of a distinct board performance model, with relevant factors, whilst similar, varying accordingly in terms of some content and prioritisation. The synthesis of these four perspectives results in an integrated model of board attributes and roles. Zahra and Pearce (1989) proposed a model in which “internal and external contingencies determine the mix of the board attributes and, in turn, a board’s performance of its three roles and, ultimately, on company performance” (p. 306). These contingencies and attributes are summarised in Table 3.2. The board roles considered critical to organisational (financial) performance are service, strategy and control. Importantly, Hoyer and Doherty (2011) note that subsequent studies support their preferred board roles of monitoring and controlling, setting strategy, providing advice and counsel, and facilitating access to resources.

The intellectual capital approach of Nicholson and Kiel (2004a) provided “a model of board effectiveness that uses the construct of board intellectual capital to integrate the predominant theories of corporate governance” (p. 5). The authors assert that board intellectual capital is a product of three sub-domains: human (director knowledge, skills, and abilities), structural (process, procedures, routines, practices) and social (intra-board, board-management, extra-organisational relationships) capital. This intellectual capital approach is then linked with their Corporate Governance Charter model (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003) to assist scholars and practitioners alike, in their understanding and application of quality board performance. In Nicholson and Kiel (2004b), an expanded input-output model of board intellectual capital is proposed. The authors described the board as “a system that transforms inputs into outputs – a process that is facilitated by its intellectual capital and is contingent on the roles required of it” (p. 454), with such roles influenced by internal and external environmental factors. A summary of the inputs, intellectual capital (with board dynamics represented as an expanded product of both individual and team intellectual capital) and the context of roles and internal/external influential factors is provided in Table 3.2. The final governance outputs being board effectiveness (a combination of team and individual effectiveness) and organisational performance.

Murphy and McIntyre (2007) based their approach on the view that a board of directors (BoD) is a team, with similar characteristics to many other types of team. Accordingly, this conceptual piece involved a synthesis of relevant governance and organisational behaviour, in particular, team and group dynamics, literature. The resultant model of board performance asserts that:

Both BoD characteristics and functionality may each independently influence performance, and BoD characteristics may also influence functionality (indirectly influencing performance). ... [They] also contend that contextual factors from within and outside the organization will moderate the relationships between BoD characteristics and performance, BoD characteristics and functionality, and BoD functionality and performance. (p. 212)

Examples of the model's BoD characteristics, BoD functionality and internal and external moderating variables are provided in Table 3.2. A board that is well composed and high functioning is more likely to effectively perform its expected activities of environmental scanning, monitoring, advice, strategy, access to resources and succession planning. However, Murphy and McIntyre (2007) do caution that BoD effectiveness is only one of the inputs in organisational performance.

In integrating the aforementioned foundation models, Hoyer and Doherty (2011) proposed a model which "acknowledges that environmental, individual and organizational factors directly impact board factors (structure and process), which directly impacts board performance, and ultimately organizational performance" (p. 276). They note that board level factors "mediate the influence of environmental, individual and organisational factors on board performance" (p. 276) and that both environmental and organisational factors influence the performance of the board in a direct way. In their model they make explicit the relationship between board and organisational performance. This integration is achieved by the allocation of the elements and relationships of the aforementioned foundation models to the IBP model elements of environmental, organisational, individual and board level factors.

The Cornforth (2001) input (will and skill) – board structure and processes – output (performance of functions) are readily transposed. Likewise, for Miller-Millesen's (2003) environmental and organisational factors. The Chait et al. (1991) six dimensions utilised in the W. A. Brown (2005) model require a little more analysis with the political dimension allocated to environmental factors, the contextual dimension to organisational factors, and, the strategic, analytic, educational and interpersonal dimensions to board factor (processes). In terms of the Zahra and Pearce (1989) approach, the internal organisational factors and the external environmental factors are readily transposed. Their four board attributes are assigned as follows; directors' characteristics to individual factors, board composition and structure to board factors (structure), and, board process to board factor (process). The Nicholson and Kiel (2004a,

2004b) approach also includes the readily transferrable external and internal factors. However, their board attributes of human, structural and social capital are not, by nomenclature, as obvious. The human capital of knowledge, skills and experience is allocated to individual factors. The structural capital, of board structures, processes and routines is allocated to the relevant board factor, structure or process. Hoye and Doherty (2011) allocated social capital, revolving around relationships between board members, the staff and stakeholders to the board factor – process. Here, questions arise as to whether concepts attached to social capital (Nicholson & Kiel, 2004b) and the Chait et al.'s (1991, as cited in W. A. Brown, 2005) interpersonal dimension, would be more appropriately allocated to the individual factors or a new board factor regarding board dynamics/behaviours? Similarly, with the Murphy and McIntyre (2007) framework, the internal and external environmental factors and the board composition (board structure) factors are readily transposed. However, again, questions arise relating to the allocation of some of the board functionality features, such as trust and group social capital, to the board factor regarding process. From the six foundation models, some of the variables clearly sit within the board process factor, such as induction, meeting practices, board evaluations, but others, such as the aforementioned trust, cohesion, relationships, may warrant a separate category? Also, noteworthy is the omission of a distinct director recruitment factor as posited in the Miller-Millesen (2003) model.


To summarise, Hoye and Doherty (2011) have, in synthesising a range of theories and factors drawn from both the for-profit and nonprofit sectors, achieved their aim of “developing a model of board performance that is both conceptually clear and able to be operationalized for research” (p. 276). This chapter’s overview of the foundation models provides a useful and timely reminder of some of the key concepts attached to board performance. A summary, which, for the sport governance student, serves as an introduction to these key concepts. For the scholar, it may prompt reflection on alternate, previously overlooked, avenues of investigation. It also provides the platform from which to explore the questions raised above relating to board factor (process) and the omission of a director recruitment factor. What follows is an exploration of these questions resulting in suggested additions to the IBP model.

A Critique of and Contribution to the IBP Model

The suggested contributions to the IBP model are the express inclusion of the Hoye and Doherty (2011) preferred board roles under board performance, the division of the board factors (process) into two separate board factors and the addition of a new director selection factor. These contributions are depicted in Figure 3.7 with the new content highlighted in italics and the proposed modifications of director selection factors and board factor (intragroup dynamics), and potential relationships, denoted by the broken lines.

Figure 3.7

Expanded Integrated Board Performance (EIBP) Model



Note. Adapted from Hoye, R., & Doherty, A. (2011). Nonprofit sport board performance: A review and directions for future research. *Journal of Sport Management*, 25, 272–285.

Justification for these contributions is drawn from the preceding overview of the IBP foundation models supported by associated literature from both academia and industry. The inclusion of board roles under board performance requires little explanation other than to assert the benefits for the sake of consistency, clarity and completion. The Hoye and Doherty (2011) preferred roles are included by way of example noting that each board performance study will need to ascertain the relevant functions against which the particular board is to be assessed. Substantive justification is however provided, first, for the separation of board factor (processes) into board factor (processes) and board factor (intragroup dynamics) and, second, for the addition of the director selection factors.

IBP Model Contribution: Board Processes – Intragroup Dynamics

The recent focus on the concepts of group fit (Elms et al., 2015) and intragroup dynamics (Schoenberg et al., 2016), together with a review of the foundation board performance models,

supports the division of the IBP model board factor (processes) into the separate board factor (processes) and board factor (intragroup dynamics). Starting with the IBP model, an intuitive distinction is made between the board factors (processes) examples of “meetings, group dynamics, [and] decision making” (Hoye & Doherty, 2011, p. 277). Board process features, such as meeting frequency, annual calendar driven agenda and role clarity are different in nature to group dynamics. Even the example of decision-making can be divided into decision-making processes (e.g., majority or consensus decision-making), and decision-making styles or behaviours, (e.g., groupthink). This intuitive differentiation leads to a closer examination of the foundation models in terms of identified board processes and board group behaviours. The features which more closely align with board processes include clear roles, regular reviews, meeting practices (Cornforth, 2001), meeting frequency and length (Zahra & Pearce, 1989) and agenda/calendar driven processes (Nicholson & Kiel, 2004a). The features which align with group behaviours include communication, conflict management, decision-making (Cornforth, 2001), inter-personal behaviours (W. A. Brown, 2005), board personality (Zahra & Pearce, 1989), meeting dynamics (Nicholson & Kiel, 2004a), goodwill, trust, culture (Nicholson & Kiel, 2004b), team personality elevation, team personality diversity and intra-group trust (Murphy & McIntyre, 2007). The W. A. Brown (2005) use of group decision-making theory and Murphy and McIntyre’s (2007) focus on team/group dynamics literature add weight to the proposed recognition of board factors (intragroup dynamics) as a distinct factor. Again, intuitively, it appears that such board processes could influence board behaviour and that board behaviour could similarly influence board processes. Represented in Figure 3.7, this new factor is contained within the relevant broken line box and the proposed relationships by the broken line double arrow.

Turning to associated academic literature, Elms et al. (2015) and Schoenberg et al. (2016) both espouse the importance of group dynamics. Elms et al. (2015) proposed that group fit is as important as role fit in determining the criteria for director selection. It is ‘group fit’ that enables the fulfilment of a director’s ‘role fit’ contribution to the board. Schoenberg et al. (2016), in a systematic quantitative literature review focussing on intragroup dynamics, confirm positive relationships between factors such as the board-CEO relationship, cohesion, boardroom climate, and performance. A review of industry ‘good governance’ codes/guides (AIS, 2015; ASC, 2012; ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2014; Financial Reporting Council, 2014; NZX, 2017; Securities Commission, 2004; Sport and Recreation Alliance, 2015; Sport Canada, 2011; Sport England & UK Sport, n.d.; Sport NZ, n.d.-c, n.d.-d, n.d.-e) reveals that all reference the concept of ethics and/or integrity. Such principles can be attributed to individual director factors or the board (process) factor, but they can equally be attributed to the collective behaviour of a group or board. Whilst some attention is paid in the industry guides to board culture (Financial

Reporting Council, 2014; Sport Canada, 2011; Sport England & UK Sport, n.d.; Sport NZ, n.d.-c, n.d.-d) and climate (Sport Canada, 2011), few overtly address the 'group fit' element in their recommendations regarding director selection criteria.

Perhaps, in light of the observation that "huge corporate scandals such as Enron have happened although they 'were supervised by an all-star board [adhering to the formal system], with qualifications far beyond what any regulator would impose'" (Hansell, 2003, p. 15, as cited by Maharaj, 2009, p. 108), the issue of board culture/intragroup behaviour merits closer attention by industry and academics alike? In summary, support is drawn from Schoenberg et al. (2016) who proposed that "intragroup dynamics such as cohesion and power patterns do not reflect processes and, conceptually, would fit better as a third factor" (p. 16) in the Hoye and Doherty (2011) IBP model. Accordingly, such terminology is adopted to describe this separate 'behaviour' related board factor (intragroup dynamics).

IBP Model Contribution: Director Selection Factors

The primary logic driving the proposed addition of director selection factors to the IBP model is that director selection is, in a temporal sense, the first step. In order to enjoy the performance-enhancing benefit of directors with the appropriate background and skill sets (individual factors) to compose a board with appropriate diversity (board factor, structure) which will constructively engage (board factor, intragroup dynamics) with relevant practices and policies (board factor, process), such directors must first be identified and recruited. Of the foundation models, the Miller-Millesen (2003) typology expressly situated director recruitment practices central to the board performance formula: recruitment practices and composition being both directly impacted by environmental and organisational factors and having a direct link with board behaviour. Other foundation models acknowledged the importance of director selection (Cornforth, 2001; Murphy & McIntyre, 2007; Nicholson & Kiel, 2004a, 2004b; Zahra & Pearce, 1989) in the development of their board performance models. The Hoye and Doherty (2011) IBP model situated both board composition and the existence of nomination committees, along with audit, risk and remuneration committees, as part of the board factor (structure). However, director selection factors, the realm of the nomination committee, are more elemental than, for example, the control and compliance focus of an audit or risk committee, and, as such, merit separate recognition, distinct from board factor (structure) and/or board factor (processes).

In associated literature, Clune et al. (2014) endorsed the elemental nature of director selection factors describing the nomination committee as the "foundational committee as it builds the other board committees and the overall board" (p. 783). W. A. Brown (2007) found support for the "contention that board development practices lead to stronger board members, and

stronger board members are a significant predictor of board performance” (p. 312). In particular, out of board recruitment, orientation and evaluation practices, the “strongest pathway was between recruitment practices and perceptions of board member competency” (p. 311). In a review of industry ‘good governance’ codes/guides, both the nonprofit and for-profit sectors stress the importance of director selection processes and outcomes (AIS, 2015; ASC, 2012; ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2014; Financial Reporting Council, 2014; NZX, 2017; Securities Commission, 2004; Sport and Recreation Alliance, 2015; Sport Canada, 2011; Sport England & UK Sport, n.d.; Sport NZ, n.d.- c, n.d.-d, n.d.-e). Director selection factors extracted from these sources can be organised under four headings: structure (e.g., constitutional constraints such as director tenure and rotation), method (e.g., delegation, election, co-option and/or appointment), process (e.g., use of a nomination committee, board skills matrices, public advertising, interviews, etc.) and criteria (related to role fit and/or group fit objectives). These are included as examples in the associated broken line box in Figure 3.7. However, in the absence of empirical data no attempt is made to infer relationships between these factors, a matter for future investigation and empirical testing.

IBP Model Contribution: Summary

In summary, the proposed additions of director selection and board intragroup dynamics factors to the ‘good governance’ equation are justified through the review and critique of the IBP model (Hoye & Doherty, 2011), including a re-analysis of the foundation models, and is supported also with reference to associated literature. The EIBP model outlines seven factors (environmental, organisational, director selection, individual, board structure/process/intra-group dynamics) and their purported relationships with overall board and organisational performance. Overlaying this model are the theoretical explanations promoted in the foundation models: agency (W. A. Brown, 2005; Miller-Millesen et al., 1989); resource dependence (W. A. Brown, 2005; Miller-Millesen, 2003; Zahra & Pearce, 1989); institutional (Miller-Millesen, 2003); legal (Zahra & Pearce, 1989); class hegemony (Zahra & Pearce, 1989); and group decision-making theory together with the concepts represented in the team/group dynamics literature (W. A. Brown, 2005; Murphy & McIntyre, 2007).

3.2.3 Conclusion

As identified earlier in this chapter, the challenge for sport governance scholars remains to “more clearly define... how improved governance may be objectively measured” (Parent & Hoye, 2018, p. 22). The elusive nature of board performance assessment and verification of causal relationships, between factors and with overall organisational performance, is recognised in the aforementioned foundation models. The complexities associated with such

measurements are replicated in the sport sector. For nonprofit sport, commonly delivered through federated member-benefit structures and organisations, indicators other than financial carry significant weight and are notoriously difficult to measure. For example, how to measure a board's contribution to an NSO's constitutional objectives of both sport participation/development and elite sport performance (K. Ingram & O'Boyle, 2018) or the extent to which a sport board satisfies the stakeowner mandate under which it operates (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2015b)?

In the delivery of professional sport competitions and team franchises, with their co-opetition dimension, unusual challenges also arise. Despite such challenges, or perhaps, because of them, it is crucial that we heed the calls for co-ordinated, yet context specific, empirical verification of the actual impact of board performance factors, and associated good governance principles, on both board and organisational performance (Hoye & Doherty, 2011; Parent & Hoye, 2018). The EIBP model, with contributions developed in this chapter, is offered as a framework to assist academics in this regard. It may also foster beneficial awareness, for policymakers and practitioners alike, of the complexities at play in their pursuit of good governance.

Finally, whilst the rallying cries for sport specific performance measurements are mounting, the theoretical developments associated with sport governance and board performance cannot be neglected. To the more traditional theories utilised in the foundation models, can be added those emerging in the sport governance literature such as board strategic balance (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2015a) and collaborative governance theories (Shilbury et al., 2016). Indeed, in conjunction with the opportunity identified by Ferkins and Shilbury (2016) for indigenous sport governance theory development is the opportunity for indigenous sport board/organisational performance measurements. Perhaps, given the evolving maturity of sport governance scholarship the time is right for both.

3.3 Director Selection, Development and Evaluation

Prelude

This sub-chapter comprises the accepted manuscript of the chapter “Director Selection, Development and Evaluation” published in the *Routledge Handbook of Sport Governance*, available online: <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429440250-24>

3.3.1 Introduction

The power of human potential to contribute to quality sport governance is the theme of this chapter. In particular, there is a focus on the recruitment and development of directors with the requisite skills, experiences, attributes and perspectives to contribute to a highly functioning board. Whilst embracing the possibilities of emerging systemic governance theories (as highlighted in Chapter 2 of this Handbook), this chapter serves to caution against neglect of the individual and the interactions between individual board members. The premise of this chapter rests on the assertion that for the ‘board to be greater than the sum of its people’, there is a need to first find the right people and then maximise their individual (human and social) and combined (intra/inter-board relationships) potential. A holistic approach is promoted whereby evaluation is integral, informing both director selection and development.

This chapter draws from the Expanded Integrated Board Performance (EIBP) model (Hoye & Doherty, 2011; see Chapter 23) as a way to position the foci of sport board performance research as it relates to selection, development, and evaluation, published since 2009. This synthesis incorporates the scoping and systematic literature reviews of Dowling et al. (2018) and Parent and Hoye (2018) respectively, together with the ‘mapping’ of sport governance articles undertaken in Chapter 1 of this Handbook. In the absence of any substantial research focusing on director selection within nonprofit sport organisations, this review then draws upon the wider nonprofit and for-profit literature related to director selection, director development and evaluation processes, and use of nomination committees. Nomination committees (NCs) are recognised as a means of advancing selection, development and evaluation processes and outcomes. To conclude, the issue of how to measure director and board performance is discussed.

3.3.2 Director Selection, Development and Evaluation Research in Sport – An Overview

In the mapping of sport governance articles in the three major sport management journals undertaken in Chapter 1, 33 of the 49 articles were published post 2008. Of these, only one was categorised under a director selection theme. However, closer examination reveals that whilst the context was director selection, the focus was on gendered self-descriptions in French NSO election profiles (Ferrand et al., 2010). Similarly, for the board processes of director development and evaluation, two articles were themed as ‘evaluation/performance’ and two as ‘monitoring and compliance’, but only one (Sherry & Shilbury, 2009) addressed the actual practices under examination in this chapter (finding director selection processes and director education influential in reducing conflict of interest risks).

In the Dowling et al. (2018) scoping review, 243 sport governance articles were identified of which 74 articles were classified as relating to organisational (as opposed to systemic or political) governance. In their analysis of reoccurring themes, sub-themes, topics and contexts there were no overt references to director selection, or the board processes/practices of director development or evaluation. The Parent and Hoye (2018) systematic review focussed on the impact of governance principles on sport organisations’ governance practices and performance. A wide-ranging search of the academic and grey literature revealed 2,155 records that was narrowed to 19 meeting their search criteria. Of these 19 records, 12 were journal articles published post 2008. Over half of these 12 article summaries did reference board structure issues such as size, tenure, duality, independence and quotas but only one (Bradbury & O’Boyle, 2015) evidenced a strong director selection methods/process theme in the findings. None of the journal article summaries focussed on director development or evaluation practices. However, the Birkbeck Sport Business Centre report (Walters et al., 2010) summary does record the importance of board induction, training, and evaluation.

To summarise, the above reviews suggest that minimal attention has been paid to the actual board practices of director development and/or evaluation. In terms of director selection, whilst appearing as a context for, or in the periphery of, some of these studies, there is a near-complete absence of this factor at the centre of sport governance research. Positioned in the EIBP model as influencing, through director competencies, board composition, processes, and intragroup dynamics, director selection is thus considered fundamental to board performance. The focus of the next section is therefore on director selection, followed by a discussion on director development and evaluation board practices. An examination of NCs is then offered as a potential vehicle for improving such processes and outcomes.

3.3.3 Director Selection

In this section, for-profit, non-profit and grey literature are used to describe key concepts related to director selection. The focus then turns to relevant sport governance literature.

Key Concepts

Director selection has been described as the “formal process by which individuals are identified, screened, nominated and elected (or appointed) to corporate boards” (Withers et al., 2012, p. 245). In the nonprofit sport sector, director selection processes reflect interorganisational network structures. The most common network structure for national sport organisations (NSOs) is the federated network (Dickson et al., 2005). In this structure, the voting members of the NSO are the regional sport entities and the voting members of the regional sport entities are the clubs. Historically, the board structure followed a delegate model of director selection (Shilbury, 1993). In this model, the NSO directors were often nominated delegates of the regional sport entities. Alternatively, various interest groups, whether based on membership class, sporting code, geographical region, or otherwise, elected delegates to the national board (more likely a management committee than a true governing board) to represent their interests as in a democratic (Cornforth, 2004) governance model. With the twin pressures of commercialisation and professionalisation, the independent and hybrid models (described in more detail later in this section) became more prevalent. In these models, directors can be selected by election, appointment and/or co-option, the appointment of additional board members by the existing directors.

Government sport agencies have advocated for these more recent approaches in their prescriptive sport governance guidelines (Australian Sports Commission, 2012; Sport England & UK Sport, n.d.; Sport NZ, n.d.-e) reflecting the importance of director selection, and associated development and evaluation, practices. Table 3.3 provides a summary of relevant Sport NZ guidelines.

Table 3.3

Summary of Key Director Selection, Development and Evaluation Guidelines (Sport NZ)

Director Selection
<p>* General:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Board responsible for director succession planning, ensuring ongoing mix of appropriate board skills (9 Steps, BC); and- Open, systematic and deliberate recruitment process (GF, 9 Steps); <p>* Structure:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Specified tenure and rotation of directors (GF); and- Appropriate ratio of independent directors - defined as those with “no formal connection with the sport for a fixed prior period” (9 Steps, p. 55);

*** Methods:**

- Election and/or appointment process; (9 Steps, BC);
- Depends on unique needs of each organisation (9 Steps); and
- Recommended mix of elected and appointed directors (GF);

*** Processes:**

- Establish appointments panel - with terms of reference (GF), including independent governance specialists (9 Steps, GF) and board members (9 Steps);
- Appointment panel interviews candidates, appointing directors and recommending 'best fit' candidates for election (9 Steps);
- Develop board skills/needs matrix (9 Steps, GF);
- Develop director recruitment profiles (9 Steps); and
- Possible use of advertising/professional search agency (9 Steps);

*** Criteria:**

- Skills (e.g., strategic thinking, financial literacy, interpersonal skills);
- Attributes (e.g., integrity, independence, emotional intelligence);
- Experience (e.g., professional, sport, life);
- Perspectives (e.g., gender, ethnic, age diversity);
- Operational knowledge; and
- Broader conceptual abilities (9 Steps).

Director Development*** Induction:**

- Role clarity – achieved via role descriptions and letters of appointment/commitment (9 Steps, GF);
- Review relevant documents (e.g., constitution, charter, policies, annual report, recent meeting papers) (9 Steps, BC);
- Meetings with Chair (governance) and CEO (operational) (9 Steps, BC);
- Use of board mentors where appropriate (9 Steps)

*** Education:**

- Development policy and plan (GF);
- Individual professional development activities encouraged (BC); and
- Board development workshops (9 Steps).

Board/Director Evaluation*** General:**

- Documented commitment to governance evaluations (GF);
- Governance evaluations inform succession planning, board/director development (9 Steps, BC) and provides accountability to stakeholders (9 Steps);
- Governance evaluations to include chair, director, and senior management perceptions (GF); and
- Board performance report provided to key stakeholders (GF);

*** Process/Criteria:**

- Board performance reviewed every 2 years (BC);
- Director performance reviewed annually (BC);
- Criteria based on relevant policies and other board agreed criteria (BC);
- Interviews (9 Steps) and self/peer-assessment surveys (9 Steps, BC) optional;
- Ideally conducted by an independent and external facilitator (9 Steps);
- Report/recommendations provided to board (BC);

*** Costs:**

- Annual 'Cost of Governance' budget – to include board/director development and assessment costs (BC).

Source Abbreviations

9 Steps = Nine Steps to Effective Governance: Building High Performing Organisations (Sport NZ, n.d.-e)

BC = Board Charter -Sport NZ template - updated 10 October 2018 (BoardWorks International Ltd, 2018)

GF = Governance Framework (Sport NZ, n.d.-c, n.d.-d)

As is evident from Table 3.3, director selection ‘key concepts’ can be categorised under four factors: structure (e.g., independent board), method (e.g., appointment), process (e.g., use of a NC) and criteria (e.g., skills, experience, attributes, perspectives). The recommendation for director/board evaluation to inform director selection and development affirms their real-world connectedness.

From a theoretical perspective, Withers et al. (2012), provide a multidisciplinary examination of the corporate director selection literature. The main discussion focussed on the supply (i.e., characteristics of potential directors) and demand (i.e., characteristics of the appointing firm) features from both the ‘rational economic’ and ‘social embeddedness’ perspectives. First, the rational perspective assumes that directors are selected to best meet the governance and resource needs of the organisation as explained by agency and resource dependency theory. Second, the social embeddedness perspective recognises the board as a complex social system with inherent social biases and inconsistencies whereby those in control of the selection will likely perpetuate the current board norms. Withers et al. (2012) make the case for integrating these theoretical approaches to reflect the integration in the actual process of director selection. In responding to this argument, Elms et al. (2015) interviewed 10 individuals in relation to 24 selection processes across a mix of 20 corporate, public and non-profit organisations. Interestingly, some director selection processes were labelled as ‘rigorous and formal’ whilst others were considered “ad hoc, informal and at times heavily influenced by a single decision maker” (p. 1320). They caution against an over-emphasis on ‘role fit’ and stress the need for balance, as, “role fit reflects the board’s economic needs and group fit acknowledges the board’s social needs. It is only by having an appropriate group fit that the equally necessary role fit of a director can be harnessed” (p. 1324).

Sport Organisations

Director selection for nonprofit sport organisations is equally important and arguably more challenging than in the corporate/commercial domain. Like other nonprofits, nonprofit sport organisations’ performance objectives go beyond the financial to the social and/or sporting objectives for which they are established. Unlike many other nonprofits, sport organisations are often member-owned (benefit) organisations (O’Boyle & Shilbury, 2016), providing sport

services to their members with some directors likely to also be customers of these services (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2004). Additionally, sport organisations face integrity issues of increasing complexity with high expectations not just from their members, but also from the media and the community (Sherry & Shilbury, 2009). For many national sport organisations (NSOs), the professionalisation of their management/governance systems is linked to their reliance on government funding (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2010; Hoye & Cuskelly, 2004). All of this in an environment where “a non-executive director is typically a volunteer” (Sherry & Shilbury, 2009, p. 48).

In this dynamic governance environment, director selection processes in nonprofit sport organisations are also evolving. One early study described the top three director-selection criteria as ‘interest’ in the organisation, ability to commit the ‘time’, and sharing ‘common views’ with the existing board members (Inglis, 1997b). A more recent study hints at greater sophistication: “extensive experience at the grassroots... is no longer regarded as sufficient preparation for work at higher levels of sporting structures” (Ferrand et al., 2010, p. 547). Whilst sport experience may no longer be a sufficient qualification, for member-benefit organisations, the director selection process will likely remain connected to the issues of membership ownership, control and representation.

The importance of membership ‘voice’ is reflected in the Hoye and Cuskelly (2004) study comparing the director selection, induction and evaluation practices of seven state sporting organisations in Australia to a list of recommended board practices. The recommended board practices included five director selection items (i.e., ability to co-opt external directors, use of board profile, nominee interviews, use of nomination or board development committee and written selection criteria), two orientation items (i.e., board manual and orientation process) and four evaluation items (i.e., individual director evaluations, feedback to individual directors, board self-evaluations and collective board self-evaluations). All four of the ‘effective’ boards used at least one of these practices whereas the three ‘ineffective’ boards used none. Director selection issues centred on the efficacy concerns attached to directors elected by the members (i.e., popularity vs. ability, conflict of interest vs. sport knowledge) and the recognised value of appointed external directors. In summary, Hoye and Cuskelly (2004) concluded that effective boards “utilised more recommended board processes to select, orientate and evaluate board members” (p. 77, emphasis added). More recent studies, involving director selection and associated developments, are now explored under four director selection factor headings of board structure, selection method, processes and criteria.

Board Structure and Selection Methods

A repeated debate in the board-structure literature concerns the merits of three models of board structure – delegate, independent and hybrid (O’Boyle & Hassan, 2016). Some authors advocate for the 100% independent model (Bradbury & O’Boyle, 2015) and others for a hybrid approach, at least during a transition phase (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2010). There is also acknowledgement that the delegate model “may remain... suitable... in less commercial and professionalized sporting environments” (O’Boyle & Hassan, 2016, p. 110). Table 3.4 summarises the key themes of this debate.

Table 3.4

Themes – Board Structure and Selection Methods

Themes	Delegate (Representative)	Independent
Legitimacy & Logic	Upholds democratic legitimacy and/or traditions (Enjolras & Waldahl, 2010; O’Boyle & Shilbury, 2016; Shilbury, 1993; Tacon & Walters, 2016)	Professional/commercial logic prevailing over the traditional volunteer/democratic logic (K. Ingram & O’Boyle, 2018; Tacon & Walters, 2016)
Affiliate Interests v Network Interests	Adversarial approach to governance (Bradbury & O’Boyle, 2015) reflecting the competitive/representative type of democracy (Enjolras & Waldahl, 2010). Promotes parochialism, politics & ‘affiliation’ interests over broader interests of the sport/network (Bradbury & O’Boyle, 2015; Enjolras & Waldahl, 2010; K. Ingram & O’Boyle, 2018; O’Boyle & Hassan, 2016; Shilbury, 1993; M. Taylor & O’Sullivan, 2009). Increases conflict of interest risk (Bradbury & O’Boyle, 2015; K. Ingram & O’Boyle, 2018; Sherry & Shilbury, 2009).	Promotes best interests of the sport/network (Bradbury & O’Boyle, 2015; O’Boyle & Hassan, 2016). Reduces conflict of interest risk (Bradbury & O’Boyle, 2015; Ferkins & Shilbury, 2010; Hoyer & Cuskelly, 2004; Sherry & Shilbury, 2009).
Member Ownership/ Control/ Mandate v Member Alienation	Preserves/protects membership voice (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2010; Tacon & Walters, 2016). Members are the most important stakeholder for a nonprofit sporting network (Bradbury & O’Boyle, 2015).	May lack member/owner mandate (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2010). Risks disconnection/alienation of members (Bradbury & O’Boyle, 2015; Ferkins & Shilbury, 2010; Hoyer & Cuskelly, 2004; O’Boyle & Hassan, 2016; M. Taylor & O’Sullivan, 2009).
Knowledge/ Skills/ Expertise	Selections often based on popularity rather than skills/attributes (Sherry & Shilbury, 2009). Operational knowledge can aid strategic decision-making (O’Boyle & Hassan, 2016).	Selections based on business expertise/skill sets (Hoyer & Cuskelly, 2004; O’Boyle & Hassan, 2016; O’Boyle & Shilbury, 2016; M. Taylor & Sullivan, 2009). Appropriate mix of sport/business experience, merit based appointments (Bradbury & O’Boyle, 2015). May lack practical level understanding of the sport (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2010). Intended independent director quality vs democracy ‘trade off’ not guaranteed (O’Boyle & Hassan, 2016).

Board Conversations	Emphasis on sport-specific topics (K. Ingram & O'Boyle, 2018).	Emphasis on strategic and financial issues (K. Ingram & O'Boyle, 2018).
Candidate pool	Candidate pool limited in terms of size, skills and/or expertise (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2004; Sherry & Shilbury, 2009).	Expanded candidate pool with increased skills and expertise (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2004; M. Taylor & O'Sullivan, 2009). AGM 'election' filters may be a disincentive for independent candidates (Bradbury & O'Boyle, 2015).
Planned v Unplanned	Uncertainty whether election outcomes will match current governance needs (Bradbury & O'Boyle, 2015; Hoye & Cuskelly, 2004).	Independent appointments more likely to align with current governance needs (O'Boyle & Hassan, 2016), performance challenges (Bradbury & O'Boyle, 2015), and experience/skill set needs (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2004).
Themes	Hybrid	
Balance	Balances sport knowledge (K. Ingram & O'Boyle, 2018), representative voices and commercial skills-based mix (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2004; Ferkins & Shilbury, 2010; M. Taylor & O'Sullivan, 2009). Supports power sharing (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2010; O'Boyle & Shilbury, 2016) and the promotion of collaboration over competition (K. Ingram & O'Boyle, 2018). Requires elected representatives to take a 'whole of sport' approach (Bradbury & O'Boyle, 2015) and appointed independents to minimise 'disharmony' risks (K. Ingram & O'Boyle, 2018).	
Ratio	Participant debate divided between preferring a 50/50 balance vs. a majority of delegate representatives (O'Boyle & Hassan, 2016). Members want a majority of directors to be elected (K. Ingram & O'Boyle, 2018). Even as a minority, independent directors are still able to influence decision-making (M. Taylor & O'Sullivan, 2009).	
Transition	Fully appointed board to a hybrid board (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2010, as cited in Tacon & Walters, 2016). Fully elected board to a hybrid board (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2015, as cited in Tacon & Walters, 2016).	

The Table 3.4 themes suggest the need to disentangle the concepts of structure and selection methods. As previously described, the traditional delegate board structure was based on representation (with director selection occurring via nomination and/or election by various constituencies). The independent board is described as 100% appointed with the hybrid board comprising both elected delegates and appointed independents. However, in the modern environment, most sport boards will have a duty to promote the best interests of the organisation as a whole (i.e. be 'independent' in behaviour). A director can act 'independently' regardless of whether they are elected (by/from within the membership), co-opted (by the existing board) or appointed. Hence, by this analysis, there are two sport board structures: the delegate/representative (competitive democracy) model and the independent (whole of sport) model. It is the selection method that can then be more accurately described as 'hybrid' with either structure utilising a range of director selection methods (to best secure the desired outcomes). Reflecting a view that behaviour/mind-set is the critical component of independence, the Australian Sports Commission requires "all directors to be independent, regardless of whether elected or appointed" (Australian Institute of Sport, 2015, p. 5). Jurisdictional restrictions may also impact selection methods such as the Canadian 'nonprofit' legislative requirement that only members elect directors (Parent et al., 2018) with those elected directors having limited co-option powers (Canada Not-for-profit Corporations Act, s 128(8)).

There are other structural factors related to director selection. These include the number of directors, tenure, and diversity quotas (reflecting gender, race, etc.). See Parent and Hoye (2018) for a summary of recent scholarly perspectives. In addition to these structural composition and selection methods dictated in the constitution, a sport organisation must consider the process of director selection.

Process

In 2013, New Zealand Cricket (NZC) transitioned to an independent (100% appointed) model described as "leading the nonprofit sporting world in governance practices" (Bradbury & O'Boyle, 2015, p. 352), In particular, the key elements of the NZC director selection process include:

- Skills matrix to assess key organisational challenges and requisite director skill-sets. The matrix is re-evaluated each year in consultation with the six major association members;
- Nation-wide 'open' campaign to attract quality director candidates;
- Short-listed candidates are interviewed by a nomination committee;

- Nomination committee makes merit-based appointments;
- Nomination committee is comprised of the NZC President, chairpersons of three of the six major associations (rotating with the other three each alternate year), and a Sport NZ representative.

The NZC model is an example of evolving director selection processes. The members have sacrificed the right to 'elect' their directors but their 'voice' is still heard. They play an active role in determining the board skills matrix. The members also retain ultimate control because they constitute the majority of the nomination committee.

A range of similar (K. Ingram & O'Boyle, 2018) and more traditional (Enjolras & Waldahl, 2010; Sherry & Shilbury, 2009) director selection processes are described by other authors. However, the NZC example is the only known reported study where the negotiation of the skills matrix goes beyond the board and senior management to the member associations. In the O'Boyle and Hassan (2016) study on board composition of the Gaelic Athletics Association, one participant noted, regarding the democracy 'trade-off' debate, "if we move to a mixed model we need to ensure that the external candidate is of an extremely high standing" (p. 119). How then to identify candidates, both internal and external, of the requisite quality? A key step, addressed below, is the development of appropriate director selection criteria.

Selection Criteria

A distinction is drawn between structural criteria that pertains to all director selection processes within an organisation and the context-specific criteria that is developed for each director selection process. Structural criteria would normally be prescribed in the organisation's constitution (e.g., quotas, number of appointed/elected directors). Context-specific criteria are developed to address the organisation's strategic needs (as influenced by relevant environmental and organisational factors).

Two types of context-specific criteria are proposed. Allocating the Sport NZ (n.d.-c) criteria to the Elms et al. (2015) concepts are 'role fit' (skills and experience) and 'group fit' (attributes and perspectives) criteria. Role fit is driven by the desire to "ensure that appropriate knowledge and expertise is present within the board in order to deliver on strategic imperatives" (Bradbury & O'Boyle, 2015, p. 357). In doing so, there is the need to balance business acumen with sport-specific knowledge. The shift towards independent (appointed/hybrid) boards created an emphasis on business skills and experience. However, it is not only the internal legitimacy issues (relating to membership and democracy) which merit inclusion of sport specific skills and experience but also the contention that "operational detail may be a necessary element of strategic decision making" (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2010, p. 238). Regardless of the relevant

experience, consider an executive’s observation that it is “better to have board members who [can] think in broad strategic terms for the sport rather than have a board full of skill-based appointments” (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2004, p, 92).

Second, there is a need to balance these ‘role fit’ criteria with the equally important ‘group fit’ criteria (Elms et al., 2015). Group fit is necessary to effectively harness the potential role fit contributions of a director. There is a need for personal attributes that are compatible with the group, yet with sufficient diversity of thought and perspective (e.g., gender, culture, age, etc.) to minimise the risk of groupthink. Balduck et al. (2010), affirm the importance of personal attributes such as emotional intelligence. After their study of 23 sport boards across 12 different sports, they concluded that, “possessing cognitive competencies such as technical abilities, strategic skills or financial skills is not enough to be an outstanding performing board member. Emotional intelligence and social intelligence competencies are important pillars in perceptions of competencies” (p. 228). Such ‘group fit’ director-selection criteria contribute to intragroup dynamics that enable the directors to engage in constructive scepticism whilst maintaining cohesion and a healthy board climate (Schoenberg et al., 2016).

This need to balance group fit and role fit criteria is reflected in the prescriptive material of government sport agencies. For example, see Table 3.5 for a board needs matrix (adapted from Sport NZ, n.d.-a), which enables a board to weight relevant areas and assess the skills/attribute needs of the board as a whole. Although the absence of the important ‘diversity perspectives’ from this matrix is noted.

Table 3.5
Board Needs Matrix (adapted from Sport NZ, n.d.-a)

Desired Characteristics	Weighting (optional)	Self	Name	...	Unweighted Total	TOTAL
Attributes						
Ethical, open, honest, trustworthy, high levels of integrity	x 2					
Independence and inquisitiveness	x 1.5					
Ability to establish quality relationships						
Ability to work as a team player	x 2					
Preparedness to work hard and commit time and effort to do the job	x 1.5					
Has an outcomes focus						
Strong stewardship orientation/consumer focus						

Skills						
Ability to think strategically	x 2					
Analytical, critical reasoning and problem solving skills						
Strong financial literacy and analytical ability	x 1.5					
Oral communication skills	x 1.5					
Ability to understand and relate to stakeholders						
Experience						
Corporate governance experience						
Understanding of and experience in the sport	x 1.5					
Community/stakeholder influence and connections						
Broad business experience	x 1.5					
Meeting performance						
Well prepared for meetings						
Adds value to board dialogue	x 2					
Able to focus at the governance level of issues						
Able to disagree without being disagreeable						
TOTAL						
Scale	5	4	3	2	1	
Competence (see Sport NZ, n.d.-a for full scale description & matrix use suggestions)	Exceptional competence	Fully competent	Mostly competent	Basic competence	Minimal/no competence	

To close this section is an endorsement for future attention to the practice, as much as the policies, of director selection. It is as true today, as it ever was, that we still need to examine “how the selection process really operates” (O’Neal & Thomas, 1995, p. 82).

3.3.4 Director Development and Evaluation – Board Processes

Director selection is not the only variable contributing to board performance. Other important factors include those falling within the EIBP model of board process factors: induction (W. A. Brown, 2007; Grassi et al., 2016), training (Gazley & Nicholson-Crotty, 2018) (considered under director development) and evaluation (Gazley & Nicholson-Crotty, 2018). Director induction has been described as “a structured process of introduction of directors into the boardroom and into the context of the company, with the aim to give fundamental information to play their role actively in the shortest possible time” (Grassi et al., 2016, p. 214). Ongoing training and development are then necessary to keep directors abreast of relevant organisational and

environmental factors (Grassi et al., 2016). Evaluation closes the loop and informs the next iteration of succession-planning, recruitment, induction and director development.

Many of the previously mentioned nonprofit sport studies assert the benefits of induction, education and evaluation board practices, but few position these board practices at the centre of their research. Regarding induction, only one of the seven boards in the Hoye and Cuskelly (2004) study used orientation practices. This absence was attributed by one participant to “a lack of resources rather than will” (p. 92). The authors observed that directors who “have not been adequately oriented to an organisation, may find it difficult to contribute optimally to the board and thereby impact negatively on board performance” (p. 95). Regarding director development generally, the associated benefit of overcoming role ambiguity is well supported (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2004; K. Ingram & O’Boyle, 2018; Sherry & Shilbury, 2009). Sherry and Shilbury (2009) noted the sport organisation “has a responsibility to ensure that directors are educated in the responsibilities and requirements of their role” (p. 58). Failure to do so potentially limits the board’s ability to perform effectively (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2004).

In terms of board evaluation practices, the Hoye and Cuskelly (2004) study revealed that the three ‘ineffective’ boards did not use any form of evaluation. Of the ‘effective’ boards, one used a board self-evaluation process and one used three of the recommended evaluation practices. In the Brunzell and Söderman (2012) study of top Nordic football clubs, 34 (52%) of clubs reported annual board evaluations, albeit mainly through informal discussions led by the Chair. More recently, the assessment methods of the five NSOs in the K. Ingram and O’Boyle (2018) study ranged from “no formal appraisal; self-assessment; peer assessment; an internal Nomination Committee being responsible for the process;... [to] an external consultant interviewing board members” (p. 166). In line with the earlier Hoye and Cuskelly (2004) study, the NSO with no assessment process attributed this to ‘other priorities’ rather than a lack of perceived value. Further barriers to evaluation included process/criteria issues (i.e., how, by whom, and against what criteria?) and the negative impact that evaluation might have on director recruitment and retention for unpaid directors recruited in a non-competitive environment (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2004). Given the potential for board evaluation practices to positively impact perceptions of board performance, including activities related to business plans, strategy, objectives and budget (Brunzell & Söderman, 2012), further scholarly attention to this board practice is warranted. Questions for further examination include: do boards evaluate themselves, against what criteria, is there a benefit to doing so, and, how is such evaluation being performed?

The use of the NC to inform director selection (Brunzell & Söderman, 2012) and director evaluation (K. Ingram & O’Boyle, 2018) is an emerging phenomenon of significant potential for

nonprofit sport organisations. Whilst at face value, the NC may appear to fit within a director selection discussion the NC also has the potential to enhance and integrate other important board responsibilities. In light of this potential, before turning to the topic of board evaluation instruments, the corporate NC literature is introduced together with implications for the sport sector.

3.3.5 Nomination Committees

The NC has been described, in the for-profit sector, as the “primary institutional mechanism designed to strengthen director selection processes” (Kaczmarek et al., 2012, p. 474). NC functions include: the implementation of a robust process (Carson, 2002; Kaczmarek et al., 2012), the design of director candidate profiles (Kaczmarek et al., 2012; Kallamu, 2016), the recommendation of director candidates for ratification by the board and/or shareholders (Kaczmarek et al., 2012; Kallamu, 2016), individual director performance assessment (Kallamu, 2016), ongoing succession planning and, critically, board evaluation (Carson, 2002; Kaczmarek & Nyuur, 2016). As with director selection generally, it is the actual practice/behaviours of those engaged with the NC processes that determine their effectiveness (Walther & Morner, 2014; Walther et al., 2017). Ultimately, NCs should contribute to organisational performance by building a well-composed and value-creating board of directors (Kaczmarek & Nyuur, 2016). Despite this NC centrality to good governance, scholarly interest in the sport governance domain is nascent.

Nonprofit and Sport Organisations

As early as 1991, NCs were recognised, in the nonprofit domain, as “the key to leading an effective recruitment practice” (Joyaux, 1991, as cited in W. A. Brown, 2002, p. 45). Similar to the for-profit literature, a wide range of functions are referenced including the identification of board needs, recruitment, induction, role allocation, development and evaluation (W. A. Brown, 2002; Renz, 2004). The use of NCs are linked to improved perceptions of both board effectiveness (Herman et al., 1997) and board member competence (W. A. Brown, 2007).

In the sport sector, Hoye and Cuskelly (2004) determined that effective boards had more effective director selection processes than ineffective boards but that “neither group of boards used a nominating or board development committee...” (p. 90). Six years later, Enjolras and Waldahl (2010) noted that NCs are “common within voluntary organizations, trade unions and political parties in Norway” (p. 228) and speculated on the possible role of NCs in reducing oligarchs within the Norwegian Olympic and Paralympic Committee and Confederation of Sports. NC functions in nonprofit sport include succession planning, director recruitment, candidate assessment, recommendation, appointment and director/board evaluation (Bradbury

& O'Boyle, 2015; Brunzell & Söderman, 2012; Enjolras & Waldahl, 2010; Ferkins & Shilbury, 2010; K. Ingram & O'Boyle, 2018). In particular, Brunzell and Söderman (2012) revealed that of 44 Nordic football clubs with NCs, 37 (84%) reported their board evaluation results to their NC. These studies, in Australia, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden and New Zealand, whilst not focussing on NCs, signal their emergence as an important governance tool for sport organisations. However, unlike the corporate sector, little is actually known about the NC, its benefits, attributes, behaviours and/or performance, within the modern nonprofit sport environment.

The NC potential to maximise the benefits, in a holistic way, associated with not only director selection, but also director development and evaluation practices, merits urgent attention. As does the need to measure NC performance, and director and board performance generally. Accordingly, the chapter now provides a brief overview of director and board evaluation instruments (as opposed to the existence/impact of board evaluation practices) available to assist with such performance assessments.

3.3.6 Evaluation Instruments: Individual (Director) and Collective (Board and Nomination Committee)

For the purposes of this section, the term board evaluation encompasses the evaluation of the board, board sub-committees and its directors. Expanding on the work of Minichilli et al. (2007), the for-profit literature emphasises the importance of designing context-specific strategies for such evaluations (Nordberg & Booth, 2019; Rasmussen, 2015; Roy, 2008). This requires thoughtful consideration to the following questions: why, what criteria, how, by whom, of whom, for whom, and, to what use will the results be applied?

Within this literature, the assessment of 'behavioural dynamics' as well as the more traditional for-profit financial indicators is promoted (Nordberg & Booth, 2019; Rasmussen, 2015). Importantly, the 'value creating' board will avoid the trap of evaluation for compliance purposes alone and maximise the associated performance enhancement opportunities (Nordberg & Booth, 2019; Rasmussen, 2015; Roy, 2008).

As identified earlier in this chapter, sport boards do engage in performance evaluation (Brunzell & Söderman, 2012; K. Ingram & O'Boyle, 2018) with this board process positively impacting perceptions of board effectiveness (Brunzell & Söderman, 2012). Despite this potential, K. Ingram and O'Boyle (2018) observed the "minimal scholarly attention" (p. 159) directed to this area. Board evaluation instruments referenced by sport governance academics include the Self Assessment for Nonprofit Governing Boards Scale (SANGBS) (Slesinger, 1991), the Board Self Assessment Questionnaire (BSAQ) (Jackson & Holland, 1998) and the Governance Self-

Assessment Checklist (GSAC) (Gill et al., 2005). Hoye and Cuskelly (2007) identified a stream of research, in the early 2000s, “adapting the SANGBS for the context of nonprofit sport organizations” (p. 154). More recent studies have departed from the SANGBS approach and developed their own scales to explore season ticket holder perceptions of board performance (McDonald & Sherry, 2010), chair perceptions of board performance (Brunzell & Söderman, 2012; Tacon & Walters, 2016) and a ‘glocalised’ measure of sport board performance (Ghadami & Henry, 2015).

The literature relating to nonprofit sport director and board committee evaluation is even more sparse. In terms of director evaluation, leading sport management researchers assert reliance on the work of Preston and Brown (2004) (Doherty & Hoye, 2011; Hoye, 2007). To measure individual director performance, Preston and Brown (2004), utilised three strategies: executive assessment (via the ‘Executive Perceived Participation’ scale), peer assessment (via the ‘Board Member Value’ scale), and self-assessment (via the ‘Self-Reported Involvement’ scale). In the nonprofit sport studies on ‘commitment, involvement and board member performance’ (Hoye, 2007) and ‘role ambiguity and board member performance’ (Doherty & Hoye, 2011), directors rate their own performance according to five items (i.e., adequacy of role fulfilment, the quality, meaningfulness and strength of their contributions, plus their contribution ‘strength’ compared to others). Akin to some board evaluation tools, there is little emphasis on the important personality traits/behaviours that contribute to effective intragroup dynamics. Unfortunately, in relation to governance committees, in particular, NCs, there are no known sport studies using evaluation instruments to assess their effectiveness.

Government sport agencies may be leading the field in terms of the utilisation of evaluation instruments. Subsequent to their increased investment in quality NSO governance, is an increased emphasis on evaluation. For example, Sport NZ, in 2017, released a revised Online Governance Evaluation System (OGES) (Sport NZ, n.d.-f). The OGES aligns with the Sport NZ Governance Framework (GF) and Governance Mark (GM) accreditation system (Sport NZ, n.d.-c, n.d.-d). It involves five modules: whole of board (i.e., skills, behaviour, processes, and outputs), chair (i.e., leadership, personal qualities and relationships with management and stakeholders), individual directors (i.e., role, contribution and behaviour), management (evaluation of the board) and nine essential questions for the board (i.e., a discussion framework for the board to consider critical governance areas) (Sport NZ, 2017).

The on-line tool has the capacity to generate multi-year ‘Whole-of-Board’ report comparisons as well as re-evaluation questions and development plans based on low-scoring areas (Sport NZ, 2017). The reference to ‘behaviours’ at both the collective and individual levels is reassuring. However, one concern is the omission of the membership/stakeholder perspective from the

OGES. In addition, from a review of publicly available website information, as at 2018, there is no evidence of similar evaluation of governance committees (e.g., NCs).

A key benefit of the Sport NZ OGES appears to be its potential to capture the 'power of integration' (Roy, 2008), of board/director evaluation, director selection and development (induction and education) strategies. Sport governance scholars, policy-makers and practitioners alike are therefore encouraged to progress such integration to maximise the associated board and organisational performance objectives. In addition, for sport governance scholars, empirical validation of the reliability of industry instruments such as the OGES would be a timely and meaningful contribution.

3.3.7 Conclusions – Implications for Industry and Future Research

There is no 'one size fits all' for nonprofit sport governance. This is reflected in the shift from 'best practice' to 'good practice' recommendations in the prescriptive literature. The challenge for sport sector practitioners is to identify the particular context-specific drivers and strategically design fit-for-purpose director selection, development (induction/education) and evaluation practices accordingly. The challenge for scholars is to help practitioners understand why this is needed, and to identify (in a resource poor environment), where and how best to allocate their governance resources (Parent & Hoye, 2018).

Director selection, development and evaluation is fertile ground for future research for at least two reasons. First, there is a dearth of empirical studies in these fields, particularly for nonprofit sport. Second, the evidence to date supports the contribution of improved director selection, development and evaluation to board performance. Of particular importance for director selection is the behavioural component and the interactions between CEO, Chair, Board, NC (Kaczmarek & Nyuur, 2016; Walther et al., 2017) and, arguably for nonprofit sport, the organisation's voting members. In the case of director development and evaluation, concepts from human resource and volunteer management studies of nonprofit sport organisations may be useful complements (T. Taylor & McGraw, 2006; Wicker, 2017). Attention is directed to the NC as a means of advancing/integrating these board practices so that director selection and development can be both informed by, and inform, evaluation, in an ongoing succession planning cycle.

Finally, the need to evolve the empirical measurement of board (including director and NC) effectiveness is pressing. Such measures need to address the challenges of assessing 'group fit' type criteria such as attributes/behaviour and intra-group dynamics. Collaboration between scholars, policy-makers and practitioners may assist in identifying, developing and validating sport/context specific evaluation instruments, such as the Sport NZ OGES. Closer analysis of the

interconnected nature of director selection, development and evaluation (inherent in the OGES) perhaps paves the way for significant scholarly contribution to sport board, and hence, organisational performance.

Prelude: Chapters 4 and 5

Chapters 4 and 5 form the empirical part of this thesis on NCs as a governance feature of New Zealand NSOs. Despite the centrality of NCs to good governance, research into them has been described as ‘neglected’ in the for-profit (Nachemson-Ekwall & Mayer, 2018, p. 1) and the nonprofit sport sectors (Hvenmark & Einarsson, 2021; Stenling et al., 2021a). Importantly, for New Zealand NSOs, there are no known prior studies conducted with the NC at the heart of the research purpose or questions. These two chapters therefore address the overarching aim of reducing this NC knowledge deficit and contributing to NSO director selection processes and outcomes.

With a broad exploratory/explanatory purpose, namely, to examine NC attributes and determinants within the nonprofit sport board context, the specific purpose(s) of the two studies (captured in Chapters 4 and 5) have been earlier summarised as follows:

- (1) Study 1 (*what*) – to verify the emergence of NCs as a governance phenomenon of New Zealand NSOs, to describe the structures of these NCs, and to critically examine the NC structures from a democratic theory perspective.
- (2) Study 2 (*why*) – to explain the internal and/or external drivers of this NC adoption and design within a selection of New Zealand NSOs.

These two chapters also provide a synthesis of the limited NC literature both generally and as relevant to the purpose(s) of Study 1 (Chapter 4) and Study 2 (Chapter 5).

The Study 1 (Chapter 4) manuscript, “Nomination Committees and National Sport Organisations: Designing the Way to Democracy?”, makes both conceptual and empirical contributions to knowledge. At the empirical level, the study verifies the emergence of NCs within the director selection processes of New Zealand NSOs, describes the design features of these NCs and develops a fourfold structural (composition- and powers-based) classification for New Zealand NSO NCs. At the conceptual level, the study proposes a new democratic concepts schema for NSOs and models a holistic democratic problem/objective-based approach (Warren, 2017) to examining democratic legitimacy (in the context of NSO NC structural design).

The Study 2 (Chapter 5) manuscript, “Director Selection: Drivers for the Adoption and Design of Nomination Committees by New Zealand National Sport Organisations”, moves from the ‘what’ to the ‘why’ of NC adoption and design. As the study evolved, additional learnings were captured relating to ‘how’ the NC adoption was implemented. Study 2 also makes both conceptual and empirical contributions to knowledge. At the empirical level, the study identifies causal mechanisms explaining the NC adoption and design for the selected NSO case studies. At both

empirical and conceptual levels, the study identifies and provides a model demonstrating the role of causal mechanisms (including institutional work and logics) and the relationship between structure, culture and agency in the adoption and design of the relevant NSO NCs (with associated learnings for future NSO NC adoption and design). At the conceptual level, the study proposes a model for applying a CR morphogenetic-cycle (Archer, 1995) based approach to sport management studies and applies the under-utilised Hampel et al. (2017) mechanisms approach to institutional work.

These two studies (Chapters 4 and 5) are each important in their own right, as they lead an emerging NC structures-based research agenda contributing to the baseline knowledge about nonprofit sport NCs. But they are also important because, in addressing the 'what' and 'why' of New Zealand NSO NC adoption and design, these studies explore and explain the past (whakapapa) to better understand the present and plan for future NC contributions (e.g., the 'how' and 'how well') to NSO director selection and governance.

Chapter 4: Study 1 –

Nomination Committees and National Sport Organisations: Designing the Way to Democracy?

Prelude

This chapter comprises the accepted manuscript of the article “Nomination Committees and National Sport Organizations: Designing the Way to Democracy?” published in the *Journal of Global Sport Management*, available online: <https://doi.org/10.1080/24704067.2022.2062029>

4.1 Introduction

Nomination committees (NCs) are the foundational governance committee (Clune et al., 2014). In the corporate sector, NCs are commonly responsible for constructing other governance committees (i.e., audit and compensation) as well as making a significant contribution to the composition of the board itself. Despite its centrality to good governance, the research focusing on for-profit NCs remains ‘neglected’ (Nachemson-Ekwall & Mayer, 2018, p. 1). In the nonprofit sport sector, NC research is almost non-existent. There are, however, a number of studies which reference, as part of broader sport governance or director selection enquiries, the use of NCs (Bradbury & O’Boyle, 2015; Brunzell & Söderman, 2012; Enjolras & Waldahl, 2010; Ferkins & Shilbury, 2010; K. Ingram & O’Boyle, 2018; Stenling et al., 2020). This reference to NC adoption by nonprofit sport is often associated with a shift away from the traditional democratic approach of director selection by election/delegation towards a more corporate hybrid approach with ‘election (by/from within the membership), co-option (by the existing board) [and/or] ... appointment’ (Molloy, Dickson, & Ferkins, 2020, p. 338). The current study seeks to assist national sport organizations (NSOs) navigate this shift and preserve a community logic, in particular democratic legitimacy, in the face of the equally important yet (potentially) competing corporate logic (Capling & Marjoribanks, 2004).

In the New Zealand context, there is industry evidence of NC adoption by a range of high profile NSOs (Swimming New Zealand, 2012). In the absence of legislative and/or regulatory restrictions on NC design, the shift to a corporate logic is evident in varied examples of NC composition (including government sport agency appointees to the NC), NC powers (including the appointment of directors directly to the board) and skills-based director appointment criteria (Swimming New Zealand, 2012). This is consistent with the perceived obsolescence of the

traditional competitive-representative governance model in favour of the independent whole-of-sport model (Molloy, Dickson, & Ferkins, 2020).

Despite this new corporate logic approach, democracy remains a structural cornerstone of nonprofit member-owned organizations. The New Zealand Law Commission (2013) stated that such organizations are self-governing and 'run by their own members' (p. iv). In the sport sector, prominent organizations also promote the principles of democracy in their good governance guidelines (International Olympic Committee, 2011; Union of European Football Associations, 2016). Importantly, nonprofit sport organization members themselves have voiced concerns about the balance between independence and representation and the need to retain regional perspectives (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2010). So, whilst the traditional delegate approach to director selection has long been questioned due to its parochialism (Kihl & Schull, 2020) and the 'system's inability to allow decisions based on the good of the game' (Shilbury, 1993, p. 124), scholars continue to promote democratic ideals (Kihl & Schull, 2020), with a range of democratic practices and principles showing useful potential for director selection (Enjolras & Waldahl, 2010; Minikin, 2015; Stenling et al., 2021b) and sport governance (Parent, 2016).

This study acknowledges the importance of democratic legitimacy (Courant, 2019) and the role of NCs in influencing board composition and hence board performance (Molloy, Ferkins, & Dickson, 2020). In particular, NC structural design and powers may inform the process by which (quality) board candidates are recruited and selected. NC design therefore plays a key role in influencing whether the director selection processes may be classified as democratic. Yet, at the time of writing, there are only two known nonprofit sport studies (Stenling et al., 2021a, 2021b) with NCs at the centre of the research question. To address the deficit, a three-stage research project examines the emergence and design (stage one), change drivers (stage two), and perceived performance (stage three) of NCs within New Zealand NSOs.

The present study (the first stage) is an exploratory examination of NC emergence and structural design. The purpose of the study is to verify the emergence of NCs as a governance phenomenon of New Zealand NSOs and to critically examine, from a democratic theory perspective, the extent to which democratic legitimacy is promoted within the NC structures of New Zealand NSO director selection processes. In support of this purpose, the study poses the following questions: What has been the rate of adoption of NCs by New Zealand NSOs?; What have been the design features (i.e., composition, powers, and responsibilities) of NCs within New Zealand NSOs?

Whilst these questions focus on the New Zealand NSO environment, the study has broader application. The New Zealand sport industry is similar to other sport jurisdictions including Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and parts of Europe (O'Boyle & Shilbury, 2016). In

particular, the New Zealand NSO system is largely based on the federated network structure (Sport NZ, n.d.-e). In this (traditional) federated structure, the NSO's voting members are the regional sport organizations, whose voting members are the clubs, whose voting members, in turn, are the individual members. Arguably, application of the present study extends beyond those organizations with similar systems to any organization with a mind to strategically design its director selection process.

To address the research questions, the study takes a descriptive/interpretive (Smythe, 2012) methodological approach. A thematic framework analysis (Ritchie et al., 2014) is applied to the constitutions of 88 New Zealand NSOs to identify those which evidence the use of an NC. A similar approach is then applied to the 26 NSO constitutions evidencing the use of an NC. A descriptive fourfold classification (Bailey, 2011) is derived reflecting the power balance between NC composition factors and NC power factors. NC responsibilities are summarized within a separate framework enabling the examination of the NC composition, power, and responsibility factors in relation to democratic theory.

In terms of contribution, a range of possible NC structural design features are identified to assist practitioners make more informed NC design choices. On a theoretical level, this exploratory study recognises the assertion that classification is a necessary first step in the theory development continuum (Bailey, 2011; Chelladurai, 2013). It complements the nonprofit sport NC process 'baseline description' of Stenling et al. (2021b, p. 1) by proffering its New Zealand NSO NC structural classification system on which to build future explanatory and evaluative NC studies. It does not attempt to address factors related to NC determinants (e.g., NSO attribute relationship with NC adoption or design) nor NC effects (e.g., comparative evaluation of NC type performance) which are reserved for future research. The study does however use the NC classification to re-invigorate the debate on a range of democratic concepts and their application to quality director selection structures and processes in a context struggling to balance corporate, including professionalization/ efficiency, and community, including democracy/representation, objectives (Capling & Marjoribanks, 2004; Stenling et al., 2021b). This comes at a critical juncture in sport governance scholarship which has been trending toward a focus on the mechanisms of professionalization including appointed, skills-based boards (Shilbury & Ferkins, 2020).

4.2 Literature Review

This review firstly introduces the concept of legitimacy, and its extension to democratic legitimacy, in the context of NCs. In the absence of a dedicated body of NC studies in the nonprofit sport sector, the review provides an overview of NC benefits, structure, processes,

and behaviors derived from the for-profit literature. A summary is then provided of the limited nonprofit and nonprofit sport literature which references the use of NCs to reveal the scope for future scholarly attention and the inherent tension between the community and corporate logics within New Zealand NSO NC design. Similarly, in promoting the application of democratic concepts not commonly used in the nonprofit sport sector, an overview is provided of both general democracy concepts and those used in the nonprofit sport sector, from which a schema is derived (and justified) for application to the present study.

4.2.1 Legitimacy

The concept of legitimacy has been defined as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p 574). In the context of the current study, this concept is extended to democratic legitimacy as an overarching frame. In particular, the extent to which NC structural design features may incorporate the community logic (the democratic norms/definitions associated with typically long-held self-government traditions) of nonprofit sport governance (Capling & Marjoribanks, 2004) applying the legitimacy-conferring capacities of Warren’s (2017) democratic functions and institutional practices.

4.2.2 Director Selection and Nomination Committees

Director selection is the ‘formal process by which individuals are identified, screened, nominated and elected (or appointed) to corporate boards’ (Withers et al., 2012, p. 245). Director selection factors are a recent addition (Molloy, Ferkins, & Dickson, 2020) to the integrated board performance model (Hoye & Doherty, 2011). They contribute to the individual factors (board composition) which, together with environmental and organizational factors, impact board, and hence, organizational performance. NCs are a part of this good governance equation with their mandate to improve director selection processes and ensure that ‘the board will be appropriately composed to perform its statutory tasks and functions’ (Kaczmarek et al., 2012, p. 476).

Nomination Committees – For-Profit Sector

NCs are associated with improved board diversification (Kaczmarek et al., 2012), shareholder protection (Eminet & Guedri, 2010), and overall board independence (Ruigrok et al., 2006) and performance (Vafeas, 1999). From a structural perspective, many NCs in the for-profit sector are sub-sets of the board, with a central concern being the ratio of executive versus independent board directors on the NC (Kaczmarek & Nyuur, 2016). There are jurisdictions where NCs are

'composed of external experts' (Aperite, 2016, p. 42) usually elected by the shareholders, whereas others advocate for a balance between the internal and external NC models (Nachemson-Ekwall & Mayer, 2018). Other NC composition factors such as independence (Ruigrok et al., 2006), diversity (Hutchinson et al., 2015; Kaczmarek et al., 2012; Pirzada et al., 2017) and finance expertise (Kallamu, 2016) are linked with the respective associated board benefits.

The activities (or processes) of NCs can vary significantly. Common themes include the development of required director candidate profiles (Eminet & Guedri, 2010; Hutchinson et al., 2015; Kaczmarek et al., 2012; Kallamu, 2016; Ruigrok et al., 2006; Walther & Morner, 2014), the implementation of a rational, independent and transparent director selection process (Appiah & Chizema, 2016; Carson, 2002; Hutchinson et al., 2015; Kaczmarek et al., 2012; Ruigrok et al., 2006; Walther & Morner, 2014), and the recommendation of director candidates for ratification by shareholders and/or the board (Appiah & Chizema, 2016; Eminet & Guedri, 2010; Kaczmarek et al., 2012; Kallamu, 2016; Ruigrok et al., 2006; Walther & Morner, 2014). Other studies reference additional NC objectives. These include performance assessment for directors (Kallamu, 2016), board performance reviews, and succession planning (Carson, 2002).

In terms of NC behavioral factors, some qualitative studies have suggested that NCs fall short of their good practice potential. In one study, Clune et al. (2014) concluded that 'the reality of many director searches does not match the NYSE's notion of independent NCs driving the director nomination process' (p. 778). Similarly, Walther and Morner (2014) found that the majority of NCs did not 'pursue their tasks in an effective manner' (p. 146). With a focus on the behavioral aspects of NCs, they identified three NC types: the box-ticking, the consultative and the active (Walther & Morner, 2014). Building on this work, Walther et al. (2017) applied decision comprehensiveness to director selection planning and candidate evaluation. Their research identified three types of selection processes: unplanned (i.e., low planning and low evaluation), projecting (i.e., high planning and low evaluation) and inclusive (i.e., high planning and high evaluation). Such processes are 'shaped by a set of complex and interwoven social dynamics among nomination committees, CEOs, and board chairs' (p. 360).

Nomination Committees – Nonprofit Sector

In the nonprofit sector, Bruneel et al. (2020) acknowledged the NC's potential to formalize and optimize director selection processes. Yet, despite early recognition of this potential (W. A. Brown, 2002), and the links to perceptions of board effectiveness (Herman et al., 1997) and director competence (W. A. Brown, 2007) the nonprofit NC remains under-researched (Hvenmark & Einarsson, 2021; Stenling et al., 2021a). Associated academic literature reference

nonprofit NC functions as including board needs identification, candidate recruitment and recommendation, and director development and evaluation (W. A. Brown, 2002; Hvenmark & Einarsson, 2021; Renz, 2004). Seaworth (2016) recorded a shift in the practitioner literature away from recommending the narrow NC (focussing on director selection processes) to the broader governance committee (including the ongoing director development and evaluation objectives). Of note is the limitation of nonprofit NC director selection powers to candidate recommendations, but with that informal power still recognized as significant due to the assertion that few NC recommendations are contested (Hvenmark & Einarsson, 2021; Stenling et al., 2021a).

Nomination Committees – Nonprofit Sport Sector

An early study (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2004) recognized the absence of NCs in sport governance, noting that neither effective nor ineffective boards were using nominating committees. More recently, NCs have been described as an ‘emerging international phenomenon’ (Stenling et al., 2020, p. 638) with a number of studies identifying various NC functions in nonprofit sport: planning, recruitment of directors, assessment of candidates, recommendation, appointment, and the monitoring and evaluation of the board/directors (Bradbury & O’Boyle, 2015; Brunzell & Söderman, 2012; Enjolras & Waldahl, 2010; Ferkins & Shilbury, 2010; K. Ingram & O’Boyle, 2018; Stenling et al., 2021b). Enjolras and Waldahl (2010) promoted the benefits of NCs, suggesting the potential for an NC to reduce oligarchs within Norwegian sport.

In the only known nonprofit sport studies with NCs central to the research question, Stenling et al. (2021a, 2021b) analyzed the potential of NCs to impact board composition. With NC composition prescribed by regulation in Sweden (all NC members to be elected at General Meetings), the studies focussed on NC processes. One study specifically focussed on the tensions between, and within, the representative and efficiency based evaluative criteria applied by NCs noting that the ‘plurality of criteria that are perceived as significant arguably presents the NCs of member-based federative nonprofits with unique challenges’ (Stenling et al., 2021a, p. 288). One such challenge being the potential for NC criteria trade-offs, in particular efficiency-based prioritization, to contribute to the erosion of the self-governance logic inherent within NSO federations. Unsurprisingly, Stenling and colleagues recommend greater attention to the ‘NCs’ [board] shaping potential, regardless of whether adequate board composition is conceived from a professionalization/efficiency or democracy/representation perspective’ (Stenling et al., 2021b, p 16).

In the New Zealand context, the Swimming New Zealand (2012) Growing a Cornerstone Sport Report recorded that eight out of the nine NSOs reviewed had recently changed their

governance structure to include a mix of appointed and elected directors with all nine NSOs utilising an NC as part of the director selection process. This is consistent with the government sport agency taking a more corporate logic approach in their recommendations for good governance practices (Sport NZ, n.d.-e). Whilst not focussing on NCs, two studies, in particular, demonstrated the importance of NC powers and design features together with the associated challenge of balancing the community (including democracy/representation) and corporate (including professionalization/efficiency) logics. Ferkins and Shilbury's (2010) action research project with Tennis New Zealand included the issue of board composition. The participant interviews evidenced tensions between the representative versus independent director debate. There was an acknowledgement that the earlier shift from a 10-person management committee to a 100% appointed board had led to 'a certain "disconnection" between the national board and regional perspectives' (p. 241). The outcome of the Tennis New Zealand debate was to create a hybrid director selection process with four appointed directors and four regionally elected director positions. An NC selected the appointed directors and provided the membership with recommendations to fill the elected positions. This dual power highlights the NCs significant influence on board composition. In a case study examining New Zealand Cricket, Bradbury and O'Boyle (2015) noted the use of an NC to 'merit-select directors following a wide ranging national recruitment campaign' (p. 359). Importantly, member voice was retained through contributions to the board skills matrix and through major association chairpersons having a majority (3/5) vote on the NC 'as the "owners" of the organisation' (p. 359). Again, the power of the NC is extensive, with all directors appointed by the NC, but with the NC design features ensuring that the balance of power lies in the hands of the members.

Although these New Zealand studies lack an explicit focus on NCs, they highlight the challenges (and opportunities) for NSOs navigating the community-corporate logic divide within their director selection processes. They also evidence the potential range of NC structural factors (constitutional provisions regarding NC composition, powers and responsibilities) evolving in a largely unregulated (with no legislative/regulatory NC requirements) context. With structure a precursor of actual processes, such NC structural features merit closer examination as a means to contribute to the nascent for-profit and minimal nonprofit and nonprofit sport NC literature. The following section of this review outlines the democratic lens through which these NC structures are examined.

4.2.3 Director Selection and Democracy

The concept of democracy is commonly associated with Abraham Lincoln's vision of freedom, with 'government of, by and for the people' (Cuomo & Holzer, 2004, p. 308). There are many models, practices and principles utilized in the pursuit of this objective. In order to re-invigorate

seemingly overlooked democratic concepts in the nonprofit sport domain, an overview is first provided of democratic theory and key associated concepts drawn from literature beyond the sport setting. Relevant applications of democratic models/practices and principles in the nonprofit sport sector are then summarized, closing with an outline of the concepts which are the focus of this study.

Democratic Concepts – General

What is democratic theory? In their paper addressing this question, Dean et al. (2019) asserted that the field of democratic theory is ‘a multitemporal and multispatial community of overlapping and contradictory concerns that breathes life into countless democratic practices, ... longs for open, recurring, challengeable, decision making ... and so much, much more’ (p. xiii). They described the model wars as the battle between key opposing practices such as direct versus indirect (representative), elite versus participatory, and agonist versus deliberative democracy.

Direct democracy derives from classical Athenian democracy where ‘all citizens [comprising free, adult, Athenian males] met to debate, decide and enact the law’ (Held, 2006, p. 25). As societies grew in size and complexity, the Athenian approach was considered logistically and intellectually impractical. Indirect (representative) democracy evolved to permit ‘the broadest participation of the majority of citizens in the selection of representatives who alone can make political decisions (... affecting the whole community)’ (Held, p. 106).

Elite democracy positions representative power with the elite few on the basis that the average citizen is neither interested in nor capable of the requisite decision-making (Dean et al., 2019). In contrast to the elite approach, participatory democracy advocates for active citizen participation from ‘the lowest appropriate level’ (Dean et al., 2019, p. vii), with the pluralist approach recognizing the influence of different interest groups, including minorities, over political decision-making (Held, 2006).

From a process view, agonist democracy promotes the benefits of productive conflict as enhancing informed engagement and minimizing marginalization and citizen apathy (Paxton, 2019). Deliberative democracy strives for ‘the transformation of private preferences via a process of [public] deliberation into positions that can withstand public scrutiny and test’ (Held, 2006, p. 252). These competing concepts are not all mutually exclusive, as demonstrated by the Irish Citizens’ Assembly which ‘combined elements of representative and direct democracy through a deliberative procedure’ (Dean et al., 2019, p. xii).

In terms of leader selection in the democratic context, Courant (2019) described four methods: election (voting by a majority or plurality of electors), nomination (to a specific office),

certification (requiring criteria satisfaction) and sortition (by lot). Interestingly, only certification is associated with a competency approach; historically, sortition is associated with democracy, and election with oligarchy. Again, these methods are not mutually exclusive and can be 'complementary and combinable' (Courant, 2019, p. 235). Less democratic methods of attaining a leadership position include filiation (i.e., heredity), acquisition (i.e., purchase) and force (Besley, 2005; Courant, 2019).

Held (2006) described these models and practices as 'divided into two broad types: direct or participatory democracy (a system of decision-making about public affairs in which citizens are directly involved) and liberal or representative democracy (a system of rule embracing elected 'officers' who undertake to 'represent' the views and/or interests of citizens within the framework of the 'rule of law')' (p. 4). Held's 'Variants of democracy' figure makes clear a further division between protective (e.g., competitive elitist) and developmental (e.g., deliberative and participatory) models (Held, 2006, p. 5). This division reveals two objectives for citizen involvement, in which 'developmental theorists stress the intrinsic value of political participation for the development of citizens as human beings, while protective theorists stress its instrumental importance for the protection [against corruption] of citizens' aims and objectives, i.e., their personal liberty' (p. 35).

Warren (2017) challenged the model-based approach to democratic theory-building, lamenting the 'proliferation of adjectives that name and differentiate models' (p. 40) and the tendency of model-based approaches to 'foreground a single problem ..., practice ..., or norm to the exclusion of others' (p. 39). He alleged that this pursuit of an ideal democratic practice (e.g., deliberative) was limiting further theoretical development. Warren promoted a more holistic systems and problem-based approach, where the theorizing could focus on the best mix of 'generic practices... within a (problem-relevant) system to serve democratic functions' (p. 43). Warren (2017) identified the democratic functions as empowered inclusion, collective agenda and will formation, and collective decision-making. The key institutional practices are recognizing, resisting, deliberating, representing, voting, joining and exiting. He asserted that these practices are not inherently democratic and should be utilized recognizing their 'function-specific strengths and weaknesses' (p. 45). Importantly, he associated the functions themselves with democratic legitimacy: inclusion with input legitimacy; collective agenda and will formation (incl. compelling rationale, transparency and accountability) with throughput legitimacy; and collective decision-making with output/performance legitimacy. Legitimacy is a theme also threading through the democracy literature in the nonprofit sport governance domain, which is explored in the next section.

Democratic Concepts – Nonprofit Sport

Democratic legitimacy is relevant to various levels of sport governance (Kihl & Schull, 2020). In a study exploring the manipulation of democratic processes, Minikin (2015) acknowledged the challenge to the 'concept of democracy that underpins how people are selected to positions on the boards of member based sport organisations and how ... decisions ... are ratified by the members' (p. 447). Minikin (2015) conducted three case studies, one National Olympic Committee and two NSOs. All the cases reflected oligarchic features, including tenures of more than 20 years for the NSO presidents. Taking the approach of Allern and Pedersen (2007), he utilized three democratic concepts: competitive, participative, and deliberative democracy. In the director selection context, the participative (described as consensus) and deliberative (described as consultative) approaches are encouraged, but they require an engaged and informed membership as conditions for success. Member disengagement, due to lack of information, constitutional manipulation and/or a sense of powerlessness, enabled the case study oligarchies to endure. Whilst Minikin (2015) argued that democratic manipulation by the oligarch is associated with the pursuit of external personal legitimacy and further enabled by external organizational legitimacy (with the oligarch ensuring technical compliance with International Sport Federation and National Olympic Committee requirements), these same processes could diminish both internal (i.e., members) and external legitimacy.

Similarly, Enjolras and Waldahl (2010) applied competitive, participative, and deliberative democratic concepts with an added distinction between direct and representative (indirect) democracy. Their study of the Norwegian Olympic Committee and Confederation of Sports did not reveal oligarchic practices, but it did reveal member disengagement which they associated with diminished organizational legitimacy. The identified disengagement factors included lack of time, money, skills, confidence, and, like the Minikin (2015) results, a lack of perceived power or influence over outcomes. These findings are described as consistent with the two theoretical sources of such deficits being members' lack of both 'enlightened understanding' and 'control over the final agenda (Enjolras & Waldahl, 2010, p. 229). Importantly, NCs are confirmed as contributors to organizational democracy, potentially overcoming such member disengagement, through the performance of their director recruitment, evaluation, recommendation and/or selection functions (Enjolras & Waldahl, 2010).

Democratic governance principles (e.g., transparency, accountability, participation, and performance) also feature in the sport literature (Chappelet & Mrkonjic, 2013; Henry & Lee, 2004). Parent (2016) explored stakeholder perspectives on these principles in the context of major sport events. Performance is described as requiring 'efficiency, effectiveness and economy' (p. 408). Accountability is 'being responsible for your performance' (p. 408) through

walking the talk. Transparency includes the ‘timely disclosure of information, ... clarity and traceable decisions’ (p. 413). Participation is the ‘process of physical, mental and emotional active engagement’ (p. 412). Parent’s (2016) model makes important distinctions between internal (i.e., intra-organizational) and external (i.e., inter-organizational) accountability, transparency, and participation, and outlines their links with each other and with major sport event governance performance. Citing legitimacy logic (Enjolras & Waldahl, 2010) amongst other factors, Parent (2016) asserted that ‘the sport industry can benefit from following democratic governance principles’ (p. 403). Overall, whilst these sport studies identify legitimacy risks associated with democracy, they also signal the continued relevance of democratic concepts to sport governance.

Democracy – A Concepts Schema for NSOs

Given the plethora of such democratic models, functions, practices and principles, a schema is offered (see Table 4.1) to guide exploration of selected key concepts for the present study.

Table 4.1
Democratic Concepts for NSOs

Schema	Source	Concepts
Theorists	(Held, 2006)	Protective and Developmental
Objectives	(Warren, 2017)	Empowered Inclusion, Collective Agenda and Will Formation, and Collective Decision-Making
Practices	(Warren, 2017)	Recognizing, Resisting, Deliberating, Representing, Voting, Joining, and Exiting
Principles	(Parent, 2016)	Transparency, Accountability, and Engagement (internal and external), and Performance
Director Selection	(Courant, 2019)	Election, Nomination, Certification, and Sortition
Methods	(Molloy, Dickson, & Ferkins, 2020)	Election, Appointment, and Co-Option

Within the context of New Zealand NSOs’ liberal/representative democracy, the schema reflects the theoretical divide between protective and developmental structures and motivations. The problem/function-based approach of Warren (2017) is preferred as the central analytical tool due to its more holistic nature, utilizing his seven institutional practices. The Parent (2016) principles, the generic leader selection methods of Courant (2019) and the common sport specific director selection methods of Molloy, Dickson, and Ferkins (2020) are also recognized. Noting the dilemma of meaning attached to the words participation (Callahan, 2007; Parent, 2016) and function (Warren, 2017), they are replaced in the schema with the words engagement and objective respectively.

4.3 Methods

This study is situated within a descriptive/interpretivist (Smythe, 2012) methodological approach, a choice consistent with the exploratory nature of the study and the lead author's critical realism (Farquhar, 2012; Ritchie et al., 2014;) philosophy. Reflexivity, consistent with the empathic neutrality of critical realism, complemented this analysis (Farquhar, 2012; Ritchie et al., 2014) in order to minimise the potential for researcher bias.

4.3.1 Data Collection

The data type for both the emergence (research question one) and classification (research question two) studies were the constitutions of New Zealand NSOs. The time horizon for data collection ranged over 16 years, between 1999 and 2014. This timespan provided insight into NC emergence and rate of adoption and concluded in 2014 as the researchers began work on stages two and three of this program of research (as noted above). In 2014, the Sport NZ website listed 93 national level sport organizations. Five umbrella/special interest type organizations (e.g., University Sport New Zealand) listed on the website were excluded from this NSO study. Hence, 88 constitutions were downloaded from the Incorporated Societies Register embedded within the New Zealand Companies Office (NZCO) website.

Within the comprehensive sample (Miles et al., 2014) of these 88 NSO constitutions, a judgment sample (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008) of the relevant director selection rules revealed 26 constitutions containing clear evidence of an NC. The criteria for inclusion in the NC sample was constitutional evidence of a committee with a role in the director selection process including, but not limited to, setting criteria, processes, recruitment, evaluation, recommendation and/or appointment of such directors to the board of the NSO. Constitutions were excluded if the director selection committee comprised the entire board or elected directors only (effectively exercising co-option powers) or dealt only with substitute directors or casual vacancies.

4.3.2 Data Analysis

A thematic framework analysis guided both the emergence and classification studies. Framework analysis was chosen as a matrix-based method for data summary and display well-suited to contextual/descriptive analysis and the iterative process of developing classifications both within and cross-cases (Ritchie et al., 2014; Srivastava & Thomson, 2009). The six steps were: 1) familiarization with the documents/relevant portions; 2) developing an initial thematic framework; 3) indexing and sorting relevant data; 4) reviewing data extracts/initial thematic framework; 5) data summary and display; and 6) abstraction and interpretation (Ritchie et al., 2014). This process was complemented, at relevant steps, by qualitative content analysis (Elo &

Kyngäs, 2008), document analysis (Bowen, 2009) and the compare, contrast and cluster tactics of Miles et al. (2014).

Emergence Study

In the emergence study the focus was on data reduction and displaying the data in table format under key headings (i.e., themes). Familiarization (step one) and the initial thematic framework development (step two) were conducted via skim reading during the data collection process. Through this process, three heading types were developed and later populated after additional reading (steps two, three and five): identification (i.e., NSO name, New Zealand Companies Office [NZCO] number, registration date of the collected constitution/s), content summary (i.e., relevant rules, key rule headings/terms and words, director selection summary/comments) and interpretation (i.e., NC status). The step four review (conducted on an iterative and ongoing basis in conjunction with steps three and five) led to a new heading, which reflected the date of the NC rule change. The critical interpretation process (step six) assessed the status of each NC. The final thematic framework was recorded in a 25-page NSO case-ordered meta-matrix (Miles et al., 2014).

Classification Study

The thematic framework analysis for the classification study was more complex, involving compare, contrast, and cluster strategies (Miles et al., 2014). The initial approach was inductive, consistent with the abductive approach of critical realism and the exploratory nature of the study. The two key dimensions of the classification - NC appointment and NC director selection powers - were identified after examining (comparing and contrasting) eight NSO NC rules. The data within these dimensions were considered to be sufficiently descriptive, yet parsimonious, and relevant to enable meaningful analysis directly connected to the study's purpose and research questions. This framework was then used to deductively categorize the remaining 18 NCs. This approach met the essential requirement of a classification in that the categories formed were 'both exhaustive and mutually exclusive' (Bailey, 2011, Basic Concepts).

To expand on the thematic framework analysis process, familiarization occurred during the emergence study. For step two, the development of an initial thematic framework, two NVivo11 framework matrices were created, one with a focus on NC appointment/ composition and the other focussed on NC responsibilities. The NC-Appointment framework headings related to who held the power to make appointments to the NC, whether held internally or externally. The NC-Responsibilities framework headings related to the powers/ responsibilities of each NC, from the recruitment and assessment of candidates for the board to the recommendation or appointment of such candidates to the board. After the step three analysis of the first 8 NCs,

these frameworks were merged into one NC case-ordered meta-matrix (Miles et al., 2014) with narrowed headings (step four themes) of Board (selection method), NC Appointment (control of NC composition), NC Powers (control of director selection), and NC Type. The third and fifth steps, data indexing/sorting and data summary/ display, were then completed under these headings. The final step, abstraction/ interpretation, was an ongoing process of categorization and refinement of the criteria for inclusion under each NC type. The application of clustering tactics then resulted in an NC partially-ordered meta-matrix (Miles et al., 2014), from which a descriptive fourfold classification (Bailey, 2011) was confirmed. Additional descriptive information relating to broader NC responsibilities was later extracted, summarized, and displayed under relevant headings in a separate document.

4.3.3 Trustworthiness

Data quality (Bowen, 2009) is assured through the legally binding and publicly available nature of the data (NSO constitutions) accessed from a government source (NZCO). In particular, the authenticity, credibility and representativeness of the data is established through the legislative requirements that, to be of legal effect, the NSOs' constitutions must provide for director selection, must be certified as to their authenticity and be registered at the NZCO (Incorporated Societies Act 1908, ss. 6–8). Trustworthiness (Bowen, 2009; Elo & Kyngäs, 2008) of the results is maximized by a transparent data analysis description, and the development of the NC inclusion/exclusion criteria together with the data reduction and categorization being conducted by the lead author alone. The links between the data reduction and the resulting categories (i.e., interpretation) were summarized in three meta-matrices (i.e., NSO case-ordered, NC case-ordered and NC partially-ordered) and peer-reviewed by the second author.

4.4 Results and Discussion

The results of the emergence and classification studies are summarized below, together with brief observations. A more detailed discussion follows, centred on the extent to which the NC design features are consistent with the democratic objectives outlined in Table 4.1 and associated recommendations to promote the vision of democratic legitimacy.


4.4.1 Emergence Study

The emergence study was designed to affirm, or not, the emergence of NCs as a note-worthy phenomenon within New Zealand NSOs. The results evidence that, as at 1 August 2014, 29.6% (26 out of 88) of the New Zealand NSO constitutions indicated a NC in their director selection processes. NSOs without such evidence accounted for 64.8% (57 out of 88 NSOs), leaving just five (5.7%) as unclassified. Of the five 'unclassified' NSOs, one constitution referred to an

'Appointment Committee', and three to policies not available through the NZCO website. Therefore, these four were unable to be classified with the requisite certainty. One NSO constitution failed to describe any aspect of its director selection process.

The NC adoption timeline is recorded in Figure 4.1. This figure displays the year in which the NSO constitutional amendments registered at the NZCO recorded a change from a more traditional model of director selection to one involving the use of an NC. The NZCO electronic records of six of the seven early NC adopters (1999–2001) did not pre-date 1999. It is therefore possible that some of these NSOs may have a pre-1999 initial NC adoption date.

Figure 4.1
New Zealand NSO NCs: Adoption Timeline (1999 – 2014)



This timeline perhaps counters the belief that NCs are an especially new phenomenon with over 65% (17/26) of the recorded initial NC adoption occurring pre-2010. This result supports the contention that closer examination of NCs in the sport context is long overdue. Of greater concern is the failure of five NSOs to record all or any relevant director selection processes in their constitution. This is potentially in breach of the Incorporated Societies Act 1908 and certainly in breach of the member-owned/run spirit of these organizations. To devolve the power to set director selection processes to the board itself, via policy development, is a significant dilution of membership rights. It appears contrary to all three of Warren's (2017) democratic objectives (i.e., empowered inclusion, collective agenda and will formation, and collective decision-making) and the principles of transparency, accountability, and member engagement (Parent, 2016).

For the remaining NSOs, these results confirm the NC as a note-worthy phenomenon in the governance of New Zealand NSOs. Given the NC numbers (at least 29% of New Zealand NSOs, with likely more since), their enduring nature (some NCs dating back to 1999, or before), and their potential to impact board composition and hence board performance (Molloy, Ferkins, & Dickson, 2020), this is a sport governance phenomenon meriting further investigation.

4.4.2 Classification Study

This part of the study was designed to determine the structural design features (i.e., composition, powers, responsibilities) within New Zealand NSO NCs in a manner conducive to examination through a democratic lens. The results are divided into two parts: 1) A power-based fourfold classification based on NC composition (i.e., distribution of the powers to appoint NC members) and NC powers (i.e., distribution of the powers to select directors); and 2) An overview of the NCs' constitutionally mandated responsibilities/rights.

NC Classification

The fourfold classification displayed in Table 4.2 was confirmed by the four clusters of NC types recorded in the NSO NC partially ordered meta-matrix (Miles et al., 2014; Ritchie et al., 2014). The four quadrants relate to the balance of power between the NC and other relevant stakeholders in the director selection process. The row labelled NC-App-Ext contains the category of NSOs whose majority of NC members were appointed by external agencies (e.g., Sport NZ, Institute of Directors New Zealand) as opposed to appointment via internal processes (e.g., by the members and/or the board). The row labelled NC-App-Int comprises NSOs categorized as having the majority of their NC members appointed through internal processes. The column headed NC-DSP-Maj contains those NSOs whose NC director selection powers accounted for the majority of directors selected to the board (e.g., direct appointments, recommendations made where the only member choice was a veto). The column headed NC-DSP-Min/Equal comprises NSOs where the minority of directors are selected by the NC (the majority selected via internal processes such as member election), or, in the case of four NSOs, where there is an equal balance of power.

Table 4.2

Nomination Committee Classification – New Zealand NSOs

NC composition balance of power	Director selection balance of power	
	NC selects majority of directors (NC-DSP-Maj)	NC selects 50% or less of directors (NC-DSP-Min/Equal)
External (NC-App-Ext)	Type A (External-Majority NC): NSO-A, NSO-N	Type B (External-Minority NC): NSO-W

Internal (NC-App-Int)	Type C (Internal-Majority NC): NSO-E, NSO-F, NSO-G, NSO-H ^a , NSO-K ^b , NSO-S	Type D (Internal-Minority NC): NSO-B, NSO-C, NSO-D ^c , NSO-I, NSO-J, NSO-L, NSO-M, NSO-O, NSO-P, NSO-Q, NSO-R ^d , NSO-T ^e , NSO-U ^c , NSO-V, NSO-X, NSO-Y, NSO-Z
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^a 4 appointed + 3 elected (with 2 x optional co-options by the board). ^b 4 appointed + 3 elected (with CEO director appointed by the board). ^c 4 appointed + 4 elected. ^d 3 appointed + 3 elected. ^e 4 appointed + 4 elected (with 1 optional co-option by the board).

Overall, Table 4.2 proposes four NC types, each exercising varying degrees of external stakeholder power over the director selection processes of the relevant NSOs. Type A, the External-Majority NC (2/26 NCs – 8%), holds the greatest power over the NSO director selection process. This NC type is effectively controlled by external appointees and then appoints the majority of directors to the NSO board. The NC for NSO-N also recommends the candidates for election with such recommendations matching the number of vacancies. In the opposite corner of the quadrant lies Type D, the Internal-Minority NC (17/26 NCs - 65%). This NC type has a majority of internal NC appointees and appoints the minority of directors, with the majority elected by the members. Type D may also contribute to the election process by making (optional) candidate recommendations. Types B and Type C fall between the two extremes. Type B, the External-Minority NC (1/26 NCs - 4%), has a majority of externally appointed NC members, but the NC appoints the minority of directors. Type C, the Internal-Majority NC (6/26 NCs - 23%), has a majority of internally appointed NC members. This NC type appoints the majority of directors and/or controls the membership’s elections by virtue of making effectively mandatory recommendations (no candidate choice beside veto). Table 4.3 provides an NSO example from each NC type, derived from the relevant constitutions and the partially ordered NC meta-matrix.

Table 4.3
Nomination Committee Types – Examples and Design Features – New Zealand NSOs

NC Type	NSO Example	Powers - directors appointed/elected by director selection stakeholders (n)			Composition - director selection stakeholder appointees on NC (n)			
		Appointed by NC	Elected by voting members	Other	External – Sport NZ	Internal – Board	Internal – Voting members	Internal – other
A	N	4	3 ^a		2 ^b	1	1	
B	W	3	4		2	1		
C	H	4	3	2 ^c	1		1	1 ^d
D	B	3	4	2 ^e		2	1	

^a From NC recommended director candidates only. ^b Sport NZ appoints the NC chair (with casting vote). ^c Optional co-options by board (‘controlled’ by NC appointees). ^d Appointed by the President (who is elected by the voting members). ^e Ex officio board positions (one with no vote).

Additional data from the NC meta-matrices confirm a mixed model (internal-external) approach to NC composition as advocated by Nachemson-Ekwall and Mayer (2018). A key distinction from the for-profit NC is that this study describes the NSO internal NC composition as including board and member appointees (as opposed to board members only) and external composition as including appointments by external agencies such as Sport NZ (as opposed to shareholder representatives). In particular, 14 of the 26 NCs included external appointments, 24 included board appointees (with specific references to the appointment of the board chairperson in nine NCs, and independents in nine also), and 16 included member (owner) NC appointments. The particular combinations of NC membership, unique to each NSO, may go some way to addressing the critique (Nachemson-Ekwall & Mayer, 2018) of the traditional for-profit internal (board sub-committee resulting in shareholder disengagement) and external (majority shareholder dominance) NC composition models.

This range of NC composition and director selection power design features does suggest some strategic intent directed towards ‘constructing a value-creating and well-composed board’ (Kaczmarek & Nyuur, 2016, p. 100). However, the domination of Type A (External-Majority NC) and Type B (External-Minority NC) by external appointees to the NC, and Type A (External-Majority NC) and Type C’s (Internal-Majority NC) control over the majority of directors selected appears to be somewhat anti-democratic. It is possible that these composition and power design features may be moderated by the more detailed NC responsibilities/rights mandated by the relevant constitutions. A summary of these NC responsibilities/rights followed by a more thorough exploration of the extent to which such NC composition, power and responsibility factors support democratic legitimacy are provided in the remaining sections of this paper.

NC Responsibilities/Rights

Completing the NC structural design analysis, the key constitutional responsibilities/rights of the NSO NCs are summarized in Table 4.4. Table 4.4 is organized to recognize the overarching role of an NC to contribute to quality board composition (Kaczmarek et al., 2012). To achieve this role, three key objectives are proposed, to enhance director selection (processes and outcomes), to enhance board/director development and to enhance board/director evaluation (Molloy, Dickson, & Ferkins, 2020). The range of NC constitutional responsibilities/rights (activities) is captured under objectives, with director selection being further divided into planning, assessment/evaluation (Walther et al., 2017), and selection functions.

Table 4.4*Nomination Committee Constitutional Responsibilities/Rights – New Zealand NSOs*

Objective 1 - Director Selection	NZ NSO NCs
Planning	
Identify board needs - unspecified process	Q
Identify board needs - consultation with the CEO/Chair/Board	B(1), D(1), N, Y
Identify board needs - review board needs matrix	No specific reference
Candidate criteria/profile development	No specific reference
Application form - development/approval/specifying required candidate information	D, Y
Recruit suitable applicants	B(1), D, J(1), K(2), L(1), P(1), Q(1), R(1), T(2), U(1), W(2), Y
Advertise for applicants - internal/external	B(1), D, G, J(1), K(2), N, P(1), Q(1), R(1), S, T(2), U(1), W(2), X, Y
Assessment	
Assess candidate suitability in relation to board needs (via CEO/Chair/Board consultation and/or review of board needs matrix or skills and competencies framework)	A, F, N, O
Assess candidates on merit and/or against general criteria - skills/qualifications/experience	A, B(1), D(1), E(3), F, G(3), H(4), J(1), L(1), N, O, P(1), Q(1), S, U(1), V(4), X, Y
Assess candidates against specific criteria - sport knowledge/experience	B(1), D, J(1), L(1), M, N(1), P(1), Q(1), R(1), S(1), U(1), X
Assess candidates against specific criteria - governance and/or business knowledge/experience	B(1), D, J(1), L(1), M, N(1), P(1), Q(1), R(1), S(1), U(1), X
Assess candidates against specific criteria - gender, age, ethnicity, and/or geographical diversity	B, D, F, L, O, P, R
Assess candidates against specific criteria - conflict of interest	B(1), D(1), J(1), L(1), N, P(1), Q(1), R(1), S, U(1)
Assess candidates via general enquiries - reviewing CVs, interviews, reference checks, eligibility criteria determination, obtaining further information	A, B(1), D, H(4), J(1), K(2), L(1), N, P(1), Q(1), R(1), S, T(2), U(1), V(4), W(2), Y
Provide board with candidate synopsis/suitability summaries	No specific reference
Provide members with candidate synopsis/suitability summaries	E(3), G(3), O, Q, Y
Provide members with board skills criteria	O, Q
Selection	

Appointment - direct to board	A, B(1), D, H(4), I, J, K(2), L(1), N, O, P(1), Q, R(1), S, T(2), U, V(4), W(2), X
Appointment recommendations - to board	C, M, Z
Appointment recommendations - to members (for AGM appointment/ratification)	E(3), G(3), Y, Z
Election recommendations - to members (with multiple candidate choices)	B(1), D, J(1), L(1), O, P(1), R(1), U(1), Y
Election recommendations - to members (with no candidate choices and/or veto only choice)	F, N, S
Casual vacancy appointments	B, D, H, J, L(1), N, O, P(1), Q(1), R, U(1), X
Casual vacancy recommendations/assistance	M, Y, Z
Objective 2 - Board & Director Development	
Induction, identifying skill set gaps, recommending development strategies/courses	No specific reference
Objective 3 - Board & Director Evaluation	
Initiating, leading and/or contributing to evaluation processes	No specific reference
Other functions	
Succession planning	No specific referenced
NC regulations (covering related matters and/or regulating own procedure)	A, B(1), D(1), H, J(1), L(1), O, P(1), Q(1), R(1), U(1)
Determine director term of office	S
Director remuneration recommendations to AGM	F(5), O(5)

Note. Bracketed numerals indicate that the NSOs with the same bracketed numeral share significant similarities in the constitutional wording of the relevant NC responsibility rule.

The data within Table 4.4 confirm the integral role of NCs in the NSO director selection process, and hence their influence on board composition and performance (Molloy, Ferkins, & Dickson, 2020). In terms of their influence on director selection, 19 of the 26 NCs appoint directors directly to the board without any board/owner/member ratification process (as commonly required in the for-profit sector).

In terms of pre-selection activities, Table 4.4 reveals the constitutional focus on assessment-type, as opposed to planning-type, responsibilities/rights. This is not to say that such planning activities do not occur in practice but their near absence from the constitutions (except for the recruiting/advertising activities) suggests a low priority. Greater constitutional emphasis on planning responsibilities may assist NCs achieve both an active (Walther & Morner, 2014) and inclusive (both high planning and high evaluation comprehensive) status (Walther et al., 2017).

The reference to NC regulations (not publicly available through the NZCO) in 11 of the NSO constitutions is also concerning if such regulations contain matters of substance in addition to procedure. The constitution is not only the primary source of NC power and guidance, it is also the source of member/owner rights and, as such, should reflect all matters of substance relating to director selection. Also telling is the lack of any identified references to NC board/director development or evaluation responsibilities/rights in the NSO constitutions. This suggests that these NSOs may be missing the opportunity to harness the power of integrating director selection, evaluation and development strategies (Roy, 2008). The extended questions of whether, how, and how well, these NSO NCs actually perform these activities is beyond the intended scope of this study and remain as future research.

4.4.3 Democratic Legitimacy

Democratic legitimacy is ‘crucial because it underwrites consent – the willingness of the demos to accept decisions without the use of force’ (Courant, 2019, p. 243). The following discussion therefore focusses on the overarching aim of assessing the extent to which these NC structural design features (i.e., composition, powers, responsibilities/rights) promote democratic legitimacy. The Table 4.1 schema is applied with the focus on a holistic systems/objectives based theoretical approach (Warren, 2017).

New Zealand NSOs - Democratic Type/Model

The New Zealand NSO environment, with its federated structure, can be considered to fall within the liberal/representative type of democracy (Held, 2006). The members, whether natural (human) or artificial (corporate, e.g., incorporated societies) legal personalities, are recognized (Warren, 2017) in the NSO constitutions. Through their endorsement of the NSO constitution, the members agree to a director selection system whereby officers are selected to represent (Warren, 2017) their interests. Prior to the modernization/professionalization of the nonprofit sport system, these representatives might have taken a competitive approach to advocating for the interests of a particular constituency. In more recent times, government sport agencies have prescribed an independent whole of sport governance model (Molloy, Dickson, & Ferkins, 2020) whereby these representatives are advised to act in the collective interests of the whole organization in the pursuit of its constitutional objectives (Sport NZ, n.d.-e). This is consistent with Courant’s (2019) collective representativeness whereby ‘the whole assembly should represent the population as a coherent whole, not each member individually (and not just society’s separate factions)’ (p. 242). The same overarching rationale is applied below to the New Zealand NSO NCs.

New Zealand NSO NC Types - Democratic Objectives and Practices

Type A (External-Majority NC) exerts the most power over the relevant NSO director selection processes with an externally dominated composition holding the director selection balance of power. As such, the ability to support Warren's (2017) empowered inclusion (having an enforceable say in relevant decisions), collective agenda/will formation (through the recognition and transformation of individual/constituency preferences) and collective decision-making (power to impose decisions on themselves) by the membership appears limited. One of the NCs in this category (NSO-A) does not include any member representatives, thus marginalizing the opportunity for the democratic practices (Warren, 2017) of member recognition, deliberation and representation in the NC processes. However, for both Type A NSOs, the members have the right to vote for three out of the seven directors (with NSO-N's rights effectively limited to the resist practice only through a veto-only type vote). At the NC level, the assessment-type constitutional responsibilities/rights suggest NC deliberation. For NSO-N, the requirement to consider sport, as well as business, expertise also suggests some level of representing influence. As with most of the NCs in all four types, NC Type A is empowered to make director selection decisions on behalf of the organization (appointing four directors). Overall, this NC type appears consistent with a more protective, than developmental (Held, 2006), approach to democracy.

Type B (External-Minority NC) has an externally dominated composition but with the director selection balance of power held internally (by the board and/or members). The only NSO in this category (NSO-W) has two NC members appointed by Sport NZ and one by the NSO board. The NC then appoints three directors with four elected by the members at the annual general meeting (AGM). So, whilst the members are excluded from democratic practices at the NC level, they are recognized and have the right to vote (for the majority of directors) at AGM level. This supports members' empowered inclusion and collective decision-making (Warren, 2017) at AGM level, but not at NC level, and does not support members' collective agenda/will formation (Warren, 2017) at either level. With the AGM typically not a forum for effective deliberation, this perhaps amounts to a lost developmental (Held, 2006) opportunity.

Type C (Internal-Majority NC) has internally dominated composition (with the majority of NC members appointed by the board and/or members) but with the NC controlling the selection of the majority of directors. With six NSO NCs in this category there is a range of director selection control mechanisms, from a majority appointed directly to the board by the NC (NSO-G) to 100% member-elected directors, but with all candidates being those recommended by the NC only and no other choices available for election (NSO-F). Four of these six NCs (NSO-E, F, G and H) also have the controlling internal NC composition appointed by the members rather than by the board/membership. This approach suggests high levels of empowered inclusion (Warren, 2017)

at NC level, and hence the opportunity for membership involvement in collective agenda/will formation and decision-making (Warren, 2017) at NC level, but less so at AGM level. The democratic practices (Warren, 2017) supported by this NC type include membership recognition at NC/AGM level, resisting (AGM veto votes), deliberating (NC), representing (NC), and voting (with four NSOs, E, G, H and K, enabling members to elect a minority of directors from a range of candidates). One NSO example in this category (atypical) also constitutionally includes membership representatives in the development of its board needs matrix (NSO-F). The practices of deliberating and representing likely inherent in such a process reinforces the developmental (Held, 2006) possibilities of collective agenda and will formation (Warren, 2017).

Type D (Internal-Minority NC) is the most common NC type with 17 out of 26 NSOs in this category. Type D has an internally dominated composition and does not control the majority of director selections. This NC type includes a variety of composition combinations. These range from 100% board-appointed NCs to those including board appointees, region/area/member appointees, and Sport NZ and/or New Zealand Institute of Directors appointees. Of note, seven of these NSO NCs do not include any member appointments in their composition (NSO-D, J, M, P, V, X and Z) and two have fully independent NCs, albeit 100% board-appointed (NSO-M and Z). In terms of director selection powers, there are two main sub-groups. One group has the majority of directors elected by the members at the AGM (11/17) and the other has an equal ratio of NC-appointed and member-elected directors (5/17). In 10 instances, the NC makes election recommendations but there are multiple candidates. Superficially, this NC type appears to support the three democratic objectives (Warren, 2017) at both NC and AGM, but, from a member perspective, the combination of each unique set of composition/powers may operate to dispel this impression. For those NCs with no member representatives, there is a lost opportunity for Warren's (2017) empowered inclusion and collective agenda/will formation (via recognition, deliberating and representing) at the NC level. At the AGM level, the vote is an effective way to achieve empowered inclusion and collective/membership decision-making, and the NCs with constitutional recommendation responsibilities provide information for membership deliberation (Warren, 2017). However, the opportunity for effective deliberation and collective agenda/will formation at AGMs is questionable and hence, whilst this NC type has the most developmental (Held, 2006) potential, this potential may not be realized in all cases.

Regardless of NC type, the NSO members retain ultimate power by virtue of their ability to join (Warren, 2017) together and change their NSO constitution to unravel the whole NC structure. Failing that, the ability to exit (Warren, 2017) the organization remains a last resort if members are sufficiently disenfranchised from the director selection processes and/or their outcomes.

Democratic Principles

In terms of Parent's (2016) democratic principles, the intended scope of this study renders it impossible to assess whether the NCs perform their objectives with 'efficiency, effectiveness and economy' (p. 404). The data do, however, suggest scope for improving performance through enhanced transparency (e.g., traceable decisions, disclosure of information), accountability (walking the talk) and active member engagement (physical, mental and emotional). All three principles could be promoted through a wider adoption of some of the existing NSO constitutional requirements. Examples include 17 NSOs with member representative/s on their NCs, one NSO involving member representatives in the development of board needs matrices (NSO-F), and the distribution to voting members of an NC-developed director-candidate synopsis (NSO-E, G, O, Q and Y). Two NSO NCs (NSO-O and Q) are also required to provide summaries of both the board skills/competencies required and candidate skills/competencies. This would all combine to provide a more developmental (as opposed to protective) approach (Held, 2006) to democracy. The intended benefit would be to maximize enlightened understanding (Enjolras & Waldahl, 2010) and collective agenda/will formation (Warren, 2017) and thus minimize the risk of member disengagement.

4.4.4 Reflexivity, Limitations, and Future Research

The lead author came to this study with a concern surrounding the democratic legitimacy of emerging New Zealand NSO director selection practices. Personal experience as an NSO director and NC member suggested it was more a lack of member empowerment (with appropriate knowledge) than other political criticisms at the heart of perceived director selection deficiencies. Reflexivity was therefore important, in order to consciously avoid pre-judgement of the NCs under examination. This enabled the development of a broader perspective, for example, the recognition of the potentially legitimizing factors of democratic processes at other levels, together with the impact of the age, stage and/or needs of an organization on what otherwise might seem undemocratic NC features.

In terms of limitations, the data for this study were drawn only from the NSO constitutions retrieved from the NZCO, offering insights for the period 1999 to 2014. Constitutional provisions over this timespan may provide an incomplete picture of NCs and their full contribution to director selection and democratic legitimacy. However, the constitutional clauses do provide a useful baseline description for future research and are the authoritative source for a study focussing on the democratic legitimacy within NC structures. Some NSOs may also be operating under constitutions not registered with the NZCO. However, as all the NSOs in the Sport NZ list are incorporated entities, subject to legislative requirements, such circumstances are unlikely.

The NC fourfold classification dimensions were also restricted to those considered sufficiently descriptive, yet parsimonious, and relevant to meet the study's purpose and research questions. A more wide-ranging set of dimensions and/or variables could be utilised in the future to develop a full NC hierarchical taxonomy.

This study focussed on NC structural factors (NC composition, powers and responsibilities prescribed in the constitutions), providing an important first step in understanding NC influence through a community (democratic legitimacy) lens. Further studies are needed to apply the corporate (professionalization/efficiency) lens, explore the balance between the two logics, and their consistency, or not, with other sport governance theories. Such studies in New Zealand, and similar jurisdictions, could utilise the NC fourfold classification as a comparison tool (Bailey, 2011) on which to base the assessment of relative effectiveness in achieving associated stakeholder objectives. In general, future research questions are encouraged in relation to nonprofit sport NC determinants, attributes, processes, intragroup dynamics factors, particularly the behavioral elements (Walther & Morner, 2014; Walther et al., 2017) and effects, in their own right and also in relation to NSO characteristics, board composition and performance. Studies examining questions about the what (NC attributes/objectives), why (NC determinants), how (NC processes/behaviors), and how well (NC performance), will provide deeper NC insights.

4.5 Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to verify the emergence of NCs as a governance phenomenon of New Zealand NSOs and to critically examine, from a democratic theory perspective, the extent to which democratic legitimacy is promoted within the NC structures of New Zealand NSO director selection processes. As the first nonprofit sport examination of NC structures, this study complements the Stenling et al. (2021a, 2021b) description of nonprofit sport NC processes and provides further 'baseline' information on which to build future NC research.

An analysis of NSO constitutions affirmed the emergence of NCs as a governance phenomenon and resulted in the development of an NC (constitutional powers-based) classification system. Democratic concepts were used to explore democratic legitimacy within the NC structures of New Zealand NSO director selection processes. The key findings were that the NC structures reflected a mixed model (i.e., internal-external NC composition and a protective-developmental powers/responsibilities/rights) approach to director selection. Within that mixed model, there were two predominant director selection methods (i.e., election and appointment) with a range of democratic practices (i.e., recognizing, resisting, deliberating, representing, and voting, but not joining or exiting) evidenced at NC and/or AGM levels. The extent to which the NC

classification types were considered consistent with democratic objectives (Warren, 2017) and principles (Parent, 2016) was varied with Type D (Internal-Minority NC) structures evidencing the most potential for supporting Warren's (2017) democratic objectives and Type A (External-Majority NC) structures, the least. The variation in detail across all NC types perhaps the most telling in terms of what democratic objectives/practices/principles were supported, or not, at NC/AGM levels. Of course, democratic legitimacy may be activated at many levels within an organization (Kihl & Schull, 2020), not just those relating to director selection. Where a context mandates a lower democratic threshold for director selection, an organization may benefit from enhancing democratic practices through greater engagement at governance and operational levels. Such an approach is consistent with recent collaborative governance theory development (Ferkins et al., 2018; Shilbury et al., 2016, 2020).

For scholars, this study affirms the emergence of the NC phenomenon and its contribution to nonprofit sport governance. Reflecting its exploratory nature, the study informs on a variety of NC structural design choices and establishes an NC classification system which may underpin future NC explanatory and evaluative studies. Such studies are needed to better understand, and hence harness, the NCs' board shaping potential (Stenling et al., 2021b).

In terms of democratic legitimacy, the Warren (2017) system objectives approach, as opposed to the previously favoured (Enjolras & Waldahl, 2010; Minikin, 2015) normative models of Allern and Pedersen (2007), is used to make sense of how NC structural design features may support democratic legitimacy within NSO director selection processes. This holistic approach (refer Table 4.1) is a key theoretical contribution to sport governance scholarship, where knowledge of NCs is, as yet, largely undiscovered. Its utility in this NC study also supports an argument for the application of holistic theoretical approaches to organizational/democratic legitimacy in a broader context.

For practitioners, the study's examination of the various NSO NC design choices may assist in the strategic design of their own director selection structures. This could support an appropriate balance between internal and external NC composition and director selection powers depending on the jurisdictional limitations and the developmental (or protective) democratic needs of an organization at the time. Again, the democratic objectives (Warren, 2017) approach to NC design may better enable empowered inclusion (of the people), collective agenda formation (by the people) and collective decision-making (by, and for, the people), whether it be for NSOs in New Zealand or other for-profit and nonprofit entities alike.

Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusions

Kia whakatōmuri te haere whakamua

I walk backwards into the future with my eyes fixed on my past

(Rameka, 2016)

I close with this whakataukī (Māori proverb) as it builds on my opening whakataukī and resonates with the NSO NC foundational knowledge-building nature of this thesis. The theoretical components of this thesis first outlined general sport governance theories and principles, then board performance factors, then director selection concepts, and, finally, captured the limited knowledge on the use of NCs by nonprofit sport organisations. The New Zealand NSO NC empirical studies within this thesis also started with the foundations, with Study 1 first outlining the structural (constitutional composition, powers, and responsibilities) foundations of these NCs as of 2014, then reflecting on the extent to which *past* ‘democratic’ values are protected within the *current* and *future* ‘professionalisation’ desires of NSOs and GSAs alike. Study 2 also sought to understand the past, explaining the internal and/or external drivers for the adoption and design of these NCs by four New Zealand NSOs. This was consistent with my desire, claimed in the introduction, to better understand and respect (protect) the past, and how it drives contemporary action (or inaction), in order to maximise the future potential of NCs and, hence, of NSO board performance.

Rameka (2016) explained how this whakataukī “speaks to Māori perspectives of time, where the past, the present and the future are viewed as intertwined, and life as a continuous cosmic process” (p. 387). She explained that, in carrying one’s past into the future, one’s ancestors are ever present and how concepts such as wairuatanga (spirituality) and whakapapa (genealogy) are inextricably linked to this perspective. Wairua, literally meaning ‘two waters’ (spiritual and physical) is conceptualised as two streams merging such that people “past, present, and future – and their relationships with the environment and events can be thought of in terms of the flow of the *wairua*” (Rameka, 2016, p. 388). Whakapapa is described as a “continuous lifeline from those who existed before to those living today, encompassing everything that is passed from one generation to the next” (p. 389), where people are not superior, but related, to their environment and identity comes from one’s past (ancestors), one’s present (family) and one’s future (children and grandchildren).

In drawing on these concepts and using them to set the scene for the ensuing discussion and conclusions, I first (reflexively) disclose my passion for exploring and promoting a more holistic approach to life in general (guided by Te Ao Māori whakaaro/worldview), as well as to the study

and practice of sport governance (including director selection and the use of NCs). As applied to this nonprofit sport governance context, consistent with CR's 'emancipation through explanation' objective, I see two key synergies. Firstly, there is the importance of "recognising and being grounded within the ... history" (Rameka, 2016, p. 395) – in this case being grounded within the *whakapapa* of both the foundational literature and the founding history, people and values of the organisations undergoing the relevant director selection/governance changes. Secondly, there is the importance of "maintaining balance or harmony ... between the sacred and the secular, the good and the bad, life and death" (p. 390) – in this case the balance between the *wairua*, or two waters, of the democratic/representative and professionalisation/efficiency imperatives of NC design. I also see synergies between the 'intertwining of the past, the present and the future' and Archer's (2020) M-M approach to explaining change with a "timescale through which structure, culture and agency themselves emerge, intertwine and redefine one another" (p. 141). Certainly, the importance of *whakapapa* appears to resonate with one of the research participants (A3) who stated:

I understand the need to move forward and to look ahead and to move beyond what the game was, but you've got to remember its heritage and you've got to remember who this game is and where it comes from, and you forget that stuff at your peril.

Having reiterated my personal philosophies and general approach to this thesis, in the balance of this chapter I provide a synthesis of the research project. I also address the issue of limitations and the applications of the research outcomes for industry practitioners and regulators, and I summarise future research opportunities, before closing with my final conclusion.

6.1 Synthesis

I open the synthesis set out below with a summary of the research context and rationale, briefly reflecting on more recent developments which serve to emphasise the importance and currency of the project. I then summarise the research purposes(s), for the overall project and for both studies (Study 1 and Study 2), as well as the findings and associated insights and knowledge contributions.

6.1.1 Research Context and Rationale

In Chapter 1.1 of this thesis, I asserted the importance of NCs to NSO director selection processes and outcomes. I outlined the existing evidence of NC use in the international and New Zealand nonprofit sport sector. I noted evidence, from the for-profit sector, of NC effectiveness in relation to particular board composition and performance outcomes, but also 'under-delivery' in terms of NC behaviours and processes. Importantly, I asserted a significant knowledge deficit

in relation to the use of NCs by NSOs in their director selection processes. In addition, I acknowledged my personal sense of unease at the potential erosion of democracy within New Zealand NSO director selection processes, alongside a desire to contribute to enhanced NSO board composition and to the conceptual understanding of NSO NCs' potential to contribute to quality director selection and governance.

The potential of NCs, productive and/or destructive, is subsequently highlighted, not only in my review of associated literature, but in recent industry and societal level developments. At industry level, disquiet is evident from stakeholders in both the for-profit and nonprofit sport sectors, with NCs viewed by some as 'barriers' to governance participation (Browne, 2021) and with others 'rebellious' against NC recommendations ("League: Long-time Critic Nominated for Seat on NZRL's Board," n.d.). At GSA level, the ASC promoted a 12-month focus on NSO NCs with NSOs demonstrating "pleasing progress in the documentation of transparent processes for the selection of directors" (ASC, 2022, p. 6). At governmental level, New Zealand's Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) is currently considering submissions on proposed regulations relating to director selection provisions in the new Incorporated Societies Act 2022. Of particular relevance to this thesis, MBIE sought submissions on their recommendation that an exception to the section 45 rule (requiring the board majority to be members of the society) be applied to "national and regional incorporated societies whose main purpose is sport and physical recreation" (MBIE, 2022, p. 19), to enable a majority of independent directors.

With almost unlimited scope, a key challenge associated with this thesis was to articulate my aim and specific project purposes, ultimately summarised in Chapter 1 and section 6.1.2. Today, as evidenced above, this research project, its aim and purpose(s), remain both important and timely.

6.1.2 Research Purposes

My overarching aim, as described in Chapter 1, was to start an NC research programme designed to reduce the identified NC knowledge deficit and contribute to NSO director selection processes and outcomes. I identified a broad exploratory/explanatory purpose for the research project, namely, to examine NC attributes and determinants within the nonprofit sport board context.

The research was presented as two studies, each with their specific purpose(s) previously summarised as:

- (1) Study 1 (*what*) – to verify the emergence of NCs as a governance phenomenon of New Zealand NSOs, to describe the structures of these NCs, and to critically examine the NC structures from a democratic theory perspective.

- (2) Study 2 (*why*) – to explain the internal and/or external drivers of this NC adoption and design within a selection of New Zealand NSOs.

In addressing the ‘what’ and ‘why’ of New Zealand NSO NC adoption and design, these purposes guided the work to explore and explain the past, to better understand the present, and to better plan for future NC contributions (‘how’ and ‘how well’) to NSO director selection and governance.

I summarise below my fulfilment of these purposes for Study 1 (see section 6.1.3) and Study 2 (see section 6.1.4).

6.1.3 Study 1 (Chapter 4) – NSO NC Emergence and Classification Studies

This study explored the ‘what’ of New Zealand NSO NC adoption and design. In support of the study’s purposes, I posed two questions: “What has been the rate of adoption of NCs by New Zealand NSOs?; What have been the design features (i.e., composition, powers, and responsibilities) of NCs within New Zealand NSOs?” (Molloy, Ferkins & Dickson, 2022, p. 3).

Thematic framework analysis, supported by document analysis and associated strategies, of 88 NSO constitutions, revealed that, as of 1 August 2014, 26 (29.6%) of the New Zealand NSO constitutions indicated use of an NC in their director selection processes. Thus, the emergence of NCs as a governance feature of New Zealand NSOs was empirically affirmed with the rate of adoption specified in Chapter 4.

Further thematic framework analysis, involving compare, contrast, and cluster strategies, focussed on the 26 NC constitutional provisions. This analysis resulted in, firstly, a case-ordered meta-matrix, and then a partially ordered meta-matrix, from which I developed a fourfold NC classification (based on NC composition and NC powers factors). I then critically examined the ‘democratic legitimacy-promoting’ nature of each of the four NC types through the application of a democratic concepts schema, focussing on Warren’s (2017) democratic objectives and practices, to the identified design features of the New Zealand NSO NCs. Through this examination I identified a mixed approach (i.e., internal-external NC composition and protective-developmental powers/responsibilities/rights) to director selection within these NCs. Importantly, a variety of democratic objectives and/or practices were evident at varying (NC/AGM) levels, ranging from the more ‘developmental’ (NC Type D) to the more ‘protective’ (NC Type A) approaches to democracy. Additional findings, relating to NC constitutional responsibilities (functions/activities), revealed a ‘low planning’ emphasis in the relevant constitutions.

6.1.4 Study 2 (Chapter 5) – NSO NC Adoption and Design – Explanatory Case Studies

This study explained the ‘why’ of the adoption and design of the NCs in the study. As the study evolved, additional learnings were captured relating to ‘how’ the NC adoption was implemented. In support of the study’s purpose, I identified and explained internal and/or external drivers of the NC adoption and design (in selected NSO case studies) through the application of CR’s M-M cycle (Archer, 1995, 2020) utilising relevant organisational change theories including institutional isomorphism, resource dependency, strategic choice, institutional work and institutional logics.

Four NSO case studies were selected, one from each of the NC fourfold classification types. A thick description of the field, NSO structures and agents, and the events (NC adoption and design) provided the platform for within and cross-case analysis (using TpA) of 31 stakeholder interviews (experiences of the events), supported by organisational documents for triangulation. In the first reported causal template capturing all four NSO case studies, I identified varying degrees of institutional isomorphism (coercive and normative, but with minimal mimetic evidence), resource dependency and strategic choice as causal mechanisms explaining the changes (NC adoption and design). Through the final causal template (including institutional work and logics), analysed using NSO-A and NSO-D as ‘polar’ examples, I developed a model demonstrating the role of these causal mechanisms, and the relationship between structure (e.g., institutional isomorphism and resource dependency), culture (e.g., institutional logics) and agency (e.g., strategic choice and institutional work), in the adoption and design of the selected NSO NCs. Additionally, examples of Hampel et al.’s (2017) symbolic, material, and relational mechanisms were identified as lessons in ‘how’ to implement future NC adoption and design. A strong theme running throughout the case studies was the ongoing negotiation between the motivations for, and appropriate balance between, the co-existing community (democracy/representation) and corporate (efficiency/professionalisation) logics. This theme is replicated contemporaneously, yet separately, by Stenling and colleagues (2020, 2021b) in their NC process-based studies involving Swedish NSOs.

The surprising results included the power of inertia (with the ‘dusty’ wineboxes of reports) and the ‘absences’ of any overt/coherent alignment with any particular governance configuration (with only one participant noting a known theory/model – ‘stewardship’) and/or any specific and measurable pre-determined objectives relating to the NC effects/performance desired as a result of these changes (other than broad ‘best practice’, ‘best people’, and/or ‘best skills’ type motivations).

Thus, these studies on the ‘what’ and ‘why’, including the implementation-based ‘how’, of NC adoption and design, help scholars and practitioners to understand the past and the present, providing baseline knowledge which can better inform the ‘how’ and ‘how well’ of future NC structure and process designs, and help to better evaluate NC effectiveness.

6.1.5 Contributions to Knowledge

The collective contributions of this thesis range from the rudimentary to the advanced, from the identification of knowledge gaps and opportunities for future research, to descriptive classifications, to the conceptual advancement and/or application of multi-theoretical models to the adoption and design of New Zealand NSO NCs. I summarise these contributions as follows:

- (1) Literature reviews.
 - (a) The proposal of a hierarchical terminology taxonomy for nonprofit sport governance.
 - (b) The development of the Sport Governance Wheel (as a new visualisation of sport governance principles and structures, board objectives and functions, and associated theories and models).
 - (c) The expansion of the IBP model (Hoye & Doherty, 2011) to include director selection and intra-group dynamic factors (in particular, identifying the temporal and substantive importance of director selection in the good governance equation).
 - (d) The identification of the potential for NCs to contribute not just to director selection but also to director development and evaluation, in a holistic board succession planning cycle (Roy, 2008; Seaworth, 2016).
 - (e) The identification of the NC’s potential (in the for-profit context) to contribute to board diversity, stakeholder protection, and board independence and performance (Eminet & Guedri, 2010; Kaczmarek et al., 2012; Ruigrok et al., 2006; Vafeas, 1999).
 - (f) The identification of NC processes (in the nonprofit sport context) including complex rankings of varied representative (community logics) and efficiency (corporate logics) candidate evaluation criteria (Stenling et al., 2020).
 - (g) The identification of mixed NC performance (in the for-profit NC behaviours/process context (Clune et al., 2014; Walther & Morner, 2014; Walther et al., 2017)) and a near-absence of research on NCs in the nonprofit sport context.
- (2) Study 1 – NSO NC emergence and classification studies.
 - (a) Verifies the emergence of NCs within the director selection processes of New Zealand NSOs.

- (b) Describes the design features of these NCs and develops a fourfold structural (composition- and powers-based) classification for New Zealand NSO NCs.
 - (c) Proposes a new democratic concepts schema for NSOs and models a holistic democratic problem/objectives-based approach (Warren, 2017) to examining democratic legitimacy (in the context of NSO NC structural design).
 - (d) Identifies that the four NC types:
 - i. reflect a mixed model (i.e., internal-external NC composition and protective-developmental powers/responsibilities/rights) approach to director selection; and
 - ii. operate in an NSO context with two predominant director selection methods (i.e., election and appointment) supporting a range of democratic practices by members (i.e., recognising, resisting, deliberating, representing, and voting, but not joining or exiting) evidenced at NC and/or AGM levels.
 - (e) Identifies the variety with which the four NC types, and associated composition and powers, contribute to and/or support Warren's (2017) three democratic objectives and/or seven democratic practices across the NC and/or AGM levels.
 - (f) Identifies the 'low planning' emphasis reflected in the constitutionally required NC responsibilities (functions/activities).
- (3) Study 2 – NSO NC adoption and design – explanatory case studies.
- (a) Proposes a model for applying a CR M-M cycle (Archer, 1995, 2020) approach to sport management studies.
 - (b) Demonstrates the application of the under-utilised Hampel et al. (2017) mechanisms (symbolic, material, relational) approach to institutional work.
 - (c) Identifies causal mechanisms explaining the NC adoption and design for the selected NSO case studies.
 - (d) Provides a model demonstrating the role of these causal mechanisms, and the relationship between structure (e.g., institutional isomorphism and resource dependency), culture (e.g., institutional logics), and agency (e.g., strategic choice and institutional work) in the adoption and design of the selected NSO NCs.
 - (e) Highlights the power of organisational inertia and affirms symbolic, material, and relational-based strategies for overcoming such inertia in effecting governance change (including the adoption and design of NSO NCs).
 - (f) Identifies the absences, in the relevant NC design processes, of:
 - i. overt alignment of NC structures and powers with governance principles and/or any particular governance model/theory; and

- ii. intended consequences, in the form of specific and measurable pre-determined objectives relating to NC performance.
- (g) Importantly, provides nonprofit sport examples of the co-existence of multiple logics in the NSO NC context and affirmed the tensions experienced by NSOs and their members in the recalibration of the relationship between the community and corporate logics.

In summary, in this thesis, my most significant contributions to knowledge are to advance multiple theoretical models for application to sport governance and organisational change generally and to advance the conceptualisation of NC adoption and design. Of particular note are: the response to calls for multi-theoretical approaches to sport governance (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2020; Shaw, 2016); a re-conceptualisation of nonprofit sport board role/objectives/functions (advancing the recent synthesis by McLeod (2020)); the addition of director selection to the integrated board performance model (Hoye & Doherty, 2011); the contribution to nonprofit sport director selection and NC knowledge (advancing the recent synthesis by Molloy, Dickson and Ferkins (2020)); and, an NSO NC 'structural' contribution to the emerging NSO NC 'process' knowledge (adding to Stenling et al., 2020, 2021b).

6.2 Limitations

It is important, of course, to acknowledge the limitations of the research project. I summarise the limitations and delimitations potentially impacting the studies, including those identified in Chapters 4 and 5, as follows:

- (1) Study 1 – NSO NC emergence and classification studies
 - (a) Data were drawn from the NSO constitutions retrieved from the NZCO (as at August 2014), offering insights for NC adoption and design during the period 1999 to 2014.
 - (b) The NC fourfold classification was:
 - i. developed on a specific set of dimensions only (NC structure – composition and powers); and
 - ii. critically examined with a democratic legitimacy lens only.
- (2) Study 2 – NSO NC adoption and design – explanatory case studies
 - (a) The interview data related to NC adoption and design occurring between 1999 to 2010, introducing risks such as participant memory fallibility and 'retrospective impression management' biases.
 - (b) The relevant NC adoption and design occurred in conjunction with other governance reforms, including changed membership structures and voting structures.

Participant reflections on their NSO's NC adoption and design were therefore intertwined with their reflections about the other governance reforms.

- (c) The initial research design did not contemplate institutional work as a potential causal mechanism and thus did not specifically probe for potential institutional maintenance, creation and/or disruption activities.
- (d) The four NSO case studies are a small sample and were selected as examples, as opposed to being 'representative', of each the four classified NC types.

- (3) General – Both Study 1 and Study 2 are situated in the New Zealand NSO director selection context which, at the time of data collection, did not have any restrictions as to director selection methods or board composition (Incorporated Societies Act 1908). Such flexibility is not necessarily replicated in other jurisdictions and, as identified in section 6.1.1 above, is currently under review in New Zealand.

The impact of, and/or strategies to ameliorate, the limitations are outlined in Study 1 and Study 2. The overarching strategy was, as described in Study 2, the thick description of context enabling others to 'transfer' the findings to their context and draw "insights as to how and why a similar mechanism could lead to different, or perhaps similar, outcomes in a different setting" (Wynn & Williams, 2012, p. 804).

Overall, in the context of a CR paradigm, these limitations do not detract from the learnings, as they are not intended to be generalisable or representative, but 'transferable', in the pursuit, not of 'the' truth, but 'a' truth that is acceptable and well-reasoned. The limitations also help to inform future research directions which I outline in section 6.3 below.

6.3 Future Research

With so little known about NCs in the nonprofit sport sector, there is almost unlimited scope for future research relating to nonprofit sport NC determinants, attributes (including structure, processes, and intra-group dynamics) and/or effects. I summarise key areas for future research, including those identified in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, as follows:

- (1) Study 1 – NSO NC emergence and classification studies
 - (a) NC fourfold classification:
 - i. apply the classification to current New Zealand NSO constitutions to determine current NC, and NC type, prevalence; and
 - ii. extend the dimensions and/or variables of the classification to develop a full NC hierarchical taxonomy.

- (b) Theoretical – re-examine the data using a corporate (professionalisation/efficiency) logic lens and/or the hybrid community-corporate logics approach.
- (2) Study 2 – NSO NC adoption and design – explanatory case studies
- (a) Examine NC adoption and design, more specifically probing for institutional maintenance, creation, and disruption outcomes, and associated symbolic, material and/or relational mechanisms.
 - (b) Absences – develop NSO studies to specifically address:
 - i. the impact of the conscious and strategic alignment (and absence thereof) of broader NSO governance contingencies, configurations, and principles with their NC design; and
 - ii. the impact of intended consequences (and absence thereof), in the form of specific and measurable pre-determined NC performance objectives, being part of NSO NC design.
 - (c) Develop studies specifically exploring the nature and associated determinants of NSO case-appropriate balance between community and corporate hybrid logics within NC design.
 - (d) Change – future research designs should:
 - i. not neglect the power of inertia (or morphostasis), and the role of agents (within both the GSA and NSOs) through their institutional work in overcoming such inertia; and
 - ii. address creation, maintenance, and disruption outcomes, as well as the symbolic, material, and relational mechanisms required to achieve such outcomes (i.e., morphogenesis and/or morphostasis).
- (3) General
- (a) Nonprofit sport studies are required to verify the applicability of for-profit findings, relating to NC determinants, attributes, processes, and behaviours, to nonprofit sport NCs, both in their own right, and in relation to NSO characteristics and NSO board composition and performance.
 - (b) Drawing on the for-profit studies, special attention should be directed to nonprofit sport NC intra-group dynamics, and the interactions between the CEO, chairperson, board, and NC members.
 - (c) There is an urgent need to develop nonprofit sport NC evaluation instruments against which to assess their effectiveness.

I also note two planned post-doctoral projects deriving from this thesis. I plan to further develop the Sport Governance Wheel and proposed hierarchical terminology taxonomy for nonprofit

sport governance. I also have ethics approval for a study utilising focus groups and importance-performance analysis (Azzopardi & Nash, 2013) to explore NSO stakeholder perceptions of their NSO's NC composition and the performance of the NC's functions/activities.

Given the identified position of director selection (and hence NCs), in both the temporal and substantive sense, in the good governance equation, progress on the above NC research programme is both important and pressing.

6.4 Practical Applications

This thesis supports a range of applications for industry practitioners and regulators. I summarise my associated recommendations as follows:

(1) Industry practitioners

(a) NC objectives

- i. That NSO NC objectives be expanded to include not only director selection, but director development and evaluation (a standing governance committee).
- ii. That NSO NC structures (composition, powers, and responsibilities), designed in pursuit of NC objective(s), be designed strategically to ensure coherent alignment with:
 - a. the broader governance principles and configurations of the NSO; and
 - b. intended consequences in terms of specific and measurable predetermined NC outcomes.

(b) NC composition – that consideration be given to the following factors:

- i. The NSO-appropriate balance between internal (member and/or board appointees) and external/independent NC members (reflecting the above governance principles and desired community/corporate dominant logic).
- ii. The potential impact of NC composition on board composition/performance (e.g., if NSOs want a diverse board, appoint a diverse NC; or, if board financial expertise/performance is a priority, ensure financial expertise on the NC, etc.).
- iii. If a governance committee approach is taken, the potential appointment of external/independent member(s) on an ad hoc basis for the director selection objective/functions only.

(c) NC director selection powers

- i. That NC powers are also recognised, along with NC composition, as a statement regarding the NSO's desire to balance community

- (democracy/representation) and corporate (efficiency/professionalisation) logics.
- ii. That the NC powers ensure a resulting board composition of NC appointed, NC recommended and/or member/board selected directors that reflects the strategically chosen, and member endorsed, balance in logics.
- (d) NC director selection responsibilities (functions/activities) – that consideration be given to:
- i. Reviewing and enhancing the constitutionally required NC planning and assessment function activities under the NC’s director selection objective.
 - ii. Adding constitutionally required NC director selection planning and assessment activities, such as:
 - a. Planning – board needs matrix and candidate criteria to be developed and/or reviewed in conjunction with the board, CEO, and/or member representatives.
 - b. Assessment – candidate synopsis/suitability summaries to be supplied to the board and voting members.
- (e) Change – in any governance change process (including NC adoption and design):
- i. That the NSO board/executive acknowledges and specifically addresses the NSO traditions (structure and culture) empowering the organisational inertia.
 - ii. That the NSO board/executive identifies and implements practical strategies to address any inertia including the:
 - a. Symbolic, e.g., providing a clear and compelling new ‘vision’;
 - b. Material, e.g., ensuring adequate human and financial resourcing; and
 - c. Relational, e.g., engaging ‘change champions’ and high-trust consultation processes.
- (f) Democratic legitimacy. If the pursuit of democratic legitimacy is an NSO goal (as a foundational governance principle), to understand, and educate stakeholders, that:
- i. Democratic objectives include empowered inclusion, collective agenda and will formation, and, collective decision-making, involving –
 - ii. Democratic practices of recognising, resisting, deliberating, representing, voting, joining, and exiting, such practices being exercised –
 - iii. At a variety of levels, with the membership, including at the NC level, the AGM level and/or at more general organisational consultation/decision-making levels.

(2) Regulators

(a) At GSA policy level, that regulators:

- i. Recognise the importance of both the community (democracy/representation) and corporate (efficiency/professionalisation) logics in the development of their policy and NSO director selection recommendations.
- ii. Promote the 'power' of the integration of NSO board/director evaluation, director selection and development (induction and education) strategies.

(b) At governmental legislative level, that regulators ensure sufficient flexibility in relation to nonprofit sport board composition and director selection rules to protect the self-determining nature of these member-benefit organisations (whether it be to agree to a member or independent board majority).

In terms of these recommendations, I note that I had anticipated recommendations endorsing an internal-majority approach to NC composition (including at least one member and one board appointee) with NC powers supporting a member-majority selected board. Whilst this might remain a recommendation and a member desire for many NSOs (with 88% of the thesis NCs having a majority of NC members internally appointed and 66% having member-majority selected boards), it would not accommodate the likes of New Zealand Cricket (not part of Study 2) which employs a completely independent NC-appointed board model. I needed to acknowledge that this seemingly 'undemocratic' model still applied democratic objectives through the member associations' active participation in the development of an organisational needs/board skills matrix and the member-majority NC composition. Thus, through the practice of reflexivity and empathic neutrality, I recognised a variety of strategies and levels through which to promote 'democratic legitimacy' and an NSO appropriate community-corporate logics balance, and developed a more flexible, NSO self-determined set of recommendations.

6.5 Conclusion

My overarching aim was to start an NC research programme designed to reduce the identified NC knowledge deficit and contribute to NSO director selection processes. As stated above, I have achieved this aim through studies on the 'what' and 'why', including the implementation-based 'how', of NC adoption and design, which help scholars and practitioners to understand the past and the present, providing baseline knowledge which can better inform the 'how' and 'how well' of future NC structure and process designs, and help to better evaluate NC effectiveness.

As I progressed through the thesis, I also identified the opportunity to contribute to the NC's more holistic potential to select or recommend (and evaluate, in order to develop) directors

with the capacity, individually and collectively, to achieve the board objectives of oversight, foresight and insight. The above-described contributions to knowledge, and the recommendations in relation to future research and industry practice, have met the overarching aim (and specific purposes) and go some way to progressing my evolving goals.

Overlaying the thesis, the thesis aim, and the studies' specific purposes, is my desire to weave through-out my thesis journey the benefits of Māori knowledge and, in so doing, identify the interface spaces between indigenous and traditionally accepted academic world views. This interface is demonstrated in the recognition throughout the thesis of the power of the people (he tangata), and the importance of whakapapa, the history, culture and values of the organisations and their people. It is 'walking backwards into the future' in the "continuous cosmic process" (Rameka, 2016, p. 387) intertwining the past, present, and future (shared by Archer's (2020) "timescale through which structure, culture and agency themselves emerge, intertwine and redefine one another" (p. 141)) that will, in my view, enable the best outcomes for future generations. All the while, I promote the need, in the context of this thesis, to navigate the two waters (wairua) of community and corporate logics and achieve the appropriate balance or 'harmony' for the people of nonprofit sport.

*He aha te mea nui o te Ao?
He tāngata, he tāngata, he tāngata...*

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
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Appendices

Appendix A1 – Ethics Approval to July 6 2018



AUTEC Secretariat

Auckland University of Technology
D-89, WA505F Level 5 WA Building City Campus
T: +64 9 921 9999 ext. 8316
E: ethics@aut.ac.nz
www.aut.ac.nz/researchethics

8 July 2015

Geoff Dickson
Faculty of Health and Environmental Sciences

Dear Geoff

Ethics Application: **15/222 The emergence of nomination committees as a governance feature of New Zealand national sport organisations.**

Thank you for submitting your application for ethical review. I am pleased to confirm that the Auckland University of Technology Ethics Committee (AUTEC) has approved your ethics application for three years until 6 July 2018.

Please note: The addition that the research is for a student qualification needs to be included in the email invitation.

AUTEC wishes to commend the researchers on the overall quality of the application.

As part of the ethics approval process, you are required to submit the following to AUTEC:

- A brief annual progress report using form EA2, which is available online through <http://www.aut.ac.nz/researchethics>. When necessary this form may also be used to request an extension of the approval at least one month prior to its expiry on 6 July 2018;
- A brief report on the status of the project using form EA3, which is available online through <http://www.aut.ac.nz/researchethics>. This report is to be submitted either when the approval expires on 6 July 2018 or on completion of the project;

It is a condition of approval that AUTEC is notified of any adverse events or if the research does not commence. AUTEC approval needs to be sought for any alteration to the research, including any alteration of or addition to any documents that are provided to participants. You are responsible for ensuring that research undertaken under this approval occurs within the parameters outlined in the approved application.

AUTEC grants ethical approval only. If you require management approval from an institution or organisation for your research, then you will need to obtain this.

To enable us to provide you with efficient service, we ask that you use the application number and study title in all correspondence with us. If you have any enquiries about this application, or anything else, please do contact us at ethics@aut.ac.nz.

All the very best with your research,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'K O'Connor', written in a cursive style.


Kate O'Connor

Executive Secretary

Auckland University of Technology Ethics Committee

Cc: Tracy Molloy ;Lesley Ferkins

Appendix A2 – Ethics Approval Extension to July 6 2019



AUTEC Secretariat

Auckland University of Technology
D-88, WU406 Level 4 WU Building City Campus
T: +64 9 921 9999 ext. 8316
E: ethics@aut.ac.nz
www.aut.ac.nz/researchethics

30 April 2018

Lesley Ferkins
Faculty of Health and Environmental Sciences
Dear Lesley

Re: Ethics Application: **15/222 The emergence of nomination committees as a governance feature of New Zealand national sport organisations.**

Thank you for your request for approval of amendments to your ethics application.

An extension for one year is approved, with your approval now expiring on the 6 July 2019. The change to the order of the supervisory team and the change to the qualification is noted.

I remind you of the Standard Conditions of Approval.

1. A progress report is due annually on the anniversary of the approval date, using form EA2, which is available online through <http://www.aut.ac.nz/researchethics>.
2. A final report is due at the expiration of the approval period, or, upon completion of project, using form EA3, which is available online through <http://www.aut.ac.nz/researchethics>.
3. Any amendments to the project must be approved by AUTEK prior to being implemented. Amendments can be requested using the EA2 form: <http://www.aut.ac.nz/researchethics>.
4. Any serious or unexpected adverse events must be reported to AUTEK Secretariat as a matter of priority.
5. Any unforeseen events that might affect continued ethical acceptability of the project should also be reported to the AUTEK Secretariat as a matter of priority.

Please quote the application number and title on all future correspondence related to this project.

AUTEK grants ethical approval only. If you require management approval for access for your research from another institution or organisation then you are responsible for obtaining it. If the research is undertaken outside New Zealand, you need to meet all locality legal and ethical obligations and requirements.

For any enquiries please contact ethics@aut.ac.nz

Yours sincerely,



Kate O'Connor
Executive Manager
Auckland University of Technology Ethics Committee

Cc: Tracy Molloy; Geoff Dickson

Appendix A3 – Ethics Approval Extension to December 31 2020



Auckland University of Technology Ethics Committee (AUTEC)

Auckland University of Technology
D-88, Private Bag 92006, Auckland 1142, NZ
T: +64 9 921 9999 ext. 8316
E: ethics@aut.ac.nz
www.aut.ac.nz/researchethics

8 July 2019

Lesley Ferkins
Faculty of Health and Environmental Sciences
Dear Lesley

Re: Ethics Application: **15/222 The emergence of nomination committees as a governance feature of New Zealand national sport organisations.**

Thank you for your request for approval of an amendment to your ethics approval.

The approval for your ethics has been extended to 31 December 2020.

I remind you of the **Standard Conditions of Approval**.

1. The research is to be undertaken in accordance with the [Auckland University of Technology Code of Conduct for Research](#) and as approved by AUTEC in this application.
2. A progress report is due annually on the anniversary of the approval date, using form EA2, which is available online through <http://www.aut.ac.nz/research/researchethics>.
3. A final report is due at the expiration of the approval period, or, upon completion of project, using form EA3, which is available online through <http://www.aut.ac.nz/research/researchethics>.
4. Any amendments to the project must be approved by AUTEC prior to being implemented. Amendments can be requested using the EA2 form: <http://www.aut.ac.nz/research/researchethics>.
5. Any serious or unexpected adverse events must be reported to AUTEC Secretariat as a matter of priority.
6. Any unforeseen events that might affect continued ethical acceptability of the project should also be reported to the AUTEC Secretariat as a matter of priority.

Please quote the application number and title on all future correspondence related to this project.

AUTEC grants ethical approval only. If you require management approval for access for your research from another institution or organisation then you are responsible for obtaining it. If the research is undertaken outside New Zealand, you need to meet all locality legal and ethical obligations and requirements.

For any enquiries please contact ethics@aut.ac.nz

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'K O'Connor', written in a cursive style.

Kate O'Connor

Executive Manager

Auckland University of Technology Ethics Committee

Cc: Tracy Molloy

Appendix A4 – Ethics Approval Extension to December 1 2021



Auckland University of Technology Ethics Committee (AUTEC)

Auckland University of Technology
D-88, Private Bag 92006, Auckland 1142, NZ
T: +64 9 921 9999 ext. 8316
E: ethics@aut.ac.nz
www.aut.ac.nz/researchethics

12 January 2021

Lesley Ferkins
Faculty of Health and Environmental Sciences
Dear Lesley

Re: Ethics Application: **15/222 The emergence of nomination committees as a governance feature of New Zealand national sport organisations.**

Thank you for your request for approval of an amendment to your ethics application.

An extension for one year has been approved until 1 December 2021.

I remind you of the **Standard Conditions of Approval**.

1. The research is to be undertaken in accordance with the [Auckland University of Technology Code of Conduct for Research](#) and as approved by AUTEC in this application.
2. A progress report is due annually on the anniversary of the approval date, using the EA2 form.
3. A final report is due at the expiration of the approval period, or, upon completion of project, using the EA3 form.
4. Any amendments to the project must be approved by AUTEC prior to being implemented. Amendments can be requested using the EA2 form.
5. Any serious or unexpected adverse events must be reported to AUTEC Secretariat as a matter of priority.
6. Any unforeseen events that might affect continued ethical acceptability of the project should also be reported to the AUTEC Secretariat as a matter of priority.
7. It is your responsibility to ensure that the spelling and grammar of documents being provided to participants or external organisations is of a high standard.

AUTEC grants ethical approval only. You are responsible for obtaining management approval for access for your research from any institution or organisation at which your research is being conducted. When the research is undertaken outside New Zealand, you need to meet all ethical, legal, and locality obligations or requirements for those jurisdictions.

Please quote the application number and title on all future correspondence related to this project.

For any enquiries please contact ethics@aut.ac.nz. The forms mentioned above are available online through <http://www.aut.ac.nz/research/researchethics>

(This is a computer-generated letter for which no signature is required)

The AUTEK Secretariat

Auckland University of Technology Ethics Committee

Cc: Tracy Molloy; Lesley Ferkins; Geoff Dickson

Appendix A5 – Ethics Approval Extension to December 31 2022



Auckland University of Technology Ethics Committee (AUTEC)

Auckland University of Technology
D-88, Private Bag 92006, Auckland 1142, NZ
T: +64 9 921 9999 ext. 8316
E: ethics@aut.ac.nz
www.aut.ac.nz/researchethics

24 September 2021

Lesley Ferkins
Faculty of Health and Environmental Sciences
Dear Lesley

Re: Ethics Application: **15/222 The emergence of nomination committees as a governance feature of New Zealand national sport organisations.**

Thank you for your request for approval of an amendment to your ethics approval.

An extension to the approval for your ethics application has been approved until 31 December 2022.

Standard Conditions of Approval.

1. The research is to be undertaken in accordance with the [Auckland University of Technology Code of Conduct for Research](#) and as approved by AUTEC in this application.
2. A progress report is due annually on the anniversary of the approval date, using the EA2 form.
3. A final report is due at the expiration of the approval period, or, upon completion of project, using the EA3 form.
4. Any amendments to the project must be approved by AUTEC prior to being implemented. Amendments can be requested using the EA2 form.
5. Any serious or unexpected adverse events must be reported to AUTEC Secretariat as a matter of priority.
6. Any unforeseen events that might affect continued ethical acceptability of the project should also be reported to the AUTEC Secretariat as a matter of priority.
7. It is your responsibility to ensure that the spelling and grammar of documents being provided to participants or external organisations is of a high standard.
8. AUTEC grants ethical approval only. You are responsible for obtaining management approval for access for your research from any institution or organisation at which your research is being conducted. When the research is undertaken outside New Zealand, you need to meet all ethical, legal, and locality obligations or requirements for those jurisdictions.

Please quote the application number and title on all future correspondence related to this project.

For any enquiries please contact ethics@aut.ac.nz. The forms mentioned above are available online through <http://www.aut.ac.nz/research/researchethics>

(This is a computer-generated letter for which no signature is required)

The AUTEK Secretariat

Auckland University of Technology Ethics Committee

Cc: Tracy Molloy; Lesley Ferkins; Geoff Dickson

Appendix B – Study 1 – NZ NSO NC Types – Partially Ordered Meta-Matrix

NZ NSO NC Types (as at August 2014)

NC – Partially Ordered Meta-Matrix

Key:

Type A – NCA (Ext) + NCR (DSBP) = NC Appointment (balance of power re appointment of NC majority is external, e.g., Sport NZ or NZID)
+ NC Responsibilities (balance of power re majority of directors selected lies with NC)

Type B – NCA (Ext) + NCR (N-DSBP) = NC Appointment (balance of power re appointment of NC majority is external, e.g., Sport NZ or NZID)
+ NC Responsibilities (balance of power re majority of directors selected does NOT lie with NC)

Type C – NCA (Int) + NCR (DSBP) = NC Appointment (balance of power re appointment of NC majority is internal, i.e., NSO board/members)
+ NC Responsibilities (balance of power re majority of directors selected lies with NC)

Type D – NCA (Int) + NCR (N-DSBP) = NC Appointment (balance of power re appointment of NC majority is internal, i.e., NSO board/members)
+ NC Responsibilities (balance of power re majority of directors selected does NOT lie with NC)

NSO	NSO – Name ^{vii}	Board (number of directors and director selection method)	NC Appointment (who controls NC composition - majority)	NC Responsibilities – Director Selection (who controls majority of directors selected)	Type
NSO-A		3 x elected 4 x appointed	NC = XX Commission (Australian clubs elect XX Commission)	3 x elected (by XX NZ members) 4 x appointed (by XX Commission)	A
NSO-N		3 x elected 4 x appointed	2 x (by SPARC – incl. Chair & casting vote) 1 x (by members) 1 x (by Board)	3 x elected (NC recommendation – no alternatives) 4 x appointed (by NC)	A
NSO-W		4 x elected 3 x appointed	2 x (by Sport NZ) 1 x (by Board)	4 x elected (by members at AGM) 3 x appointed (by NC)	B

NSO-E	Pres + VP, x elected 5 x appointed/confirmed	1 x Pres (elected by members), or nominee 1 x (by AGM delegates) 1 x (by Board)	2 x elected 5 x appointed (by AGM delegates on recommendation of NC – no alternatives)	C
NSO-F	8 x elected	1 x (by Board) 3 x (Major Association Chairs) 1 x (by Sport NZ)	8 x elected (by members at AGM, on recommendation of NC – no alternatives)	C
NSO-G	2 x elected 4 x appointed	1 x (by Board) 2 x (by General Meeting delegates)	2 x elected (by AGM delegates) 4 x appointed (by AGM delegates, on recommendation of NC – no alternatives)	C
NSO-H	3 x elected 4 x appointed 2 x co-opted (optional)	1 x Pres (elected by members) 1 x (nominated by District Federation Chairs) 1 x Sport NZ Chair	3 x elected (by members at Annual Congress) 4 x appointed (by NC) 2 x co-opted (by Board, optional)	C ⁱ
NSO-K	3 x elected 4 x appointed 1 x CEO (appointed by Board)	1 x (by NZID or similar) 2 x (by Board)	3 x elected (by members at AGM) 4 x appointed (by NC) 1 x CEO, appointed (by Board)	C ⁱⁱ
NSO-S	3 x elected 3 x appointed	2 x (incl. NC Chair, by Sport NZ, NZID or similar) 1 x Board Chair (or other Board member, by Board) 2 x (by Regional Associations)	3 x elected (by members at GM on NC recommendations – no alternatives) 3 x appointed (by NC)	C
NSO-B	4 x elected 3 x appointed (ex officio Pres + IAAF Councillor, non-voting)	1 x (by Board) 1 x independent (by Board) 1 x Club Appointee (by members at AGM)	4 x elected (incl. NC recommendations) 3 x appointed (by NC)	D
NSO-C	Pres + VP, x elected	1 x President (elected by members)	6 x elected (by members)	D

		4 x elected 2 x appointed	2 x non-board members (by Board)	2 x appointed (by Board on NC recommendation)	
NSO-D		4 x elected 4 x appointed	1 x NC Chair (proposed by Board and approved by Sport NZ) + 2 or 3 of the following: - 1 x non-board member (as above) - 1 x Board member (by Board) 1 x non-board member (by Board)	4 x appointed (by NC) 4 x elected (from NC shortlist, with alternatives)	D ⁱⁱⁱ
NSO-I		6 x elected 2 x appointed	1 x Board Chair 1 x Board member (by Board) 1 x President (elected by members) 1 x NZID (by Board)	6 x elected (by members, postal vote) 2 x appointed (by NC)	D
NSO-J		4 x elected 3 x appointed	1 x Board Chair (or other Board nominee) 1 x (by Board) 1 x independent (by Board)	4 x elected (by members at GM, NC recommendations + others) 3 x appointed (by NC)	D
NSO-L		2 x appointed 5 x elected	1 x Board Chair (or other Board nominee) 1 x independent (by Board) 1 x (by Areas)	2 x appointed (by NC) 5 x elected (by members at GM, from NC recommendations + others)	D
NSO-M		4 x elected 4 x appointed (by Board on NC recommendation) 1 x appointed (by Board – Secondary School Committee recommendation)	Independent NC (by Board)	4 x elected (by members at AGM) 4 x appointed (by Board – NC recommendation) 1 x appointed (by Board – SSC recommendation)	D

NSO-O		2 x North Zone reps (elected) 2 x Central Zone reps (elected) 2 x South Zone reps (elected) 1 x Māori rep (elected) 2 x independent (appointed)	1 x Board member (by Board) 3 x Affiliated Union Chairs (elected by AU Chairs) 2 x independent (by above NC members)	7 x rep election (by Affiliated Bodies at AGM, on NC recommendations – two alternatives for each vacancy) 2 x appointed (by NC)	D
NSO-P		4 x elected 3 x appointed	1 x Chair / nominee or other Board member (by Board) 1 x independent (by Sport NZ) 1 x independent (by Board)	4 x elected (includes NC recommendations + others) 3 x appointed (by NC)	D
NSO-Q		4 x elected 3 x appointed	1 x Board Chair (or Deputy other Board member - by Board) 1 x (by Pres NZID or equivalent) 1 x Pres (elected by members at AGM) or nominee 1 x independent (by Board)	4 x elected (by members at AGM, NC advice = skill set needs of Board cf skill sets of candidates, all valid nominees) 3 x appointed (by NC)	D
NSO-R		4 x elected 2 x appointed (by NC) 2 x independent appointed (by NC) 1 x co-opted (optional)	4 x (1 appointed by each Region) 1 x Board Chair (or other Board member, by Board) 1 x independent (by Board)	4 x elected (by members at AGM, NC recommendations + others) 4 x appointed (by NC) 1 x co-option (by Board - optional)	D ^{iv}
NSO-T		3 x elected 3 x appointed	2 x (by NZID or equivalent) 1 x President (elected by members) or nominee 1 x (by Board)	3 x elected (by members at AGM) 3 x appointed (by NC)	D ^v
NSO-U		4 x elected 4 x appointed	1 x Board Chair (or other Board member, by Board)	4 x appointed (by NC)	D ^{vi}

			1 x (by Regional Centre Chairs) 1 x independent (by Board)	4 x elected (by members at AGM, NC recommendations + other nominations)	
NSO-V		4 x elected 2 x appointed (+ Pres, VP, IITU rep + co-opted?)	1 x Patron/Past Pres (by Board) 1 x (by Sport NZ) 1 x (by Board)	4 x elected (by members, secret postal/ electronic ballot) 2 x appointed (by NC)	D
NSO-X		4 x elected 3 appointed	2 x existing Board members 1 x non-board member (approved by Sport NZ) 1 x non-board member (by Board) (NC Chair = non-board member).	4 x elected (by members, postal vote, from shortlist, including alternatives, created by Shortlisting Panel, comprising the Board + a governance expert) 3 x appointed (by NC)	D
NSO-Y		4 x elected 4 x appointed	1 x (by / from Annual Meeting delegates) 1 x Board Chair or nominee 1 x independent (by Board)	4 x elected (by delegates at AGM, from NC recommendations + others) 4 x appointed (by NC, ratified by delegates at AGM)	D
NSO-Z		5 x elected 4 x appointed	Independent NC (by Board)	5 x elected (by members at AGM) 4 x appointed (by Board on NC recommendation, ratified at AGM)	D

Note.

Alternatives / no alternatives – refers to the number of candidates recommended by the NC, if the number of candidates matches the number of vacancies = no alternatives.

Reference to ‘others’ – refers to other candidates available for election consideration in addition to any NC recommendations.

NCA (Internal) – includes the Board as an internal appointee of NC members, when, in some cases, the Board will be dominated by ‘external’ directors.

i NSO-H – DS Responsibility Powers = allocated type C on basis that optional co-options not exercised, so DS majority lies with NC (if co-options exercised, remains NC type C, as would be exercised by a NC dominated board).

ii NSO-K – DS Responsibility Powers = 50/50, with CEO inclusion on the board (but allocated NC type C, as initial DS majority lies with NC, with CEO then appointed by NC dominated board).

iii NSO-D – DS Responsibility Powers = 50/50 - DS majority does not lie with NC = type D.

iv NSO-R – DS Responsibility Powers = 50/50 if no co-option, or, if co-option exercised, DS majority does not lie with NC = type D.

- v NSO-T – DS Responsibility Powers = 50/50 – DS majority does not lie with NC = type D.
- vi NSO-U – DS Responsibility Powers = 50/50 – DS majority does not lie with NC = type D.
- vii NSO names/identifiers removed from public thesis version.

Appendix C – Study 2 – Participant Information Sheet



Participant Information Sheet

Date Information Sheet Produced:

18 April 2018 (updated, post transfer to PhD, from MPhil version dated 23 June 2015)

Project Title

The emergence of nomination committees as a governance feature of New Zealand national sport organisations.

An Invitation

I (Tracy Molloy) invite you to participate, by way of interview, in a research project which is designed to contribute to the knowledge and practice of sport governance in New Zealand. In particular, I seek to explore the emergence of nomination committees (NCs) in the New Zealand national sport organisation (NSO) governance landscape.

Recent NSO governance reviews have identified the increase in independent and appointed directors with the use of nomination committees, or board appointment panels, to identify, nominate and/or appoint such directors to NSO boards. The purpose of this study is to measure the emergence of these NCs, describe the types of NCs in use by New Zealand NSOs and explain the reasons for the adoption of NCs by NSOs in New Zealand. This information will lay the foundation for future evaluative research to assess whether the use of NCs is achieving the intended purpose/s.

Intended interview participants include people, from four NSOs, who were involved in the process whereby such a nomination committee was introduced to the relevant NSO governance structure. I intend to seek participation from a wide range of stakeholders with a wide range of perspectives; including leaders of the relevant NSOs at the time, leaders of relevant NSO members and relevant advisors. Whilst it is anticipated there will be negligible risk to the participants attached to this study, any such risks are mitigated by the voluntary nature of participation, the ability to choose not to answer any interview question, the ability to terminate the interview and the ability to withdraw from the study at any time up to completion of data collection.

I am the primary researcher for this project; I am a Senior Lecturer at AUT (since 2005), an ex-lawyer (12+ years) and ex NSO/ISO board member (15+ years). The successful completion of this research project will result in a **Doctor of Philosophy** qualification. Any queries can be directed to my postgraduate supervisor, **Lesley Ferkins** (contact details at the end of this document) or myself.

What is the purpose of this research?

The primary purpose of this research project is to contribute to the knowledge and practice of NSO sport governance in New Zealand. Associated academic outcomes include:

- **Doctor of Philosophy** qualification for myself;
- Relevant academic articles published in sport management journals;
- Communication of results/theories via sport management conferences and industry information distribution networks such as Sport NZ's Relay newsletter and the Australian Sport Commission's Clearinghouse for Sport newsletter.

How was I identified and why am I being invited to participate in this research?

Delete one option...

Option A

You were selected to take part in this project as the [Chair/CEO – delete one] of an NSO at the time a NC was introduced to the NSO. As a leader of the organisation at the time, it is anticipated that you will have in-depth knowledge of the process, the rationale for the adoption/design of the NC and the views of the key participants. Your contact details were obtained either via public sources or my personal industry contacts.

Option B

You were selected to take part in this project as a key stakeholder/advisor of an NSO at the time a NC was introduced to the NSO. As a key stakeholder/advisor of the organisation at the time, it is anticipated that you will have a relevant perspective of the process and the rationale for the adoption/design of the NC. You were identified as a key stakeholder/advisor either from information provided by other interview participants or the analysis of relevant public documents by the researcher. Your contact details were obtained either via public sources or my personal industry contacts.

How do I agree to participate in this research?

Your participation in this research is voluntary (it is your choice) and whether or not you choose to participate will neither advantage nor disadvantage you. You are able to withdraw from the study at any time. If you choose to withdraw from the study, then you will be offered the choice between having any data that is identifiable as belonging to you removed or allowing it to continue to be used. However, once the findings have been produced, removal of your data may not be possible.

You can indicate your willingness to participate by return email. I will bring the attached consent form to the interview which I will ask you to sign as a record of your willingness to participate. This exchange may also occur via email.

What will happen in this research?

Your participation in the project will involve:

- One 30 to 60 minute interview (which will be audio-recorded and transcribed);
- Interview to be held at a public location to be agreed (likely to be your work-place or my work-place, or via telephone);
- You will be sent a copy of the interview transcript to make any changes or additions you consider appropriate.

What are the discomforts and risks?

I expect there to be minimal discomfort/risks attached to participation in this project.

A possible 'discomfort' could arise if the decision to introduce a NC to the relevant NSO was a contentious one. However, such a decision was made in a professional/organisational context, as opposed to a personal context, and so any discomfort attached to revisiting a professional/organisational decision should be minimal and/or appropriately managed as set out below.

A possible 'risk' relates to the issue of confidentiality. Whilst pseudonyms will be used in any relevant publication, it is possible that, due to the size and nature of the New Zealand NSO community and the nature of the project, people might guess your identity.

How will these discomforts and risks be alleviated?

The above risks will be minimised as follows:

- Your participation is totally voluntary and subject to informed consent;
- You have the right to decline to answer any question during the interview process, to review the interview transcripts and make any corrections/additions you consider appropriate;

- You have the right to withdraw from the project at any time prior to completion of the data collection without any disadvantage to you (in which case all data, recordings, transcripts relating to you would be destroyed);
- Pseudonyms will be used so that neither your name nor the name of the relevant NSO will be used in any publications. The raw data will be kept confidential, will be stored in a secure location and will be destroyed 6 years after completion of the project.

What are the benefits?

The project has the potential to benefit the NSO community, the participants and myself, as the researcher, as follows:

New Zealand NSO community – To learn from others, to reflect on the findings/theories discussed in the project report and apply to future personal/organisational governance decision-making.

Interview participants – To reflect on a significant governance decision, reflect on the finding/theories discussed in the project report and apply any learnings to any future personal/organisational governance decision-making.

The researcher – To access the information necessary to better understand/advance governance and organisational change theories in the context of New Zealand NSOs. To apply this knowledge to fulfil the requirements of a **Doctor of Philosophy** qualification.

How will my privacy be protected?

You will not be anonymous, as I will know your identity. However, all reasonable steps will be taken to protect your confidentiality, in relation to future readers of the final report/thesis/journal articles, as set out in the paragraph detailing the strategies to alleviate any ‘discomfort and risks’.

What are the costs of participating in this research?

The costs relate to your time only. The time commitment required for the interview will be between 30 to 60 minutes.

What opportunity do I have to consider this invitation?

You will have 2 weeks to consider this invitation.

Will I receive feedback on the results of this research?

Yes. Please indicate on the consent form that you would like to receive the project report.

What do I do if I have concerns about this research?

Any concerns regarding the nature of this project should be notified in the first instance to the Project Supervisor, Lesley Ferkins, lesley.ferkins@aut.ac.nz, phone 921 9999 ext 7644.

Concerns regarding the conduct of the research should be notified to the Executive Secretary of AUTEK, Kate O’Connor, ethics@aut.ac.nz, 921 9999 ext 6038.

Whom do I contact for further information about this research?

Please keep this Information Sheet and a copy of the Consent Form for your future reference. You are also able to contact the research team as follows:

Researcher Contact Details:

Tracy Molloy, tmolloy@aut.ac.nz, phone 921 9999 ext 7092.

Project Supervisor Contact Details:

Lesley Ferkins, lesley.ferkins@aut.ac.nz, phone 921 9999 ext 7644.

Appendix D – Study 2 – Consent Form



Consent Form

Project title: *The emergence of nomination committees as a governance feature of New Zealand national sport organisations.*

Project Supervisor: *Lesley Ferkins*

Researcher: *Tracy Molloy*

- I have read and understood the information provided about this research project in the Information Sheet dated **18 April 2018**.
- I have had an opportunity to ask questions and to have them answered.
- I understand that notes will be taken during the interviews and that they will also be audio-taped and transcribed.
- I understand that taking part in this study is voluntary (my choice) and that I may withdraw from the study at any time without being disadvantaged in any way.
- I understand that if I withdraw from the study then I will be offered the choice between having any data that is identifiable as belonging to me removed or allowing it to continue to be used. However, once the findings have been produced, removal of my data may not be possible.
- I agree to take part in this research.
- I wish to receive a summary of the research findings (please tick one): Yes No

Participant’s signature:

Participant’s name:

Participant’s Contact Details (if appropriate):
.....
.....
.....
.....

Date:

Approved by the Auckland University of Technology Ethics Committee on 8 July 2015 (updated post PhD transfer on 30 April 2018) AUTEK Reference number 15/222.

Note: The Participant should retain a copy of this form.

Appendix E1 – Study 2 – Indicative Question Sheet (June 2015)

NZ NSO Governance
Director Selection – Nomination Committees
Semi-Structured Interviews – Indicative Questions
(June 2015)

Question	Type*	Purpose
Can you tell me about your background and involvement in the sport of ...?	Main question – broad/'tour' question	Warm-up/ background
Can you tell me a bit more about your involvement from an organisational/governance perspective?	Probe – if/as necessary	
What about the period when ... changed the constitution to include NCs? What are your recollections?		
Explanatory		
Please describe that change process from your perspective: - The age/stage/state/culture of the organisation; - The people involved; - The process; - The motivation/reasons; - The nature of any support/opposition;	Main question – focussed (+ probes, if/as necessary)	Elicit explanatory information – organisational change theories
Was the organisation under any pressure to make the change – internal or external?		As above
What do you think was the main reason for the change?		As above
Can you reflect on the way the NC was set up –its composition, structure, powers, etc? - Why did the organisation adopt the particular type of NC? The people who opposed this structure...what were their concerns? Can you recall alternative models? - By what process did the organisation decide on the particular type of NC?		As above
What does 'good governance' mean to you?		Elicit explanatory information – governance theories
In your opinion, what are the role/s of the board, a nomination committee, the members, other stakeholders in the governance of an NSO?		As above
Evaluative		
What specifically was the organisation trying to achieve through the change?		Set up for any future evaluative study.

What would you consider to be evidence that the change had achieved the goal/s?		As above.
Other Data/Snowball Sample		
What organisational documents were relevant/used as part of the process?		Identify additional data – private organisational documents.
Can you suggest any other people who may have a meaningful/different perspective to add: - Members, legal advisors, Sport NZ personnel, restructure consultants, etc?		Snowball sample

Types of Interview Questions*

Question Type	Purpose
1. Main Questions	To get the overall experience/understanding of the interviewee; - start broad, open-ended, avoid limiting/guiding, avoid opinion questions until later in the interview; - 'tour' questions, talk me through...
2. Follow-Up Questions	To get a better/deeper understanding of the interviewee perspective, more focussed main questions, for example; - chronology questions; - stage questions; - confirmatory questions.
3. Probe Questions	
3.1 Continuation	To encourage interviewee to keep talking on the current topic or to finish a line of thought.
3.2 Elaboration	To get more detail on a particular theme.
3.3 Attention	To reassure interviewee that you are paying attention.
3.4 Clarification	To explain something that the researcher did not follow.
3.5 Steering	To get the interviewee back on track.
3.6 Sequence	To get a step by step order of events.
3.7 Evidence	To find out how the interviewee knows about the subject/came to their conclusions.
3.7 Slant	To explore for bias (requires careful/sensitive wording).

* Rubin, H. J., & Rubin, I. S. (2005). *Qualitative interviewing: The art of hearing data* (2nd ed.).

Available from

<http://srmo.sagepub.com.ezproxy.aut.ac.nz/view/qualitative-interviewing/SAGE.xml>

Appendix E2 – Study 2 – Indicative Question Sheet (Updated September 2018)

NZ NSO Governance
Director Selection – Nomination Committees
Study 2 – Explanatory Case Studies
Semi-Structured Interviews – Indicative Questions for Interviewees
(Updated September 2018 – reflecting areas to be clarified during interviews)

Background
Can you tell me about your background and involvement in the sport of ...?
Can you tell me a bit more about your involvement from an organisational/governance perspective?
What about the period when ... changed the constitution to include a nomination committee (NC)? What are your recollections?
Explanatory
Please describe that change process from your perspective: - The age/stage/state/culture of the organisation; - The people involved; - The process; - The motivation/reasons; - The nature of any support/opposition.
Was the organisation under any pressure to make the change – internal or external?
What do you think was the main reason for the change?
Can you reflect on the way the NC was set up –its composition, structure, powers, etc? - Why did the organisation adopt the particular type of NC? Did anyone oppose this structure...what were their concerns? Can you recall alternative models? - By what process did the organisation decide on the particular type of NC?
In particular, do you have any observations regarding the relevant NC rules, being rules: -? -?
What does 'good governance' mean to you? What role does director selection play in achieving 'good governance'?
In your opinion, what are the role/s of the board, a nomination committee, the members, other stakeholders in the governance of an NSO?
Evaluative
What specifically was the organisation trying to achieve through the change – NC adoption/design?
What would you consider to be evidence that the change had achieved the goal/s?

Other Data/Snowball Sample
What organisational documents were relevant/used as part of the process?
Can you suggest any other people who may have a meaningful/different perspective to add: - Members, legal advisors, Sport NZ personnel, restructure consultants, etc?

Appendix F – Study 2 – NZ NSO NC Change Drivers – Final (TpA) Coding Template Extracts

Nodes				
Name	Files	References		
1.1 Inertia - Evidence		0	0	
1.2 Inertia - Enablers		0	0	
1.3 Inertia - Disruptors		0	0	
1.4 Inertia - Piercers (see IT-W-Creation)		0	0	
2.1 IT - Coercive Isomorphism		0	0	
2.1.1 GSA Partnership		16	34	
2.1.2 GSA Persuasion		10	18	
2.1.3 GSA Ultimatum		7	27	
2.2 IT - Normative Isomorphism		0	0	
2.2.1 Business-Like + Best Practice		19	48	
2.2.2 Staff-board expertise-influence		11	25	
2.2.3 GSA-Advisor guidelines-influence		18	55	
2.3 IT- Mimetic Isomorphism		0	0	
2.3.1 General - NZ NSO NC Reviews		6	11	
2.3.2 Specific - No 'exemplar' adoption		4	5	
3.1 RD - Magnitude		0	0	
3.1.1 Ext Funds - insuff to influence		3	4	
3.1.2 ExtFunds - sig influential		8	14	
3.2 RD - Criticality-Concentration		0	0	
3.2.1 Ext Funds - GSA		21	49	
3.2.2 Ext Funds - Corp-Trusts		11	18	
3.2.3 Int Funds-Assets - Independent		7	13	

Nodes			
Name	Files	References	
4.1 SC - NC Dominant Coalition		0	0
4.1.1 Ext - GovRevComms		11	15
4.1.2 Int - Board-Committees		10	25
4.1.3 Int - Leaders-Chair-CEO		17	43
4.2 SC - NC Design Choices		0	0
4.2.1 Breaking New Ground		6	6
4.2.2 Changes in Stages		4	18
4.2.3 Other Options (incl NSO reviews)		17	38
4.2.4 Balance (hybrid) logics		0	0
(a) Insider v outsider voice		28	104
(b) Negn (sticking-selling) points		12	38
5.1 IT - Logics - Rep-democracy		0	0
5.1.1 Member voice		29	92
5.2 IT - Logics - Prof-Efficiency		0	0
5.2.1 Bus-like+Best practice		15	36
5.2.2 Best people-skills		18	55
5.3 IT - Logics - Balancing-Hybrid		0	0
5.3.1 Insider v outsider voice		27	129
5.3.2 Negn (sticking-selling) points		11	35

Nodes			
Name	Files	References	
6.1 IT - Work - Creation		0	0
6.1.1 Symbolic		0	0
(a) Compelling new vision narrative		5	11
(b) Structure-logic change to achieve vision		1	3
6.1.2 Material		0	0
(a) Capacity - \$\$		8	11
(b) Capacity - HR		9	13
6.1.3 Relational		0	0
(a) Trust - high		9	25
(b) Trust - low		6	12
(c) Champions for change		4	9
(d) Comms - consultation		17	47
(e) Comms - compulsion		8	30
6.2 IT - Work - Disruption		0	0
6.3 IT - Work - Maintenance		0	0
7. NC Adoption-Design Objectives		0	0
A.1 Great Quotes		13	35
A.2 Participant Backgrounds		30	86
A.3 NSO Contexts (age-stage-history)		0	0
A.4 Not Sure		8	12
A.5 NC Outputs		0	0
A.6 Other Ideas		1	1