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Performance Management in the Central Governments of New Zealand and Brazil: A Comparative Study

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Performance Management in the Central Governments of New Zealand and Brazil: A Comparative Study

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Attestation of Authorship:

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person (except where explicitly defined in the acknowledgements), nor material which to a substantial extent has been submitted for the award of any other degree or diploma of a university or other institution of higher learning.

Auckland, 31st of January 2012,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Mario F. Woortmann". The signature is written in a cursive style with a horizontal line underneath.

Mario Fensterseifer Woortmann

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Abstract:

The modernization of the public sector in most countries brought along reforms based on models and practices imported from the private sector (Halachmi, 2002). With the movement of New Public Management, similarities started to be found among governments across borders, however each with a different pace of implementation and with its own obstacles. This study investigated performance management at the employee level, in the central governments of New Zealand and Brazil. Whereas New Zealand has been acknowledged as a model of public sector reform (Halligan, 2007), Brazil is currently improving its HRM policies to seek more efficiency and accountability in this moment of economic growth. However, both countries have faced and still struggle with some dysfunctions in their performance management systems. This research utilized an archival analysis of performance management documents together with a questionnaire survey to observe what is formalized on paper and what is done in practice. Internal guidelines, laws and decrees were analysed against the most prominent literature on performance management, and members of the HR departments of ten Ministries provided interesting answers that either corroborated, contradicted or complemented these documents. In the end, the performance management frameworks of both countries were compared, showing similarities and differences in procedures, application and potential dysfunctions. Whereas the New Zealand frameworks seem to be more evolved, they face dysfunctions related to management commitment, a weak link to pay and overly subjective measures. In Brazil, a more precise link to pay contrasts with some framework issues, besides resistance to change, inadequate use of the systems and instances of paternalism. All in all, this study shows that in both countries the rhetorics and realities have some distance between them.

1. Introduction and Justification

The growing interest in performance management became evident especially in the last two decades. However, the subject of performance management is not something new (Armstrong, 2009). Since the early days of the last century, the mechanistic forms of control had some aspects of performance measurement intrinsically devised to quantify the productivity of workers. After the 1970's the idea of performance management emerged with a stronger focus on people, motivation and behaviours (Armstrong, 2009) rather than on how quickly employees operated machines.

Performance Management has long been utilized in the private sector to measure and improve individual and organizational results. In the context of Human Resource Management (HRM), performance management utilizes systems and procedures for improvement of individual and team performance, ultimately in order to focus their efforts and motivation to achieve an organization's goals (Latham, Sulsky & MacDonald, 2007).

Similarly to the private sector, government organizations have also been concerned with their performance and image towards citizens and society (Fryer, Antony & Ogden, 2009). There has been an increasing pressure for accountability and results in areas such as education, health services and social welfare in general, not forgetting the impact that governments have on the economy of a country. Around four decades ago, a global movement of public sector reforms stemmed from Britain to several other countries, which was later called the "New Public Management" (NPM) (Latham, Borgogni & Petitta, 2008; Halachmi, 2002; Mwita, 2000). The premises of New Public Management were based on ideas such as accountability, performance management and other private-sector managerial practices (McAdam, Hazlett & Casey, 2005; Mwita, 2000). As will be detailed later in this study, some of the reasons for the widespread interest of governments and scholars in performance management in the public sphere involve the points below (Halachmi, 2002):

- The necessity of reviewing more thoroughly the distribution of resources in the face of the incapacity of many government agencies to apply them efficiently and effectively;
- Demands by increasingly educated citizens for information on the use of taxpayers money, and the services provided;
- The evolution of means of communication and the media, which rapidly publicizes practices being conducted in the government sphere and related opinions from anywhere in the world;

- The desire of governments to regain credibility with society, especially through good governance and accountability (Halachmi, 2002).

Performance management is also one of the main pillars of *good governance*, a term that was re-invented by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which are part of the United Nations international body (Neumayer, 2003). Integrated Governance (IG), in its turn, is a further concept which derived from the central orientation on different forms of coordination and control, being designed to bestow greater coherence and capacity to the public sector. It has two main intentions: renovating the public sector to enhance capability, as well as refocusing and redirecting the central public service to elevate performance (Halligan, 2007).

In this line of thought, one of the reasons for this study is due to the attention gained by recent government reforms taking place in many developed and developing countries around the world, through the prism of New Public Management. Practices imported from private sector firms have and still are in the process of implementation at all government levels, seeking a new design of work systems that can bring more efficiency and productivity for citizens and society in general. And a central element in these reforms is the performance management of public servants.

In this sense, New Zealand represents an internationally recognized model of public sector reform, and its New Public Management (NPM) model employed a sophisticated and coherent framework (Halligan, 2007). New Zealand is both an early and a long-term reforming country by Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) parameters, as well as being a member of the 'Anglo-Saxon' countries (along with the UK and Australia) which have been historically related to New Public Management (Halligan, 2007). The USA, for instance, found much inspiration in New Zealand's radical reforms (Scott, Ball and Dale, 1997). Recently, New Zealand has been acclaimed the second place worldwide with the lowest levels of corruption in the public sector, and the highest levels of government transparency (New Zealand Herald, 01/11/2010). Norman (2002), however, points to several inconsistencies in performance management and obstacles presently faced by the New Zealand government at the *organizational level*, and they indicate indirectly that some dysfunctions may be present in current *employee* performance management systems.

Brazil, in its turn, is a developing country that has been attracting a great deal of attention worldwide, due to its burgeoning economy. It is regarded as one of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), which are the fastest growing economies in the present days, and Brazil has recently surpassed Britain and France and become the fifth largest economy in the globe, according to a study by Times Magazine (04/2011). Its government reforms started a few years after the Anglo-Saxon countries, yet with similar purposes and principles of NPM. Several attempts were taken to change and improve the performance management systems and related procedures in the government, seeking a higher degree of accountability (Santana, 2002). Nevertheless, the reforms and the credibility of performance management in the Brazilian government have been questionable (Odelius and Santos, 2007). As asserted by Mwita (2000), traditionally the public sector of developing countries is seen as rather non-productive and a drain on the “wealth-producing” part of the economy. Yet, some recent managerial initiatives have attempted to change this scenario, which will be described in more detail in the following sections of this study.

Both New Zealand and Brazil have undergone long mandates of Labour governments: whereas in New Zealand it started in 1984, in Brazil it started in the late 1990’s and still perseveres to the present day. However, the literature on employee performance management in the governments of both countries is indeed scarce. More studies are necessary to investigate and provide a more detailed account of the current state of the field in this context. After all, the subject is of high relevance to citizens (tax payers), to government officials and to the academic community in general.

For these reasons mentioned above, as well as to help address this gap in the literature, this study proposed to identify the characteristics and potential dysfunctions of the current performance management systems of New Zealand (a role model) and Brazil (an emerging economy), through the lens of Human Resource Management. First, a literature review outlines the context of organizational performance management in the public sector. Secondly, the key concepts and elements of employee performance management are explained, before moving on to the specific contexts of New Zealand and Brazil. The research was comprised of two phases, an archival analysis and a questionnaire survey, and a comparative analysis was provided as a result. Some theoretical insights are suggested, with complementarities useful to both countries.

2. Literature review:

2.1. New Public Management and Performance Management

This first section provides an overview of several aspects that pertain to Performance Management, in order to outline the context where this study is situated.

As mentioned earlier, in the late 1970's and early 1980's, sparked by a crisis in the national health system (NHS), the British government of Thatcher devised several changes to be implemented in the public sector (Fryer, Antony & Ogden, 2009). Focusing on changing the public's view of the efficiency of the state, this movement was later called New Public Management (NPM), and its principles involved aspects of accountability such as 'value for money' and 'performance measurement'. Amongst the chief propositions that underpinned reforms in the public sector were the employment of professional managers, clear measures of performance, decentralization, emphasis on private-sector practices of management and increased transparency (McAdam, Hazlett & Casey, 2005; Mwita, 2000). These reforms by the British government created a widespread movement that was reproduced in varying degrees in several countries, such as the US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand (Latham, Borgogni & Petitta, 2008; Halachmi, 2002; Mwita, 2000).

As argued by Kettl (2000), New Public Management (NPM) is part of a broader global movement of managerial reform in the public sphere. In the case of New Zealand, the strategy of government officials was to reduce the size of government agencies and elevate their performance, especially with the implementation of accrual accounting and management contracts. These were the responsibility of the newly hired senior managers, assigned to generate particular outcomes based on certain standards, budgets and performance specifications. The central aim was to develop public sector administration by using market-like models as well as results-oriented attitudes guided by performance targets (Kettl, 2000).

The new paradigm brought by NPM was developed largely by private sector practitioners, drawing on institutional economic theories. Halachmi (2002), for example, describes 'benchmarking' (comparisons with the most effective performances in an industrial sector) as an interesting tool for conducting modernization and decentralization processes because it gives emphasis to achievements and strategic thinking for future measures. But as Dormer and Gill (2010) suggest, most NPM models were labelled as "managerialism": bundles of management practices imported from private into the public sector to promote

improvements in efficiency. Public managers needed indicators in order to measure the levels of performance being achieved by their organizations (Holloway et al.,1999). Some contextual aspects, such as the status of the economy and the receptiveness of the government system to international managerial practices promoted by international institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, OECD and WTO, were influential to most countries that adhered to NPM and managerialism (Horton, 2006). According to the author, the organizational culture of public organizations were not totally changed, but were permeated by values and institutional frameworks of business organizations.

As indicated in this and the next sections, the modernization movement of the public sector of many countries was influenced by practices essentially created by private companies, which for commercial reasons have a focus on seeking optimal levels of efficiency and performance to obtain organizational results. Corroborating with this line of thought, Bouckaert and Peters (2002) point to the notion that the creation of a *best practice*, “with prize winners and charter marks” (pp.360), may result in a positive motivational effect for employees, who in this context are *public servants*. On the other hand, the authors highlight that best practices are not executable in all enterprises (public or private), nor can all achieve the same expected results, for it creates the issue of acceptability of such practices, involving the internal culture and work design. Hence the need for *best fit* (e.g. Boxall and Purcell, 2008).

Applying the concepts of agency theory¹, Bouckaert and Peters (2002) maintain that in order to “debureaucratize” the public sector, central governments had (and still have) to invest in a relationship of trust with the agents (government agencies, local councils and contracted companies monitored by them). They go further to assert that performance needs to be “related to satisfaction, and satisfaction must be related to trust of actors and stakeholders; that is, citizens in government, the state, and society” (pp.361). Of course, the connection between performance and satisfaction is complex and involves different interpretations and expectations, and their link to trust is even more complex, encompassing aspects of communication, results and accountability, desired outcomes and the details of the workflow necessary to reach them. Organizational performance management processes have tended to be more closely related to forms of governance, based on managing the relationships between

¹ Agency theory explains the conditions of relationships between parties where the focus is the delegation of power of the ‘principal’ (e.g. CEO, president etc) to the ‘agent’(e.g. manager, member of parliament) to make decisions or act on their behalf (Jenkins, Ambrosini and Collier, 2007).

central government and agencies to guarantee the delivery of the most important targets (Goddard and Mannion, 2004).

There is a general recognition that these processes in some countries have taken a “bottom-up” approach (Goddard and Mannion, 2004), where the performance management systems enabled the public servants (especially managers) involved to gain autonomy, with the condition of showing results to central government in a decentralized way, but keeping some level of control centralized by top instances in the government. Norman (2002) argues that agency theory in this case emphasizes monitoring as a safety measure for principals (central government) against the possibility of receiving misleading information by agents (local agency managers) in daily operations. He also highlights that the performance measures utilized in this relationship (or contract) can yield benefits such as an increasing return on management time, a very limited resource for all enterprises, by providing objective data for decision making and corrective actions.

In addition to objective data, performance management (PM) and its systemic procedures generate learning cycles for organizations. The transfer of systems, practices, policies and strategies can occur between countries, different levels of government, different services provided to citizens, and many other commonalities that relate to learning processes (Bouckaert and Peters, 2002). Furthermore, the performance function denotes a focus on change actors, strategy implementation, appropriate audit procedures, design of an evaluation system with objective measures and a performance-oriented management system (Bouckaert and Peters, 2002). Examples from some countries are described below.

In the USA, for example, Holzer and Kloby (2005) regard performance measurement as playing a vital role in the government reform agenda, not only locally but worldwide, driven by growing pressure from citizens demanding higher levels of quality and delivery of public services. They suggest that performance measurement might have gained importance with the advent of NPM after the 1970's, although some initiatives go back to the beginning of that century. Notwithstanding, it was only after the sanction of the Government Performance Results Act 1993 that the guidelines for the implementation and use of performance measures and indicators were formalized in the USA. In Australia, a country formed by a bicameral government with federal states and thus a more fragmented public sector, there was an effort to reform the local government so it would become more responsive to changing political priorities and more aligned with modern public sector management (Parker and Bradley,

2000). As detailed by Dann (1996), the reforms being widespread by the Labour Party in the state of Queensland at the time were later compiled into the Fitzgerald Report 1993, which replicated further the premises of accountability to other states.

In summary, organizational performance management in the public sector has been largely driven by measures of efficiency and accountability, among which is the use of systems and models of performance management from the private sector. However, organizational PM stems from and relies on the contribution of *individuals* to the systemic success of an organization (e.g Latham, Borgogni and Petitta, 2008; Harris, 2005). The next section discusses the main influences and features of PM from the Human Resource Management perspective. Before we move to a deeper stance of employee performance management in the public sector, some concepts and definitions must be outlined, to clarify what we will be analyzing in this study and to form the basis for investigation in the central governments of New Zealand and Brazil.

2.2 Human Resource Management and employee performance management

The importance of Human Resource Management comes into the picture especially when employee performance management is concerned. Motivation, skills, work design, training and development, knowledge (tacit and explicit), commitment are all important elements that HRM considers as strategic to any organization, and it is ultimately the HR function's responsibility to manage these aspects. There is a consensus among HR scholars that higher quality in human resources brings enhanced financial outcomes to firms, and in the case of government enterprises the outcomes are in terms of efficiency. For example, Barney and Wright's (1998) research has demonstrated the direct contribution of HR policies and practices to worker satisfaction, which in turn is connected to customer satisfaction and consequently leading to enhanced business results. They found that practices such as appraisal and compensation policies may have high influence on organizational performance. These notions strengthen the importance of HRM and performance management in the strategic level of virtually any kind of organization.

Here the concept of HRM as a strategic partner (Lawler and Mohrman, 2003) becomes valuable in the implementation of procedures and policies for the management of work and people, especially in this current era of information technology and knowledge-intensive jobs

(including the public sector). The effective management of *human capital* (what individuals know and do that is valuable to the organization; Boxall et. al., 2008), attitudinal climate, motivation, rewards and performance is key to the accomplishment of strategy. And as the major function responsible for employee performance management in the organization, HRM plays a vital role in making strategy viable.

Nevertheless, the direct chain of effects between employee performance and organizational performance remains permeated by unanswered questions. This is what many scholars refer to as the “*black box*” problem in HRM (Boxall and Purcell, 2008; Keenoy, 2009). The “black box” entails the doubts, limitations and unanswered questions concerning the actual impact of HR practices and systems on organizational outcomes, and how to exactly measure the links that prove the effectiveness of these HR practices (Keenoy, 2009). One element that makes this link of causality particularly difficult to determine is employees attitudes and behavior, which, despite how appropriate the HR systems might be, represent the complexity and variability that is always present in human performance (Boxall and Purcell, 2008).

Notwithstanding, two prominent frameworks related to individual performance are receiving attention in the academic sphere of HRM. Firstly, the AMO framework, also called the “*performance equation*”, is a mathematical representation where performance is the function of an individual’s abilities (A), motivations (M) and opportunity to perform (O) (Macky and Boxall, 2009) . The equation $P=f(A.M.O)$ indicates the relationship and importance between variables such as procedural and declarative knowledge (skills and abilities - A), motivation (discretionary effort and persistence - M) and the opportunities that enable employees to perform (support, technology, working conditions, assignments etc - O), with the final outcome in terms of performance (P) (Boxall et. al., 2008). A second framework, *PIRK*, in its turn, involves four variables that, when appropriately combined together, are seen to enhance productivity and thus performance. The variables P (power to act and make decisions on various aspects of work), I (information necessary for their work, internal processes and feedback), R (rewards connected to organizational results, capabilities and individual contribution) and K (knowledge necessary for the delivery of the work, learning and development, improvement internal procedures, methodologies and technology) are sometimes seen as analogous or complementary to the AMO equation (Macky and Boxall, 2009). Therefore, these frameworks represent specific points where HRM practitioners can

focus and help enhance individual performance, and to some extent reduce the gaps entailed by the “back box” conundrum. As such, they can be useful principles for performance management.

It is important, at this point, to define individual performance and performance management, with its systems and features. *Individual or employee performance* involves actions and specific behaviours that an employee takes to achieve the goals or tasks and objectives required by their job or their team (Macky, 2008). Through the perspective of competencies in HRM, Macky (2008) defines individual performance as²:

“(...) either employee on-the-job behavior or the use of traits (intelligence, reasoning abilities, personality characteristics and so on) that have been identified by job analysis/competency profiling as leading to success in a job” (pp. 262).


Similarly, Latham, Sulsky and MacDonald (2007) define performance as the kinds of choices made by an individual that are related to doing a job (performing), the level of effort and duration of that effort, in other words, individual persistence.

Performance management, in its turn, is defined by Armstrong (2009) as a “systematic process for improving organizational performance by developing the performance of individuals and teams”(pp.9). In his viewpoint, the management of employee performance is a strategic and integrated process which yields concrete organizational success when it enhances the performance of people who work for them (Armstrong, 2000). Fryer et al. (2009) define performance management generally as strategic actions devised to implement change where it is required, after a period of monitoring, seeking to improve aspects such as processes, quality and motivation, besides promoting innovation. It should be an ongoing process (Latham, Sulsky & MacDonald, 2007) that aims at performance improvement (DeNisi and Pritchard, 2006). This monitoring can be seen at organizational level and at individual level, and is based on quantitative or qualitative indicators of the output, level of activity or results achieved in a process, in other words performance *measurement*. Fletcher and Williams (1996) affirm the two terms are sometimes used interchangeably in an erroneous manner, however they argue that measurement is in fact a part of management in providing information for decision-making.

² This is an input approach to performance management, the most commonly connected to HRM. An output approach would involve performance as the results obtained (e.g. units produced, number of errors), in a more objective or quantitative manner (Guest, 2000).

A recent outline of a performance management framework is proposed by Macky (2008), with a model that more clearly depicts the processes involved and the alternative actions that can be undertaken. With the aim of improving performance at the individual level, and consequently at organizational level, performance management is represented graphically in the framework below (see figure 1), showing the stages or phases that will be explained further in this section :

Figure 1: The performance management system:



Source: Macky (2008: p. 264)

It is clear to note how this model denotes the connection between managing employee performance and the strategy of an organization, where Human Resource Management must be aligned with the overall vision, mission, objectives and strategies (i.e. HRM as a strategic partner). Macky's (2008) model entails that the Human Resource department must consider

the sound structuring of its planning, as well as the operationalization of subsystems (e.g. recruitment and selection, orientation, induction), in a way that supports the management of performance in a cohesive manner. That is, employee performance management starts when the job description is well formulated, and thence the candidate is selected and introduced into the organization's workflow. This process is of great relevance to the public sector, as it will be evidenced in sections 2.5 and 2.6.

The *performance planning* which takes place subsequently aims to make sure that every employee has a clear understanding of the performance goals and expectations of their work, and that these are logically connected to the team and departmental targets (Macky, 2008). The goal-setting theory is vast, with many studies conducted also in the public sector of countries such as the USA, the UK, Australia and others, as will be illustrated in section 2.4 of this study. Performance goals are perceived as the core of individual and organizational performance (Locke and Latham, 2002; Lawler, 2003; Latham et. al., 2007). Lawler contends that goals themselves are a powerful motivator of behavior, and that the achievement of goals generates strong feelings of intrinsic satisfaction. Therefore these performance goals must be well set between managers and employees, and must be clear, understandable, challenging yet achievable (Locke and Latham, 2002) and preferably meaningful (Lawler, 2003). In order to put this into practice, performance management planning should define some parameters that will help monitor and manage levels of performance. For example: Key Result Areas (KRAs), which are the expected outcomes from an employee's work (what he/she is accountable for) connected to the organization's critical success factors; performance *objectives, standards* and *targets* which can be compared to previous years or months; and finally the measurement indicators, also called *KPIs* (Key Performance Indicators), which are specific practical elements that allow to check if performance targets are achieved or not, for example customer satisfaction questionnaires, the number of non-conformities in a process, etc (Macky, 2008; Armstrong, 2009).

Performance appraisal, also called assessment or evaluation, is a process where these measurement parameters are used to judge an employee's performance, being one of the central elements of employee P.M, as depicted in Figure I above. According to Guimarães and Brandão (2001), throughout the 20th century, the evaluation of performance shifted from mechanistic control of times and movements to processes that observe the employee's behavior and their work as a wider organizational context. Especially based on contribution of

Social Science and with a focus on employee behavior and motivation, the methods of performance appraisal and review were gradually improved throughout the decades (Guimarães and Brandão, 2001).

Currently, appraisal is defined as a process conducted in periods or time intervals (every semester, year or longer periods, for example) where all the progress and quality of work developed by an employee are summarized (Latham et. al., 2007), and subsequently setting new goals or objectives to be attained in the next period. For this to happen within a performance management process, according to Latham et al. (2007) and in line with Macky's (2008) model, some basic steps must be followed in a logical order: firstly, the desired job performance standards must be *defined* (i.e. performance agreement), and secondly the individual's performance must be *observed and measured* against pre set objectives, KRAs and KPIs, and then *appraised*. The following step involves *feedback and review*, which should be provided in a constructive manner as to inform the employee of his or her areas of excellence and where he or she needs improvement and support. Here some challenging personal goals can be outlined by the supervisor in a more direct way, as to channel the individual's effort towards doing things differently. The fourth step is when the organization decides on rewards, promotions, training and development, coaching, retention, demotion and termination (Latham et al, 2007: pp. 365). This is perhaps one of the most critical parts concerning performance improvement, and it will be investigated in the context of the public sector further in this study.


The uses of performance appraisal are generally two-fold according to Tziner, Joanis and Murphy (2000): one is for administrative purposes, such as rewards, salary progressions or increases, periodic bonuses, and assignment decisions, involving transfers, promotions, demotions and so on. The other purpose is that it serves as a tool for employee development by helping to identify strengths and points for further improvement, making feedback more feasible and logical, and facilitating professional exchanges between supervisors and subordinates (pp.175/6).

The typologies of performance appraisal vary, according to several aspects, amongst which: the framework of the appraisal system per se (e.g.: who evaluates who) and the purpose of the evaluation itself (e.g.: employee development, salary increase, promotions, etc). For example, in the more traditional type, the top-down appraisal or 180 degree, the employee is solely evaluated by his or her superior, who is expected to provide feedback on

the performance demonstrated. This is also called single-source appraisal, and is designed to reinforce employee accountability in work delivery (Edwards and Ewen, 1996: pp. 5). This model is the oldest known and was predominant until the late 1970's, and is better suited for determining salary increases, performance-based pay and other personnel administration purposes (Armstrong, 2009). It has advantages such as straightforwardness and practical measurement parameters for personnel decisions, but also potential disadvantages such as severity or leniency by the supervisor, central tendency (when the appraiser tends to choose the middle range of the scale to avoid discussions), pre-judging the appraisee in terms of what bonus or pay increase he or she should have and only then start evaluating their work, amongst other problems (Levy, 2006). These dysfunctions will be discussed in the next section of this study.

The multidirectional type, also called multisource or 360 degree feedback, differs substantially from the top-down appraisal framework. This appraisal system utilizes multiple sources of evaluation and feedback for the employee, which entails a more honest, credible and reliable source of information (Edwards and Ewen, 1996). Not only supervisors, but also peers, subordinates and sometimes internal/external clients participate in the assessment of an employee, who also does a self-evaluation for comparison purposes (Armstrong, 2009). This system of appraisal first appeared in the 1980's and gained more evidence in the 1990's, showing a more developmental rationale that aims at reinforcing team behaviours, identifying areas for skills and behavioural change and training needs, support for management strategies and cultural transitions (Edwards and Ewen, 1996). It focuses more on employee development, motivation and performance improvement, as opposed to performance pay or promotion decisions, and should be used primarily for these purposes alone (De Nisi and Kluger, 2000, Atwater, Waldman and Brett, 2002). However, the 360 degree feedback framework is not a substitute for the traditional top-down appraisal, it is more of a supplement to it (Edwards and Ewen, 1996). The next page shows a graphical representation of the 360 degree feedback system by Levy (2006), regarding the evaluators and the target employee (Figure 2):

Figure 2: 360 degree feedback



Source: Levy (2006: pp.135, adapted)

As asserted by De Nisi and Kluger (2000), in this model of employee assessment, the feedback recipient is provided with valuable information from different perspectives (evaluators), and this helps to ensure that those evaluating one's work and behavior are those in the best position to do so. Nevertheless, the authors recognize that the effectiveness of this system is not universally accepted, and despite being appreciated by many organizations, some issues related to the final feedback process need attention by practitioners. These issues will be discussed further in the next section.

The ways of measuring or monitoring performance can also be competency-based (Guimarães & Brandão, 2001), emphasizing the most relevant competencies (knowledge, skills and behavior) that are aligned with the organizational strategic orientation and core business processes. In many OECD countries, competency management has become a central concern in the public sector. For example, the USA, the UK and Canada have been developing this concept and practice for decades, whereas Sweden, France and Germany are still introducing competency management in its early stages, according to a recent study by the OECD (2010). The value of managing competencies lies mainly on becoming more effective to determine the abilities and behaviours necessary for a job, and thus linking this to several other HR subsystems in order to certify that the organization is provided with competent and high performing individuals (OECD, 2010). Therefore, as well as recruitment and selection and training and development, for example, performance management may also be practiced

through the lenses of competencies, focusing the attention on observing, rewarding and incentivizing the behavioural aspects of performance that are valued by the organization.

The individual competency approach, however, has also been object of criticism. Finegold, Lawler and Ledford (1998) remind us that managers frequently assume that organizational performance and effectiveness are improved by fostering individual competencies, when in fact there is little research evidence to support this. Nevertheless, this typology is widely utilized and may or may not be combined with goal-setting frameworks that emphasize results or, yet in another typology, may focus on outcomes instead of outputs (Latham, Borgogni and Petitta, 2008).

Many public and private organizations subjectively measure performance by using rating scales, and these can also vary, primarily in three ways. According to an extensive review by Tziner, Joanis and Murphy (2000), three main rating scale formats can be found: behavioural observation scales (BOS), behaviourally anchored rating scales (BARS) and graphic rating scales (GRS). In BOS, raters are asked to answer the appraisal on the *frequency* of specific job-related behaviours that have occurred and been observed, while BARS uses *behavioural statements* to illustrate rating levels in scales of 1 to 5 or 1 to 7, for example. Typical BARS rating scales use illustrations such as 'unacceptable', 'acceptable', 'highly acceptable' and 'outstanding performance', with a concise definition of what each means (Latham et. al., 2007). With a lesser emphasis on behavior, GRS focuses on asking respondents to rate general evaluations of people's performance in specific functions and work-related aspects (Tziner et. al., 2000). In an earlier study, Tziner, Kopelman and Joanis (1997) found strong evidence that BOS-based appraisal and review may be a more adequate method, in that it generates more favourable attitudinal effects by employees. However, Latham et al. (2007) defend that there is no evidence to affirm that one is superior to the others, even though BOS can be seen as more practical.

The *feedback phase*, observed in most models of performance management, is central to organizational development and learning (Mausolff, 2004). Skinner's earlier studies on conditioning theory defend that behaviour is constrained and influenced by its consequences, which are in one way or another informed through *feedback* (Skinner, 1969). In the feedback process, he adds, frequently new information is acquired, then interpreted, and a response emerges as a result, and this is when the improvement cycle has its apex. Furthermore, the importance of feedback is highlighted by De Nisi and Pritchard (2006), where they argue

appraisals and performance interventions can assist in enhancing performance provided they offer feedback on how to improve performance. This straightforward notion brings our attention to the fact that feedback must not only be provided, but be provided in the right way. Additionally, according to Latham et. al. (2007), feedback and motivation walk hand in hand. In other words, they affirm that adequate feedback is likely to turn into action, and commitment to goals can be high if the appraisal rating scales illustrate the behaviours valued by the strategy of the organization.

After feedback is provided, some actions concerning *employee development* may be necessary for performance improvement. These actions can aim for keeping areas of excellence on track, responding to new demands of the job or department, or gaps in the desired level of performance in specific areas. Causes for gaps in performance may or may not be due to human factors (technical or behavioural); they can also be due to conditions in the work environment (Macky, 2008). Therefore a well conducted diagnosis should include the results of performance evaluations as well as a needs assessment and observations derived from performance meetings with managers. As suggested by Boxall et. al.(2008), employee development should seek to build employee potential for the long run, with an adequate bundle of formal training and education, and informal coaching and team building, on the practical side of the work environment. While *coaching* is deemed essential for performance improvement and focuses more on guidance for task performance (Armstrong, 2009, Latham et. al., 2007), *mentoring* is another useful form of intervention, yet it is based rather on an informal relationship that aims at improving personal and professional career skills (Connor and Pokora, 2007).

The important point is to make sound decisions as to how the course of action for performance improvement will be done, with careful planning in order to avoid wasting time and money on costly training programmes that may not be the best solution. A well structured performance intervention should consider multiple variables and alternatives to tackle performance barriers and favour employee development in the broad sense, and should evaluate these interventions (training or others) to assess their impact. This goes in line with the “A” part of the performance equation (*AMO*) described previously, for it helps to positively impact the individual’s abilities to perform the job, and also helps to strengthen the human capital of the organization.

Parallel to development is *recognizing* and *rewarding* good performance. Organizations that reward the performance of their employees can use the information from sound performance evaluations for decisions on recognition schemes, promotions and salary increases based on merit (Boxall and Purcell, 2008). Nevertheless, rewarding the good performance of employees entails understanding what motivates people to perform, thus reward systems should be designed in a way that they are valued and clearly understood by employees:

“(...) it must motivate people to perform through valued and truly sufficient rewards, provide them with a clear line of sight, give them power to influence their performance, and deliver on its promises.” (Lawler, 2003, pp. 180).

In this line of thought, some of the most important aspects of reward systems are alignment with strategic goals, organizational structure and culture: if an organization promotes teamwork and collaboration, for example with collective performance goals, it should not reward only individual performance, because that sends the wrong message to the employee and may create conflict (Lawler, 2003). Likewise, the opposite situation also applies.

As part of a performance management system, rewards can be given under different strategies, and these can be financial or non-financial. Non-financial rewards can include recognition schemes, opportunities to succeed, career planning and skills development, travels, amongst others (Armstrong, 2009; Macky, 2008). For example, the decision to use merit pay or bonuses depends on several aspects, chief amongst which the financial possibilities of the organization and the regulatory constraints of the sector where they operate. Inasmuch as Lawler (2003) defends that bonuses have many advantages over merit pay raises, if any bonus or variable pay is provided as a reward, it should be based on transparent ratings, that should be discussed separately from developmental performance reviews, as in different subjects (Armstrong, 2009).

Many organizations tend to base pay raises on performance, skills acquisition and/or seniority as part of the performance management cycle. In several Asian countries, for example, seniority is a long utilized practice in private and public organizations (Macky, 2008), however the practice can be seen as arguable on the basis of performance and productivity. Lawler's (2003) point of view states that possibly the best way is, in fact, to base pay raises on skills acquisition, because it incentivizes self-development, motivation and consequently performance improvement, and avoids the classical pitfalls of performance assessments

(appraisals). His argument is indeed interesting, yet the researcher does not share exactly the same view. Each organization would probably make safer decisions when using the methods or strategies of rewards that are most viable to their case, provided these rewards reinforce the strategic orientation and do not confuse employees on what is expected of them.

Finally, on the negative side, a performance management framework needs to be prepared to deal with low performance. Repeated results of poor performance can lead to *disciplinary procedures* or, at the extreme end, the *dismissal* of an employee, according to the organization's policies, and the laws and regulations in the country. These may occur when an individual's performance is not in the interests of the employer or fellow employees, and may be caused by instances of incompetence, negligence, deliberate disobedience or misconduct (Macky, 2008). In first instance, disciplinary procedures normally take place after interviews between the HR department or the immediate manager and the employee produced no effect, or no justification for poor performance was found (Armstrong, 2009). When the employee is given support by management, time and conditions to demonstrate improvement and still does not change behavior, informal warnings are given, followed by formal written warnings and suspension if necessary. The eventual dismissal of an employee must be conducted with substantive justification, according to the local laws, and must be *procedurally fair*, where the employee has clear knowledge of the organization's policies, procedures and performance expectations, besides being given the necessary training for the job (Macky, 2008). This is where the documentation of performance evaluations becomes an important evidence to support termination decisions (Armstrong, 2009).

In the end, the whole system must be *evaluated* in order to check its cohesion and alignment to strategy (i.e. goals are not static) for constant improvement (Clark, 2005). Periodic evaluations should be conducted as to monitor the system and implement maintenance adjustments to keep it tuned for management decisions (Bernardin, Kane, Ross, Spina and Johnson, 1995).

After setting the ground on what performance management is, with its phases and characteristics, we will now explore some of the *dysfunctions* associated with performance management. These will also be object of investigation in this research.

2.3 Common dysfunctions in performance management:

The measurement and management of individual performance is not without pitfalls or difficulties that may come either from the method utilized, parameters, purposes, preparedness or simply from undesired human behavior in organizations. A vast literature on dysfunction in performance management allows us to infer that the systems and frameworks are not always accurate. Any analysis of performance management either in the public or private sector must therefore be cognizant of such potential for dysfunctions.

For example, since most performance management systems utilize somewhat *subjective measures* of performance, the evaluator (or appraiser) must be someone knowledgeable and who observes closely the performance of a given employee. Relying on perceptions of a manager towards his or her subordinates means that errors may occur, and other *personal issues* (e.g. political, relational and so on) can also undermine several aspects of the process of performance management (Macky, 2008). These sources of error may stem from the looseness of subjective measures of performance, and can lead to other dysfunctions that will be discussed below.

The so called *halo effect*, for example, is regarded as a biased perception or tendency that a given evaluator may have towards an employee. That is, the evaluator may let him or herself be carried away by the first judgments of a performance dimension and be led to have the same kind of perception over other dimensions of an employee's performance (Macky, 2008), where perhaps a more reasonable evaluation would be different. In similar fashion, Levy (2006) argues that halo originates from an evaluator's unwillingness to differentiate the independent dimensions of an employee's performance. A general impression of an employee, or personal prejudices or stereotypes can also be sources of halo effect on performance evaluations (Macky, 2008). However, not all halo is negative or error: when a specific employee is actually good at everything (which is not impossible), the evaluator's ratings can be accurately positive across all dimensions, with strong intercorrelations between performance dimensions (Levy, 2006). This case is called 'true halo'.

Most dysfunctions, however, appear to come from the appraisal system or process. Employee satisfaction with appraisal methods is a vital ingredient for performance appraisals to be successful and show credibility: the effectiveness of the feedback relies largely on whether ratees recognize the legitimacy of the appraisal process (Tziner, Joanis and Murphy, 2000). However, several dysfunctions can be found in performance management systems, more frequently in the appraisal phase.

By way of illustration, managers can sometimes be lenient on their ratings in order to avoid conflict with subordinates (Meyer, 1991). *Leniency* may happen due to misinterpretations of words in a performance appraisal form, or when the results of the appraisal process are seen to be negative to those evaluated (e.g. lose a promotion, be dismissed etc), or even when the evaluator fears retaliation (Levy, 2006). Other kinds of similar dysfunctions can be found in appraisals, such as *strictness* towards one or all team members, despite how well they might have performed; the 'in between' error of *central tendency* (being reluctant to provide ratings on either extreme); and the *recency error*, where evaluators sometimes judge someone's performance based on the most recent occurrences in the workplace (Levy, 2006).

Perhaps more important than the format of the appraisal/assessment scales and standards is the training of the appraisers, so that they are apt and prepared to evaluate one's performance and reduce errors (Latham et. al., 2007; Armstrong, 2009). Latham et. al. strongly emphasize that when appraisers are trained and re-trained on the framework, standards and possible errors that may happen in the process, they are much less prone to allow bias into the evaluation of an employee. Therefore, we can infer that a dysfunctional situation would be the *lack of training for appraisers*.

The element of *trust* between appraisers and appraisees is also essential for the effectiveness of the appraisal process and the performance management system as a whole (Edwards and Ewen, 1996). Therefore, when something goes amiss and trust is lost, the performance management system loses *credibility* with employees, and from this many other dysfunctions may derive, such as defensive behavior and a sense of injustice with the promotion of a colleague, issues of power struggle (Odelius and Santos, 2007) and other disguised disputes in the workplace. The misleading information that comes from these dysfunctions is confusing both for employees and for the HR department, and a dysfunctional system becomes an annual bureaucratic convulsion for the organization. Neither does the employee understand where to improve nor does the HR staff understand why someone is supposed to be penalized (Meyer, 1991).

More fundamental dysfunctions happen when some performance management elements are *applied in a wrong way*. For example, some organizations were found to be applying 360 degree appraisals to determine pay increases and promotions, or penalties for the underperformers (DeNisi and Kluger, 2000; Armstrong, 2009). In these cases, 360 degree

feedback was the only system present in the organization, and had to serve for all purposes. As mentioned before, 360 degree feedback can be effective and appropriate for developmental purposes, motivation and related aspects (Atwater, Waldman and Brett, 2002), but is not considered adequate for personnel decisions (e.g. pay increases, promotions, demotions, dismissals), where top-down 180° assessment is regarded as more appropriate (DeNisi and Pritchard, 2006). One of the problems of using 360 degree appraisals for administrative decisions is that an appraisal is a subjective judgment of someone else's performance, and therefore using multiple sources of appraisal for this purpose would only increase the problem of subjectivity (Heijden and Nijhof, 2004). Other common issues involve the influence of rater affect on leniency of ratings, especially related to superiors or peers (Antonioni and Park, 2001). In the government, as Bouckaert and Peters (2002) highlight, an inadequate performance management system can turn out to be "the Achilles' heel" (pp. 359) of the process of modernization in the public sphere.

In fact, some organizations have started to abolish performance appraisals altogether (regardless of the type used), in light of all the problems and difficulties found over the years (Coens and Jenkins, 2000). Non-traditional systems have emerged as hybrid models of performance management, where the focus is on development and the improvement of performance and less on measurement. Organizations such as the Madison Police Department and Glenroy Inc. (USA) have designed less structured systems, where feedback meetings were more common and frequent, as well as training and development, with assessments in a secondary place or completely abolished (Coens and Jenkins, 2000). Another alternative that has emerged in private sector organizations is the use of technology with electronic performance monitoring (EPM), which monitors certain employee's behaviours through computer usage, level of production, time when the employee arrives and leaves and so on (Latham et. al. 2007). This eliminates several issues related to dysfunctions in appraisals, as well as absenteeism and tardiness, and improves performance of specific tasks. On the other hand, it violates the basic psychological boundary between the employer and the employee (privacy, autonomy and respect) and creates several other problems, such as increased stress, illnesses, and dissatisfaction, which end up bringing about absenteeism and turnover again (Latham et. al. 2007).

Another common kind of dysfunction relates to the feedback process. DeNisi and Kluger's (2000) extensive review of the literature on feedback found that when the feedback

meeting between the manager and the employee *focuses on the person, instead of the task* or the objectives, this feedback tends to be harmful to the performance of this employee. Employees feel that the problems are related to themselves personally, and not to how they accomplish their tasks. This is where most 360° feedback systems fall short, because even if the whole process is designed and conducted appropriately, when it comes to providing feedback to a given employee, the problem arises if feedback is scarce or focuses on the self, rather than the task at hand (DeNisi and Kluger, 2000). They argue that either positive or negative feedback can help improve motivation and performance, as long as the focus is right.

Finally, culture and context are also complex variables for managing performance (Latham et. al., 2007). As argued by Guimarães, Nader and Ramagem (1998), most dysfunctions of performance management systems in the public organization they studied were related either to *cultural aspects*, due to the absence of an organizational culture that emphasizes the planning of work and evaluation of results, or *managerial aspects*, where there is no priority given to the appraisal and feedback process. Apparently, up to the late 1990's there was a general culture of resistance to performance evaluations and meritocracy in the Brazilian government (Barbosa, 1996).

In a different view, DeNisi and Pritchard (2006) argue that practitioners and researchers have focused excessively on appraisal systems and measurement criteria, instead of the broader picture of performance improvement, the chief goal of performance management. They call this "the disconnect" or forgotten link in performance management research and practice (p.255). In similar fashion, Latham et. al. (2007) conclude that *ongoing* performance management is more effective than a *periodical* appraisal in order to enhance performance and change behavior.


After outlining these important concepts pertaining to performance management, including planning, appraisal, feedback, interventions and dysfunctions, we can now turn back the focus to individual performance management in the context of public organizations.

2.4 Employee performance management in the public sector:

Most of the literature on performance management (PM) in the public sector approaches the topic from the organizational level. Yet, some studies have been carried out under the lens of human resource management (HRM), analyzing it from the angle of the employee and his or her contribution to the overall performance of the public organization.

Sole's (2009) recent work, for example, brought even more attention to the fact that both employee and organizational performance management are the key factors for improving government results and accountability to stakeholders, emphasizing the achievement of objectives at *all levels* of the public organization. This means a more systemic, bottom-up integrated view of the issue. As Sole puts it, the system of performance management needs to cover processes and workflows at all levels: strategic, operational and individual or team level. Although there is some degree of controversy about discerning a "strategic level" from other more operational levels in organizations (meaning that all levels should be considered strategic, in that all parts of the system contribute to its success), Sole's model derived from observations of several governments in Europe and serves as a clarification in the link between organizational level PM and employee PM (see Figure 3, next page):

Figure 3: The Performance Management Model for public organizations.



Source: Sole (2009: pp.5).

In explaining the main features of his model, Sole highlights that people need different information at the various levels of the public organization: while senior managers and officers need an overview of the organizational performance, mid-level managers or department managers need the kind of information that helps them to manage the service their team provides, and individuals need to know how they are performing in comparison to the whole department (Sole, 2009: pp.4). At the strategic level, as discerned by Sole, the outcome measures have significant importance to the community, customers (recipients of the public service), politicians and legislators. At the operational level, the focus is on inputs, outputs and the related measures, departmental productivity involving service quality, and customer service satisfaction that will imply measures for transparency. At individual or team level, productivity and efficacy of the work performed by each public servant or group are the chief concerns, including feedback to them as valuable information and a way of self-evaluation and performance improvement. He argues that integrated information for strategic decision-making process is vital for future directions on internal process improvement, information systems accuracy, individual and organizational learning and a performance-oriented culture (focus on target completion and responsibility), which will all ultimately influence in one way or another how policy making is conducted and implemented. In the end of the cycle, the alignment of all levels with strategic planning of the public agency (or whatever government instance is concerned) is what dictates the overall performance.

Therefore, organizational and employee performance are intrinsically linked, and many interconnections with the previous section of this study will become evident in the next paragraphs, when analyzing the overview of the practices in some countries. Countries such as the UK, the USA and Australia are generally the ones where most of the research on PM stems from, whereas in countries like New Zealand and Brazil the scarcity of literature on this specific topic in the government is evident. This will be demonstrated later on. We will, then, analyze the most relevant literature available and then look into the cases of New Zealand and Brazil.

Starting from the UK, McAdam, Hazlett and Casey (2005) describe that both employee and organizational performance management have been conceived through measurement frameworks such as the Balanced Scorecard, often utilized in public organizations. Their findings illustrate that there remains a challenge about creating ideal measures for the scorecard, and despite some positive aspects such as the appraisal process using a stakeholder-categorized scorecard approach, the problems lie on a lack of continuous

management of the appraisal process. Additionally, top objectives were disconnected from motivational factors in public organizations, such as reward and recognition systems.

Still referring to the UK, Mwita (2000) produced a very influential theoretical paper based on a broad literature review through the prism of systems theory. He argues that New Public Management's (NPM) customer-based principles stimulate some level of competitiveness and public service quality, and employee performance management is conceived through a culture of "achievement". His findings indicate the need to link employees and their jobs to the strategic objectives of the organization, and not only in the economic sense, but also in the social, behavioural and managerial. Attention must be paid to sustained organizational improvement and the means of achieving results.

With similar findings, Harris (2005) argues that in the UK there is a gap in the synergy between overall targets of performance, departmental and individual objectives, coupled with low shared interpretations of priorities and commitment. This research paper is grounded on the "Best Value" approach (relating to agency theory), and reveals that this approach was not encouraging because it lacked consistency in its application, since the present system is fragmented, and managerial engagement is vital for an effective PM model.

In the USA, on the other hand, a conceptual and prescriptive paper by Grote (2000) defends goal setting as probably one of the best ways to enhance employee performance, and thus overall performance. Drawing on some of the prominent authors of the field and empirical observations, Grote provides examples of American government agencies that are leading the way in terms of practices in PM. There, performance appraisal is goal-driven, related to core competencies, and intrinsically connected to the strategic plan. Loops of feedback are conducted in a safe and constructive way, with less disciplinary action and a better atmosphere. However, the author fails to address the complexity of the public sector, in comparison with private companies.

In the same line of thought, Latham, Borgogni and Petitta (2008) produced a review of the literature in the USA equally defending the goal setting method in general as well as revealing some of its dysfunctions. In their opinion, whereas high goals positively affect choice and persistence towards task accomplishment (and thus employees' focus on performance is increased), the dysfunctions are more present in the federal government than in local state governments. That is mainly due to vagueness in defining performance goals and outcomes.

With regards to outcomes and especially rewards that reinforce them, Horton (2006) highlights that, with NPM, the decentralization of HRM and reward systems allowed for some innovative practices in terms of pay in many countries (notably the USA), something referred to as “New Pay”. New pay was conceived to increase productivity and motivate public servants and to connect the rewards to organizational strategy, breaking free from bureaucratic standards into flexibility and rewards based on performance. Horton regards this as an important move in the process of change in public organizations (now transforming into managerial bureaucracies), and this serves as an example of the kind of practices that can be implemented in the government to increase productivity. Clearly the public organizational culture is more and more receptive to modern HR and managerial practices.

In Australia, Dann’s (1996) research shows that, after citizen pressures for higher levels of public service quality and efficiency in the past decades, the increase in HR practices and especially merit-based promotion provided a fertile ground for the dissemination of employee performance management among public agencies. However, a critical finding was that the practices have been applied unevenly between men and women, denoting further issues to be discussed for the improvement of the HR systems. This so far is the most relevant article from Australia in this school of thought, making it clear more research needs to be done.

Some similarities between these countries can be identified, such as the predominant mentality of goal setting in the UK and USA. In Australia, there seems to be a general philosophy of outcomes-oriented managerialism, less focused on goals than the US framework, which is apparently more simplistic and quantitative in its approach. A comparative table is suggested below as a result of this overview of these three Anglo-American countries (Table 1 below):

Table 1: overview of chief characteristics of PM in three Anglo-American countries.

	United States	UK	Australia
MAIN CHARACTERISTICS	Goal oriented	Goal oriented	Outcomes-oriented
	Objective, to some extent over simplistic. Utilization of scorecards.	Incipient utilization of scorecards.	Objective, yet comprehensive of public sector characteristics.
	Best-practice focused, aiming for monitoring numbers.	Best-practice focused, aiming for monitoring numbers and outcomes.	Balance of best-practice and best fit principles.

This and the previous sections help to provide the grounding context on which this study will develop, within a scenario of importation of PM frameworks from the private sector into public organizations. The next sections will explore the few studies which looked into how the current systems operate in New Zealand and Brazil and the possible difficulties they face, through the prism of a quest for increased accountability and transparency towards citizens.

2.5 Performance management in the public sector of New Zealand:

Focusing this study now on the specific context of New Zealand, a model of government reform (Halligan, 2007), some interesting characteristics were found in the literature concerning the principles and processes which have shaped performance management in public organizations, public servants' attitudes and opportunities for improvement. For instance Horton (2006) affirms the organizational changes that gradually took place in the government sphere removed certain bureaucratic obstacles to "release the entrepreneurial spirit" (pp.537), allowing public servants to determine, to some extent, their guidelines for the organization of work and the necessary actions to achieve results. The New Zealand Treasury, for example, proposed a list of principles to guide the national NPM framework in 1987 as a path to move away from bureaucratic controls (Norman and Gregory, 2003), which included freedom to manage, clarity of objectives, accountability, precise information systems and effective evaluation of performance. Public service statutes have been made more flexible, and these reforms in New Zealand have been extensive to the point of having employment conditions of public servants dictated by *individual contracts* or *collective agreements* (OECD, 2010).

Dormer and Gill (2010), though, argue that New Zealand has gone and still goes through significant reforms according to the NPM philosophy. Based on institutional theory³, they argue that managerialism, as imported from private sector practitioners, influenced government organizations greatly towards organizational performance and results, and the level of development in terms of performance management *varies from institution to*

³ Institutional theory, in short, argues that organizations are not completely autonomous, but shaped and constrained by the environment where they operate, being strongly influenced by the state, professional bodies, other organizations and society. Conformity is almost a rule, and the condition of isomorphism is promoted by coercive, mimetic and normative mechanisms (Jenkins et. al, 2007). For more, see Di Maggio and Powell (1983).

institution. Some have been applying efficient measures that seem to support ongoing decision-making, whereas others are far behind, with informal and general procedures. Finally, it was found that an integrated (top-down) framework of performance goals is not always present, and that cultural and cognitive-based controls may be the way to go.

In a survey about the attitudes of public servants in Australia and New Zealand, Gregory (1991) found that the attitudinal orientation of the two nationalities differs, in the sense that in Wellington people were more committed to government programmes than their Canberran counterparts. Additionally, the Australian public servants were found to be more elitist and less likely to become involved in policymaking, yet both cases were considered proactively oriented towards work. However, the interesting factor was that the changes in New Zealand were more supportive of technocratic attitudes in top government levels, as well as more inclined to power-sharing, something that is favourable to innovative practices in work design, related to high skills development, empowerment and the related HR management systems.

Likewise, in a valuable report the Commonwealth Secretariat (2003) describes New Zealand's public reforms as a continuous process of improvement since 1984. After the year 2000, a new shift in orientation took place by adding three guiding drivers to the strategic planning of the government: the need to be more outcomes-focused, the need to strengthen the public enterprises' capabilities through shared values, culture, leadership, integration of structures and processes (networks, information, coordination and technology), and an attitude of delivery to citizens. Actions such as the Ethics, Values and Standards Programme (where public servants are expected to behave in an ethical, honest way in accordance to a set of values), Equal Employment Opportunities Policy to 2010 and Senior Leadership and Management Development Programme (SLMDP) have placed Human Resource Management in a central position. The development of leadership and of a diverse workforce, changes in organizational culture, training of staff and managers, assessment of the strategy, capability and performance of central and local departments were included in the Strategic Human Resource Management agenda.


Accordingly, Norman (2002) describes the relative freedom of managers as a feature of New Zealand's public reform, where they have flexibility from centralized financial controls and for the employment of staff. He argues that it was typical for any public organization in this case to have enforced performance requirements yet simultaneously encouraging self-

evaluation and development as a path to improve performance. In his book published in the next year, Norman (2003) details that the essence of the New Zealand model is a framework of control systems that allow public managers with greater freedom to manage, while holding them accountable for showing results. The New Zealand Treasury, he describes, designed the foundations to debureaucratize government organizations in a report where the main principles were: “clarity of objectives, freedom to manage, accountability, adequate information flows and effective assessment of performance.” (pp.43).

In a similar view, Radin (2003) affirms New Zealand has promoted changes in public service characterized by managerialism and an emphasis on outcomes, instead of outputs, seeking higher levels of accountability and “value for money” (relating to agency theory). Hitherto, he supports that the country is sometimes seen as a model of public management, having the advantage of being fairly small and perhaps easier to administrate. On the other hand, some dysfunctions were found in the current employee PM models at that time: the systems fail to manage core capabilities of the public servants and need a more systematic way of achieving priority indicators, which again draws attention to the complex context of the public sector.

A more recent study by the OECD in 2005 (replicated in OECD, 2010) suggests the New Zealand public sector is placed in a slightly different position from that suggested by Radin (2003) regarding the overall criteria that forms its basic principles of employee PM. As depicted in Figure 4 (next page), the central government of New Zealand was viewed at the time as utilizing parameters that would focus more on outputs and achievement of objectives, rather than outcomes or other criteria.

Figure 4: Criteria used for assessing performance of employees in central governments of selected OECD countries (2005).



Source: OECD (2005c), as cited in OECD (2010), p. 193.

This OECD study (2010) affirms in general terms, from its previous studies (i.e. 2005), that in several governments around the world a wide variety of systems and criteria for performance assessment could be found: from subjective supervisor appraisals, to more observable quantitative variables, to more complex systems such as 360 degree feedback. Some implemented in a more rudimentary manner, and some seen to be more adequate or complex, involving standardization of assessments across levels and sectors, to reduce risks of subjectivity or bias, and utilization of guides, manuals and training for the evaluators. In this comparison of several selected OECD countries (Figure 4 above), the central New Zealand government was perceived as closer to northern European countries, along with Australia and the UK, in that the performance management criteria tended to focus more on objective measures, such as outputs, goals and targets, and much less on competencies, values, interpersonal or managerial skills at that time (2005). Both OECD studies of 2005 and 2010 fail, however, to specify the frameworks utilized by these government organizations around the world, including New Zealand. The question remains, still, as to which view of New Zealand

had been more accurate (Radin's or OECD's) back then and, more importantly, which kind of general orientation is utilized for determining such performance criteria in the present days (2011).

After this overview of the literature concerning the context of New Zealand's public sector, the situation described above and the clear scarcity of research on performance management in the New Zealand government leads to the first research question: *What are the Performance Management frameworks currently in place in the central government of New Zealand?*

Investigating these performance management frameworks entails observing the several phases, typologies of performance assessment and interventions described in the previous section, as well as the extent to which these frameworks are integrated or fragmented between and across the public organizations. Finally, another important aspect that needs investigation is what dysfunctions (if any) are faced by these public organizations in the management of their employee's performance, considering the phases and processes also described in the previous section.

2.6 Performance management in the public sector of Brazil:

Brazil, the second context chosen for this research, is a democratic republic where the growing economy contrasts with enduring efforts to reduce the inefficiency of the State. Whereas the conception of New Public Management in Europe started in the 1980's, a similar movement of reforms in Brazil started around the 1990's (Santana, 2002). The federal government, at that time, was suffering from a generalized lack of credibility and legitimacy towards society (Nader, 2005). Therefore, the central focus of these reforms was to review the functions of the State and its internal administration in order to move away from the bureaucratic organization to a more efficient and effective managerial system of administration. Here, the concept of managerialism (as described previously) was introduced, in the sense of bringing management practices from private enterprises and adapting them to the public sector, as to seek more flexibility (Guimarães, 1998).

However, it was not until the year of 1995 that such reforms took a more solid stance and were starting to be gradually put into practice in the form of guidelines and decrees (Nader, 2005). The inception of the *Plano Bresser* (the "Bresser plan") promoted a more real

thrust for the management concepts and ideologies being discussed in the first years of that decade. This government plan aimed at implementing flexibilization measures in public administration through the reform of organizational structures (including legal aspects), empowerment and transfer of responsibility to government managers for the results of institutional actions, as well as promoting general managerial practices (Nader, 2005). Even though the plan was not fully implemented, it laid the foundations to integrate more closely the dimensions of planning, budgeting and management of the actions and programs carried out by the government (Santana, 2002). Such foundations were later reviewed in an attempt to further implement more solid action plans with the advent of the PPA (pluri-annual plan) 2000-2003, where new efforts to rationalize the State structure and processes were made. Those actions involved aspects such as management training and development, internal and external marketing campaigns to promote the image, as well as management methodologies that included planning, monitoring, evaluation and reviewing of programmes and action plans that were to be implemented (Nader, 2005: pp. 3) . The *Ministério da Administração Federal e Reforma do Estado, MARE* (“Ministry for the federal administration and reform of the State”) had been previously created to direct the efforts towards the modernization of the central government, focusing on the implementation of management tools, strategic planning, quality control and improvement of work processes (Santana, 2002), where cultural change, new values and performance indicators (organizational and employee level) were introduced.

Nevertheless, despite all these programmes, decrees and plans (with several new labels), many aspects of employee performance management were not effectively implemented, and were highly questionable (Odelius and Santos, 2007). Up until Nader’s (2005) study, the performance management at employee level was the one that was least practiced, with some public servants’ positions receiving monetary bonuses that were in no way connected to high levels of performance, achievement of goals or results in individual or team level (Nader, 2005). As described by Odelius and Santos (2007), stagnant and obsolete performance appraisal and performance management systems seemed to persist in the Brazilian central government until that year, and lacked initiatives to improve the systems and employee performance itself (related to weak OD [Organizational Development] frameworks). In this context, Odelius and Santos (2007) observe that very few studies have attempted to outline and explain how “things are done” in terms of managing performance in the Brazilian government. Their study provided interesting insights on aspects that influence employee perception of performance appraisal, such as culture, management training and preparation,

the impacts of the appraisal results on the individuals, with differences according to hierarchical functions and demographics. However interesting and highly relevant, it does not explain the frameworks that are in place nowadays.

In a more recent and broad study of HRM practices in the Brazilian government, the OECD report (2010) describes several practices, issues and directions that human resource management is taking in the public sphere. Within human resource management frameworks, *competency management* is becoming one of the chief pillars of the HRM practices in the federal government, under the name of 'competency-based administration' (OECD, 2010). It is under way of implementation, and forms the basic principle of national policies devised for the development of civil servants (Decree nº 5.707, February 2006). Inasmuch as these policies focus on developing knowledge, skills and attitudes of public sector employees to improve the quality of their work, and to reflect the objectives of the organization, the idea of competency management is too narrowly conceived and applied, for it solely serves to reformulate the training and development systems and procedures (OECD, 2010). So far these policies have failed to integrate the notion and usefulness of competencies into other subsystems of HRM, such as performance management. Yet, as expressed on this OECD report, this is only one of the characteristics of the fragmented structures and practices of HRM in the federal government, where several attempts to improve aspects such as job and salary structures, and public selection processes, have been hindered by an overly bureaucratic legal framework and a rather static form of administration. At least up to the year of 2010, when the report was published, the consequences of this scenario have been a "patchwork" of systems, regulations and frameworks created for individual organizations, that overlapped from one to another and created potential dysfunctions that became difficult to solve over time.

By way of illustration, an important motivational factor that tends to be intrinsically linked to performance management, *mobility for career development* is considerably constrained because the job categories are narrowly and too specifically designed, even for corresponding positions in different sectors (OECD, 2010). Thus, for the lack of a general classification system, it is nearly impossible to identify equivalent job positions across Ministries in a way to permit a logical career flow or progression. Let alone the fact that, for the selection of a public servant, candidates must undertake a severe examination based solely on technical knowledge for the specific function they applied for, not taking experience into account, and after one passes such examinations, their career possibilities are considerably

limited to that professional specialty (OECD, 2010). Additionally, the report affirms that some past implementations of bonuses or performance-related pay lack credibility, as they do not reflect good performance, were in fact mostly based on seniority and frequently distributed to all.

This OECD study provides an overall view of performance management, but it does not assert what specific kind of frameworks are currently utilized for performance management in the public sector of Brazil. Likewise, the recent literature also does not provide many details in this respect, as can be noted above, and this drives the same kind of question directed to the New Zealand case: *What are the Performance Management frameworks currently in place in the central government of Brazil?*

3. Consolidation of research questions:

There is clear gap in the scholarly literature concerning employee performance management in the specific cases of both New Zealand and Brazil. This is one of the motivations for this research.

Studying these two countries entails the notion of comparing the features of both, in a way where insights can be generated to inform the literature on HRM in the public sphere. Therefore, this study incorporates notions of comparative HRM. As defined by Boxall (1995), comparative HRM is, in broad terms, the comparative study of the management of work (labour) and the investigation of countries with analytical implications, having explanations rather than simple descriptions of HRM models. According to Boxall, the aim of comparative HRM as a field of study should be to explain how and why the different dimensions of HRM vary across national boundaries. These boundaries being, in this case, the central governments of New Zealand and Brazil, and the dimension being performance management.

These comparisons should consider the perspective of institutional theory, where the transposition of practices from the private to the public sector continue to take place, and to intrinsically identify the HR models that become embedded in these public institutions of each country. Additionally, comparative HRM looks beyond the ethnocentric notions of Anglo-American HRM and those paradigms assumed as 'best practice' (Boxall, 1995). An example of a study of comparative (international) HRM is Verbarg, Drenth, Koopman, van Muijen and Wang

(1999), who compared HRM practices between the Netherlands and China. Many differences were found, chiefly due to variations in historical processes, culture and managerial practice.

A comparison should be conducted by analyzing one element to another, in this case the models of one country to another, and preferably having a parameter or reference to compare. In this case, as mentioned in the beginning of the introduction of this study, New Zealand is considered by several scholars in the academic community (e.g. Kettl, 2000, Halligan, 2007) as a reference point in public sector management and performance management in particular, due to the features of its reforms described earlier. Therefore it is reasonable to compare the performance management systems in the public sector of an emerging country such as Brazil, where several attempts have been taken to modernize the public sector, to a reference (or model) that New Zealand is considered to be, bearing in mind that this does not mean that the latter is without pitfalls or dysfunctions of its own.

Thus, the research questions presented previously in the contexts of both countries lead to several other questions, as in a chain of connections. Hence, the original questions are expanded and better specified below, in order to properly delimit the scope and reach of this study:

Question 1: *What are the Performance Management frameworks currently in place in the central governments of New Zealand and Brazil? How do they differ and why?*

Question 2: *How do they fit into the classical typologies of performance assessment? (e.g.: top-down, 360 degree, competency-based, goal-based, outputs or outcomes-driven)? Do they fit at all or do they represent some kind of hybrid model?*

Question 3: *How cohesive and integrated are the current PM systems within and across the Ministries in New Zealand and Brazil? Which (if any) are the perceived dysfunctions in the current frameworks, and what aspects may be causing them?*

4. Methodology:

In the following sections the research methods of this study are described with regards to sampling, data collection, data analysis and ethical considerations.

4.1 Data sources and methods of data collection:

For this research, data were collected from government Ministries in New Zealand and Brazil. These organizations were chosen for this research because of their important position in the government in general, and their representativeness in the central (or federal) government. Ministries are generally the public organizations that implement decrees, laws and policies, and are providers of key decisions and important guidelines for government agencies and public enterprises, who are expected to report back to them constantly. Therefore, it is important to obtain a detailed view of the state of performance management in these organizations.

Both primary and secondary data were collected. Secondary sources of data involved documents such as internal reports, guidelines, manuals, decrees and similar documents that describe and pertain to employee performance management frameworks. These provided a valuable overview of the general aspects of performance management that are designed in the Human Resource policies and procedures of the Ministries (see Appendix I and II). No individual appraisal, review or feedback documents regarding any public servant were analyzed nor requested in particular.

Primary data were collected in a second phase of the research process, through an anonymous *electronic questionnaire survey*. This questionnaire consisted of closed and open-ended questions: closed questions were used to identify typologies of systems and characteristics of the frameworks in place: for example the utilization of top-down appraisal or 360 degree feedback, forms and persons involved in the evaluation process, results being related or not to pay, and so on. And open-ended questions were utilized to allow participants to provide more details and comments relevant to the topic. These open-ended questions were also intended to provide space for participants' descriptions of the most common dysfunctions perceived in the present performance management systems, following the examples described in section 2.3.

After conducting two pilot tests with HR professionals to check the adequacy of language and questions per se, the electronic questionnaire (see Appendix III) was administered via an online survey website called Survey Monkey, widely utilized for academic and practitioner research. The links to this questionnaire were sent in **September** of 2011, with a period of **two weeks** for completion, and an extension of one week for some cases where some Ministries agreed to participate later in the process. The answers were stored in MS Excel format in the internet platform of the survey website (Survey Monkey), for later retrieval and processing using SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences).

4.2 Sample and method of sampling:

The sampling method used for this research was *purposive sampling*. According to Teddlie and Yu (2007), purposive sampling aims at selecting units, for example individuals, groups or organizations, based on the particular objectives related to answering the research questions. The authors describe that in purposive sampling, samples are usually small, normally do not seek generalizability, but enable comparisons between cases, and not only qualitative but numeric data can be generated (Teddlie and Yu, 2007).

The Ministries were chosen chiefly based on their correspondence between the two countries (i.e. similar activity), so as to match the function of each organization in the government and thus approximate their internal characteristics. This way, the research could more closely compare “apples with apples”. The Ministries were also selected based on their relative importance in the central government, not disregarding the importance of any other Ministry. Originally five Ministries were selected to participate in each country, thus with a total of **twelve** Ministries invited overall (see Table 2, next page). This number was decided based on having both a reasonable number of organizations (to yield a rich amount of data) and the feasibility of the research, considering the time limit, geographical distance and available resources.

Table 2: target Ministries for the research.

MINISTRIES	
NEW ZEALAND	BRAZIL
Treasury (Ministry of Finance)	Ministério da Fazenda
Ministry of Health	Ministério da Saúde
Ministry of Education	Ministério da Educação
Ministry for the Environment	Ministério do Meio-Ambiente
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry *	Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento
Department of Labour**	Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego**

* The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry recently incorporated the Ministry of Fisheries, in 2011.

** The Department of Labour in New Zealand has the status of a Ministry, despite its name.

In the case of New Zealand, the State Services Commission (SSC) is an organization that provides general and overarching guidelines for government entities, but does not specify the particular performance management framework for each of the Ministries. Each Ministry has its own customized PM framework. For this reason, the SSC was not included in the survey, but was only approached for the collection of documents as secondary data.

For the survey, the target population approached was the HR staff and managers of the Human Resource departments of these Ministries, assuming they are the ones who more clearly understand and participate in the development and implementation of performance management systems. Furthermore, they are the ones responsible for controlling and processing the information of appraisal and review processes, and monitoring that the feedback between appraisers and appraisees happens effectively. Thus, they are more familiarized the variables involved, and are classified as *key informants*.

All Ministries were invited through an invitation letter sent by post and e-mail, explaining more details about the research. Specifically, these letters requested their participation in the survey and asked for internal documents that would describe their P.M. frameworks and procedures. These documents (Appendix I) contained guidelines and details that, complemented by the survey, provided sufficient material to analyse and answer the research questions. In each ministry, the HR staff and managers that are directly or indirectly involved with the performance management systems were invited for the survey. Telephone calls were also made to provide more details that would allow their participation.

Of the twelve Ministries invited, ten agreed to participate (five in each country). Table 3 below shows the Ministries who agreed to participate in the research, and the participation rate. Since the survey is anonymous and the participants were informed that none of the Ministries or individuals would have their responses identified, all the results will refer to codes randomly assigned to the participants, to preserve their anonymity.

Table 3: Survey participation rate

New Zealand			
Ministry	N° invited	N° responded	Response rate %
NZ 1	12	8	67%
NZ 2	15	9	60%
NZ 3	5	4	80%
NZ 4*	1	1	100%
NZ 5	13	13	100%
Total	46	35	76%
Brazil			
Ministry	N° invited	N° responded	Response rate %
BR 1	17	13	65%
BR 2	8	8	100%
BR 3*	1	1	100%
BR 4	5	5	100%
BR 5	12	12	100%
Total	43	38	88%

* Only the Senior HR Advisor or Analyst was allowed to participate, as the HR managers deemed these as the most suitable persons to answer the survey. Those are the persons responsible for performance management in their Ministries, thus the quality of their answers is considered valuable for the research.

The Ministries participated in different degrees: some Ministries only allowed some specific senior HR advisors or equivalent positions to answer the questionnaire, whereas others allowed all the HR staff who work with performance management to take part in the survey. The number of staff in each of the HR departments in these Ministries was smaller than originally expected: each Ministry in New Zealand had an average of 5 to 13 individuals in the HR department, whereas in Brazil these numbers were slightly larger, with some degree of variation. A total of 89 individuals were allowed to participate by their HR managers (46 in New Zealand, 43 in Brazil) and therefore received the link to the questionnaire. 73 individuals (82%) completed the questionnaire survey overall, being 38 in Brazil and 35 in New Zealand.

All participating Ministries in New Zealand were cooperative and provided their internal documents, which contained the frameworks and guidelines for employee performance management. In Brazil, as will be discussed in the next sections, these documents

are in the form of government laws and decrees that are open for public access, yet some Ministries were equally helpful to indicate those and provide additional information when requested. Due to the fact that two of the invited Ministries did not participate, the mismatch does not allow to compare one Ministry against their counterpart, but only against the other Ministries in general. However, the sample was considered valid and valuable to the research.

These methods of sampling and data collection were considered appropriate for this research because, amongst other factors, they are straightforward and feasible, considering the large number and size of public organizations available and the geographic distance between the countries. Additionally, this form of data collection does not interfere too much with routine of the respondents and does not take too much of their time, thus having a higher chance of a satisfactory participation rate. Therefore self-completion questionnaires are both accessible and effective, and when compared to structured interviews, for example, they are seen as quite similar in format and results (Bryman and Bell, 2007). The research questions can be answered in a satisfactory manner by the analysis of internal documents, complemented by the questionnaire survey.

4.3 - Methods of data analysis:

The first phase of this research involved the analysis and understanding of internal documents (e.g.: reports, guidelines, decrees, etc) of the Ministries that pertain to performance management systems and procedures. Thus, an archival analysis was conducted in order to understand the frameworks in place and the general characteristics of these systems. Archival analysis is a method for analyzing and understanding archival materials, such as government documents, in an unobtrusive manner, that removes the observer from the context or interactions being researched (Bryman and Bell, 2007).

For the second phase of the research process, the electronic questionnaire survey, a descriptive analysis on the close-ended questions was conducted. No tests of statistical inference were necessary in this case, as the aim of this research was not to find numbers or quantities regarding the specific issues in performance management that could be generalized, but which typologies, terminologies, characteristics and dysfunctions are present in the organizations studied. And this can be achieved when analyzing the strongest elements that arise from the answers, and the comparison between Ministries of both countries. The results

refer only to those Ministries involved in this research, and not to a wider population or context.

The open-ended question of the questionnaire (question 32) was chiefly designed to enquire about the dysfunctions found in the performance management systems and to provide space for valuable comments by the participants. The aim of this open-ended question was also to avoid leading the respondents to choose options (items) that may not represent their opinions or even exist within their organizations. These responses were analyzed through *thematic analysis*, which is a method where the researcher tries to recognize specific patterns and themes in subjective data (Joffe and Yardley, 2005). This is a straightforward process (Holloway and Wheeler, 2009), where the researcher interprets the data and breaks it down to codes (i.e. coding) and then to categories. Broader themes emerge from these categories, that become the center of the analysis, and the interpretation and theorization are more important to the researcher than the frequency of words or expressions in the data set (Boyatzis, 1998). Theoretical insights can be suggested by the researcher as a result of the analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006).

This comparative mixed-methods research aimed to use primary data to complement the important details that the documents cannot provide, especially in this case where valuable information lies in the form of tacit knowledge. As mentioned by Creswell (2011), the advantage of such mixed methods research is that combining qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection and analysis can provide a better understanding of the results that will answer the research question. And that is the case here, where this complementarity proved effective.

A post-positivist stance was adopted as to investigate the differences between what is formalized on paper (i.e. documents), and what is done in practice. As argued by Guest (2011), it is necessary to investigate not only the intended but also the implemented HR practices. Or in the words of Karen Legge (2005), to examine the discrepancies between the 'HRM rhetorics and realities'; what is discourse and what actually takes place.

4.4 . Ethical Considerations and Ethics Approval:

This study followed AUT's recommendations for ethical research, using an EA1 form, and was approved by the AUT Ethics Committee (AUTEC) in 31/08/2011, application number 11/201. All ethical issues described in the AUTEC guidelines were respected when conducting this research, such as the informed consent in the participant information sheet of the questionnaire, the minimization of risks, anonymity and confidentiality. For example, none of the organizations or participants were identified when analyzing their answers, only coded (e.g: Ministry 1, Ministry 2, participant 1, participant 1 etc) by country, for comparison purposes. The data and information collected in the form of documents and the survey served solely for the purpose of this study, and will not be disclosed to the public for any purpose. An eventual publication of the dissertation will omit the participants' names likewise.

5. Results and Discussion:

Following the steps described above, the findings and discussion are divided into two parts: an archival analysis, with the internal documents and legislation pertaining to the Ministries researched, and the results from the questionnaire survey conducted with the members of the HR departments of these Ministries.

5.1. Part I: Archival analysis

For the archival analysis, all the participating Ministries in New Zealand provided their internal documents with the performance management frameworks and guidelines. These were received either in electronic format (MS Word or PDF files) or hard copy. When the documents seemed to lack some specific information, additional e-mails were sent to the HR managers of these Ministries with complementary questions, which were answered promptly. The documents from Brazil consisted of the recent legislation that regulates (and creates) the new guidelines for performance management that applies to an array of public organizations, including the Ministries researched. Some of the HR managers of the Brazilian Ministries were also helpful as to indicate new developments or amendments to the recent legislation, which were included here as appropriate.

The archival analysis followed a framework created specifically for this purpose (see Appendix I), as to guide the researcher through the analysis of the documents. This framework contains the main phases of performance management, according to the literature review in section 2.2, and yielded a concise compilation of the chief characteristics of the performance management systems utilized by these Ministries, in a qualitative manner. The researcher chose to use descriptive observations of the systems and frameworks instead of simply checking for the existence of pre-determined parameters, in order not to lose the richness of the documents provided. Each table relating to each Ministry (see Appendix I) served as the source for the discussions described in the following sections.

5.1.1. New Zealand Ministries:

The following documents were analysed according to the model framework, regarding the five Ministries of the New Zealand Government:

- NZ1: 'Guidelines for People Capability', 'Guidelines: Performance and Behaviour Improvement' and 'Performance and Development Agreement' templates.
- NZ2: a compilation of separate documents with the guidelines and templates for performance management provided by NZ2.
- NZ3: 'Guide to Performance and Development at NZ3: Managers and Employees', 'Performance and Development Templates'.
- NZ4: 'Performance Work and Development Plan', 'Manager Guide to Performance Management at NZ4'⁴ and templates.
- NZ5: 'Performance Management P4O: Performance for Outcomes'.

The first phase of performance management observed in the documents, *performance planning*, revealed several similarities between the Ministries. Chief amongst these similarities is the fact that all Ministries' performance management frameworks and guidelines demonstrate a great focus on performance improvement and employee development. For example, most documents provided by the Ministries elaborate on the orientations for managers and employees to build not only *Performance Agreements*, but *Performance and Development Agreements*, where the planning for performance goals and development of employees' competencies are combined in what they call 'a living document'. All expectations, goals and action plans are documented at first, then they can be modified according to contingencies throughout the year (e.g. different organizational strategies, changes of direction), and the milestones of achievements or the difficulties encountered are also added to the document during the performance year. These performance and development agreements are expected to be constructed in a cooperative manner between managers and employees, where both are allowed to suggest areas to focus the efforts for improvement and, in terms of performance, to direct the efforts for achievement in connection with the team and with the overall organizational objectives.

⁴ As mentioned previously, according to the compromise of anonymity in this research, whenever the name of a Ministry appears in the documents or anywhere else, they will be shown in this study in the form of codes.

All Ministries, according to the documents provided, start the planning process by outlining a 'line of sight' in the performance and development agreements, which will serve as the connection between organizational, departmental (or team) and individual goals and objectives. All Ministries follow the logic of goal-setting in the beginning of the performance year, which starts in July and ends in June of the following year. The goal-setting exercise is conducted in meetings with the manager and the employee, where they set individual goals and performance expectations related to tasks, achievements in projects or internal processes. All these are then connected to team or departmental goals, discussed in a meeting with the whole group.

These objectives or goals are set out in all five Ministries according to the principles of the S.M.A.R.T. acronym: Specific, Measurable, Assignable/Achievable, Realistic and Time-bound. Ministries NZ1 and NZ3 go a little further to include the expression "achievable yet stretching"⁵ goals in their guidelines, as to emphasize that the goals are expected to be reasonably within the reach of the employee, but also forcing them to push themselves a little further to produce better results. The idea behind the SMART acronym is generally accepted in the academic realm and highly utilized by organizations in general (Armstrong, 2009). The first to come up with the term was Doran (1981), in an article that aimed to help practitioners to rationalize their goals in a reasonable, feasible yet efficient way. The idea of quantification of goals is important, according to Doran, however not all objectives must be quantified, with the risk of losing what the objective signifies merely for gaining quantification. As he points out, it is the connection of the objective to an action plan that is truly important.

The individual and team goals are translated into Key Result Areas (KRAs) or Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) in all five Ministries, in order to convert these goals and objectives into observable measures. In all Ministries researched, the exercise of setting goals and their correspondent KRAs or KPIs does not follow exact prescriptions of specific parameters: the complexity of the individual goals relating to the team or departmental strategic plan is supposed to be analysed in a case-by-case basis by the manager with his or her employees, and it is their responsibility to find the best way to make these goals as observable and as measurable as possible. Templates of performance and development agreements are provided to guide managers and employees, and guidelines are also provided by the HR departments to support the process. The guidelines of performance management apply to all

⁵ 'Stretching goals' are derived from Jack Welch's popular strategies for creating motivating goals in General Electric, in the late 1970's. For more, see Slater, R. (2004) *Welch on Leadership*. NY: McGraw-Hill.

employees and managers, that is, managers also develop their own goals and expectations with the superior managers. Each job or position level has a specific template to be followed, and performance expectations also vary according to the position (e.g. assistant, analyst, advisor, manager). The performance and development agreements are seen as a vital reference for the rest of the performance year, therefore the commitment of employees and managers to these plans are formalized in signing. So far, it is possible to notice a clear alignment of these documents with the literature of the field (e.g. Lawler, 2003; Latham et. al., 2007; Macky, 2008) concerning performance planning and goal-setting.

The goals and objectives are described by the five Ministries as '*the what*', which are expected to be achieved or enabled by competencies, '*the how*'. These competencies are divided by the five Ministries in core organizational competencies, supposed to be demonstrated by all employees in all levels, and individual competencies, which are divided into behavioural and technical. Both behavioural and technical competencies are discussed and "chosen" by managers and employees in the performance planning meetings, according to the specifications of the job description, to new requirements that may arise for the job or team, to demands of the Ministry for that particular year and to support development for future career aspirations. These competencies are to be utilized as criteria for performance assessments later in the year.

While four Ministries conceive competencies as the typical view of a blend of *knowledge, skills* and *behaviours*, one of the Ministries (NZ1) conceptualizes individual competencies as a combination of capability and development, in a perspective that clearly highlights the connection of performance evaluation and employee development in their framework. Additionally, four Ministries (with the exception of NZ5) make explicit in their guidelines that they utilize the Lominger competency set, and the Lominger FYI (For Your Improvement) book. Lominger⁶ is a North American consulting company founded in 1991 and a member of the Korn Ferry International group that provides consultancy on leadership, assessments and competency development through specific sets of systems or packages that promise to suit every kind of organization, especially through what they call 'The Leadership Architect'. According to Finegold, Lawler and Ledford (1998), organizations are frequently purchasing prepackaged "one size fits all" (pp. 137) competency models that might not offer significant benefits, often focusing on too generic or vague competencies which may in reality

⁶ The name of the company is a combination of the founder's surnames (Lombardo and Eichinger). For more, see www.lominger.com (accessed in 30/10/2011).

not be the central competencies of the organization. However, in the view of the researcher, that can be interpreted a case-by-case situation, in that it is possible that these competency packages may actually work for one organization, and not for another. This is when the arguments of the “best fit” school of HRM need to be reflected upon, so as to identify if these pre-set competency systems can add value to the organization’s internal management systems.

Still referring to performance planning, the five Ministries highlight throughout their documents that they have shifted their focus of performance management from simply delivering work results to focusing on constant improvement as well, especially concerning employee development. That is why development initiatives and performance interventions are to be conducted and monitored by managers before and after assessments (i.e. throughout the year), as will be detailed further when we discuss the employee development phase. Examples of performance management frameworks and graphic representations are provided in the Appendix I.

Concerning the *performance measurement and assessment* phase, a higher degree of variation was identified amongst the Ministries in New Zealand, despite several similarities. All five Ministries evaluate performance on an ongoing fashion, through formal and informal meetings between managers and employees. This goes in line with the focus of constant performance improvement, as opposed to single periodical performance ratings. All Ministries demand managers and employees to have informal meetings throughout the year, when both discuss and document the performance issues and achievements in a balanced way, with inputs from both parts. Performance is observed and at the same time performance barriers are supposed to be identified and removed whenever possible. Evidence of feedback, difficulties, achievements and opportunities for improvement are gathered and documented throughout the year. Ministry NZ5 is the only one that described having a mandatory mid-year performance review that counts for the final assessment, whereas the other Ministries have only informal or optional interim reviews. Employee engagement surveys are conducted by all five Ministries to help monitor workplace conditions and difficulties that may obstruct performance.

Most Ministries describe which core competencies are valued and desired by the organization, in the form of behaviours or attitudes to be demonstrated by all staff and managers, which serve as some of the parameters for assessment. NZ1, for example,

determines that the technical competencies to be assessed are compiled from an internal competency framework for each position, and the behavioural competencies are to be chosen from the Lominger FYI book. NZ2, in its turn, expects all employees to demonstrate at least five core behavioural competencies: 'integrity and trust', 'drive for results', 'customer focus', 'priority setting' (according to the Ministry's vision and purposes) and 'problem solving' (exploring all sources of information and alternatives). NZ highlights the five 'strategic behaviours' that it expects from employees: 'analyse', 'engage', 'learn', 'validate' and 'collaborate', which are clearly aligned with the function of research and action towards the mission of the Ministry as an organization. NZ4 outlines its own overarching principles for employees in the form of personal conduct on the job: 'Accountability (take responsibility, do not wait to be told, seek feedback, contribute to debate)', 'Influence (understand others, communicate effectively, persistent efforts)' and 'One NZ4' (awareness of mission and vision, understanding of other internal sectors, resistance to silos, interaction and knowledge of what is done across departments)'. This is expected to promote inter-team and departmental cooperation in NZ4, where managers encourage employees to participate a number of days per year in projects or workgroups within other departments. Additionally, a set of four core competencies are demanded by NZ4; 'analysis and expertise', 'communication', 'relationship management', 'work practice' and the parameters of 'contribution to results' and 'emerging leadership'. NZ5, on the other hand, did not describe its core competencies in the documents provided.

At the end of the performance year, all these New Zealand Ministries have formal performance assessment meetings where all the records from informal reviews and discussions are revised, goal achievement is discussed and the performance monitoring is summarized and compiled in one final assessment. For this end-of-year performance assessment meeting, both the employee and the manager are expected to be prepared and to bring evidence of relevant issues or milestones to be utilized as material for discussions. Employees conduct a self-assessment of their own performance and are expected to send this to their manager prior to the meeting. They are also evaluated by their immediate manager, and they can also bring evidence of feedback from colleagues or clients (e.g. e-mails, customer surveys) to support the assessment by the manager. However, these are only supposed to be considered by the manager when making his or her own decisions on the performance assessment. Only Ministry NZ1 describes explicitly that the manager and the employee can jointly decide on which sources of assessment will be utilized; besides self and manager's

assessment, peers and other stakeholders can also be sources. All guidelines from the documents make clear that managers and employees must reach an agreement on the final assessment, and that both have a say in a democratic and constructive manner. Other managers or top level managers can be asked to moderate the process in cases where there is no agreement.

One interesting fact is that Ministry NZ3 is gradually reducing the importance of the rating of performance as such. It is being changed during the course of this research, and the focus is gradually becoming higher and higher on performance monitoring, performance intervention, constant feedback and employee development, and less on performance measurement and assessment. According to additional information provided by one of the Ministry's Senior HR Advisors, the Ministry will still continue to conduct 360 degree feedback assessments for managers for development purposes alone, which is compulsory, however all assessment formats are expected to change and be replaced soon by other mechanisms. This resembles some tendencies described by Coens and Jenkins (2000) in the private sector, where certain companies are reducing appraisals and investing more on employee development.

In the other four Ministries, most templates of performance assessment forms are quite similar, with spaces for comments by the manager and the employee on the achievement of objectives, competencies, KRAs or KPIs, barriers or contextual elements that may have obstructed performance during the year, and a final rating scale that summarizes the overall performance of the individual in a more objective manner. Therefore, the overall format of the performance assessment forms utilized by the New Zealand Ministries serves to evaluate qualitative parameters of performance in an objective manner (through KRAs and KPIs), with a final overall rating that summarizes the performance judgment. Three Ministries (NZ1, NZ2 and NZ5) utilize five point scales for the final assessment of individual performance, while one Ministry (NZ5) utilizes a 6 point scale. According to what was explained in the previous paragraph, NZ3 does not describe a rating scale. Below are examples of the rating scales utilized by these Ministries, as described in their frameworks:

- NZ1: 'Unacceptable', 'Meets some but not all expectations', 'Performing well, meeting expectations', 'Exceeds expectations', 'Outstanding'.
- NZ2: 'Requires significant development', 'Requires some development', 'Performs competently', 'Exceeds expectations' and 'Outstanding performance'.

- NZ4 (six-point scale): 'Not meeting', 'Mostly meeting', 'Developing', 'Meets expectations', 'Exceeds expectations' and 'Outstanding'.
- NZ5: 'IR (improvement required)', 'SP (sound performance)', 'HS (high standard performance)', 'EP (exceptional performance)'.

The ratings used by Ministries NZ1 and NZ4 is supposed to be rigorous according to their framework, where 'Exceeds expectations' and 'Outstanding' are expected to be rare ratings, only used in truly exceptional cases. In the case of NZ4, each point in the scale is well explained according to each of the four main competencies utilized, and the focus is on results and impact for the team or for the Ministry, requiring evidence to support the rating. In the case of NZ1, the Lominger FYI book is suggested to managers as a reference for the rating process.

These rating scales clearly resemble BARS (behaviourally anchored scales), as they use representations of levels of performance (i.e. 'unacceptable', 'acceptable', 'highly acceptable' and so on), with the correspondent definitions in relation to behaviours and competencies. Even though there is no consensus as to which is the best format (Latham et. al., 2007), BARS are one of the most utilized formats of rating, therefore these Ministries do not utilize any particularly innovative method that stands out. Besides, the utilization of behavioural competencies and goal-setting by these Ministries are also consistent with this rating format.

Regarding the performance assessment methods, the documents revealed that the Ministries utilize what seems to be hybrid models, in that they are not classical top-down 180 degree assessments, nor typical 360 degree assessments. Managers are expected to consider (as secondary sources) the inputs from the employee's peers and the employee's self-assessment when making decisions on the final evaluation, however it is the manager who makes the final rating. 360 degree feedback models were reported in the documents as developmental instruments only for managers or senior leaders, with no connection to remuneration. Only NZ1 allows employees and managers to decide on their sources of assessment, which may or may not be of the 360 kind, being, therefore, flexible.

Regarding the following phase of performance management, *employee feedback*, all five Ministries revealed that feedback is also ongoing, and happens in parallel with performance monitoring. Therefore, the notion that feedback is to be given *after* performance

assessments is seen differently by these Ministries, where managers are expected to constantly provide feedback during formal and informal “catch-up” meetings that happen either weekly, fortnightly or monthly depending on the Ministry and on the manager’s discretion according to the internal guidelines. The idea of ongoing feedback entails constant communication between managers and employees, so these meetings (formal or informal) can also include the whole team. Again, the documents provided by all five Ministries are aligned in that this feedback should be timely and constructive, and is supposed to be provided on the progress of objectives, goals, relevant competencies outlined in the performance and development agreements, as well as the achievements or barriers encountered. Both managers and employees are expected to bring these performance agreements to the meetings and to document the feedback given and the decisions made.

Coaching is also expected to be part of the feedback process in order to help employees overcome any difficulties faced during the performance year. This ongoing monitoring is represented by the expression ‘no surprises’ that is utilized by the Ministries, meaning that by the time of the final end-of-year assessments, all are aware of what happened during the year in terms of individual and team performance. In this sense, the Ministry NZ3 stands out in the high level of importance given to these constant conversations between managers and employees, since their system is gradually shifting from performance assessments to ongoing coaching and performance improvement. Note also that in NZ3 managers are supposed to follow transformational leadership principles: facilitate flows of information, encourage the sharing of ideas, give direction, recognize initiatives, support failure and learning.

It can be understood that these constant feedback meetings described in the documents seem to make performance interventions easier to understand, to implement and to monitor in a timely manner. Moreover, the closer communication between managers and employees can help to minimize eventual conflicts related to performance assessments and related procedures, and can pave the way for performance improvement. This goes in line with what is argued in the literature (DeNisi and Kluger, 2006; Latham et. al., 2007), where feedback is one of the most crucial points for enhanced performance.

The *employee development* phase, as noted above, follows the same logic of ongoing coaching and performance improvement initiatives throughout the year, before and after assessments. The five Ministries describe employee development as an integral part of

performance management, and the development initiatives are also recorded and monitored in the performance agreements and work plans. The employee development plans are set out after the end-of-year assessments, where the Ministry's competencies and those competencies related to KRAs are prioritized. However the process is continuous, with development initiatives being monitored during the year and reviewed annually. These development plans are also designed by managers and employees in tandem, in open two-way conversations with support by HR where necessary. Most of the Ministries utilize the Lominger FYI book to support development plans, with the exception of NZ5, who does not mention it in their documents.

The options for employee development across the Ministries include, besides coaching and mentoring schemes, external and internal training, study programs (self-development), 'stretch assignments', project assignments and secondments. For external training and educational programs, online courses are available, as well as the Leadership Development Centre, promoted by the State Services Commission (SSC). The SSC also provides Fellowships and Masters programmes in public administration through the Australia and New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG). The applications are managed and processed by the HR departments, and funding is available depending on the allocated budget. NZ2 was the only Ministry to specify a clear ratio of what is expected for employee development initiatives, in the form of: 70% on-the-job experience and learning, 20% observation and coaching and 10% formal training.

Clearly, the frameworks of these five Ministries reveal that their employee development processes are not a mere remedy for poor performance, but a constant monitoring and supporting exercise to help develop employees, their performance and consequently team performance.

In terms of *rewards and recognition*, the possibilities that the Ministries can offer are somewhat limited. Financial rewards are mainly represented by salary progression within the job level. All the five Ministries utilize the results of performance (assessments, achievement of objectives and recommendations by managers), the position of the employee in the remuneration matrix, budget (affordability) and salary surveys to decide on individual salary progression or increases. The recommendations by managers and the final rating of overall performance will indicate to which level of salary progression the employee is eligible to, where above average increases are mostly limited to those rated as 'outstanding'. Some

Ministries (NZ1, NZ2 and NZ4) also described having small budgets (endorsed by the SSC) for one-off payments to 'outstanding' performers. For example, NZ1 provides the 'Director-General Awards', which are vouchers of NZD\$ 300.00 that can be given to individuals or teams, on exceptional cases. All internal decisions on pay are analysed on a case-by-case basis and must be approved by the Directorate Management team, the Executive team, HR and the employee's manager who gave each recommendation. All Ministries described that salary surveys are periodically conducted to ensure internal and external equity for attracting and retaining talent, and to remain competitive in the job market, as to ensure fair and consistent remuneration patterns.

Another form of reward or recognition is employee promotion schemes, and those who seek promotion must apply with a written application to HR. Managers also recommend which employees they believe should be promoted. Senior management group discusses the applications and reach a shared view, which must still be approved by Directors. Additionally, non-financial rewards are highly utilized and emphasized in the documents provided. Forms of non-financial rewards can be specific opportunities for development, such as working on high profile projects, secondments and training opportunities. Besides, verbal recognition given by managers is highly promoted within these Ministries.

All employees in the Ministries are allowed to appeal the decisions concerning performance assessments or financial rewards. These appeals are managed by HR, with the participation of managers and Directors, and are to be submitted by the employee within an average of two weeks of receiving the original results.

With regards to *disciplinary procedures*, these were described briefly by NZ1, NZ3, NZ4 and NZ5, all of which are quite similar. In fact, the larger emphasis described in the documents is to first try to detect the causes of poor performance and make all efforts possible to improve the performance or behavior of the employee, where the manager and the employee work on an improvement plan, progress meetings, follow-up meetings and consultation with HR. All these issues are to be dealt with promptly, confidentially, with an open and positive attitude and seeking to assist the employee. In fact, in one of the documents provided by NZ3, they suggest to managers to evaluate the performance issues of an employee who is lagging behind according to their own version of the performance equation: 'Performance = Ability x Motivation x Opportunity x Direction', where giving 'Direction' is the responsibility of the manager as a leader, coach or mentor.

If the issues are not resolved, the disciplinary process begins. Failing to perform according to the Performance Agreement, failing to meet standards or competencies required, and reoccurrence of issues contrary to the Code of Conduct are reasons for disciplinary procedures. All decisions are made with the principle of fairness and on a case-by-case basis, with the involvement of the employee and his/ her representation in every meeting. After all efforts towards support and improvement are made, the alternatives are: extension of time to improve, consideration of an alternative role or location for the employee, or cessation of employment (termination). The Performance Agreement, performance assessments, job description, personnel file and all available evidence are revised to support disciplinary decisions. Employees also have the right to appeal.

Most documents provided by the New Zealand Ministries do not mention explicitly the procedures for the performance management *system evaluation*, however most Ministries mention the utilization of employee engagement surveys also to help identify points where the system may need improvement. Only NZ3 has specific forms devised to evaluate the feedback quality, which entails one of the essential elements of their performance management system. However, during the course of this research, the HR Advisors and Managers informed the researcher that their performance management systems had recently undergone revision of some aspects, with more significant changes implemented by NZ3.

Finally, a few *potential dysfunctions* could be identified in the frameworks described in these documents. Chief amongst which is the general impression that most frameworks are somewhat loosely coupled, in that they lack some objectivity especially when referring to assessment criteria. The subjective measures that are written in the form of qualitative comments (referring to competencies, goals and objectives) can be rather difficult to pin down, even when utilizing KPIs or KRAs. For example, NZ1's performance management system is concisely and coherently devised, but perhaps the excessive flexibility (e.g. optional sources for assessment, optional interim meetings) allows for vagueness or subjectivity that can cause further dysfunctions (Levy, 2006). In the case of NZ3, the assessment framework seems to be considerably flexible and perhaps vague, although well explained when it comes to performance conversations, feedback and employee development procedures. This appears to be the focus of their whole P.M. system, which is an alternative to the more traditional assessments of performance. NZ4, in its turn, uses some rather dubious terms, such as 'may',

‘mostly’ and others, and the criteria for promotions and salary progressions seem a bit loose, which again opens breaches for different interpretations.

Nevertheless, as noted from these documents, the process of recording the achievement of goals, objectives and demonstration of competencies is done jointly by employees and managers, therefore the subjectivities can be agreed upon and easily understood for the final overall ratings of performance. These joint evaluations can help smooth the process and possibly reduce potential dysfunctions such as strictness and halo, although they might allow for more leniency or central tendency in the performance evaluations as the manager and the employee reach an agreement on the assessments.

As a general impression, the P.M. frameworks of these five Ministries appear to be highly integrated with the strategic organizational goals, which cascade down to departmental and individual goals. They are also highly focused on performance improvement and employee development, and the constant monitoring and feedback is supportive of this, making the end-of-year assessment become a “mere” summary of the performance conversations carried out during the year. This allows us to observe an evident alignment of these frameworks with the current literature and research in the field of performance management. Not only is performance management in the Ministries connected and woven to strategic goals of the organizations, but it is also viewed as a continuous process (Latham et. al., 2007; Macky, 2008; Armstrong, 2009) for performance improvement, evidenced in the documents by the constant performance monitoring, feedback and development initiatives carried out during the performance year. In the performance planning phase of these Ministries, the practice of goal setting or setting of individual objectives is also aligned with what is described in the P.M. literature (i.e. Lawler, 2003; Latham et al., 2007; Macky, 2008), which is also observable by their utilization of parameters such as KPIs, KRAs and success factors for measuring against expectations. The frameworks are also analogous to the AMO theory (Boxall and Purcell, 2003; Macky, 2008), in that the performance management guidelines focus on the elements of the performance equation, (Boxall and Purcell, 2008).

Additionally, it was possible to note that managers play a vital role in the performance management systems of these Ministries, whereas the HR department is more of a supporting platform for the operational process, and a point of reference to ensure fairness and to help in cases of conflicting evaluations. However, a considerable number of phases or steps rely too much on subjective decisions by these managers, which can open breaches for differing

interpretations and conflict between employees and managers. Nevertheless, moderation committees are present at all of these phases to help resolve any disputes, and the appeal process always includes the employee and his or her representative in the meetings scheduled for that purpose, which confers an aspect of transparency and democracy for decision making.

5.1.2. Brazilian Ministries:

In Brazil, all the Ministries involved in this research, as well as others, have to follow the more centralized and bureaucratized guidelines provided by the Decree nº 7.133 (2010)⁷, which is presently the main document that sets the norms for employee performance management in the central government. It is a fairly comprehensive and detailed document, comprised of 14 pages, with some complementary amendments by the Norm nº 7 (31st of August, 2011) and other aspects regulated by earlier laws and decrees.

Concerning the first phase of performance management, *performance planning*, it became clear that most of the content of the Decree nº 7.133 (2010) focuses on organizational and individual performance assessment rather than management, for the purpose of better provision of the remuneration bonuses that have been practiced in the government for several years, called 'gratificação'. The major emphasis is on performance appraisal vis-à-vis individual goals and competencies, connected to departmental and organizational goals. The performance cycle has the length of one year, and the start and finish months are determined by each Ministry as they find appropriate.

The '*work plan*' is a group of living documents, such as a performance agreements, where the parameters of quality, performance and productivity are set in the beginning of the performance year. This work plan is updated with the results and assessment decisions throughout the year, including external factors that may influence them. The team (or department) work plan is to be set out through the combination of intermediary and individual goals (except where otherwise justified), which are derived from organizational goals. When there is no agreement between the manager and the team, the manager defines the goals to

⁷ Despite also referring to several other public organizations, for the purpose of this study the Decree nº 7.133 (2010) was analysed with regards to the Ministries involved in this research.

be achieved. All goals are expected to be set out in an objective and measurable manner, considering the levels achieved in the previous year.

The updating of work plans must contain at least the most representative actions of the team/department, the activities and projects derived from these actions, the intermediary and individual goals, the performance commitments of the team and individuals, the criteria for monitoring individual and team performance during the performance cycle, the interim evaluation of performance (to subsidy adjustments during the cycle) and the final evaluation of goal achievement and performance commitments, to enable the compilation of all elements for the final yearly assessment. This work plan must be formalized and registered with the HR department of each Ministry.

Each Ministry determines its own performance indicators and the 'units' (teams, departments, regional groups) that will be assessed in terms of intermediary goals. The organizational goals and results to be achieved must be publicized internally and externally on each Ministry's website, otherwise the Ministry cannot participate in the performance assessment cycle, with consequences for the performance bonuses. Meetings are expected to be held by the managers and the teams at the beginning of the performance year to clarify the methodologies that will be employed for assessing performance. Before the performance cycle ends, the planning for the following year begins (Norm nº 7, 31st of August 2011).

Up to this point, regarding performance planning, the guidelines seem to be aligned to what is suggested in the current literature (e.g. Lawler, 2003; Locke and Latham, 2002; Latham et. al., 2007; Macky, 2008), and similar, in general, to the way it is done in New Zealand. However, it is possible to observe a more hierarchical form of decision making in the Brazilian framework, where in case there is no agreement on the setting of goals, the manager is the one who decides. This seems to be different from what was observed in the New Zealand ministries, where performance planning happens in a more balanced manner between managers and employees⁸.

In terms of performance *measurement and assessment*, the Decree nº 7.133 (2010) defines the performance assessment as a systematic and continuous monitoring of individual and organizational performance, against the organizational and intermediary goals. The individual performance assessment is conducted according to the criteria and parameters that

⁸ Public servants, advisors and staff in general are simply called 'employees' in this study.

reflect the competencies and task achievements of the employee. Besides these parameters, the employees are also evaluated on the following factors: work productivity, technical knowledge, teamwork, commitment to work, abiding to norms and to the code of conduct. Optional parameters that can be included according to the discretion of each team in the Ministries are: quality of work, capacity of self-development, initiative, relationship management and flexibility to change.

The individual performance assessment model described is the *360 degree appraisal*, where the performance of each individual is assessed yearly by the manager (superior), peers, subordinates and him or herself. A relative weight is given to each source of assessment, being 15% to self-assessment, 25% to assessment by the team (minimum of 3 evaluators) and 60% to assessment by the manager⁹. Managers are assessed by the whole team, whereas the performance of outsourced contractors, interns and fixed-term (temporary) employees are not assessed. Employees in other positions such as special assistants or advisors (called 'funções de confiança' or 'cargos em comissão'), which are hired in a different type of employment contract, are not assessed on the organizational performance level, only on the individual level. Employees who are relocated to different organizations are to be assessed according to the specific criteria of the organization where they work. And as determined by the Law 8.112 (1990), every new public employee is subject to a two-year probation period where he or she is evaluated in terms of aptitude for work, according to the following criteria: work attendance, discipline, initiative, productivity and responsibility. After this probation period, the employee achieves what is called 'stability'.

A commission (named 'CAD') is appointed in each Ministry before the commencement of the performance cycle, to monitor the process of performance assessment and to help, support and ensure the procedures are followed. Employees can appeal the decisions of their individual assessment results within ten days of receiving these results. The appeals are evaluated by the above mentioned 'CAD'.

Some similarities can be noted with the New Zealand Ministries, chiefly regarding the guidelines for continuous monitoring of performance, as well as the moderation committees devised to resolve appeals. However, the assessment format (360 degree) differs, and this will be discussed later on when we analyse the potential dysfunctions.

⁹ The exceptions determined for the first year of the Decree nº 7.133 (including the related exceptions described in the Norm nº 7 of August 2011) are not considered relevant here, because they will not remain valid for the years to come. Only the permanent guidelines are observed.

Concerning *feedback*, it was quite surprising to see that little to no emphasis is given. It is only mentioned that employees should receive the results of their final evaluations and discuss these results. No explicit responsibility is given to managers and no particular focus on communication was given relating to feedback. This seems quite contradictory to what is recommended by most scholars (i.e. DeNisi and Kluger, 2000; Mausolff, 2004; DeNisi and Pritchard, 2006; Latham et. al. , 2007), and reveals an apparent gap in the performance management framework. As it was mentioned before in this study, feedback to employees on their performance is one of the core elements for performance improvement. This will also be discussed further on, regarding potential dysfunctions.

The only point made in the Decree nº 7.133 (2010) with relation to *employee development* or performance improvement is that the performance assessments are expected to be used as instruments for performance management, and to support decisions of performance improvement and training initiatives. Employees whose performance assessment is below 50% of a total of 100% scale, will be subjected to a development process or a job adequacy analysis, which aims to identify causes for poor performance and needs for improvement. Exceptions exist for specific positions and specific public organizations. No more details are given concerning employee development in this decree.

The Decree nº 5.707 (2006), however, defined the “Politica Nacional de Desenvolvimento de Pessoal (the national policy for employee development), which includes all Ministries and other federal public organizations. The guidelines are designed to improve the efficiency, efficacy and effectiveness of public sector employees, with their constant development and adequacy to the required competencies (knowledge, skills and attitudes) necessary for each Ministry. Options for training and development include: training in-company, online training, learning on-the-job, study groups, exchange programs, internships, seminars and symposiums. All directed to support core organizational and individual competencies.

This national policy demands three elements: an annual training and development plan, a report on the execution of this plan and a competency management system. All these are to be promoted and controlled by the ‘Ministério do Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão’ (Ministry of planning, budget and management) and the ‘Secretaria de Gestão’ (management secretariat) of this Ministry, who is responsible for creating the competency management system. Training programs on managerial themes have priority, and funding for training and

educational programmes can be provided by the Ministries, depending on the type, duration, adequacy, purpose and budget. Special remunerated leaves are allowed for long term employees, for short courses, and non-remunerated leaves for longer postgraduate courses.

According to this policy, the results of training programmes are to be used in conjunction with performance assessment as complementary elements for evaluation purposes. The policies of the Decree nº 5.707 (2006) incentivize an annual development plan to be designed by each department/organization. External training should prioritize the national school of government ('ENAP'), yet universities can also be providers of training if they are in partnership with, for example, ENAP, and recognized by the state. Despite having been created six years earlier, this decree is not mentioned in the Decree nº 7.133 (2010), which can represent a relative disconnect between the outcomes of performance assessments and development initiatives. The fact that the Decree nº 7.133 (2010) is apparently disconnected from employee development and, to a great extent, from performance improvement, allows for an interpretation that these are seen, in the perspective of this decree, as separate from performance management, which in this case prioritizes assessments and individual scores for administrative purposes. Even though it is widely known that the Brazilian Ministries commonly hire consultancy services in an effort to improve their measurement systems and to provide training for their staff¹⁰, the Decree 7.133 (2010) lacks more specific and direct guidance with regards to performance improvement, therefore that is left to each Ministry's own initiative. This apparent gap in the decree is somewhat opposing to what is argued by Latham et. al. (2007), Macky (2008) and Armstrong (2009), in that performance management's ultimate goal is performance improvement.

Rewards and recognition are, perhaps, one of the main topics mentioned by the Decree nº 7.133 (2010). Clearly with more emphasis on financial rewards than on recognition, this decree focuses a great deal on the GDPGPE¹¹, a financial reward in the form of a monthly bonus (called 'gratificação'), which is expected be paid according to performance. This monthly bonus applies to the Ministries involved in this research, for operational, intermediary and superior positions. Some similar types of monthly bonuses are used by other Ministries and public organizations. These bonuses are paid to the employees according to their score in the

¹⁰ For example, see the report published in the IV Congresso CONSAD by the Ministry of Health in Brazil and the Instituto Publix on the initiatives of this Ministry to improve its measurement parameters and training for staff: <http://www.institutopublix.com.br/2012/?p=3595> retrieved in 20/12/2011.

¹¹ Monthly bonus implemented by the Law nº 11.784 (2008), effective as of January 2009. Source: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2007-2010/2008/Lei/L11784.htm retrieved in 14/11/2011.

performance assessment, including organizational and individual level. The bonuses are paid on a minimum of thirty points and to a maximum of a hundred points, being 20% from the employees individual assessment and 80% from the organizational performance assessment. The formula determines the financial bonus according to the multiplication of the monetary amount in the progression table by the points achieved by the individual. Employees only receive the bonus if they worked in the organization for the last performance cycle of one year. There are different parameters and bonus amounts for special positions in the Ministries (e.g. the so called 'DAS'). Non-financial rewards or recognition schemes, though, are not mentioned.

Despite being well designed to connect performance to financial bonuses, it can be noted that, in the above mentioned decrees, there is an excessive focus on financial rewards and no importance given to other recognition schemes that could potentially impact motivation. It is well-known that financial rewards are extrinsic motivational factors, however non-financial rewards can have different and sometimes long-lasting impacts on an individual's intrinsic motivation (Ryan and Deci, 2000). For example, in the words of Pfeffer (1998):

“People do work for money, but they work even more for meaning in their lives. (...) Companies that ignore this fact are essentially bribing their employees and will pay the price in a lack of loyalty and commitment.” (Pfeffer, 1998: pp. 112).

Additionally, if on the one hand the proportion of 80% weight given to organizational performance and 20% given to individual performance in the decree may incentivize cooperation and team work, this proportion can ultimately reduce the importance of the individual performance vis-à-vis remuneration bonuses and promotions. That is, the organizational goals carry the most weight and impact on bonuses, which can indirectly overshadow poor performers versus high performers when it comes to paying these bonuses.

Concerning *disciplinary procedures* and *termination*, no guidelines are provided in these decrees, in relation to poor performance. They are, however, delineated in the constitutional amendment nº 19 (June 1998)¹², which states that permanent employees in the public service can only be dismissed due to poor performance by means of judicial sentence, through administrative prosecution, being allowed legal defense, all based on periodical

¹² For more, see: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/emendas/emc/emc19.htm

performance assessments. It is widely known, however, that such dismissals have been a rare event in the Brazilian public sector due to the lack of effective performance appraisals, prior to the Decree nº 7.133 of 2010. After this decree, though, the link between performance assessments, poor performers, disciplinary procedures and termination might become closer, even though the decree itself makes no mention to it.

Regarding *system evaluation*, no guidelines are provided in the decrees. This can create an impression that the framework will remain static over time, and dependent on particular initiatives by one Ministry or another that may or may not be translated into future amendments.

Finally, some *potential dysfunctions* were identified in the frameworks described by these documents. As mentioned before, whereas the guidelines for performance planning seem to be aligned with what is suggested in the literature of HRM, the performance assessment format does not follow such alignment. As argued by several authors (De Nisi and Kluger, 2000; Atwater, Waldman and Brett, 2002; Armstrong, 2009), a multi-source or 360 degree feedback assessment should be only used for development purposes, based on these multiple sources of feedback, however it became clear that this model is being utilized by these Brazilian Ministries for decisions on pay, bonuses and promotions, configuring a basic dysfunction in the format of the system utilized for performance assessment.

One fact that confirms this observation is, with effect, another potential dysfunction: the performance management framework, as described by the Decree nº 7.133 (2010), focuses excessively on performance assessment, measures and ratings, and little on employee development or performance improvement, which are the foundations of performance management (Armstrong, 2009; Macky, 2008; Boxall and Purcell, 2003; Latham et. al., 2007). This decree seems to have been created to better design, implement and coordinate the individual performance assessments in the Ministries (and other public organizations), apparently to enforce what was not being done properly in the past. However, despite being well detailed with regards to performance assessment and the link to performance related pay (bonuses), it lacks guidelines for performance improvement and, especially, feedback to employees. This had already been observed by Odelius and Santos (2007) in the previous frameworks.

If the Decree nº 5.707 (2006) defined the major guidelines for employee development in the government (in the “Política Nacional de Desenvolvimento de Pessoal”), it is expected

that this decree would have been mentioned and closely connected to the Decree nº 7.133 (2010). This disconnect adds to the notion that, analogous to these gaps, there is a very strong emphasis on remuneration and financial bonuses, instead of performance standards and quality, which are essential aspects for accountability in the public sector. A mere set of norms for assessing performance of employees as to justify the provision of bonuses is not a performance management system.

5.1.3. Summary comparison of Archival Analysis:

To finalize this section, a comparative table (Table 04) is proposed on the next page with the main characteristics found in the frameworks described in the documents of both countries, as to summarize this analysis. In brief, the main points are the similarities between the two countries with regards to performance planning, contrasting with the differences in the focus of the PM system itself and most subsequent phases of the performance management process, especially in terms of feedback and performance improvement.

Table 04: Comparative table from archival analysis (characteristics of the performance management systems of New Zealand and Brazil)

P.M. element or phase	References utilized for each phase:	New Zealand	Brazil
Performance planning:	Lawler (2003), Locke and Latham (2002), Latham, Sulsky and MacDonnald (2007), Macky (2008).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Great focus on performance improvement and employee development. Utilization of Performance and Development Agreements (living documents). Utilization of “line of sight”, organizational and departmental objectives, SMART goals, KRAs, KPIs, all connected to strategic plan. Goals (the what) and competencies (the how). Utilization of Lominger competencies by most Ministries. Focus on cooperation between managers and employees. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Great focus on financial rewards in the Decree nº 7.133 (2010). Utilization of Work Plans (living documents). Utilization of organizational, intermediary (departmental) and individual goals. Some competencies and parameters for assessing performance are mentioned in the Decree nº 7.133 (2010). Some degree of cooperation between managers and employees, however more hierarchical.
Performance measurement and assessment:	Latham et. al. (2007), Tziner, Joanis and Murphy (2000), Edwards and Ewen (1996), Armstrong (2009), DeNisi and Kluger (2000), Levy (2006), Guimarães and Brandão (2001), OECD (2010),	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ongoing monitoring, regular performance meetings (conversations). Mid-year informal assessments and end-of-year final assessments. Assessments on achievement of goals, competencies and level of improvement. Principle of “No Surprises”. Rating scale: BARS Hybrid models: top-down assessments, with employee self-assessment and some (secondary) contributions of peers and stakeholders. 360 used only for managers’ development in some Ministries. Moderation groups to aid in rating conflicts. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ongoing performance monitoring. Yearly assessments, with monitoring during the year. Assessment of achievement of goals and competencies. Rating scale: not mentioned. Classical 360 degree model for all employees and managers. Moderation groups to aid in rating conflicts.
Employee feedback:	Mausolff (2004), DeNisi and Kluger (2000), DeNisi and Pritchard (2006), Latham et. al. (2007)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continuous feedback from managers to employees (regular meetings). Close communication between managers and employees. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not mentioned in the Decree nº 7.133 (2010).
Employee development:	Macky (2008), Armstrong (2009), Latham et. al. (2007).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strong focus on development and improvement initiatives (especially NZ3). Development seen as an integral part of performance management. Development plans set out yearly, and monitored throughout the year. Options: coaching and mentoring schemes, external and internal training, study programs (self-development), ‘stretch assignments’, project assignments and secondments. External training prioritizes the Leadership Development Centre, promoted by SSC. Focus on Ministry’s core and individual competencies. Most Ministries utilize the Lominger FYI book as a reference. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Only briefly mentioned that performance assessments are expected to be used as instruments for management, supporting decisions of performance improvement and training initiatives. Earlier Decree 5.707 (2006) outlined development programmes, but is not mentioned in the Decree nº 7.133 (2010). Decree 5.707 (2006) outlines criteria, parameters and options: training in-company, online training, learning on-the-job, study groups, exchange programs, internships, seminars and symposiums. External training prioritizes ENAP. Focus on Ministry’s core and individual competencies.
Rewards and recognition:	Lawler (2003), Macky (2008), Boxall and Purcell (2008), Armstrong (2009).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mostly focuses on recognition and non-financial rewards. Financial rewards in the form of salary increases, according to scales. Exceptional one-off payments or small awards for outstanding performers. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strong focus on bonus (gratificacao), which is determined yearly, and paid monthly on the following year.

Disciplinary procedures:	Macky (2008), Armstrong (2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Emphasis on development and improvement interventions. ▪ If these do not bring results, formal warnings are issued. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Not mentioned in the Decree nº 7.133 (2010).
Termination:	Macky (2008), Armstrong (2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Employees can be dismissed for repeated poor performance or misconduct, as a last resource if development initiatives do not work. All records of assessments, feedback and development are used as evidence. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Only mentioned in the Constitutional Amendment nº 19 (1998), which determines that public employees can be dismissed due to poor performance, by means of judicial sentence, with the right for defense.
System evaluation:	Bernardin et al.(1995), Armstrong (2009), Clark (2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Little is mentioned, but employee engagement surveys are used to gather information also about the performance management system. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Not mentioned in the Decree nº 7.133 (2010).
Potential dysfunctions:	Macky (2008), Levy (2006), Tziner et. al. (2000), Meyer (1991), Latham et. al. (2007), Edwards and Ewen (1996), Odelius and Santos (2007), DeNisi and Kluger (2000), DeNisi and Pritchard (2006), Armstrong (2009), Guimarães, Nader and Ramagem (1998)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Criteria for assessment is somewhat loosely coupled, and not clearly linked to pay. ▪ Performance management systems rely too much on managers discretion, judgment and collaboration. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 360 degree feedback is utilized for administrative purposes (pay and bonuses). ▪ Excessive focus on assessment, no mention of feedback, little emphasis on development. ▪ Decree nº 7.133 (2010) disconnected from Decree 5.707 (2006).

All this is what is formalized on paper as the procedures and parameters to be followed. The next section analyses the results from the questionnaire survey conducted with the members of the HR departments of these Ministries, as to compare their answers with the descriptions in the documents. After that, the research questions can be fully answered.

5.2. Part II: Survey results

The results from the questionnaire survey, applied with the HR staff and managers of the ten participating Ministries, were analysed using SPSS for the closed-ended questions. For all closed-ended questions, descriptive statistics are presented by country and by Ministry, in terms of response count, due to the sample size. The comparisons were conducted chiefly on a country basis, since some of the Ministries had few participants in the survey. As mentioned before, tests of statistical inference and analysis of variance were not necessary in this study since the aim is not to generalize the findings to a wider population. Moreover, there was no need to conduct a factor analysis because the research is not intending to measure a construct.

For the open-ended question (question 32), Thematic Analysis was utilized, which yielded codes, categories and related themes from the patterns identified by the researcher in the comments of the participants. From these categories and themes, the most relevant subjects were discussed and analysed in relation to performance management.

The results and analysis are presented in the same order as in the questionnaire (see Appendix III), which is analogous to the framework of the archival analysis, in order to keep the same flow of topics.

5.2.1. New Zealand and Brazil: quantitative and qualitative results

In the first question of the survey, the participants were asked if they had participated in a performance review in the past 12 to 18 months, and how. Table 05 below shows that 33¹³ of the 35 participants of the New Zealand Ministries had participated in a performance review in the past 12 to 18 months, either as evaluators *and* having their performance evaluated or only having their performance evaluated in that period. In Brazil, the majority of the participants (n=34) had also participated in a performance review in that period, either having their performance evaluated, having only evaluated somebody else's performance or both.

Table 05: Results of questions 1 to 3 (nominal data)

Question	Country	Nominal Scale Items				-----
Q1 Participated in p. review in the past 12 to 18 months?	-----	Yes, as the evaluator of somebody else's work;	Yes, having my performance evaluated;	Yes, as both;	No.	Total
Count	New Zealand	2	13	18	2	35
	Brazil	8	18	8	3	37
Q2 What is your involvement in the p.m. processes?	-----	In the design of the P.M. framework	In the management of this framework, or part of it	Only as a participant in the evaluation process	All of the above.	Total
Count	New Zealand	4	10	8	12	34
	Brazil	3	3	23	8	37
Q3 Sources of evaluation	-----	Top-down	Full 360 degree	Multi-source	-----	Total
Count	New Zealand	13	1	20		34
	Brazil	14	2	20		36

The average time of the participants working at the New Zealand Ministries was 5.9 years (SD=6.12) and, in the case of the Brazilian participants, 13.4 years (SD=10.9) (see Table 19, Appendix IV).

The results of the second question shown in Table 05 above demonstrate that, in the New Zealand Ministries, 12 of the 35 respondents participate in the design, in the management of the P.M. framework and in the performance evaluation itself. 10 respondents participate only in the management of the P.M. framework or part of it, whereas 8 individuals only participate in the performance evaluation process. In Brazil, 23 respondents only participate in the performance evaluation process, and 8 participate in the design, the management and in the evaluation process itself.

¹³ The survey responses are presented in terms of count and not percentages, as the sample is smaller than 100 participants.

The figures from these questions assured the researcher that these participants would be able to provide valuable information regarding the performance management systems in their respective Ministries.

Question three asked the respondents about who evaluates their performance, and the results in Table 05 above show that, in New Zealand, the majority of participants are evaluated by multiple sources (including self-assessment, though not 360 degree), and 13 are only evaluated by managers. Only 1 participant reported having their performance evaluated in the full 360 degree model. In the Brazilian Ministries, also the majority of participants reported being evaluated in some form of multi-source assessment (including self-assessment, though not 360 degree) and 14 reported being evaluated only by their managers. Again, only 2 reported having their performance evaluated in a full 360 degree model.

Even though this confirms what was observed in the documents provided by the New Zealand Ministries (see section 5.1) and contradicts the utilization of 360 degree assessments in the Brazilian Ministries, it must be said that some of the participants might not have subordinates. Therefore, the Brazilian respondents could be involved in a 360 degree model without subordinate assessments, logically. Hence, this question generally indicates a strong utilization of multi-source assessments by the Ministries in both countries, though it is inconclusive whether some of these Ministries in fact utilize a full 360 degree model in practice.

Question four asked the respondents if they participate in deciding who evaluates their performance, on a scale of 1(strongly disagree) to 5(strongly agree). The results on Table 06 (next page) show that in the New Zealand Ministries the majority of respondents disagrees and strongly disagrees, with only 9 who agree and 3 who strongly agree. In a similar fashion, a large proportion of participants from the Brazilian Ministries disagrees and strongly disagrees that they participate in those decisions, with 12 who agree that they do participate. Additionally, the means for the two countries on question four are quite similar overall, being 2.62 for the New Zealand responses (SD=1.349) and 2.84 for Brazil (SD=1.263).

These figures indicate that a large proportion of respondents from the HR departments of the Ministries from both New Zealand and Brazil **do not seem to fully participate in determining who evaluates their performance**, as opposed to what was asserted in their documents. Therefore, this aspect of performance planning is apparently not so balanced and participative in the Ministries after all, especially in the case of New Zealand.

Table 06: Results of questions 4 to 7 (scale data).

Question	Country	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	Mean	SD*	Total
Q4 Participation in deciding my evaluators	New Zealand	8	12	2	9	3	2.62	1.349	34
	Brazil	6	12	5	12	3	2.84	1.263	38
Q5 Participation in deciding who I evaluate	New Zealand	7	9	5	9	3	2.76	1.324	33
	Brazil	6	10	6	9	7	3.03	1.385	38
Q6 Shared decision on goal-setting:	New Zealand	0	5	1	20	8	3.91	.933	34
	Brazil	7	6	2	15	8	3.29	1.450	38
Q7 PM system connected to Job description:	New Zealand	0	5	5	22	2	3.62	.817	34
	Brazil	5	14	5	10	3	2.78	1.228	37

* SD: Standard Deviation.

The fifth question of the survey asked the respondents if they participate in deciding whose work performance *they* evaluate, in the same scale from 1 to 5. The results on Table 06 above show that the majority of respondents from the New Zealand Ministries either disagree or strongly disagree that they are involved in deciding whom they evaluate. Only 9 agree that they do participate and 3 strongly agree. The participants from Brazil seem to have a balanced view on this question, where the same number of respondents (n=16) either agrees or disagrees, however with a larger proportion who strongly agree that they participate in these decisions. The means of the responses of both countries demonstrate that the New Zealanders agree less (mean=2.76, SD=1.32) about being involved in these decisions, whereas the Brazilian respondents agree more (mean=3.03, SD=1.38), albeit they are around the midpoint in the scale.

This indicates that, overall, the participants from the **New Zealand Ministries** feel that they are also **less involved in deciding whose performance they evaluate than their Brazilian counterparts**, despite being a slight difference. This also contradicts what is affirmed in the documents, where performance planning in New Zealand is supposed to be a democratic process.

Question six of the questionnaire asks the respondents if the goal-setting phase is done in conjunction between managers and employees, in the same scale (1 to 5). Table 06 above shows that in the New Zealand Ministries the majority of the respondents agrees and strongly agrees that goal-setting is done in conjunction. The respondents from the Brazilian Ministries also agree more than disagree that goal-setting is done in conjunction between

managers and employees. The means of question six for both countries indicates that the responses from New Zealand had a higher mean (mean=3.91, SD=0.933) than the responses from Brazil (mean=3.29, SD=1.45).

From the figures above we can infer that the respondents from the New Zealand Ministries tend to agree more that goal-setting is done in conjunction between employees and managers. Although the majority of the respondents from the Brazilian Ministries agrees as well, a considerable proportion disagrees, suggesting that **the employees in New Zealand participate more in the goal-setting phase** than their Brazilian counterparts, which generally confirms what was described in the documents provided (section 5.1).

Regarding question seven, the participants were asked if their P.M. system is connected to the job descriptions. Table 06 (previous page) shows that the majority of the New Zealand respondents agrees with the item, whereas only 5 disagree. On the other hand, in the Brazilian Ministries only 10 respondents agree, and 14 disagree that their P.M. system is connected to the job descriptions. The overall mean of the responses from the New Zealand Ministries (mean=3.62, SD=0.817) is indeed higher than the mean of the responses from Brazil (mean=2.78, SD=1.228).

From these results, we can observe that **in New Zealand the performance management systems are more closely connected to the job descriptions of the employees**, when compared to the Brazilian Ministries. This possibly indicates that the parameters for performance evaluation in New Zealand are more connected to the specific work that each employee actually does.

When evaluating question eight, which asks the participants about the form of performance evaluation utilized (formal, informal or no evaluation), it reveals that the vast majority of the New Zealand Ministries utilize a formal performance appraisal process, however 5 participants chose the option “other”, where they described having both formal and informal evaluations (see Table 07 below). Specifically looking at Ministry NZ3 (Table 30, Appendix IV), half of their responses indicate that they utilize informal appraisals, which is coherent with the framework in their documents (shifting from assessments to constant conversations). In Brazil, also a high proportion of responses indicate that they mostly utilize formal performance appraisals. Interestingly, it was observed that two respondents from the Brazilian Ministries answered that they do not have performance evaluations, and one

respondent commented in the field “other” that he or she has never had a formal performance appraisal in three years working there.

Table 07: Results of questions 8 to 12 (nominal data)

Question	Country	Nominal Scale / Items				----	----	-----
Q8 Format of performance evaluation:		A formal performance appraisal	Informal evaluations	There is no performance evaluation	Other	----	----	Total
Count	New Zealand	26	3	0	5	----	----	34
	Brazil	32	1	2	2	----	----	37
Q9 Performance evaluation period:		6 months;	12 months;	18 months;	Continuously	Other timeframe	----	Total
Count	New Zealand	11	16	0	1	3	----	31
	Brazil	0	33	1	0	0	----	34
Q10 * Form of completion of evaluations		Electronically	On paper	Electronic and paper	Electronic and verbal	Paper and verbal	All three forms	Total
Count	New Zealand	1	3	5	4	9	9	31
	Brazil	16	9	9	0	0	1	35
Q11 P.M. system only for development		Yes	No	----	----	----	----	Total
Count	New Zealand	5	28	----	----	----	----	33
	Brazil	12	25	----	----	----	----	37
Q12** Administrative purpose of P.M. system		Performance and pay increases	Performance and variable pay	Performance, pay increases and promotions	Performance, pay increases and variable pay	All three	None of the above	Total
Count	New Zealand	19	6	5	1	3	0	34
	Brazil	6	23	3	3	1	1	37

* Q10: none of the participants chose the option “verbally” alone, except when they chose the option “All three forms”.

** Q12: none of the participants chose the option “Performance and promotions” alone, except when they chose the option “All three”.

Hence, it can be inferred that in general **both countries utilize formal performance appraisals** in their P.M. systems, though some New Zealand Ministries also have informal appraisals, which is coherent with their documents. The respondents from Brazil who answered not having performance appraisals or evaluations may indicate some kind of internal inconsistency in their P.M. system.

Of the participants who described having formal evaluations, question nine asked about the time period when these evaluations were held in their Ministries, and the results (Table 07 above) show that in New Zealand 11 respondents have evaluations every six months, 16 have their evaluations yearly. Only 3 reported “other timeframe”, chiefly NZ4, who have evaluations every four months *and* an end-of-year assessment. In Brazil, nearly all responses indicated having evaluations yearly.

It can be observed that **in Brazil** they have **performance evaluations yearly**, whereas in **New Zealand**, generally, they have **evaluations during the year** (with some variation) **and a final evaluation at the end of the year**. This partially confirms the descriptions from the New Zealand documents, because in fact all Ministries mentioned having interim evaluations (formal or informal), not just some. Yet, the results contradict the documents from Brazil, since they described interim evaluations and performance monitoring during the PM cycle.

In question ten, those participants who have formal performance evaluations were asked about the form of completion of these evaluations (electronically, on paper, only discussed verbally, or a combination of those). Table 07 above demonstrates that the majority of the New Zealand participants either have evaluations on paper and discuss them verbally or utilize all three forms. A smaller proportion has evaluations electronically and on paper or electronically and verbally. In Brazil, most of the Ministries only utilize electronic forms or electronic *and* paper forms. 9 respondents from Brazil affirmed that they utilize only paper forms.

Subsequently, it can be inferred from the above figures that the **New Zealand Ministries** tend to **use a combination** of paper forms and verbal discussions or electronic, paper forms and verbal discussions combined, **whereas electronic forms alone seem to be mostly utilized in Brazil**. It appears that verbal discussions on the performance evaluations are not so common in the Brazilian Ministries, what possibly entails that there is very little interaction between evaluator and evaluated, being more restricted to filling out forms.

Question eleven asked the participants if their performance management systems were designed *only* to support employee development. Table 07 above shows that, in New Zealand, the majority of Ministries **do not** utilize the P.M. system *only* for development. Similar results happened in the Brazilian Ministries, though in a smaller proportion. We can conclude that, **in both countries**, the performance management system is **not utilized solely for developmental purposes**.

On question twelve, the participants were asked if their performance management systems are designed to measure performance and determine either pay grade increases, promotions, variable pay or a combination of those (Table 07 above). In New Zealand, the majority indicated that they utilize it for pay grade increases, whereas 6 respondents indicated they utilize it for variable pay, and only 5 for pay grade increases *and* promotions. In Brazil, however, the majority responded that they utilize it for variable pay, whereas only 6

respondents indicated the utilization for pay increases. Only a small number answered that they utilize it for either pay increases *and* promotions or pay increases *and* variable pay, equally.

The figures from question twelve above confirm what was described in the documents, where the New Zealand Ministries connect the performance evaluations to pay grade increases, and generally do not tend to offer variable pay (only small awards in exceptional cases). Likewise, the results are coherent in the case of Brazil, where the Ministries provide variable pay as '*Gratificações*', besides annual increases. Thus, **both countries connect their PM systems to pay, though in different formats**, which confirms the descriptions from the archival analysis.

In question thirteen, the participants were asked, in a scale from 1(strongly disagree) to 5(strongly agree), if the employees in their Ministries receive training on the performance management system before any process is started (Table 08 below). The same number of participants from New Zealand agree and disagree, though one strongly agrees, therefore it is a balanced result. In the Brazilian Ministries, also the same number agrees and disagrees, however with a higher proportion who strongly disagrees. The means of the responses from both countries show that the respondents from New Zealand, in general, agree more that employees receive training on the performance management system (mean=3.06, N=34) than the respondents from Brazil (mean=2.89, N=38).

This allows us to infer that, **in both countries there are Ministries who provide training to their staff on the P.M. system, and some who have problems in that respect** (e.g. NZ1, NZ2, BR1 and BR4). Such kind of training was described in the Ministries' documents of both countries, though some kind of inconsistency may happen in practice. As observed before, training for both employees and evaluators is vital for the success of any performance evaluation process (Latham et. al., 2007).

Table 08: Results of questions 13 to 16 (scale data).

Question	Country	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	Mean	SD	Total
Q13 Employees receive training on P.M.	New Zealand	0	14	5	14	1	3.06	.983	34
	Brazil	8	8	6	12	4	2.89	1.351	38
Q14 P.A. focuses mainly on behaviours	New Zealand	2	18	7	7	0	2.56	.894	34
	Brazil	3	11	11	8	4	2.97	1.142	37
Q15 P.A. focuses mainly on results	New Zealand	2	10	9	13	0	2.97	.969	34
	Brazil	4	12	8	12	1	2.84	1.093	37
Q16 P.A. includes team performance:	New Zealand	5	20	5	3	1	2.26	.931	34
	Brazil	3	10	5	14	5	3.22	1.228	37

In question fourteen, the participants were asked, in the same scale from 1 to 5, if their performance measurement parameters focus predominantly on behavioural aspects (e.g. use of skills, abilities towards work, personal conduct etc) instead of results, quantitative or qualitative aspects of work. The results on Table 08 above show that the majority of the 34 New Zealand respondents disagree, whereas only 7 agree. In Brazil, a higher proportion agrees, however the majority also disagrees. Overall, the respondents from Brazil seem to agree more (mean=2.97, SD=0.894) than the respondents from New Zealand (mean=2.56, SD=1.142).

It can be inferred that **the New Zealand Ministries appear to focus slightly less on measures of behavioural aspects than those of the Brazilian Ministries**, even though the results are quite close.

Question fifteen asked the participants if their performance measurement system focuses predominantly on results, qualitative or quantitative aspects of work, in the same scale (1 to 5). The respondents from the New Zealand Ministries seem to agree slightly more than they disagree, with a difference of one respondent who agrees (see Table 08 above). In Brazil, the opposite results show that there are more participants who disagree. The means of both countries indicate that indeed the respondents from the New Zealand Ministries agree more (mean=2.97, SD=0.969) than the respondents from Brazil (mean=2.84, SD=1.09), though the difference is not considerable.

It can be concluded that, from these figures, the performance measurement systems of both countries do not focus predominantly on results. Thus, from questions fourteen and fifteen, **we can assume that the performance measurement systems of both countries utilize a blend of behavioural and result-like parameters.** This confirms the description from their documents, as analysed in section 5.1.

In question sixteen, the participants were asked if the performance evaluation includes team performance, besides individual performance. Results from Table 08 above are clear to indicate that the majority of the New Zealand respondents disagree and strongly disagree. From the Brazilian Ministries, the majority agrees, showing an opposite result from that of New Zealand. BR1 can be considered the exception: the majority disagrees (n=6) or strongly disagrees (n=3), as shown on Table 41 (Appendix IV). The means of both countries clearly show that the respondents from the Brazilian Ministries agree more (mean=3.22, SD=1.22) than their New Zealand counterparts (mean=2.26, SD=0.931).

This allows to infer that, **in Brazil, the majority of the performance evaluations include team performance,** besides individual performance, **whereas this does not happen in the same proportion in New Zealand.** Indeed, the documents from the New Zealand Ministries were not all clear about how team performance is evaluated, especially in relation to individual performance.

In question seventeen, participants were asked if they have one performance measurement system that serves all purposes, or they have more than one system for different purposes. Table 09 on the next page shows that, in New Zealand, the majority responded that there is only one system that serves all purposes (n=28). In Brazil, the majority also indicated having only one system (n=22), where Ministry BR1 had the largest proportion (n=11). 15 participants indicated having more than one P.M. system, however there were considerable differences within the answers of Ministries BR2, BR4 and BR5, which were quite balanced.

In conclusion, **in New Zealand, the Ministries generally utilize one performance measurement system for all purposes,** whereas the results referring to Brazil can be considered inconclusive, due to differences in the responses within the Ministries. This also may imply that there is some degree of misunderstanding amongst the HR staff about the P.M. system within these three Ministries.

Table 09: Results of questions 17 to 19 (nominal data)

Question	Country	Nominal Scale / Items		-----
Q17 One or more Performance measurement systems		We have more than one performance measurement system, each for different purposes;	There is only one performance measurement system, that serves all purposes necessary.	Total
Count	New Zealand	6	28	34
	Brazil	15	22	37
Q18 I have seen and know Performance measurement systems of other Ministries		Yes.	No.	Total
Count	New Zealand	15	18	33
	Brazil	11	26	37
Q19* Performance measurement system similar or different to other Ministries		Similar to the ones in the other Ministries, only with slight differences.	Completely different from the other Ministries	Total
Count	New Zealand	13	3	16
	Brazil	9	2	11

* None of the participants chose the option "A" (exactly the same as in the other Ministries).

Question eighteen was a filter question for question nineteen, and it asked the participants whether they had seen and knew the performance measurement systems of other Ministries. Those who answered "yes" went on to question 19; those who answered "no" skipped to question 20. In New Zealand, a rather balanced result indicated that 18 respondents did not know P.M. systems of other Ministries, whereas 15 did know. In Brazil, the majority indicated that they did not know P.M. systems from other Ministries (see Table 09 above).

It is possible to conclude that, in New Zealand, **approximately half of the participants do know other P.M. systems from other Ministries, and nearly half do not, whereas in Brazil the majority does not know P.M. systems from other Ministries.**

On question nineteen, those who answered "yes" in the previous question were asked if their performance measurement systems are exactly the same, similar or completely different from the other Ministries. The number of "missings" (46) is due to the fact that these participants chose the option "no" in the previous question. From the respondents who answered "yes" to the previous question, most of the participants in New Zealand and in Brazil indicated that their P.M. systems are similar to those of other Ministries, only with slight differences (see Table 09 above).

Overall, **we can infer that the P.M. systems tend to be similar between the Ministries within each country.** This goes in line with the observations from the archival analysis of both countries, with the exception of some particular characteristics in the PM system of NZ3.

In the space for comments in this question, few participants decided to write general comments. From the participants of the New Zealand Ministries, one mentioned that the P.M. system from the other Ministry he or she knows is electronically based (as opposed to NZ1), and the other participant, from NZ3, mentioned that their new P.M. system is introducing an even balance on the delivery of work and employee development, as to achieve the work programme and strategic direction. Additionally, it was mentioned that the focus now is on continuous feedback and performance and development conversations, apparently different from the other Ministries. From the participants of the Brazilian Ministries, almost all comments referred to the fact that the P.M. systems of all Ministries are similar in that they must follow the guidelines from the same decree (Decree nº 7.133, 2010). Only one participant mentioned that NZ1 has not completely implemented the P.M. system yet, and another participant mentioned that one of the secretariats of his or her Ministry does not link the performance evaluations to pay, as they should.

In question twenty, the participants were asked if they always receive feedback from their performance evaluations, in the same scale from 1 to 5. Table 10 (next page) shows that, in general, the New Zealand participants feel they do receive this feedback, as most of them agree or strongly agree. In Brazil, the results are somewhat divided, with a slightly larger proportion who agrees. Ministry BR5 is the outlier in this case, as the respondents agree (n=8) and strongly agree (n=5) that they receive feedback (see table 46, Appendix IV). The means of the two countries confirm that the respondents from the New Zealand Ministries agree more (mean=3.79, SD=1.19) than the participants from the Brazilian Ministries (mean=3.14, SD=1.47) about receiving feedback.

We can infer from this that the **participants from the New Zealand Ministries tend to receive more feedback after their performance evaluation than their Brazilian counterparts.** This is also coherent with what was described in the documents, since feedback is not emphasized in the Decree N 7.133 (2010) at all. This can become a problem in the P.M. system of the Brazilian Ministries, due to the importance that feedback has for the performance improvement of an employee (DeNisi and Kluger, 2000; Mausolf, 2004; De Nisi and Pritchard, 2006; Latham et. al. , 2007).

Table 10: Results of questions 20 to 31 (scale data).

Question	Country	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	Not Applicable to me*	Mean	SD	Total
Q20 I always receive feedback about my P.Appraisal	New Zealand	2	4	3	14	10	-----	3.79	1.193	33
	Brazil	8	5	6	10	8	-----	3.14	1.475	37
Q21 I receive feedback also in meetings during the year	New Zealand	3	4	4	14	8	-----	3.61	1.248	33
	Brazil	7	9	6	11	4	-----	2.89	1.329	37
Q22 I receive T&D opportunities related to my P. evaluation	New Zealand	2	2	4	19	5	-----	3.72	1.023	32
	Brazil	7	8	8	12	3	-----	2.89	1.269	38
Q23 I have support from my manager to improve my performance	New Zealand	1	3	3	22	4	-----	3.76	.902	33
	Brazil	5	8	5	15	5	-----	3.18	1.291	38
Q24 Repeated low performance can result in dismissal	New Zealand	0	1	6	22	3	-----	3.84	.628	32
	Brazil	16	10	8	3	0	-----	1.95	.998	37
Q25 HR has autonomy to customize P.M. system	New Zealand	1	13	5	13	1	-----	3.00	1.031	33
	Brazil	1	7	7	18	4	-----	3.46	1.016	37
Q26 P.M. in this Ministry changes constantly	New Zealand	1	20	10	2	0	-----	2.39	.659	33
	Brazil	2	15	15	3	3	-----	2.74	.978	38
Q27 These changes can become a bit confusing	New Zealand	0	0	4	6	0	-----	3.60	.516	10
	Brazil	0	2	6	9	2	-----	3.58	.838	19
Q28 The P.measurement system measures what it is supposed to measure	New Zealand	2	5	8	15	0	-----	3.20	.961	30
	Brazil	3	4	9	15	2	-----	3.27	1.069	33
Q29 Recognition and rewards are fair and encouraging	New Zealand	2	7	9	12	0	-----	3.03	.964	30
	Brazil	6	7	12	6	3	-----	2.79	1.200	34
Q30 I feel comfortable when evaluating my subordinates or peers	New Zealand	0	2	3	14	4	7	4.37	1.159	30
	Brazil	1	6	12	10	4	1	3.38	1.101	34
Q31 I have heard complaints about our P.M. system	New Zealand	1	2	6	15	6	-----	3.77	.971	30
	Brazil	1	4	11	11	6	-----	3.52	1.034	33

* The alternative "Not Applicable" was utilized only in question 30.

Question twenty one was a complementary question, in which the participants were asked if they received feedback also in review meetings throughout the year. The results in Table 10 above indicate that the majority of the New Zealand participants agree that they

receive this feedback during the year as well. In Brazil, the results indicated rather divided responses. Ministry BR5 is, again, the exception.

The means of each country demonstrate that, overall, the participants from the New Zealand Ministries indeed seem to receive more feedback (mean=3.61, SD=1.248) in these review meetings during the year than the participants from the Brazilian Ministries (mean=2.89, SD=1.329).

It can be concluded that, in line with the previous question, the **participants from New Zealand receive more feedback during the year than the participants from Brazil**. This would also be expected, from the observations in the archival analysis.

In question twenty two, the participants were asked if they receive Training and Development (T&D) opportunities related to their performance evaluations, on the same scale (1 to 5). The results on Table 10 above indicate that the majority of the New Zealand respondents agree that they receive these T&D opportunities related to their evaluations, whereas in Brazil a smaller proportion agrees that they receive these T&D opportunities connected to their performance evaluations. The mean of the responses from the New Zealand Ministries (mean=3.72, SD=1.02) is considerably higher than the one from the Brazilian Ministries (mean=2.89, SD=1.26).

It can be inferred from these figures that **the participants from the New Zealand Ministries seem to receive more training and development relative to their performance evaluations than the participants from Brazil**, as to improve their performance. According to the observations from the archival analysis, these results corroborate with the fact that training and development is not at all emphasized in the Decree 7.133 (2010), being only described in the previous Decree 5.707 (2006). As mentioned by Macky (2008) and Boxall et. al.(2008), performance improvement initiatives should seek to build employee potential with an adequate bundle of formal training and education, as well as coaching and mentoring (Armstrong, 2009) as to obtain results on the long run. Hence, a disconnect may indeed be present in the framework of the Brazilian Ministries that can potentially hinder performance improvement.

On question twenty three, the participants were asked if they receive support from their managers to improve their performance, and Table 10 above indicates that the majority of the New Zealand participants agrees or strongly agrees that they do receive support from their managers. A large proportion of respondents from the Brazilian Ministries also tend to

agree or strongly agree in general. With effect, the responses from the New Zealand Ministries had a higher mean (mean=3.76, SD=0.902) than the responses from Brazil (mean=3.18, SD=1.29).

We may infer from these results that **the respondents from the New Zealand Ministries tend to have more support from their managers than the respondents from Brazil**. The documents of the New Zealand Ministries, when emphasizing regular conversations, feedback and communication between managers and employees, are coherent with these results. On the other hand, it appears that in Brazil some of the problems asserted by Guimarães, Nader and Ramagem thirteen years ago (1998) still persist to some extent (see section 2.3), though there is no particular contradiction with the Decree 7.133 (2010).

In question twenty four, the participants were asked if repeated low performance of an employee can result in dismissal. The vast majority of the respondents from the New Zealand Ministries agrees (n=22) that they can be dismissed, and 3 participants strongly agree. In Brazil, a rather opposite result took place: 16 participants strongly disagree, and 10 disagree. The means of each country confirm the opposing results, where the responses from New Zealand had a mean of 3.84(SD=0.628) and the responses from Brazil had a mean of 1.95 (SD=0.998) (see Table 10 above).

This allows us to infer that, in **New Zealand, the participants agree that repeated low performance results can lead to the dismissal of an employee**, whereas **in Brazil the vast majority of participants do not believe that an employee can be dismissed due to repeated low performance**. This is contradictory to what the law in Brazil determines, and is not aligned to the ideal procedures in PM described in the literature (e.g. Macky, 2008; Armstrong, 2009). This can stimulate a general 'comfort zone' for low performers, which is negative for teams and departments.

In question 25, the participants were asked if their HR department has autonomy to customize the performance management system of their Ministry. Table 10 above shows that, in New Zealand, a balanced result indicates that the same number either agrees or disagrees. In Brazil, the majority of the respondents agrees or strongly agrees. The means of the two countries indicate that, **overall, the Brazilian participants seem to agree more that their HR departments have autonomy to customize the performance management system** (mean=3.46, SD=1.01), whereas the participants from New Zealand agree less (mean=3.00, SD=1.01).

In the space for comments, very few participants made further comments in this question. Most comments from the New Zealand Ministries referred to the necessity of interaction with the other internal departments and management 'buy-in' for the effective customization of the P.M. system. From the participants of the Brazilian Ministries, the few comments expressed that any customization of the P.M. system must be done within the limits of the Decree nº 7.133 (2010), and also pointed to the need of interaction with the other departments, which is a process that sometimes faces political barriers.

Question twenty six was a filter question for question twenty seven, where the participants were asked if the performance management system in their Ministries changed constantly, in the same scale (1 to 5). Table 10 above shows that the majority of respondents from the New Zealand Ministries disagrees, with similar results found in the responses from Brazil. The mean of the responses from Brazil was higher (mean=2.74, SD=0.978) than the mean of responses from New Zealand (mean=2.39, SD=0.659), even though in both cases the majority of respondents disagreed.

It is possible to see that **a large proportion of respondents from both New Zealand and Brazil disagree that their performance management systems change constantly.** Therefore, these PM systems appear to be relatively stable over time.

Question twenty seven depended on the answer to the previous question, and it asked if the changes could be a bit confusing. If the respondents answered that they strongly agreed, agreed or neither agreed nor disagreed in question twenty six, they would be directed to this question, and if they answered that they disagreed or strongly disagreed, they would automatically skip this question. For this reason, this question had a high number of "missings" (n=44). From the few who answered the question, a large proportion of the New Zealand respondents agreed, and a fair amount of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed. In Brazil, the majority also agreed (see Table 10 above). The means of the countries are very close, being 3.6 (SD=0.516) from New Zealand and 3.58 (SD=0.838) from Brazil.

Therefore, it can be concluded that, from the respondents who believe their PM system changes constantly (question 26), a somewhat larger proportion in both countries tends to agree that these changes can be a bit confusing. However, due to the large number of "missings", this question can be considered inconclusive in relation to all the participants from both countries.

In question twenty eight, the participants were asked if they believe that their performance evaluation systems measure what they are supposed to measure, in the same scale (1 to 5). Table 10 above shows that the majority of the respondents from the New Zealand Ministries agree, whereas only a few disagree or strongly disagree. However, a considerable proportion of respondents from NZ2 strongly disagree ($n=2$) (see Table 62, Appendix IV). From the participants of the Brazilian Ministries, a large proportion agrees, whereas 4 disagree and 3 strongly disagree. BR1 had a fair amount of respondents who strongly disagree ($n=3$), and BR2 had 4 participants who strongly disagree (see Table 62, Appendix IV). Overall, the responses from the Brazilian Ministries had a slightly higher mean (mean=3.27, $SD=1.069$) than the responses from the New Zealand Ministries (mean=3.20, $SD=0.961$).

It can be inferred from the figures above that, generally **in both countries**, the participants from the Ministries **agree more than they disagree that their performance management systems measure what they are supposed to measure**. It must be noticed, though, that NZ2, BR1 and BR2 had large proportions of respondents who do not agree. The few comments from the participants indicate that, despite some subjective measures and inadequate practices, the systems are evolving.

In question twenty nine, the participants were asked if their recognition and rewards are considered fair and encouraging, in the same scale (1 to 5). The results on Table 10 above indicate that a larger proportion of the New Zealand respondents agree, whereas only 7 participants disagree. From the respondents of the Brazilian Ministries, a larger proportion seems to disagree and strongly disagree, whereas only 6 agree and 3 strongly agree. The mean of the responses from the New Zealand Ministries (mean=3.03, $SD=0.964$) is indeed higher than the mean from the responses of the Brazilian Ministries (mean=2.79, $SD=1.2$).

We can conclude, thus, that **in general the respondents from New Zealand feel that their rewards and recognition schemes are slightly more fair and encouraging than the respondents from the Brazilian Ministries**. Once again, though, some Ministries had considerable proportions of responses that did not agree, which is the case of NZ1, NZ2, BR1 and BR4. This is an interesting result, bearing in mind that variable pay (bonus) is a strong and consolidated practice in the Brazilian Ministries, and very rare in their New Zealand counterparts according to the archival analysis. This can suggest that non-financial recognition

schemes are possibly more positive towards employees in New Zealand than the financial rewards are in Brazil.

On question thirty, the participants were asked if they feel comfortable when evaluating the performance of their subordinates or peers. Table 10 above indicates that the majority of the New Zealand respondents tend to agree that they do feel comfortable in those evaluations. 7 participants answered that this does not apply to them, and the researcher understands that they probably do not have subordinates. From the responses of the Brazilian participants, also a considerable proportion of respondents agree or strongly agree that they do feel comfortable when evaluating subordinates or peers, whereas only 6 disagree. The mean of the responses from the New Zealand responses (mean=4.37, SD=1.159) is significantly higher than the mean of the responses from Brazil (mean=3.38, SD=1.1), overall.

It can be concluded, from the results above, that in general the **respondents from the New Zealand Ministries tend to feel more comfortable when evaluating their peers' or subordinates' performance than the respondents from the Brazilian Ministries**. Ministries NZ3 and BR2 seem to be the exceptions in their groups, however, in that a large proportion of respondents do not agree (see Table 66, Appendix IV). However, despite the difference in the answers from the two countries, generally the participants do not seem to feel uncomfortable in that process.

Question thirty one asked the participants if they have heard complaints about their performance management systems, as members of their HR departments. Table 10 above shows that, in New Zealand, the majority of respondents either agree or strongly agree , whereas in Brazil the majority also agrees, though in a smaller proportion. The means of the responses from the two countries indicate that the New Zealand respondents seem to agree more (mean=-3.77, SD=0.971) that they have received complaints about their PM system than the respondents from the Brazilian Ministries (mean=3.52, SD=1.03), even though the results are fairly close.

Hence, it is possible to conclude in general that the **respondents from the New Zealand Ministries agree slightly more that they receive complaints about their performance management systems than the respondents from Brazil**. The reasons for these complaints are explained in question thirty two below.

Question *thirty two* was an open-ended question, where the participants were asked to comment on the types of issues that could motivate the complaints they received about

their P.M. system (if any), as members of the HR department. This question aimed to identify *potential dysfunctions* in the P.M. systems of these Ministries, without forcing the respondents to choose between pre-set alternatives that could not be applicable to their reality. Of the fifty one original comments made by the participants, 46 were considered relevant and pertinent to the question (26 from New Zealand and 20 from Brazil). A *Thematic Analysis* was conducted, which yielded thirteen codes and five categories overall, according to the interpretation of the researcher.

The results and analysis are presented first in relation to the responses from New Zealand, and then the responses from Brazil. Table 11 below shows the codes and categories from the New Zealand responses:

Table 11: Question 32: Issues that motivate complaints in New Zealand Ministries (potential dysfunctions):

NEW ZEALAND		
INITIAL CONCEPTS	FINAL CODES	CATEGORIES
Complicated - not encouraging	Complicated - not encouraging (COMPNE)	FRAMEWORK ISSUES
Complicated templates		
Complicated - not encouraging		
Complicated - not encouraging		
Complicated - not encouraging		
Lengthy Performance Plan		
Cumbersome software	Inadequate Rating Parameters (ISPARAP)	
Lominger competency set too generic		
Ambiguity on rating descriptions		
Ambiguity on rating scale		
Inconsistent application	Fragile link to Remuneration (FRALREM)	
Fragile link to remuneration		
Fragile link to remuneration		
Fragile link to remuneration		
Fragile link to remuneration		
Fragile link to remuneration		
Fragile link to remuneration		

Table 11: Question 32 (continuation):

NEW ZEALAND		
INITIAL CONCEPTS	FINAL CODES	CATEGORIES
Lazy Managers	Uncommitted Managers (UNCMGS)	LOW COMMITMENT AND INTEGRATION
Low Management accountability in P.M.		
P.M. System manipulated by Managers		
Resistance to a new system	Resistance to Change (RESCHG)	
Resistance to a new system		
P.M. process a mere formality	Mere formality (MEFLTY)	
P.M. process a mere formality		

As suggested by Bryman and Bell (2007), the initial concepts were interpreted from answers with similar meanings, and then re-visited to check consistency and to yield the final codes. The categories are a higher level of abstraction from the codes, relating to broader themes.

The answers from the New Zealand participants were labeled in six codes. The first code, “Complicated – not encouraging” involved comments that came from NZ1 and NZ5, and it reflects the comments that related to the complexity or length of forms and templates utilized for performance ratings and performance planning, as well as difficulties with the software utilized for performance evaluations. All of which are framework and planning issues. Some examples of answers¹⁴ are provided below:

“Too complicated. Don't understand, system doesn't encourage people to perform.”

“Length of performance plan detail required.”

“The main issue raised is the software solution used here - it is cumbersome and error prone.”

These issues can create complications against the sound design of performance agreements, or in the application of performance assessments, in the procedures that lead to performance improvement initiatives, and the overall outcomes of the performance management system in general. As a consequence, these problems seem to discourage the users of the P.M. system.

The second code, “Inadequate Rating Parameters”, had comments from NZ1, NZ2, NZ3 and NZ5. The comments were related to inconsistencies, subjectivities or ambiguities in the descriptions of rating scales, as well as parameters of objectives and competencies when translated to performance measures. Besides, the way ratings are conducted is sometimes also inadequate:

¹⁴ The participating Ministries could be possibly identified through their specific sample answers, therefore the Ministries are only mentioned in general terms, and any eventual names are omitted from the answers.

“Lominger competencies are (...) too generic and don't reflect an individual's activities and performance.”

(...) “around matters such as ambiguity on rating descriptions which lead to inconsistency.”

“The way they are conducted, and what they do not measure” (...)

Apart from the polemic on the Lominger competencies, the focus of the comments is around measures for rating performance, and how these reflect or do not reflect performance. This relates to classical problems with rating bias derived from overly subjective measures (Levy, 2006; Macky, 2008), which in turn can obstruct the rater's perception of the employee's performance, and create further issues.

The third code identified in the category Framework Issues was *“Fragile link to Remuneration”*, which is a rather straightforward issue where all comments relate to inconsistencies between performance assessments and their outcome in terms of pay increases. According to these answers from NZ1, NZ2 and NZ5, the performance management framework has loose connections to remuneration:

“The Ministry systems are not equitable and pay parity is an issue.”

“Because our linkages to remuneration are not completely overt - there are some concerns that it should be more transparent.”

Although non-financial recognition is an interesting motivational factor (Pfeffer, 1998), it is common sense that fair remuneration is one of the central recognition factors for employees (Lawler, 2003), thus any lack of transparency of criteria and parameters for financial rewards can bring about dissatisfaction.

These were all grouped under the interpretation of “Framework Issues”, in that they are related to potential dysfunctions from poor system design and performance planning, which are when the important phase of goal-setting takes place (Locke and Latham, 2002). This is where targets, objectives, KRAs, KPIs and performance expectations are intertwined, and linked to rewards.

The category of *“Low Commitment and Integration”* was derived from the codes *“Uncommitted Managers”*, *“Resistance to Change”* and *“Mere Formality”*, from all five Ministries. The issue of low commitment chiefly stems from the level of accountability of Managers when conducting the evaluation of performance, especially in relation to poor performers and performance outcomes. An example is the following:

“Weak managers hide behind the system or are too afraid of giving poor performers the correct evaluation, which demotivates the rest of the team!”

With regards to resistance to change, the answers relate to the way employees and managers behave when dealing with a new performance management system, which can affect the individual's 'comfort zone'. This can be interpreted as a lack of commitment towards improvements. For example:

“Any negative views are mostly "teething" issues with a new system and are mostly administrative.”

Finally, some answers described that the performance management system of some Ministries (mainly NZ2 and NZ3) is viewed as a mere formality, only another bureaucratic exercise that has no real implications:

“Seen as a compliance exercise. Just another box to tick.”

These themes converge towards the subject (category) of Commitment and Integration, where the lack of commitment and accountability of managers, the resistance to change and rhetorical purposes of the performance management system denote that the departments (and individuals) within some Ministries are not integrated enough for the P.M. system to work. The need for such an integration is evident in Macky's(2008) model in section 2.2, and is also advocated in the Ministries' documents, however does not seem to happen fully in practice.

This entails that the discourse of managerialism, freedom to manage with a counterbalance of accountability in New Zealand (Radin, 2003; Dormer and Gill, 2010) is not completely valid in relation to employee performance management, as it appears. The New Zealand Ministries need more support and true engagement of managers so that the 'gears in the engine' work together.

Regarding the comments from the Brazilian participants, Table 12 on the next page shows the six codes and three categories yielded from the initial analysis. Some similarities with the categories from New Zealand can be identified:

Table 12: Question 32: Issues that motivate complaints in Brazilian Ministries (potential dysfunctions):

BRAZIL		
INITIAL CONCEPTS	FINAL CODES	CATEGORIES
Manipulation of results by Managers	Manipulation of results by Managers (MRESMGs)	LOW COMMITMENT AND INTEGRATION
Manipulation of results by Managers		
Manipulation of results by Managers		
Manipulation of results by Managers		
Resistance to a new system	Resistance to a new system (RESNSYS)	
Resistance to a new system		
Resistance to a new system		
P.M. a justification for bonuses	Inadequate use of P.M. (INDUSPM)	
P.M. system is a mere formality		
Discontinuity of the P.M. process		
Lack of involvement and communication	Poor Communication (PORCOM)	
Lack of communication		
Limitations of the Decree	Limitations of the Decree (LIMTDCR)	FRAMEWORK ISSUES
Restrictions of the Decree		
Overly subjective measures	Overly Subjective Measures (OSUBME)	
P.A. vague and generic		
P.M. system new - a work in progress	P.M. System - a work in progress (PMSYPRO)	P.M. SYSTEM EVOLVING
P.M. System - Work in progress		
P.M. System - Work in progress		

The first category, “*Low Commitment and Integration*”, is analogous to the second category identified in the New Zealand responses, with some different concepts and codes. The code “*Manipulation of results by Managers*” had a stronger presence in the responses from the Brazilian Ministries (NZ1, NZ3 and NZ5), where instances of paternalism or generalized lack of interest of managers in the outcomes of performance evaluations is perceived as a critical issue. Some examples¹⁵ follow:

“The so called managers, often with no skills for the position, still use personal criteria and do not apply any instrument of collective improvement.”

“Related to the paternalism of some managers when evaluating some employees.”

Since the performance management systems of the New Zealand Ministries rely so much on managers’ actions, as described earlier in the analysis of the documents, more attention should be given to the manager – employee relationship and communication. As asserted by Pulakos and O’Leary (2011), this communication and relationship helps ensure continual guidance towards performance improvement, and is more important than constant adaptations of appraisal procedures.

¹⁵ The extracts are literal translations by the researcher, who is a native speaker of the Portuguese language.

The code “Resistance to a new system” is also analogous to one of the codes from New Zealand, and it denotes that, with the Decree nº 7.133 (2010), a new method of performance evaluations was introduced, which can also have broken the ‘comfort zone’ of some individuals who were used to the old status quo. Some examples of this are:

“Resistance to change, demotivation from some employees.”

“Implementing a new model of assessment in this Ministry requires cultural change ... the resistance is considerable, and complaints exist, of course ... however we are working on it.”

The next code related to this category is “Inadequate use of P.M.”. The respondents, notably from BR1, concentrated their comments on a misuse or inadequate use of the performance management instruments, where a lack of continuity weakens the processes and is unstimulating. A good example that involves most of the concepts identified is below:

“A complicated matter is the issue of discontinuity in the performance management ... slowness of implementation, changes of managers, no link to career growth, etc.”

As explained in section 2.2, amongst the administrative purposes of performance management outcomes, it should be used for recognition schemes, opportunities to succeed, career planning and rewards (Armstrong, 2009). The discontinuity and disconnect of processes can hinder the effective use of the P.M. system., in the context of these comments.

The aspect of poor communication is chiefly due to difficulties in transmitting the information to all offices and branches in an equally effective manner, as to explain how things are supposed to be done. Besides organizational complexity and geographical distance between offices, the lack of commitment to share the information further undermines the communication:

“Lack of communication about evaluation procedures. Managers lack the knowledge”

“Frequently the complaints are due to lack of knowledge. (...)The dissemination of information does not always reach the other end. Efforts are being done to minimize this.”

Hence, the issue of communication and involvement is another factor that undermines the integration of processes and procedures in the performance management system. Government organizations tend to be large in general, therefore the way information flows is logically a key aspect in the design and utilization of a P.M. system.

The next category, “*Framework Issues*”, was derived from the codes “*Overly Subjective Measures*”, which bears similarities with the codes from the New Zealand responses, and “*Limitations of the Decree*”, which is particularly related to the legal regulations in Brazil.

As explained previously, the Decree nº 7.133 (2010) outlines in a rather detailed manner the framework that the Ministries must follow for the implementation of their performance management systems. Therefore, as much as it guides the processes, procedures and parameters to be used, it constrains the degree of freedom of the Ministries to design their systems in the best manner for internal fit. The phrase below illustrates this issue in a simple way:

“Due to the restrictions of the Decree, which is expected to be improved in the next cycle.”

The objectives, goals, KRAs and KPIs of a P.M. system are essential elements to be tailored to the needs of the organization (Armstrong, 2009), in a way that will relate to specific outputs and competencies of the employee’s job and reflect his or her performance. Therefore, if the decree specifies too many details (as it does, including some competencies), some Ministries may become constrained in the design of their specific parameters for assessment and goal achievement.

The second code related to the category of Framework Issues refers to the level of subjectivity in the performance measures utilized by these Ministries (notably BR1 and BR4). From the observation of the responses, it is possible to infer that performance evaluations and discussions are often diverted to personal issues or subjectivities that hinder the effective evaluation of performance. For example:

“We lack objective criteria to assess performance; the discussions revolve around something that happened, and not the achievement of goals or how these were achieved.”

These comments relate to some of the more ‘classical’ dysfunctions in performance assessments (i.e. subjective measures), and to what was argued in earlier studies on the Brazilian government by Odelius and Santos (2007). Apparently, such issues have not been fully addressed.

The last category reflects the specific moment of the development and improvement of the performance management framework in Brazil, derived from the Decree, which was implemented recently. Hence, the responses concentrate in the positive advancements that

this new framework can bring to the Brazilian Ministries, and that adjustments will be necessary in a natural evolution of the system. The example below illustrates this subject:

“Since we are in the second cycle of performance evaluations, we are still trying to understand the logic of the system to replicate it to all branches of the Ministry”...

The last question of the survey (34) allowed the respondents to provide more comments about performance management topics and about the survey itself. A moderate number of participants produced comments, which largely involved reinforcing what they had already mentioned about the perceived dysfunctions, as well as compliments and constructive feedback to the survey.

This study has now reached a point where the research questions can be more properly answered. And that will be done while summarizing the findings of this section.

5.3 Summary of findings of Phase I and Phase II

From the results, observations and comparisons in the survey results, it can be noted that some aspects of the archival analysis were corroborated by the survey, and others were not. These results are summarized below, by answering the three research questions. The first question asked:

What are the Performance Management frameworks currently in place in the central governments of New Zealand and Brazil? How do they differ and why?

In New Zealand, the performance management frameworks are surprisingly aligned to the current literature, for example to Macky's (2008) model, to the importance of training for evaluators and those who will be evaluated (Latham et al, 2007), performance improvement, coaching, mentoring, training (Armstrong, 2009), and even aspects of the AMO theory (Boxall and Purcell, 2008). Firstly, the performance planning in these Ministries involves the setting of performance expectations, performance goals, technical and behavioural competencies (e.g. Lominger competencies), KRAs and KPIs, performance and development agreements, all linked in one way or another to the organizational strategy. A strong emphasis on cooperation and interaction between managers and employees is described in the documents. According to the survey, though, a large proportion of the participants do not participate in deciding who

evaluates their performance, or whose performance they evaluate, although they generally do participate in the goal-setting phase. The performance management system is connected to the job description of the employees, through the elements contained in the performance and development agreement mentioned above. Managers and employees receive instructions and guidelines on the internal P.M. system, however the survey suggests it is unclear if all employees receive proper training on the P.M. system before the process starts, as some Ministries appear to do so and others may have some issues in that respect (e.g. NZ1 and NZ2).

The performance evaluation or assessment happens as a formal appraisal process, (combined in most cases with informal evaluations in between) generally at the end of the year with interim evaluations every six months or less. The regular performance conversations or meetings described in the documents reinforce the aspect of ongoing monitoring. The forms utilized for completing the evaluations are mostly a combination of electronic, paper forms and verbal discussions between managers and employees, with little variation between the Ministries. The performance measurement parameters focus on a blend of results and behaviours (correspondent to technical and behavioural competencies), and tend not to include team performance in the evaluations, despite the fact that the documents describe a moderation process that compares individual to team performance levels. The administrative purpose of the P.M. systems is mainly for pay increases, and the developmental purpose includes a plethora of alternatives which are monitored with the aim of performance improvement. The NZ Ministries seem to provide more training and development (T&D) connected to the performance evaluations to their staff, for performance improvement. Repeated low performance results can lead to the dismissal of an employee, if all the initiatives for performance improvement fail.

In Brazil, the performance planning phase has several similarities with the New Zealand Ministries, where organizational, departmental and individual goals are recorded in work plans, along with the relevant competencies. Some degree of cooperation between managers and employees is expected in the Decree 7.133 (2010), however it is a rather hierarchical relationship. Besides, a large proportion of the survey participants do not participate in deciding who evaluates their performance, nor whose performance they evaluate, although they also tend to participate in the goal-setting phase (BR1 being the exception). Generally, the P.M. system of these Ministries is disconnected from the job description, with the exception of BR5. It is also unclear if all employees receive training on the

P.M. system before the process starts, however in BR1 and BR4 such training may not be reaching all employees.

The performance is evaluated through a formal yearly appraisal (assessment) process, with no informal evaluations, in spite of the mentions of ongoing performance monitoring in the Decree 7.133 (2010). The evaluation (appraisal, assessment) forms are either electronic or on paper, with no indication of verbal discussions between the evaluator and the evaluated during the assessment process. The administrative purpose of the P.M. systems in these Ministries is largely to serve as a parameter for variable pay decisions, and to a lesser extent for pay increases and promotions. The P.M. systems also seem to focus on results and behaviours (related to goals and competencies), and unlike New Zealand they do include team performance in the evaluations. The survey results show that, although the Decree 7.133 (2010) makes no reference to employee development, some Ministries provide T&D connected to the performance evaluations, whereas other Ministries may be lagging behind in that respect. In the eyes of the survey participants, repeated low performance results do not lead to dismissals in practice.

The second part of the question will be answered after research question two, which asked:

How do they fit into the classical typologies of performance assessment? (e.g.: top-down, 360 degree, competency-based, goal-based, outputs or outcomes-driven)? Do they fit at all or do they represent any kind of hybrid model?

The results suggest the frameworks utilized in New Zealand are hybrid models, where a combination of top-down assessments with some elements of 360 degree assessments, in a secondary level of importance, are compiled by the managers for their final decisions. However, some Ministries still utilize classical 360 degree assessments exclusively for senior positions, for developmental purposes alone.

In Brazil, despite some inconsistencies noted from the answers to the survey, the Ministries are supposed to utilize the classical form of 360 degree assessments, though the aspect of feedback appears to have received little attention¹⁶.

¹⁶ Ministry BR5 appears to be the exception in this case, as the survey results show that feedback is provided to employees.

In both countries, the systems are competency and goal-based, however it cannot be clearly asserted if they are outputs or outcomes driven.

It is clear that their *differences* lie on the focus of the P.M. systems (performance improvement vs performance appraisal), the typology of performance assessments and its sources, the periodicity of formal and informal evaluations, and the emphasis (or lack of it) on feedback and closer communication between managers and employees. However the *reason why* they differ is not so clear cut. One of the possibilities is that, as the P.M. systems of the New Zealand Ministries have evolved since the 1980's reforms, they have reached a higher maturation stage that favours a different performance culture and therefore less formal and bureaucratic procedures. These allow for more flexibility and a stronger focus on performance improvement, instead of emphasizing measures.

Lastly, the results of the survey and the analysis of the documents were sufficient to answer research question number three:

How cohesive and integrated are the current PM systems across the Ministries in New Zealand and Brazil? Which (if any) are the perceived dysfunctions in the current frameworks, and what aspects may be causing them?

The answer is, in effect, a compilation of the observations from the documents and the analysis of question thirty two of the survey. In short, we can point out that the performance management systems across the Ministries are only partially cohesive and integrated, *vis-à-vis* the potential dysfunctions identified. However, they are reasonably similar amongst the New Zealand Ministries and amongst the Brazilian Ministries. In New Zealand, NZ3 can be considered as the exception, due to its different emphasis on performance improvement and constant performance conversations, where assessments are being gradually reduced. In Brazil, the similarities seem to be chiefly due to the obvious presence of an overarching framework outlined in the Decree nº 7.133 (2010), albeit some discrete differences between the Ministries were found in the survey.

In a nutshell, the perceived dysfunctions of the performance management systems of the New Zealand Ministries seem to revolve around framework issues, involving complicated measures and templates for assessment, inadequate rating parameters and a fragile link to remuneration, and low management commitment and integration, which are related to internal issues of resistance to change and lack of interest given to the performance evaluation process. These dysfunctions were also identified in the Brazilian Ministries, with the exception

of the issue with the link to pay, which is more clear and objective in Brazil. In addition to these analogous dysfunctions mentioned above is the inadequate use of 360 degree feedback for administrative purposes, the excessive focus on financial rewards and little on performance improvement and feedback. Moreover, old habits of paternalism still endure.

6. Conclusions:

The data and methodological triangulation applied in this study were useful to compare the frameworks described in documents of the New Zealand and Brazilian Ministries with the view of their HR staff and managers on the practical side. When analyzing the results of Phase I and Phase II of this study, it was possible to answer the research questions outlined in the beginning, and the comparisons allowed broader insights from the subject of investigation.

The performance management frameworks in New Zealand seem to be more evolved when compared to the literature, with a much stronger focus on feedback and performance improvement throughout the year. It is possible that a higher maturation stage was achieved as the government reforms started earlier, and perhaps faced less fragmentation and bureaucracy along the way. The current frameworks allow for more flexibility and a stronger focus on performance improvement, instead of emphasizing measures. The performance assessments employed by these Ministries can be considered as hybrid models, as they utilize elements of 360 degree feedback in a top-down type of assessment where managers make the ultimate decision on the evaluations, and play a vital role in the performance management system itself. The constant feedback and interaction between managers and employees suggest that the assessments are mostly used as thermometers to show if improvement programs and initiatives are on the right course or not. However, the connection between performance evaluations (and performance management overall) and remuneration seems relatively problematic in most Ministries, due to some degree of looseness in the measures that make this link and to the high reliance on managers discretion. The comments of survey participants revealed that in some cases managers fail to demonstrate the engagement and accountability expected of them.

In Brazil, the analysis of the documents, the survey and the comparison with the current literature indicate an excessive focus on assessment measures, remuneration and financial rewards, and little on feedback and performance improvement, which are key to individual and organizational performance. This strong focus on measurements and formal assessments indicate that the P.M. frameworks of these Ministries seem to be more precise in the link to variable pay and salary increases, chiefly due to the objective parameters of the Decree 7.133 (2010). However, the fact that low performing employees are not dismissed in practice and the paternalism of some managers weakens the system. Moreover, the several

exceptions in this decree and the fragmentation of job structures in Brazilian government (OECD, 2010) undermine these positive initiatives undertaken by the HR departments of these Ministries. For instance, career growth (a powerful motivator) is directly hindered by this fragmentation. Despite all the problems, the procedures outlined in this recent decree are an advancement towards a more effective performance management system in Brazil.

Some theoretical insights can be drawn from this. For example, the findings confirm that the general notion of the utilization of 'benchmark' practices imported from the private sector into the public sector still perseveres. In the same line of thought, it is curious to see the isomorphism in the systems amongst Ministries in such distant countries, under the perspective of institutionalism. By way of illustration, 360 degree appraisals, sometimes seen as a fashionable model of performance assessment and feedback, were openly adopted and publicized by the Decree 7.133 (2010), however the misuse of this 'benchmark' model by the Brazilian Ministries can become dysfunctional over time, growing into the 'Achilles heel' (Bouckaert and Peters, 2002) of the framework, for the reasons explained before.

In both cases, the rhetorics and realities seem to be still a bit distant, since some of the procedures described in the documents were contradicted by the survey participants, showing a slightly different practice. In NZ, the flexibility of the P.M. system is not sufficiently accompanied by engagement and accountability of managers. In Brazil, similar issues take place, with old traces of paternalism. In both cases, the findings corroborated with certain aspects of earlier studies, such as Norman and Gregory (2003) and Radin (2003) in New Zealand, and Odelius and Santos (2007) and Guimarães, Nader and Ramagem (1998) in Brazil.

A few recommendations can be suggested here. In the case of New Zealand, more accurate measures or parameters should be devised to link performance evaluations to pay. And if flexibility and accountability are the way to go, the mechanisms that monitor managers as key players in the P.M. systems must be revised to ensure their engagement. In the case of Brazil, if greater attention is given to feedback and performance conversations between managers and employees, this could possibly enhance a culture of performance management and performance improvement. In this sense, the 'no surprises' principles from the New Zealand Ministries serve as a useful example. After all, couching a performance management system only on financial bonuses seems rather limited. The same applies to training, especially on the performance management system itself, as well as a closer connection between the outcomes of performance assessments and development initiatives for employees. On the

bright side, having a 360 degree appraisal system in place can facilitate future programs for performance improvement, as long as it is used that way. Further amendments to the Decree 7.133 (2010) would be necessary.

These theoretical insights and recommendations serve as interesting drivers for further improvement of the performance management systems in these Ministries. This study also helps to reduce the gap in the literature and represents a recent and updated account of the practices of employee performance management in the central governments of New Zealand and Brazil.

7. Limitations of this study and recommendation for future research:

Despite the interesting findings of this research, some limitations to the research must be acknowledged. Firstly, the archival analysis was conducted on the internal documents provided by the New Zealand Ministries, whereas the archival analysis related to Brazil was conducted chiefly on the Decree nº 7.133 (2010), which outlines the overarching guidelines of performance management in some detail. In addition, this decree is fairly recent, therefore the implementations are still under consolidation. Secondly, the sample size was fairly small, even though the overall approach was more qualitative than quantitative and did not intend to generalize results beyond these specific Ministries. The respondents were 'key informants' and provided quality data.

The findings and theoretical insights of this study can motivate future research in the field of performance management in public organizations. For example, more studies are necessary to approach a larger sample of Ministries and staff (preferably HR), in a few years from now, which could yield interesting findings applicable to the whole central government. And a focus on feedback and the manager-employee interaction could produce useful insights on performance culture of public organizations. Performance culture alone, for example, would be enough for a research project that could bring more light to the subject of performance management in the public sector of these countries. Up to date research on this subject could aggregate to studies on frameworks and systems and generate theory that can help address the issues currently identified, and point to further causes of these issues.

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9. Appendix

Appendix I

a) FRAMEWORK: REFERENCE FOR ARCHIVAL ANALYSIS

In order to analyse the documents provided by the Ministries pertaining to performance management, including laws and decrees, the following framework of reference (Table 13) was necessary to guide the researcher when looking for specific information, as well as to keep a focus for answering the research questions. The focus was on the performance management systems, characteristics and possible dysfunctions that could be found in these documents. It was designed using the concepts, elements and issues described on sections 2.2 and 2.3 of the literature review:

Table 13: Model framework for archival analysis

FRAMEWORK FOR ARCHIVAL ANALYSIS: PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT			
Country:		Document(s) analyzed:	
Date doc. produced:		Ministry(ies) involved:	N° of pages:
P.M. element or phase	References of the concepts utilized:	Format and characteristics identified	
Performance planning:	Lawler (2003), Locke and Latham (2002), Macky (2008), Latham, Sulsky and MacDonnald (2007)		
Performance measurement and assessment:	Latham, Sulsky and MacDonnald (2007), Tziner, Joanis and Murphy (2000), Edwards and Ewen (1996), Armstrong (2009), DeNisi and Kluger (2000), Levy (2006), Guimarães and Brandão (2001), OECD (2010),		
Employee feedback:	Mausolff (2004), DeNisi and Kluger (2000), DeNisi and Pritchard (2006), Latham et. al. (2007)		
Employee development:	Macky (2008), Armstrong (2009), Latham et. al. (2007)		
Rewards and recognition:	Macky (2008), Armstrong (2009), Lawler (2003), Boxall and Purcell (2008)		
Disciplinary procedures:	Macky (2008), Armstrong (2009)		
Termination:	Macky (2008), Armstrong (2009)		
System evaluation:	Bernardin, Kane, Ross, Spina and Johnson (1995), Armstrong (2009), Clark (2009)		

Potential dysfunctions:	Macky (2008), Levy (2006), Tziner et. al. (2000), Meyer (1991), Latham et. al (2007), Edwards and Ewen (1996), Odelius and Santos (2007), DeNisi and Kluger (2000), DeNisi and Pritchard (2006), Armstrong (2009), Guimarães, Nader and Ramagem (1998)	
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The structure of this framework for analysis (Table 13 above) follows the sequence of Macky's (2008) model, however with a focus that starts from performance planning. Inasmuch as the preceding phases are of considerable importance to the performance management system, they were not the focus of this analysis. Observations and comments on these phases will be made, though, if perceived as relevant to the purpose of this research.


b) SUMMARIZED DESCRIPTION OF THE FRAMEWORKS OF THE FIVE NEW ZEALAND MINISTRIES:

Table 14: Summarized description of performance management framework of NZ1:

ARCHIVAL ANALYSIS: PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT			
Country: New Zealand		Document(s) analyzed: 'Guidelines for People Capability', 'Performance and Development Agreement' templates and 'Guidelines: Performance and Behaviour Improvement'.	
Date doc. produced: 07/2011		Ministry(ies) involved: NZ1	N° of pages: 39
P.M. element or phase	References of the concepts utilized:	Format and characteristics identified	
Performance planning:	Lawler (2003), Locke and Latham (2002), Macky (2008), Latham, Sulsky and MacDonald (2007)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The documents describe performance in terms of capability and development and emphasize how the Ministry's success depends on their employee's performance. The performance management guidelines apply to all employees and managers, and the performance cycle goes from July to June every year. The performance planning involves communication of the Ministry's organizational strategy and general workplan (derived from the Statement of Intent – Sol), aligned to business plans (department level) and then cascade down to team and individual objectives. Mapping of competencies is essential to each position and is conducted/reviewed yearly. It is connected to team work plans for improving capabilities, and helps improve the performance assessment process. Employee engagement is monitored through a yearly survey, with a focus on 'basic needs', 'management support', 'team work' and 'growth', and serves as input for workplace improvement and feeds information for performance management monitoring. Four key principles for performance and development must be promoted by managers and employees themselves: employees must know what is expected of them; they should have the competencies (technical and behavioural) for the job; they should have the opportunity to perform and be motivated for the job. There are three main components for employee performance management in this Ministry: performance planning, employee capability development and performance review. The Performance and Development Agreement outlines the KRA's ('the what'), core competencies ('the how') identified in the job description (varies for different position levels), as well as a development plan and overall assessment parameters. Produced by managers and employees together at the beginning of the performance year. Must be signed by both parties and updated twice a year to adapt to changing demands and objectives. New employees need the Performance and Development Agreement done within 90 days. Competencies are expected to be designed by managers and employees in a way that essentially describes performance and relates to team, departmental and organizational goals. These goals should follow the S.M.A.R.T. principles: specific, measurable, achievable (yet stretching), results-oriented and time bound. 	
Performance measurement and assessment:	Latham, Sulsky and MacDonald (2007), Tziner, Joanis and Murphy (2000), Edwards and Ewen (1996), Armstrong (2009), DeNisi and Kluger (2000), Levy (2006), Guimarães and Brandão (2001), OECD (2010).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Performance assessment evaluates 'the what' and 'the how' in terms of the achievement and success factors of KRA's and development interventions. Assessment happens twice a year, in the middle and at the end of the performance year. When an employee changes jobs within the Ministry, he/she must be assessed before that, or be assessed later with the assistance of the previous manager. Assessment sources are flexible: can include self-assessment, peer assessment and stakeholder assessment, or a combination of all, as deemed appropriate by employee and manager. Management assessment is mandatory. Employees are assessed according to behavioural competencies (core competencies for all employees, branch competencies and leadership competencies) and technical competencies specific to the job. Managers are assessed according to the Ministry's competency framework, involving competencies for managers and some core competencies for all employees. The assessment of technical competencies is conducted on the basis of how they contributed to KRAs, whereas the behavioural competencies are assessed according to the Lominger FYI Book. Managers monitor and support performance of employees, who are expected to make every effort to achieve objectives against performance indicators and development objectives. A 'One-up' manager (higher level) serves as the mediator if both manager and employee do not agree on performance assessment. Both employee and manager are oriented to be prepared for the review meeting (otherwise should be rescheduled), bring evidence of achievements or difficulties, be equal in the discussion, work towards an agreement of the assessment and recognize that parameters and objectives may change over time. Overall assessment summarizes the performance evaluations on a five point scale: 'Unacceptable', 'Meets some but not all expectations', 'Performing well, meeting expectations', 'Exceeds expectations', 'Outstanding'. This five point scale is designed to balance overall performance and development progress. Outstanding level rating is meant to be rare and exceptional. 	
	Mausolff (2004), DeNisi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regular feedback is to be provided by managers, in an ongoing fashion (at least once a month) that 	

Employee feedback:	and Kluger (2000), DeNisi and Pritchard (2006), Latham et. al. (2007)	<p>promotes the Ministry's principle of 'no surprises'.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Close communication between managers and employees is constantly emphasized. Both managers and employees are expected to raise issues and identify opportunities to address these issues before the end of the performance year. The Ministry incentivizes ongoing coaching and mentoring.
Employee development:	Macky (2008), Armstrong (2009), Latham et. al. (2007)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Called 'Employee Capability Development', it focuses on development interventions throughout the year, before and after the performance assessments. Discussed and documented in the beginning of the financial year. Set out every year, with a two year focus, aiming to be a dynamic and ongoing process. Focuses on two directions: development needs for performance in the position and development needs for career development. Competencies for development plan must be related to KRAs, objectives of the position or objectives for future positions. Guidelines advise managers and employees to focus on one to three competencies to develop for each annual development plan, as to keep a focus and to be more efficient. A copy of the development plan must be sent to the HR department, who also provides models of competency development action plans to support managers and employees. If the competency assessment shows the employee to be unskilled or overused, they can develop that competency or develop a substitute or compensator competency. Types of development alternatives include: on the job (projects, secondments, acting positions) development, coaching and mentoring (can involve managers, peers, clients, external mentoring relationships,). Coaching programs can utilize the Lominger FYI Book provided by HR. Training and education programmes must be matched to specific competencies, and can be funded by the Ministry or by the employees themselves. A directory of online courses is also available, managed by HR. The Leadership Development Calendar promotes short courses and events for managers, but may include senior employees. Centers for management development such as the Leadership Development Centre (LDC) and ANZSoG Executive Fellows/Masters of Public Administration are provided by the State Services Commission. Applicants must fulfill some criteria for eligibility, and funding is limited to branch contribution.
Rewards and recognition:	Macky (2008), Armstrong (2009), Lawler (2003), Boxall and Purcell (2008)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No bonuses or variable pay are allowed to be used in the Ministry, only salary increases, with the exception of the 'Director-General Awards' which are vouchers of NZD\$ 300,00 given to outstanding individual or team performers. These are provided twice a year, on exceptional basis. Salary increases are done according to the level of performance (i.e. assessment), within budget confines. The Senior Leadership team moderates the salary increase process, and also the extreme cases where exceptional performers may receive above average increases.
Disciplinary procedures:	Macky (2008), Armstrong (2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Failing to perform according to the Performance Agreement, failing to meet standards or competencies required, and recurrence of issues contrary to the Code of Conduct are the reasons for disciplinary procedures. However, efforts are made to identify the causes and improve the performance or behavior of the employee. Employees are advised that continued occurrences of performance or behavioural concerns could lead to a formal disciplinary procedure. All these issues are to be dealt with promptly, confidentially, with an open and positive attitude and seeking to assist the employee. All decisions are made with the principle of fairness and on a case-by-case basis, with the involvement of the employee and his/ her representation. After all efforts towards support and improvement are made (i.e. improvement plan, progress meetings, follow-up meetings and consultation with HR), the alternatives are: extension of time to improve, consideration of an alternative role or relocation of the employee, or cessation of employment (termination). The Performance Agreement, performance assessments, job description, personnel file and all available evidence are revised to support disciplinary decisions.
Termination:	Macky (2008), Armstrong (2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Briefly mentioned in the disciplinary procedures above, as the last option after efforts for performance improvement.
System evaluation:	Bernardin, Kane, Ross, Spina and Johnson (1995), Armstrong (2009), Clark (2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No mention is made explicitly about system evaluation in the documents, however one of the Ministry's HR Advisors informed that it is reviewed every year.
Potential dysfunctions:	Macky (2008), Levy (2006), Tziner et. al. (2000), Meyer (1991), Latham et. al (2007), Edwards and Ewen (1996), Odelius and Santos (2007), DeNisi and Kluger (2000), DeNisi and Pritchard (2006), Armstrong (2009), Guimarães, Nader and Ramagem (1998)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Performance Management system is well devised, but perhaps excessive flexibility allows for vagueness or subjectivity that can cause further dysfunctions. For example, the sources of assessment can be determined by the manager and the team, so this configuration can vary from department to department.

Figure 5: graphical representation of the performance management system of NZ1 (adapted):




Source: provided by NZ1 (name is omitted).

Table 15: Summarized description of performance management framework of NZ2:

ARCHIVAL ANALYSIS: PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT			
Country: New Zealand		Document(s) analyzed: compilation of separate documents (guidelines and templates) provided by NZ2.	
Date doc. produced: valid for 2011		Ministry(ies) involved: NZ2	N° of pages: 45
P.M. element or phase	References of the concepts utilized:	Format and characteristics identified	
Performance planning:	Lawler (2003), Locke and Latham (2002), Macky (2008), Latham, Sulsky and MacDonald (2007)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The performance cycle starts in July and ends in June of the following year. ▪ The performance planning starts with the Performance Agreement, which is to be defined in a discussion between managers and employees, and should include key objectives for the role and competencies for achievement. It is completed annually, and encompasses objectives, competencies and personal development plan, where these objectives should be S.M.A.R.T., connected to the job description and serve as the criteria for measurement. These objectives emphasize outcomes rather than details of results. ▪ The performance management system allows for 1 to 15 objectives to be set out in the performance planning phase, yet 8 is considered the ideal number. Objectives focus on 'the what' and competencies focus on 'the how'. ▪ Definition of competencies follows the logic of knowledge (know-how), skills (can do) and attitudes (will do). ▪ At least 5 of the Ministry's core competencies must be included, which are: 'integrity and trust', 'drive for results', 'customer focus', 'priority setting' and 'problem solving'. These should be coupled with specific competencies of each position. ▪ Competencies range from core competencies (described above), foundation competencies, specialist competencies, management and leadership competencies. Other technical competencies can be added where appropriate. Managers and employees are free to choose between Lominger competencies and other competencies that they deem more adequate to represent performance on the job. 	
Performance measurement and assessment:	Latham, Sulsky and MacDonald (2007), Tziner, Joanis and Murphy (2000), Edwards and Ewen (1996), Armstrong (2009), DeNisi and Kluger (2000), Levy (2006), Guimarães and Brandão (2001), OECD (2010),	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The performance assessment is done through interim and end-of-year performance reviews, and emphasizes 'catch-up' meetings (informal) throughout the year. The interim review is optional, whereas the end-of-year review is mandatory. ▪ Both top-down assessment and employee self-assessment are part of the overall evaluation, which is discussed by employees and managers in these meetings. ▪ The evaluation of performance (assessments/reviews) is conducted under the 'no surprises' orientation, where frequent conversations are intended to keep all parties informed and provide support for good performance. Therefore the end-of-year assessment is a summary of what has been closely monitored and discussed during the year. ▪ The performance review meetings ('catch-up') are a pre-measurement exercise aimed to reduce deviations. These meetings require both manager and employee to be prepared, aware of the subjects of the meeting and holding evidence of achievements or difficulties. It is a two-way participation with equal 'voice', where individual performance is discussed in connection to team performance. Employees can ask for a second manager to participate as well, as a moderator for the final rating of performance. ▪ The review meetings expected to have a positive ending, with a focus on improvement. ▪ Process is summarized as follows: HR triggers the process with an e-mail, manager prepares material for the meeting and informs employee, both meet, discuss, document and sign the minutes (formal end-of-year review) and start preparing the next year's Performance Agreement and Performance Development Plan. ▪ The rating scale utilized has five points: 'requires significant development', 'requires some development', 'performs competently', 'exceeds expectations' and 'outstanding performance'. Both core Ministry competencies and job specific competencies are assessed. ▪ Both manager and employee use a performance management information system to input information and compare actual performance with expectations on KRAs, outputs and key competencies. 	
Employee feedback:	Mausloff (2004), DeNisi and Kluger (2000), DeNisi and Pritchard (2006), Latham et. al. (2007)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Feedback is supposed to be ongoing and should be conducted in informal conversations, formal individual and team meetings. ▪ The feedback is expected to be timely and constructive, specific, honest, relevant to the objectives and competencies, make future expectations clear, allow opportunity for coaching and should make the employee accept personal responsibility for his/her performance. ▪ Feedback is expected to be provided in regular 'catch-up' meetings and after the annual review. Both manager and employee must refer to the Performance Agreement for these 'catch-up' meetings, and document the discussions where they identify achievements, alignment of goals and look for solutions to remove performance barriers. 	
Employee development :	Macky (2008), Armstrong (2009), Latham et. al. (2007)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The competencies (behavioural and technical) set out previously in the planning phase serve as the starting point for the Personal Development Plan (PDP). This is considered critical for the Performance Management in the Ministry. ▪ The PDP must review critical objectives and competencies necessary for the following year, identify 	

		<p>priorities for development (current level of ability and future position or career aspirations) and implement agreed actions in conjunction. The Ministry's competencies should be prioritized when devising the action plan.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Alternatives for development can include: formal study (training), in-house training, coaching and Lominger competencies' development planner (Lominger FYI – for your improvement – book). Learning initiatives should follow the ratio: 70% on-the-job experiences/learning, 20% observation and coaching and 10% formal training. ▪ The development plan does not allow peers to participate, yet it allows for a second manager's opinion.
Rewards and recognition:	Macky (2008), Armstrong (2009), Lawler (2003), Boxall and Purcell (2008)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The assessed quality of individual performance is one of the criteria for remuneration recommendations. Others are: position in salary range relative to the midpoint, relativities to other employees in similar jobs and similar performance level (rating) and the consistency with the ministry's remuneration policy. ▪ Before final decisions on remuneration increases and one-off performance payment, the Directorate Management team, the Executive team and HR meet with the manager to analyse case by case for recommendations. ▪ Financial rewards follow a Ministry salary budget endorsed by the State Services Commission.
Disciplinary procedures:	Macky (2008), Armstrong (2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Not mentioned.
Termination:	Macky (2008), Armstrong (2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Not mentioned.
System evaluation:	Bernardin, Kane, Ross, Spina and Johnson (1995), Armstrong (2009), Clark (2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Not mentioned, yet the performance management system is under revision at this moment, according to information provided by the HR Manager.
Potential dysfunctions:	Macky (2008), Levy (2006), Tziner et. al. (2000), Meyer (1991), Latham et. al (2007), Edwards and Ewen (1996), Odelius and Santos (2007), DeNisi and Kluger (2000), DeNisi and Pritchard (2006), Armstrong (2009), Guimarães, Nader and Ramagem (1998)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Assessments for developmental and administrative purposes are done together, yet it is not a 360 degree model.

Figure 6: graphical representation of the performance management system of NZ2:




Source: provided by NZ2 (name is omitted).

Table 16: Summarized description of performance management framework of NZ3:

ARCHIVAL ANALYSIS: PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT			
Country: New Zealand		Document(s) analyzed: 'Guide to Performance and Development at NZ3: Managers and Employees', 'Performance and Development Templates' and 'Performance Improvement'.	
Date doc. produced: 08/2011		Ministry(ies) involved: NZ3	N° of pages: 52
P.M. element or phase	References of the concepts utilized:	Format and characteristics identified	
Performance planning:	Lawler (2003), Locke and Latham (2002), Macky (2008), Latham, Sulsky and MacDonald (2007)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Guidelines are explicit about making a shift from just delivering work to focusing on development as well. Performance management has been changed recently from a focus on simple assessment to a wider emphasis on supporting job and career development, combining these main elements (performance and development) with clarity of objectives, direction and feedback. The process of performance management starts in July, when managers and employees discuss and review the individual and team objectives set for the next year, with the related career goals and resources needed. During the following months the performance is monitored and discussed in development conversations between manager and employee (which are documented), and in June of the following year the overall performance is discussed and assessed in a meeting. HR provides access and support to all managers and employees for the performance planning and subsequent processes of performance management. Goal setting and definition of individual objectives and KRAs are set by managers and employees together, and follow the S.M.A.R.T. principles. Goals start with a 'line of sight' (how individual performance connects to Ministry's overall objectives and where to reach), then context objectives, common expectations, departmental objectives, personal objectives, resources and parameters on how the employee performance will be recognized. Both employee and manager sign the performance and development plan, committing to each other. The ministry promotes the use of 'stretch goals' to push effort and motivation forward. There are different (yet similar) templates for managers, senior analysts, directors and all other roles. All documents are explicit in highlighting the three-way relationship between the Ministry, managers and employees, promoting improved quality, frequent feedback and a culture that supports excellence. The general Ministry guidelines aim to make the Ministry a 'high performing, highly respected organization in the marketplace'. 	
Performance measurement and assessment:	Latham, Sulsky and MacDonald (2007), Tziner, Joanis and Murphy (2000), Edwards and Ewen (1996), Armstrong (2009), DeNisi and Kluger (2000), Levy (2006), Guimarães and Brandão (2001), OECD (2010),	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Constant monitoring and exchange of information on the progress of performance and development goals, as well as difficulties, barriers and resources necessary to achieve the success factors. Top-down assessment has been replaced by constant conversations between manager and employee (yet still not completely abolished). Therefore no rating scale for performance assessment is described. 360 degree developmental review is compulsory for managers, where they conduct their self-assessment, also including assessments by colleagues, senior staff and external stakeholders. No connection of this review to remuneration. Employees are expected to feed their key decisions, changes in plans and objectives and their progress into a system each month. Both employees and managers benefit from this internal information system. Employee engagement surveys are added as part of monitoring. Assessment evaluates result areas connected to tasks, inputs, outputs, goals and personal growth, as agreed in the Ministry's Collective Employment Agreement. 	
Employee feedback:	Mausolff (2004), DeNisi and Kluger (2000), DeNisi and Pritchard (2006), Latham et. al. (2007)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There has been a clear shift from performance improvement conversations twice a year to constant feedback. Guidelines explain in detail how the manager is supposed to go about to provide formal and informal feedback. The focus of the feedback must be positive. Feedback should be constant, at least monthly, with overall feedback at the end of the performance cycle. The feedback provided must help build performance development initiatives, which will focus on increasing the capability of individuals while delivering the work programme. Frequent intervention is designed to incentivize high achievers towards career development. Coaching is to be provided by managers. Follows transformational leadership principles: facilitate flows of information, encourage sharing of ideas, give direction, recognition for initiatives, support failure and learning. 	
Employee development:	Macky (2008), Armstrong (2009), Latham et. al. (2007)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The constant conversations between managers and employees are supposed to include space to discuss development initiatives and their progress. Coaching and mentoring are linked to these constant conversations. Priority is given in the forms and templates to developing competencies connected to the strategic behaviours desired by the Ministry: 'analyse', 'engage', 'learn', 'validate' and 'collaborate'. Employees and managers are asked to identify where they need competency improvement during the year, and to include some Lominger competencies as appropriate. Managers are expected to interact and utilize the Leadership Development Centre's competencies for the leadership profile, as provided by the State Services Commission. 	

Rewards and recognition:	Macky (2008), Armstrong (2009), Lawler (2003), Boxall and Purcell (2008)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Financial and non-financial rewards are being reviewed as the last stage of the performance management redesign project. How performance results are connected to pay progression are expected to be revised and determined by the end of 2011. In the previous system, pay increases for employees were done according to Ministry budget, market movements (salary surveys), performance against objectives and the position in the salary matrix. A salary range is utilized for each position that recognizes increasing levels of performance, where for low performance there is no increase, regular performance receives an increase on market movement, and for good and exceptional performance the increase is on market movement plus one or two increments. Managers and senior positions have a different pay system. Guidelines so far incentivize emphatically verbal recognition and a focus on positive remarks on achievements, as strategies for recognition of performance.
Disciplinary procedures:	Macky (2008), Armstrong (2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Ministry's guidelines suggest that managers, when facing performance issues with an employee, should have a formal meeting with this employee, clarify performance expectations, identify the gaps between expectations and performance and outline appropriate interventions to assist in performance improvement. The following equation is utilized to guide managers for performance improvement: Performance = Ability x Motivation x Opportunity x Direction. If the performance interventions do not bring the expected results in performance, a formal disciplinary procedure commences. The employee receives a formal notification and has the right to a hearing and to personal or legal representation at all times. If problems of misconduct or deliberate low performance are proven, a suspension can be issued, followed by dismissal if necessary, according to the applicable law and utilizing mediation with either the HR representative or the Employment Relations authority.
Termination:	Macky (2008), Armstrong (2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mentioned above as the last option when performance issues are not resolved by performance improvement interventions.
System evaluation:	Bernardin, Kane, Ross, Spina and Johnson (1995), Armstrong (2009), Clark (2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There are evaluation forms for feedback quality, yet no specific mention to system evaluation is made in the documents. However, the HR Advisor of the Ministry informed that whole performance management system is being revised at this point in time (2011). The documents provided are versions already revised.
Potential dysfunctions:	Macky (2008), Levy (2006), Tziner et. al. (2000), Meyer (1991), Latham et. al (2007), Edwards and Ewen (1996), Odelius and Santos (2007), DeNisi and Kluger (2000), DeNisi and Pritchard (2006), Armstrong (2009), Guimarães, Nader and Ramagem (1998)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The performance management system seems too flexible and perhaps loose: can become vague and difficult to pin down. It is overly dependent on subjective measures, however it is well explained and detailed for performance conversations and development.

Figure 7: graphical representation of performance management system of NZ3:




Source: provided by NZ3 (name is omitted).

Table 17: Summarized description of performance management framework of NZ4:

FRAMEWORK FOR ARCHIVAL ANALYSIS: PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT			
Country: New Zealand		Document(s) analyzed: 'Performance Work and Development Plan', 'Manager Guide to Performance Management at NZ4' and templates.	
Date doc. produced:		Ministry(ies) involved: NZ4	N° of pages: 40
P.M. element or phase	References of the concepts utilized:	Format and characteristics identified	
Performance planning:	Lawler (2003), Locke and Latham (2002), Macky (2008), Latham, Sulsky and MacDonnald (2007)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The Performance Workplan Agreement is a formal document developed by manager and employee, and signed by both. It is expected to be updated during the performance year. ▪ The overarching principles that guide the way competencies and behaviours are set are: Accountability ('take responsibility, do not wait to be told, seek feedback, contribute to debate'), Influence ('understand others, communicate effectively, persistent efforts') and 'One NZ4' (awareness of mission and vision, understanding of other internal sectors, resistance to silos – interaction and knowledge of what is done across departments'). This promotes inter-team and departmental cooperation, where managers expect employees to participate a number of days per year in projects or workgroups within other departments. ▪ The P. W. Agreement outlines the performance expectations, which must provide a clear 'line of sight' between everyday work and the Ministry's intermediate outcomes set out in the strategic plan. These performance expectations are based on competencies valued by the Ministry ('analysis and expertise', 'communication', 'relationship management', 'work practice'), and the parameters of 'contribution to results' and 'emerging leadership'. Manager and employee chose these and other competencies and parameters according to which better represent 'the how' necessary to achieve their KRAs and KPIs. ▪ All the performance planning focuses on 'the what' (individual contributions) and 'the how' (behaviours and competencies). All these parameters and expectations are set in a "S.M.A.R.T." way: specific, measurable, achievable, results-oriented and time bound. Major elements of job description of each position are also used for individual performance planning. ▪ Where internal or external advice is needed for the delivery of the KPIs, this should be documented and supported by Senior leaders. ▪ Performance Management aims to align the impact that the NZ4 is having and the impact the staff are having on delivering the strategic goals and improving motivation, fairness and consistency. 	
Performance measurement and assessment:	Latham, Sulsky and MacDonnald (2007), Tziner, Joanis and Murphy (2000), Edwards and Ewen (1996), Armstrong (2009), DeNisi and Kluger (2000), Levy (2006), Guimarães and Brandão (2001), OECD (2010),	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ongoing monitoring of performance: quarterly assessment conversations between managers and employees, evaluating performance against specific objectives and progress. ▪ The end-of-year assessment 'wraps up' all quarterly conversations, compiling a summary of progress and accomplishments throughout the year, and formally rates overall performance. Rating scale utilizes 6 points: 'not meeting', 'mostly meeting', 'developing', 'meets expectations', 'exceeds expectations' and 'outstanding'. Rating is rigorous: 'exceeds expectations' and 'outstanding' are supposed to be rare ratings, only in truly exceptional cases. Each point in the scale is well explained according to each of the four main competencies mentioned above, and focuses on results and impact, with evidence to support it. ▪ Self-assessment by employee is to be sent to manager prior to the assessment meeting. ▪ Overall assessment requires a referee to moderate the rating, who is named by the employee. ▪ Performance expectations are assessed differently for new employees in the first eighteen months of entry level. Performance expectations are also different for each of the ten different positions in the Ministry: from Assistants to Corporate Directors. ▪ Managers are assessed by Deputy Secretaries. Everyone uses an internal software to submit assessments. ▪ In the case of projects, the project manager assesses the team performance, facilitated by HR or other manager. 	
Employee feedback:	Mausloff (2004), DeNisi and Kluger (2000), DeNisi and Pritchard (2006), Latham et. al. (2007)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Intended to be 'real-time' feedback and coaching: manager is expected to provide ongoing feedback as progress is monitored in quarterly conversations. ▪ Feedback in the Ministry aims to bring awareness of progress, results and need for improvement. ▪ Feedback conversations are recorded on the work plan, which in turn is expected to be updated in tandem with development goals. 	
Employee development:	Macky (2008), Armstrong (2009), Latham et. al. (2007)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The Individual Development Plan is also designed by managers and employees in conjunction, focusing on learning needs, strengths to be further enhanced and career aspirations. ▪ Ongoing formal and informal coaching is highly valued and incentivized within the organization, especially to help improve performance, work relationships and trust. ▪ The options for development plans are: training, on-the-job development (i.e. assignments, shadowing), coaching/mentoring by manager or external mentor, use of stretch opportunities for further development. All these can be used for work and career aspirations, that is, related to current position or future positions. ▪ The Lominger FYI Book and internal guidelines are provided by HR to managers to help with coaching and employee development. ▪ For each case, the manager and the employee decide what the measure of change will be: which competencies will be targeted, the time frame, indicators of progress and so on. ▪ For the development meetings, managers must come prepared with the employee workplan, evidence 	


		of progress or issues (e.g. deliverables, customer satisfaction surveys, accomplishment of projects etc). These meetings are expected to be an open, two-way conversation that looks for opportunities for learning, where goals must be clear and concise, and focus on work and not personal issues.
Rewards and recognition:	Macky (2008), Armstrong (2009), Lawler (2003), Boxall and Purcell (2008)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Performance assessments are used as main information for decisions on remuneration (i.e. inputs for remuneration matrix). Ministry rewards those who demonstrated high performance, and who demonstrated 'Accountability', 'One NZ4' and 'Influence'. Ministry uses formal job evaluation to ensure internal equity for similar sized roles (consistency). Decisions on pay are also dependent on the annual budget (affordability). A small budget is available to reward outstanding performers in a one off payment. Non-financial rewards can be provided as opportunities for development, such as working on high profile projects, secondments. Those who seek promotion must apply with a written application to HR. Managers also recommend which employees they think should be promoted. Senior management group discusses the applications and reach a shared view. Final decisions on salary progression, increases or promotions must be approved by Directors. Ministry makes an effort to ensure that all staff are remunerated fairly and consistently. Salary surveys are periodically conducted to ensure internal and external equity for attracting and retaining talent and to remain competitive in the job market.
Disciplinary procedures:	Macky (2008), Armstrong (2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Managers are required to support and direct strategies to improve poor performance, and only when the improvement plans are not satisfactory, a formal disciplinary process can be initiated as per legislation. The disciplinary procedures are not detailed.
Termination:	Macky (2008), Armstrong (2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No specific mention to termination.
System evaluation:	Bernardin, Kane, Ross, Spina and Johnson (1995), Armstrong (2009), Clark (2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No specific mention to system evaluation.
Potential dysfunctions:	Macky (2008), Levy (2006), Tziner et. al. (2000), Meyer (1991), Latham et. al (2007), Edwards and Ewen (1996), Odelius and Santos (2007), DeNisi and Kluger (2000), DeNisi and Pritchard (2006), Armstrong (2009), Guimarães, Nader and Ramagem (1998)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The criteria for promotions and salary progressions seems rather loose, lacking more objective explanation and criteria. Some terms used are dubious: 'may', 'mostly', etc, which opens breaches for misinterpretations. Too much seems to depend on managers' discretion.

Figure 8: graphic representation of the performance management system of NZ4:



Source: provided by NZ4 (name is omitted).

Figure 9: NZ4 performance pathway (adapted):



* Specialist roles include a range of corporate and operational roles

Source: provided by NZ4 (name is omitted).

Table 18: Summarized description of performance management framework of NZ5:

ARCHIVAL ANALYSIS: PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT			
Country: New Zealand		Document(s) analyzed: 'Performance Management – P4O: Performance for Outcomes'.	
Date doc. produced: valid for 2011		Ministry(ies) involved: NZ5	N° of pages: 21
P.M. element or phase	References of the concepts utilized:	Format and characteristics identified	
Performance planning:	Lawler (2003), Locke and Latham (2002), Macky (2008), Latham, Sulsky and MacDonald (2007)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The performance management cycle starts in July and ends in June of the following year. ▪ The performance management system focuses on goals and expectations, including objectives, capabilities and behaviours needed for optimal performance. ▪ At the beginning of the performance year, each employee and their manager meet and discuss the performance expectations that align with group or unit business plans. They also discuss the individual development plan for the year ahead, to help the performance on the job and in future positions in the desired career plan. Both are documented and signed. ▪ The S.M.A.R.T. principles are used to guide the setting of the key objectives that are expected to be met. ▪ The performance plans must be updated during the year, where significant changes must be documented by managers. ▪ Employees are expected to be participative in the performance and in the development planning process. ▪ The 'P4O' system applies to all employees below the Deputy Chief Executive, and to all overseas employees, except where local legislation is against it. It follows the principles of being 'fair', 'equitable' (having the same standards for equivalent roles), 'consistent', 'transparent', 'no surprises' and 'flexible'. 	
Performance measurement and assessment:	Latham, Sulsky and MacDonald (2007), Tziner, Joanis and Murphy (2000), Edwards and Ewen (1996), Armstrong (2009), DeNisi and Kluger (2000), Levy (2006), Guimarães and Brandão (2001), OECD (2010),	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ A formal mid-year review is conducted where managers and employees discuss, assess and document the employee's performance against the expectations set out in the beginning of the performance cycle. This mid-year review generates an indicative rating that will serve as subsidy for the end-of-year assessment. ▪ The same process is conducted for the end-of-year assessment, with a formal review meeting and a final assessment of the employee's performance. Self-assessment is expected to be done by the employee before the review meeting, and is considered by the manager together with the team's overall assessment. ▪ The end-of-year assessment must consider results ('the what') and competencies ('the how') related to the job description and Performance Agreement. ▪ Examples of achievements (evidence) are utilized to inform the decisions in the meeting. Evidence of feedback provided by colleagues is also considered as evidence of achievements by the manager. ▪ All employees have the right to appeal the assessment results of the end-of-year assessment if they do not agree with the results. Additionally, a special group (DCE) checks the individual ratings to ensure they reflect the overall department performance assessment. ▪ Managers are expected to retain evidence of the progress discussed in the meetings throughout the year, to support his or her decisions and ratings on the final year assessment. They are also expected to provide genuine opportunities for the employees to discuss their achievements, results and the final assessment. ▪ The 'P4O' system of the Ministry requires informed ratings, and not forced distributions. ▪ Managers are accountable to peers, team and their upper managers on their assessment decisions. The ratings must be conducted by the managers who know and observe the performance of the employee. When it is a new manager, he or she will consult with the former manager on the employees' performance. ▪ Senior managers form a group who assesses all department's overall performance, which is used in the pre-assessment meetings for discussion with the team members. ▪ All performance agreements and assessments recorded are handed in to HR, who processes the information. ▪ The rating scale utilized is: 'IR (improvement required)', 'SP (sound performance)', 'HS (high standard performance)', 'EP (exceptional performance)'. 	
Employee feedback:	Mausolf (2004), DeNisi and Kluger (2000), DeNisi and Pritchard (2006), Latham et. al. (2007)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ There is an emphasis on providing feedback throughout the year, against the performance expectations set out in the Performance Agreement. Both employee and manager should meet weekly or fortnightly, and take the opportunity to talk about any issues that may arise. ▪ Managers and employees are expected to communicate regularly and constructively, as to avoid surprises in the assessments. ▪ Coaching notes should be kept by managers to allow follow-ups during the performance year. 	
Employee development:	Macky (2008), Armstrong (2009), Latham et. al. (2007)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Development initiatives are conducted and monitored also throughout the year, before and after the performance reviews. The focus is on performance improvement at all times, not just as a remedy for poor performance. ▪ Aims to enable the individual to achieve the objectives set and develop fully in their role, and also to clarify the career aspirations and what can be done to achieve them, as well as to develop areas (technical and behavioural) that need improvement. ▪ Can include: coaching on the job, external and/or internal training, self-development (study programs and recommended readings), 'stretch assignments', project assignments, mentoring, intra-department involvement and collaboration. ▪ The Ministry provides support for these initiatives and expects the employees to be active in their development and managers to monitor their progress. 	

Rewards and recognition:	Macky (2008), Armstrong (2009), Lawler (2003), Boxall and Purcell (2008)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Salary progression is perceived as one form of reward, and depends on the performance reviews conducted in the mid-year and end-of-year reviews combined. Feedback and other opportunities for development, such as project assignments, are considered as forms of recognition.
Disciplinary procedures:	Macky (2008), Armstrong (2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Explicitly outlined that, where performance improvement process had no effect, a disciplinary process may be commenced. The first instance is a meeting with the manager, otherwise with the manager's manager, with written reports of what was discussed and decided. If the issues are not resolved, the disciplinary process begins. Managers should consult with HR before finalizing their decisions. Employees have the right to appeal.
Termination:	Macky (2008), Armstrong (2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not explicitly described in the document.
System evaluation:	Bernardin, Kane, Ross, Spina and Johnson (1995), Armstrong (2009), Clark (2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The employee engagement survey conducted periodically serves as a tool for monitoring and receiving information for the evaluation of the performance management system.
Potential dysfunctions:	Macky (2008), Levy (2006), Tziner et. al. (2000), Meyer (1991), Latham et. al (2007), Edwards and Ewen (1996), Odelius and Santos (2007), DeNisi and Kluger (2000), DeNisi and Pritchard (2006), Armstrong (2009), Guimarães, Nader and Ramagem (1998)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> One system of performance management for all purposes (development and administrative decisions), though it seems to be top-down with contribution of peers, not a classical 360 degree model.

No graphical representations of the performance management system of NZ5 were provided.

c) SUMMARIZED DESCRIPTION OF THE FRAMEWORKS OF THE FIVE BRAZILIAN MINISTRIES:

Table 19: Summarized description of P.M. framework of the Brazilian Ministries (Decree nº 7.133, 2010):

FRAMEWORK FOR ARCHIVAL ANALYSIS: PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT			
Country: Brazil		Document(s) analyzed: Decree nº 7.133 (March 2010), Norm nº 7 (August 2011) and Decree nº 5.707 (February 2006).	
Date docs. produced: 03/2010, 08/2011 and 02/2006		Ministry(ies) involved: all Ministries involved in this study	Nº of pages: 19
P.M. element or phase	References of the concepts utilized:	Format and characteristics identified	
Performance planning:	Lawler (2003), Locke and Latham (2002), Macky (2008), Latham, Sulsky and MacDonnald (2007)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The Decree nº 7.133 (2010)¹⁷, which is presently the main document that sets out the guidelines for performance management in the Ministries (and other public organizations), focuses on organizational and individual performance assessment vis-à-vis remuneration bonuses that have been practiced in the government for several years, called 'gratificação'. The major emphasis is on performance appraisal (i.e. individual goals), departmental and organizational goals. ▪ The performance cycle has the length of one year, and the start and finish months are determined by each Ministry as appropriate. ▪ The work plan commitment is a group of living documents, such as a performance agreement, where the parameters of quality, performance and productivity are set in the beginning of the performance year. This work plan is updated with the results and assessment decisions throughout the year. The team (or department) work plan is to be set out through the combination of intermediary and individual goals (except where otherwise justified), which are derived from organizational goals. The intermediary goals can be segmented in terms of location, hierarchy and nature of activities. Organizational and intermediary goals can include projects and special activities where appropriate, according to the annual strategic plan and budget orientations. When there is no agreement between the manager and the team, the manager defines the goals to be achieved. These goals are expected to be updated or modified according to factors that may influence them. ▪ The work plan must contain at least the most representative actions of the team/department, the activities and projects derived from these actions, the intermediary and individual goals, the performance commitments of the team and individuals, the criteria for monitoring individual and team performance during the performance cycle, the interim evaluation of performance (to subsidy adjustments during the cycle) and the final assessment of goal achievement and performance commitments to enable the compilation of all elements of the final performance assessment. This work plan must be formalized and registered with the HR department of each Ministry. ▪ Each Ministry determines its own performance indicators and the 'units' (teams, departments, regional groups) that will be assessed in terms of intermediary goals. ▪ The organizational goals and results to be achieved must be publicized internally and externally on the Ministry's website, otherwise the Ministry cannot participate in the performance assessment cycle, with consequences for the performance bonuses. ▪ Meetings are held by the managers and the teams at the beginning of the performance year to clarify the methodologies that will be employed for assessing performance. ▪ Before the performance cycle ends, the planning for the following year begins (Norm nº 7, August 2011). 	
Performance measurement and assessment:	Latham, Sulsky and MacDonnald (2007), Tziner, Joanis and Murphy (2000), Edwards and Ewen (1996), Armstrong (2009), DeNisi and Kluger (2000), Levy (2006), Guimarães and Brandão (2001), OECD (2010),	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The Decree nº 7.133 (2010) defines the performance assessment as a systematic and continuous monitoring of individual and organizational performance, against the organizational and intermediary goals. ▪ All goals are expected to be set out in an objective and measurable manner, considering the levels achieved in the previous year. ▪ The individual performance assessment is conducted according to the criteria and parameters that reflect the competencies and task achievements of the employee. Besides these parameters, the employees¹⁸ are also evaluated on the following factors: work productivity, technical knowledge, teamwork, commitment to work, abiding to norms and to the code of conduct. Optional parameters that can be included according to the discretion of each team in the Ministries are: quality of work, capacity of self-development, initiative, relationship management and flexibility to change. ▪ The individual performance assessment model described is the 360 degree appraisal, with a weight of 15% to 	

¹⁷ Despite referring to several other public organizations, for the purpose of this study the Decree nº 7.133 (2010) is analysed with regards to the Ministries involved in this research.

¹⁸ Public servants, advisors and staff in general are simply called 'employees' in this study.

		<p>self-assessment, 25% to assessment by the team (minimum of 3 evaluators) and 60% to assessment by the manager¹⁹. Managers are assessed by the whole team.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Outsourced contractors, interns and fixed-term (temporary) employees' performance are not assessed. Employees in other positions such as special assistants or advisors (called 'funções de confiança' or 'cargos em comissão'), which are hired in a different type employment contract, are not assessed in the organizational performance level, only on the individual level. Employees who are relocated to different organizations will be assessed according to the criteria of the organization where they work. And as determined by the Law 8.112 (1990), every new public employee is subject to a two-year probation period where he or she is evaluated in terms of aptitude for work, according to the following criteria: work attendance, discipline, initiative, productivity and responsibility. After this probation period, the employee achieves what is called 'stability'. A commission (named 'CAD') is appointed in each Ministry before the commencement of the performance cycle, to monitor the process of performance assessment and to help, support and ensure the procedures are followed. Employees can appeal the decisions of their individual assessment results within ten days of receiving these results. The appeals are evaluated by the above mentioned 'CAD'.
Employee feedback:	Mausolff (2004), DeNisi and Kluger (2000), DeNisi and Pritchard (2006), Latham et. al. (2007)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No mention of feedback is made in the documents.
Employee development:	Macky (2008), Armstrong (2009), Latham et. al. (2007)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The only point made in the Decree nº 7.133 (2010) with relation to employee development or performance improvement is that the performance assessments are expected to be used as instruments for management, supporting decisions of performance improvement and training initiatives. Employees whose performance assessment is below 50% of a total of 100% scale, will be submitted to a development process or a job adequacy analysis, which aims to identify causes for poor performance and needs for improvement. Exceptions exist for specific positions and specific public organizations. The Decree nº 5.707 (2006) defines the "Política Nacional de Desenvolvimento de Pessoal (the national policy for employee development), which includes all Ministries and other federal public organizations. The guidelines are designed to improve the efficiency, efficacy and effectiveness of public sector employees, with their constant development and adequacy to the required competencies (knowledge, skills and attitudes) necessary for each Ministry. Options for training and development include: training in-company, online training, learning on-the-job, study groups, exchange programs, internships, seminars and symposiums. All directed to support core organizational and individual competencies. This national policy demands three elements: an annual training and development plan, a report on the execution of this plan and a competency management system. All these are to be promoted and controlled by the 'Ministério do Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão (Ministry of planning, budget and management) and the 'Secretaria de Gestão' (management secretariat) of this Ministry, who is responsible for creating the competency management system. A special committee has been created to aid the process. Training programs on managerial themes have priority. In the first year of the Decree nº 5.707 (2006), the HR department of all Ministries had priority for training over other departments, in order to be better capacitated to carry out the T&D programs. Funding for training and educational programmes can be provided by the Ministries, depending on the type, duration, adequacy, purpose and budget. Special remunerated leaves are allowed for long term employees, for short courses, and non-remunerated leave for longer postgraduate courses. The results of training programmes are to be used in conjunction with performance assessment as complementary elements for evaluation purposes. The policies incentivize an annual development plan to be designed by each department/organization. External training should prioritize the national school of government ('ENAP'), yet universities can also be providers of training if they are in partnership with, for example, ENAP, and recognized by the state.
Rewards and recognition:	Macky (2008), Armstrong (2009), Lawler (2003), Boxall and Purcell (2008)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> One of the main topics also mentioned by the Decree nº 7.133 (2010) is the GDPGPE²⁰, a financial reward in the form of a monthly bonus (called 'gratificação'), which is expected be paid according to performance. This monthly bonus applies to the Ministries involved in this research, for operational, intermediary and superior positions. Some similar types of monthly bonuses are used by other Ministries and public organizations. These bonuses are paid to the employees according to their score in the performance assessment, including organizational and individual level. The bonuses are paid on a minimum of thirty points and to a maximum of a hundred points, being 20% from the employees individual assessment and 80% from the organizational performance assessment. The formula determines the financial bonus according to the multiplication of the monetary amount in the progression table by the points achieved by the individual. Employees only receive the bonus if they worked in the organization for the last performance cycle of one year. There are different

¹⁹ The exceptions determined for the first year of the Decree nº 7.133 (including the related exceptions described in the Norm nº 7 of August 2011) are not considered AS relevant here, because they will not remain valid for the years to come. Only the permanent guidelines are observed.

²⁰ Monthly bonus implemented by the Law nº 11.784 (2008), effective as of January 2009.

		<p>parameters and bonus amounts for special positions in the Ministries (e.g. the 'DAS').</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Non-financial rewards or recognition schemes are not mentioned.
Disciplinary procedures:	Macky (2008), Armstrong (2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Not mentioned in the Decree nº 7.133 (2010)
Termination:	Macky (2008), Armstrong (2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Not mentioned in the Decree nº 7.133 (2010)
System evaluation:	Bernardin, Kane, Ross, Spina and Johnson (1995), Armstrong (2009), Clark (2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Not mentioned in the Decree nº 7.133 (2010)
Potential dysfunctions:	Macky (2008), Levy (2006), Tziner et. al. (2000), Meyer (1991), Latham et. al (2007), Edwards and Ewen (1996), Odelius and Santos (2007), DeNisi and Kluger (2000), DeNisi and Pritchard (2006), Armstrong (2009), Guimarães, Nader and Ramagem (1998)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 360 degree appraisal is also used for administrative purposes. ▪ Excessive focus on appraisal and no mention of feedback. ▪ Excessive focus on remuneration and little on performance standards and performance improvement. ▪ Decree nº 7.133 (2010) disconnected from Decree 5.707 (2006).

APPENDIX II

Extract of the relevant legislation of Brazil:

“EMENDA CONSTITUCIONAL Nº 19, DE 04 DE JUNHO DE 1998

(...)

“Art. 6º O art. 41 da Constituição Federal passa a vigorar com a seguinte redação:

Art. 41. São estáveis após três anos de efetivo exercício os servidores nomeados para cargo de provimento efetivo em virtude de concurso público.

§ 1º O servidor público estável só perderá o cargo:

I - em virtude de sentença judicial transitada em julgado;

II - mediante processo administrativo em que lhe seja assegurada ampla defesa;

III - mediante procedimento de avaliação periódica de desempenho, na forma de lei complementar, assegurada ampla defesa.

§ 2º Invalidada por sentença judicial a demissão do servidor estável, será ele reintegrado, e o eventual ocupante da vaga, se estável, reconduzido ao cargo de origem, sem direito a indenização, aproveitado em outro cargo ou posto em disponibilidade com remuneração proporcional ao tempo de serviço.

§ 3º Extinto o cargo ou declarada a sua desnecessidade, o servidor estável ficará em disponibilidade, com remuneração proporcional ao tempo de serviço, até seu adequado aproveitamento em outro cargo.

§ 4º Como condição para a aquisição da estabilidade, é obrigatória a avaliação especial de desempenho por comissão instituída para essa finalidade.”

Source: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/emendas/emc/emc19.htm
(retrieved in 14/10/2011).

Appendix III

Instrument of data collection (questionnaire).

Participant Information Sheet



Project Title: **Performance management in the public sector.**

26 07 2011

An Invitation

Dear participant,

You are invited to participate in an academic research survey about performance management in the public sector. This survey aims to collect data about performance management systems and characteristics in the public sector, and this research is a central part of the requirements for my Master's degree at AUT – Auckland University of Technology, in the field of People and Employment (Human Resource Management). This is an anonymous survey, so you will not be identified by any means. You are free to choose to participate or not, at any time.

How was I selected and why am I being invited to participate in this research?

You have been selected to participate in this research because you are a member of the HR department of your Ministry, which was decided as the most appropriate to answer this questionnaire about employee performance management. Your e-mail was provided by your HR manager/coordinator, who received the criteria (by the researcher) to select those who directly or indirectly work with performance management.

What will happen in this research?

This project involves the analysis of employee performance management systems, frameworks and characteristics in the central government. As a participant, you are invited to answer an online questionnaire that approaches this subject. All data will be stored in a secure server, in electronic spreadsheet format, and will only be used for the purpose of this research.

What are the benefits?

This research will result in a dissertation for the completion of my Master's programme, and possibly an article about employee performance management in the public sector. As a participant, you are welcome to request a copy of the dissertation or article, so that you can benefit from the information on the subject.

How will my privacy be protected?

This is an anonymous survey, so you will not be identified. Nor you nor your answers can be identified, and your organization will become a code (e.g. Ministry 1, 2, 3) in the dataset.

How much time do I need to participate in this research?

This questionnaire will take around 20 to 25 minutes to complete. I would like to sincerely thank you in advance for participating in this research.

What opportunity do I have to consider this invitation?

This survey will be available for two weeks, starting from the day you receive this information sheet.

How do I agree to participate in this research?

By completing the questionnaire on the next pages, you indicate your consent to participate in this survey.

What do I do if I have concerns about this research?

Any concerns regarding the nature of this project should be notified in the first instance to the Project Supervisor, Dr Keith Macky, keith.macky@aut.ac.nz , phone: (xx64) 9 921 9999 ext 5035.

Concerns regarding the conduct of the research should be notified to the Executive Secretary, AUTEK, Dr Rosemary Godbold, rosemary.godbold@aut.ac.nz , (xx64) 9 921 9999 ext 6902.

Whom do I contact for further information about this research?

Researcher Contact Details: Mario F. Woortmann, mariofwt@yahoo.com.br , zdt9858@aut.ac.nz.

Project Supervisor Contact Details: Keith Macky, keith.macky@aut.ac.nz , (xx64) 9 921 9999 ext 5035.

Approved by the Auckland University of Technology Ethics Committee 31/08/2011. Reference number: 11/201.

 Click here to proceed.

QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY: PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR



Dear Sir/Madam,

This first page contains the instructions for the completion of the questionnaire.

As this is a voluntary survey, you are free to choose to participate or not, at any time. If you agree to participate, please click on the link below, after the instructions, which will redirect you to the questionnaire itself.

This questionnaire will take around 20 to 25 minutes to complete. I would like to sincerely thank you in advance for participating in this research.

Mário F. Woortmann
Master's Student – People and Employment
AUT – Auckland University of Technology
zdt9858@aut.ac.nz
mariofwt@yahoo.com.br
(xx64 9) 0226521952

Instructions:

You will be asked to answer mostly closed-ended questions, and some open-ended questions. You will be able to provide more comments in the spaces provided. This questionnaire format allows you to go back to previous questions and change your answers, if you feel it is necessary. After you click on the “Finish” button at the end, you cannot change your answers anymore.

To help answering this questionnaire, the following definitions are provided: “*Performance management* is a systematic process for improving organizational performance, by developing the performance of individuals and teams” (Armstrong, 2009; pp. 9). Performance management is comprised of several phases, including: 1) communication of mission and strategic objectives to employees, 2) setting individual performance goals related to departmental objectives, 3) conducting periodical measurements of performance (i.e. performance evaluation, assessment, appraisal, review), 4) continuous monitoring of performance and feedback throughout the year, 5) identification of training & development needs and performance interventions (e.g. development plans, administrative procedures, rewards), and finally 6) evaluation of the system itself for continuous improvement (Macky and Johnson, 2003).

Performance management systems are constantly changing and being improved in organizations, so this survey should be therefore answered considering the system as it is, at this point in time.

 Next page.

Please answer the items below by clicking on the response that most closely represents your answer, your agreement or disagreement with the item. Please provide comments where you feel you have more details to add.

- 1) Have you participated in a performance review in the past 12 to 18 months?
 - a) ☐ Yes, as the evaluator of somebody else's work;
 - b) ☐ Yes, having my performance evaluated;
 - c) ☐ Yes, as both;
 - d) ☐ No.

- 2) What is your involvement in the performance management processes in your Ministry?
 - a) ☐ In the design of the performance management framework;
 - b) ☐ In the management of this framework, or part of it;
 - d) ☐ Only as a participant in the evaluation/review process;
 - c) ☐ All of the above.

- 3) In this Ministry , my performance at work is evaluated by:
(you may chose more than one item)
 - a) ☐ my peers (colleagues);
 - b) ☐ my Manager (superior);
 - c) ☐ my subordinates;
 - d) ☐ myself (self-evaluation).
 - e) ☐ others: _____

- 4) I participate in determining who evaluates my work performance:

<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree

- 5) I participate in determining whose work performance I evaluate:

<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree

- 6) In this Ministry, the initial phase of setting goals to be achieved by an individual is done in conjunction between managers and employees:

<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree

- 7) The performance measurement system we use in this Ministry is clearly and closely connected to the job description of each employee (or group of employees):

<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree

- 8) The performance evaluation in this Ministry happens in the form of:
(you may chose one or more options)
- a) ☐ A formal performance appraisal process;
 - b) ☐ Informal evaluations (e.g. throughout the year or whenever necessary) (eliminates next2)
 - c) ☐ There is no performance evaluation or appraisal as such. (*if chosen, this item automatically eliminates the next 2 questions on Survey Monkey*).
 - d) ☐ Other: _____
- 9) The formal performance evaluation here happens every:
- a) ☐ 6 months
 - b) ☐ 12 months
 - c) ☐ 18 months
 - d) ☐ 24 months
 - e) ☐ Continuously.
 - f) ☐ Other timeframe: () months
- 10) Our performance evaluation forms are completed:
(you may choose more than one item)
- a) ☐ Electronically;
 - b) ☐ By hand, on paper;
 - c) ☐ Discussed verbally in a meeting or interview.
- 11) In this Ministry, the performance management system in general is designed **only** to help **develop** the employees (i.e. measure and enhance their performance, skills, abilities):
- a) ☐ Yes.
 - b) ☐ No.
- 12) In this Ministry, the performance management system is designed to:
(you may choose more than one option)
- a) ☐ Measure work performance and determine **pay scale or grade increases**.
 - b) ☐ Measure work performance and determine **promotions**.
 - c) ☐ Measure work performance and determine some kind of **variable pay**.
 - d) ☐ None of the above.
- 13) Employees of this Ministry receive training on how to proceed in the performance management phases before any process is started:

<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree

- 14) In this Ministry, the performance measurement system focuses predominantly on behavioural aspects (e.g.: use of skills, abilities towards work, personal conduct etc) instead of results, quantitative or qualitative aspects of work:

<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree

- 15) The performance measurement system in this Ministry focuses predominantly on results, quantitative and qualitative aspects of work (e.g.: quantity of reports or similar tasks, keeping deadlines, rating the quality of work in specific tasks, etc) instead of behavioural aspects:

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree

- 16) The measurement process also includes team performance (evaluation of the work of a team or department), besides individual performance:

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree

- 17) In this Ministry:

(please choose one option)

- a) ☐ we have more than one performance measurement system (e.g. monitoring, appraisal, review), each for different purposes;
- b) ☐ there is only one performance measurement system (e.g. monitoring, appraisal, review), that serves all purposes necessary for the internal procedures.

- 18) I have seen and know other performance measurement systems of the other Ministries:

- a) ☐ Yes.
- b) ☐ No (*automatically skips the next question- function of Survey Monkey*)

- 19) The performance measurement system we have in this Ministry is:

- a) ☐ exactly the same as in the other Ministries:
- b) ☐ similar to the ones in the other Ministries, only with slight differences.
- c) ☐ completely different from the other Ministries.

Please provide more comments if you feel so inclined:

--

- 20) I always receive feedback about the **results** of my performance evaluation:

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree

- 21) I receive feedback also during **review meetings** throughout the year:

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree

- 22) I receive training and development opportunities related to my performance evaluation:

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor	Agree	Strongly agree

		disagree		
--	--	----------	--	--

23) When I face performance deficiencies in some areas, I have support from my Manager to improve these aspects (e.g. coaching, training and other forms of support):

()	()	()	()	()
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree

24) Repeated low performance results (poor performance) can result in the dismissal of an employee:

()	()	()	()	()
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree

25) The HR department has autonomy to customize or adapt the performance management framework as it finds best for the purposes of the Ministry:

()	()	()	()	()
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree

Please provide comments if you feel so inclined:

--

26) The performance management system in this ministry changes constantly:

()	()	()	()	()
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree

27) These changes can become a bit confusing:

()	()	()	()	()
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree

28) The performance measurement system measures what it is supposed to measure in my point of view:

()	()	()	()	()
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree

Please provide comments if you feel so inclined:

--

29) The recognition and rewards I receive for my performance are fair and encouraging:

()	()	()	()	()
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree

30) I feel comfortable when evaluating and reporting the performance of my team members (subordinates or peers): *This question depends on question 3 on Survey Monkey.*

()	()	()	()	()
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree

Please provide more comments if you feel so inclined:

31) I have heard complaints about the **performance management** system we have here:

()	()	()	()	()
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree

32) Please comment on the types of issues (if any) that motivate these or other complaints:

33) For how long have you been working at this Ministry?

_____ (years)

34) Is there anything else you would like to comment about performance management in your Ministry or about this survey?

Thank you for your time and participation!

Your contribution to the research is much appreciated.

Appendix IV

SPSS tables from the analysis of the questionnaire survey:

Table A1: general frequencies of participation by country.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	New Zealand	35	47.9	47.9	47.9
	Brazil	38	52.1	52.1	100.0
	Total	73	100.0	100.0	

Table A2: general frequencies by Ministry.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	BR1	13	17.8	17.8	17.8
	BR2	8	11.0	11.0	28.8
	BR3	1*	1.4	1.4	30.1
	BR4	5	6.8	6.8	37.0
	BR5	11	15.1	15.1	52.1
	NZ1	8	11.0	11.0	63.0
	NZ2	9	12.3	12.3	75.3
	NZ3	4	5.5	5.5	80.8
	NZ4	1*	1.4	1.4	82.2
	NZ5	13	17.8	17.8	100.0
	Total	73	100.0	100.0	

* Only one key informant was authorized/designated by these two Ministries to answer the questionnaire, yet they were still considered by the researcher for the quality of their answers.

Table 19: Demographics for New Zealand and Brazil on Question 33

	Country Code	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Q33 How long have you been working at this Ministry? (years)	New Zealand	30	5.90	6.127
	Brazil	34	13.47	10.974

Table 19: Question 1: Participation in P. review in the past 12 to 18 months by Ministry (Crosstabulation)

Country Code				Q1 Participated in p. review past 12 to 18 months?				Total
				Yes, as the evaluator of somebody else's work;	Yes, having my performance evaluated;	Yes, as both;	No.	
New Zealand	Ministry	NZ1	Count	1	3	2	2	8
		NZ2	Count	1	0	8	0	9
		NZ3	Count	0	2	2	0	4
		NZ4	Count	0	1	0	0	1
		NZ5	Count	0	7	6	0	13
		Total	Count	2	13	18	2	35
Brazil	Ministry	BR1	Count	4	4	3	2	13
		BR2	Count	1	6	0	1	8
		BR3	Count	0	0	1	0	1
		BR4	Count	0	3	2	0	5
		BR5	Count	3	5	2	0	10
		Total	Count	8	18	8	3	37

Table 20: Question 2: Type of involvement in the P.M. processes by Ministry (Crosstabulation)

Country Code				Q2 What is your involvement in the p.m. processes?				Total
				In the design of the P.M. framework	In the management of this framework, or part of it	Only as a participant in the evaluation process	All of the above.	
New Zealand	Ministry	NZ1	Count	0	6	0	2	8
		NZ2	Count	2	1	2	3	8
		NZ3	Count	1	1	0	2	4
		NZ4	Count	0	0	0	1	1
		NZ5	Count	1	2	6	4	13
		Total	Count	4	10	8	12	34
Brazil	Ministry	BR1	Count	1	0	10	2	13
		BR2	Count	1	2	3	2	8
		BR3	Count	0	1	0	0	1
		BR4	Count	0	0	4	1	5
		BR5	Count	1	0	6	3	10
		Total	Count	3	3	23	8	37

Table 21 : Question 3: Source of performance evaluation by Ministry (Crosstabulation)

Country Code				Q3 Sources of evaluation			Total
				Top-down	Full 360 degree	Multi-source	
New Zealand	Ministry	NZ1	Count	4	0	4	8
		NZ2	Count	2	0	6	8
		NZ3	Count	0	1	3	4
		NZ4	Count	0	0	1	1
		NZ5	Count	7	0	6	13
	Total	Count		13	1	20	34
Brazil	Ministry	BR1	Count	7	0	6	13
		BR2	Count	4	0	3	7
		BR3	Count	0	0	1	1
		BR4	Count	1	0	4	5
		BR5	Count	2	2	6	10
	Total	Count		14	2	20	36

Table 22 : Question 4 – I participate in deciding who evaluates my performance, per Ministry (Crosstabulation)

Country Code				Q4 Participation in deciding my evaluators					Total
				Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	
New Zealand	Ministry	NZ1	Count	0	3	0	4	1	8
		NZ2	Count	3	2	1	2	0	8
		NZ3	Count	0	1	0	2	1	4
		NZ4	Count	0	0	0	0	1	1
		NZ5	Count	5	6	1	1	0	13
	Total	Count		8	12	2	9	3	34
Brazil	Ministry	BR1	Count	1	6	1	4	1	13
		BR2	Count	1	2	2	2	1	8
		BR3	Count	0	1	0	0	0	1
		BR4	Count	3	1	0	1	0	5
		BR5	Count	1	2	2	5	1	11
	Total	Count		6	12	5	12	3	38

Table 23: Descriptives for question 4, per country (Group Statistics)

	Country Code	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Q4 Participation in deciding my evaluators	New Zealand	34	2.62	1.349
	Brazil	38	2.84	1.263

Table 24: Question 5 – I participate in deciding whose performance I evaluate, per Ministry (Crosstabulation)

Country Code				Q5 Participation in deciding who I evaluate					Total
				Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	
New Zealand	Ministry	NZ1	Count	0	2	1	5	0	8
		NZ2	Count	2	2	1	2	1	8
		NZ3	Count	0	1	2	0	1	4
		NZ4	Count	0	0	0	0	1	1
		NZ5	Count	5	4	1	2	0	12
	Total		Count	7	9	5	9	3	33
Brazil	Ministry	BR1	Count	2	5	1	3	2	13
		BR2	Count	1	2	2	2	1	8
		BR3	Count	0	0	0	1	0	1
		BR4	Count	3	1	0	1	0	5
		BR5	Count	0	2	3	2	4	11
	Total		Count	6	10	6	9	7	38

Table 25: Descriptives for question 5, per country (Group Statistics)

	Country Code	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Q5 Participation in deciding who I evaluate	New Zealand	33	2.76	1.324
	Brazil	38	3.03	1.385

Table 26: Question 6: Goal-setting done in conjunction (managers and employees), per Ministry (Crosstabulation)

Country Code				Q6 Shared decision on goal-setting:					Total
				Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	
New Zealand	Ministry	NZ1	Count	0	1	0	5	2	8
		NZ2	Count	0	2	1	5	0	8
		NZ3	Count	0	1	0	0	3	4
		NZ4	Count	0	0	0	1	0	1
		NZ5	Count	0	1	0	9	3	13
	Total	Count		0	5	1	20	8	34
Brazil	Ministry	BR1	Count	5	4	1	2	1	13
		BR2	Count	2	1	0	4	1	8
		BR3	Count	0	0	0	1	0	1
		BR4	Count	0	1	1	2	1	5
		BR5	Count	0	0	0	6	5	11
	Total	Count		7	6	2	15	8	38

Table 27: Descriptives for question 6, per country (Group Statistics)

	Country Code	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Q6 Shared decision on goal-setting	New Zealand	34	3.91	.933
	Brazil	38	3.29	1.450

Table 28: Question 7 - PM system connected to Job description, per Ministry (Crosstabulation)

Country Code				Q7 PM system connected to Job description:					Total
				Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	
New Zealand	Ministry	NZ1	Count	0	0	2	6	0	8
		NZ2	Count	0	1	3	4	0	8
		NZ3	Count	0	1	0	3	0	4
		NZ4	Count	0	0	0	1	0	1
		NZ5	Count	0	3	0	8	2	13
	Total	Count		0	5	5	22	2	34
Brazil	Ministry	BR1	Count	2	8	0	2	1	13
		BR2	Count	2	3	2	0	0	7
		BR3	Count	0	1	0	0	0	1
		BR4	Count	1	2	1	1	0	5
		BR5	Count	0	0	2	7	2	11
	Total	Count		5	14	5	10	3	37

Table 29: Descriptives for question 7, per country (Group Statistics)

	Country Code	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Q7 P.M. system connected to job description	New Zealand	34	3.62	.817
	Brazil	37	2.78	1.228

Table 30: Question 8 - Format of performance evaluation, by Ministry (Crosstabulation)

Country Code				Q8 Format of performance evaluation:				Total
				A formal performance appraisal	Informal evaluations	There is no performance evaluation	Other:	
New Zealand	Ministry	NZ1	Count	8	0	0	0	8
		NZ2	Count	5	0	0	3	8
		NZ3	Count	1	2	0	1	4
		NZ4	Count	1	0	0	0	1
		NZ5	Count	11	1	0	1	13
		Total	Count	26	3	0	5	34
Brazil	Ministry	BR1	Count	9	1	2	1	13
		BR2	Count	7	0	0	0	7
		BR3	Count	1	0	0	0	1
		BR4	Count	5	0	0	0	5
		BR5	Count	10	0	0	1	11
		Total	Count	32	1	2	2	37

Table 31: Question 9 - Performance evaluation period, by Ministry (Crosstabulation)

Country Code				Q9 Performance evaluation period:					Total
				6 months;	12 months;	18 months;	Continuously.	Other timeframe:	
New Zealand	Ministry	NZ1	Count	2	6	0	0	0	8
		NZ2	Count	3	4	0	0	1	8
		NZ3	Count	0	1	0	1	0	2
		NZ4	Count	0	0	0	0	1	1
		NZ5	Count	6	5	0	0	1	12
		Total	Count	11	16	0	1	3	31
Brazil	Ministry	BR1	Count	0	9	1	0	0	10
		BR2	Count	0	7	0	0	0	7
		BR3	Count	0	1	0	0	0	1
		BR4	Count	0	5	0	0	0	5
		BR5	Count	0	11	0	0	0	11
		Total	Count	0	33	1	0	0	34

Table 32: Question 10 - Form of completion of evaluations, by Ministry (Crosstabulation)

Country Code				Q10 Form of completion of evaluations						Total
				Electronically	On paper	Electronic and paper	Electronic and verbal	Paper and verbal	All three forms	
New Zealand	Ministry	NZ1	Count	0	0	2	0	4	2	8
		NZ2	Count	0	0	1	2	2	3	8
		NZ3	Count	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
		NZ4	Count	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
		NZ5	Count	1	3	2	2	2	2	12
	Total	Count		1	3	5	4	9	9	31
Brazil	Ministry	BR1	Count	0	7	3	0	0	0	10
		BR2	Count	4	0	4	0	0	0	8
		BR3	Count	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
		BR4	Count	4	0	0	0	0	1	5
		BR5	Count	8	1	2	0	0	0	11
	Total	Count		16	9	9	0	0	1	35

None of the participants chose the option "only discussed verbally" alone.

Table 33: Question 11 - P.M. system used only for employee development, by Ministry (Crosstabulation)

Country Code				Q11 P.M. system only for development:		Total
				Yes.	No.	
New Zealand	Ministry	NZ1	Count	1	7	8
		NZ2	Count	2	5	7
		NZ3	Count	0	4	4
		NZ4	Count	0	1	1
		NZ5	Count	2	11	13
	Total	Count		5	28	33
Brazil	Ministry	BR1	Count	6	7	13
		BR2	Count	3	4	7
		BR3	Count	0	1	1
		BR4	Count	0	5	5
		BR5	Count	3	8	11
	Total	Count		12	25	37

Table 34: Question 12 - Administrative purpose of PM system, by Ministry (Crosstabulation)

Country Code				Q12 Administrative purpose of PM system						Total
				Performance and pay increases	Performance and variable pay	None of the above	Pay increases and promotions	Pay increases and variable pay	All three	
New Zealand	Ministry	NZ1	Count	4	2	0	1	0	1	8
		NZ2	Count	3	1	0	2	1	1	8
		NZ3	Count	2	2	0	0	0	0	4
		NZ4	Count	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
		NZ5	Count	10	1	0	2	0	0	13
		Total	Count	19	6	0	5	1	3	34
Brazil	Ministry	BR1	Count	2	5	0	2	3	1	13
		BR2	Count	2	5	0	0	0	0	7
		BR3	Count	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
		BR4	Count	1	4	0	0	0	0	5
		BR5	Count	1	8	1	1	0	0	11
		Total	Count	6	23	1	3	3	1	37

None of the participants chose the option "Performance and promotions" in the questionnaire.

Table 35: Question 13 - Employees receive training on P.M. , by Ministry (Crosstabulation)

Country Code				Q13 Employees receive training on P.M.					Total
				Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	
New Zealand	Ministry	NZ1	Count	0	4	1	3	0	8
		NZ2	Count	0	4	2	2	0	8
		NZ3	Count	0	1	0	3	0	4
		NZ4	Count	0	0	0	1	0	1
		NZ5	Count	0	5	2	5	1	13
		Total	Count	0	14	5	14	1	34
Brazil	Ministry	BR1	Count	6	4	1	1	1	13
		BR2	Count	0	3	0	4	1	8
		BR3	Count	0	0	1	0	0	1
		BR4	Count	2	1	1	1	0	5
		BR5	Count	0	0	3	6	2	11
		Total	Count	8	8	6	12	4	38

Table 36: Descriptives for New Zealand and Brazil on Question 13 (Group Statistics)

	Country Code	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Q13 Employees receive training on P.M.	New Zealand	34	3.06	.983
	Brazil	38	2.89	1.351

Table 37: Question 14 - P. measurement focuses predominantly on behaviours, by Ministry (Crosstabulation)

Country Code				Q14 P. measurement focuses mainly on behaviours:					Total
				Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	
New Zealand	Ministry	NZ1	Count	0	5	1	2	0	8
		NZ2	Count	1	6	1	0	0	8
		NZ3	Count	0	2	0	2	0	4
		NZ4	Count	1	0	0	0	0	1
		NZ5	Count	0	5	5	3	0	13
	Total	Count		2	18	7	7	0	34
Brazil	Ministry	BR1	Count	1	6	2	3	1	13
		BR2	Count	0	3	2	1	1	7
		BR3	Count	0	0	0	1	0	1
		BR4	Count	1	0	2	1	1	5
		BR5	Count	1	2	5	2	1	11
	Total	Count		3	11	11	8	4	37

Table 38: Descriptives for question 14, per country (Group Statistics)

	Country Code	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Q14 P. measurement focuses mainly on behaviours:	New Zealand	34	2.56	.894
	Brazil	37	2.97	1.142

Table 39: Question 15 - P. measurement focuses mainly on results, by Ministry (Crosstabulation)

Country Code				Q15 P. measurement focuses mainly on results:					Total
				Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	
New Zealand	Ministry	NZ1	Count	0	2	1	5	0	8
		NZ2	Count	1	3	1	3	0	8
		NZ3	Count	0	3	0	1	0	4
		NZ4	Count	1	0	0	0	0	1
		NZ5	Count	0	2	7	4	0	13
		Total	Count	2	10	9	13	0	34
Brazil	Ministry	BR1	Count	2	4	2	5	0	13
		BR2	Count	1	1	1	4	0	7
		BR3	Count	0	1	0	0	0	1
		BR4	Count	1	3	0	1	0	5
		BR5	Count	0	3	5	2	1	11
		Total	Count	4	12	8	12	1	37

Table 40: Descriptives for question 15, per country (Group Statistics)

Country Code		N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Q15 P. measurement focuses mainly on results:	New Zealand	34	2.97	.969
	Brazil	37	2.84	1.093

Table 41: Question 16 - P. Evaluation includes team performance, by Ministry (Crosstabulation)

Country Code				Q16 P.A. includes team performance:					Total
				Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	
New Zealand	Ministry	NZ1	Count	1	5	2	0	0	8
		NZ2	Count	1	6	1	0	0	8
		NZ3	Count	0	3	0	1	0	4
		NZ4	Count	1	0	0	0	0	1
		NZ5	Count	2	6	2	2	1	13
		Total	Count	5	20	5	3	1	34
Brazil	Ministry	BR1	Count	3	6	2	1	1	13
		BR2	Count	0	2	0	5	0	7
		BR3	Count	0	0	0	1	0	1
		BR4	Count	0	1	1	2	1	5
		BR5	Count	0	1	2	5	3	11
		Total	Count	3	10	5	14	5	37

Table 42: Descriptives for question 16, per country (Group Statistics)

Country Code		N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Q16 P.A. includes team performance:	New Zealand	34	2.26	.931
	Brazil	37	3.22	1.228

Table 43: Question 17 – We have one or more than one P. measurement system, by Ministry (Crosstabulation)

Country Code				Q17 One or more P.measurement system:		Total
				We have more than one performance measurement system, each for different purposes;	There is only one performance measurement system, that serves all purposes necessary.	
New Zealand	Ministry	NZ1	Count	4	4	8
		NZ2	Count	1	7	8
		NZ3	Count	0	4	4
		NZ4	Count	0	1	1
		NZ5	Count	1	12	13
	Total	Count		6	28	34
Brazil	Ministry	BR1	Count	2	11	13
		BR2	Count	3	4	7
		BR3	Count	1	0	1
		BR4	Count	3	2	5
		BR5	Count	6	5	11
	Total	Count		15	22	37

Table 44: Question 18 - I have seen P. measurement systems of other Ministries, by Ministry Crosstabulation)

Country Code				Q18 I have seen P. measurement systems of other Ministries:		Total
				Yes.	No.	
New Zealand	Ministry	NZ1	Count	5	2	7
		NZ2	Count	2	6	8
		NZ3	Count	2	2	4
		NZ4	Count	1	0	1
		NZ5	Count	5	8	13
	Total	Count		15	18	33
Brazil	Ministry	BR1	Count	2	11	13
		BR2	Count	2	5	7
		BR3	Count	1	0	1
		BR4	Count	0	5	5
		BR5	Count	6	5	11
	Total	Count		11	26	37

Table 45: Question 19 - P. measurement system similar or different to other Ministries, by Ministry(Crosstabulation)

Country Code				Q19 P. measurement system similar or different to other Ministries:		Total
				Similar to the ones in the other Ministries, only with slight differences.	Completely different from the other Ministries	
New Zealand	Ministry	NZ1	Count	5	1	6
		NZ2	Count	2	0	2
		NZ3	Count	0	2	2
		NZ4	Count	1	0	1
		NZ5	Count	5	0	5
	Total		Count	13	3	16
Brazil	Ministry	BR1	Count	2	0	2
		BR2	Count	0	2	2
		BR3	Count	1	0	1
		BR5	Count	6	0	6
	Total		Count	9	2	11

None of the participants chose the option "A" (exactly the same as in the other Ministries).

Table 46: Question 20 – "I always receive feedback about my P. Evaluations", by Ministry (Crosstabulation)

Country Code				Q20 I always receive feedback about my P.A.:					Total
				Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	
New Zealand	Ministry	NZ1	Count	0	3	1	2	1	7
		NZ2	Count	1	1	2	3	1	8
		NZ3	Count	0	0	0	1	3	4
		NZ4	Count	1	0	0	0	0	1
		NZ5	Count	0	0	0	8	5	13
	Total		Count	2	4	3	14	10	33
Brazil	Ministry	BR1	Count	8	2	1	2	0	13
		BR2	Count	0	2	3	1	1	7
		BR3	Count	0	0	0	1	0	1
		BR4	Count	0	1	1	1	2	5
		BR5	Count	0	0	1	5	5	11
	Total		Count	8	5	6	10	8	37

Table 47: Descriptives for New Zealand and Brazil on Question 20

	Country Code	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Q20 I always receive feedback about my P.evaluations	New Zealand	33	3.79	1.193
	Brazil	37	3.14	1.475

Table 48: Question 21 – “I receive feedback also in meetings during year”, by Ministry (Crosstabulation)

Country Code				Q21 Feedback also in meetings during year:					Total
				Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	
New Zealand	Ministry	NZ1	Count	0	2	0	4	1	7
		NZ2	Count	2	1	2	3	0	8
		NZ3	Count	0	0	1	0	3	4
		NZ4	Count	1	0	0	0	0	1
		NZ5	Count	0	1	1	7	4	13
	Total	Count		3	4	4	14	8	33
Brazil	Ministry	BR1	Count	7	5	0	1	0	13
		BR2	Count	0	2	2	3	0	7
		BR3	Count	0	0	1	0	0	1
		BR4	Count	0	2	1	1	1	5
		BR5	Count	0	0	2	6	3	11
	Total	Count		7	9	6	11	4	37

Table 49: Descriptives for New Zealand and Brazil on Question 21

	Country Code	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Q21 Feedback also in meetings during year:	New Zealand	33	3.61	1.248
	Brazil	37	2.89	1.329

Table 50: Question 22 – “I receive T&D opportunities related to my P. evaluation”, by Ministry (Crosstabulation)

Country Code				Q22 I receive T&D opportunities related to my P. evaluation:					Total
				Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	
New Zealand	Ministry	NZ1	Count	0	0	1	5	1	7
		NZ2	Count	1	2	1	4	0	8
		NZ3	Count	0	0	1	1	2	4
		NZ4	Count	1	0	0	0	0	1
		NZ5	Count	0	0	1	9	2	12
	Total	Count		2	2	4	19	5	32
Brazil	Ministry	BR1	Count	6	4	2	1	0	13
		BR2	Count	0	3	3	1	1	8
		BR3	Count	0	0	0	1	0	1
		BR4	Count	1	1	2	1	0	5
		BR5	Count	0	0	1	8	2	11
	Total	Count		7	8	8	12	3	38

Table 51: Descriptives for New Zealand and Brazil on Question 22

	Country Code	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Q22 I receive T&D opportunities related to my P. evaluation	New Zealand	32	3.72	1.023
	Brazil	38	2.89	1.269

Table 52: Question 23 – “I have support from my manager to improve my performance”, by Ministry (Crosstabulation)

Country Code				Q23 I have support from my manager to improve my performance:					Total
				Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	
New Zealand	Ministry	NZ1	Count	0	1	0	5	1	7
		NZ2	Count	0	2	1	5	0	8
		NZ3	Count	0	0	0	3	1	4
		NZ4	Count	1	0	0	0	0	1
		NZ5	Count	0	0	2	9	2	13
	Total	Count		1	3	3	22	4	33
Brazil	Ministry	BR1	Count	4	5	0	4	0	13
		BR2	Count	1	3	2	1	1	8
		BR3	Count	0	0	0	1	0	1
		BR4	Count	0	0	2	3	0	5
		BR5	Count	0	0	1	6	4	11
	Total	Count		5	8	5	15	5	38

Table 53: Descriptives for New Zealand and Brazil on Question 23

	Country Code	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Q23 I have support from my manager to improve my performance:	New Zealand	33	3.76	.902
	Brazil	38	3.18	1.291

Table 54: Question 24 - Repeated low performance can result in dismissal, per Ministry (Crosstabulation)

Country Code				Q24 Repeated low performance can result in dismissal:					Total
				Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	
New Zealand	Ministry	NZ1	Count	0	0	0	6	1	7
		NZ2	Count	0	1	3	4	0	8
		NZ3	Count	0	0	0	3	1	4
		NZ4	Count	0	0	0	1	0	1
		NZ5	Count	0	0	3	8	1	12
	Total	Count		0	1	6	22	3	32
Brazil	Ministry	BR1	Count	6	4	2	1	0	13
		BR2	Count	2	3	1	1	0	7
		BR3	Count	0	0	1	0	0	1
		BR4	Count	4	0	1	0	0	5
		BR5	Count	4	3	3	1	0	11
	Total	Count		16	10	8	3	0	37

Table 55: Descriptives for New Zealand and Brazil on Question 24

	Country Code	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Q24 Repeated low performance can result in dismissal:	New Zealand	32	3.84	.628
	Brazil	37	1.95	.998

Table 56: Question 25 - HR has autonomy to customize the P.M. system, by Ministry (Crosstabulation)

Country Code				Q25 HR has autonomy to customize P.M.:					Total
				Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	
New Zealand	Ministry	NZ1	Count	0	3	0	4	0	7
		NZ2	Count	0	1	2	5	0	8
		NZ3	Count	1	1	0	2	0	4
		NZ4	Count	0	1	0	0	0	1
		NZ5	Count	0	7	3	2	1	13
	Total	Count		1	13	5	13	1	33
Brazil	Ministry	BR1	Count	0	5	2	5	1	13
		BR2	Count	0	1	1	5	0	7
		BR3	Count	0	0	1	0	0	1
		BR4	Count	0	0	2	3	0	5
		BR5	Count	1	1	1	5	3	11
	Total	Count		1	7	7	18	4	37

Table 57: Descriptives for New Zealand and Brazil on Question 25

	Country Code	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Q25 HR has autonomy to customize the P.M. system	New Zealand	33	3.00	1.031
	Brazil	37	3.46	1.016

Table 58: Question 26 – “P.M. system in this Ministry changes constantly”, by Ministry (Crosstabulation)

Country Code				Q26 P.M. in this Ministry changes constantly:					Total
				Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	
New Zealand	Ministry	NZ1	Count	0	6	1	0	0	7
		NZ2	Count	0	4	3	1	0	8
		NZ3	Count	0	3	1	0	0	4
		NZ4	Count	0	1	0	0	0	1
		NZ5	Count	1	6	5	1	0	13
	Total	Count		1	20	10	2	0	33
Brazil	Ministry	BR1	Count	1	5	4	1	2	13
		BR2	Count	0	5	1	1	1	8
		BR3	Count	0	0	0	1	0	1
		BR4	Count	0	1	4	0	0	5
		BR5	Count	1	4	6	0	0	11
	Total	Count		2	15	15	3	3	38

Table 59: Descriptives for New Zealand and Brazil on Question 26

	Country Code	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Q26 P.M. in this Ministry changes constantly:	New Zealand	33	2.39	.659
	Brazil	38	2.74	.978

Table 60: Question 27 – “These changes can become a bit confusing”, by Ministry (Crosstabulation)

Country Code				Q27 These changes can become a bit confusing:				Total
				Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	
New Zealand	Ministry	NZ1	Count	0	1	0	0	1
		NZ2	Count	0	1	2	0	3
		NZ3	Count	0	0	1	0	1
		NZ5	Count	0	2	3	0	5
		Total	Count	0	4	6	0	10
Brazil	Ministry	BR1	Count	1	1	2	2	6
		BR2	Count	0	0	3	0	3
		BR3	Count	0	0	1	0	1
		BR4	Count	0	3	1	0	4
		BR5	Count	1	2	2	0	5
		Total	Count	2	6	9	2	19

None of the participants chose the option “strongly disagree” .

Table 61: Descriptives for New Zealand and Brazil on Question 27

	Country Code	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Q27 These changes can become a bit confusing:	New Zealand	10	3.60	.516
	Brazil	19	3.58	.838

Table 62: Question 28 - P.A. measures what it is supposed to measure, by Ministry (Crosstabulation)

Country Code				Q28 P.A. measures what it is supposed to measure:					Total
				Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	
New Zealand	Ministry	NZ1	Count	0	2	3	2	0	7
		NZ2	Count	2	1	3	1	0	7
		NZ3	Count	0	0	0	3	0	3
		NZ4	Count	0	0	0	1	0	1
		NZ5	Count	0	2	2	8	0	12
	Total	Count		2	5	8	15	0	30
Brazil	Ministry	BR1	Count	3	0	2	4	1	10
		BR2	Count	0	4	2	1	0	7
		BR3	Count	0	0	1	0	0	1
		BR4	Count	0	0	2	3	0	5
		BR5	Count	0	0	2	7	1	10
	Total	Count		3	4	9	15	2	33

Table 63: Descriptives for New Zealand and Brazil on Question 28

Country Code		N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Q28 P.A. measures what it is supposed to measure:	New Zealand	30	3.20	.961
	Brazil	33	3.27	1.069

Table 64: Question 29 - Recognition and rewards are fair and encouraging, by Ministry (Crosstabulation)

Country Code				Q29 Recognition and rewards are fair and encouraging:					Total
				Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	
New Zealand	Ministry	NZ1	Count	0	4	1	2	0	7
		NZ2	Count	1	3	2	1	0	7
		NZ3	Count	0	0	0	3	0	3
		NZ4	Count	0	0	0	1	0	1
		NZ5	Count	1	0	6	5	0	12
	Total	Count		2	7	9	12	0	30
Brazil	Ministry	BR1	Count	5	2	2	0	1	10
		BR2	Count	1	1	4	2	0	8
		BR3	Count	0	1	0	0	0	1
		BR4	Count	0	3	1	1	0	5
		BR5	Count	0	0	5	3	2	10
	Total	Count		6	7	12	6	3	34

Table 65: Descriptives for New Zealand and Brazil on Question 29

	Country Code	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Q29 Recognition and rewards are fair and encouraging:	New Zealand	30	3.03	.964
	Brazil	34	2.79	1.200

Table 66: Question 30 – “I feel comfortable evaluating my subordinates or peers”, by Ministry (Crosstabulation)

Country Code				Q30 I feel comfortable evaluating my subordinates or peers:						Total
				Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	Not applicable to me	
New Zealand	Ministry	NZ1	Count	0	0	2	1	1	3	7
		NZ2	Count	0	0	0	3	2	2	7
		NZ3	Count	0	1	0	2	0	0	3
		NZ4	Count	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
		NZ5	Count	0	1	1	8	0	2	12
	Total		Count	0	2	3	14	4	7	30
Brazil	Ministry	BR1	Count	1	1	3	4	1	1	11
		BR2	Count	0	2	4	1	0	0	7
		BR3	Count	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
		BR4	Count	0	1	1	2	1	0	5
		BR5	Count	0	2	4	2	2	0	10
	Total		Count	1	6	12	10	4	1	34

Table 67: Descriptives for New Zealand and Brazil on Question 30

	Country Code	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Q30 I feel comfortable evaluating my subordinates or peers:	New Zealand	30	4.37	1.159
	Brazil	34	3.38	1.101

Table 68: Question 31 – “I have heard complaints about our P.M. system”, by Ministry (Crosstabulation)

Country Code				Q31 I have heard complaints about our P.M. system:					Total
				Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	
New Zealand	Ministry	NZ1	Count	0	0	1	5	1	7
		NZ2	Count	0	0	1	2	4	7
		NZ3	Count	1	0	1	1	0	3
		NZ4	Count	0	0	0	1	0	1
		NZ5	Count	0	2	3	6	1	12
	Total	Count		1	2	6	15	6	30
Brazil	Ministry	BR1	Count	0	3	2	2	3	10
		BR2	Count	0	0	1	4	2	7
		BR3	Count	0	0	0	0	1	1
		BR4	Count	0	0	3	2	0	5
		BR5	Count	1	1	5	3	0	10
	Total	Count		1	4	11	11	6	33

Table 69: Descriptives for New Zealand and Brazil on Question 31

	Country Code	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Q31 I have heard complaints about our P.M. system:	New Zealand	30	3.77	.971
	Brazil	33	3.52	1.034