INTUITION & EXPRESSION
a one-day symposium and workshop on

Gilles Deleuze

Closing Remarks: On Deleuze & Heidegger, via Foucault
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These closing remarks aim to draw on and draw out the theme for this symposium: intuition & expression. While we are familiar with Deleuze’s engagements with philosophical traditions that have developed these notions, we are less familiar with Martin Heidegger’s 1920 (Summer Semester) lecture course titled Phenomenology of Intuition & Expression. My aim is to suggest obtuse relations we can draw between Heidegger and Deleuze. These relations will be introduced via provocations offered by Michel Foucault’s (also less familiar and Heideggerian) Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology.

Two comments at the outset: (i) there is no finality in what I am presenting nor (ii) any propositions.

My aim is neither to rescue Heidegger’s peculiar phenomenology and peculiar hermeneutics from the problems Deleuze or Deleuzians can raise with it; nor is it to finally say, there you see Deleuze was a Heideggerian all along, to reduce them to some level of the same. Rather, my aim is to see what happens to some sedentary strata, some congealed concepts when we go along with Heidegger and Deleuze. That congealing happens in the theoretical attitude we adopt when we become, for example, Deleuzian or Heideggerian. Neither Deleuze nor Heidegger saw the theoretical attitude as primordial or essential. In this they are perhaps the ‘same’ but precisely a ‘same’ that Deleuze encounters in Heidegger’s “Principle of Identity” and discussed in that three-page excursus in Difference and Repetition. Of course, we can go directly to those few passages where Deleuze does mention Heidegger for some clues but, as we are all aware, Deleuze did not take up Heidegger in a thematic or extended way as he did Hume or Nietzsche, Spinoza or Bergson, Foucault or Kant.

From Heidegger’s first lecture course in 1919, Toward a Definition of Philosophy, and his 1920 lecture course, Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression, Kantian transcendental philosophy and Heidegger’s contemporary neo-Kantians were primary targets. It is this latter lecture course that we will have as our particular target. However, I want to start not with Heidegger but with Deleuze or, rather, Deleuze’s Spinoza. In 2011 a new book on Spinoza appeared, edited by Dimitris Vardoulakis, titled Spinoza Now. For that volume, the Italian political philosopher, Cesare Casarino, developed an essay on Marx and Spinoza, a precursor to a book-length study he is writing. The essay, “Marx before Spinoza: Notes toward an investigation,” introduces Deleuze’s notion of “sense-event” in order to develop an understanding of Marx’s concept of nexus rerum the connectivity of all things, as related to Spinoza’s rerum concatenationem. To give emphasis to this notion of “sense-event,” the second half of Casarino’s text is in fact an exposition on Spinoza via a close reading of two of Deleuze’s books, Expressionism in Philosophy and The Logic of Sense. Crucial for Casarino is developing Spinoza’s understanding of “intuition” as the third and highest kind of knowledge, more vital than “representation” as a first kind and “reason as conceptual” as a second. This is elucidated in conjunction with Deleuze’s notion of “expression,” developing a relation between intuition and expression: “The
concatenation of all things can neither be denoted or manifested as actual representations by the first kind of knowledge nor signified or demonstrated as actual concept by the second kind of knowledge … rather, it can be only expressed as virtual sense-event by the third kind of knowledge, by intuitive knowledge. The concatenation of all things constitutes the raison d’être of intuitive knowledge.”

If, for Spinoza, there is a single Substance and no ‘verticality’ with respect to the traditional hierarchy God/Man/World, then there is a single plane of Being with an infinite number of modalities of being, where each thing in its modifications expresses an attribute of God as potential for being. Each mode has an essence and an existence, which is, in some ways, how Spinoza engages the kind of distinction Descartes has made between res cogitans and res extensa. But crucially, there is no real distinction between essence and existence in the sense that they could be two transcendent Substances. Existing modes are material singularities, hence a fundamental materialism in the immanence of Spinoza’s system. But an existing mode is its own essence in that the essence possesses an infinity of extensive parts. Essences express attributes of God as degrees of power. They are what Deleuze suggests as intensive realities, complicated in their attributes, expressing the essence of God each according to its degree of power. Existing modes are the actualization of the degree of power of a mode’s essence in acquiring extensive parts such as size or duration. In this respect, they are no longer a measure of the attributes as degrees of power of modal essences but rather may be thought of as the essence of a thing outside of the attributes of God.

Deleuze thinks this in terms of the modal distinctions of ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ where, however, modes are all contained in the attributes they modify. He expresses this further in terms of a double movement by which we understand the immanent materialism in Spinoza’s system, a double movement of complication with respect to intrinsic modal essences and explication with respect to existing modes extrinsically distinct. We understand Deleuze’s differentiation of virtuality and actuality in the context of this Spinozian distinction. The material thing is thus the unfolding, in its singularity, of its own degrees of power within an infinite number of degrees as attributes of God / Nature as Substance. Crucially, in this sense, the thing is unconditioned or cause is understood as potentia. It is for this reason that Deleuze emphasizes the most significant implication for Spinoza’s system: “Necessity everywhere appears as the only modality of being.” It is in this sense that we understand the Spinozian ‘absolute’. All modal being is ‘absolute’ from the perspective of the degrees of power of the attributes of Substance. We earlier mentioned Spinoza’s “intuition” as a kind of knowledge. Casarino suggests: “In short, it is at one stroke that intuitive knowledge understands modal essence and links it to the essence of substance—and hence that understanding and that linking may no longer be distinguished from one another.”

We further recognize for Deleuze something essential in an understanding of intuition and expression in his approach to Bergson, where intuition is understood as method. In his 1956 essay, “Bergson, 1859-1941,” Deleuze sets out in Bergsonian terms intuition’s methodological character in four characteristics. The first characteristic addresses something essential to an understanding of science and philosophy. Is philosophy first science? Or is philosophy reflection on science? Or is philosophy radically broken from science? In his approach to an understanding of intuition, Bergson makes a break with science — intuition shows precisely
what science hides from us. Deleuze suggests that Bergson, in repudiating critical philosophies, shows us the many forms and relations that separate us from things and from their interiority. In our separation from things, the immediately given is not given but mediated. Intuition presents itself as a return, returning us in a philosophical relationship that puts us in things rather than leaving us outside. Separation, mediation, is not from us — things must lose themselves in order for us to lose them. Movement that changes the nature of things must be found in things themselves. In this sense, matter is an ontological principle of intelligence, rather than intelligence being a psychological principle of matter or space, hence, intelligent intuition as the highest expression of things. Scientific knowledge, as objectifying, theoretical attitude or representation, separates us from things.

Hence for Bergson there are not two worlds, the sensible and the intelligible, just as for Spinoza there were not two substances, res cogitans and res extensa. For Bergson there are two directions for one and the same movement, just as for Spinoza one Substance with two attributes, essence and existence. As we mentioned, for Spinoza an existing mode is its own essence as infinity of extensive parts, so for Bergson, in one direction movement congeals in its product, that which interrupts movement; in the other direction, movement turns back, retraces its steps and rediscovers in the product the movement from which it resulted. Hence there are Bergson’s two directions of one and the same movement, spirit and matter, two times in the same duration, past and present co-existing, present and past forming the same world: matter and memory. For Bergson, a thing’s essence, nature or being is differentiation, difference, the difference, not between two things, but the very difference of a thing with itself — nuance — a concept for that thing only. Deleuze quotes Bergson: “An empiricism worthy of the name … would measure out for the object a concept appropriate to only that object, a concept of which one could barely say it was a concept because it would apply only to that thing. Intellectual intuition concentrates on the individual, recaptures the individual’s essence.”

Hence the third characteristic of intuition is that it is a method that seeks differences in nature as articulations of the real. But what are these differences in nature? Difference in nature is a tendency in one and the same thing between two tendencies that traverse it. The thing is already a composite. The tendency itself is ‘pure’ which is to say, is Substance. Matter and duration are not two things but two tendencies or movements in a single thing: simple relaxation of movement in matter; the other movement, contraction, disturbs it and brings us back to duration. But matter is simple — undifferentiated — what is repeated, what can no longer change its nature. Duration is what differs from itself. But in this, duration differs from matter in that duration is precisely what differs from itself. Thus everything is entirely defined in duration, including matter itself. Differentiation is the power of what is simple, what persists. Duration, movement, tendency is the vital impulse, the élan vital that Bergson discusses. Deleuze sees duration as virtuality: that which changes its nature by being divided. In reality not everything is given. That is, the given simultaneously presupposes a movement that invents or creates it, a movement that is not conceived in the image of the given (hence a break with representation or a pre-figured conceptual attitude). That is, Bergson critiques the idea of the possible understood as the pro/retrojection of the product or thing as simple copy, as movement of production or invention. Actualization, in this sense, is expression, not production.
I have laboured a little on these textbook summary accounts of Deleuze’s Spinoza and Bergson in order to establish a breach with Heidegger, in order to broach Heidegger’s phenomenology of intuition and expression. From his first lecture course in 1919, Heidegger aimed at a radical encounter with philosophy, with everything that was to be understood by that word. From the beginning he destructed, or deconstructed, the tradition, particularly the dominance of neo-Kantianism in Germany. As well as ‘destructing’ Kant, Hegel and Aristotle, he ‘destructed’ the frameworks of his contemporaries, Rickert, Windelband, Max Scheler, Natorp, Husserl, which is to say key philosophers from Freiburg and Marburg. One finds strong resonance in Heidegger with Deleuze’s discussion of Bergson with respect to science and philosophy. Heidegger’s questioning seems the same, with a similar emphasis on life, immediacy, situated encounter, radical destruction of intuition as passive reception of sense data and knowledge as judgement with respect to the absolute a priori (science) and absolute validity (history), and with ‘concept’ as order with respect to an objectifying theoretical attitude within a rational system. The subtitle of Heidegger’s 1920 lecture course on intuition and expression was: Theory of Philosophical Concept Formation. Scientific and philosophical concepts, propositions and ways of considering permeate factical life experience comprehendingly but do not compose it. They permeate it in the character of the ‘faded’, the ‘fallen-away’ from primordial existence relations. In this lecture course on intuition and expression, Heidegger aims at asking what are ‘concepts’ for fundamental experiences. This ‘asking’ itself is philosophizing. His application of ‘destruction’ is to two problem groups:

(i) the a priori of absolute validity: the a priori of reason and the a priori of value
(ii) the duality of the rational and irrational: living experience (atheoretical) and the knowing of it (as theoretical apprehension of the atheoretical)

Heidegger in 1920 saw that contemporary philosophy was centered on life as primal phenomenon. He recognised two major directions. Either life in general is posited as the primal phenomenon and all questions are directed back to this. Thus, every objecthood is comprehended as objectivation and manifestation of life, as with philosophies of life, in biological contexts, connected to the names of James and Bergson, and in the human sciences to Dilthey, and to Simmel who connects these two. Or, life is seen as cultural, as manifestation, enacting itself in a bond to norm-giving principles and values in a universal a priori systematics of reason, with the Marburg School, Rickert and Husserl. For the latter, culture is an expression or symbol of mental realms. For Bergson, culture is an organic unity of forming life. Hence, in sharp relief, life as objectifying with its attendant problem of absolute validity and a priori; and life as historical process, as becoming, creating and objectifying, where ‘culture’ is the epitome of creations of spirit. With an emphasis on lived and living experience, philosophy raises an objection against itself, its own ‘disfiguration’. An emphasis on life as experiencing has a tendency towards emphasis on increased openness and capacity of feeling for manifold possibilities, an abundance of attitudinal directions, causing merely logical-theoretical attitudinal directions to recede. This ‘endangering’ of the theoretical cannot leave philosophy untouched. Heidegger suggests two motives that were effective in addressing the “disfiguration” of philosophy by living experience, one Kantian-Hegelian and the other Bergsonian.
With the former is the resolution of the tension between the rational and irrational: knowledge is a rationalization of the irrational, a demolition or immobilization of life in the schema of concepts as the means and results of knowledge-forming itself — concepts as condensed judgements. With the latter (and here Heidegger makes reference to Bergson’s 1889 ‘An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness’), all theoretically conceptual apprehension of living experience is a spatialization and therefore a fundamental disfiguration (all logic is logic of space) — hence the inappropriateness of the conceptual as something separated in a spatial way with respect to the unspatiality of the mental (duration). Heidegger recognises that with Bergson steps toward a dialectic reappear: recognition of the oppositions into simultaneously progressing supersessions, i.e., positing elements of opposition: absolute and relative, a priori and history, rational and irrational, to which the task of such mediation is properly assigned can now be taken into consideration as an achievement and phenomenon of life — movement-tendency unifying and superseding within itself the abundance of forms. (We recognise the possibility of reading Deleuze’s Bergson in this manner). Heidegger includes in this the legitimate core of phenomenology as cultural-philosophical or understanding-psychological circumstantial observation (Husserl).

Opposed to either predominant direction addressing the disfiguration of life philosophies, Heidegger poses phenomenological destruction: from the having-present of different situations (arbitrariness of fundamental concepts) as differentiations by which meaning-directions depart and in which they become genuinely pursuable. From this initial understanding of sense-clarification we have to go back to the philosophically primordial basis of enactment — sensation — from which such clarifying and determining must grow. What does ‘enactment’ mean? If a relation of sense is had in enactment, who has? In theoretical acts and enactment of acts, it is not about a concrete enactment of judgement but about a judging consciousness in general—the pure form of judging—and in this enactment is disengaged. The formal indication of enactment is an “always actual renewal in a self-worldly Dasein.” Hence, the non-primordial, that which is deduced or derived from a particular understanding does not require an actual renewal in that it co-constitutes self-worldly Dasein. By ‘renewal’ (and one needs to think here essentially in relation to Deleuze’s difference and repetition), Heidegger suggests: “I seize my own past so that it again and again is had for the first time and I myself am affected anew by myself and “am” in renewed enactments. This ‘like the first time’ does not wear itself out but becomes increasingly surprising — the rejection of every trace of finality — blocking the way for any formation of habit, being intensified.” (one might be tempted to think here nomadism and deterritorialization).

What, then is philosophizing? What accomplishes this? If philosophy is to be determined as primordially enactmentally understanding and attention-drawing explication of factical life experience, then this explication necessarily always starts with destruction (deconstruction). It begins in the faded (theoretical attitude). And if the aim is directed towards the explication of the sense of philosophizing itself, then pre-given philosophy is also to be understood destructively. The scope of destruction is not a priori — it is in the concrete and proves its existentiell meaning there. Destruction does not have the sense of reaching the proper through result. It is not a method! The proper is destruction itself and its facticity, that is the setting apart that persists within it. The ‘proper’ in this sense is what can never be grasped
theoretically: explicating an individuated expression from the complications of attitudinal differentiations of sense-complexes.

Heidegger here brings into relation key themes that will preoccupy him until *Being and Time* under some new concepts he invents and re-invents again and again: fundamental mood, ecstatic temporality, the authentic and inauthentic. From concrete enactments destruction goes backwards to the ec-stases of anticipation and pre-conceptions: pre-conceptions that are to be brought out are already anticipated and beforehand secondarily destruction-guiding — even though they are not yet fully explicated (this is achieved by the carrying out of destruction). The anticipation itself enacts itself in primordial fundamental experience and the primordial preconception motivated from there of the one who is philosophizing (no a priori or world-historical decreeing of factual life experience). If for Deleuze matter is that which repeats and Being is differentiation then, for Heidegger, destruction *is* actualization, propriation of what persists. If we began with Casarino engaging Deleuze’s sense-event in order to determine something primordially essential in Spinoza and Marx, and sense-event is understood in the peculiar understandings Deleuze has for intuition and expression, we recognise Deleuze’s sense-event along with Heidegger’s enactment of primordial sense-complexes in destruction in this same peculiar understanding of intuition and expression. They are the motive and tendency of philosophical experience itself. As Heidegger suggests towards the end of this lecture course: “The questions about intuition and about expression are therefore to be understood in the following way: It is the question about the how of philosophical experience and about the how in which philosophical experience explicates itself.” Intuition and expression are the implicative and explicative movements of the tendency of living disclosed with the destruction of all a priori and worldview reason — Deleuze’s individuated existence, Bergson’s *nuance*, Heidegger’s *mineness*. No transcendental ego — what is properly mine *is* dasein — impersonal existence, a life, concrete existence whose essence, being, is a power as differentiator, a potential to be.